Strategic Arms Limitation after SALT I
Author(s): Paul Doty
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Daedalus, Vol. 104, No. 3, Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control (Summer, 1975),
pp. 63-74
Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024346 .
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PAUL
DOTY
Strategic Arms Limitation
After
SALT
I
of November,
1974, is transformed into a treaty, we
will have reached a turning point in the long, tortuous, frustrating effort to bring
under control. This turning point will not necessarily be a
strategic nuclear weapons
no
substantial
controls on existing or planned
however;
strategic
breakthrough,
If the Vladivostok
Agreement
Still, some essential steps have been
weapons
systems will have been accomplished.
in the throw-weights
of
taken: The issues of forward-based
systems, of asymmetries
for the British and French
missile
forces on either side, of strategic compensation
and for the alleged geographical
of the
nuclear-armed
submarines,
disadvantages
on equal
Soviet Union have been resolved in the process of arriving at agreements
that
ceilings for the number of strategic delivery systems and the number of missiles
can be MIR Ved (i.e., fitted with multiple
re-entry
vehicles).
independently
targeted
The large numbers proposed
for these ceilings allow the continuing
development
and deployment
of most of the weapons
systems now being planned by the two sides;
are
will
the limits begin to be felt, unless the present
these
reached
after
only
ceilings
is
the
modified.
does not in itself constitute
agreement
agreement
Consequently,
arms
in
and
it was a disappointment
limitation.
visible
for
progress
timely
Clearly
those who thought or hoped that the time had come for such an achievement.
But it
to significant limita
does provide for the elimination
of several persistent obstacles
tions and for a framework within which
these limitations can be negotiated.
over the last twelve years
In addition, about a dozen other treaties negotiated
in various ways. The 1963 treaty, banning all but
limit the nuclear-arms competition
nuclear-weapons
testing, and the 1972 ABM treaty were particularly
underground
two leading nuclear powers
to the practice
for
the
of
important
introducing
verified restraint and the benefits to be derived from it.
In a sense, more has been accomplished
than this assessment
implies. In 1963 the
concerns expressed
in many public opinion polls in this country centered on the
the
echoed
of nuclear war1 and these concerns were
likelihood
throughout
ex
a
six
recent
of
hundred
rest of the world.
contrast,
survey
corporate
By
a strategic nuclear exchange
ecutives
found only two or three who considered
anxiety over the possibility
likely in the next decade.2 This evidence of diminished
of nuclear war is almost surely linked to the improvement
in understanding
between
the two leading nuclear powers?and
of more
demonstrations
rational behavior
within
has been exemplified
them?which
by the succession of nuclear treaties. On
seem also to have produced
an air of self
the other hand, these developments
It is now argued, for example, that there is no urgent
satisfaction and complacency.
reason for dealing with the very difficult problem of curbing nuclear-arms
competi
63
PAUL
64
DOTY
tion to the extent of actually reducing the number of nuclear armaments on each side;
the next decade should instead be spent in adjusting our strategic inventory to the
Vladivostok
under the assumption
that the present
relative calm will
ceilings,
continue.
But
States policy
is revealed by scrutinizing
side to United
the three
set
for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).3 The first objec
stated objectives
tive was to achieve essential equivalence
in the strategic forces permitted
to each side;
the second was to find limitations that would
improve the stability of these forces in
another
times of crisis and, in this and other ways, reduce the risk of nuclear war; the third was
to reduce arms competition
the SALT II
and, in time, military expenditures. When
is concluded,
these three objectives will
Treaty, based on the Vladivostok Agreement,
remained largely unfulfilled. At first glance, essential equivalence may seem to
been established
by the equal ceilings. But these in fact represent only very
vague limitations in the simplest categories of judging strategic force. Moreover,
they
appear to have been made possible by settling on numbers sufficiently high to allow
deferment of many problems that would have had to be solved had the numbers been
to equivalence
lower. Thus the commitment
has so far been one that has functioned
a
can be accom
at
of
and uncertainties
where
levels,
variety
asymmetries
only
high
have
have
modated.
Progress toward the second objective has been even more limited. The principal
to negligible
achievement
has been the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles
numbers.
This was supposed to allow both sides to forego multiplying
their strategic forces to
fail to penetrate
for those that might
of the other side.
the defenses
compensate
has not been grasped:
the multiplication
of warheads
this opportunity
of
has
become
the
instead
both
major occupation
strategic es
through MIRVing
tablishments. With the number of warheads growing toward a figure that ismore than
tenfold greater than that originally thought adequate for deterrence, with continued
in yield and accuracy, and with a growing effort on both sides to find
improvements
of the sea-based deterrent of the other, we certainly
ways to reduce the invulnerability
toward a strategic environment
that ismore stable in times
do not seem to be moving
reduction of the arms competition
and military
of crisis. That the third objective?the
come
is
in the
in
than
area?has
receded
rather
closer
evident
the
strategic
budgets
on
both
sides.
and
planned
strategic programs
budgets
had set for SALT remain
Thus the objectives
that the United States government
it is now at least possible to move into the area of significant
unrealized. Nevertheless,
However,
on strategic offensive arms for the first time since the arms competition
it will be absent in
decades ago. The will to do so is the first requirement;
three
began
those military planners on both sides who seek military superiority rather than mutual
restraint. It will be absent in government
leaders who subor
benefit through mutual
arms
to
control
of
nuclear
for
the
dinate the slow, demanding
attempts to gain
quest
an
in
terms
nuclear
of one index or
from
superiority
alleged
advantage
diplomatic
limitations
in those who underestimate
the difficulty of
And it will be ineffective
in
institutions
American
two
the
the
and the Soviet
the
world,
reorienting
largest
a
new
effort is clearly re
But, for those who have the will,
military establishments.
another.
quired.
environment
which would be altered by the arms-control
The military
ments
that are now possible is itself undergoing
rapid change. The complexity
agree
of the
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AFTER SALT I
65
for further change in the present strategic arsenals were
problems and the potential
not foreseen in the fifties and sixties, when many of the ideas for arms control took
shape. Thus, a new effort is now needed to join these rather na?ve and often elemen
tary ideas to the complexity of the present situation. Such an effort will not recapture
that animated the fifties. The revolutionary
the expansive period of new conceptions
over:
is
the
of
nuclear
weaponry
present task is the less heady one of finding
phase
forces at lower levels
self- and mutual restraint in order to consolidate
to
It
is
in
context
needs.
that
the role of balanced
related
this
justified
obviously
it is necessary first to ex
reductions of strategic forces will be discussed. However,
amine the alternatives
that exist.
ways
more
to accept
routes to the limitation of strategic arms should be considered?
many
a
Although
large number can be identified, almost all of them fall into two main
and 2) control over the improve
1) control over the numbers of weapons,
categories:
can
In other words,
ment of weapons.
limitations
be applied by controlling
either
quantity or quality.
in the 1972 treaty, and on
Numerical
limits were placed on anti-ballistic missiles
the number of launchers in submarines
(SLBMs), as well as the number of SLBM
How
in the Interim Agreement
of that year. Agreements
to slow
carrying submarines,
down schedules
for the deployment
of new systems represent another form of nu
merical
limit. Outright bans on certain types of weapons
(such as space-based ABM
a numerical
limitation
systems) can also be considered
(by limiting the number to
the set, the banning of weapons
from certain locations, as in the
zero). To complete
Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 and in nuclear-free
zones, can also be classed as a
(by limiting the number to zero in specific locations).
that is, limits on improvement, were placed on ABM radars and
limits,
Qualitative
the greatest effort has been directed toward attempts
ICBM silos in SALT I. However,
to limit the quality (as well as the number) of MIRVed missiles. Restricting MIRVing
to missiles below a certain size, limiting the number of re-entry vehicles per missile,
and placing a ceiling on the total MIRVed
throw weight
(i.e., on the total throw
are
to
of
illustrations
missiles
allowed
be
of proposals that have
MIRVed)
weight
failed to attract support from either side Qualitative
restraints on bombers,
to limit
numerical
limitation
their weight,
range, and the numbers and types of missiles
they may carry, are likely
to be examined
in the negotiations
of a SALT II Treaty.
The foregoing
illustrations
show the basic distinction
the two types of
between
in numerical
limitation. The problems
limits lie in deciding precisely what categories
are to be subject to numerical control and how maintaining
of weapons
the numbers
restraints usually enter the picture only after
agreed upon is to be verified. Qualitative
numerical
controls are considered
for then it becomes evident
enforceable,
that, if
numbers are to be controlled,
in the quality of the weapons must also
improvements
be
limited by collateral
restraints
if the limitation of numbers
is to retain its
on number could simply shift
usefulness. Without
restraints, agreements
qualitative
the objective of an arms race from numerical
to qualitative
superiority.
The recognition
that an arms race can easily shift from a quantitative
to a
one
under
the
influence
of
restriction
is
numerical
absent
from
earlier
qualitative
arms-control
literature. Before
the mid-sixties,
numerical
limit would provide a freeze, in which
it was
assumed
that a
commonly
were
if
weapons,
they
replaced at
PAUL
66
DOTY
of the ones that had been eliminated,
and that inspection
all, would be duplicates
would
reveal the violation.
But this assumption
became untenable as the speed with
regarding replacements
which
was demonstrated
could
be
introduced
and as
improvements
technological
satellite systems for verifying compliance were developed.
In its place, three new
were recognized:
of modification
different and allowed; 2)
1) detectably
not
different
and
different or the same, hence al
allowed; 3) undetectably
detectably
can be gradually
lowed. In almost every case, improvements
into a fixed
introduced
some
can
number of weapons
using 1) and 3), although
specific major improvements
be prevented by enforcing 2) to control the rate of possible improvement
for a fixed
number of weapons. Not unexpectedly,
the discussion of, and eventually
the agree
ments
restraints?and
their operational
qualitative
regarding,
counterpart,
categories
central issues in SALT I, in both the internal and external
verifiability?became
to be central features of arms-control
and will continue
treaties.
negotiations,
The complexity of the issues arising from qualitative
restraints is the result of the
many features of a weapons
system that significantly affect its military utility. For ex
an ICBM we are concerned with its size, payload for a given
ample, when considering
range, number of warheads,
(MIRV or not), accuracy,
of the warheads, guidance of the warheads
megatonnage
readiness, and silo hardness. Yet verification
reliability,
measures
estimates
generally provide only for the counting of silos and approximate
of their size. Observations
of flight tests can provide additional
information if they can
be reliably tied to missiles known to be in particular silos. However,
it is obvious that
in the possibilities
of verification
restrict
limitations
extent
to which
the
severely
can
limits
be
upon.
qualitative
agreed
A potential
solution to this problem arises from the fact that most substantial
of missiles
and testing stage that is
improvements
require a development
qualitative
most
the
other
side.
also observable
substantial
by
Consequently,
qualitative
can be controlled by severely limiting the annual number of flight
improvements
of new or improved
tests. This kind of control could greatly retard the development
a restriction could
ones.
such
to
missile
Moreover,
systems designed
replace existing
to the extent that
also reduce the number of confidence firings of deployed missiles
these desir
a "first strike" would be even less conceivable
than at present. Despite
limitations on flight tests are very unpopular with the military,
able consequences,
of their being proposed at SALT is, at best, uncertain.
and the possibility
in a fixed num
restraints in limiting improvements
The usefulness of qualitative
to
of
human
is
the
also
ber of weapons
foresight?it
subject
shortcomings
systems
in advance and forestalled
to be discerned
is impossible for all future developments
restraints. Were one to try to do so, the number of neces
by negotiating
qualitative
sary prohibitions
that the imagination
too
to negotiate.
cumbersome
might
suggest becomes
too great and therefore
A further difficulty with qualitative
restraints is that, to be effective, they must be
The current attempt to negotiate a partial
introduced prior to large-scale deployment.
time to have negotiated
MIRV limit in SALT bears testimony to this. The appropriate
a MIRV ban or limit would have been in 1969 or 1970, before American deployment
apparent to government
began. But the prudence of that course is only now becoming
leaders. At that time, the pressures on them to exploit the American advantage were
too strong and their perceptions
of the complications
itwould
introduce were
too dim
STRATEGIC
ARMS
LIMITATION
AFTER
SALT
I
67
In general, it is asking more than the system will bear to im
deployment.
at the end of a research and development
cycle. Yet it is only then that
to work.
be expected
in
restraints lies in their acceptability
different kind of limit on qualitative
itself as being at an earlier
Insofar as the Soviet Union
perceives
negotiation.
of most major weapons
stage than the United States in the development
technological
restraint that will freeze it in a
systems, it will tend to avoid agreeing to a qualitative
inferior position. Yet the limits on acceptable verification procedures
technologically
the
restraint be so simple and inclusive as to preclude
require that the qualitative
to prevent
pose limits
limits can
A quite
kinds of distinctions
further development
restraints will
be
that would allow one side to catch up, while restraining any
on the other. In practice, therefore, the usefulness of qualitative
one negotiating
itself
restricted whenever
party considers
inferior to the other.
technologically
to limit
it is reasonable to conclude that an agreement
From these considerations,
or freeze the numbers of strategic weapons
an
arms
not
will
itself
systems
stop
by
race competition. Negotiated
restraints
is
based
what
verifiable
upon
pro
qualitative
in a fixed number of
vide the principal means of restricting the growth of capability
as are possible and negotiable will only
such measures
strategic weapons. However,
partially
restrain
or
retard
improvements
in
strategic-weapons
limits or ceilings strategic capability
fixed numerical
by recourse to reductions can it be diminished.
performance.
is thus destined
Within
to expand;
only
restraints and numerical
Because of the inability of qualitative
limits to stabilize
reduction
the strategic capability of the two sides, some new scheme for numerical
must be brought into play, if the continued growth in strategic forces is to be reversed
how reduction agreements might
rather than simply retarded. Before examining
operate, it is useful to summarize the argument for reduction. There are at least five
a means
of compensating
for the inevitable
points in its favor: First, it provides
in
and
allowed
conventional
forces,
systems.
improvements
Military
strategic, will un
a
continuous
continuous
rate
of
The
of reduction
imposition
improvement.
dergo
or
even
a
to
it. Sec
to
counter
diminish
hold
constant,
strategic capability
provides
of old weapons
for the orderly elimination
rates, it provides
ond, set at moderate
their being replaced by new ones. Third, it engages the military of
systems without
both sides in an institutionalized
and continuous process of scheduled reductions and
verification. Fourth, it provides a highly visible sign to all that arms control is at work;
forces are being reduced by the most obvious index?numbers.
the process
Finally,
can be made
readily verifiable.
destruction
Against these positive features, one has to admit that the premeditated
of serviceable weapons will risk outraging both the dedicated officer and the thrifty
barrier is admittedly
very great, but only its breaching
taxpayer. This psychological
will make clear to all that arms control has begun in earnest.
A program of numerical
in strategic systems involves three essential
reductions
the rate of reduction, the schedule of reduction, and the definition of the
components:
in many
programs can be undertaken
subject to reduction. Reduction
categories
ways. The rate of reduction is, of course, crucial to any proposed program. Although
its choice obviously depends on many factors, it is important to recognize that it is
closely
related
to qualitative
restraints. At one extreme,
reduction
schedules may
be
PAUL DOTY
68
use of qualitative
to the maximum
restraints. In this
regarded simply as a supplement
restraints cannot do; used together
for what qualitative
case, reductions compensate
in prudent
or a
either a constant
fashion,
they can produce
strategic capability
one.
on
At
the
other
maximum
reduction
extreme,
gradually diminishing
dependence
schedules assumes that, if reductions are sufficiently rapid, no amount of qualitative
can compensate;
the burden to be carried by qualitative
restraints is
more
measures
and
the
obvious
need
be
only
thereby greatly reduced,
negotiated.
Clearly these two extremes enclose a broad spectrum of rates of reduction, and this
should be borne in mind as we consider the other variations to which we now turn.
Four important distinctions
the more obvious reduction schemes:
encompass
versus
annual
reductions;
progressive
1) single step
or individual
to aggregates
reductions
of weapons
2)
applicable
categories
improvement
systems;
random versus national selection of weapons
versus inactivation of eliminated
destruction
to be eliminated;
weapons
4)
systems.
A single-step
reduction over a few years, perhaps with a specification
of minimum
rates for reductions within each year, seems at first to be more manageable
than a
scheme of progressive annual reductions. The goal of a single-step program is finite; it
at the end, and it corresponds
to a period in which both sides
implies consolidation
It does, however, risk the development
would have fairly firm projections.
of tensions
over whether
it is to be regarded as one step not to be repeated, or as a process that
3)
could be renegotiated
rather
than
and repeated.
a commitment
to
In other words,
it represents
a single engagement
a process.
A progressive annual reduction over an unstipulated
period, even if less ambitious
in the short run, would, by contrast, commit the military planning and procurement
on both sides to a continuous
bureaucracies
and this could
process of retrenchment,
have far-reaching psychological
and political consequences.
rate of the
the
Again,
reduction will be crucial. If it is sufficiently low to provide only for the orderly disposal
it will have one kind of impact; if it bites deeply into advanced
of obsolete weapons,
stocks, it will have quite another.
weapons
The rate of reduction can be most simply defined as the constant percentage
by
in certain categories must be reduced annually. Thus,
which the remaining weapons
ten per cent per year over five years would reduce the level to fifty-nine per cent of the
the rate
original inventory; and over eight years to forty-three per cent. Obviously,
could be changed along the way, or "hold periods" could be inserted to permit inten
sive
verification.
to stop reductions
crucial if one
becomes
of where
no
are
For
there
the
this
process.
simple answers. As
seriously contemplates
beginning
we have argued, the first years of balanced reductions would mean cutting into the ex
cessively high forces that both sides were doing without only a few years ago. But the
course and extent of subsequent
reductions engages one's whole conception of future
of the roles that all the
that
world-order
is, it forces a consideration
arrangements,
nuclear powers and potential nuclear powers will want to play. As such, the proper
treatment of this problem
is far beyond the scope of our present considerations.
But,
Of
course,
the question
arise in deciding what
clearly, it can only be deferred. The more timely questions
are
are
to
to
to
be
and
how
control
be
weapons
subject
they
specified. Some possible
classes for this purpose are illustrated by the following categories:
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AFTER SALT I
69
as an
1 ) All those to be controlled can be put into a single class, usually designated
one
or
a
in
view
both
the
involve
of
of
the
This
may,
parties,
part
only
aggregate.
strategic force.
2) Sublimits may be
separate limits for broad
on the aggregate
number,
(for example,
categories of weapons
imposed
that is, there may be
ICBMs, SLBMs, and
heavy bombers).
may be used to define other categories with
3) Size, or other characteristics,
missiles
limits.
MIRVed
may be treated as a separate category, as in the
Thus,
specific
or ICBMs may be divided into two classes according to size,
Vladivostok Agreement,
as in the Interim Agreement
of 1972.
types; they will, in this
4) Classes may be defined in terms of existing weapons
is
it would
done comprehensively,
case, differ for each side. If the classification
an
to
inventory for each side according
represent
categories (for example, Minuteman
II, Minuteman
III, B-52 bombers, Poseidon,
etc).
5) Within
any category or class the number allowed might be determined
by a
separate criterion rather than by specific number. Thus the number of MIRVed mis
throw weight of the class, thereby allow
siles might be determined
by the combined
of different numbers.
ing different combinations
is intimately
for an arms-control agreement
The choice of the level of aggregation
and it will probably be agreed upon
related to what the two sides wish to accomplish,
in which reductions might subsequently
of the manner
be car
prior to consideration
ried out. Reduction
programs would then have to be fitted into an already existing
and care would have to be taken to insure that a given reduction program
agreement,
that imposed the various ceilings
preserves the aims inherent in the prior agreement
and restraints. However,
before pursuing
this, a few more general observations may
be useful.
level denoted
the simplest way of dealing with major
by 1) represents
a
total
re
number
because
would be selected. It does, however,
systems,
aggregate
that
all
of
all
and
major delivery systems (ICBMs
sizes, SLBMs,
quire
heavy bombers)
The
are
assumed
to be
equivalent,
a very
distant
approximation
to the
truth.
Nevertheless,
if the preservation
of the freedom to mix, that is, to change the composition
of the
an
in
forces
the
an
future
within
is
strategic
agreed aggregate number,
important con
dition for an arms-control
this
will
still
be
tolerable.
agreement,
approximation
Reduction
schedules would obviously lead to different consequences when applied
to different levels of aggregation.
If applied to the first level, that of a total aggregate
it is likely that each side would
tend to eliminate
its older, less versatile
number,
and preserve the most modern
and effective ones. Under 2) or 3) the bias
weapons
would be against the oldest or smallest weapons
in each category. Since the freedom
to mix would not be allowed outside of broad categories, each side could
predict with
some confidence
in which the other side's force structure would
the manner
change
over time. The results may not be equally
to both parties. Consequently,
agreeable
the negotiation might again return to definitions of equivalency
or relative value, so
that asymmetries would not develop or increase as reductions proceed. This situation
is avoided in schedules of the type indicated under 4), which represents the most con
trolled mode of reduction. Here all asymmetries
are taken care of in the
original as
of
on
and
each
is
same
side's
reduced
the
sumption
parity,
inventory
schedule, for ex
PAUL DOTY
70
do not arise.
ample, by five per cent per year. Consequently,
problems of equivalency
new
seems
not
it
would
be
allowed.
weapons
However,
systems
Totally
likely that
its reductions
in categories
to
each side would prefer to concentrate
that it wished
out.
the
of
This
could
then
be
between
subject
separate negotiations
phase
military
staffs.
that each side would insist on deciding
The expectation
for itself which weapons
are to be retired, subject to the agreed reduction
is so readily taken for
schedule,
seems
one
of
that
the
consideration
alternative
academic.
any
Nevertheless,
granted
can imagine situations
in which both sides would prefer random rather than self
if the land-based ICBMs of both sides
of weapons. For example,
selected eliminations
were partially MIRVed,
but both sides were uncertain of the extent, then itmight be
to the advantage of both not to risk passing through a potentially
unstable period in
and those of the other
which the missiles of one side were almost completely MIRVed
were not. Such a situation could be avoided
to be inactivated were
if the missiles
mix was
chosen at random: this would then insure that the MIRVed-single-warhead
preserved through the reduction stage. This unusual procedure would
approximately
have the further effect of discouraging
any attempt to improve the weapons
systems
being reduced, for a fraction of the newly improved weapons would also be picked for
It is, in effect, an alternative way to avoid the development
of asym
destruction.
metries
as
reduction
proceeds.
are dealt with.
for elimination
lies in how weapons designated
The final distinction
of inspectors would be unambiguous
and
under the supervision
Their destruction
to curb the
the intention of the superpowers
it would convey dramatically
decisive:
arms race. Insofar as the weapons
involved would be those nearing obsolescence,
this
more
recent
in
But
when
substan
would
little
weapons
present
difficulty.
procedure
can be expected. The anticipation
of
tial numbers are designated, many objections
of the rate at which
reductions
will surely affect the negotiation
this opposition
it is
it is difficult to estimate the extent of its influence. Therefore,
proceed, although
for
of putting at least some weapons
the alternative
useful to consider
designated
in the event of abrogation of the
into an inactive state. Their availability
elimination
Another alter
itself be the subject of negotiation.
treaty or other emergency would
native would be to store them in groups, which would make them easy targets in the
can be found that would
In any event, conditions
event of a nuclear exchange.
diminish the anxieties of the negotiating
parties, and, by adopting them, higher rates
are destroyed or in
of reductions might be negotiable. Whether
designated weapons
it would be useful if their identification were subject to inspection by the
activated,
Soviet position, but it would greatly
other side. This is contrary to a long-standing
improve
verification.
inventories
lies in
removed from national
option for weapons
some
Most
versions
this
force.
of
to
international
future
option
being assigned
but one can envision some possibly acceptable versions,
patently unacceptable,
as one in which the contributing nuclear powers could exercise some joint control
in crisis periods.
even have power of gradual withdrawal
of weapons
Still another
the foregoing considerations
Although
on
do permit some practical observations
tions were to be pursued in the framework
That Agreement
proposed a ceiling (2,400)
their
seem
such
and
theoretical,
may appear somewhat
they
the course that might be followed if reduc
expected from the Vladivostok Agreement.
on the total aggregate of strategic delivery
STRATEGIC
ARMS
LIMITATION
AFTER
SALT
I
71
vehicles subject to two sublimits: one set a ceiling of 1,320 on the numbers of MIRVed
sizes to approximately
the
for each side and the other limited overall missile
missiles
The latter limit has the effect of allowing
the Soviet
sizes of those now deployed.
Union about three hundred quite large ICBMs (of the SS-9 and SS-18 class) while
to the United
States. Presumably
this apparent
comparably
large missiles
denying
as
was
not to
considerations
the
such
decision
unspecified
asymmetry
by
equalized
in the aggregate for British and French submarines,
provide numerical compensation
that the Soviets have now abandoned. Whatever
the
and other similar requirements
are
out
correct
in
in
critics
the
missile
the
the
gap
rationale,
pointing
throw-weight
a
at
is
it
also
be
noted
that
there
should
bomber
but
gap in
present
present agreement,
the opposite direction.
The reason for emphasizing
that
these two asymmetries
lies in the importance
were
assume
if
undertaken.
Reduction
schedules
that
would
reductions
preserve
they
formula would allow the Soviets
the high degree of freedom to mix in the Vladivostok
to carry their heavy-missile
and the Americans
their bomber advantage
advantage
into the smaller force structures prescribed by a reduction agreement. Asymmetries
to one or both parties
that were acceptable at high ceilings may become unacceptable
these ceilings are lowered.
when
that is becoming
This example illustrates a more general observation
increasingly
apparent:
to preserve
In order
a
rough
balance,
or essential
equivalency,
a reduction
as it progresses. To do so, it will be necessary to
program must diminish asymmetries
are
introduce new sublimits along the way in order to insure that the asymmetries
at
in
to
In
least
the
reductions.
this
instance,
proportion
particular
diminishing
for heavy missiles and heavy bombers,
specific sublimits may have to be established
on a separate schedule.
and their numbers may have to be decreased
In retrospect, it seems likely that the very high ceilings of the Vladivostok Agree
ment were deemed desirable at the time because they permitted
the agreement on an
number and the ignoring of asymmetries
overall aggregate
within
the respective
strategic forces. If this is true, it follows that it would be unrealistic to assume that the
reopening and solving the problem of these
ceilings could be greatly reduced without
is to be
Substantial
reductions
that allow each side to select what
asymmetries.
removed from its strategic inventory will almost certainly increase the asymmetries
in
both
force
structures.
Moreover,
a
preference
to
retain
MIRVed
missiles
over
un
MIRVed missiles,
weapons over
large missiles over small missiles, and quick-reacting
a
less balanced and less stable strategic
slow-reacting weapons will probably produce
a reduction program will be to avoid this
situation. The principal task in negotiating
and to promote more symmetric, more obviously equivalent
strategic forces that are
also
more
stable
in crisis
situations.
In order to keep the foregoing discussion general, we have employed
the concept
over a period of years that would be widely ap
of a schedule of reductions proceeding
plicable. This should not obscure the virtues of the simpler procedure of a single-step
reduction where it is appropriate. At present, it would be appropriate
in working out
the Vladivostok Agreement.
The number of MIRVed missiles allowed is now unneces
into fantasy that are required to visualize either
the excursions
sarily high. Despite
a first strike on the other, the degree to which this scenario has become
side mounting
a test of arms-control options is very great. By this test, the
stability of the strategic
situation would be vastly improved if the ceiling for MIRVed missiles were cut in half,
PAUL
72
DOTY
in 1975-76. With
either in the SALT II Treaty or by a subsequent
treaty negotiated
a first-strike scenario would be assigned to
this lower number of MIRVed missiles,
in one step confer many of the
oblivion. More important, such an agreement would
or
were
more
a
to
would
achieve
the MIRVed
that
take
decade
forces to be built
gains
up to 1,320 and then reduced back to the much safer number of, say, 660. Alterna
a comparable
number of its older missiles
tively, both sides could agree to identify
or
from
refrain
for future retirement and
improving them. In either event,
upgrading
not
to
mention
the
the capital and resources,
diplomats,
energies of the negotiating
are
more
useful purposes
that could be saved for
Subsequent negotiations
prodigious.
on the orderly restraining and reduction of already more
could then concentrate
strategic forces.
manageable
This survey of what might be called the tactics of reducing numbers of strategic
to present the versatility and the complexity of this mode of
has attempted
weapons
arms control and to demonstrate
if the
that reductions would become unavoidable
containment
and the decrease of strategic capability are desired by both sides. More
introduce a
reduction programs would
over, it has become apparent that numerical
it will become
new dynamic
situation. As reductions progress,
into the arms-control
to deal
reduction schedules,
to institute new sublimits, and accompanying
necessary
increase. Likewise,
verification procedures,
that would otherwise
with asymmetries
in the context of high ceilings, will have to be
which may have been acceptable
a commitment
by the two leading nuclear
tightened as numbers are lowered. In short,
powers to a treaty calling for substantial reductions will engage them in procedures
for destruc
exceedingly more complex than that process of simply certifying weapons
tion that is sometimes
taken
to represent
arms control.
and indeed necessity, of reduc
all that might be said for the usefulness,
Despite
that this mode of arms control is certain to encounter
tions, it must be admitted
has about it a touch of
of expensive weapons
strong resistance. The destruction
the futile and the tragic. This view is strengthened
by the very short life of the
a
to the Newhouse
SALT I option (Option D) which,
report,4 contained
according
one
hundred strategic missiles per year
substantial reduction schedule, the removal of
for seven years, and had a "half life of one plenary session."
or not, this view was much more prevalent a few years ago than it is at
Apocryphal
there are only two options in arms control: either control and
present. Fundamentally,
The
that permits improvement.
limit numbers, or control and limit the technology
the military
armed forces, charged with maintaining
strength of the nation, naturally
interest in genuine arms
find neither of these options congenial. But as the political
control grows, some accommodation
by the military will have to be made. The choice
will not be an easy one for either side.
The military position, of course, will be based on what is perceived as constituting
acute
an advantage over the adversary. In this respect, the Soviets face a particularly
es
of planes and tanks?and
of American
production
problem. Their recollection
World War II tells them to
pecially the astronomical production of motor vehicles?in
restraints. On the other hand,
seek controls on numbers and to reject technological
reflect that
American
sense
of
can
the
continued
military
superiority
technology,
they
States has been the side to introduce almost every new weapons
the United
system
into the strategic
inventory
since World War
II, and conclude
that it would
be pref
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AFTER SALT I
73
?rable to seek controls on technology
rather than on numbers. But if they acquiesce
in this, do they not risk placing themselves permanently
in an inferior technological
dilemma for the Soviets, and might ex
position? This must represent a continuing
the SALT talks.
plain much of the stalling that characterized
It should be evident, however,
that the current state of affairs is not so sharply
drawn. For two decades
States has been shifting to progressively more
the United
systems, with a consequently
sophisticated weapons
high unit cost that makes the
to us nor
lines neither acceptable
large numbers turned out by endless production
our budgets. The technological
is also now open to
argument
"superiority"
as the Soviet defense
and remains the
industry increases in sophistication
the Soviets could hardly ex
recipient of unrestrained
budgetary
largess. Moreover,
that we would have a
pect the United States to make concessions on the expectation
within
question
lead. Although
permanent
technological
they do not remove it.
these considerations
moderate
the dilemma,
American views on this question display a characteristic diversity. The Soviet reac
tion to the apparent American
lead has been to field much larger mis
technological
a greater part of the Soviet strategic force in this visible, and
siles and to concentrate
The American
response has not surpris
component.
potentially more threatening,
to
size
limit
involved
the
and
of
Soviet missiles.
In these
proposals
ingly
MIRVing
efforts both technological
and numerical restraints are requested. At a rhetorical level,
several branches of the American government
have devoted a great deal of attention
to the Soviet lead in the throw weight of ICBMs and the number of warheads
that
in them, ignoring the fact that the deliverable megatonnage
could be deployed
of the
whole strategic force on each side is approximately
equal, that the United States has a
three-fold lead in warheads,
that weapons beyond one or two thousand are of increas
ingly more marginal utility, and that we prefer our more diversified force in any case.
this concern is not, for the most part, matched
for
by enthusiasm
so
that
the
Soviet
cannot
missile
throw
be
jointly limiting technology
larger
weights
to
interests
American
tend
sizes
Instead,
fully exploited.
prefer limiting numbers and
of launchers, evidently assuming
techno
that, under these restraints, a continuing
logical lead can be assured.
Taken together, these observations
suggest that the military
leadership on both
sides would probably much prefer numerical
reductions to equally drastic restraints
on either technological
of existing systems or the development
of new
improvements
ones. Some further evidence
can be found in official pronounce
for this preference
on both sides. Despite
ments
that Soviet representatives
have not ex
allegations
in
interest
in
reduction
formulas
the
SALT
any
discussions, we do have
great
pressed
More
important,
specific endorsement
past
three
of them from Chairman
in statements
Brezhnev
dating
from the
years.
Evidently itwould be a good thing to give some thought to how we could move from the limita
tion of arms to their gradual reduction, and also to the establishment of some kind of limits on
their
The
qualitative
successful
questions
siderable
of
improvement.
completion
the further
of
the new
limitation
phase
and
of
possible
talks
the USSR,
between
reduction
of
strategic
and
arms
can
the U.S.A.
play
on
a con
role.
In short, if the government of the United States adheres to the principles of equal security and
renunciation
of attempts
to gain
unilateral
advantages
as set down
in our
agreements,
it will
PAUL DOTY
74
find
Soviet
the
as
ing
the
a conscientious
to be
Union
limitation
reduction
and
of
and
active
an
in such
partner
undertak
important
arms.6
strategic
On the American
side, we find that reduction proposals have also been made by
several Senators.6 And, although
insisted in the early days of
Secretary Kissinger
he has more recently modified
SALT that reductions could not be negotiated,
his
opinion, as the talks enter a new phase. The following statement was made in defense
interview:
in a Newsweek
of the Vladivostok
Agreement
in fact is the significance
of the nuclear
what
of this agreement?
The nightmare
Now,
age is the
on the expectation
arms based
One
of what
the other
side is doing.
has to get
fear of strategic
must
in
be to get that cycle of self-fulfilling
one's priorities
prophecies
right. The first objective
now
is
into
Once
of
that
has
been
built
the
achieved.
That
substantially
planning
terrupted.
both
I think
sides,
A number
to
reductions
So
is an
agreement.7
in his 1975 budget
Finally,
...
we
1985.
welcome
would
has
in an
be
easier.
were
reductions
the
negotiations
now been
to start only after 1985. The
no later than 1980
for
start
would
from
eliminated
on reductions
an agreement
start as soon as possible
and
statement,
forces
[strategic]
fashion.8
equitable
the
aide
m?moire
to take place well before
take effect as soon as there
of Defense
Secretary
in these
reductions
to reciprocate
willing
that
That
to preclude
can
that negotiations
it is clear
1985.
that
impression
in fact said
after
place
never
intended
will
reductions
the
take
it was
because
on
negotiations
of people
gained
announcement
Vladivostok
were
the
states that:
Schlesinger
that
provided
the
Soviet
Union
in numbers
of
balanced
reduction
that a negotiated,
therefore,
on
an
next
item
for
the
the
at
least
become
acceptable
agenda
strategic weapons has
steps to be taken in arms control.
It would
seem,
References
1
Gallup
2
poll
B. M.
Russett
tune, May,
1974.
3
P. H.
5
6
Strategic
J. Newhouse,
Cold
Dawn:
I. Brezhnev,
E. g., Senator
Record,
7
Henry
8
and B. C. Hanson,
"The
L.
sional
York Herald
Nitze,
136.
1974-75),
4
in New
H.
February
A. Kissinger
"How
The
of Salt
Story
December
22,
Jackson, Congressional
5, 1974.
in an
Corporate
Between
Balance
interview
1963.
July 5,
1972,
Hope
and
(New York,
p.
Record,
published
Executives
See America's
Skepticism,"
in the World,"
Policy,
Foreign
For
17 (Winter,
1973).
1; October
27,
December
4, 1973;
in Newsweek,
Role
1973,
p.
Senator W.
December
15, 1974,
1; June
30,
Proxmire,
p.
1.
Congres
1974.
on the FY 1976 and Transi
to the Congress
of Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger
Defense
and FY 1976-1980
1977 Authorization
(mimeographed),
Programs"
Request,
1975, p. 27.
"Statement
tion Budgets,
5,
February
Pravda,
Tribune,
FY