Durham E-Theses
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher
Lascelles, D.E.
How to cite:
Lascelles, D.E. (1973)
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher, Durham theses, Durham University.
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The R u l e i n R y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r
by
D.E.
L a s c e l l e s LL.B.
(London)
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.
S u b m i t t e d f o r t h e d e g r e e o f B.C.L.
a t Durham U n i v e r s i t y .
May, 1973-
Abstract
of the
Table of
cases
Table of
Statutes
Pages
thesis
CONTENTS
of the Rule i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
1 -
18
Chapter I
The O r i g i n s
Chapter I I
Escape
Chapter I I I
Personal
Chapter I V
N o n - N a t u r a l U s e r o f Land
38-51
Chapter V
Dangerous T h i n g s
52
-
5^
C h a p t e r VI
Fire
55
-
67
Chapter V I I
The D e f e n c e s
19-31
Injuries
68-91
statutory authority
68
- 71
Part I I
a c t of a s t r a n g e r
72
-
80
Part
a c t o f God
81
-
85
Part IV
consent of the p l a i n t i f f
86
-
89
Part V
default
90 -
91
I I I
R i s k and F a u l t
Chapter IX
The New
Bibliography
37
Part I
Chapter V I I I
Conclusion
32 -
of the p l a i n t i f f
Approach
92 - 104
105
-
116
A b s t r a c t of the T h e s i s .
The
thesis will
commence w i t h a b r i e f s t u d y o f t h e
historical
1
background to the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
the extent t o which Blackburn J . ' s statement
t i o n o f a c o m p l e t e l y new
p r i n c i p l e of
A d e t a i l e d examination
w i t h a view to c o n s i d e r i n g
of t h e r u l e was
the exposi-
law.
w i l l be t h e n made o f t h e v a r i o u s component
p a r t s o f t h e r u l e w i t h c h a p t e r s d i s c u s s i n g t h e need f o r an e s c a p e , w h e t h e r
there i s l i a b i l i t y
f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y and
u s e r and d a n g e r o u s o b j e c t .
the concepts of n o n - n a t u r a l
L i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of f i r e w i l l
also
be c o n s i d e r e d .
Having c l a r i f i e d
t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e and s c o p e o f t h e t o r t we
t h e n c o n s i d e r t o what d e g r e e
strict
liability
the general claim that the t o r t
i s justifiable.
An i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f t h i s p a r t
t h e t h e s i s v / i l l be t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e e f f e c t w h i c h
to
the t o r t
i s one
the f i v e
v/ill
of
of
defences
and t h e need f o r t h e r e t o be a n o n - n a t u r a l u s e r o f l a n d h a v e
on'the s t r i c t n e s s o f
liability.
N o t i c e w i l l a l s o be t a k e n o f t h e f a c t t h a t d o u b t s a b o u t ; t h e
s t r i c t n e s s of l i a b i l i t y
tendency
of
i n R y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e modern
..the t o r t o f n e g l i g e n c e t o form i t s b a s i s o f l i a b i l i t y more
on a c o n c e p t
o f r i s k t h a n o f f a u l t means t h a t we
e q u a t i o n o f t h e two
a r e moving t o w a r d s
torts.
F i n a l l y we must l o o k t o t h e f u t u r e and c o n s i d e r t h e
in
which
t h e t o r t may
go.
direction
W i l l t h e gap between n e g l i g e n c e and R y l a n d s
Fletcher diminish further u n t i l
p r i n c i p l e of negligence or w i l l
1.
some c o m p l e t e l y new
system
1866
L.R.
1 Ex.
redundant?
265.
wider
of compensation
p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s u p e r s e d e a l l t h e p r e s e n t r u l e s and make b o t h
and R y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r
v
the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s surrounding Rylands v
F l e t c h e r r e s u l t i n i t s disappearance as a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y i n t o a
for
an
negligenc
Table of Cases
A l d r i d g e v Van P a t t e r
Anderson v Oppenheimer
Anon. (1582)"
A t k i n s o n v N e w c a s t l e Waterworks Co.
Baird v Williamson
Balfour v Barty-King
Bamford v T u r n l e y
Barker v Herbert
B a r r e t t e v F r a n k i Compressed P i l e Co. o f Canada
B a t c h e l l e r v T u n b r i d g e W e l l s Gas C o .
Beaulieu v Finglam
B e n n i n g v Wong
Besozzi v Harris
B l a k e v L a n d a n d House P r o p e r t y C o r p .
B l a k e v Woolf
Bland v Yates
B l y t h v Birmingham Waterworks Co.
Bottomley v B a n n i s t e r
Boulston's case
Box v Jubb
B r a d y v Warren
B r i t i s h C e l a n e s e v Hunt
C a n a d i a n P a c i f i c R a i l w a y v Roy
Canterbury (Viscount) v Attorney-General
C a r s t a i r s v Taylor
C a t t l e v S t o c k t o n Waterworks Co.
C h a r i n g C r o s s E l e c t r i c i t y Supply Co. v H y d r a u l i c
Power Co.
C h i c h e s t e r Corp. v F o s t e r
C o l l i n g w o o d v Home a n d C o l o n i a l S t o r e s L t d .
Commissioner f o r Railways v Stewart
Cottrell v Allen
Cox v B u r b r i d g e
C r o w h u r s t v Amersham B u r i a l Board
D a n i e l s and D a n i e l s v W h i t e and Sons L t d . and
Tarbard
Davey v Harrow C o r p .
Dominion N a t u r a l G a s C o . L t d . , v C o l l i n s and P e r k i n s
Donoghue v S t e v e n s o n
Dunn v Birmingham C a n a l Co.
Dunne v N o r t h Western G a s B o a r d
E a s t e r n a n d S o u t h A f r i c a n Telegraph. Co. L t d . v
Cape Town Tramways C o . L t d .
Emanuel v G r e a t e r London C o r p o r a t i o n
Eriksen v Clifton
*
36
88
55
106
8, 9, 19, 39
67
39, ^0, 41
5^
30
^2, 53
55, 56
69, 71
22
52
kj>
^9
95
86
^+8, ^9
73, 75, 78, 82
^6
28, 31, 36, k$
69
59
86, 87,
3^, 35
20, 27,
53
h2, 61
85
85
h
*+8 53
f
98
h-7
78
97, 98
90
51, 69
k2, 90
55, 67
76
88
28,
29, 51
Fardon v H a r c o u r t - R i v i n g t o n
F a r r e r v Nelson
F i l b u r n v P e o p l e ' s P a l a c e Aquarium Co. L t d .
F i l l i t e r v Phippard
F i r t h v Bowling I r o n Co.
100
kS, 50
22
59, 60,
53
62,
66
*
G i l e s v Walker
Goldman v H a r g r a v e
Grant v A u s t r a l i a n K n i t t i n g M i l l s L t d .
Green v C h e l s e a V/aterworks C o .
Greenock Corp. v Caledonian Railway
G u n t e r v James
k6, k7, ^9
66
98
25
8 2 , 83, 8^
61
Hale v Jennings Bros.
H a l s e y v E s s o P e t r o l e u m Co. L t d .
Hammersmith R a i l w a y Co. v B r a n d
H e a t h ' s G a r a g e L t d . v Hodges
H i l l i e r v Air Ministry
Hines v Tousley
Hoare and Co. v M c A l p i n e
H o l l y w o o d S i l v e r F o x Farm L t d . , v Emmett
Howard v F u r n e s s H o u l d e r L t d .
Humphries v C o u s i n s
Hunt v B r i t i s h C e l a n e s e L t d .
Hurdman v N.E. R a i l w a y Co.
17,
28
69
53
28
53
30
90
20,
53,
28,
^1
I l f o r d U.D.C. v B e a l and J u d d
k2
Job Edwards v Birmingham C a n a l N a v i g a t i o n s
Jones v F e s t i n i o g R a i l w a y Co.
52,
53,
K e r r y v E a r l o f Orkney
Kiddle v City Business Properties Ltd.
8k
8?
Lambert v B e s s e y
Latham v J o h n s o n
L a u n c h b u r y v Morgans
10, 12
5^
101, 102,
Manchester Corporation v Farnworth
Mason v L e v y Auto P a r t s L t d .
May v B u r d e t t
Midwood 8: Co. L t d . v M a n c h e s t e r C o r p o r a t i o n
M i l e s v F o r e s t Rock G r a n i t e Co. L t d .
Monk v Warbey
Morgan v K h y a t t
Morgan.-s v L a u n c h b u r y
M u l h o l l a n d and Tedd L t d . v B a k e r L t d .
Musgrove v P a n d e l i s
70
55,
k
19,
28,
102
*+7
101,
61
53,
21,
36, 76,
77
22
86
31, 36, *t5
65,
61
66
103,
61,
62
20,
29,
27
35,
102,
53,
103,
61, 62,
66
108
62
108
N a t i o n a l T e l e p h o n e Co. v B a k e r
Nichols v Marsland
N i e l d v L . + N.W. R a i l w a y
Noble v H a r r i s o n
N o r t h w e s t e r n U t i l i t i e s L t d . v London G u a r a n t e e
and A c c i d e n t C o . L t d .
P e r r y v K e n d r i c k s T r a n s p o r t Co. L t d .
F e t e r s v P r i n c e o f Wales T h e a t r e ( B i r m i n g h a m ) L t d .
P h i l l i p s v B r i t t a n i a H y g i e n i c L a u n d r y Co. L t d .
Piggot v Eastern Counties Railway
Pontardawe R.D.C. v Moore-Gwyn
P o n t i n g v Noakes
Porter v Bell
P r o p r i e t o r s o f M a r g a t e P i e r and H a r b o u r v Town
C o u n c i l o f Margate
P r o s s e r v Levy
Rainham C h e m i c a l Works L t d . v B e l v e d e r e F i s h
Guano Co. L t d .
Read v L y o n s and C o . L t d .
Richards v Easto
Rickards v Lothian
Robinson v K i l v e r t
R o s s v Fedden
Rylands v F l e t c h e r
40, 53
40, 81, 82,
46
40, te, 48
70, 71, 88
17, 36,
88
53
60
50
19, 22
9
61, 62, 74, 75, 77
47, 50
65, 89
44, 45, 53
17, 18, 19, 21-28, 30,
34-36, 44, 45, 53, 65
59
40-44, 66, 74, 78
90
43, 86, 88
Throughout b u t C h a p t e r I
in particular.
S t . Anne's W e l l B r e w e r y Co. v R o b e r t s
Samuel v E d i n b u r g h and Glasgow R a i l w a y
S.C.H. v W h i t t a l l
Seligman v Docker
S h i f f m a n v Grand P r i o r y o f t h e O r d e r o f S t . J o h n
Smeaton v I l f o r d C o r p o r a t i o n
Smith v G r e a t Western R a i l w a y
Smith v Kenrick
Snow v Whitehead
Sochacki v Sas
S p a r t a n S t e e l and A l l o y s L t d . v M a r t i n and Co.
S p i c e r v Smee
S t e a m v Prentice Bros.
S t e v e n s v Woodward
42
83
108
50
20, 35
51
53
8, 9, 19, 39
53
42
108
65
42 , 46 , 49
75
T a r r y v Ashton
Tenant v Goldwin
The Mostyn
Thompson v Bankstown C o r p .
T u r b e r v i l l e v Stampe
2
3, 4, 5, 6
8 4 , 85
69
11, 55, 58,
59
Vaughan v Menlove
Vaughan v The T a f f V a l e R a i l w a y Co.
59? 60,
68,
70
West v B r i s t o l Tramways Co.
Western S i l v e r F o x Ranch L t d . v R o s s and C r o m a r t y C.C.
Whitmores L t d . v S t a n f o r d
Wilson v Waddell
V / i l s o n s and C l y d e C o a l Co. v E n g l i s h
Wing v London G e n e r a l Omnibus Co.
Winterbottom v W r i g h t
20,
90
52,
41
99
28,
98
27,
77
29
62
^fO, k2
TABLE OF STATUTES.
1285
S t a t u t e of Westminster I I
11
1707
6 Anne c . 3 1 (S6)
57, 58, 59,
177^
Fires
1852 .
Common Law P r o c e d u r e A c t
H , 15
1925
C o a l Mines Act
96
19^-5
Law Reform ( C o n t r i b u t o r y N e g l i g e n c e ) A c t
9
1956
C o p y a r i g h t A c t (S**3(8)).
96
1960
Road T r a f f i c
A c t (S201).
102
1957
Occupiers' L i a b i l i t y
Act
77
1969
Employers' L i a b i l i t y
(Defective Equipment) A c t
99
P r e v e n t i o n ( M e t r o p o l i s ) A c t (S86)
60
57, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66
1
1971
Animals A c t (S2(1) and S8(1))
100
1972
A c c i d e n t C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t (New Z e a l a n d )
110
CHAPTER 1
The O r i g i n s o f t h e R u l e i n R y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r .
The r u l e i n R y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r had i t s g e n e s i s a s a s e p a r a t e
head of t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y
i n the second h a l f of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y
although i t s h i s t o r i c a l antecedents a r e of f a r g r e a t e r a n t i q u i t y .
In
o r d e r t o f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r e and s c o p e o f t h e r u l e i t i s n e c e s sary i n i t i a l l y
itself
of
and,
to make a d e t a i l e d s t u d y o f t h e c a s e o f R y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r
i n p a r t i c u l a r , o f t h e judgment o f B l a c k b u r n J . i n t h e c o u r t
Exchequer
The
Chamber.
f a c t s o f t h e c a s e were, b r i e f l y , t h a t M e s s r s . R y l a n d s
and
Horrocks, the defendants a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e , caused a r e s e r v o i r f o r the
h o l d i n g o f r a i n w a t e r t o be c o n s t r u c t e d on t h e i r own
land.
t h e y employed a competent e n g i n e e r and c o n t r a c t o r . The
To t h i s
end
d i s t r i c t v/as a
m i n i n g a r e a and i t s o happened t h a t a t t h e s e l e c t e d s i t e t h e r e were some
old
vertical
workings.
s h a f t s which,
a s i t t r a n s p i r e d , l e d down t o abandoned
T h e s e v e r t i c a l s h a f t s , w h i c h were h a l f f i l l e d w i t h
earth,
were d i s c o v e r e d by t h e workmen w h i l e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r e s e r v o i r but
filled
coal
they
them up and b l o c k e d them w i t h s u c h c a r e a s v/as deemed n e c e s s a r y .
Subsequently,
the r e s e r v o i r being f i l l e d ,
t h e s e s h a f t s and,
t h e w a t e r f o r c e d i t s way
escaping i n t o the o l d workings,
flowed through
and
f l o o d e d t h e c o a l mine o f F l e t c h e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f .
the
case' came b e f o r e t h e C o u r t o f E x c h e q u e r
On
down
them
these f a c t s
which comprised S i r F r e d e r i c k
2
P o l l o c k C.B.
and B a r o n s B r a r a w e l l , M a r t i n and C h a n n e l l .
T h e r e were two p o i n t s a t i s s u e .
The
f i r s t v/as w h e t h e r t h e
defen-
d a n t s were l i a b l e i r r e s p e c t i v e o f n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e m s e l v e s
t h o s e who
c o n s t r u c t e d t h e r e s e r v o i r and t h e s e c o n d was
n o t t h e m s e l v e s n e g l i g e n t , t h e d e f e n d a n t s were l i a b l e
1.
2.
1866 L . R . 1 E x . 265.
3 H. and C. 77^.
1.
whether,
or
although
f o r the n e g l i g e n c e of the
i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r t h e y had employed.
decided i n favour of the defendants.
On
t h i s s e c o n d point- t h e c o u r t
The q u e s t i o n was n o t f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r e d
on a p p e a l i n view o f t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e dei'endents v/ere l i a b l e on t h e
first
p o i n t b u t t h e w e i g h t o f a u t h o r i t y would s u g g e s t t h a t t h e c o u r t
wrong f o r , no., m a t t e r how
competent
was
an i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r i s , a p l a i n -
t i f f c a n n o t r e l i e v e h i m s e l f o f l i a b i l i t y by e n t r u s t i n g t o him work w h i c h i s
3
p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous
On t h e f i r s t
of
to adjacent
property.
p o i n t t h e C o u r t o f E x c h e q u e r gave judgment i n f a v o u r
t h e d e f e n d a n t s on t h e ground
t h a t t h e y were n o t l i a b l e f o r damage
r e s u l t i n g from t h e l a w f u l u s e r o f t h e i r own
i n t e n t and o f n e g l i g e n c e .
l a n d i n the absence both of
B r a m w e l l B. d i s s e n t e d on t h e ground t h a t t h e
p l a i n t i f f had t h e r i g h t t o e n j o y h i s l a n d f r e e from f o r e i g n w a t e r and
the
defendants' a c t was b o t h a t r e s p a s s and a n u i s a n c e .
E r r o r was brought t o t h e C o u r t o f E x c h e q u e r Chamber w h i c h
of
that
W i l l e s , B l a c k b u r n , K e a t i n g , M e l l o r , Montague
unanimously
held the defendants l i a b l e ;
d e l i v e r e d by B l a c k b u r n J .
consisted
S m i t h and L u s h J . J ,
They
t h e judgment o f t h e c o u r t b e i n g
The l e a r n e d judge began by s a y i n g t h a t i t was
an
e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e o f law t h a t a p e r s o n who b r i n g s s o m e t h i n g onto h i s l a n d s
and k e e p s i t t h e r e i s under a duty t o s e e t h a t i t does n o t e s c a p e and c a u s e
damage t o h i s n e i g h b o u r s .
the
He saw t h e q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e a s b e i n g
"whether
duty w h i c h t h e law c a s t s upon him under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s an
a b s o l u t e duty t o k e e p i t i n a t h i s p e r i l o r i s , a s t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e
C o u r t o f E x c h e q u e r have t h o u g h t , m e r e l y a d u t y t o t a k e a l l r e a s o n a b l e and
if
p r u d e n t p r e c a u t i o n s t o keep i t
i n , b u t no more":
i n o t h e r words d i d t h e
p l a i n t i f f have t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had been
In
negligent?
answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n B l a c k b u r n J . gave what h a s come t o be
r e g a r d e d a s t h e s t a n d a r d pronouncement o f t h e r u l e i n B y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r .
k
He s a i d :
h i s own
3.
k.
"We
t h i n k t h a t t h e t r u e r u l e of law i s ,
t h a t t h e p e r s o n who
for
purposes b r i n g s on h i s l a n d s and c o l l e c t s and k e e p s t h e r e a n y t h i n g
T a r r y v AshtqnJ[8?6
At pages
1 Q.3.D.314.
2.
l i k e l y t o do m i s c h i e f i t i s e s c a p e s , must k e e p i t i n a t h i s p e r i l , and i f
he does n o t do s o , i s p r i m a
n a t u r a l consequence
facie
a n s w e r a b l e f o r a l l t h e damage w h i c h i s t h e
of i t s escape.
He c a n e x c u s e h i m s e l f by showing t h a t t h e
e s c a p e was owing .to t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s d e f a u l t ; o r p e r h a p s
the
consequence
exists
t h a t t h e e s c a p e was
o f v i s m a j o r , o r t h e a c t o f God; b u t a s n o t h i n g o f t h i s
sort
h e r e , i t i s u n n e c e s s a r y t o e n q u i r e what e x c u s e would be s u f f i c i e n t .
general rule,
a s s t a t e d above, seems on p r i n c i p l e
o T c o r n i s e a t e n down by t h e e s c a p i n g c a t t l e
f l o o d e d by t h e w a t e r from h i s n e i g h b o u r ' s
by t h e f i l t h
of t h i s neighbour's
by t h e fumes and noisome v a p o u r s
w i t h o u t any f a u l t
neighbour,
just.
The
The p e r s o n whose g r a s s
of h i s neighbour
o r whose mine i s
r e s e r v o i r , o r whose c e l l a r i s i n v a d e d
p r i v y , o r whose h a b i t a t i o n i s made u n h e a l t h y
of h i s neighbour's
a l k a l i works, i s d a m n i f i e d
o f h i s own; and i t seems b u t r e a s o n a b l e and j u s t t h a t t h e
who h a s brought
something
on h i s own p r o p e r t y w h i c h was n o t n a t u r a l l y
t h e r e , h a r m l e s s t o o t h e r s s o l o n g a s i t i s c o n f i n e d t o h i s own p r o p e r t y , b u t
w h i c h he knows w i l l be m i s c h i e v o u s i f i t g e t s on h i s n e i g h b o u r ' s ,
o b l i g e d t o make good t h e damage w h i c h
fining it
t o h i s own p r o p e r t y .
s h o u l d be
e n s u e s , i f h e does n o t s u c c e e d i n c o n -
B u t f o r h i s a c t i n b r i n g i n g i t t h e r e no m i s c h i e f
c o u l d have a c c r u e d and i t seems b u t j u s t t h a t he s h o u l d a t h i s p e r i l k e e p i t
t h e r e , s o t h a t no m i s c h i e f may a c c r u e , o r answer f o r t h e n a t u r a l and a n t i c i p a t e d
consequences.
And upon a u t h o r i t y , we t h i n k t h i s i s e s t a b l i s h e d t o be t h e lav/,
whether t h e t h i n g s so brought
be b e a s t s , o r w a t e r , o r f i l t h ,
or stenches.
We must now examine t h e a u t h o r i t i e s on w h i c h t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n was
based.
Placitum
B l a c k b u r n J . remarked
t h a t a s e a r l y a s t h e Y e a r Book 20 E d . k -
10 B r i a n C . J . l a i d down a d o c t r i n e v e r y much r e s e m b l i n g t h e l a t e r
judgement o f L o r d H o l t C . J . i n T e n a n t
much r e l i a n c e .
v G o l d w i n ^ on w h i c h B l a c k b u r n J . p l a c e d
The e a r l i e r c a s e was c o n c e r n e d w i t h c a t t l e
trespass.
The d e f e n -
d a n t ' s c a t t l e had s t r a y e d on t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d and t h e d e f e n d a n t
b a c k a s soon a s p o s s i b l e .
5.
11
2 L d . Raym. 1089.
B r i a n C . J . h e l d t h a t t h i s was n o t s u f f i c i e n t
(1?04)
3.
drove
them
excuse t o avoid
l i a b i l i t y a n d s a i d " : " I t behoves him t o u s e h i s common
s o t h a t he s h a l l do no h u r t
t o a n o t h e r man, and i f t h e l a n d i n w h i c h he
has
i t b e h o v e s him t o k e e p t h e b e a s t s
common be n o t e n c l o s e d ,
common and out o f t h e l a n d o f any o t h e r . "
by
i n the
He f u r t h e r e m p h a s i s e d
a d d i n g , when i t was p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e p l e a d i n g
should
this
be amended s o
a s t o c l a i m t h a t t h e c a t t l e were d r i v e n o u t o f t h e common by dogs, t h a t
t h i s e x c u s e would n o t c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d d e f e n c e t o t h e a c t i o n .
7
B l a c k b u r n J . t h e n c i t e d t h e c a s e o f Cox v J j u r b r i d g e
where t h e
d e f e n d a n t ' s h o r s e t r e s p a s s e d on t o t h e highway and t h e r e k i c k e d
child.
question
The c h i l d h a d no p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t i n t h e highway and s o no
of c a t t l e trespass arose.
negligence
property
I t was h e l d t h a t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f
o r s c i e n t e r t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t l i a b l e .
g
however s a y o b i t e r
plain.
: " I apprehend t h e g e n e r a l
Williams
J .did
r u l e o f lav/ t o be p e r f e c t l y
I f I am t h e owner o f a n a n i m a l i n w h i c h by lav; t h e r i g h t o f
c a n e x i s t , I am bound t o t a k e c a r e t h a t i t does n o t s t r a y i n t o
t h e l a n d o f my n e i g h b o u r , a n d I am l i a b l e
and
a young
for the ordinary
f o r any t r e s p a s s i t may commit,
consequences o f that t r e s p a s s .
e s c a p e o f t h e a n i m a l i s due t o my n e g l i g e n c e
q
Whether o r n o t t h e
i s altogether
immaterial."
A g a i n i n Hay v B u r d e t t ' where t h e p l a i n t i f f was b i t t e n by t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
monkey t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t " a p e r s o n k e e p i n g a m i s c h i e v o u s
w i t h knowledge o f i t s p r o p e n s i t i e s , i s bound t o k e e p i t s e c u r e
animal,
at his
peril."
An
earlier authority relied
on f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n was L o r d
Hale
10
who,
i n h i s F l e a s o f t h e Crown
knowing i t s n a t u r e
being loose
o r h a b i t s a r e s u c h t h a t t h e natur<?.l c o n s e q u e n c e o f h i s
i s t h a t he w i l l harm men, t h e owner "must a t h i s p e r i l k e e p
him
s a f e from d o i n g h u r t
6.
7.
8.
P a g e s 1089 and 1090.
13 C B . (N.S.) a t page 4.38
Page 438
1846 9 Q.B. 101
At page 430.
9.
10.
, s a i d t h a t where one k e e p s a b e a s t ,
f o r , though he u s e h i s d i l i g e n c e t o k e e p him up,
(1863)
4.
if
he e s c a p e and do harm t h e owner i s l i a b l e t o a n s w e r damages" a l t h o u g h ,
a s L o r d H a l e goes on t o show, he w i l l n o t be l i a b l e c r i m i n a l l y w i t h o u t
p r o o f of want o f
The
Goldwin
of
was
c a s e on w h i c h B l a c k b u r n J , p l a c e d most r e l i a n c e , Tenant
and t h u s e v e r y t h i n g t h a t was
a d m i t t e d t o be t r u e .
The
l a y contiguous
t o be s e p a r a t e d and
d e c l a r a t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f had
t o a messuage o f t h e d e f e n d a n t
and by t h e d e f e n d a n t
and u s e d
a
(Solebat)
o f r i g h t ought t o h a v e been
The
t h e d e f e n d a n t was
objection
under any
t a k e n v/as t h a t t h e r e was
obligation
t h e w a l l de i u r e d e b u i t r e p a r a r i by t h e d e f e n d a n t
d i d n o t a r i s e from t h e f a c t s
Lord Holt C.J. held
that
flowed
into
nothing
to r e p a i r the w a l l ;
v/as s a i d , b e i n g a c h a r g e not o f common r i g h t , and
which
declaration
Y e t he d i d n o t r e p a i r i t and. f o r want o f r e p a i r f i l t h
the p l a i n t i f f ' s c e l l a r .
show t h a t
c o r r e c t l y pleaded i n the
by
f e n c e d from a p r i v y h o u s e o f o f f i c e , p a r c e l o f t h e s a i d
messuage of t h e d e f e n d a n t ,
repaired.
escape
T h i s c a s e v/as a m o t i o n i n a r r e s t o f judgment a f t e r judgment
c e l l a r which
it
v
, v/as c o n c e r n e d n o t w i t h t h e e s c a p e of a n i m a l s but w i t h t h e
filth.
default
care.
to
that,
the a l l e g a t i o n t h a t
b e i n g an i n f e r e n c e
of
law
alleged.
t h e r e was
a sufficient
He
d i d n o t d e c i d e t h i s on t h e s o l e b a t
it
v/as enough t o s a y t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f had a h o u s e and
c a u s e of
action.
o r t h e de i u r e d e b u i t r e p a r a r i
the defendant
since
had
11
a w a l l and he ought t o h a v e r e p a i r e d t h e w a l l .
"The
L o r d Raymond commented:
r e a s o n o f t h i s c a s e i s upon t h i s a c c o u n t , t h a t
own
a s n o t t o do damage t o a n o t h e r ; and a s e v e r y man
his
c a t t l e a s t o k e e p them out o f h i s n e i g h b o u r ' s
everyone
must s o u s e h i s
i s bound s o t o l o o k
ground, t h a t s o he
to
may
r e c e i v e no damage; s o he must k e e p i n t h e f i l t h o f h i s house of o f f i c e t h a t
it
may
n o t f l o w i n upon and d a m n i f y h i s n e i g h b o u r . "
L o r d H o l t ' s reasoning-
c a n be s e e n t o c o r r e s p o n d v e r y c l o s e l y w i t h t h a t o f B r i a n
11.
2 L d . Raym. 1089
a t page
1092.
5
C.J.
The r e a s o n f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s u c h d u t i e s a s t h i s duty
r e p a i r was
The
t h a t they e i t h e r a f f o r d e d p r o t e c t i o n or provided a b e n e f i t .
d e f e n d a n t had
e i t h e r t o deny t h e duty o r t o p l e a d t h a t he had
formed i t ; t o deny f a u l t was n o t a p r o p e r p l e a .
T h a t t h i s was
prevent t h e i r escape.
Nor
d i l i g e n t l y t h e d e f e n d a n t had
i s t h e r e any a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e
knew o f t h e bad c o n d i t i o n o f t h e w a l l , t h a t i t was
was
likened
defendant's o b l i g a t i o n t o r e p a i r the w a l l t o the duty t o r e s t r a i n
c a t t l e i n w h i c h i t was i m m a t e r i a l how
to
per-
Lord
H o l t ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e duty would a p p e a r from t h e f a c t t h a t he
the
to
r e m i s s i n not d i s c o v e r i n g i t .
I t was
defendant
obvious or t h a t
he
evident to Lord Holt that
d u t y o f r e p a i r r e q u i r e d t h e w a l l t o be a c t u a l l y i n good o r d e r , s o
s h o u l d i n f a c t be s u f f i c i e n t
tried
to keep the f i l t h i n .
the
that i t
The d e f e n d a n t ' s
conduct
is
i m p o r t a n t o n l y a s a means o f a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h i s r e q u i r e d r e s u l t and n o t
as
a t h i n g which i n i t s e l f
determines h i s l i a b i l i t y .
We
are looking at the
matter i n a wholly o b j e c t i v e f a s h i o n , p u r e l y e x t e r n a l to the defendant.
conduct
his
to
i s j u d g e d s o l e l y by i t s r e s u l t and not by h i s s u b j e c t i v e
His
attitude,
d e l i b e r a t e d i s r e g a r d o f h i s n e i g h b o u r ' s s a f e t y n o r even by h i s o m i s s i o n
d i l i g e n t l y take those steps n e c e s s a r y to secure that
safety.
12
Blackburn J .
was
next r e f e r r e d to the escape of noxious vapours.
u n a b l e t o quote any d e c i s i o n s on t h e p r e c i s e p o i n t b u t gave an
t i o n from
a g a i n s t t h e owners o f some a l k a l i works f o r a l l e g e d
damage c a u s e d by fumes.
I t was shown t h a t a l l p o s s i b l e p r e c a u t i o n s had
been t a k e n ' b u t t h e j u r y d e c i d e d t h a t t h e fumes must have
J.
illustra-
a c a s e a few y e a r s b e f o r e R y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r i n w h i c h t h r e e
a c t i o n s were b r o u g h t
and i t was
He
t h u s h e l d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was
liable.
escaped,
somehow,
The v e r d i c t , B l a c k b u r n
s t a t e d , was n o t d i s p u t e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t on t h e ground t h a t a l l p r o p e r
c a r e had been t a k e n .
B l a c k b u r n J . t h u s d e r i v e d t h e r u l e i n R y l a n d s v F l e t c h e r from
12.
At page 285.
6.
cases
concerned w i t h the escape
w i t h the escape
o f c a t t l e and
o f fumes.
a n o t i o n a l case concerned
T h i s p r o c e s s o f r e a d i n g h a s a marked
to the i n d u c t i v e p r o c e s s .
from t h e o b s e r v e d
f i l t h and
on
similarity
I n d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g i s a p r o c e s s whereby we
to the unobserved, concluding
argue
t h a t some q u a l i t y found t o
r e s i d e i n a l l observed
members o f a c l a s s must t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r i l y r e s i d e
i n a l l o t h e r members.
Thus i n R y l a n d s
v F l e t c h e r we
from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e were r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g
v a r i o u s o t h e r t h i n g s and
escape
the escape
starting
o f c a t t l e and
of
e n d i n g by p o s i t i n g a r u l e f o r a l l t h i n g s whose
i s l i a b l e to cause
of i n d u c t i o n .
see the court
damage.
T h i s i t w i l l be
s e e n i s not a t r u e c a s e
T h e r e would be a g e n u i n e example o f i n d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g
for
example, a n o n - l a w y e r , h a v i n g
of
cattle
and
v a r i o u s o t h e r s i m i l a r r u l e s went on t o i n f e r t h a t E n g l i s h lav; h a s a
strict
r u l e regarding a l l those
t h i s may
be
t r u e but
t h i n g s whose e s c a p e
might c a u s e harm.
In practice
i t does n o t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w from
b a s i c p r e m i s e t h a t i t w i l l be
the c o u r t d i d not
d i s c o v e r e d a r u l e about t h e e s c a p e
i f ,.
true.
On
i n f e r t h a t E n g l i s h law
t h e o t h e r hand i n E y l a n d s
contained
the
v Fletcher
such a r u l e , i t decided
that i t did.
Whether i n d e c i d i n g R y l a n d s
v F l e t c h e r the court e s t a b l i s h e d a
r u l e o f law o r m e r e l y r e i t e r a t e d a j s r e - e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e w i l l be
s h o r t l y but
of Lords
13
i t i s now
n e c e s s a r y to look
to Blackburn
t h e h e a r i n g but
far
t h i s i s not
Doubts h a v e been
c o n s i s t e d of the n e c e s s a r y
germane t o t h e i s s u e f o r R y l a n d s
the Court
at
v Fletcher i s
What
judgments were d e l i v e r e d i n t h e House, by t h e
C h a n c e l l o r , L o r d C a i r n s j a n d by L o r d
The
expressed
t h r e e judges
too w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d a c a s e t o f o u n d e r on s u c h a t e c h n i c a l i t y .
a r e s u r e o f i s t h a t two
discussed
a t t h e a t t i t u d e t a k e n by t h e House
J . s judgment on a p p e a l .
a s t o w h e t h e r t h e House o f L o r d s
new-
we
Lord
Cranworth.
L o r d C h a n c e l l o r b a s e d h i s judgment a f f i r m i n g t h e d e c i s i o n o f
o f E x c h e q u e r Chamber on two
p r o p o s i t i o n s of law.
First,
Lord
C a i r n s s t a t e d t h a t i n c a s e s s u c h a s t h i s t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d l a w f u l l y have
u s e d t h e l a n d f o r any p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h i t might i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e
13.
Ik.
L.R. 3 I I . L . 330
S e e 19 L.T. 220
and 19 L . T . 2 2 0
a t page 221.
7.
of
1 if
the
enjoyment
o f l a n d , be u s e d , and i f i n s u c h ' n a t u r a l u s e r ' o f t h a t
l a n d , a s he termed
i t , t h e r e was
s u r f a c e o r underground
any a c c u m u l a t i o n o f w a t e r w h e t h e r
on t h e
and i f by t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e t h a t
a c c u m u l a t i o n o f w a t e r had p a s s e d i n t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d , t h e n t h e
c o u l d not complain a t law.
this
The L o r d C h a n c e l l o r c i t e d
p r o p o s i t i o n t h e c a s e of Smith v K e n r i c k .
the
as h i s a u t h o r i t y f o r
I n t h a t c a s e t h e owner o f
a c o a l mine v/orked out a l l o f h i s c o a l and s o l e f t
mine and t h e mine on t h e l o w e r l e v e l
plaintiff
no b a r r i e r between h i s
so t h a t the water p e r c o l a t e d
through
upper mine, f l o w e d i n t o t h e l o w e r mine and o b s t r u c t e d t h e owner o f i t i n
getting i n h i s coal.
I t was h e l d t h a t on t h e f a c t s t h e r e was no
liability
s i n c e t h e d e f e n d a n t had a r i g h t t o remove a l l h i s c o a l and t h e damage
was
c a u s e d by t h e n a t u r a l f l o w o r p e r c o l a t i o n o f t h e w a t e r .
Secondly Lord C a i r n s s a i d t h a t i f the defendant, not being
satisfied
w i t h a m e r e l y n a t u r a l u s e r o f h i s l a n d , wanted t o u s e i t f o r any n o n - n a t u r a l
u s e r i n o r d e r t o b r i n g i n t o o r on t h e l a n d t h a t w h i c h , i n i t s n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n , was n o t i n o r on t h e l a n d , and i f i n c o n s e q u e n c e
i n consequence
of h i s doing so or
o f any i m p e r f e c t i o n i n t h e mode o f h i s d o i n g s o t h e w a t e r
happened t o e s c a p e and t o p a s s i n t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
i n s o b e h a v i n g i s a c t i n g a t h i s own
l a n d , then the
defendant
p e r i l and i f i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h i s
w a t e r e s c a p e d and p a s s e d on t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d and i n j u r e d t h e
then f o r the consequences
t h e r e o f the defendant
i s liable.
the
plaintiff
For t h i s
second
p r i n c i p l e L o r d C a i r n s q u o t e d a s h i s a u t h o r i t y t h e c a s e o f Btjrd v W i l l i a m s o n ? ^
In
t h a t c a s e t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e owner o f t h e upper mine, d i d n o t
m e r e l y s u f f e r t h e w a t e r t o f l o w t h r o u g h h i s mine w i t h o u t l e a v i n g a b a r r i e r
between i t and t h e mine below b u t , i n o r d e r t o work h i s own
mine more
b e n e f i c i a l l y , he pumped up l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s o f w a t e r w h i c h p a s s e d i n t o
the
p l a i n t i f f ' s mine i n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t w h i c h would n a t u r a l l y have r e a c h e d i t
and s o o c c a s i o n e d t h e p l a i n t i f f
15.
? C.B.
16.
15 C.B. (N.5.) 376
damage.
515
8.
He was
h e l d t o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
the
damage so occasioned a l t h o u g h t h i s was done w i t h o u t n e g l i g e n c e .
i n consequence o f h i s a c t , whether s k i l f u l l y
the
I t was
or c a r e l e s s l y performed, t h a t
p l a i n t i f f had been damaged and t h e defendant was t h e r e f o r e h e l d l i a b l e
f o r t h e consequences.
The damage i n t h e former case (Smith v K e n r i c k )
be t r e a t e d as h a v i n g a r i s e n from t h e a c t o f God,
may
i n t h i s case from t h e a c t
of the defendant.
The Lord C h a n c e l l o r e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d i n h i s judgment t h a t he
w i t h a l l t h a t B l a c k b u r n J . had s a i d .
A l l t h a t L o r d C a i r n s d i d was
concurred
t o put
s t r e s s on an a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r , t h a t o f t h e n o n - n a t u r a l u s e r o f l a n d ; so
m o d i f y i n g t h e e f f e c t o f B l a c k b u r n J.'s judgment.
This a d d i t i o n a l
criterion
17
l e d McDonald J . i n P o r t e r v B e l l
me
t o say t h a t " t h e t r u e s i t u a t i o n seems t o
t o be t h a t t h e r e i s n o t one r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r b u t two; and
that
B l a c k b u r n J.'s v e r s i o n o r L o r d C a i r n s-. more f l e x i b l e one i s invoked a c c o r d i n g
;
t o the c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e case i n hand."
the
c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e case.
This, i t i s submitted, i s not
There a r e n o t two r u l e s b u t
a l t h o u g h t h a t p a r t o f t h e one r u l e which i s concerned
i s t h e more f l e x i b l e p a r t and may
one,
w i t h non-natural user
v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o s o c i a l and economic
expedience and g e n e r a l m a t t e r s o f p o l i c y - i t i s t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y e l a s t i c
p a r t o f any r u l e which can be v a r i e d so as t o r e p r e s e n t t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e
court.
The statement o f t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r which t h u s r e s u l t s
from t h e o p i n i o n s o f B l a c k b u r n J . and L o r d C a i r n s can be p u t as f o l l o w s : a
person who,
i n t h e course o f t h e n o n - n a t u r a l u s e r o f l a n d , i s h e l d t o be
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n on i t o f a n y t h i n g l i k e l y t o do harm i f i t
escapes i s l i a b l e f o r t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e use o f l a n d o f a n o t h e r
which r e s u l t s from t h e escape o f t h e t h i n g from h i s l a n d .
The second judgment i n t h e House o f LorriP d i d n o t h i n g t o a l t e r
Lord Cranworth
this.
endorsed t h e Lord C h a n c e l l o r ' s o p i n i o n s and s a i d t h a t i n
18
cases o f t h i s n a t u r e
plaintiff
" i n c o n s i d e r i n g whether a defendant i s l i a b l e t o a
f o r damage which t h e p l a i n t i f f may
have s u s t a i n e d t h e q u e s t i o n i n
g e n e r a l i s not whether t h e defendant has a c t e d w i t h due c a r e and c a u t i o n b u t
17
18
1955 1 D.L.R. 62
19 LT 220 a t page 222.
9
whether h i s a c t s have occasioned t h e damage".
He c i t e d as h i s a u t h o r i t y
19
t h e case o f Lambert v Bessey.
V/e must now t u r n our minds t o t h e q u e s t i o n 6 f whether t h i s
prin-
c i p l e was i n d e e d a v a l i d g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r i n g one who c o l l e c t s
upon h i s l a n d f o r e i g n substances l i k e l y t o escape t o c o n f i n e them a t h i s
peril.
The o p i n i o n s d e n y i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f such a p r i n c i p l e were urged
20
by M a r t i n B. i n t h e Court o f Exchequer.
These b r i e f l y were t h a t t h e
defendent's a c t i s n o t a t r e s p a s s f o r t h e damage i s n o t d i r e c t b u t cons e q u e n t i a l ; n o r i s i t a n u i s a n c e f o r t h e r e i s no c o n t i n u o u s o f f e n s i v e o r
injurious condition.
F u r t h e r t h e a c t i o n on t h e case f o r t h e spread o f
f i r e i s an anomalous e x c e p t i o n and f i n a l l y " t h e r e i s no-reason why damage
t o r e a l p r o p e r t y s h o u l d be governed by a d i f f e r e n t r u l e and p r i n c i p l e t h a n
damage t o p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y where p r o 6 f o f n e g l i g e n c e i s e s s e n t i a l t o
recovery."
These o b j e c t i o n s a r e t a k e n f u r t h e r by P r o f e s s o r W i n f i e l d i n h i s
22
a r t i c l e "The Myth o f A b s o l u t e L i a b i l i t y " .
P r o f e s s o r W i n f i e l d t a k e s about
150 examples o f t r e s p a s s from Brooke's Abridgement Cases o f t h e f o u r t e e n t h
century.
These cases show t h a t i t was no t r e s p a s s t o hunt on y o u r l a n d
w i t h your l i c e n c e o r t o t a k e goods by t h e S h e r i f f ' s agency when
judgement
has been made o r t o rescue your goods which have been thrown overboerd i n
a storm o r t o a c t i n s e l f defence.
I n n u i s a n c e i t was l i k e w i s e i n many
cases a v a l i d defence f o r t h e defendant t o show t h a t he was i n e f f e c t
without
fault.
As f a r as f i r e was concerned we a r e u s u a l l y t o l d t h a t a t common law
a man must keep h i s f i r e a t h i s p e r i l .
Most w r i t e r s on t h e t o p i c seem t o
c o n s i d e r t h a t a p a r t from a s t a t u t e o f 177^ which came r e l a t i v e l y l a t e i n
23
t h e development
o f t h e lav/ t h i s has always been so.
t h e r e i s l i t t l e evidence f o r t h i s a s s e r t i o n .
W i n f i e l d argues
Only one case on f i r e
that
appears
i n t h e R o l l s S e r i e s e d i t i o n s o f t h e Year Books and none i n t h e Selden
S o c i e t y s e r i e s . Cases quoted i n t h e Year Books a r e g e n e r a l l y i n c l u s i v e .
19 1681. T. Raym. 4 2 1 .
20 3 Hand C. 791 (1865)
2k
F u r t h e r , i n t h e i m p o r t a n t esse o f T u r b e r v i l l e v Stampe
t h r e e judges
t o one h e l d t h a t t h e l i a b i l i t y extended t o a f i r e o r i g i n a t i n g i n a
f i e l d j u s t as much as i n a house b u t t h a t i f a sudden storm had a r i s e n
which l e f t t h e defendant h e l p l e s s t h i s c o u l d be shown in evidence. I t
was a l s o s a i d t h a t what a r e now known as a c t s o f a strango* and i n e v i t a b l e
a c c i d e n t would i n a d d i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e v a l i d
defences.
To d e t e r m i n e t h e v a l i d i t y o f these o b j e c t i o n s we must go back t o
25
t h e e a r l i e s t days o f t h e common Law.
As Bohlen says
we cannot expect
t o f i n d any g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e expounded i n t h e e a r l i e s t cases.
The
common law as e n f o r c e d by t h e King's c o u r t s o r i g i n a t e d i n a s e r i e s o f
s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s which were r i g i d and gave r e d r e s s o n l y i n c e r t a i n
situations.
I t was n o t u n t i l t h e S t a t u t e o f Westminster I I ,
i n consimiDjt
casu, c r e a t e d t h e a c t i o n o f t r e s p a s s on t h e case t h a t t h e l a w began t o
expand.
Even then i t expanded s l o w l y and by a n a l o g y .
There were s e v e r a l e a r l y a c t i o n s which gave a remedy t o landowners
whose l a n d was i n j u r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by an a c t done o r c o n d i t i o n c r e a t e d by
an a d j a c e n t
owner on h i s own l a n d o r as a consequence o f t h e use t o which
26
the l a t t e r put i t .
These a c t i o n s a r e e x p l a i n e d by Salmond.
and a t g r e a t e r
27
l e n g t h by Bohlen.
F i r s t , t h e r e was t h e a c t i o n o f t r e s p a s s , where t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
l a n d was d i r e c t l y i n v a d e d as a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e defendant's a c t .
Then t h e r e was t h e a s s i z e o f nuisance i n which t h e o b j e c t o f t h e remedy
was s p e c i f i c r e l i e f and i n which t h e r e c o v e r y
o f damages v/as n o t t h e
p r i m a r y o b j e c t o f t h e a c t i o n b u t m e r e l y an i n c i d e n t t o t h e s p e c i f i c
relief.
T h i r d l y t h e r e was t h e a c t i o n o f t r e s p a s s f o r t h e escape o f
c a t t l e and f o u r t h l y t h e r e was t h e a c t i o n on t h e case f o r harm done by
t h e spread o f f i r e s t a r t e d on t h e defendant's premises.
Bohlen, t a k i n g
a d i f f e r e n e ^ y v i e w t o t h a t which W i n f i e l d was l a t e r t o t a k e , says t h a t
2k.
each
25.
26
27
1697
1 Ld.
o
f these
a c Raym.
t i o n s 26k.
lay irrespective of fault.
At page 353
15th Ed. page kOk
A t page 35k
11
He t h e n p o i n t s o u t t h a t these a c t i o n s cover a l l t h e s i t u a t i o n s i n
which harm would be l i k e l y t o r e s u l t t o one man's l a n d by reason o f
simple s t a t e o f s o c i e t y .
From t h i s t h e c o n c l u s i o n i s drawn t h a t "these
are a l l b u t a p p l i c a t i o n s t o t h e v a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n s o f some underlyingg e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e imposing l i a b i l i t y
the f a u l t o f i t s author".
f o r harm t o l a n d w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o
Bohlen c i t e s t h e case i n Y.B. 6 Ed. 1, 7 Pl«
18, 1*f6 which i s somewhat i n a d e q u a t e l y
r e p o r t e d i n Lambert v Bessey.
Thesquestion was whether a man had t h e r i g h t t o e n t e r t h e l a n d o f
another t o r e t a k e t h o r n s which had f a l l e n upon h i s neighbour's l a n d when
he c l i p p e d h i s hedge.
The defendant i n s i s t e d t h a t he c o u l d n o t be l i a b l e
because h i s c u t t i n g was l a w f u l and he d i d n o t i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a s t them upon
his
n e i g h b o u r ' s l a n d : - t h a t t h e harm done was damnum absque i n i v r i a .
and L i t t l e t o n J.J. a s s e r t e d t h e o l d c o n c e p t i o n
Brian
:
t h a t "where any man. does a
t h i n g , he i s h e l d t o do i t i n such a way t h a t t h r o u g h h i s a c t no p r e j u d i c e ,
o r damage, s h a l l happen t o o t h e r s " ( p e r B r i a n J.) "and t h a t i f a man has
been damaged, he ought t o be recompensed" ( L i t t l e t o n J.) The case was one
o f t r e s p a s s t o r e a l p r o p e r t y b u t t h e p r i n c i p l e was s t a t e d b r o a d l y and n o t
l i m i t e d i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o such cases.
There i s t h e r e f o r e every reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l conc e p t i o n was t h a t l e g a l l i a b i l i t y
f o r i n j u r y o f a l l k i n d s depended n o t upon
t h e a c t o r ' s f a u l t b u t upon t h e f a c t t h a t h i s a c t had c l e a r l y caused harm t o
the p l a i n t i f f .
Bohlen takes t h e orthodox view eschewed by P r o f e s s o r
Winfield
t h a t i n t r e s p a s s t o r e a l p r o p e r t y , i n n u i s a n c e and i n a c t i o n s on t h e case f o r
t h e spread o f f i r e t h e defendant who i s w i t h o u t f a u l t i s as l i a b l e today as
he was i n 1'+61.
I t i s c l e a r t h e n , says Bohlen, t h a t B l a c k b u r n J . d i d n o t
make new lav; b u t m e r e l y a p p l i e d t o a n o v e l s i t u a t i o n , c l o s i n g analogous t o
those r e d r e s s e d
i n e x i s t i n g a c t i o n s , a p r i n c i p l e p l a i n l y deducible
from t h e
d e c i s i o n s t h e r e i n and i n d o i n g so was f o l l o w i n g t h e time-honoured custom o f
12
E n g l i s h c o u r t s o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a new remedy upon f a c t s c l o s e l y cognate t o
those covered by t h e former a c t i o n s .
T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f l e g a l l i a b i l i t y has, however, come i n f o r s t r o n g
c r i t i c i s m i n Milsom.'s r e c e n t book ' H i s t o r i c a l Foundations
o f t h e Common Law.'
""Milsom p o i n t s o u t t h a t i n t h e whole o f t h e Year Books t h e r e i s no s p e c i a l
p l e a o f a c c i d e n t i n t r e s p a s s and t h a t t h i s has l e d most h i s t o r i a n s t o t h i n k
t h a t l i a b i l i t y was s t r i c t o r a b s o l u t e .
I t seems l i k e l y , he says, t h a t •-
a c c i d e n t v/as n o t i r r e l e v a n t i n t h e Year Book p e r i o d b u t had been pushed back
i n t o the general d e n i a l i n trespass.
I t would then be d i s c u s s e d b e f o r e t h e
j u r y a t n i s i p r i u s and was o f no i n t e r e s t t o p l e a d e r s o r t h e i r r e p o r t e r s .
In
t h e l a t e r Year Books t h e r e a r e two d i s c u s s i o n s o f a c c i d e n t , b o t h
r a i s e d i n c i d e n t a l l y by p l e a s c o n c e r n i n g d e l i b e r a t e a c t s .
Both are amateurish
and t h i s c o n f i r m s t h a t t h e m a t t e r was n o t a s u b j e c t o f p r o f e s s i o r a j d i s c u s s i o n .
But t h i s , he says, i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t j u r i e s were
l e f t t o s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n as best t h e y c o u l d .
The same i s suggested
by a case o f 1695 where i n an a c t i o n f o r b a t t e r y t h e defendant pleaded
that
he v/as r i d i n g on h i s h o r s e , t h e horse b o l t e d , he shouted a w a r n i n g b u t t h e
p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o jump c l e a r , and so he r a n him down by a c c i d e n t .
h e l d l i a b l e because t h i s was no j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
He was
A l l t h e r e p o r t s note-an
o b s e r v a t i b n by t h e c o u r t t h a t he s h o u l d have pleaded t h e g e n e r a l i s s u e and
g i v e n these f a c t s i n evidence.
I f they
V7ere
t r u e , he had n o t committed
a
battery.
He goes on t o say t h a t f a u l t i n t r e s p a s s v i e t armis seems t o be
one o f those areas which were l o n g p r o t e c t e d from s y s t e m a t i c l e g a l
by t h e primacy o f t h e g e n e r a l i s s u e .
thought
B u t , a l t h o u g h t h i s may seem a more
a c c e p t a b l e c o n c l u s i o n tha;t i t s o n l y r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e which i s t o b e l i e v e
i n an almost a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y , we must n o t assume t h a t j u r i e s were e a s i l y
moved by h a r d l u c k s t o r i e s .
The l a t e Year Book d i s c u s s i o n s and t h e Seven-
t e e n t h Century r e p o r t s a l l suggest t h a t t h e defendant had t o be so f r e e o f
28.
Page 25^.
13
f a u l t t h a t i n some sense he d i d n o t do t h e harm.
A horse c o u l d b o l t
because o f a s t r a n g e r ' s a c t , a c l a p o f t h u n d e r , o r i t s own
3
1
i t v/ss e a s i e r t o f i n d i t s r i d e r n o t g u i l t y the :*! th* *
the
f a n c y ; and
vjh^ v-—s Vsol^ivig
r
gun when i t went o f f .
Milsom i s t h u s showing not t h a t n e g l i g e n c e was
p a r t o f e a r l y lav/ b u t r a t h e r t h a t l i a b i l i t y t h e n was
He does r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h i s l i a b i l i t y was
an e s s e n t i a l
f a r from a b s o l u t e .
s t r i c t e r than o r d i n a r y n e g l i -
gence -and so, i t i s suggested, h i s view i s not r e a l l y as d i f f e r e n t
t h a t o f W i n f i e l d as might appear a t f i r s t s i g h t .
of
from
Any d i f f e r e n c e i s one
degree o f s t r i c t n e s s r a t h e r than one o f p r i n c i p l e .
Bohlen c r i t i c i s e d t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r on t h e b a s i s
t h a t i t was
t o o narrow r a t h e r than t o o broad i n i t s f o r m u l a t i o n - t h a t
B l a c k b u r n J . d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e a c t i o n s o f t r e s p a s s f o r harm d i r e c t l y
done by one land-owner t o a n o t h e r .
He seems t o g i v e a b a s i c a l l y economic
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e r u l e , s a y i n g t h a t i t was
the r e s u l t o f the E n g l i s h
judges' i n c l i n a t i o n t o p r o t e c t landowners a g a i n s t t h e i n v a s i o n o f t h e i r
p r o p e r t y by t h e newer c l a s s o f people engaged i n t h e e x p l o r a t i o n o f
n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , a view r e s t a t e d by P r o f e s s o r Horsrisin h i s a r t i c l e
29
'Hazardous e n t e r p r i s e s and R i s k - B e a r i n g C a p a c i t y . '
30
As:.is p o i n t e d out by Fridman
T o p i c s on t h e Law
o f T o r t s ' t h e r e i s l i t t l e i n t h e judgment o f B l a c k b u r n
J. t o support t h i s view.
the
of
and by Prosser i n h i s 'Selected
The language o f h i s judgement i s concerned
assessment o f l i a b i l i t y
p r o t e c t i n g landowners.
f o r c a u s i n g harm and not w i t h t h e
with
importance
The s i m p l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e judgment i s
based upon t h e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f pre-Common Law
Procedure
A c t 1852 i d e a s about l i a b i l i t y i n t o a p e r i o d when some o f t h e judges were
beginning t o f e e l less r e s t r i c t e d i n t h e i r outlook.
The p r i n c i p l e i n
Bylands v F l e t c h e r was n o t d e l i b e r a t e l y produced f o r t h e purpose o f
29.
30.
1952 61 Yale L.J. page 1172.
1956 Canadian Bar Review page 810.
14
r e s t r i c t i n g i n d u s t r i a l growth a l t h o u g h t h a t purpose may have been a
supplementary
factor i n thedecision.
I t was founded p r i m a r i l y on t h e
medieval m o r a l i d e a t h a t a man a c t s a t h i s p e r i l .
The Common Law Procedure Act 1852 f r e e d t h e common law o f t h e
bonds p r e v i o u s l y imposed upon t h e development o f i t s p r i n c i p l e s by
the
medieval forms o f a c t i o n .
Throughout t h e r e m a i n i n g p a r t o f t h e
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e c o u r t s were b e t t e r a b l e t o adapt t h e lav/ t o
the
needs o f a changing community.
A d a p t a t i o n was n e c e s s a r y ^ f o r t h e l a w
s u i t a b l e t o a p r e d o m i n a n t l y a g r i c u l t u r a l s o c i e t y was u n s u i t e d t o an
expanding i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e .
T h i s was seen by a t l e a s t some o f t h e
judges who began t o t u r n t h e law o f nuisance and t r e s p a s s away from
the
f o r m e r l y d o m i n a t i n g n o t i o n o f l i a b i l i t y based on t h e i d e a t h a t a man
acts at h i s p e r i l .
The change o f d i r e c t i o n was achieved by t h e g r a d u a l l y
more extended use o f t h e concepts o f n e g l i g e n c e and unreasonable
con-
duct i n f i e l d s o f law from which h i t h e r t o those i d e a s had been l a r g e l y
excluded.
in
The law o f n e g l i g e n c e was a l l t h e t i m e growing i n scope and
importance.
I n t o t h e c r u c i b l e where a l l these i d e a s were i n t e r a c t i n g ,
J . threw an i d e a which had a h a r d e n i n g e f f e c t .
Blackburn
I n d e l i v e r i n g h i s judge-
ment he-seems t o have t r i e d t o p u t a s t o p t o o r a t l e a s t t o l i m i t t h e
freedom o f change and development which t h e common law had begun t o
enjoy.
At a t i m e when t h e c o u r t s were making t h e law o f t o r t i n t o a more
f l e x i b l e and reasonable i n s t r u m e n t f o r t h e b a l a n c i n g o f c o n f l i c t i n g
s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s he r e t u r n e d t o t h e m e d i e v a l p e r i o d w i t h i t s ideas o f
strict
liability.
We have up t o now s t u d i e d t h e h i s t o r i c a l background o f t h e d e c i s i o n
and a t t e m p t e d t o p l a c e i t i n i t s c o r r e c t p o s i t i o n i n t h e development o f
our l a w .
We must now c o n s i d e r t h e e x t e n t t o which B l a c k b u r n J.'s j u d g e -
ment i n v o l v e d n o v e l i d e a s .
15
s
^
Bohlen, as we have seen, regarded t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
31
as merely a l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n o f p r e y i o u s law.
Ames
, on t h e o t h e r
hand, regarded t h e judgment as i n v o l v i n g c o m p l e t e l y new t h o u g h t s . I t
was i n h i s view a judgment t h a t caught up and r e c o n c i l e d t h e a b s o l u t e
l i a b i l i t i e s a l r e a d y p r e d i c a t e d as w e l l i n t h e r u l e s j u s t above;; mentioned
( c o n s e q u e n t i a l damage o f an u n l a w f u l a c t , and 'So use your own as n o t
to
i n j u r e a n o t h e r ' s ) as i n t h e r e m a i n i n g r u l e s f o r t r e s p a s s by a c t s
done a t p e r i l ; i t f u r n i s h e d a g e n e r a l c a t e g o r y i n which a l l such r u l e s ,
32
whenever f o r m u l a t e d , c o u l d be p l a c e d .
Holdsworth
a l s o regarded t h e
p r i n c i p l e i n t h e case as new; i n scope and d i r e c t i o n i f n o t i n language.
He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n medieval laiv l i t t l e o r no a t t e m p t was made t o
try
t h e i n t e n t o f a man and t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f n e g l i g e n c e had as y e t
hardly arisen.
These i d e a s , a c c o r d i n g t o H o l d s w o r t h , were c a r r i e d
over
and adapted f o r modern law by Rylands v F l e t c h e r v/hich l a i d t h e f o u n d a t i o n
s t o n e f o r t h e modern r u l e s on dangerous a c t s .
One p o i n t on v/hich t h e r e can be no d i s p u t e i s t h a t t h e eminent
judges who decided t h e case were unconscious o f any r e v o l u t i o n a r y p r i n c i p l e i m p l i c i t i n t h e i r own d e c i s i o n .
Thus B l a c k b u r n 0. s a i d " I wasted
much t i m e i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e judgment i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i f I
did
n o t succeed i n showing t h a t t h e l a w h e l d t o govern i t had been l a w
for
a t l e a s t t h r e e hundred y e a r s . "
I t . w a s t o t h e judges n o t h i n g more
than a restatement o f e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s , p r i n c i p l e s dubiously
d e s c r i b e d by L o r d C a i r n s as 'extremely s i m p l e . ' ^
5k
Newark i n h i s a r t i c l e 'The Boundaries o f Nuisance'
agrees w i t h
L o r d C a i r n s as t o t h e s i m p l i c i t y o f t h e p r i n c i p l e i n t h e case b u t t h e
p r i n c i p l e i n Newark's mind i s t h a t n e g l i g e n c e i s n o t an element i n t h e
31-f' R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r T o r t i o u s A c t s : I t s H i s t o r y , 3 S e l e c t Essays i n
Anglo-American L e g a l H i s t o r y (1909) page W?h a t pp.516-520.
32. H i s t o r y o f E n g l i s h Law V o l . 8 page ^68.
33.
19 LT. 220 a t page 221.
3k. 65 L.Q.R. (19^+9) page ^ 0 .
16.
t o r t of nuisance.
B l a c k b u r n J . , he s d m i t s , never used t h e word nuisance
i n h i s judgment n o r d i d he r e l y on cases o f n u i s a n c e , b u t he d i d c i t e
i n h i s judgment t h e case o f fumes escaping from an a l k a l i works as an
i n s t a n c e o f l i a b i l i t y under t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e he c l a i m e d he v/as
r e i t e r a t i n g ; t h i s b e i n g a c l e a r example o f n u i s a n c e .
35
Newark goes on t o say:
" t h e p r o f e s s i o n as a whole f a i l e d t o see
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r a s i m p l e case o f n u i s a n c e .
They regarded i t as
an
e x c e p t i o n a l case and t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r as a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n
of
e x c e p t i o n a l cases.
They t h e r e f o r e jumped r a s h l y t o two c o n c l u s i o n s :
f i r s t , t h a t t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r c o u l d be extended beyond t h e
case o f n e i g h b o u r i n g o c c u p i e r s and asecondly t h e t t h e r u l e c o u l d be used
to
a f f o r d a remedy i n cases o f p e r s o n a l i n j u r y .
Both these c o n c l u s i o n s
were denied by L o r d M a c M i l l a n i n Read v Lyon's b u t i t remains t o be seen
v/hether t h e House o f Lords w i l l s u p p o r t h i s o p i n i o n when t h e p r e c i s e
p o i n t comes up f o r d e c i s i o n . "
T h i s paragraph exposes t h e f l a w i n Newark's argument f o r by h i s
c r i t e r i a o f 19^9 i t
j u d i c i a r y who
i s now
i n 1973
not only the p r o f e s s i o n but also the
do n o t see Rylands v F l e t c h e r as a c l e a r case o f nuisance
37
i f indeed t h e j u d i c i a r y ever d i d see i t as such.
the
Lord M a c M i l l a n
was
o n l y L o r d i n Read v Lyons t o express a d e f i n i t e view on whether
n e g l i g e n c e i s e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e r e t o be l i a b i l i t y
f o r personal i n j u r i e s .
Other judges e x p r e s s l y l e f t
t h e p o i n t open and L o r d M a c M i l l a n ' s view v/as
38
n o t accepted subsequently by t h e Court o f Appeal i n Hale v Jennings
or
39
Perry v Kendricks.
to
Doubts must a l s o be expressed
neighbouring occupiers.
The l a n d s o f t h e p l a i n t i f f
on t h e p o i n t
and t h e
relating
defendants
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r were n o t i n f a c t a d j o i n i n g , and i n Read v Lyons
L o r d P o r t e r s a i d t h a t what v/as r e q u i r e d was
"escape from t h e p l a c e i n
which t h e dangerous o b j e c t has been mained by t h e defendant t o some p l a c e
tain
35.
At page k8&.
36.
19^+7 A.C.156
37.
At page 173
38.
1938 I.A.E.R. 579
not subject t o h i s c o n t r o l " .
The
f a c t i s t h a t t h e c o u r t s were f a c e d -with a s e t o f f a c t s f o r
which t h e t h e n - e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e an adequate
solution.
The
t o r t o f nuisance c o u l d n o t a p p l y because i t had
t o be decided t h a t a person was
his
still
l i a b l e f o r t h e nuisances committed by
independent c o n t r a c t o r ; t h e defendant
was
n o t n e g l i g e n t and
the
n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e independent c o n t r a c t o r s was n o t m a t e r i a l
to
t h e d e c i s i o n ( L o r d Sinpn said, i n Read v Lyons; " t h e case was t r e a t e d
as d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any
of
negligence.")
question
Trespass, as L o r d Si/non p o i n t e d o u t , c o u l d n o t apply-
s i n c e t h e damage was n o t d i r e c t b u t c o n s e q u e n t i a l .
The
court, then,
had t o f i n d some f r e s h p r i n c i p l e o f law or a t l e a s t an e x t e n s i o n o f
already e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s .
of
P r e v i o u s cases were l i m i t e d t o t h e escapes
animals and o f f i l t h ; t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i s a g e n e r a l
which i s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e escape o f any dangerous o b j e c t .
s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f a l i a b i l i t y , now
w e l l developed, which was
I t was
rule
the
i n i t s own
f i e l d more embracing than any form o f t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y which preceded
it.
kO.
At page 178
18.
CHAPTER I I
Escape
1
B l a c k b u r n J . spoke i n h i s judgment i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
" a n y t h i n g l i k e l y t o do m i s c h i e f i t escapes".
of
T h i s need f o r an escape
has always been one o f t h e e s s e n t i a l elements o f t h e r u l e i n Rylands
Fletcher.
v
The n o t i o n o f an escape was c o n s i d e r e d by t h e c o u r t s on s e v e r a l
occasions between 1868
and 19^7 b u t i t was n o t u n t i l t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e
2
'
House o f Lords i n Read v Lyons t h a t i t s p r e c i s e d scope was c l a r i f i e d .
The concept i s now a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d one t h a n i t was a hundred
years
ago b u t i t remains i n essence t h e same.
I n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i t s e l f B l a c k b u r n J . c o n s i d e r e d t h e examples
o f c a t t l e escaping on t o a p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d , water escaping from t h e
defendant's r e s e r v o i r on t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d , and t h e escape o f f i l t h
and o f fumes from t h e defendant's l a n d on t o t h a t o f t h e p l a i n t i f f .
I t
seems c l e a r from t h e t e n o r o f h i s judgment and from t h e examples he gave
t h a t B l a c k b u r n J . r e g a r d e d escepe as meaning t h e escape o f some t a n g i b l e
o b j e c t from t h e l a n d o f t h e defendant t o t h e l a n d o f t h e p l a i n t i f f .
The
L o r d C h a n c e l l o r , L o r d C a i r n s , seems t o have been o f t h e same o p i n i o n i n
the House o f Lords f o r t h e escape was a l s o o f t h a t n a t u r e i n t h e two
3
cases on which he p l a c e d most r e l i a n c e i n h i s judgment, Smith v K e n r i c k
4
and Bayd v W i l l i a m s o n .
Subsequent cases d i d n o t h i n g t o a l t e r t h i s i m p r e s s i o n .
I n Ponting
5
v Noakes
a h o r s e was poisoned when i t a t e t h e l e a v e s o f t h e defendant's
yew t r e e by r e a c h i n g over t o h i s l a n d ; t h e t r e e n o t h a v i n g extended
the boundary between t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s .
over
I t was h e l d t h a t t h e r e
was no l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r because t h e l e a v e s had n o t escaped
from t h e defendant's l a n d .
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1866
1947
1849
1863
1894
1905
I n Midwood & Co. v Manchester C o r p o r a t i o n
L.R. 1 Ex. 265 a t pages 279.
280.
A.C.
156.
7 C.B. 515.
15C.B. (N.S.)576.
2 Q.B. 281.
2K.B. 59719.
t h e r u l e was h e l d a p p l i c a b l e where, a f t e r an e x p l o s i o n i n a c a b l e
b e l o n g i n g t o and l a i d
by t h e defendant
escaped i n t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
i n t h e highway, i n f l a m m a b l e gas
nearby house and s e t f i r e t o i t s c o n t e n t s
7
and t h e r u l e a l s o a p p l i e d i n West _v B r i s t o l Tramways Co. when fumes g i v e n
o f f by t h e defendant's
p l a n t s and shrubs.
c r e o s o t e escaped and i n j u r e d t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
The Midwood case was r e l i e d on by t h e Court o f Appeal
8
i n Charing Cross E l e c t r i c i t y Supply Co. v H y d r a u l i c Power Co.
when i t
' h e l d t h a t t h e r e was a s u f f i c i e n t escape where water from a main l a i d by
t h e defendant
company under t h e highway escaped and damaged t h e p l a i n t i f f
e l e c t r i c c a b l e which was near t o i t and under t h e same highway.
9
i n Howard v Furness Houlder L t d .
Similarly
'where t h e r e was an escape o f steam due
t o an e x p l o s i o n on b o a r d s h i p and t h e p l a i n t i f f , a welder on t h e s h i p ,
was
i n j u r e d $ i t was h e l d t h a t t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r c o u l d n o t
A
a p p l y s i n c e t h e r e had been no escape o f steam from t h e premises o f t h e
defendant
shipowner.
A s l i g h t m o d i f i c a t i o n t o t h e n o t i o n o f an escape was then seen when
i n two cases i t was decided
defendant's
t h a t , p r o v i d e d t h e r e was an escape from t h e
l a n d , i t d i d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y need t o be on t o l a n d owned by
10
the p l a i n t i f f .
I n S h i f f m a n v Grand P r i o r y o f t h e Order o f S t . John,
t h e defendants,
a t t h e request o f t h e l o c a l constabulary, erected a
casualty t e n t .
Nearby t h e y e r e c t e d a f l a g - p o l e which was s u p p o r t e d by
f o u r guy r o p e s .
A man was l e f t i n charge o f t h e t e n t ; i t a l s o b e i n g h i s
duty t o p r e v e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e f l a g p o l e .
C h i l d r e n who came t o
p l a y around t h e p o l e and t o swing on t h e ropes were r e p e a t e d l y
by t h e a t t e n d a n t t o keep away.
ordered
While t h e a t t e n d e n t was a s s i s t i n g a
c a s u a l t y i n s i d e t h e t e n t t h e c h i l d r e n caused t h e p o l e t o f a l l and i n j u r e
t h e p l a i n t i f f on l a n d o f which t h e defendant
was n o t i n o c c u p a t i o n b u t
which t h e p l a i n t i f f d i d n o t own. A t k i n s o n J . s a i d o b i t e r t h a t t h e r e was
7. 1908 2 K.B. ^
8. 1914 3 K.B. 772
9 . 1936 2 A.E.R. 781.
10.
1936 1 A.E.R. 557.
20.
l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
L i k e w i s e i n Hale v Jennings
the
p l a i n t i f f was t e n a n t o f a s t a n d orja f a i r ground b e l o n g i n g t o t h e d e f e n d a n t .
A c h a i r w i t h i t s occupant became detached
from a c h a i r - o - p l a n e , t h e p r o p e r t y
of and o p e r a t e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t , anc i n j u r e d t h e p l a i n t i f f .
I t was found
as a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t t h a t t h i s was due t o t h e r e c k l e s s n e s s o f t h e occupant
of
the car.
The Court o f Appeal, c o n s i s t i n g o f S l e s s e r , S c o t t and Clauson
L.J.J, h e l d t h a t t h e r u l e i n Rvlands v F l e t c h e r a p p l i e d where t h e r e had
been an escape from l a n d w i t h i n t h e p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l o f t h e d e f e n d a n t .
I t must however be conceded t h a t a l t h o u g h t h i s p o i n t was v i t a l t o t h e
d e c i s i o n i t does n o t appear t o have been f u l l y
argued.
Thus i n 1 9 ^ t h e p o s i t i o n seemed t o be c l e a r : f o r t h e r u l e i n
Rylands v F l e t c h e r t o a p p l y t h e r e had t o be an escape from t h e defendant's
l a n d o r a t l e a s t from t h e p a r t i c u l a r area w i t h i n h i s c o n t r o l .
This
apparent
s t a t e o f t h e law was now s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e by CasEels
J . i n Read v J . Lyons L t d . ~*
I n t h a t case t h e defendant was i n 19^2 i n t h e employment o f t h e
M i n i s t r y o f M u n i t i o n s as an i n s p e c t o r a t a f a c t o r y where h i g h e x p l o s i v e
s h e l l s f o r use i n t h e v/ar were f i l l e d .
A g a i n s t h e r w i l l she had been
d i r e c t e d t o v/ork t h e r e by t h e M i n i s t r y o f Labour and N a t i o n a l S e r v i c e .
defendants were t h e o c c u p i e r s o f t h e f a c t o r y and conducted
under an agreement w i t h t h e M i n i s t r y o f Supply.
The
i t s operations
That agreement made t h e
defendant u n d e r t a k e t h e o p e r a t i o n , management and maintenance o f t h e f a c t o r y
and made them g e n e r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n o f a l l t h e m a t e r i a l s
required.
By t h e agreement they were deemed t o be t h e employers o f employees
w o r k i n g a t t h e f a c t o r y a l t h o u g h t h e p l a i n t i f f , as an i n s p e c t o r , was d i r e c t l y
i n t h e employment o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f M u n i t i o n s .
I n t h e r e l e v a n t i n c i d e n t t h e p l a i n t i f f was s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d by t h e
e x p l o s i o n o f a s h e l l i n t h e course o f f i l l i n g i t . The cause o f t h e
exTxLo-
s i o n was unknown and was never a d e q u a t e l y e x p l a i n e d .
brought
11.
12.
13.
At page 561.
1958 1.A..E.R. 579.
1 9 ^ 60. T.L.R. 363.
21.
The p l a i n t i f f
t h i s a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r damages f o r t h e i n j u r i e s t o h e r person and based
her c l a i m s o l e l y on t h e ground t h a t t h e defendants c a r r i e d on t h e rnanuf a c t u r e o f h i g h l y e x p l o s i v e s h e l l s w h i h t o t h e i r knowledge were
dangerous
t h i n g s and t h a t she, w h i l e employed t h e r e , s u f f e r e d i n j u r y , l o s s and
damage t h r o u g h t h e e x p l o s i o n o f one o f t h e s h e l l s .
Two defences were
r a i s e d ; t h a t t h e statement o f c l a i m d i s c l o s e d no cause o f a c t i o n and t h a t
the
p l a i n t i f f was v o l e n t i .
The second p o i n t was decided i n f a v o u r o f t h e
p l a i n t i f f b u t i t v/as t h e f i r s t which was o f fundamental importance i n t h e
development
o f t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
The case came b e f o r e Cassels J . i n t h e King's Bench D i v i s i o n .
c o n s i d e r e d t h a t , f o l l o w i n g Rylands v F l e t c h e r , " l i a b i l i t y
He
f o r damage a r i s i n g
from mischievous and dangerous animals o r from e x p l o s i v e s on a man's l a n d
1 if
are
merely instances o f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . "
He demonstrated t h a t i n t h e
case o f animals l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h e s even where t h e r e i s no escape - r e l y i n g
15
on Besogzi,v H a r r i s
(where a bear on a c h a i r mauled t h e p l a i n t i f f and
Crowder J . s a i d : " I f i t be so k e p t t h a t a person p a s s i n g i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y
16
'
p r o t e c t e d , t h e owner i s l i a b l e " ) and on F i l b u r n v People's Palace
where
i t was h e l d t h a t t h e defendants were l i a b l e f o r i n j u r i e s i n f l i c t e d by an
e l e p h a n t which t h e y were e x h i b i t i n g p u b l i c l y and which r a n a t h i m . From
these cases Gassels J . reached t h e r a t h e r dubious conclusion, t h a t " t h e
k e e p i n g of m a n u f a c t u r i n g o f e x p l o s i v e s comes under t h e same d o c t r i n e o f
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y when t h e y cause damage.
The l i a b i l i t y under such a
heading i s n o t l i m i t e d t o those who s u f f e r i n j u r y on a d j a c e n t l a n d o r
18
o u t s i d e t h e premises."
He d i s m i s s e d two cases which seem c o n t r a r y t o
19
20
t h i s v i e w , P o n t i n g v Noakes
and Howard v Furness H o u l d e r , by s a y i n g t h a t
the
f o r m e r r e a l l y t u r n e d on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
t r e s p a s s e r and t h a t i n t h e l a t t e r
horse was a
t h e f a c t s w i e r e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t and t h e
p o i n t arose o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y .
The l e a r n e d judge was h e l p e d t o h i s c o n c l u s i o n by t h e seemingly
s t r a n g e r e s u l t s t h a t would o t h e r w i s e ensue.
F o r , though t h e p l a i n t i f f
h e r s e l f would be w i t h o u t a remedy, i f she had had a f r i e n d w a i t i n g f o r h e r
Hf.
At page J6k
15.
l858 l F a n d F 9 2
20.
1936 2 A.E.R. ?81
22.
17. 1890 25 Q.B.25&
f\
9
1OWPQ?B?281 .
o u t s i d e t h e premises when t h e e x p l o s i o n occured, t h a t f r i e n d i f i n j u r e d
would have
Deen
a b l e t o b r i n g an a c t i o n t o which s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y
would
have been a p p l i c a b l e and indeed she h e r s e l f would have had a remedy i f she
had been approaching
t h e f a c t o r y b u t had n o t reached i t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e
explosions.
2*1
But, asks S t a l l y b r a s s ,
t h e y seemed t o t h e judge?
a r e t h e r e s u l t s i n f a c t as s t r a n g e as
I s i t unreasonable t h a t a man engaged upon
dangerous o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be l i a b l e even i n t h e absence o f n e g l i g e n c e
to
anyone i n j u r e d as a r e s u l t o f them who i s o u t s i d e h i s premises b u t s h o u l d
n o t be l i a b l e t o those who come upon h i s premises o f t h e i r own f r e e w i l l ?
Mr. S t a l l y b r a s s c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t someone i s o r d e r e d by a t h i r d
p a r t y t o e n t e r t h e premises s h o u l d n o t i n v o l v e t h e o c c u p i e r i n any g r e a t e r
liability.
S u r e l y , he says, t h e o c c u p i e r o f premises w i t h a dangerous
c h a t t e l upon them i s n o t l i a b l e t o a s o l d i e r who i s damaged by t h e c h a t t e l
when he has e n t e r e d t h e l a n d under t h e o r d e r o f h i s s u p e r v i s o r s ?
absence o f n e g l i g e n c e ) .
( i n the
I t i s , he c l a i m s , unnecessary and u n d e s i r a b l e t o
extend t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r t o cases where
t h e r e has been no escape o f t h e t h i n g l i k e l y t o do m i s c h i e f i f i t escapes.
Mr. S t a l l y b r a s s goes or. t o p o i n t o u t a f u r t h e r i m p r e c i s i o n i n the judgment:
Cassels J . d i d n o t make i t c l e a r whether he regarded t h e r u l e i n Rylands v
F l e t c h e r as a r u l e g o v e r n i n g l i a b i l i t y
f o r damage caused by dangerous
t h i n g s i n g e n e r a l o r as one sub-head under a w i d e r r u l e o f s t r i c t
o t h e r sub-heads b e i n g l i a b i l i t y
liability;
22
f o r t h e escape o f a n i m a l s , e x p l o s i v e s e t c .
He seemed t o p r e f e r t h e l a t t e r view which i s p l a i n l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o f Blackburn J .
Cassels J . had t h u s s h a t t e r e d some f i r m l y entrenched b e l i e f s as t o
the
t r u e n a t u r e o f t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
Orthodoxy however was
23
t o r e a s s e r t i t s e l f i n t h e hands o f t h e Court o f Appeal
consisting of
21.
60.L.Q.R. 207
22.
At page 208
23.
19^5 1 K.B.216
23.
S c o t t , Mackinnon and Du Parcq LJJ and t o be f i r m l y r e i n s t a t e d i n t h e
subsequent judgments o f t h e House o f L o r d s .
2k
S c o t t L.J.
t o o k as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t Cassels J.'s view t h a t
o n l y escape from f u l l
c o n t r o l was
needed and t h a t whether t h e harm i s
done i n s i d e or o u t s i d e t h e defendant's l a n d i s i m m a t e r i a l .
This
was
indeed t h e case w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s i m i l a r causes o f a c t i o n grouped
t o g e t h e r i n B l a c k b u r n J.'s
judgment.
J u s t i c e s a i d , t h a t t h a t f e a t u r e was
But i t does n o t f o l l o w , t h e
Lord
i n each case t h e r a t i o deedJderidfior
t h a t no o t h e r concomitant f a c t was
needed t o e n t i t l e t h e p l a i n t i f f t o
judgment.
a l i n k i n the chain of
I t was
Escape from c o n t r o l was
causation.
one m a t e r i a l f a c t b u t n o t t h e r e a l ground o f t h e defendant's
liability.
Some f u r t h e r i n g r e d i e n t i s r e q u i r e d .
S c o t t L.J. t h e n c o n s i d e r e d
each t o r t i n B l a c k b u r n J.'s
list
25
separately.
I n c a t t l e t r e s p a s s i t was,
he s a i d , t h e i n j u r y t o the
p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d f o r w h i c h t h e c o u r t gave r e l i e f and
r e l i e f was
tiff's
t h a t the defendant's a c t was
r i g h t of property.
o r f i l t h i t was
the b a s i s o f t h e
an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the p l a i n -
I n cases concerned w i t h t h e escape o f fumes
a breach o f t h e d u t y o f v i c i n a g e because t h e r e was
an
escape from t h e defendant's l a n d which damaged t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d .
breach and damage were a c t i o n a b l e because i t was-the p l a i n t i f f ' s
which was
damaged.
land
W i t h r e g a r d t o animals a s p e c i a l r u l e o f p u b l i c p o l i c y
had, he s a i d , been enforced
s u b s t a n t i v e lav;.
The
f o r so l o n g t h a t i t was
now
p a r t of the
" I have l i t t l e doubt" remarked S c o t t L.J.,
t h e p r a c t i c a l c e r t a i n t y o f harm which h i s t o r i c a l l y was
"that i t i s
the judicial basis
26
for that l i a b i l i t y . "
Rylands v F l e t c h e r a c t i o n s i n h i s view resemble
c a t t l e t r e s p a s s and t h e escape o f f i l t h and
t h e y resemble
liability
2k.
At page 22*t
25.
At page 2 3 6
26.
At page 2 3 7
f o r dangerous
2k.
fumes much more c l o s e l y than
animals.
He t h u s saw Rylands v F l e t c h e r as l i m i t e d t o an escape from t h e
defendant's l a n d t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d which t h e r e causes damage.
Escape from c o n t r o l i s a p u r e l y n e u t r a l f a c t except e v i d e n t i a l l y as a
l i n k between f i r s t cause and l a s t e f f e c t and t o extend t h e r u l e t o a
case l i k e t h i s on grounds o f p u b l i c p o l i c y was beyond t h e power o f a
judge.
27
He c i t e d L i n d l e y L.J. who s a i d i n Green v Chelsea Waterworks:
" t h a t case (Rylands v F l e t c h e r ) i s n o t t o be extended beyond t h e l e g i t i mate p r i n c i p l e on which t h e House o f Lords d e c i d e d i t .
I f i t were extended
as f a r as s t r i c t l o g i c might r e q u i r e i t would be a v e r y o p p r e s s i v e d e c i s i o n . "
Mackinnon and Du Parcq L J J . c o n c u r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e a p p e a l .
Du
Parcq L J . agreed w i t h L o r d J u s t i c e L i n d l e y and s a i d t h a t t h e r u l e i n Rylands
v_ F l e t c h e r i s an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e r e i s no
l i a b i l i t y w i t h o u t f a u l t and i t ought n o t be r e a d i l y extended even i f t h e
28
e x t e n s i o n appeared t o be l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t .
J.
He c o n s i d e r e d t h a t
Cassels
was unduly impressed by t h e apparent anomalies i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r and
s a i d t h a t these were a necessary consequence o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s which t h e
law i s compelled t o draw i n d e t e r m i n i n g r i g h t s which must v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o
the
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which t h e person c l a i m i n g t h e r i g h t i s p l a c e d .
29
T h e i r d e c i s i o n was unanimously c o n c u r r e d i n by t h e House o f L o r d s .
V i s c o u n t Simon s a i d t h a t "escape f o r t h e purposes o f a p p l y i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r means escape from a p l a c e where t h e defendant has .
o c c u p a t i o n o f o r c o n t r o l over l a n d t o a p l a c e which i s o u t s i d e h i s o c c u p a t i o n
or
c o n t r o l " " ^ v/hile L o r d M a c M i l l a n t a l k e d o f an escape "from one man's c l o s e
31
32
t o another man's c l o s e "
and L o r d P o r t e r
o f an escape t o p r o p e r t y over
which t h e defendant had no c o n t r o l .
P r o f e s s o r L l o y d , ^ t a l k i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f l o g i c and t h e
law,
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
had s a i d : "on t h e one hand, t h e r e i s t h e appeal t o l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y
189^ 70 L.T. 5^7 a t page 5^9.
A t page 246.
19^7 A.C.156.
At page 168.
A t pages 173, 17^.
and t h e r a t i o n a l development o f t h e law: on t h e o t h e r , t h e a s s e r t i o n
t h a t t h e m a t t e r must be c o n s i d e r e d p r a g m a t i c a l l y and w i t h r e g a r d o n l y
t o p r a c t i c a l consequences. S t a t e d i n t h i s form, t h e whole course o f t h e
common law p o i n t s u n s w e r v i n g l y
t o t h e v i e w p o i n t t o which E n g l i s h
may be expected
The judges of" t h e Court o f Appeal and
t o adhere."
judges
House o f L o r d s , u n l i k e Cassels J . , d i d so adhere.
P r o f e s s o r Goodhart
c o n s i d e r s • t h e c o n c l u s i o n a reasonable one
because t h e r e i s a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e p o s i t i o n o f a person
who,
e i t h e r as an i n v i t e e o r as a l i c e n s e e , comes on t o t h e
lands and a person who has no c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h a t l a n d .
defendant's
There i s no
ground f o r p l a c i n g t h e onerous d u t y o f what i s p r a c t i c a l l y i n s u r a n c e on
t h e o c c u p i e r and t h e person who comes on t o t h e l a n d can a t most r e q u i r e
t h a t t h e o c c u p i e r s h a l l t a k e reasonable
o f any known dangers.
care t o make i t s a f e o r warn him
The d i s t i n c t i o n between what happens w i t h i n and
what happens o u t s i d e a landowner's boundaries
i s , he says, a v a l i d one.
P r o f e s s o r Goodhart would agree t h a t t h i s v a l i d i t y r e s t s more on p r a c t i c a l
consequences t h a n on l o g i c .
The l i n e , as Du Parcq L.J. suggested, must
28
be drawn somewhere and t h i s i s perhaps t h e best p l a c e t o draw
it.
I t s h o u l d be remarked t h a t , as w e l l as d e a l i n g c o n c l u s i v e l y w i t h
t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e need f o r an escape, Read v Lyons was an i m p o r t a n t
. landmark i n the development o f t h e law o f t o r t i n t h a t i t denied
the
e x i s t e n c e o f any g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y f o r u l t r a - h a z a r d o u s
a c t i v i t i e s ; a t h e o r y such as t h a t found i n t h e American Restatement o f
36
t h e Law o f T o r t s
and which P a u l l K.C. suggested i n argument was e q u a l l y
37
- 38
v a l i d i n E n g l i s h Law.
Scott L . i J .
condemned as not b e i n g i n c o n f o r -
m i t y w i t h E n g l i s h Law t h e d e c l a r a t i o n by t h e Restatement t h a t "one who
c a r r i e d on an u l t r a h a z a r d o u s a c t i v i t y i s l i a b l e t o another whose person,
l a n d o r c h a t t e l s t h e a c t o r s h o u l d r e c o g n i s e as l i k e l y t o be harmed by
t h e u n p r e v e n t a b l e m i s c a r r i a g e o f t h e a c t i v i t y f o r harm r e s u l t i n g t h e r e t o
from t h a t which makes t h e a c t i v i t y u l t r a h a z a r d o u s , a l t h o u g h t h e utmost
3>h. At page V71.
37. 19 i5 1K.B.216 a t page 21935.
63. L.Q.R. 160
38. At page 2 2 8 f f .
z
care i s e x e r c i s e d t o p r e v e n t t h e harm."
I f t h a t p r i n c i p l e had been
accepted E n g l i s h law would have possessed a g e n e r a l r u l e o f s t r i c t
l i a b i l i t y b u t t h e d e c i s i o n was
Rylands v F l e t c h e r was
taken t h a t t h e Scope o f t h e r u l e i n
t o be l i m i t e d and n o t expanded; t h a t i n E n g l i s h
law t h e r e i s t o be l i a b i l i t y f o r n o n - n e g l i g e n t conduct o n l y i n c e r t a i n
s t r i c t l y defined circumstances.
V i s c o u n t Simon t a l k e d o f "an escape from a p l a c e where t h e d e f e n dant has o c c u p a t i o n o f or c o n t r o l over l a n d t o a p l a c e which i s o u t s i d e
3°
h i s occupation or c o n t r o l " .
T h i s would suggest t h a t t h e escape need
not be from t h e defendant's l a n d b u t may
be from any l a n d over which
he
has e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l p r o v i d e d t h a t i t i s t o somewhere o u t s i d e h i s
occupation or c o n t r o l .
Thus i n Mdwood and Go. y Manchester Corp.
Rylands v F l e t c h e r was h e l d t o be apv>licable where t h e r e was
an e x p l o s i o n
i n a c a b l e b e l o n g i n g t o and l a i d by t h e defendant i n t h e highway.
That
case was r e l i e d on by t h e Court o f Appeal i n C h a r i n g Cross E l e c t r i c i t y
Supply Co.
v H y d r a u l i c Power Co.
when i t was h e l d t h a t t h e r e was
s u f f i c i e n t escape where water from a main l a i d by t h e defendant
underthe
highway escaped and damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s e l e c t r i c c a b l e which was
t o i t and under t h e same highway.
a
near
F u r t h e r , i n West v B r i s t o l Tramways Co.*t
the b a s i s o f l i a b i l i t y was t h e escape o f c r e o s o t e from wood b l o c k s l a i d i n
t h e highway.
L o r d Simonds was
t h e o n l y judge t o d i s c u s s t h i s p o i n t a t any l e n g t h
^3
i n Read v Lyons and he e x p r e s s l y l e f t i t open.
Nevertheless the f a c t i s
t h a t t h e House o f Lords d i d n o t o v e r r u l e t h e Midwood and C h a r i n g Cross
cases and L o r d Simonds d i d p o i n t out t h a t i n each t h e r e was an escape i n t o
p r o p e r t y over which t h e defendant had no c o n t r o l from a c o n t a i n e r which
kk
the defendant had a l i c e n c e t o p u t i n t h e highway.
The Rule i n Rylands
v F l e t c h e r was f a i r l y r e c e n t l y h e l d t o a p p l y i n s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n
39.
19^7 A.C. 156 a t page 168
hO. 1905 2 K.B.
597
V I . 191^ 3 K.B.
772
k2. 1908 2 K.B. 14
2
7
H i l l i e r v Air Ministry
45
an escape o f e l e c t r i c i t y
defendant's
where t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s cows were e l e c t r o c u t e d by
from t h e h i g h v o l t a g e c a b l e s l a i d under t h e
field.
We must a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e escape needs
t o be a c t u a l l y on t o t h e l a n d o f t h e p l a i n t i f f .
V i s c o u n t Simon t a l k e d
o n l y o f an escape " t o a p l a c e w h i c h i s o u t s i d e h i s o c c u p a t i o n o r c o n t r o l "
a l t h o u g h i t does seem from t h e g e n e r a l t e n o r o f t h e judgments i n t h e
House o f Lords t h a a t t h e y c o n s i d e r e d t h a t a guest o r i n v i t e e upon a d j o i n i n g
p r o p e r t y c o u l d n o t sue.
to authority.
was
T h i s view was merely o b i t e r and seems c o n t r a r y
I n t h e C h a r i n g Cross case Bray J . s a i d t h a t what was r e q u i r e d
"not n e c e s s a r i l y m i s c h i e f occasioned
t o t h e owner o f a d j o i n i n g l a n d ,
46
b u t any m i s c h i e f t h e r e b y occasioned".
47
case o f Hunt v B r i t i s h
More s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e r e c e n t
Gelanese ' Lawton J . s a i d t h a t once t h e r e has been
an escape from o c c u p a t i o n o r c o n t r o l those d a m n i f i e d may c l a i m and t h e y
need not be t h e o c c u p i e r s o f a d j o i n i n g l a n d o r indeed o f any l a n d .
More d i f f i c u l t i s t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e r u l e i n Rylands v
F l e t c h e r extends t o an escape from l a n d a d j a c e n t t o t h e highway c a u s i n g
damage t o a u s e r o f t h e highway.
Statements t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t i t does
48
were made by F l e t c h e r Moulton L.J. i n "wing v London General Omnibus Co.
49
and by Swinfen Eady M.R. i n M i l e s v F o r e s t Rock G r a n i t e Co.
Lawton J .
a l s o seemed t o t a k e t h i s view i n t h e Hunt case.
F u r t h e r i n Halsey v
50
Esso Petroleum
t h e r e was h e l d t o be l i a b i l i t y i n Hylands v F l e t c h e r where
an escape from t h e defendant's
cn t h e a d j a c e n t highway.
l a n d caused damage t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
car
T h i s e x t e n s i o n t o o appears i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
51
d i c t a i n Read v Lyons and L o r d Sumner i n t h e Charing Cross
p a i n s t o d i s t i n g u i s h l i c e n s e e s from co-users o f t h e highway.
4 5 . 1962 C.L.Y. 2084
46. 1914 3K.B. 772 a t page 785
47.
1969 2 A.E.R. 1252
43. 1 ° 0 9 2 K.B. 652 a t page 665
49.
34 T.L.R. 500 a t page 501
28.
50.
1961 2 A.E.R. 145
51.
1914 3 K.B. 772.
case was a t
He s a i d : " I
d i f f e r from S c r u t t o n J . ( a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e ) because he c l e a r l y was
to
t h i n k t h a t t h i s was
a case o f j o i n t user o f highways.
disposed
These c a b l e s
mains were l a i d under t h e highway b u t t h e l a y i n g and u s i n g o f them are
and
no
52
p a r t o f t h e use o f trie highway."
He a l s o p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e
statements
i n b o t h Wing and M i l e s were o b i t e r .
53
T y l o r , i n h i s a r t i c l e "The
R e s t r i c t i o n o f S t r i c t L i a b i l i t y " , argues
t h a t as t h e highway i s d e d i c a t e d f o r t h e use o f t h e p u b l i c i t i s
reasonable
t h a t an o c c u p i e r o f a d j o i n i n g : l a n d s h o u l d be l i a b l e o n l y f o r c r e a t i n g a
p u b l i c nuisance o r f o r c o n t i n u i n g a n u i s a n c e .
Thus a f o r t u i t o u s e x p l o s i o n
on a d j a c e n t l a n d would not be a c t i o n a b l e by a user o f t h e highway.
A case
such as M i l e s , he c o n s i d e r e d , would remain a c t i o n a b l e i n nuisance s i n c e
t h e b l a s t i n g o p e r a t i o n s were i n t e n t i o n a l .
for
There would seem t o be no b a s i s
t h e d i s t i n c t i o n T y l o r draws here and. i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e highway
s h o u l d be t r e a t e d no d i f f e r e n t l y from p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y t o which t h e escape
has taken p l a c e .
B l a c k b u r n J . t a l k e d o f t h e escape o f a substance which had been
b r o u g h t on t o l a n d and i t has o f t e n been s a i d t h a t t h i s i s necessary f o r
the r u l e t o apply.
A more s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has p r e v a i l e d ,
however, and i t seems t h a t i t i s enough t h a t t h e t h i n g accumulated caused
t h e escape; i t need n o t escape i t s e l f .
Thus i n M i l e s v F o r e s t Rock G r a n i t e
54
Co.
Rylands v F l e t c h e r was h e l d t o a p p l y where e x p l o s i v e s were Drought on
t o l a n d and as a r e s u l t r o c k s escaped.
52.
53.
54.
At page 780.
1947 IGM.L.H. 396
1918 34 T.L.R. 500
A s i m i l a r p r i n c i p l e can be seen i n
29.
cases concerned w i t h l i a b i l i t y
f o r t h e escape o f f i r e .
55
A f u r t h e r p o s s i b l e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e r u l e was seen i n Hoare v
HcAlpine
where p i l e d r i v i n g caused v i b r a t i o n s t o escape and damage a
building.
T h i s case would suggest t h a t t h e m a t t e r which escapes need n o t
be o f a t a n g i b l e n a t u r e .
The d e c i s i o n has n o t met w i t h a p p r o v a l however.
57
Pollock
has termed i t a f a l l a c i o u s e x t e n s i o n and has p o i n t e d out t h a t
a v i b r a t i o n i s n o t something one can c o l l e c t o r s t o r e .
There i s , he says,
no r e a l analogy w i t h sewage o r e x p l o s i v e s o r h i g h t e n s i o n c u r r e n t s o r water
s t o r e d i n a r e s e r v o i r and t h e r e i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n t h e a u t h o r i t i e s f o r
i n v e n t i n g one.
"Why, he asks, when t h e o l d lav/ o f nuisance i s enough do we
go about d e v i s i n g " f a n t a s t i c e x t e n s i o n s " o f t h e law o f t r e s p a s s ?
I n the
58
O n t a r i o High Court case o f B a r e t t e v F r a n k i Compressed P i l e Co. o f Canada
Schroeder J . h e l d t h a t p i l e d r i v i n g o p e r a t i o n s s e t t i n g up v i b r a t i o n s which
damaged t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s b u i l d i n g were a-nuisance and n o t w i t h i n t i e ambit o f
Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
doubt.
The a u t h o r i t y o f Hoare v He.Alpine must t h u s be i n
T h i s apparent need f o r t a n g i b l e m a t t e r does n o t e x c l u d e such t h i n g s
as gas and e l e c t r i c i t y from t h e r u l e ; l i k e water and u n l i k e v i b r a t i o n s t h e y
are
t h i n g s which can be c o l l e c t e d on l a n d and s t o r e d t h e r e .
We can t h u s agree w i t h V i s c o u n t Simon's statement i n Read v Lyons
59
thatf
"escape f o r t h e purposes o f a p p l y i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n in Rylands v
F l e t c h e r means escape from a p l a c e where t h e defendant has o c c u p a t i o n o f
or c o n t r o l over l a n d t o a p l a c e which i s o u t s i d e h i s o c c u p a t i o n o r c o n t r o l . "
55- See Chapter V I
56.
1923 1 Ch.167
57.
39 L.Q.R. 145
58.
1955 2.D. :£v.'R;-665.
30.
59.
1947 A.C.156 a t page 168
I t seems from t h i s and i n t h e l i g h t o f Hunt v B r i t i s h Celanese
that i t
i s s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e escape i s from any l a n d under t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s con-
trol;
even i t seems escape on t o t h e highway, a l t h o u g h here a t l e a s t
t h e r e i s an element o f doubt.
The concept o f escape has been m o d i f i e d
so t h a t i t i s now enough t h a t i t was caused by t h e dangerous thing-
b r o u g h t on t o t h e l a n d ; t h e t h i n g b r o u g h t on need n o t i t s e l f have escaped.
I t remains t r u e , however, t h a t t h e t h i n g escaping must have some t a n g i b l e
quality.
60.
1969 1 W.L.R. 95931.
CHAPTER I I I
Personal I n j u r i e s *
We must now t u r n our minds t o t h e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n o f whether
1
t h e r e can be any l i a b i l i t y under t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
where
t h e r e s u l t o f t h e escape i s t h e i n f l i c t i o n o f i n j u r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
person.
T h i s q u e s t i o n , l i k e t h a t o f t h e need f o r an escape, was g i v e n
2
d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e House o f Lords i n Read v Lyons .
I n Read v Lyons p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s were caused f o r which t h e
damages were assessed a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e a t £525*
A s t r o n g a t t e m p t was
made b y L o r d K a c M i l l a n t o r e s t r i c t Rylands v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y t o p r o p r i e t a r y as opposed t o p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s .
A f t e r remarking t h a t " t h e process
o f e v o l u t i o n has been from t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t every man a c t s a t h i s p e r i l
and i s l i a b l e f o r a l l t h e consequences o f h i s a c t s t o t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t
a man's freedom o f a c t i o n i s s u b j e c t o n l y t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n n o t t o i n f r i n g e
3
any d u t y o f care which he owes t o o t h e r s "
he c o n t i n u e d : "Cassels J . , i n
h i s judgment, r e c o r d s t h a t i t was n o t denied t h a t i f a person o u t s i d e t h e
premises had been i n j u r e d i n t h e e x p l o s i o n t h e defendant
if
l i a b l e without proof o f negligence."
would have been
I do n o t agree w i t h t h i s view.
In
my o p i n i o n , persons i n j u r e d by t h e e x p l o s i o n i n s i d e o r o u t s i d e t h e defenda n t ' s premises would a l i k e r e q u i r e t o aver and prove n e g l i g e n c e t o render
5
t h e defendant
Tylor
liable."
sees these d i c t a as r e v i v i n g t h e o l d c o n f u s i o n between
c u l p a b i l i t y and compensation.
I f a l l t h a t t h e y a r e i n t e n d e d t o mean i s
t h a t t h e escape from t h e defendant's
l a n d o f something l i k e l y t o do
mischief, r e s u l t i n g i n personal i n j u r y t o the p l a i n t i f f , o f i t s e l f
1.
1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265.
2.
19^7 A.C. 156.
J . A t page 171
k.
1 9 H 60 T.L.R. 363 a t page 36k.
5 . At page 172.
6.
19V7 10 H.L.R. page 396.
32.
d i s c l o s e s no cause o f a c t i o n i n t h e absence o f n e g l i g e n c e , then t h e d i c t a
are t o him u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e .
lay
I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e y are i n t e n d e d t o
down t h a t , a cause o f a c t i o n h a v i n g been e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e r u l e i n
Rylands v F l e t c h e r , d i r e c t p e r s o n a l i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g i s i r r e c o v e r a b l e , so
r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c o n c l u s i o n does n o t appear t o accord w i t h t h e modern t h e o r y
which would compensate f o r d i r e c t p e r s o n a l i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from t h e v i o l a t i o n o f a r i g h t , and. appears d e v o i d o f a u t h o r i t y .
7
T y l e r goes on t o remark
t h a t t h e f a l l a c y i n c o n f u s i n g cause o f
a c t i o n w i t h k i n d of damage appears from L o r d l»SacMillan's judgment when he
g
says : "The
d o c t r i n e o f Rylands v F l e t c h e r , as I u n d e r s t a n d i t , d e r i v e s from
a. c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e mutual d u t i e s o f a d j o i n i n g or n e i g h b o u r n i n g Landowner and
i t s congeners are t r e s p a s s and nuisance.
the
I f i t s f o u n d a t i o n i s t o be found i n
i n j u n c t i o n s i c u t e r e t u o u t alienum non l a e d a s ; then i t i s m a n i f e s t t h a t
i t has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s .
i n j u r i n g not a l i u m b u t
The d u t y i s t o r e f r a i n from
alienum."
The o r i g i n a l form o f t h i s i n j u n t i o n i n t h e I n s t i t u t e s was a l t e r u m
l a e d e r e and, t o t h e t r a n s l a t i o n i n Broom's L e g a l Maxins, "Enjoy your
non
own
p r o p e r t y i n such a manner as n o t t o i n j u r e t h a t o f a n o t h e r person', i s
9
appended t h e n o t e : "Such i s t h e l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e above maxim;
i t s . ; t r u e l e g a l meaning would r a t h e r be:
i n j u r e the r i g h t s of a n o t h e r I "
'So use your own p r o p e r t y as n o t t o
I t i s i n any event i n c o n c e i v a b l e , i t i s
s u b m i t t e d , t h a t so i m p o r t a n t a q u e s t i o n as whether n e g l i g e n c e must be
proved f o r t h e r e t o be l i a b i l i t y
f o r causing personal i n j u r i e s ,
resting
as i t must p r i m a r i l y on m a t t e r s o f p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y , s h o u l d be decided
the
p r e c i s e t r a n s l a t i o n o f an o l d i n j u n c t i o n .
10
T y l o r ends:
" t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t I can r e c o v e r f o r an e x p l o s i o n
w r e c k i n g my c o n s e r v a t o r y o r a horse t r e s p a s s i n g on my rose bed, but n o t
for
7.
8.
9.
TO.
on
an
At
At
At
At
e x p l o s i o n b l o w i n g me out o f my deck c h a i r i n my own garden, o r a
pa,ge 400.
page 173page 289.
page kOO.
33-
horse t r e a d i n g on my f a c e as I s l e e p on my lawn, has l i t t l e t o commend i t " .
The f a c t t h a t he r e g a r d s such a r u l e as h a v i n g l i t t l e t o commend i t i s on
the
face o f i t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s p r e v i o u s statement t h a t he regards t h e
view t h a t an escape r e s u l t i n g i n p e r s o n a l i n j u r y i s n o t a c t i o n a b l e i n
n e g l i g e n c e as u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e u n l e s s we a r e t o assume t h a t by u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e
he means u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e i n law r a t h e r than merely
desirable.
T y l o r does c l e a r l y say, as we have n o t e d , t h a t i f l i a b i l i t y has
a l r e a d y been e s t a b l i s h e d i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r f o r another form o f i n j u r y
•such as i n j u r y t o p r o p e r t y t h e n damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s must be o b t a i n a b l e i n a d d i t i o n t o those o t h e r damages.
I t seems d o u b t f u l whether Lord
M a c M i l l a n was t h i n k i n g o f t h i s example when he gave h i s judgment f o r he seems
t o have regarded h i m s e l f as propounding
a g e n e r a l r u l e o f Law and i t i s
f u r t h e r t h e case t h a t when p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s a r e i n v o l v e d i n a Rylands v
Fletcher action i t i s i n general personal i n j u r i e s only that are involved.
T h i s view i s r e i n f o r c e d by t h e f a c t t h a t i n Read v Lyons t h e r e l e v a n t
damage was s o l e l y t o t h e person o f t h e p l a i n t i f f .
I t appears then t h a t L o r d I-'acMillan c o n s i d e r e d t h a t where t h e r e
a r e i n j u r i e s s o l e l y t o t h e person Rylands v F l e t c h e r does n o t l i e .
He was
however t h e only member o f t h e House o f Lords who s t a t e d h i s o p i n i o n
d e f i n i t i v e l y on t h i s aspect o f t h e t o r t .
L o r d Simonds, i n Read v Lyons,
11
r e s e r v e d h i s o p i n i o n on t h e p o i n t when he s a i d :
"But I would n o t be
f o r example
1
-taken as assenti-ng t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i f <ag»/ t h e p l a i n t i f f i n Rain ham s
case had been a n a t u r a l person who had s u f f e r e d p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s t h e r e s u l t
would n e c e s s a r i l y be t h e same." V i s c o u n t Si-flpn L.C. a l s o r e s e r v e d h i s o p i n i o n
a l t h o u g h he seemed t o t e n d towards L o r d M a c K i l l a r i ' s view.
C h a n c e l l o r c i t e d B l a c k b u r n J.'s judgment
The Lord.
i n C a t t l e v S t o c k t o n Waterworks
13
Co.
as r e f e r r i n g t o workmen's c l o t h s , t o o l s o r wages b u t n o t p e r s o n a l
injuries.
Yet t h e p o i n t o f t h a t case was whether a s u b - c o n t r a c t o r n o t i n
o c c u p a t i o n c o u l d sue and t h e n a t u r a l i n f e r e n c e from B l a c k b u r n J.'s language
11. At page 180.
12.
See pages 168 and 169*
13.
1875 L.R. 10Q.B. 453.
34.
would seem t o be t h a t he r e c o g n i s e d o t h e r damage than t h a t t o l a n d e.g.
damage t o c h a t t e l s o r damage due t o l o s s o f employment.
The escape o f
water, from a main as i n C a t t l e ' s case, so d e l a y i n g o p e r a t i o n s , would n o t
suggest any p e r s o n s ! i n j u r y and hence no s i g n i f i c a n c e can be a t t a c h e d t o
i t s omission.
L o r d P o r t e r seemed t o p r e f e r t h e opposing view a l t h o u g h
he reached no d e c i s i o n on t h e q u e s t i o n .
t h a t o p i n i o n s expressed
undoubtedly
He r e s t r i c t e d h i m s e l f t o s a y i n g
supporting it's a p p l i c a t i o n t o personal i n j u r i e s
extend t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e r u l e
1
and may some day r e q u i r e
examination.'
The f a c t i s t h a t i n b o t h C a t t l e ' s case and i n Read V Lyons, as i n
s e v e r a l r e c e n t cases on aspects o f n e g l i g e n c e , t h e c o u r t s were f e a r f u l o f
a m u l t i p l i c i t y of actions.
The c o u r t s o f t e n p r e f e r , i t seems, t o a l l o w
damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y o n l y i n t h e form o f p a r a s i t i c damages where
t h e y can be t a c k e d on t o damages o b t a i n e d f o r i n j u r y t o p r o p e r t y .
This
r a i s e s i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s which w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d a t g r e a t e r l e n g t h i n
Chapter V I I I when t h e importance o f j u d i c a l p o l i c y views^on t h e development
of t h i s area o f t h e law o f t o r t v / i l l be c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i s e d .
In order t o solve the r e s u l t i n g d i f f i c u l t y the text-book w r i t e r s
have c a l l e d i n t o p l a y t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between p l a i n t i f f s on t h e i r own
l a n d and p l a i n t i f f s who a r e non-occupiers
injured.
o f t h e l a n d on which t h e y a r e
I n Read v Lyons t h e p l a i n t i f f was a non-occupier
o f the- l a n d on
which she was i n j u r e d and so L o r d K a c H i l l a n ' s judgement has been i n t e r preted
as meaning t h a t o n l y a non-occupier
need e s t a b l i s h n e g l i g e n c e i n "
o r d e r t o r e c o v e r damages f o r i n j u r y t o t h e person.
Whether o r n o t L o r d K a c M i l l a n was r e f e r r i n g t o a l l p e r s o n a l
i n j u r i e s o r o n l y t o those t o non-occupiers
n o t good l a w . A non-occupier
i t i s submitted that h i s d i c t a are
r e c o v e r e d damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s i n
15
K i l e s v F o r e s t Rock G r a n i t e Co.
and a l s o i n S h i f f m a n v Grand P r i o r y o f t h e
Order o f S t . J o h n ; ^ n e i t h e r o f which was mentioned
Ik.
15.
16.
At page 178.
1918 34 T.L.R. 500.
1936 I.A.E.R. 557.
i n t h e judgments o f t h e
House o f Lords i n Read v Ly_ons_.
F u r t h e r , t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e Court o f
17
Appeal m
Hale v Jennings B r o s .
, a l s o n o t r e f e r r e d t o by t h e L o r d s , i s
a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a non-occupier o f l a n d i s e n t i t l e d t o
damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y under t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . I n t h a t
18
case S c o t t L.J. s a i d :
" I t was i n h e r e n t l y dangerous, and t h e defendants
have t o t a k e t h e r i s k o f any damage which may r e s u l t from i t , "
I n the
19
Canadian case o f A l d r i d g e v Van P a t t e r
Rylands v F l e t c h e r was h e l d t o
a p p l y i n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , Spence J . t a k i n g t h e view t h a t t h e f o u r
r e m a i n i n g Lords e x p r e s s l y r e f r a i n e d from a s s e n t i n g t o L o r d M a c M i l l a n ' s
dicta.
I n P e r r y v K e n d r i c k s T r a n s p o r t L t d . ^ t h e p l a i n t i f f , a boy o f t e n ,
was r e t u r n i n g home from s c h o o l by c r o s s i n g some waste l a n d , and was
approaching l a n d used by t h e defendant as p a r k i n g ground when he saw two
o t h e r boys s t a n d i n g on a bank a t t h e Southern end o f t h e defendant's
p a r k i n g ground near t h e s i d e o f t h e coach-.
As he approached them t h e two
boys r a n away and i m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e was an e x p l o s i o n i n t h e p e t r o l t a n k o f
the
coach r e s u l t i n g i n t h e p l a i n t i f f beinr-' b a d l y burned and i n j u r e d . I n
the
Court o f Appeal S i n g l e t o n L.J. s a i d he would 'assume' t h e r u l e a p p l i e d
21
t o i n j u r i e s t o t h e person;
J e n k i n s L.o. d i d n o t r e f e r t o t h e p o i n t b u t
P a r k e r L.J. mentioned t h e doubts expressed i n Read v Lyons as t o whether
the
r u l e covered p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s and s t a t e d t h a t " t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n on
22
the
m a t t e r was e x p r e s s l y l e f t over."
He was c l e a r l y o f t h e o p i n i o n however
t h a t an a c t i o n f o r damages f o r p e r s o n a l I n j u r i e s would l i e i n such a case
without proof o f negligence.
J.
T h i s view was i m p l i e d l y accepted by Lawton
i n A.H. Hunt ( C a p a c i t o r s ) L t d . , v B r i t i s h Celanese L t d ^ w h e n he s a i d
t h a t once t h e r e has been an escape i n V i s c o u n t Simon's sense those who
2k
are d a m n i f i e d may c l a i m .
17- 1938 1 A'.E.R. 57918.
A t page 585.
19.
1952 k D.L.R. 93.
20.
1956 1 W.L.E. 85.
21. At page 8 7 .
22.
A t page 92.
23- 1969 2 A.E.R.1252.
2k.
At page 1257.
g
3
Nor, i t i s s u b m i t t e d , i s L o r d M a c M i l l a n ' s view s a t i s f a c t o r y i n
o t h e r r e s p e c t s f o r , as we have seen, h i s o p i n i o n s would serve merely t o
i n c r e a s e t h e l o g i c a l anomalies i n a t o r t a l r e a d y amply p r o v i d e d f o r i n
that respect.
L o r d M a c M i l l s n ' s a n t i p a t h y t o t h e r u l e i n Rylands v
F l e t c h e r i s c l e a r t h r o u g h o u t h i s judgment.
H i s views w i t h r e g a r d t o
l i a b i l i t y f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y are c o n t r a r y t o b o t h precedent
sense.
and common
Precedent and l o g i c can be o v e r i d d e n b u t o n l y f o r p o w e r f u l
reasons; reasons which L o r d K a c M i l l a n d i d n o t f u r n i s h .
I t i s submitted
t h e r e f o r e t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e q u e s t i o n remains t o be f i n a l l y r e s o l v e d ,
t h e p r e f e r a b l e view i s t h a t t h e r e i s always l i a b i l i t y f o r i n j u r y t o t h e
person i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
circumstances.
37-
CHAPTER I V
Non-Natural User o f Land
The need f o r t h e r e t o be a n o n - n a t u r a l u s e r o f l a n d i n o r d e r t o
e s t a b l i s h l i a b i l i t y under t h e Rule i n Rylands v "Fletcher d i d n o t m a n i f e s t
i t s e l f i n t h e judgment o f B l a c k b u r n J . i n t h e Court of Exchequer Chamber.
I t i n f a c t has i t s o r i g i n i n t h e judgment o f L o r d C a i r n s L.C.
i n t h e House
2
o f Lords where t h e Lord C h a n c e l l o r s a i d : "The
defendants,
t r e a t i n g them
as t h e owners or o c c u p i e r s o f t h e c l o s e on which t h e r e s e r v o i r was
cons-
t r u c t e d , might l a v / f u l l y have used t h a t c l o s e f o r any purpose f o r which i t
m i g h t i n t h e o r d i n a r y course o f t h e enjoyment o f l a n d be used; and i f , i n
what I may
term t h e n a t u r a l user o f t h a t l a n d , t h e r e had been any accumula-
t i o n of w a t e r , e i t h e r on t h e s u r f a c e or underground, and i f , by t h e o p e r a t i o n
of
the laws o f n a t u r e , t h a t a c c u m u l a t i o n
o f water had passed, o f f i n t o t h e
c l o s e occupied by t h e p l a i n t i f f , t h e p l a i n t i f f c o u l d n o t have complained
t h a t t h e r e s u l t had taken p l a c e .
"On
t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e defendants, n o t s t o p p i n g a t t h e n a t u r a l
u s e r of t h e i r c l o s e , had d e s i r e d t o use i t f o r any purpose which I may
term
a' n o n - n a t u r a l use, f o r t h e purpose o f i n t r o d u c i n g i n t o t h e c l o s e t h a t which
i n i t s n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n was n o t i n or upon i t , f o r t h e purpose o f i n t r o d u c i n g water e i t h e r above o r below ground i n q u a n t i t i e s and i n a manner n o t
t h e r e s u l t o f any work o r o p e r a t i o n on o r under t h e l a n d
t h e defendants were d o i n g , t h e y were d o i n g a t t h e i r own
The
i^.C. who
peril."
c r e d i t f o r t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e r u l e must be g i v e n t o M a n i e t y
based h i s argu.nient i n a l l t h r e e c o u r t s on t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between
t h e n a t u r a l and n o n - n a t u r a l u s e r o f l a n d .
v Fletcher l i t i g a t i o n
1.
2.
t h a t which
i t was
From t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e Rylands
e v i d e n t t h a t i f t h e p l a i n t i f f was
See i n g e n e r a l S t a l l y b r a s s
19 L.T. 220 a t page 221.
30.L.J.376.
38.
t o succeed •
he must d i s t i n g u i s h Smith v K e n r i c k " and i t was t h i s which l e d M a n i s t y , t h e
plaintiff's
c o u n s e l , t o f a s t e n on t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e water i n t h e d e f e n -
dant's r e s e r v o i r was an a r t i f i c i a l a c c u m u l a t i o n .
f i r s t t o see t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n - i n 1860
Bamford v T'urnley
had s a i d :
He was n o t however t h e
Bramwell B. i n h i s judgment i n
"What has been done was n o t t h e u s i n g o f
l a n d i n a common and o r d i n a r y way, b u t i n an e x c e p t i o n a l manner - n o t
5
u n n a t u r a l o r u n u s u a l , b u t n o t t h e common and o r d i n a r y use o f l a n d . "
The e n t i r e v a l i d i t y o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n has been doubted.
Sir
John Salrnond s a i d :
recommend i t .
Thus
"Such a d i s t i n c t i o n has l i t t l e i n p r i n c i p l e t o
What i s t h e n a t u r a l use., o f land?
a house on i t , or t o l i g h t a f i r e ?
I s i t natural to build
Almost a l l use o f l a n d i n v o l v e s some
a l t e r a t i o n o f i t s n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n , and i t seems i m p o s s i b l e t o say
far
or
t h i s a l t e r a t i o n may
how
go b e f o r e t h e use o f t h e l a n d becomes n o n - n s t u r a l
e x t r a o r d i n a r y , so as t o b r i n g t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i n t o
operation."
C h a r l e s w o r t h observes t h a t Lord C a i r n s g i v e s Smith v K e n r i c k as
7
an example o f n a t u r a l , and B a i r d v W i l l i a m s o n
n a t u r a l user o f l a n d .
"The
ss an example o f non-
e x p l a n a t i o n given of a non-natural user of
l a n d shows t h a t what L o r d C a i r r i s had i n mind," C h a r l e s w o r t h says,
the
d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and a r t i f i c i a l water
a c t u a l u s e r o f t h e l a n d i s concerned,
"was
as f a r as t h e
i t i s impossible to define with
g
p r e c i s i o n what i s a n a t u r a l , and what a n o n - n a t u r a l , u s e r o f l a n d . "
9
As
S t a l l y b r a s s p o i n t s o u t , L o r d C a i r n s * use o f t h e words " i n t h e o r d i n a r y
course o f t h e enjoyment
o f t h e l a n d " p r e v e n t s us a c c e p t i n g C h a r l e s w o r t h ' s
views as adequate a l t h o u g h i t i s t r u e n e v e r t h e l e s s t h a t L o r d C a i r n s d i d
not
seem t o n o t e t h e c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on t h e
l a n d and t h i n g s b r o u g h t upon t h e l a n d i n t h e course o f n a t u r a l u s e r .
3.
1849 7 c.B. 515.
*
k. 1862 3MHgpfiHK B. and S.62
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
At page 83.
P.3^7 (7th Ed. ' T o r t s ' ) .
1863 15 C.B. (N.3.) 376.
' L i a b i l i t y f o r Dangerous T h i n g s ' page 148
3 C.L.J. 376 s t page 39" •
391
The f a c t i s t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e - n a t u r a l and
n a t u r a l user o f l a n d has been accepted i n subsequent
an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f t h e Rule i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
non-
cases and has
remained
I t i s equally true,
though, t h a t t h e judges have r e c o g n i s e d t h e r e a l d i f f i c u l t y i n v o l v e d i n
10
drawing t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n .
Kekewich J . i n N a t i o n a l Telephone Co. v Baker
,
a case concerned w i t h t h e escape o f e l e c t r i c i t y , expressed t h e o p i n i o n
t h a t f o r ' n o n - n a t u r a l ' t h e r e s h o u l d be s u b s t i t u t e d t h e word
'extraordinary'.
T h i s term was l a t e r used by L o r d A l v e r s t o n e C.J. and F a r w e l l L.J. i n
11
12
West v B r i s t o l Tramways Co.
and by W r i g h t J . i n Noble v H a r r i s o n .
Other words, such as 'unusual' and 'abnormal' have been used b u t t h e i r
i m p o r t appears t o be t h e same.
13
Bramwell B. i n N i c h o l s v Marsland
regarded " t h e reasonable use
o f p r o p e r t y i n t h e way most b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e community" as o u t s i d e the
scope o f t h e r u l e , t h e words ' n a t u r a l ' and ' o r d i n a r y ' b e i n g absent from t h e
14
judgment, and s t a t e m e n t s o f L o r d Moulton i n R i c k a r d s v L o t h i a n
come c l o s e
15
t o l a y i n g down t h i s c r i t e r i o n o f reasonableness.
Thus a t one p o i n t
he
s a i d t h a t " t h e p r o v i s i o n o f a p r o p e r s u p p l y o f water t o t h e v a r i o u s p a r t s
o f a house i s n o t o n l y r e a s o n a b l e , b u t has become, i n accordance
with
modern s a n i t a r y v i e w s , an almost necessary f e a t u r e o f town l i f e
some form o r o t h e r i t i s u s u a l l y made o b l i g a t o r y i n c i v i l i s e d
in
countries.
Such a s u p p l y ccnnot be i n s t a l l e d w i t h o u t c a u s i n g some c o n c u r r e n t danger o f
leakage o r o v e r f l o w .
who
I t would be unreasonable f o r t h e law t o r e g a r d those
i n s t a l o r m a i n t a i n such a system o f s u p p l y as d o i n g so a t t h e i r
own
peril."
T h i s however i s i n c o m p l e t e ; t h e u s e r must n o t o n l y be reasonable
but ordinary or n a t u r a l .
T h i s p r i n c i p l e can be seen i n t h e judgment
Bramwell B. i n Bamford v T u r n l e y
v/hen he says: "those a c t s necessary f o r
t h e common and o r d i n a r y use and o c c u p a t i o n o f l a n d and houses may
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
1893
1908
1926
1875
1913
2 Ch. 186.
2 K.B.
1'+.
2 K.B.
332.
L.R. 10 Ex. 255
A.C. 263.
of
s t page 259.
be done,
i f c o n v e n i e n t l y done, w i t h o u t s u b j e c t i n g those who do them t o an a c t i o n . . . .
17
t h e r e i s an obvious n e c e s s i t y f o r such a p r i n c i p l e "
and i n t h a t o f Jones
J . who s a i d i n an o l d e r case: "where t h e r e i s an o r d i n a r y use o f sea c o a l
no a c t i o n l i e s because i t i s a m a t t e r o f n e c e s s i t y and t h e r e i s mutual
sufferance."
Whatever a d j e c t i v e may be used t h e b e s t e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e concept
o f n o n - n a t u r a l u s e r o f l a n d was t h a t g i v e n by Lord Moultori i n d e l i v e r i n g t h e
1
a d v i c e o f t h e J u d i c i a l Committee o f t h e F r i v w y C o u n c i l i n R i c k a r d s v L o t h i a n .
He s a i d t h a t t o come w i t h i n t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r t h e use t o which
t h e defendant's l a n d i s p u t must be "some s p e c i a l use b r i n g i n g w i t h i t
i n c r e a s i n g danger t o o t h e r s , and must n o t merely be t h e o r d i n a r y use o f t h e
20
l a n d o r such a use as i s p r o p e r f o r t h e g e n e r a l b e n e f i t o f t h e community".
The
relating
r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i s h i s t o r i c a l l y d e r i v e d from t h e l a w
t o t h e working
o f mines and i t i s a v / e l l e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t
i f you work mines so as t o cause damage t o your neighbour you w i l l be l i a b l e
u n l e s s you work them i n an o r d i n a r y manner.
21
B l a c k b u r n i n Wilson v Waddell
T h i s r u l e was s t a t e d by Lord
and by C o t t o n L . J . i n Hurdman v K.E. Railway
22
Co.
where he s a i d t h a t t h e e x c a v a t i o n
and r a i s i n g o f m i n e r a l s so t h a t
water g r a v i t a t e s on t o a neighbour's p r o p e r t y i s an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l
r u l e o f l i a b i l i t y , because i t " i s considered
t h e n a t u r a l use o f m i n e r a l
l a n d , and these d e c i s i o n s ( v a r i o u s cases c i t e d ) a r e r e f e r a b l e t o t h i s
prin-
c i p l e , t h a t t h e owner o f l a n d s h o l d s h i s r i g h t t o t h e enjoyment, t h e r e o f ,
s u b j e c t t o such annoyance as i s t h e consequence o f what i s c a l l e d t h e n a t u r a l
u s e r by h i s n e i g h b o u r o f h i s l a n d , and t h a t when an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e
enjoyment by something i n t h e n a t u r e o f nuisance
i s t h e cause o f com-
p l a i n t , no a c t i o n can be m a i n t a i n e d i f t h i s i s t h e r e s u l t o f t h e n a t u r a l
23
user by a neighbour o f h i s l a n d . "
1 ? . A t pages 83, 8 4 .
18.
1628 Palm. 536 a t page 533.
19- 1913 A.C. 263.
20.
A t page 281.
VI.
21.
1876 2 App. Cas. 95.
22.
1878 3 C P . D . 168.
I t i s t h i s p r i n c i p l e , i d e n t i c a l t o Lord fioulton's 'special use',
which has been extended t o f i e l d s o t h e r t h a n t h a t o f t h e w o r k i n g o f mines.
2k
Thus i n B a t c h e l l e r v Tunbridge W e l l s Gas. Co.
F s r w e l l L.J. extended t h e
concept o f n o n - n a t u r a l u s e r t o gas - " i t was c l e a r l y a n o n - n a t u r a l use o f
the
l a n d t o p u t gas p i p e s t h e r e . "
The l a y i n g o f a submarine c a b l e was
h e l d by t h e J u d i c i a l Committee o f t h e P r i v y C o u n c i l t o be a n o n - n a t u r a l
25
user o f l a n d i n E a s t e r n and South A f r i c a n Telegraph Co. v Cape Town Tramways
as was h e l d t h e l a y i n g o f c r e o s o t e b l o c k s as road p a v i n g by t h e Court o f
26
27
Appeal i n West v B r i s t o l Tramways Co.
I n S t e a r n v P r e n t i c e Bros.
a
D i v i s i o n a l Court regarded a l a r g e heap o f bones a t a manure f a c t o r y as
something a r i s i n g i n t h e o r d i n a r y course o f b u s i n e s s and bones as a n a t u r a l
waste, p r o d u c t from r e a r i n g sheep o r c a t t l e f o r s l a u g h t e r .
A retaining
w a l l was h e l d t o i n v o l v e t h e o c c u p i e r s i n no l i a b i l i t y because i t was e r e c t e d
i n t h e o r d i n a r y and normal use o f t h e defendant's l a n d i n b o t h I l f o r d U.D.C.
23
29
v Seal and Judd
and S t . Anne's W e l l Brewery Co. v Roberts
w h i l e i n Noble
30
v
Harrison
a D i v i s i o n a l Court h e l d t h a t non-poisonous t r e e s came i n t h e
same c a t e g o r y .
A f i r e i n a domestic g r a t e (Sochacki v Sas
) and e l e c t r i c
32
w i r i n g ( C o l l i n g w o o d v Home and C o l o n i a l S t o r e s L t d .
) have b o t h been h e l d
t o be n a t u r a l u s e r s o f l a n d .
Cases i n which n o n - n a t u r a l user o f l a n d as a r e q u i r e m e n t o f l i a b i l i t y
i n Kylands v F l e t c h e r i s i n v o l v e d have t h r e e t i m e s come b e f o r e t h e f i n a l
appeal c o u r t s o f t h i s c o u n t r y .
was
33
The f i r s t o f these cases, R i c k a r d s v L o t h i a n
an appeal from t h e High Court o f A u s t r a l i a and was heard by t h e J u d i c a l
Committee o f t h e P r i v y C o u n c i l c o m p r i s i n g V i s c o u n t Haldane L.C.,-; Lord
MacNagbten, Lord A t k i n s o n and L o r d M o u l t o n .
The defendant was t h e l e s s e e o f
a b u i l d i n g and t h e p l a i n t i f f was t e n a n t under him o f p a r t o f t h e second
floor.
On t h e f o u r t h f l o o r t h e r e was a room i n which a wash hand b a s i n was
f i x e d . One n i g h t a s t r a n g e r b l o c k e d up t h e b a s i n and t u r n e d on t h e t a p s w i t h
2k.
1901 8k L.T. 765 a t page 766.
29.
1928 1*f0 L.T.1.
25.
1902 A.C. 381.
30; 1926 2 K.B.332.
26.
1908 2 K.B.H.
31.
19'+7 1 A.E.R.3Mt.
27.
1919 1K.B. 3?^.
32.
1936 3 A.E.R. 200.
28.
1925 1 K.B. 671.
33.
1913 A.C. 263.
k2.
the
r e s u l t t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e q u a n t i t y o f water o v e r f l o w e d and t h e
plaintiff's
s t o c k i n t r a d e was
damaged.
The defendant was unable t o
e s t a b l i s h negligence.
L o r d M o u l t o n , who
d e l i v e r e d t h e judgment o f t h e J u d i c a l Committee,
remarked t h a t i t i s n o t every use t o which l a n d i s p u t t h a t b r i n g s t h e
r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i n t o p l a y - " i t must, be some s p e c i a l
use
b r i n g i n g w i t h i t i n c r e a s e d danger t o o t h e r s , and must not merely be t h e
1
o r d i n a r y use o f t h e land' .
He c i t e d W r i g h t , J . who
s a i d i n Blake v 'W'oolf
" ^ " t h e b r i n g i n g o f water on t o such premises as these and t h e m a i n t a i n i n g
a c i s t e r n i n t h e u s u a l way seems t o me t o be an o r d i n a r y and
reasonable
u s e r o f such premises as these were: and t h e r e f o r e , i f t h e water escapes
w i t h o u t any n e g l i g e n c e or d e f a u l t on t h e p a r t o f t h e person b r i n g i n g t h e
water i n and owning t h e c i s t e r n , I do not t h i n k t h a t he is l i a b l e f o r any
37
damage t h a t may
ensue"; and a l s o B l a c k b u r n J . i n Ross v Fedden
, a similar
case i n which t h e r e was no l i a b i l i t y v/hen p i p e s o v e r f l o w e d s i n c e n e g l i g e n c e
c o u l d not be
proved.
The J u d i c i a l Committee shared these v i e w s .
the
The c o u r t had r e g a r d t o
d e s i r a b i l i t y o f a p r o p e r s u p p l y o f water t o t h e v a r i o u s p a r t s o f t h e
house and c o n s i d e r e d t h a t " i t would be unreasonable
f o r t h e law t o r e g a r d
t h o s e who i n s t a l o r m a i n t a i n such a system o f s u p p l y as d o i n g so a t t h e i r
own p e r i l , w i t h an a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y f o r any damage r e s u l t i n g from i t s
presence
i n h a v i n g on h i s premises such means of s u p p l y he i s o n l y
u s i n g those premises
i n an o r d i n a r y and p r o p e r manner."
The importance o f t h i s case cannot be o v e r e s t i m a t e d .
f i r s t t i m e s i n c e Rylands v F l e t c h e r "
the
i t s e l f , '+5 y e a r s e a r l i e r , t h a t
q u e s t i o n had been c o n s i d e r e d by a f i n a l aj/peal c o u r t .
3^.
35>
36.
37.
38.
39.
I t was
See a l s o t h e defence o f a c t o f a s t r a n g e r .
At page 281.
1898 2 Q.B. *t26 a t page hZ8.
1872 L.R. 7 Q.B.
661.
1913 A.C. 263 a t page 282.
1868 19 L.T. 220.
V5.
this
The need f o r a non-
Chapter V I I . P a r t
II'
n a t u r a l u s e r o f l a n d t o e s t a b l i s h Rylends_v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y was
as o f t e n as i t was
r e l i e d upon between 1868
as w e l l as p r o v i d i n g t h e now
standard
ignored
1913 and R i c k a r d s v L o t h i a n
and
d e f i n i t i o n of non-natural user of land
f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s concept, as a r e q u i r e m e n t o f l i a b i l i t y under t h e
^
n
v
Rylands
rul
Fletcher.
The House o f Lords was
c a l l e d on t o c o n s i d e r t h e m a t t e r e i g h t y e a r s
40
l a t e r i n Rainham Chemical Works L t d . , v Belvedere F i s h Guano Co.
t h i s case t h e a p p e l l a n t company c a r r i e d on t h e manufacture o f
..
Ltd.
In
explosives.
Large q u a n t i t i e s o f d i n e t r o - p h e n o l were d e l i v e r e d a t the f a c t o r y and were
stored there close t o other inflammable m a t e r i a l s .
o c c u r r e d which caused damage t o n e i g h b o u r i n g
As a r e s u l t an
property.
Lord Buckmaster
t a l k e d o f usinti: l a n d i n an e x c e p t i o n a l manner' and s a i d t h a t use
purpose o f making m u n i t i o n s was
of the land.
there
vise
The
explosion
41
f o r the
c e r t a i n l y n o t t h e common and o r d i n a r y
use
o t h e r members o f t h e House o f Lords seemed t o assume t h a t
a n o n - n a t u r a l user o f l a n d .
42
The
t h i r d and most r e c e n t o f t h e cases was
1+3
t h e f a c t s o f w h i c h have a l r e a d y been g i v e n
l a r i t y t o those o f t h e Rainham case.
Read v J . Lyons L t d . ,
and which bear a marked s i m i -
Viscount
Simon confessed t o f i n d i n g
44
t h e t e s t o f n o n - n a t u r a l user o f l a n d d i f f i c u l t t o a p p l y .
Since he d e c i d e d
t h e appeal on t h e ground t h a t t h e r e had been no escape he c o n t e n t e d
himself
w i t h s a y i n g t h a t i n a n a l y s i n g the concept he. a t t a c h e d f i r s t importance t o
t h e judgment o f L o r d Moulton i n R i c k a r d s v L o t h i a n .
did
not f e e l i t riecessr.ry t o c o n s i d e r
thennature
The
remaining
o f t h e t e s t and
Lords
restricted
themselves t o some i n t e r e s t i n g comments on t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e House o f
45
Lords i n t h e Rainham Chemicals v Belvedere F i s h Guano
case,
\fiscount
Simon remarked t h a t S c r u t t o n L.J., s i t t i n g as an a d d i t i o n a l judge o f t h e
40.
1021 2 A-.C. 4654
1
.
At
page D471.
King's Bench
i v i s i o n , had u n d e r s t o o d i t t o be a d m i t t e d b e f o r e him t h a t t h e
42.
1947 A.C. 156.
43. See page 19- Chapter I I .
44.
At page 169.
45.
1921 2 A.C. 465.
^
c o n s t i t u e n t elements o f Rylands v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y were p r e s e n t .
Lord C h a n c e l l o r f u r t h e r p o i n t e d out t h a t Lords Carson and
The
Buckmaster
were almost e n t i r e l y concerned w i t h t h e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e d i r e c t o r s o f t h e
a p p e l l a n t company and s a i d t h a t he d i d n o t c o n s i d e r
t h e House t o be bound
by Rainham on t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether m u n i t i o n s i n a f a c t o r y f o r t h e
46
purpose o f h e l p i n g t o d e f e a t t h e enemy was
a n o n - n a t u r a l user o f l a n d .
L o r d Kact'.illan s a i d t h a t L o r d Buckmaster's d e c i s i o n was
a f i n d i n g of fact
r a t h e r than o f law and c l e a r l y a f f o r d e d no precedent f o r t h e c l a i m i n
47
Read v Lyons.
1
I n r e f u s i n g t o accept L o r d B u c k m a s t e r v view t h e House o f Lords
showed a c l e a r d e s i r e t o r e s t r i c t t h e scope o f t h e r u l e i n Rylands v
Fletcher.
There were s e v e r a l a l l u s i o n s i n t h e Read v Lyons judgments t o
t h e p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s (war t i m e ) and these f a c t o r s combine t o i n d i c a t e
t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h the r e q u i r e m e n t o f n o n - n a t u r a l
u s e r o f l a n d can
m o d i f i e d a t w i l l so as t o g i v e e f f e c t t o p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,
be
thus
g i v i n g the r u l e a measure o f e l a s t i c i t y which would n o t o t h e r w i s e
be
present.
non-
This f a c i l i t y
of t h e judges f o r a p p l y i n g t h e concept o f
n a t u r a l user of land according
g e n e r a l p o l i c y was
t o l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s and t o f a c t o r s o f
seen again i n t h e r e c e n t case o f B r i t i s h Celanese v
48
Hunt
where Lawton J. a p p l i e d Lord K o u l t o n ' s t e s t o f 'some s p e c i a l
b r i n g i n g w i t h i t increased
o f e l e c t r i c a l and
use
danger t o o t h e r s ' ar.d s a i d ; " t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g
e l e c t r o n i c components i n t h e year 1964
cannot
be adjudged t o be a s p e c i a l use nor can t h e b r i n g i n g and s t o r i n g on
premises o f m e t a l f o i l be a s p e c i a l use i n i t s e l f .
f o i l was
for
s t o r e d may
have been a n e g l i g e n t one;
The
way
the metal
but the use o f the premises
s t o r i n g such f o i l d i d not by i t s e l f c r e a t e s p e c i a l r i s k s .
f o i l was
the
The
metal
t h e r e f o r use i n t h e manufacture o f goods o f a common t y p e which
at a l l m a t e r i a l t i m e s were needed f o r t h e g e n e r a l b e n e f i t o f t h e community.
46.
At page 16947.
At page 175.
48.
1969 2 A.E.H. 1252.
49.
At page 125745.
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h we have considered
between t h e n a t u r a l and
n o n - n a t u r a l user o f l a n d i s o f t e n confused w i t h t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between
those t h i n g s which are n a t u r a l l y on t h e l a n d and those which are brought
on t o t h e l a n d o r are a r t i f i c i a l l y c r e a t e d t h e r e .
These d i f f e r e n t
c o n c e p t i o n s do n o t appear t o have been c l e a r t o Lord C a i r n s b u t i n f a c t
t h e y are q u i t e d i s t i n c t and so, h a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d
the f i r s t
distinction
we must t u r n out minds t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e r e can be any
liability
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r f o r t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on t h e l a n d .
50
P r o f e s s o r Salmond has
said:
" t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
a p p l i e s t o t h i n g s which are a r t i f i c i a l l y b r o u g h t or kept upon t h e defendant's
l a n d , and i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i n g s which are n a t u r a l l y t h e r e , howsoever
dangerous they may
be - e.g.
n o x i o u s weeds, vermin o r w a t e r ,
oo f a r from
b e i n g a b s o l u t e l y l i a b l e f o r t h e escape o f these t h i n g s , t h e o c c u p i e r
of
l a n d i s n o t even under any d u t y o f c a r e t o p r e v e n t t h e i r escape." Salmond
^1
c i t e d t h r e e cases - G i l e s v Walker,^ H i e l d v London and N o r t h Western
52
53
Ra±lwa2_Co.
and S t e a r n v P r e n t i c e B r o s .
and a l s o t h e I r i s h case o f
5k
Brady v Warren
- i n each o f which t h e l a n d had been a r t i f i c i a l l y a l t e r e d
so t h a t t h e r e s u l t complained o f was
i n d i r e c t l y due t o a human a c t .
This,
55
Goodhart says,
to
i s t r u e as f a r as i t goes but m i s l e a d i n g
f o r Salmond f a i l e d
draw t h e v i t a l d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y p r e s e n t
on l a n d w h i c h
has been a r t i f i c i a l l y a l t e r e d so as t o cause t h e harm complained o f a n d ' t h i n g s
n a t u r a l l y on l a n d which has n o t been so a l t e r e d by human a c t .
I t i s suggested
however t h a t the r e c o g n i t i o n o f such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s i m p l i c i t i n what
Salmond s a i d .
I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i n g s
n a t u r a l l y on l a n d and t h i n g s a r t i f i c i a l l y b r o u g h t on or c r e a t e d t h e r e we
f i r s t examine t h e cases concerned w i t h t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on l a n d which
50.
51.
52.
53.
5if.
55.
Page 351 (7th e d i t i o n )
T89O 2k Q.B.D. 656.
187^ L.R. 10 Ex. i f .
1919 1 K.B.
35k.
1900 I r i s h Reports 632.
if C.L.J. 13 a t page Ik.
if 6.
has
will
been a l t e r e d , b e a r i n g i n mind t h e v i r t u a l e q u a t i o n i n many o f these cases
of
l i a b i l i t y i n nuisance and under t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
For a case which was s u b s e q u e n t l y t o assume c o n s i d e r a b l e importance
G i l e s v W a l k e r ^ was handled a t a l l l e v e l s i n a most haphazard
fashion.
Counsel f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o c i t e the one case which was
strongly
57
-
i n h i s f a v o u r - P r o p r i e t o r s o f Margate P i e r and Harbour v Town -of Margate
- and o f t h e two judges i n t h e D i v i s i o n a l Court one d e l i v e r e d a
of
two sentences and t h e o t h e r merely c o n c u r r e d w i t h him.
judgment
The f a c t s were
t h a t t h e defendant occupied l a n d which had o r i g i n a l l y been f o r e s t l a n d b u t
which h i s predecessor had c u l t i v a t e d .
The f o r e s t l a n d d i d n o t bear t h i s t l e s
p r i o r t o c u l t i v a t i o n b u t on i t s b e i n g c u l t i v a t e d t h i s t l e s sprang up a l l over
it.
The defendant d i d n o t n-ow t h e t h i s t l e s and as a r e s u l t t h e t h i s t l e seeds
were blown on t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d where t h e y caused damage.
Lord Coleridge
disposed o f t h e case t h u s : " t h e r e can be no d u t y as between a d j o i n i n g o c c u p i e r s
58
to
c u t t h e t h i s t l e s , which a r e t h e n a t u r a l growth o f t h e s o i l . "
The t h i s t l e s , however, were n o t t h e n a t u r a l growth o f t h e s o i l i n i t s
n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e y d i d n o t appear u n t i l t h e l a n d had been c u l t i v a t e d .
The d e c i s i o n can thus n o t be accepted as a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e view t h a t an
o c c u p i e r o f l a n d i s never l i a b l e f o r " t h i n g s which are n a t u r a l l y t h e r e ,
howsoever dangerous t h e y may be."
As f a r as Kylands v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y i s
59
concerned, i n t h e words o f C l e r k and L i n d s e l l ,
" t h i s d e c i s i o n must be
r e g a r d e d as t u r n i n g upon t h e f a c t t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n which caused t h e
t h i s t l e s t o s p r i n g up was a n a t u r a l use o f t h e s o i l . "
There would i n c i d e n -
t a l l y be l i a b i l i t y today i n n u i s a n c e on these f a c t s f o r t h e r e can be
liability
i n nuisance f o r c o n t i n u i n g an a c t which one d i d n o t s t a r t and, a l t h o u g h t h e
defendant was n o t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f i r s t y e a r ' s g r o w t h , he ought t o have
t a k e n s t e p s t o p r e v e n t t h e damage i n t h e second year as was d e c i d e d i n Davey
v Harrow C o r p o r a t i o n
56.
57.
58.
59.
and approved i n Morgan v K h y a t t .
1890 2k Q.B.D. 656.
1869 20 L.T. (M.S.) 56k.
At page 657.
Page 389.
*
n
Crowhurst v Amersham B u r i a l Board
t h e defendants p l a n t e d two
yew t r e e s about f o u r f e e t i n s i d e t h e i r l a n d b u t t h e t r e e s grew t h r o u g h and
beyond t h e boundary r a i l i n g s .
C a t t l e l a w f u l l y on a d j a c e n t l a n d a t e t h e
f o l i a g e and were poisoned by i t .
A l t h o u g h t h e r e was h e l d t o be l i a b i l i t y
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r t h e q u e s t i o n under d i s c u s s i o n d i d n o t a r i s e f o r t h e
t r e e s were n o t n a t u r a l l y on t h e l a n d .
I t does seem though t h a t any d i s t i n c -
t i o n between s e l f - g r o w n and p l a n t e d t r e e s i s i m m a t e r i a l ; thus R o w l a t t J .
s a i d i n Noble v H a r r i s o n " T o grow a t r e e i s one o f t h e n a t u r a l uses o f
t h e s o i l , and i t makes no d i f f e r e n c e , i n my judgment, whether t h e t r e e was
1
p l a n t e d o r self-sown '.
To grow a poisonous t r e e , Crov/hurst
v Amersham
B u r i a l Board t e l l s u s , i s n o t a n a t u r a l use o f l a n d .
I t w i l l now be u s e f u l t o c o n s i d e r t h e c o m p l i c a t e d
question o f
whether t h e o c c u p i e r i s l i a b l e f o r t h e presence o f animals n a t u r a l l y on h i s
64
land.
The e a r l i e s t r e l e v a n t d e c i s i o n was B o u l s t o n ' s caseein which t h e
defendant c o n s t r u c t e d s e v e r a l coney-boroughs w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e
coneys ( r a b b i t s ) i n c r e a s e d
t o such an e x t e n t t h a t they caused damage t o
the p l a i n t i f f ' s adjacent l a n d .
I t was h e l d t h a t " h i s neighbours cannot
have an a c t i o n on t h e case a g a i n s t him who makes t h e s a i d coney-boroughs;
f o r as soon as t h e coneys come on h i s n e i g h b o u r ' s l a n d he ( t h e n e i g h b o u r )
may k i l l them, f o r t h e y a r e f e r a e n a t u r a e , and he who makes t h e coneyboroughs has no p r o p e r t y i n them, and he s h a l l n o t be punished f o r t h e
damage which t h e coneys do i n which he has no p r o p e r t y , and which t h e
o t h e r may l a w f u l l y k i l l . "
I n t h i s case t h e coneys were d e l i b e r a t e l y i n t r o -
duced on t o t h e l a n d and can n o t be s a i d t o have been n a t u r a l l y t h e r e .
P o l l o c k B. r e f u s e d t o f o l l o w t h e p r i n c i p l e o f B o u l s t o n ' s case i n
65
F a r r e r v Nelson
where he s a i d : "The moment he b r i n g s on game t o an
unreasonable amount o r causes i t t o i n c r e a s e t o an unreasonable e x t e n t he
i s doing t h a t which i s u n l a w f u l , and an a c t i o n may be m a i n t a i n e d
62.
63.
64.
65.
1878 4 Ex. D.5.
1926 2 K.B. 332 a t page 336.
5 Co. Rep. 104b.
1885 15 Q.B.D. 258.
43.
by h i s
n e i g h b o u r f o r t h e damage which he has s u s t a i n e d . "
66
I n Bland v Yates
W o r t h i n g t o n J . g r a n t e d an i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t a
defendant who used an e x c e s s i v e q u a n t i t y o f manure i n which f l i e s b r e d .
The f l i e s b r e d every b i t as spontaneously as d i d t h e t h i s t l e s i n G i l e s v
67
Walker
b u t t h e defendant was h e l d l i a b l e .
I n S t e a r n v P r e n t i c e Bros.
68
Ltd.
,the d e f e n d a n t s , who.-were bone m a n u f a c t u r e r s , k e p t on t h e i r premises
a heap o f bones which caused r a t s t o assemble t h e r e .
t h e i r way on t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d and a t e h i s c o r n .
The r a t s t h e n made
Bray J . , p u r p o r t i n g
t o f o l l o w B o u l s t o n ' s case, s a i d t h a t he was n o t aware t h a t t h a t d e c i s i o n had
ever been o v e r r u l e d o r q u e s t i o n e d and t h a t t h e defendants were n o t l i a b l e
s i n c e they had no p r o p e r t y i n t h e r a t s .
gq
With reference t o t h i s strange
1
c o n c l u s i o n Salmond says: ' "Probably t h i s case ( B o u l s t o n s case) i s no
l o n g e r law, though approved and f o l l o w e d i n S t e a r n v P r e n t i c e Bros."
This
makes i t s t r a n g e t h a t Salmond s h o u l d have c i t e d S t e a r n as a u t h o r i t y f o r h i s
statement t h a t an o c c u p i e r o f l a n d i s never under a d u t y o f c a r e t o p r e v e n t
the escape o f t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on h i s l a n d .
70
Goodhart
t a k e s the view t h a t t h e c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n was t h a t o f
66
W a r r i n g t o n J . i n Bland y Y a t e s .
He says t h a t "an o c c u p i e r o f l a n d i s
e n t i t l e d t o keep a reasonable number o f animals on h i s l a n d , whether t h e y
are t h e r e n a t u r a l l y o r have been s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t r o d u c e d , b u t i f they
i n c r e a s e t o an unreasonable e x t e n t , t h e n he i s under a d u t y t o abate h i s
nuisance."
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h e n t h a t t h e cases concerned w i t h animals demonst r a t e t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n must be drawn betv/een animals n a t u r a l l y on t h e
l a n d and those unreasonably i n t r o d u c e d o r h e l p e d t o remain t h e r e .
On t h i s
b a s i s Bland v Yates can be e x p l a i n e d on t h e ground t h a t t h e defendant
encouraged t h e f l i e s t o breed t h e r e by u s i n g an e x c e s s i v e q u a n t i t y o f manure.
66.
191^ 58 S o l , J . 612.
67.
1890 2k Q.B.D. 656.
68.
1919 1 K.B. 39k.
^9.
69.
Page 351 n o t e (m).
76. At page 21.
E q u a l l y t h i s enables us t o draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between two f a i r l y s i m i l a r
i n s t r u c t i v e cases, F a r r e r v Nelson
71
72
and Seligman v Docker.
and
I n t h e former
case a t e n a n t b r o u g h t an unreasonable number o f pheasants on t o h i s l a n d
was
h e l d l i a b l e f o r t h e damage they caused t o n e i g h b o u r i n g
and
l a n d ; i n Seligman
v Docker t h e defendant d i d n o t b r i n g t h e pheasants on t o h i s l a n d o r unreasona b l y cause them t o i n c r e a s e t h e r e and v/as h e l d n o t t o be l i a b l e .
Thus a l t h o u g h many o f t h e cases are i n c o n c l u s i v e i t i s s u b m i t t e d
that
t h e p r e f e r a b l e view i s t h a t t h e rule.-i i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r does n o t a p p l y t o
t h i n g s which are n a t u r a l l y on l a n d u n l e s s i t can be s a i d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ,
e i t h e r by making some a l t e r a t i o n t o t h e l a n d or by encouraging the t h i n g s t o
remain o r i n c r e a s e i n number t h e r e , has a r t i f i c i a l l y i n t e r f e r e d i n some way
w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l presence on t h e l a n d .
T h i s view seems t o be i n accord
b o t h w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s and w i t h p r i n c i p l e .
We must now see
a u t h o r i t i e s concerning
have n o t e d , s u p p o r t s
t o what e x t e n t t h i s i s v a l i d h a v i n g r e g a r d t o t h e
t h i n g s on u n a l t e r e d l a n d .
Seligman v Docker, as we
t h e view t h a t t h e r e w i l l be no l i a b i l i t y where the
l a n d i s u n a l t e r e d and the presence o f t h e t h i n g has n o t been encouraged by
the d e f e n d a n t .
I t was s a i d t h a t t h e defendant i s under a duty t o remove
t h e substance i n P r o p r i e t o r s o f Margate P i e r and Harbour v Town C o u n c i l o f
Margate
73
b u t i n Pontardawe R.D.C. v Moore-G-wyn
74
Eve <J. h e l d t h a t an
o c c u p i e r o f l a n d need t a k e no steps t o p r e v e n t r o c k s which have been loosened
by w e a t h e r i n g
from f a l l i n g .
case b u t i t i s s u b m i t t e d
Goodhart p r e f e r s t h e view taken i n t h e Margate
t h a t t h e Pontardawe d e c i s i o n i s t h e b e t t e r one
and
t h a t t h i s , a l l i e d w i t h Selijgrn,gn v Docker, shows t h a t t h e r e i s no l i a b i l i t y
for
t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on u n a l t e r e d l a n d unless t h e defendant has b r o u g h t them
on t o the l a n d o r encouraged t h e i r c o n t i n u e d
presence t h e r e .
I t s h o u l d be f u r t h e r remarked t h a t , even i f i t i s shown t h a t t h e
71.
72.
73.
74.
1885
1949
1869
1929
15 Q.B.D. 258.
Ch. 53.
20 L.T. (K.S.) 564.
1 Ch. 656.
50.
defendant brought t h e dangerous t h i n g bh t o h i s own l a n d , t h e defendant
will
o n l y be l i a b l e under t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i f i t can be shown t h a t ,
i n Blackburn J.'s
own words, he b r o u g h t i t on t o t h e land, ' f o r h i s own
75
purposes.'
T h i s phrase has u s u a l l y been w i d e l y i n t e r p r e t e d and t h u s i t
i s g e n e r a l l y s a i d t h a t t h e defendant w i l l be l i a b l e even where he g a i n s no
b e n e f i t from t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n on h i s l a n d .
I f t h i s were n o t t h e case b o d i e s
such as l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s c o u l d never be l i a b l e i n t h e t o r t o f ^ l a n d s _ _ v
F l e t c h e r ; i t b e i n g decided t h a t t h e y can be i n Charing- Cross E l e c t r i c i t y
76
Supply Co. v H y d r a u l i c Power Co.,
a d e c i s i o n agreed w i t h by Upjohn J . i n
78
Smeaton v I l f o r d Corp.77 where he s a i d :
" I can see no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r
a p p l y i n g a d i f f e r e n t lav/ t o a l o c a l a u t h o r i t y merely because i t i s a l o c a l
a u t h o r i t y , o r t h a t i t i s c a r r y i n g out something b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e community,
o r even t h a t i t i s d o i n g so p u r s u a n t t o a s t a t u t o r y d u t y . "
A different
and
7Q
as y e t unsupported view was expressed i n Dunne v H. Western Gas Board
S e l l e r s L.J. g i v i n g t h e judgment
' where
o f t h e Court o f Appeal, p o i n t e d out t h a t
gas
and water are brought on t o t h e l a n d f o r t h e g e n e r a l b e n e f i t o f t h e t h e p u b l i c
and went on t o say t h a t " i t would seem odd t h a t f a c i l i t i e s so much sought
a f t e r by t h e community and approved by t h e i r l e g i s l a t o r s s h o u l d be a c t i o n a b l e
a t common law because t h e y have been b r o u g h t t o t h e p l a c e s where t h e y a r e
r e q u i r e d and have escaped w i t h o u t n e g l i g e n c e by an u n f o r s e e n sequence o f
mishaps."
75.
76.
7778.
79.
80.
1S66 L.R. 1 Ex. 265 a t page 2791914 3 K.B.
772.
1954 c h . 45C.
At page 478.
1964 2 Q.B. 806.
At page 832.
51.
CHAPTER V
Dangerous Things.
As o r i g i n a l l y formulated, the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r a p p l i e d
1
to
'anything l i k e l y to do m i s c h i e f i f i t escapes'.
T h i s concept
appears
i n s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t branches of the law of t o r t - f o r example the l i a b i l i t y
of the vendor, manufacturer, h i r e r , consigner or donor of dangerous c h a t t e l s ,
the l i a b i l i t y of the occupier of l a n d t o persons coming upon h i s land,
l i a b i l i t y f o r p u b l i c nuisance and l i a b i l i t y under c e r t a i n s t a t u t e s - as
w e l l as^a component p a r t of t h e r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
In
spite
of the use of the concept i n these v a r i o u s branches of the law the phrase
i s a h i g h l y u n c e r t a i n one f o r i t can t r u t h f u l l y be s a i d that t h e r e a r e few
o b j e c t s which do not i n some circumstances present a r i s k of harm i f they
escape*
Almost anything i s p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous.
Blackburn J . ' s expression 'anything l i k e l y to do m i s c h i e f i f i t
escapes', has come t o be equated with 'dangerous t h i n g s ' .
(Blackburn J .
h i m s e l f explained the r u l e a s applying t o a 'thing of a dangerous nature*
i n Jones v F e s t i n p j g Railway Co.) .
I n order t o d i s c o v e r the e s s e n t i a l
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a dangerous thing we must examine those t h i n g s which, i n
the context o f the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r , have been h e l d t o come
w i t h i n the ambit of t h i s phrase.
Rylands v F l e t c h e r i t s e l f was concerned with the escape of water
and water has ever s i n c e been g e n e r a l l y regarded as coming w i t h i n the
rule.
Thus Eve J . i n Whitmores L t d . v S t a n f o r d ^ spoke of Water, or any
other dangerous element'.
But Stephen J . appears not to have regarded
water c o l l e c t i n g i n a c i s t e r n as f a l l i n g w i t h i n the r u l e i n h i s judgment
if
5
i n Blake v Land and House Property Corp.
Fire
and t h i n g s l i k e l y to
cause a f i r e come w i t h i n the 'dangerous category*. T h i s i n c l u d e s a l s o
1.
1866 L.R. 1 E.X. 265 a t page 279.
2.
1868 L.R. 3 Q.B. 733 a t page 736.
3.
1909 1 Ch. *+27 a t page ^38.
k.
1887 3 T.L.R.667.
5 . E.G. Job Edwards v Birmingham Cflnal Navigations 192 * 1 K.B. 3^1.
1
/
6
7
8
gas , r a i l w a y engines emitting sparks and c a r s with f u l l p e t r o l tanks.
q
E q u a l l y e x p l o s i v e s a r e w i t h i n the r u l e (Miles v F o r e s t Rock G r a n i t e Co.,
the Rainham
sewage
14
10
case and Read v Lyons
, wire rope
15
11
) as a r e e l e c t r i c i t y
and, i t seems, poisonous t r e e s
16
12
, chemicals,
13
. Motor c a r s have
17
been held not t o come w i t h i n the r u l e
( u n l e s s t h e i r p e t r o l tanks a r e
f u l l and they a r e i n a garage) although t h i s i s not because they l a c k
the 'dangerous' q u a l i t y but because t h e i r use i s a n a t u r a l user of l a n d .
18
Stallybrass
concludes from the a u t h o r i t i e s that chemicals,
e x p l o s i v e s , f i r e and e l e c t r i c i t y w i l l always be dangerous things but that
other things such as water, t r e e s and unloaded guns a r e sometimes regarded
as dangerous i n themselves and sometimes not.
The essence of the matter,
he s a y s , l i e s i n the r e l a t i v i t y of danger and here we have t o agree with
19
D a r l i n g J . who s a i d i n C h i c h e s t e r Corp. v F o s t e r :
" I very much doubt
whether anything whatever can, s t r i c t l y speaking, b e - c a l l e d a 'dangerous
1
thing .
That depends on i t s use - on environment.
Water
only dangerous under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and so i s f i r e . "
is
J u s t as there
i s nothing which i s a t a l l times and i n a l l circumstances dangerous, so
i t seems that there i s nothing which i s i n a l l circumstances s a f e ; a view
20
taken by Kay J . i n Snow v Whitehead
when he s a i d t h a t "anyone who c o l l e c t s
upon h i s land water, or anything e l s e , which would not i n the n a t u r a l
c o n d i t i o n of the land be c o l l e c t e d t h e r e , ought t o keep i t i n a t h i s p e r i l . "
21
22
Sheep
and dogs
have been held not t o come w i t h i n the r u l e but i t i s
6.
B a t c h e l l e r v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co. 1901 84 L.T. 765.
7 . Jones v F e s t i n o i g Railway Co. 1868 L.R. 3 Q.B. 733«
8 . Musgrove v P a n d e l i s 1919 2 K.B. 43.
9.
1918 34 T.L.R. 500.
10> 1921 2 A.C. 465.
11.
1947 A.C. 156.
12. National Telephone Co. v Baker 1893 2 CH. 186.
13.
e.g. Smith v Great Western Railway Co. 1926 135 L.T. 112.
14. Humphries v Cousins 18?7 2 CTP.D. 239^
15. F i r t h v Bowling I r o n Co. 1878 3 C.P.D. 254.
16. Crowhurst v Amersham B u r i a l Board 1878 4 Ex. D . 5 .
17. P h i l l i p s v B r i t a n n i c Hygienic Laundry Co. 1923 1 K.B. 53918. 3 C.L.J. 376 a t page 38519. 1906 1 K.B. 167 a t pages 177, 178.
20.
1884 27 Ch. D. 588 a t page 591.
21. Heath's Garage v Hodges 1916 2 K.B. 370.
22. Hines v Tousley 1 9 2 6 9 5 L.J.K.B. 77353.
submitted t h a t , as with a l l other t h i n g s , circumstances are conceivable
i n which they could come to be regarded as 'dangerous t h i n g s ' .
The t r u e
d i s t i n c t i o n t h e r e f o r e i s not between the dangerous or non-dangerous
c h a r a c t e r of the t h i n g but between those circumstances where the defendant w i l l be allowed to deny the dangerous c h a r a c t e r of h i s a c t and
where he w i l l
those
not.
I t can thus be seen t h a t the category of Rylands v F l e t c h e r
o b j e c t s has never become narrowed to that of ' i n h e r e n t l y dangerous*
t h i n g s which have a t t r a c t e d a s t r i n g e n t duty of c a r e elsewhere i n the
law of t o r t .
I t i s to that other adaptable c r i t e r i o n , non-natural u s e r
of land, t h a t the task of c o n f i n i n g the s t r i c t form of l i a b i l i t y i n
Rylands v F l e t c h e r to extra-hazardous c o n d i t i o n s has f a l l e n .
It is, i t
i s submitted, because the use of motor c a r s i s nowadays normal and u s u a l
that they do not g e n e r a l l y i n c u r s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y and not because they
are
not regarded as o b j e c t s l i k e l y to do m i s c h i e f .
The d i s t i n c t i o n s between n a t u r a l and non-natural u s e r of l a n d
and between dangerous and non-dangerous things have on occasions been
23
confused.
Thus i n Barker v Herbert
F l e t c h e r Moulton L . J . s a i d : " t h i s
i s not a case where a landowner has erected or brought upon h i s l a n d
something of an unusual nature, which i s e s s e n t i a l l y dangerous of i t s e l f .
There i s nothing unusual or n e c e s s a r i l y dangerous i n an area protected
2k
by r a i l i n g s , " and i n Latham v Johnson
duction i n t o the l a n d
F a r w e l l L . J . spoke of "the i n t r o -
of something out of the normal u s e r of
25
land, known to the owners to be dangerous."
The two questions are i n
f a c t e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t although they are f u n c t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d i n t h a t
both make room f o r j u d i c a l d i s c r e t i o n i n applying or withholding
liability.
Many Rylands v F l e t c h e r o b j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g water, gas
strict
and
e l e c t r i c i t y , are p e r f e c t l y u s u a l , and i n such order t h a t t h e ; r u l e should
apply i t i s necessary both t h a t there must be an e x t r a o r d i n a r y u s e r of
the land and t h a t the object must i n the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances be
dangerous.
CHAPTER V I
Fire
1
The law governing l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of f i r e has had a
long h i s t o r y during which i t has undergone many changes; changes which
have frequently c o i n c i d e d v/ith developments
within society i t s e l f . For
reasons o f s o c i a l p o l i c y i t has developed i n a d i f f e r e n t way t o the t o r t
of Rylands v F l e t c h e r and because of t h i s , although the r u l e i n Rylands
v F l e t c h e r p l a y s a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of f i r e ,
f i r e must be regarded i n the law of t o r t a s much more than merely something l i a b l e t o do m i s c h i e f i f i t escapes.
I n t h i s chapter we w i l l
study the h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s of l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of f i r e , the
r e l e v a n t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s and the manner i n which the l i a b i l i t y has
developed i n recent times, culminating i n the d e c i s i o n s i n Mason v Levy
2
3
Auto P a r t s of England and Emanuel v G r e a t e r London C o u n c i l .
I n the e a r l y common law the a c t i o n brought f o r damage caused by
the
escape of f i r e was an a c t i o n on the case pur negligent garder son
few.
The duty imposed to keep one's f i r e s a f e was but one example of a
number of s p e c i a l d u t i e s imposed on such persons a s innkeepers and common
c a r r i e r s who had a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u s i n the eyes of the law. A p a r a l l e l
with Rylands v F l e t c h e r can be seen from the need from e a r l i e s t times f o r
1
the f i r e t o be w i t h i n the c o n t r o l of the defendant.
the
Thus i n Anon. 1582
court suggested that an a c t i o n on the custom of the realm was not
w e l l brought where the defendant, by f i r i n g a gun a t a fowl, s e t f i r e
to h i s own and an a d j o i n i n g house.
defendant's c o n t r o l .
The f i r e had never been w i t h i n the
The defendant was held to be l i a b l e f o r a f i r e l i t
5
i n h i s own f i e l d i n T u r b e r v i l l e v Stampe
1.
2.
3.
k,
5.
6.
6
and i n Beautieu v Finglam a
See g e n e r a l l y Cgus a r t i c l e i n 1969 C.L.J. P.1C4.
1967 2 Q.B. 530.
1971 2 A.E.R. 835.
Cro. E l i z . 10.
1697 S a l k . 647. 1 Ld. Raym. 264.
1401 Y.B. 2 Hen. I V , f . 1 8 .
1
55-
f i r e l i t by the defendant's servant or guest was held to be the defendant's
own
f i r e f o r the a c t s of those persons were w i t h i n h i s c o n t r o l .
For
ac
t h e r e to be l i a b i l i t y the f i r e had to be l i t 'tam n e g l i g e n t e r
1
improvide .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the word n e g l i g e n t e r has been the
7
s u b j e c t of much d i s c u s s i o n ,
for
Braeton , i n d i s c u s s i n g c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y
f i r e , s a y s that a c i v i l a c t i o n l i e s f o r 'incendia f o r t u i t a , v e l per
negligentiam f a c t a ' which would seem to favour absolute l i a b i l i t y .
There
i s a remarkable absence from the Year Books of c a s e s concerned with the
escape of F i r e .
The f i r s t reported case of t r e s p a s s on the case f o r the
escape of f i r e i s Beaulieu v F i n g l a m and that case i s s i n g u l a r l y inconclusive.
T h i r n i n g C.J. s a i d t h a t a man s h a l l answer f o r h i s f i r e which
by misfortune burns the goods of another.
Markham J . s a i d that the
l i a b i l i t y extended to a c t s done by a neighbour entering the defendant's
house with h i s leave or knowledge, and a l s o by a guest, but not by a
s t r a n g e r , because the f i r e was not due to e v i l on the defendant's p a r t ,
g
but was a g a i n s t h i s w i l l .
the
Winfield
a u t h o r i t i e s , that negligence i n t h i s a c t i o n did not have the t e c h n i c a l
meaning which i t now bears i n t o r t .
the
concludes, j u s t i f i a b l y , i n view of
I t c e r t a i n l y excluded l i a b i l i t y f o r
a c t of a s t r a n g e r and f o r misadventure' or as we would now c a l l i t
•inevitable accident.'
As Winfield concludes: "we cannot be sure that
a t any p e r i o d i n the h i s t o r y of the E n g l i s h common law a man was a b s o l u t e l y
l i a b l e f o r the escape of h i s f i r e . "
Having e s t a b l i s h e d that t h e r e was a f i r e w i t h i n the defendant's
c o n t r o l the p l a i n t i f f must show t h a t i t was that f i r e which escaped and
9
caused damage to h i s property.
tions.
the
Ogus
examines three h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a -
F i r s t due to a c t of God or of a s t r a n g e r the f i r e breaks out on
defendant's land,
Here the defendant i s not l i a b l e .
Secondly the
defendant l i g h t s a candle i n h i s house and due to an a c t of God i t i s
knocked over, s e t s f i r e to the defendant's house and then spreads to the
7.
F o l . 1lf66.
8.
k2 L.Q.R. 37 a t P . ^ 9 .
9.
At page 106.
56.
p l a i n t i f f ' s house.
The p o s i t i o n i s u n c e r t a i n but i t seems probable that
the defendant would have been l i a b l e on these f a c t s .
said:
Thus Markham J .
" I f my servant or my guest puts a candle by a w a l l and the
candle
10
f a l l s i n t o the straw
I s h a l l answer to my neighbour"
and i n
11
Bacon's Abridgement, w r i t t e n a f t e r the Act of 1774,
appears the statement:
" I t was formerly holden, that i f a f i r e broke out a c c i d e n t a l l y i n a man's
house, and raged to that degree as to hurt h i s neighbour's, that he i n
whose house the f i r e f i r s t happened was l i a b l e to an a c t i o n on the case
on the general custom of the realm, quod q u i l i b e t ignem suum s a l v o . "
T h i r d l y the defendant l i g h t s a f i r e i n h i s f i e l d and due to an a c t of
o r of a stranger sparks are blown on to l e a v e s which i g n i t e .
spreads to the p l a i n t i f f ' s property.
God
The f i r e
Again there i s u n c e r t a i n t y but i t
seems that the defendant would not have been l i a b l e .
The majority i n
T u r b e r v i l l e v Stampe s a i d of t h i s : " I f he k i n d l e i t a t a proper time and
p l a c e , and the violence of the wind c a r r y i t i n t o h i s neighbour's ground
12
and p r e j u d i c e him, t h i s i s f i t to be given i n
evidence."
At t h i s point i n time s o c i a l considerations began to play t h e i r
p a r t i n the development of the law.
With wooden houses m u l t i p l y i n g the
r i s k s were much g r e a t e r as was demonstrated by the Great F i r e of London
i n 1666.
E i r e insurance was
with preventing
on the i n c r e a s e and Parliament
the outbreak of f i r e s .
became obsessed
Many r e g u l a t i o n s were enacted
among which were two major c l a u s e s r e l a t i n g to c i v i l l i a b i l i t y . The f i r s t
17>
i s ^6 of an Act of 1707
'for the b e t t e r preventing the m i s c h i e f s t h a t
may happen by f i r e . ' The f i r s t f i v e s e c t i o n s of the Act imposed penal
14
s a n c t i o n s and §6 was added, Ogus argues,
i n order to r e s o l v e the doubt
o u t l i n e d i n h i s second h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .
§ 6 provides t h a t 'no
a c t i o n , s u i t or process, whatever, s h a l l be had, maintained or
10. 1401 Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, f . 1 8 .
11.
(5th
12.
13.
14.
1 Ld. Eaym. 264.
6 i&nne, c . 3 1 .
At page 108.
ed. 1798
I.85.)
57.
prosecuted
a g a i n s t any person i n whose house or chamber any f i r e s h a l l
a c c i d e n t a l l y begin, or any recompense be made by such person f o r any
damage s u f f e r e d or occasioned thereby; any law, usage, or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding*.
Ogus concludes t h a t as f a r as Parliament
was concerned "the problems of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y were i n s i g n i f i c a n t compared
w i t h the fundamental
aim of preventing and c o n t r o l l i n g f i r e s . "
This
information i s gained from the preamble to the s t a t u t e which s a y s :
"Whereas
many F i r e s have l a t e l y broken out i n s e v e r a l p l a c e s i n and about the c i t i e s
of London and Westminster,
and other P a r i s h e s and P l a c e s comprised w i t h i n
the weekly B i l l s of M o r t a l i t y , and many Houses have f r e q u e n t l y been burnt
and consumed before such F i r e s could be extinguished, to the Impoverishing
and u t t e r r u i n of many of Her Majesty's S u b j e c t s , the Rage and V i o l e n c e
whereof might have been i n great P a r t prevented, i f a s u f f i c i e n t quantity
of water had been provided i n the Pipes l y i n g i n the S t r e e t s , and i f
P a r t y Walls of B r i c k had been b u i l t between House and House, from the
Foundation to the Top of the Roofs, and l e s s Timber i n the Front of Houses,"
I f we accept Ogus's point i t means that when i n s u r e d property had
been damaged insurance companies were never concerned with the l i a b i l i t y of
the owner of neighbouring property from which the f i r e had spread.
Further
t h i r d party r i s k s were not covered i n f i r e insurance p o l i c i e s u n t i l the
nineteenth century.
A d d i t i o n a l evidence that §6 was enacted i n order to
r e s o l v e doubts as to the need f o r negligence i n such c a s e s i s supplied by
Holdsworth
who,
i n h i s H i s t o r y of E n g l i s h Law Volume XI a t page 6'07, p o i n t s
out that the form of a c t i o n i n which the l i a b i l i t y f o r damage caused by
f i r e was a s s e r t e d was case and .that i t was i n connection with a c t i o n s on
the case that lawyers were coming to be f a m i l i a r with the idea that
l i a b i l i t y was based on negligence.
civil
I t was g e n e r a l l y a l l e g e d , as was seen
i n T u r b e r v i l l e v Stampe, that the'defendant had n e g l i g e n t l y kept h i s f i r e
whereby damage had been caused to the p l a i n t i f f and t h i s tended to make
58.
lawyers think that i t was anomalous that a man should be l i a b l e f o r
damage caused by a f i r e which was not occasioned by h i s negligence.
T h i s Act of 1707 was repealed i n 1772-Section 6
enacted.
was r e -
The new Act was i t s e l f repealed i n 177^ but S . 6 was again
reenacted i n S.86 of the F i r e s Prevention (Metropolis) Act 177*+ 15
and was extended from f i r e s o r i g i n a t i n g i n b u i l d i n g s to those, such as
the f i r e i n T u r b e r v i l l e v Stampe, which o r i g i n a t e d 'on e s t a t e s ' .
This
widened the scope of the s e c t i o n and r e s o l v e d remaining doubts on the
t h i r d of Ogus's Hypothetical s i t u a t i o n s .
The f i r s t reported
case i n which the Act was pleaded was Canterbury
16
v Attorney-General
i n 18^2.
By t h i s time negligence had begun to a s s e r t
17
i t s e l f as was demonstrated i n Vaughan v Menlove
where the d i r e c t i o n t o
the j u r y was to consider whether i n the circumstances the defendant had
conducted h i m s e l f with the "caution such as a man of ordinary prudence
would observe.'
With the advent of the t o r t of negligence the courts had
to r e c o n c i l e t h i s part of the common Law v/ith S . 8 6 .
17
I n Vaughan v Menlove
may
the s t a t u t o r y s e c t i o n was ignored.
This
have been because the court considered that the p r o v i s i o n applied
only to London ( i t was c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d to have general a p p l i c a t i o n i n
Richards v Easto 1846)
18
. Lord Denman C.J. i n F i l l i t e r v Phippard
19
suggested that i t was ignored because the court assumed the p r o v i s i o n
did not apply where the defendant v/as negligent but what i s most l i k e l y
i s that the court considered the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n to have no relevance
to the modern t o r t of negligence.
There i s a l s o the view t h a t S.86 i s a good defence even where the
defendant i s n e g l i g e n t ; that the word ' a c c i d e n t a l l y ' i n the S t a t u t e
embraces the common Law on t h i s p o i n t .
T h i s view i s based upon a passage
20
i n Blackstone's Commentaries:
"By the Common Law, i f a servant kept
h i s master's f i r e n e g l i g e n t l y , so that h i s neighbour's house was burned
15.
1 * Geo. 3, c 78
16 . 18^3 1 P h i l . 306.
17. 1837 3 Bing. N.C. if68.
18.
15 M. and W. 251.
19. 18V? 11 Q.B. 3^7 a t page 357.
20 . V o l . 1, p. ^31.
2
:
59.
down thereby, an a c t i o n l a y a g a i n s t h i s master; because t h i s negligence
happened i n h i s s e r v i c e
But now the common Law i s a l t e r e d by
S t a t u t e which ordains that no a c t i o n s h a l l be maintained a g a i n s t any, i n
whose house or chamber any f i r e s h a l l a c c i d e n t a l l y begin, f o r t h e i r own
l o s s i s s u f f i c i e n t punishment f o r t h e i r own or t h e i r s e r v a n t ' s c a r e l e s s ness.'
1
I t must be s a i d however that the meaning Blackstone a t t a c h e s t o
the word 'negligence' i s u n c e r t a i n , no statement i s made on l i a b i l i t y
a f t e r the s t a t u t e , and i t i n v o l v e s a misreading of l i a b i l i t y before
1707.
T h i s view f u r t h e r seems c o n t r a r y t o the p o l i c y behind the eighteenth
century s t a t u t e s f o r i t would v i r t u a l l y a b o l i s h c i v i l l i a b i l i t y f o r the
19
escape of f i r e .
The passage was used i n argument i n F i l l i t e r v Phippard
but d e c i s i v e l y r e j e c t e d .
Having discounted that p o s s i b i l i t y Lord Denman had t o f i n d h i s
own way of r e c o n c i l i n g S86 with the p r i n c i p l e s of negligence.
He d i d t h i s
by holding t h a t ' a c c i d e n t a l l y ' meant not only u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y but a l s o
without negligence i n s p i t e of the f a c t that the concept of negligence
did
not e x i s t i n t h i s sense i n 177^«
T h i s was n e v e r t h e l e s s an e f f e c t i v e
way of disposing of $6.
S o c i a l p o l i c y reared i t s head again i n the mid eighteenth century
when the escaping of sparks from r a i l w a y engines and t h e i r s e t t i n g
to property became a common occurence.
fire
Negligence was considered t o be
an adequate remedy f o r a time as was seen i n the judgments i n Piggot v
21"
E a s t e r n Counties Railway
. Other judges who saw a g r e a t e r danger from
mechanised i n d u s t r i e s tended t o favour a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y a s
i l l u s t r a t e d by Branwell B.'s judgment i n Vaughan v T a f f Vale Railway
22
where he s a i d :
" r a i l w a y companies, by using f i r e , a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
any accident which may r e s u l t from i t s use, although they have taken
every precaution i n t h e i r power."
21.
22.
1846 3 C.B. 229.
1860 5 H. and N. 679 a t page 685.
60
I t can thus be seen that with a s i t u a t i o n i n which the judges were
d i v i d e d over the s t r i c t n e s s of l i a b i l i t y i n cases of t h i s nature the impact
of the d e c i s i o n i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r was c o n s i d e r a b l e .
F i r e was r e a d i l y
accepted a s a Rylands v F l e t c h e r object f o l l o w i n g Blackburn J . ' s own
23
judgment two y e a r s l a t e r i n Jones v Festinbg Railway
. As we have seen
L .
l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r was modified t o include
not only the escape of the dangerous thing i t s e l f but any escape caused
by b r i n g i n g i t on t o the l a n d .
the
A s i m i l a r r u l e was q u i c k l y developed i n
case of f i r e and thus f o r the purposes of l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape
of f i r e a t r a c t i o n engine was h e l d to be the dangerous t h i n g i n Gunter v
Zk
25
James,
p a r a f f i n i n Mulholland and Tedd v Baker,
p e t r o l fumes i n a
26
c a r ' s p e t r o l tank i n P e r r y v Kendricks Transport
and a motor c a r with
27
p e t r o l i n i t s tank i n Musgrove v P a n d e l i s .
I t should be noted however that i n the caflse of other Rylands.v
F l e t c h e r o b j e c t s l i t t l e o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d to t h i s extension o f the
p r i n c i p l e t o an escape caused by the thing brought on t o the l a n d . I n
the
case of f i r e i t met with s t e r n e r opposition, opposition which i f
s u c c e s s f u l would have s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d the e f f i c a c y of Rylands v F l e t c h e r
as a form of t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y where f i r e i s i n v o l v e d . Romer L . J .
pointed out the apparent i n c o n s i s t e n c y of t h i s i n Collingwood v Home and
28
Colonial Stores
and Mackenna J . considered t h a t matter a t g r e a t e r length
29
i n Mason v Levy Auto P a r t s .
The judge acknowledged that he was bound
27
to follow the precedent of Musgrove v P a n d e l i s
but did not accept t h e
reasoning i n that c a s e . Mackenna J . s a i d that s i n c e i n Musgrove v
P a n d e l i s the thing brought on to the land had not escaped^ the r u l e i n
f
Rylands v F l e t c h e r could not apply which i s l o g i c a l but c o n t r a r y to
;
1
23.
1868 L.R. 3 Q.B. 733*
2k.
25.
26.
1908 24 T.L.R. 868.
1939 3 A.E.R. 2531956 1 W.L.R. 85.
1919 2 K.B. 43.
1936 2 A.E.R. 200 a t 208-209,
1967 2 Q.B. 530.
27.
28.
29.
61.
precedent.
He concluded as a r e s u l t that Musgrove v P a n d e l i s must have
been decided on the wider p r i n c i p l e on which, he s a i d , Bylands v F l e t c h e r
i t s e l f was based - s i c u t e r e tuo ut alienum non l a e d a s .
He f u r t h e r
s t a t e d that f o r the defendant to be l i a b l e f o r the escape of f i r e under
the
r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r he must
1.
have brought something onto h i s land l i k e l y
it
to do m i s c h i e f i f
escaped.
2.
have done so i n the course of a non-natural user of the l a n d .
3*
the thing must have i g n i t e d and the f i r e spread.
T h i s argument i s l o g i c a l l y a t t r a c t i v e but there are grave
difficulties
i n accepting i t .
The r e i t e r a t i o n of the s i c u t e r e maxim
i s of l i t t l e value but what i s more important i s that t h i s argument
could much reduce the scope of l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r - such
26
c a s e s as P e r r y v Kendricks Transport
and M i l e s v F o r e s t Rock G r a n i t e Co.
could no longer be decided under t h a t p r i n c i p l e .
S i g n i f i c a n t l y Mackenna
J . ' s views on escape have nowhere met with acceptance.
V/e must now study the e f f e c t Rylands v F l e t c h e r had on the 177^
Act.
The c o u r t s as we have seen t r i e d to r e c o n c i l e the Act with the
modern concept of negligence and i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r too attempts a t
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n were made.
I f Mackenna Ji'is view of the law i s accepted
there i s no d i f f i c u l t y f o r i f the defendant l i t the f i r e i n t e n t i o n a l l y
the
Act would be i n a p p l i c a b l e .
Where however the source of the f i r e i s
the
Rylands v F l e t c h e r object there can be circumstances i n which the f i r e
i t s e l f could be s a i d to have begun a c c i d e n t a l l y .
27
Such a case was Musgrove v P a n d e l i s .
i n h i s garage.
The defendant kept a c a r
While h i s chauffeur was t r y i n g to s t a r t the engine a f i r e
broke out i n the c a r b u r e t t o r f o r some reason never adequately e x p l a i n e d .
I t was found that the chauffeur was n e g l i g e n t i n not preventing the f i r e
from spreading and so the defendant r e l i e d on 586 and claimed that the
f i r e began ' a c c i d e n t a l l y * .
The Court of Appeal decided i n favour of the
p l a i n t i f f , holding that §86 was not a good defence to an a c t i o n i n Rylands
v F l e t c h e r , following on t h i s point Lush J . ' s d e c i s i o n a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e .
32
Bankes L . J .
law:
d i s t i n g u i s h e d three forms of l i a b i l i t y e x i s t i n g a t common
(i)
f o r the mere escape of f i r e ,
( i i ) for f i r e caused d e l i b e r -
a t e l y o r n e g l i g e n t l y by the defendant o r h i s servant and
the p r i n c i p l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r which was,
p r i n c i p l e of the common Law.
( i i i ) under
he s a i d , an e x i s t i n g
Bankes L . J . s a i d that the object of the
Act was t o give p r o t e c t i o n under the f i r s t head, that l i a b i l i t y under
19
the second head was not a f f e c t e d following F i l l i t e r v Phippard
where
i t was held t h a t the Act did not apply t o a f i r e caused e i t h e r d e l i b e r a t e l y or n e g l i g e n t l y .
He then went on: "Why, i f that i s the law a s to
the second head of l i a b i l i t y , should i t be otherwise a s to the t h i r d
head; the l i a b i l i t y on the p r i n c i p l e of Rylands v F l e t c h e r ?
I f that
l i a b i l i t y e x i s t e d , there i s no reason why the s t a t u t e should a l t e r i t
and yet leave untouched the l i a b i l i t y f o r f i r e caused by negligence or
design."
I t should be f i r s t remarked that i t i s i l l o g i c a l
to argue from
head ( i i ) to head ( i i i ) , t o argue that because i t i s accepted that
' a c c i d e n t a l l y ' does not apply where the f i r e was caused by negligence i t
should not apply i n a Rylands v F l e t c h e r s i t u a t i o n where the essence of
l i a b i l i t y i s t h a t negligence need not be proved.
Mackenna J . i n Mason v
33
Levy Auto P a r t s
s a i d that " i n holding t h a t an exemption given to a c -
cidental fires
does not include f i r e s f o r which l i a b i l i t y might be
imposed upon the p r i n c i p l e of Rylands v F l e t c h e r , the Court of Appeal
went very f a r . "
I t i s submitted that i t went too f a r .
I n addition
Bankes E . J . showed a l a c k of understanding of the nature of the r u l e i n
Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
He s a i d t h a t i t was p l a i n that the p r i n c i p l e of
Rylands v F l e t c h e r e x i s t e d long before the case i t s e l f was decided.
evidence of t h i s he offered a statement of T i n d a l C.J. i n Vaughan v
32. At page 46.
33.
1967 2 Q.B. 530.
63.
As
ice
34
Henlove where the C h i e f J u s t / s a i d :
"there i s a r u l e of law which s a y s
you must so enjoy your own property as not to i n j u r e that of another."
Here again i s the f a u l t of assuming from that very general and, i n
p r a c t i c e , almost meaningless p r i n c i p l e the f a r more s p e c i f i c form of
l i a b i l i t y espoused by Blackburn J .
The p r e c i s e p r i n c i p l e i n Rylands v
F l e t c h e r d i d not e x i s t before the Act of 1774.
Thus Bankes L . J . ' s reasons f o r s a y i n g that $86 does not apply
35
to the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r a r e inadequate.
Ogus
suggests that
Bankes L . J . ' s c o n c l u s i o n was r i g h t but that i t should be based on the
ground that s i n c e l i a b i l i t y a t common law r e s t e d only on 'the mere escape
of f i r e ' , the s t a t u t o r y defence was r e l e v a n t only to that form of l i a b i l i t y .
The best view, i t i s submitted, i s that i t i s p o i n t l e s s to attempt to
r e c o n c i l e $86 with the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
Each of these two
p r i n c i p l e s of law was introduced without thought to the other and they a r e
i n p r i n c i p l e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e f o r Rylands v F l e t c h e r i s e s s e n t i a l l y concerned
with l i a b i l i t y f o r non-negligent escape w h i l e $86 s a y s that there s h a l l be
is
no l i a b i l i t y i n those circumstances. The f a c t / t h a t l i a b i l i t y f o r the
escape of f i r e e x i s t e d before such c a t e g o r i e s as negligence and Rylands v
F l e t c h e r were thought o f . No s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n can be found while
r i g i d c a t e g o r i e s a r e maintained.
We w i l l however r e t u r n to t h i s question
a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g f u r t h e r arguments of Ogus which have a bearing on i t .
I n e v i t a b l y the l i m i t a t i o n s engrafted on the r u l e i n Rylands v
F l e t c h e r i n c a s e s concerned with other Rylands v F l e t c h e r o b j e c t s came
to be applied to f i r e .
Thus the l i g h t i n g of a f i r e f o r domestic cooking
or f o r the heating of a room was held to be a n a t u r a l u s e r of land and
the
defence of s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y was held to apply where a f i r e was
l i t i n c i d e n t a l l y to an e n t e r p r i s e c a r r i e d on under that a u t h o r i t y .
3^. 1837 3 Bing. N.C.
35.
at P.116.
6k.
The
widespread use of the f l e x i b l e concept of non-natural u s e r of land meant
that Rylands v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y only a p p l i e d where the f i r e c r e a t e d an
unreasonable r i s k and i t can thus be seen t h a t we had a concept very
s i m i l a r to those of negligence and nuisance.
F u r t h e r the r u l e i n Rylands
v F l e t c h e r has been used more s p a r i n g l y i n a l l c a s e s s i n c e the House of
Lords d e c i s i o n i n Read v L y o n s . ^
As a r e s u l t of these f a c t o r s recent
c a s e s on the escape of f i r e have tended to be decided on p r i n c i p l e s of
negligence and nuisance r a t h e r than under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
37
Ogus
says t h a t because of the extra f l e x i b i l i t y of those two t o r t s over
Rylands v F l e t c h e r i t would be best to use one of them e x c l u s i v e l y i n a l l
cases concerned with the escape of f i r e .
Although nuisance i s defined as "an unlawful i n t e r f e r e n c e with a
person's use or enjoyment of land or of some r i g h t over, or i n connection
38
with i t " ,
i t was never a p p l i e d to the escape of f i r e u n t i l Job Edwards v
39
Birmingham Canal Navigations
i n 1924.
There i s a l s o the case of S p i c e r v
40
Smee
where d e f e c t i v e e l e c t r i c w i r i n g i n the defendant's house caused a
f i r e which escaped and destroyed the p l a i n t i f f ' s a d j o i n i n g bungalow.
There
was held to be l i a b i l i t y i n nuisance although not f o r the f i r e but f o r i t s
source, the d e f e c t i v e w i r i n g .
Ogus says that t h i s approach was introduced
when the c o u r t s became u n w i l l i n g to extend the ambit of Rylands v F l e t c h e r
to i n c l u d e a l l sources of f i r e as 'dangerous t h i n g s ' . T h i s case, i t i s
submitted, i s no evidence f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that nuisance i s a more
s a t i s f a c t o r y form of l i a b i l i t y than Rylands v F l e t c h e r i n such c a s e s .
The unreasonable u s e r ' of land i n nuisance; i s the same as 'non-natural
u s e r ' i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
The point Ogus makes about dangerous things
i s of l i t t l e v a l i d i t y s i n c e although ordinary e l e c t r i c w i r i n g could not
be c l a s s i f i e d as a Rylands v F l e t c h e r o b j e c t , d e f e c t i v e e l e c t r i c w i r i n g
such as e x i s t e d i n t h i s case would be very much a Rylands v F l e t c h e r
object on the same p r i n c i p l e as was seen i n P r o s s e r v L e v ^ where a s m a l l
p i e c e of pipe which was p a r t of a domestic water supply system
36. 1947 A.C.156.
37.
Pages 116-117.
38.
Winfield 8th Ed. p. 353.
39.
1924 1 K.B. 341.
{«?•
tttt
1 AER 489.
65.
which,
f 42
according to Rickards v Lothipn,
would o r d i n a r i l y be a n a t u r a l u s e r
I
of land, was h e l d to be a non-natural u s e r of land and a l s o a dangerous
t h i n g because i t s p o s i t i o n under the wasi b a s i n c r e a t e d an i n c r e a s e d
danger.
I n another type of case the f i r e i t s e l f has been held t o c o n s t i t u t e
k3
a nuisance.
Thus i n Goldman v Hargrave
nuisance was held a p p l i c a b l e
where l i g h t n i n g i g n i t e d a f i r e on the defendant's land and he n e g l i g e n t l y
f a i l e d to e x t i n g u i s h i t .
The importance of e s t a b l i s h i n g negligence i n
c a s e s of t h i s type again suggests that t h e r e would be l i t t l e point i n
making nuisance the s o l e form of l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of f i r e .
Negligence on the face of i t would be a s a t i s f a c t o r y t o r t to a c t
as the s o l e form of l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of fire. Two
would e x i s t however.
First,
difficulties
there i s the old problem of 586 of the F i r e s
Prevention (Metropolis) Act 177*+»
Lord Denman C.J.'s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n
F i l l i t e r v Phippar&Sias never gained general acceptance.
Another attempt
to avoid the s e c t i o n was seen i n Musgrove v P a n d e l i s where the court
d i s t i n g u i s h e d the f i r e which o r i g i n a t e d i n e x p l i c a b l y i n the c a r b u r e t t o r -.
and i t s continuance which r e s u l t e d from the chauffeur's negligence i n not
turning o f f the tapto the p e t r o l tank.
These were regarded as two separate
f i r e s and i t was the second on which l i a b i l i t y was based.
This a r t i f i c i a l
reasoning was approved by the J u d i c a l Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n
Goldman v Hargrave . A b e t t e r s o l u t i o n to the d i f f i c u l t y was t h a t provided
by Scrutton L . J . i n the Job Edwards case where he s a i d :
" I should
res-
p e c t f u l l y have thought t h a t i t was s a f e r to s a y that the f i r e was continued
by negligence, and t h a t the cause of a c t i o n was not f o r a f i r e a c c i d e n t a l l y
begun, but f o r negligence i n i n c r e a s i n g such a f i r e . "
The second d i f f i c u l t y i s that i t would no longer be p o s s i b l e t o
apply a s t r i c t e r
form of l i a b i l i t y i n cases which seem t o merit i t .
Thus
i n A u s t r a l i a the climate accounts f o r the continuing s e n s i t i v i t y t o the
kZ.
1913 A.C. 263.
43. 1967 1 AC 6k5.
kk. 18^7 11 Q.B. 3^7
45. 1919 2 K.B. ^3.
r i s k o f f i r e and the corresponding r e t e n t i o n o f a s t r i c t form o f l i a b i l i t y
as an added incentive t o f i r e prevention. This d i f f i c u l t y can perhaps be
overcome by varying the s e v e r i t y o f the duty o f care or by the a p p l i c a t i o n
of the doctrine of res ipsa l o q u i t u r .
The best view, i t i s submitted, i s that we should avoid a r e l i g i o u s
a f f i n i t y t o labels such as 'negligence', 'nuisance' and 'Rylands v Fletcher.'
As we have seen the requirement of non-natural user o f land i n Rylands v
Fletcher means that that r u l e can become almost i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from
negligence and equally negligence can be a f a i r l y s t r i c t form of l i a b i l i t y
where a severe duty o f care i s i n s i s t e d upon or where res ipsa l o q u i t u r i s
applicable.
The f a c t i s that we are i n a mid-way p o s i t i o n between neg-
ligence and a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y - a s t a t e of a f f a i r s j u d i c i a l l y noted as
48
long ago as 1957 i n Balfour v Barty-King
and which gained recent emphasis
49
i n the Court o f Appeal decision i n Emanuel v Greater London Council
Lord Denning remarked^
where
t h a t i t i s unnecessary t o put l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e
escape of f i r e i n t o any o f t h e three categories o f negligence, nuisance
and Rylands v F l e t c h e r j i t goes back as he said t o the time when such
categories were unheard o f .
The incidence of f i r e insurance plays an important p a r t i n t h i s
view.
I n cases o f escape o f f i r e between a d j o i n i n g p r o p e r t i e s i t i s
i n v a r i a b l y the p l a i n t i f f who insures against the r i s k and according t o
modern p r i n c i p l e s of l o s s - d i s t r i b u t i o n i t i s he who should bear the l o s s .
For t h i s reason there i s no need t o resurrect a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y .
As f a r as categorisation i s necessary a wider conception o f negligence w i l l
be s u f f i c i e n t l y precise provided i t i s r e a l i s e d that negligence too i s a
f l e x i b l e p r i n c i p l e and not a r i g i d category; i t can mean almost any standard o f care that the judge wants i t t o mean.
48.
49.
50.
1957 1 AER 156.
1971 2 A.E.R. 835.
At page 839.
67
CHAPTER V I I
The
Defences.
Part I
1
S t a t u t o r y Authority.
The r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r may be excluded by s t a t u t e although
t h i s does not happen as often as i s sometimes supposed.
Whether or not
the r u l e i s excluded depends on the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e
concerned.
S t r i c t l i a b i l i t y has to a l a r g e extent been removed from
undertakings c a r r i e d out under s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y such as p u b l i c s e r v i c e s
which supply water, e l e c t r i c i t y and gas and the r a i l w a y s .
The p r o t e c t i o n
provided by such l e g i s l a t i o n i s i n t e r p r e t e d as extending not only to the
l e g a l i s i n g of the e n t e r p r i s e i t s e l f , thus preventing i t being regarded as
a nuisance, but a l s o to any harmful consequences
o c c u r r i n g during the
normal operation of the e n t e r p r i s e where negligence can not be
proved.
S e v e r a l cases concerned with the operation of r a i l w a y s have establ i s h e d that the s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n a p p l i e s where the harm s u f f e r e d i s
a necessary i n c i d e n t of the a c t i v i t y e x p r e s s l y a u t h o r i s e d .
Thus i n Vaughan
2
v The T a f f Vale Railway Co.
the Court of Exchequer Chamber held that a
r a i l w a y company, a u t h o r i s e d by the l e g i s l a t u r e to use locomotive engines,
was not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r damage from f i r e occasioned by sparks emitted from
an engine t r a v e l l i n g on t h e i r r a i l w a y , provided they have taken every
precaution i n t h e i r power and adopted every means which s c i e n c e can suggest
to prevent i n j u r y from f i r e , and are not g u i l t y of negligence i n the
management of the engine.
Cockburn C . J . summarised the r u l e as f o l l o w s : ^
"Although i t may be t r u e , that i f a person keeps an animal of known dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s , or a dangerous instrument, he w i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e
to those who are thereby i n j u r e d independently of any negligence i n the
mode of d e a l i n g with the animal or u s i n g the instrument; yet when the
1. See i n p a r t i c u l a r Fleming page 293.
l e g i s l a t i n g has sanctioned and a u t h o r i s e d the use of a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g ,
is
and i t y u s e d f o r the purpose f o r which i t was authorised, and every precaution has been observed to prevent i n j u r y ,
the sanction of the l e g i s -
laticre c a r r i e s with i t t h i s consequence, that i f damage r e s u l t s from the
use of such t h i n g independently of negligence, the party u s i n g i t i s not
responsible."
v Brand
k
S i m i l a r d e c i s i o n s were reached i n Hammersmith Railway
and i n Canadian P a c i f i c Railway Co. v Roy.
P r o t e c t i o n has a l s o been extended
Co.
5
to c a s e s where the damage would
not appear to have been a necessary i n c i d e n t of the a u t h o r i s e d a c t i v i t y .
Thus s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y was h e l d not to apply where e l e c t r i c i t y w i r e s
became dislodged i n Thompson v Bankstown Corporation
nor where a water
7
main b u r s t i n Benning v Wong
nor where a gas main b u r s t i n Dunne and
g
another v North-Western Gas Board and another
and the Court of Appeal
held t h a t although the Board was a c t i n g , as water undertakers, under
P r i v a t e Acts of Parliament which gave permissive powers only and which
contained no c l a u s e excluding l i a b i l i t y i n nuisance, the Board, a g a i n s t
which negligence v/as not e s t a b l i s h e d , was; not l i a b l e e i t h e r under the
r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r or i n n u i s a n c e .
That s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s removed by the e x i s t e n c e of s t a t u t o r y
a u t h o r i t y i s undeniable from the case law but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see
t h i s should be so.
activity itself.
why
The l i a b i l i t y connotes something unlawful about the
A c t i v i t i e s to which s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y a p p l i e s are
g e n e r a l l y those which e n t a i l e x t r a o r d i n a r y r i s k to others but which
must be t o l e r a t e d d e s p i t e t h i s because of t h e i r value to s o c i e t y .
one of the most important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
Thus
of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s that i t
i s imposed on a c t i v i t i e s which are both l a w f u l and non-reprehensible.
If strict
l i a b i l i t y does not i n any way suggest that there i s anything
unlawful about the a c t i v i t y then l o g i c a l l y there i s no reason why s t a t u authority
tory should imply t h a t an3SC*£v£By i s absolved from s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y .
4.
1869 L.R. 4 H.L. 171.
5. 1902 A.C. 220.
6v
1953 8? fi.L.R.619.
7.'
1969 43 A.L.tf.R. 467.
,
8.
1964 2 Q.B. 806.
a
b 9 .
The reason f o r s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y excluding the a p p l i c a t i o n
of the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i s not that i t l o g i c a l l y should but
g
t h a t , as Cockburn C . J . s a i d i n Vaughan v The T a f f Vale Railway Co.,
" I t i s c o n s i s t e n t with p o l i c y and j u s t i c e that i t should be so."
Thus
gas, water and e l e c t r i c i t y a r e brought i n t o an area f o r the general
b e n e f i t of the members of the p u b l i c f o r whom such f a c i l i t i e s are
provided.
Gas, water and e l e c t r i c i t y can be regarded as n e c e s s i t i e s
of modern l i f e and i f the companies which provide these s e r v i c e s were
to be h e l d l i a b l e f o r a c c i d e n t s i n connection with t h e i r p r o v i s i o n i n
the absence of negligence then the p u b l i c need would be endangered.
T h i s i s of course equivalent to the nineteenth century opposition to
imposing negligence on the ground t h a t i t i n h i b i t e d e n t e r p r i s e .
The s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n i s l o s t i f the corporation f a i l s i n
i t s duty of care to avoid unecessary danger*-
I t must observe standards
of s a f e t y i n proportion to the high degree of r i s k i n v o l v e d .
a v a i l a b l e s c i e n t i f i c a i d and knowledge must be used.
Thus a l l
Im Manchester
10
Corporation v Farnworth
the corporation was h e l d to be l i a b l e when
fumes escaped from a generating s t a t i o n because i t s r e s p o n s i b l e o f f i c e r s
d i d not d i r e c t t h e i r minds to the prevention of nuisances which i t was
obvious might occur but were r a t h e r under the impression t h a t , f o r a l l
p r a c t i c a l purposes, so long as t h e i r p l a n t was e f f i c i e n t l y and s u c c e s s f u l l y run, the neighbours must endure any consequent
There i s disagreement,
injuries.
however, as to the burden of proof when
seeking to e s t a b l i s h negligence i n such c a s e s .
Whereas the burden of
supporting a defence of s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y by proving due care i s c a s t
on the defendant
i n nuisance ( t h i s was e s t a b l i s h e d by the House of Lords
10
i n the Manchester Corporation v Farnworth
case), i t i s uncertain
whether the same r u l e a p p l i e s to Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
T h i s view that f o r
the defence to apply the defendant must e s t a b l i s h a f f i r m a t i v e l y that the
r e q u i s i t e c a r e was e x e r c i s e d was seen i n the d e c i s i o n of the J u d i c i a l
Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n North Western U t i l i t i e s L t d . v London
Guarantee and Accident Company
and i n p a r t i c u l a r i n the judgment of
12
Lord Wright i n t h a t c a s e
.
A s i m i l a r view has been c o n s i s t e n t l y taken
13
i n the Commonwealth c a s e s on t h i s p o i n t .
11.
12.
13.
1936 A.C. 108.
At pages 119.
121.
Benning v Wong (1969) 43 A.L.J.R. 467.
71.
Part I I .
Act of a Stranger
L i a b i l i t y under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r can be avoided
i f i t can be shown that the escape was caused by the d e l i b e r a t e a c t of
a stranger.
The defence was hinted a t i n the judgment of Blackburn J .
2
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
and, i n s p i t e of the f a c t that Blackburn J . i s
g e n e r a l l y regarded as having expounded a p r i n c i p l e of s t r i c t
liability
i n t h a t case, i t i l l u s t r a t e s more than any other s i n g l e defence to the
t o r t the f a c t that l i a b i l i t y under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i s
not as s t r i c t as i s g e n e r a l l y a s s e r t e d s i n c e i t enables a defendant to
escape l i a b i l i t y even though the a c t causing the damage was committed
on h i s own land by human agency and though the p l a i n t i f f had no knowledge of the a c t and so could not have consented to i t .
Nor i n the
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s defence does any s t a t u t e come to the a i d of the
defendant.
I f i t i s to be regarded as a t o r t of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y one would
expect that the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r would be a p p l i c a b l e to a l l
p e r i l s a r i s i n g from s i t u a t i o n s created or caused by the defendant, i n c l u d i n g the r i s k that others may a c t s t u p i d l y or with m a l i c e .
The
p o s i t i o n remains however that the defence of a c t of a stranger i s f i r m l y
e s t a b l i s h e d as an excuse from l i a b i l i t y .
The defence must now be studied
i n some depth i n order to discover to what extent i t s p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n bears out the assumption that here i s a s e r i o u s r e t r e a t i n the d i r e c tion of negligence from true p r i n c i p l e s of s t r i c t
liability.
The o r i g i n of t h i s type of defence to the t o r t l i e s , as i n d i c a t e d
above, i n the case of Rylands v F l e t c h e r i t s e l f and, more p r e c i s e l y , i n
2
the Judgment of Blackburn J .
1.
2.
i n the Court of Exchequer Chamber where the
See Goodhart 'The T h i r d Man'k C.L.R. 178-183,
1866 L.R. 1 Ex.265.
72.
judge, t y p i f y i n g the often e x c e s s i v e l y c a u t i o n s approach of our j u d i c i a r y ,
weakened the e f f e c t of the firm r u l e he had j u s t l a i d down by adding^ that
the defendant "can excuse h i m s e l f by showing t h a t the escape was owing to
the p l a i n t i f f ' s d e f a u l t ; or, perhaps, that the escape was the
of v i s major, or the a c t of God;
consequence
but as nothing of t h i s s o r t e x i s t s here,
i t i s unnecessary to i n q u i r e what excuse would be s u f f i c i e n t . "
This
changed the whole emphasis of the r u l e from being based on a conception
of r i s k to being based on one of f a u l t and was q u i c k l y s e i z e d upon by
the c o u r t s i n 1879
i n the case of Box v Jubb and another
I n that case the defendants possessed a r e s e r v o i r with s l u i c e s
connected with a main d r a i n or watercourse, from which the r e s e r v o i r
was s u p p l i e d , and with other s l u i c e s by which the s u r p l u s water was
returned i n t o the d r a i n at a lower l e v e l .
The combined e f f e c t of the
emptying of a r e s e r v o i r belonging to a t h i r d person above the defendant's
premises, and of an o b s t r u c t i o n i n the d r a i n below them, was to force
water through the s l u i c e s i n t o the defendant's r e s e r v o i r and so cause
an overflow from there on to the p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d .
I n an a c t i o n f o r
damage caused thereby i t was shown that the defendants had no c o n t r o l
over the main d r a i n or the other r e s e r v o i r , or knowledge of the circumstances which caused the overflow, and that the s l u i c e s were maintained
so as to prevent overflow under ordinary circumstances. K e l l y C.B.
saw
5
the crux of the matter as being : "What was the cause of t h i s overflow?
Was i t anything f o r which the defendants are r e s p o n s i b l e - d i d i t proceed
from t h e i r a c t or d e f a u l t or from t h a t of a s t r a n g e r over which they had
no c o n t r o l ? "
The answer he gave to t h i s question was that "the matters
complained of took p l a c e through no d e f a u l t or breach of duty of the
defendant, but were caused by a s t r a n g e r over whom and a t a spot where
they had no c o n t r o l " and so the defendants were excused from l i a b i l i t y .
3.
k.
5.
At pages 279,
280.
1879 4 Ex. D. 76.
At pages 78,
79.
73.
T h i s i s c l e a r l y reasoning based on p r i n c i p l e s of f a u l t and negligence
and i n no way based on p r i n c i p l e s of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y f o r s t r i c t
l i a b i l i t y , w h i l e l e s s than absolute, i s founded more on a r i s k than on
a f a u l t concept.
The f a u l t d o c t r i n e i n what i s g e n e r a l l y regarded a s a t o r t of
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y was taken to i t s l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n by the d e c i s i o n of
the
J u d i c i a l Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n Rickards v L o t h i a n ^ .
In
that case a wash-basin, i n rooms occupied by the defendant on the top
f l o o r of h i s house, was m a l i c i o u s l y plugged by an unknown t h i r d person,
with the r e s u l t that the water overflowed and damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s
property on the second f l o o r .
The Court h e l d t h a t t h e r e v/as no l i a b i l i t y
under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r because i t wass a n a t u r a l u s e r of
land but the important part of the d e c i s i o n f o r the purposes of t h i s
7
chapter i s that i t was a l s o held that
"a defendant i s not l i a b l e on the
p r i n c i p l e of F l e t c h e r v Rylands f o r damage caused by the wrongful a c t s
of t h i r d persons", because a defendant cannot "be properly s a i d to have
caused or allowed the water to escape i f the m a l i c i o u s a c t of a t h i r d
person was the r e a l cause of i t s escaping without any f a u l t on the p a r t
of the defendant."
Thus the court drew no d i s t i n c t i o n between the m a l i c -
ious and n e g l i g e n t a c t s of the t h i r d person.
s t a t e the p o s i t i o n a s f o l l o w s :
Salmond was thus l e d t o
" I t would not appear t h a t
i t
matters whether the novus a c t u s be j u s t i f i a b l e , l a w f u l , negligent or
c r i m i n a l or whether i t be the a c t of the p l a i n t i f f or of a t h i r d party ."
One of the more recent of the few cases concerned with t h i s
q
defence was P e r r y v Kendricks Transport L t d . ,
had placed a motor-coach
I n that case the defendants
on a parking ground a f t e r emptying the tank of
p e t r o l and screv/ing a cap on the entrance pipe.
As the p l a i n t i f f was
r e t u r n i n g from school he saw two s m a l l boys standing near the coach;
6.
1913 A.C. 263.
? . At page 278.
8.
10th Ed. page 1^2.
9.
1956 1 A.E.fi. 154.
7k.
they jumped away and immediately afterwards there was an explosion i n
the p e t r o l tank which i n j u r e d him s e v e r e l y .
At the t r i a l Lynskey J .
found as a question of f a c t that the cap had been removed by some unknown
person, and t h a t one of the boys had thrown a l i g h t e d match i n t o the
p e t r o l tank.
The case reached the Court of Appeal where J e n k i n s L . J .
10
held t h a t :
" i f the a c t b r i n g i n g about the escape was the a c t of a
s t r a n g e r , and not any a c t or omission of the occupier h i m s e l f or h i s
servant or agent" then the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r does not apply.
11
S i m i l a r l y Parker L . J . s a i d :
" I t has f o r a long time been an exception
to the r u l e i f the defendants can show t h a t the a c t which brought
about
the escape was the a c t of a s t r a a g e r , meaning thereby, someone over
whom they had no c o n t r o l . "
Thus the c o u r t s again came down on the s i d e
12
of a f a u l t r a t h e r than a r i s k concept.
Although the defence of a c t of a s t r a n g e r has been with us f o r a
long time, there i s no c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n of the word 'stranger' i n t h i s
k
context.
As Box v Jubb
t e l l s us, the category of s t r a n g e r s c e r t a i n l y
i n c l u d e s t r e s p a s s e r s and any others who,
without a c t u a l l y e n t e r i n g the
defendant's premises, commit an a c t that causes the escape.
A servant
a c t i n g i n the course of h i s employment w i l l not be a s t r a n g e r . When a
13
servant i s a t r e s p a s s e r as i n Stevens v Woodward
where the servant
used a p r i v a t e lab^ltory and wash-basin to which he had been forbidden
a c c e s s and f a i l e d to t u r n o f f the tap then he i s not a c t i n g i n the course
of h i s employment and can, i t i s submitted, be regarded as a s t r a n g e r
f o r the purposes of t h i s defence.
That the occupier w i l l be l i a b l e
for the a c t s of h i s independent c o n t r a c t o r s i s apparent from the case
1 if
of Rylands v F l e t c h e r
i t s e l f although there i s a recognised exception
which s t a t e d that an employer w i l l not be l i a b l e f o r the c o l l a t e r a l or
c a s u a l negligence of an independent c o n t r a c t o r ; that i s , negligence i n
some c o l l a t e r a l respect as d i s t i n c t from negligence with regard to the
75.
11.
Ik.
10.
12.
13.
TAt
1881
1866
h i spage
L.R.
question
6 Q.B.
161.
159.
1 Ex.
318.
i s 265.
f u l l y discussed
i n Chapter V T I I .
matter delegated to be c a r r i e d out.
15
An occupier w i l l a l s o be l i a b l e under the r u l e i n Rylands v
F l e t c h e r f o r the a c t s of any members of h i s family on the
premises
16
over whom he has c o n t r o l . I n Hale v Jennings
i t was h e l d t h a t he
i s l i a b l e f o r the a c t s of i n v i t e e s - i n t h a t case an i n v i t e e tampered
with a p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous machine provided f o r h i s amusement.
There
i s some dispute between the textbook w r i t e r s on the question of whether
an occupier i s l i a b l e f o r the a c t s of l i c e n s e e s on h i s l a n d . There i s
17
18
no a c t u a l d e c i s i o n on t h i s point but Charlesworth
and Salmond
both
c o n s i d e r that an occupier w i l l not be able to d i s c l a i m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
19
f o r the a c t s of l i c e n s e e s .
Winfield
however claims t h a t " i t would be
harsh to hold a person l i a b l e f o r the a c t of every c a s u a l v i s i t o r
who
has bare permission to enter h i s land and of whose p r o p e n s i t i e s to e v i l
he may know nothing" and suggests that the t r u e t e s t may be: "Can i t be
i n f e r r e d from the f a c t s of the p a r t i c u l a r case t h a t the occupier had
such c o n t r o l over the l i c e n s e e or over the circumstances which made h i s
a c t p o s s i b l e , that he ought to have prevented i t ? I f so the occupier i s
l i a b l e , otherwise not."
20
Fleming
argues t h a t the conclusions of Salmond and
are supported by the analogy of l i a b i l i t y f o r f i r e .
Charlesworth
T h i s reasoning i s
not v a l i d however f o r the defence of a c t of a s t r a n g e r i s i n p r a c t i c e
a p p l i e d d i f f e r e n t l y to the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r than to f i r e ( a l though there i s no l o g i c a l reason why
t h i s should be s o ) .
Thus we have
a l r e a d y seen t h a t an occupier w i l l be l i a b l e f o r the a c t s of an i n v i t e e
under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r but i t was held i n a case
21
with the escape of f i r e , E r i k s o n v C l i f t o n ,
concerned
t h a t where an i n v i t e e on
impulse s e t gorse a l i g h t the absent occupier was to be excused from
liability.
15- P i c k a r d v Smith 1861 1 0 C . B . (N.S.) 470
16.
1938 1 A.E.R. 579
17.
Negligence 4th Ed. pages 258 to 263
18.
14th Ed. page 451.
1 9 . Page 426.
20.
Page
292 note 33.
76
21.
1963 N.Z.L.R.
705.
I t i s submitted that the most r e a l i s t i c way
of e x p l a i n i n g the
case law on t h i s point i s to say that the true t e s t i s not concerned
ful
with d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between c a t e g o r i e s of l a w / v i s i t o r s as they are
now
c a l l e d under
the Occupiers' L i a b i l i t y Act 1967 but i s r a t h e r a
t e s t of f o r s e e a b i l i t y .
T h i s f o r s e e a b i l i t y t e s t i s c o n s i s t e n t with the
tendency we have n o t i c e d to r e l y i n the defence of a c t of a s t r a n g e r
on a f a u l t r a t h e r than on a r i s k concept and would e x p l a i n why
P e r r y v Kendricks
forseeable and why
in
the defence was held to apply when the a c t was
not
i n Hale v Jennings there was l i a b i l i t y under the
r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i n circumstances
where the a c t could c l e a r l y
have been forseen.
I t i s worth reminding ourselves at t h i s point that the
w i l l not be l i a b l e f o r the a c t s of h i s predecessor
occupier
i n t i t l e s i n c e the
r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r makes i t necessary that the defendant
have brought the danger on to h i s own l a n d .
22
b r i d g e ) L t d . v Stanford Eve J . s a i d :
"The
should
Thus i n Whitmores (Eden-
r u l e ( i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r )
so s t a t e d does not appear to me to extend to make the owner
of land l i a b l e f o r consequences brought about b y t h e c o l l e c t i n g
and
impounding on h i s land, by another, of water, or any other dangerous
element."
The defence of a c t of a s t r a n g e r w i l l not be a p p l i c a b l e i f
there has been any negligence
on the p a r t of the defendant s i n c e the
essence of the defence i s that the defendant was i n no way
for the a c t or f o r the damage caused thereby.
responsible
I t appears f u r t h e r ,
however, that the defence w i l l not be v a l i d i f the s t r a n g e r ' s a c t
was
negligent because i t seems that the possessor of a dangerous t h i n g i s
bound to guard a g a i n s t the negligence
of t h i r d p a r t i e s .
T h i s s t a t e of
a f f a i r s i s contrary to common sense f o r the defendant's a b i l i t y xbocx
22.
1909 1 Ch. h27 at page 438.
77.
to a n t i c i p a t e cannot depend on the s t r a n g e r ' s s t a t e of mind.
Never-
t h e l e s s t h e r e i s c l e a r a u t h o r i t y f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the occupier
w i l l be expected to a n t i c i p a t e n e g l i g e n t but not d e l i b e r a t e a c t s of
23
strangers.
Thus i n Box v Jubb
K e l l y C.B. held that the a c t which
2k
caused the escape was a m a l i c i o u s a c t and went on
" I think the defen-
dants could not p o s s i b l e have been expected to a n t i c i p a t e t h a t which
25
happened here."
Lord Moulton i n Rickards v Lothian
s t a t e d the p o s i t i o n
26
as f o l l o w s :
"A defendant cannot i n t h e i r Lordship's opinion be properly
s a i d to have caused or allowed the water to escape i f the m a l i c i o u s a c t
of a t h i r d person was the r e a l cause of i t s escaping without any f a u l t
on the part of the defendant" and i n Dominion N a t u r a l Gas Co. v C o l l i n s
27
and P e r k i n s the question was put: "Have the defendants been able to show
a f f i r m a t i v e l y that the true cause of the accident was the conscious a c t
of another v o l i t i o n " ?
The matter was again considered by the J u d i c i a l
Committee df the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n North Western U t i l i t i e s L t d . v London
28
Guarantee and Accident Co.
where Lord Wright held that m a l i c i o u s i n
t h i s context meant merely conscious or d e l i b e r a t e .
The f a c t that defendant w i l l be l i a b l e f o r another's negligence
i s an important r e s t r i c t i o n on the scope of the defence and i s i n i t s
s m a l l way a r e v e r s i o n to the e a r l i e r acceptance of the r u l e i n Rylands
v F l e t c h e r as c o n s t i t u t i n g a r i s k r a t h e r than a f a u l t concept.
It
cannot a l t e r the f a c t , however, t h a t the defence of a c t of a s t r a n g e r
c o n s t i t u t e s a s i g n i f i c a n t erosion of the r i s k concept i n Rylands v
F l e t c h e r and a s s i s t s i n the move towards a narrowing of the boundaries
between Rylands v F l e t c h e r and the t o r t of negligence and the c r e a t i o n
of one all-embracing t o r t based on a p r i n c i p l e l y i n g somewhere between
23.
1879 k Ex. D.76.
2k. At page 79.
25. 1913 A.C. 263.
78.
26.
At page 278.
27.
1909 A.C. 6k0.
28.
1936 A.C. 108.
f a u l t and r i s k .
As we have seen, the more l o g i c a l conclusion and that
reached i n the r e l e v a n t American c a s e s i s that s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s based
on the p r i n c i p l e of the a l l o c a t i o n of r i s k and t h a t a person who has
created an unusual r i s k i s l i a b l e i f harm r e s u l t s from i t even though
the immediate cause was an a c t of God or of a t h i r d p a r t y .
graph 522 of the American Law I n s t i t u t e ' s Restatement
Thus para-
of the Law of T o r t s
reads a s follows.:
C o n t r i b u t i n g Actions of T h i r d Persons, Animals and Forces of
Nature.
One c a r r y i n g on an ultra-hazardous a c t i v i t y i s l i a b l e f o r harm
under the r u l e s t a t e d i n paragraph 5191 although the harm i s caused by
the unexpectable.
(1)
innocent, negligent or r e c k l e s s conduct of a t h i r d person, or
(2)
a c t i o n of an animal, or
(3)
operation of a f o r c e of n a t u r e .
Comment:
Rationale.
The reason f o r imposing absolute l i a b i l i t y upon those
who c a r r y on ultra-hazardous a c t i v i t i e s i s that they have thereby f o r t h e i r
own purposes c r e a t e d a r i s k which i s not a u s u a l i n c i d e n t of the ordinary
l i f e of the community.
I f the r i s k r i p e n s i n t o i n j u r y i t i s immaterial
t h a t i t i s made e f f e c t i v e i n harm by the unexpectable a c t i o n of a human
being, an animal or a f o r c e of n a t u r e .
T h i s i s so, i r r e s p e c t i v e of
whether the a c t i o n of the human being which makes the ultra-hazardous
a c t i v i t y harmful i s innocent, negligent or even r e c k l e s s .
Caveat:
The I n s t i t u t e expresses no opinion as to whether the f a c t that
the harm i s done by an a c t of a t h i r d person, which i s not only d e l i b e r a t e
but i s intended to b r i n g about such harm, r e l i e v e s from l i a b i l i t y one
who c a r r i e s on an ultra-hazardous a c t i v i t y .
29.
See Chapter V I I I .
79.
Despite the caveat i t can be seen that the American lawmakers i n t h i s matter have followed p r i n c i p l e s of l o g i c f a r more
than have the E n g l i s h c o u r t s .
T h i s tendency of the E n g l i s h judges
to r e s t r i c t the s e v e r i t y of the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r can be
t r a c e d t o those oft-quoted words of L i n d l e y L . J . i n Green v Chelsea
"50
Waterworks Co.
when he s a i d of the case of Rylands v F l e t c h e r ;
"That case i s not to be extended beyond the l e g i t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e
on which the House of Lords decided i t .
I f i t were extended as f a r
as s t r i c t l o g i c might r e q u i r e , i t would be a very oppressive d e c i s i o n . "
The question o f v/hich i s the p r e f e r a b l e approach w i l l be considered
i n depth i n a l a t e r chapter.
30.
1894 70 L.T. 547.
80.
PART I I I
Act of God
2
The defence of a c t of God was, as we have noted,
3
by Blackburn J . i n h i s judgment i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
recognised
However the
defence has been r a r e l y invoked and indeed there i s only one reported
E n g l i s h case i n which i t has been s u c c e s s f u l l y pleaded, that of
Nichols v Marsland
i n 1875
where the Court of Appeal s e i z e d on
Blackburn J . ' s 'exclusion c l a u s e ' f o r l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
The f a c t s of the case were that there were ornamental
pools
on the defendant's l a n d which contained l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of water.
These pools had been formed by damming up with a r t i f i c i a l banks a
n a t u r a l stream which rose above the defendant's land and flowed
through i t , and which was allowed to escape from the pools s u c c e s s i v e l y
by w e i r s i n t o i t s o r i g i n a l course.
An e x t r a o r d i n a r y r a i n f a l l caused
the stream and the water i n the pools to s w e l l so that the a r t i f i c i a l
banks were c a r r i e d away by the p r e s s u r e , and the water i n the pools
being thus suddenly l e t l o o s e , rushed down the course of the stream
and i n j u r e d the p l a i n t i f f ' s a d j o i n i n g property.
having brought an a c t i o n a g a i n s t the defendant
The
plaintiff
f o r damages, the j u r y
found that there was no negligence i n the maintenance or c o n s t r u c t i o n
of the pools and t h a t the flood was so great t h a t i t could not
reasonably have been a n t i c i p a t e d .
The Court of Exchequer decided''
t h a t the escape of water was caused by an Act of God and that the
defendant was thus not l i a b l e for the damage caused.
The case came before the Court of Appeal
c o n s i s t i n g of
Cockburn C.J., James and M e l l i s h L . J . J , and Baggallay J.A.,^ the
judgement of the court being read by M e l l i s h L . J .
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
£
The Court h e l d
See Goodhart k C.L.P.178 to 183.
See Chapter 1 page 3
1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265.
1876 2 Ex. D.1.
81.
1875 L.R. 10 E x . 2 5 5 .
A Fourth judge. A r c h i b a l d J . , died before judgment was d e l i v e r e d .
that act of God was a v a l i d defence, Lord J u s t i c e M e l l i s h saying
7
that
"a defendant
cannot, i n our opinion, be properly s a i d to
have caused or allowed the water to escape, i f t h e Act of God or
the Queen's enemies was the r e a l cause of i t s escaping without
any f a u l t on the part of the defendant."
He i s c l e a r l y t a l k i n g
here i n terms of f a u l t and causation and not i n terms of a l l o c a t i o n
of r i s k ; a mode of reasoning i d e n t i c a l to that of Bramwell B. i n
5
8
the Court of Exchequer a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e
the defendant
infringed?
done wrong?
when he s a i d :
"What has
What r i g h t of the p l a i n t i f f has she
She has done nothing wrong, she has i n f r i n g e d no r i g h t .
I t i s not the defendant
who l e t loose the water and sent i t to destroy
the b r i d g e s . "
Nichols v Marsland would appear a t f i r s t s i g h t to be p r e c i s e l y
the s o r t of case t h a t the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r was designed to
cover s i n c e the r u l e can have no p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t i f the defendant i s
allowed to escape l i a b i l i t y
except where the embankment gives way
under ordinary r a i n f a l l for then the defendant
would normally be l i a b l e
i n negligence f o r f a i l i n g to avoid a consequence which i s reasonably
forseeable.
The only explanation f o r t h i s case, and indeed f o r the
9
s i m i l a r case seen i n the chapter on Act of a Stranger, Box v Jubb ,
i s that the c o u r t s completely f a i l e d t o r e a l i s e that the case of
Rylands v F l e t c h e r had e s t a b l i s h e d a new p r i n c i p l e of t o r t i o u s
liability
separate from and independent of negligence.
The only other case which revolved around the v a l i d i t y of the
defence of a c t of God was the S c o t t i s h case of Greenock Corporatibn
10
v CaledonianRailway.
I n that case the o r i g i n a l defendants, the
municipal a u t h o r i t y , while l a y i n g out a park, constructed a concrete
7. At page 5*
8 . At page 259*
9.
1879 k Ex. D.76.
10. 1917 A.C. 556.
82.
paddling pool f o r c h i l d r e n i n the bed of a stream and a l t e r e d the
course of the stream and obstructed the n a t u r a l flow of water
therefrom.
Owing to an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y v i o l e n t rainstorm the stream
overflov/ed at the pool and, as a r e s u l t of the municipal a u t h o r i t y ' s
a c t s , a great volume of water, which would have been c a r r i e d o f f by
the stream i n i t s n a t u r a l course without damage, poured down a p u b l i c
highway i n t o the town and damaged the property of two r a i l w a y companies.
The case came to the House of Lords which comprised the Lord
C h a n c e l l o r , Lord F i n l a y , and Lords Dunedin, Shaw, Parker and Wrenbury.
11
Lord F i n l a y ,
c i t i n g the judgment of Lord Cockburn i n Samuel v
12
Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co.
, accepted the view that the a u t h o r i t y
was bound "to provide a g a i n s t the ordinary operations of nature but
not a g a i n s t her m i r a c l e s . " He did not say what c o n s i s t e d a m i r a c l e
13
but he did say
"What s h a l l be considered a damnum f a t a l e i n such a
case I need not i n q u i r e , but of t h i s I am very c l e a r , that a great
f a l l of r a i n and consequent
accumulation and weight of water i s not
a damnum f a t a l e which exempts the p r o p r i e t o r from l i a b i l i t y from
the f a i l u r e of h i s operation - f o r i t i s a g a i n s t such
and weight of water that he i s bound to provide."
accumulation
No case i n which
damnum f a t a l e was s u c c e s s f u l l y pleaded was c i t e d i n the judgments
and the term i s not f a m i l i a r to E n g l i s h lawyers but Lord Denedin i n
the Greenock case d i d equate the phrase with a c t of God and i t seems
that the two can reasonably be regarded as synonymous. Lord Shaw
14
15
4
held,
using the exact words of M e l l i s h L . J .
i n Nichols v Marsland,
that the defendant was not l i a b l e even though the " f a l l was
ordinary or even unprecedented
extra-
i n q u a n t i t y " while Lord Parker made i t
c l e a r that although he questioned the f i n d i n g of the j u r y i n Nichols
v Marsland he accepted t h a t that case had c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
At page 572.
13 D. 312 a t page 314.
Pages 573, 574.
At page 579See note 7>
o,
03.
e x i s t e n c e o f the defence of a c t o f God.
I t can thus be seen that to a c e r t a i n extent the d e c i s i o n
i n the Greenock case d i s c r e d i t e d that i n N i c h o l s v Marsland.
Goodhart
16
considered t h a t
because o f t h i s and because of the f a c t t h a t the
N i c h o l s case i s the foundation of the defence of a c t of God on which
a l l subsequent c a s e s a r e b u i l t the defence of a c t of God cannot be
supported i n r e l a t i o n to the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r .
He c i t e s a s
a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n the statement of law made by Lord
17
J u s t i c e - C l e r k Hope i n Kerry v E a r l of Orkney
where he s a i d :
"The
dam must be made p e r f e c t a g a i n s t a l l e x t r a o r d i n a r y f a l l s of r a i n e l s e the p r o t e c t i o n i s not afforded a g a i n s t the operation which the
p a r t y must accomplish."
I t i s submitted however that the tone of
the judgments and i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t of Lord Parker suggests only that
they saw the requirements o f the defence of a c t of God as being more
18
severe than d i d the judges i n N i c h o l s v Marsland.
Thus i t was
considered i n the Greenock case than r a i n f a l l , no matter how great
i t s volume, was i n essence so n a t u r a l a t h i n g that i t could not const i t u t e an a c t of (Sod whereas i n the N i c h o l s case i t was considered,
r i g h t l y i t i s suggested, that a freak rainstorm could c o n s t i t u t e an
act of God.
Thus, i t appears, i s the only way i n which the two c a s e s
can be l o g i c a l l y r e c o n c i l e d .
S u f f i c e i t to say that
subsequent
d e c i s i o n s , some of which a r e c i t e d below, have not accepted the
Greenock case as having eaten away a t the very roots of the e x i s t e n c e
of the defence of a c t of God.
Act of God i s a term e n t i r e l y devoid of t h e o l o g i c a l import 'an u n t h e o l o g i c a l expression' a s Lord P h i l l i m o r e c a l l e d i t i n The
19
Mostyn.
Rather than being concerned with phenomena a s c r i b e d by
some to a d e i t y i t s i g n i f i e d the operation of f o r c e s of nature which
a r e unaffected by any human i n t e r v e n t i o n .
I t can be j u s t l y s a i d that
i t would be s e n s i b l e to combine the defences of a c t of God and a c t
0 4
1
to i t t h a t E n g l i s h Law has not developed i n t h i s more l o g i c a l manner.
The scope of the defence of a c t of God must be r e s t r i c t e d to such
extremes of nature as l i g h t n i n g , e l e c t r i c i t y , thunderstorms,
snow-
storms and h u r r i c a n e s .
I n Nichols v Marsland i t was considered enough t h a t the
occurrence could not reasonably have been a n t i c i p a t e d but s i n c e then
a f a r more severe t e s t has come to be applied; t h a t of whether human
f o r e s i g h t could have recognised even the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s occurence.
T h i s s e v e r e r t e s t , already seen i n the Greenock c a s e , has a l s o been
applied i n several Australian cases.
Thus, according to C o t t r e l l v
20
Allen,
an ordinary whirlwind can not amount to an a c t of God
21
i n Commissioner of Railways (Western A u s t r a l i a ) v Stewart
held t h a t a t r o p i c a l
and
i t was
downpour of exceptional i n t e n s i t y and duration
22
was not an a c t of God by the High Court of A u s t r a l i a , Dixon J . s a y i n g
"The weather experienced was not of an unfamiliar.:kind.
I t was
:
unusual
only i n degree, and the d i f f e r e n c e i n degree arose apparently from the
circumstance t h a t heavy r a i n f a l l took p l a c e a f t e r s a t u r a t i o n of the
ground.
I"do not think the occurrence i s one a g a i n s t which no prudent
engineer would have provided."
Thus i t can be seen t h a t f o r the defence
to be a p p l i c a b l e there must have been, i n t h e words of Lord Blanesburgh i n the Mostyn, "an i r r e s i s t i b l e and unsearchable
providence
n u l l i f y i n g a l l human e f f o r t " .
Act of God can thus be seen to d i f f e r from a c t of a s t r a n g e r
i n the l a c k of c a u s a l l i n k with human a c t i v i t y and from i n e v i t a b l e
accident both i n t h a t and i n the degree of u n e x p e c t a b i l i t y .
20.
1882
16 S.A.L.R.
122.
21.
22.
1936 56 C L . R . 520.
At pages 53^, 53585.
PART I V .
Consent of the P l a i n t i f f .
The essence of t h i s defence i s that the p l a i n t i f f has permitted
the
defendant to accumulate the thing of whose escape the p l a i n t i f f i s
complaining
then the defendant w i l l not be l i a b l e t o the p l a i n t i f f
under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r when the thing escapes.
Consent
of the p l a i n t i f f was the f i r s t j u d i c i a l l y recognised defence to an
a c t i o n i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r a f t e r Blackburn J . ' s judgment i n t h a t
case, i t s existence being acknowledged i n C a r s t a i r s v T a y l o r
i n 1871 •
The defence has been most often worked i n c a s e s where one
tenant s u f f e r s damage as a r e s u l t of seepage of water from part of the
b u i l d i n g occupied by the l a n d l o r d .
Thus when a person becomes tenant
of premises a t a time when the condition of a d j o i n i n g premises which
are
occuped by the l a n d l o r d i s such that a Rylands v F l e t c h e r type
occurrence i s p o s s i b l e he i s considered to be consenting to the r i s k
of the occurrence a c t u a l l y t a k i n g p l a c e .
I t was held i n 1877 i n
2
Humphries v Cousins
that the p r i n c i p l e of implied consent a p p l i e s
only where the p l a i n t i f f and the defendant a r e i n a l a n d l o r d and
tenant r e l a t i o n s h i p to one another although i t i s submitted t h a t c a s e s
are imaginable i n which i m p l i e d consent would e x i s t a s between two
tenants (Ross v Fedden e s t a b l i s h e d such consent between o c c u p i e r s ) .
The value of the defence w i l l i n any case be g r e a t e s t when the claim
i s a g a i n s t a l a n d l o r d because of the e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e that a
tenant takes the premises from the landlord i n the c o n d i t i o n they
are
i n a t the time and i s e n t i t l e d to complain only of n e g l i g e n t
i n j u r y emanating from beyond the demised premises u n l e s s there i s a
3
covenant a f f o r d i n g a d d i t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n .
1.
2.
3.
1871 L.R. Ex. 217.
86.
1877 2 C.P.D. 239.
See Bottomlev y B a n n i s t e r 1932 1 K.B. 458, 468.
G. Williams i n
Duties of N o n - u c c u p e r s i n Respect of Dangerous Premises 5 M.L.R.
The defence, as s t a t e d above, was f i r s t seen i n C a r s t a i r s v
Taylor .
I n that case the p l a i n t i f f s h i r e d the ground f l o o r of a
warehouse from the defendant, the upper part of which warehouse the
defendant h i m s e l f occupied.
The water from the roof was c o l l e c t e d
by g u t t e r s i n t o a box, from which i t was discharged by a pipe i n t o
the d r a i n s .
A hole was made i n the box by a r a t , as a r e s u l t of
which water entered the warehouse and damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s goods.
I t was found as a f a c t t h a t the defendant had used reasonable care
i n examining and seeing t o the s a f e t y of both the g u t t e r s and the
box.
The case came before the Court of Exchequer which c o n s i s t e d of
Bramwell, Martin and P i g o t t B.B.
They unanimously agreed that no
k
a c t i o n l a y under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r , Bramwell B. s a y i n g :
"But I am c l e a r l y of the opinion t h a t there i s a m a t e r i a l d i f f e r e n c e
5
between the c a s e s .
I n Rylands v F l e t c h e r
the defendant, f o r h i s own
purposes, conducted the water t o the p l a c e from which i t got i n t o the
p l a i n t i f f ' s premises.
Here the conducting of the water was no more
f o r the b e n e f i t of the defendant than of the p l a i n t i f f s .
I f they had
been adjacent owners, i t would have been f o r the b e n e f i t of the adjacent
owner that the water from h i s roof was c o l l e c t e d , and the case would
have been w i t h i n the d e c i s i o n i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r ; but here the roof
was f o r the common p r o t e c t i o n of both, and the c o l l e c t i o n of the water
running from i t was a l s o f o r t h e i r j o i n t b e n e f i t
Here the
p l a i n t i f f s must be taken t o have consented to t h i s c o l l e c t i o n of the
water which was f o r t h e i r own b e n e f i t , and the defendant can only be
l i a b l e i f he v/as g u i l t y of negligence."
Another case where the defence
was s u c c e s s f u l l y pleaded was K i d d l e v C i t y Business P r o p e r t i e s L t d .
4.
5.
6.
At page 221.
1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265.
19^2 1 K.B. 269.
87.
where an overflow of rainwater from a blocked g u t t e r a t the bottom of
a s l o p i n g roof i n the possession of the l a n d l o r d , and above the tenant's
premises, damaged the stock i n the tenant's premises.
I t must be remem-
bered i n t h i s context that i f the damage i s caused by a domestic water
supply then the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r w i l l i n any event be i n a p p l i c a b l e
s i n c e the domestic supply w i l l be regarded as being a n a t u r a l u s e r of
land.
I t w i l l be seen from the judgment of Bramwell B. i n C a r s t a i r s v
1
T a y l o r , quoted above, that the e x i s t e n c e of a 'common b e n e f i t
7
s i g n i f i c a n t part i n t h i s defence.
Winfield
1
plays a
t r e a t s consent of the
p l a i n t i f f and common b e n e f i t as two separate defences although he
accepts that they a r e very c l o s e l y l i n k e d .
The best view, i t i s sub-
mitted, i s that if, t h e accumulation benefits both the p l a i n t i f f and the
defendant then that i s an important f a c t o r i n determining whether the
p l a i n t i f f can be regarded a s having consented as having consontod.
This
was made c l e a r i n the judgments of the Court of Appeal i n P e t e r s v P r i n c e
g
of Wales Theatre (Birmingham) L t d . , where the occupants of the premises
were thus deemed to have consented to the r i s k and where a water c l o s e t
9
was i n s t a l l e d i n Ross v Fedden
and a l s o where water pipes were f i t t e d
10
i n Anderson v Oppenheimer.
That common b e n e f i t i s not a defence i n
i t s own r i g h t but merely a f a c t o r , a l b e i t an important one, i n establ i s h i n g consent can be f u r t h e r seen from the f a c t that the defence i s
not a v a i l a b l e where the i n s t a l l a t i o n was s e t up a f t e r the p l a i n t i f f ' s
11
tenancy had commenced
nor where the p l a i n t i f f has i n no way consented
to the r i s k i n s p i t e of d e r i v i n g a b e n e f i t from the i n s t a l l a t i o n as
12
was the case i n North West U t i l i t i e s v London Guarantee Corp.
where
a consumer of gas s u f f e r e d damage to h i s house as a r e s u l t of pipes i n
the c o n t r o l of the s u p p l i e r exploding i n an adjacent road.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
pages ^23 and h'2k.
19^3 K.B.7300
12.
1936 A.C. 108.
1872 L.R. 7 Q.B. 661.
°
1880 5 Q.B.D. 602.
See the comment on t h e Western Engraving Co. v F i l m L a b o r a t o r i e s 1936
1 AER 106 i n the P e t e r s case a t 19V5 K".B. '?} a t page V9.
0 ,
I t should be remarked f i n a l l y t h a t although consent of the
p l a i n t i f f i s a defence t o an action i n Rylands v Fletcher the p l a i n t i f f
w i l l s t i l l be able t o succeed i f he can e s t a b l i s h negligence.
Thus,
13
f o r example, i t was held i n Prosser v Levy
t h a t a p l a i n t i f f could
not be held t o have consented t o the existence of a dangerous water
supply connection.
13.
1955
3 A.E.R. 577.
89.
Part VggE
Default of the P l a i n t i f f
This defence was noted by Blackburn J. i n Rylands v Fletcher
1
i t s e l f and was s h o r t l y afterwards pleaded successfully i n a case of
2
s i m i l a r f a c t s , Dunn v Birmingham Canal Co.,
when a mine-owner, knowing
that there was danger of h i s mine being flooded by h i s neighbour's
operations on a d j o i n i n g land, courted the danger by working a mine
under the defendant's canal.
By analogy w i t h nuisance there w i l l be no a c t i o n i n the absence
of negligence i n cases where the damage occurred only because of the
unusual s e n s i t i v i t y of the p l a i n t i f f ' s property or the use t o which i t
3
i s put.
Thus i n Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. v Cape Town
i+
Tramways Companies
the p l a i n t i f f s , who complained that the defendant's
tramways caused e l e c t r i c a l i n t e r f e r e n c e with the receiving of messages
through t h e i r submarine cable, f a i l e d because no damage t o the cable
i t s e l f was occasioned and "a man cannot increase the l i a b i l i t i e s o f
his neighbour by applying h i s own property t o special uses, whether
f o r business or pleasure". ^
This need f o r there t o be no element of
s p e c i a l use would suggest a need f o r n a t u r a l user by the p l a i n t i f f as
w e l l as by the defendant as was suggested i n the S c o t t i s h case of
Western S i l v e r Fox Ranch Ltd.,
where Lord P a t r i c k
v County Council of Ross and Cromarty
said: "The 'special use' of land by a neighbour
to which the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher w i l l not apply muBt be a
non-natural use, and I do not regard the use of land f o r the breeding
g
of s i l v e r foxes as a non-natural use of land."
This decision i n the
Eastern and South A f r i c a n Telegraph Co. case must have been a f f e c t e d
1.
1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265.
2.
1872 L.R. 7 Q.B. Mt.
3. For nuisance see Robinson v K i l v e r t 1889 41 Ch. D.88.
4.
1902 A.C. 381.
5.
At page 393.
6.
1940 5 L.T.lMt.
90.
by considerations o f p o l i c y as i t would have s e r i o u s l y hampered a widespread and b e n e f i c i a l a c t i v i t y i f the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher was
applied t o the use o f earth as a r e t u r n f o r e l e c t r i c currents.
1
I n Rylands v Fletcher Blackburn J . c l e a r l y considered t h a t any
d e f a u l t on the part o f the p l a i n t i f f excluded the defendant's l i a b i l i t y
altogether.
I t seems now however t h a t apportionment under the provisions
of the Law Reform (Contributory NegligenceO Act o f 1?A5 w i l l apply i n
such circumstances.
1.
Under t h i s Act opportionment i s authorised whenever
the defendant's f a u l t consists i n 'negligence, breach o f
duty or other act or omission which gives r i s e t o a
l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t ' and
2.
the p l a i n t i f f ' s f a u l t 'would, apart from the Act, have
given r i s e t o the defence o f c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence.'
The f i r s t requirement c l e a r l y includes a l l t o r t i o u s claims
i n c l u d i n g those o f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y .
The second requirement l i t e r a l l y
exempts from apportionment a l l cases where c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence was
not a defence a t common law.
However t h i s requirement i s generally
i n t e r p r e t e d i n a l i b e r a l fashion and there seems t o be l i t t l e doubt t h a t
9
the Act i s applicable t o the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher.
9«
The textbook w r i t e r s are i n agreement on t h i s p o i n t .
Fleming P.228, Street P. 253-
91.
See e.g.,
CHAPTER V I I I
Risk and Fault
The existence o f a law of t o r t s i n i t s present form i s due t o
the need o f society t o reconcile two basic but c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s o f
men.
On the one hand there i s the i n t e r e s t which w e i a l l share i n the
welfare o f the i n d i v i d u a l and i n h i s r i g h t not t o s u f f e r harm a t the
hands o f other men and on the other there i s the r i g h t t o i n d i v i d u a l
freedom o f action which i s an inherent part o f t h e democratic s t a t e .
The i n t e r e s t i n i n d i v i d u a l welfare and safety requires t h a t i f one man
causes damage t o another then he must pay compensation t o the v i c t i m
regardless o f whether the damage was caused i n t e n t i o n a l l y , recklessly
or by negligence or indeed a c c i d e n t a l l y .
The i n t e r e s t i n i n d i v i d u a l
freedom i n cases o f t h i s nature, accepting t h a t f o r the b e n e f i t o f society
as a whole t h i s freedom can never be complete, requires that compensation
should be paid only i n cases v/here the causer o f the harm acted i n a
d e l i b e r a t e , reckless or negligent manner.
The f i r s t i n t e r e s t r e s u l t s i n
a ' r i s k ' concept o f damages - we must accept any r i s k o f damage t h a t our
actions may involve - and the second i n t e r e s t r e s u l t s i n a ' f a u l t ' concept
of damages - compensation i s payable only where f a u l t can be established.
I t i s these c o n f l i c t i n g concepts o f r i s k and f a u l t t h a t the law o f t o r t s
i s constantly attempting t o reconcile.
We have noted i n our study of the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher t h a t
that r u l e s t a r t e d o f f i n the 1860s as a r u l e o f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y as f a r ,.
2
as the j u d i c i a r y were concerned . This, as we saw, was less than the
complete t r u t h .
Blackburn J. i n h i s judgment in" Rylands v Fletcher^ said
that the defendant "can excuse himself by showing t h a t the escape was
owing t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s d e f a u l t ^ o r , perhaps, that the escape was t h e
consequence o f v i s major, or the act o f God."
Not only d i d the judge
ensure i n t h i s sentence t h a t t h e r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher could never
1. See i n p a r t i c u l a r Fleming pages 7 - 9 and 271 - 276.
2. See CJhapter 1 page 1 ©
be regarded as one of absolute l i a b i l i t y but he ensured also, i t i s
submitted, that the r u l e could only w i t h d i f f i c u l t y be regarded as one
of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y .
the
This d i f f i c u l t y was subsequently accentuated by
gradual development o f the f i v e defences of Act o f God, s t a t u t o r y
a u t h o r i t y , consent o f the p l a i n t i f f , f a u l t o f the p l a i n t i f f or c o n t r i b u t o r y
negligence and, most p a r t i c u l a r l y , act o f a stranger. The s t r i c t n e s s o f
the
l i a b i l i t y has also been a f f e c t e d by such f a c t o r s as the doubt over
the
p o s s i b i l i t y o f recovering damages f o r personal i n j u r y and the supple-
mentary requirement imposed by the House of Lords t h a t thereimust be some
non-natural user o f land.
As a r e s u l t i t i s suggested t h a t i n 1973 the
r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher, i f we r e t u r n t o the terminology o f the f i r s t
paragraph, while s t i l l tending t o be based more en a r i s k than on a f a u l t
concept, must be regarded as r e s t i n g a t some stage i n between these two
extremes.
I t has been said by various w r i t e r s on a large number of occasions
5
i n recent years
t h a t t h i s move away from a ' r i s k ' basis o f l i a b i l i t y i n
Rylands v Fletcher has coincided w i t h a marked s h i f t o f emphasis i n the
t o r t o f negligence away from f a u l t and i n the d i r e c t i o n of r i s k .
This,
i f t r u e , would c l e a r l y mean a f a r closer a l l i a n c e between the two t o r t s
than has ever been the case since Blackburn J.'s judgment and indeed, i f
taken t o i t s l o g i c a l conclusion, would r e s u l t i n a merger between them.
I f t h i s took place the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher, surrounded as i t i s by
such t e c h n i c a l i t i e s as, f o r example, the necessity f o r there t o be an
escape, would be a redundant r u l e and we .-would have reached a s i t u a t i o n
where there was one r u l e of law t o cover a l l n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t s o f t h i s
nature.
The occurrence of t h i s s h i f t o f emphasis i n the t o r t o f negligence
i s thus o f c r u c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher and must
be considered a t some l e n g t h .
F i r s t , however, i t would be as w e l l ^ t o
remind ourselves of some relevant aspects o f the h i s t o r i c a l background
and development o f the two t o r t s .
5.
See Fleming i n . p a r t i c u l a r .
93-
Early lav;, as W i n f i e l d has shown,
absolute l i a b i l i t y .
never accepted a p r i n c i p l e of
L i a b i l i t y was s t r i c t , however, and the presence of
any notion of f a u l t was d i f f i c u l t t o discern although i t was not wholly
excluded.
The need f o r a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n early law i s apparent when
we r e a l i s e t h a t the existence of t h i s p r i m i t i v e law was due t o the desire
to provide an a l t e r n a t i v e t o p r i v a t e vengeance and t o give society some
means of keeping i t s own peace and order.
As time went on man became less v i o l e n t and more c i v i l i s e d - t o
use the words of Hobbies he was less ' s o l i t a r y , poor, nasty, b r u t i s h and
short' - and moral f a c t o r s came t o play a greater part i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the law.
P r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l law came t o be quoted once more
i n England i n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Nor should the
influence of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n be underestimated f o r i n t h i s age
of the as yet u n d i s c i p l i n e d machine the growth of industry would have
been s t i f l e d i f i t had been l i a b l e f o r the occurrence of unavoidable
accidents f o r t h i s would have meant that the enterprise would have e i t h e r
had t o cease t o function or t o bear the cost of a l l accidents at a stage
7
i n i t s development when i t could not e a s i l y shoulder t h i s burden.
Another reason f o r the nineteenth century move towards a f a u l t
concept was that the r o l e of the t o r t remedy was seen then as being penal
rather than compensatory.
The law of t o r t s was regarded as an extension
of the c r i m i n a l law, exacting f i n e s on those who were at f a u l t .
This
view seems t o have been f i r s t put forward by Jeremy Bentham who maintained that the underlying object of c i v i l and c r i m i n a l law was the same.
Austin agreed, saying i n Lecture 27 that "although the proximate end of
a c i v i l sanction is, generally speaking, redress t o the i n j u r e d p a r t y ,
i t s remote and paramount end, l i k e that of a c r i m i n a l sanction, i s the
prevention of offences generally."
6.
7.
This b e l i e f i n a deterrent t o r t law
'The Myth of Absolute L i a b i l i t y ' . k2 L.Q.R. 37.
.
Woodward 'Reality and S o c i a l Reform: T r a n s i t i o n from Laussez Faire
to Welfare State.' 72 Yale L.J. 286.
9k.
(1962).
J
i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y u n r e l i a b l e f o r , as G l a n v i l l e Williams t e l l s us,
u t i l i t a r i a n philosophy of which both Bentham and. Austin were exponents
required t h a t a punishment must not be greater than i s necessary t o
repress the mischief i n question.
Damages may, however, be f a r greater
than i s required as a deterrent f o r they can be based on losses© f a r i n
excess of those forseeable at the time of the t o r t i o u s a c t .
Today the nineteenth century process i s being reversed and the
law of negligence i s coming more and more t o be based on compensatory
f a c t o r s and thus on concepts of r i s k rather than of f a u l t .
The classic
d e f i n i t i o n of negligence, given by Alderson B. i n B l y t h v Birmingham
9
Waterworks Co.
i s that "negligence i s the omission t o do something
which a reasonable man, guided upon these considerations which o r d i n a r i l y
regulate the conduct of human a f f a i r s , would do, or doing something
a prudent and reasonable man would not do."
which
This o b j e c t i v e standard of
care has l i t t l e connection w i t h notions of personal f a u l t f o r accident
v i c t i m s frequently obtain damages f o r accidents caused by those who d i d
the best they could t o avoid the accident but f a i l e d t o l i v e up t o the
highest standards of care.
I n these cases
society c l e a r l y puts the
need f o r compensation above the deterrent value of the law.
I t i s useful at t h i s stage i n our analysis of the recent developments i n negligence t o study various rules whose opecation imposes v/hat
i s i n r e a l i t y a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y although'they are disguised
as ordinary rules applying t o the t o r t of negligence.
of these rules i n res ipsa l o q u i t u r .
The most important
This i s a r u l e of evidence whereby
a p l a i n t i f f i s permitted t o e s t a b l i s h negligence on the part of the
defendant without having t o prove any s p e c i f i c act or omission.
The
r u l e w i l l apply where there i s an absence of any other explanation, the
harm i s of such a k i n d that i t does not normally occur i f proper care i s
8.
9.
k e . L . P . 137 at page i V t .
1856 11 Exch. 781 at page 78^.
95-
taken and the cause o f the accident was w i t h i n the exclusive c o n t r o l o f
the defendant.
The use o f the maxim i s intended t o e s t a b l i s h only a
prima f a c i e case but where i t i s applicable' the p l a i n t i f f w i l l
i n v a r i a b l y succeed.
almost
Res ipsa l o q u i t u r has come t o cover a wide range
of s i t u a t i o n s and plays an important p a r t i n modern accident l i t i g a t i o n .
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t New Zealand has a s t a t u t o r y equivalent t o
res ipsa l o q u i t u r i n the Coal Mines Act o f 1923 where there i s a p r o v i s i o n
that any accident occuring i n a mine i s t o be t r e a t e d prima f a c i e as
occurring because o f some negligence on the part o f the owner o f the mine.
Also o f much importance i s the j u d i c i a l device of construing a
large number of c r i m i n a l safety s t a t u t e s as sources o f c i v i l
liability.
S*+5(8) o f the Copyright Act 1936 enacts t h a t c e r t a i n contraventions o f
the s t a t u t e are actionable 'as a breach of s t a t u t o r y duty' and there i s
a s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n i n the Factories Acts but such provisions are not
found i n many s t a t u t e s .
The m a j o r i t y o f penal Acts o f Parliament do
not take the p o s s i b i l i t y of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y i n t o account but n e i t h e r do
they exclude i t and the courts have frequently considered the unexcused
v i o l a t i o n of a safety s t a t u t e as tantamount t o negligence per se.
This
doctrine i s often said t o be based on a presumed i n t e n t i o n o f the l e g i s l a t u r e but i t i s i n r e a l i t y a f i c t i o n f o r the silence would r a t h e r
suggest e i t h e r than c i v i l l i a b i l i t y was not intended or that the p o s s i b i l i t y
was never even considered.
Insurance has also had a p a r t t o play, a l b e i t a lesser one, i n
the move towards a negligence without f a u l t .
English law has f o r the
most p a r t adhered t o the f i c t i o n t h a t insurance has no influence on the
mind of a judge when determining l i a b i l i t y but i t does have an e f f e c t
both i n the f a c t that i t s presence may make the judge more l i k e l y t o
f i n d i n favour o f the p l a i n t i f f and because i t provides new guidelines
96.
f o r the settlement of claims between insurance companies so t h a t , f o r
example, compromises are often reached i n motoring cases without regard
to whether negligence could be established.
The a f f e c t of these devices i s t o a l t e r the established p r i n c i p l e s
of the t o r t of negligence.
the
They show the increasing r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t w i t h
number of accidents our advanced t e c h n o l o g i c a l age makes i n e v i t a b l e
we can no longer r e a l i s t i c a l l y t a l k i n terms of the deterrent toalue of
t o r t law.
The r e a l deterrents t o the causing of accidents are penal
sanctions and insurance premiums and the law of t o r t i s becoming more and
more compensatory i n f u n c t i o n .
This trend can be seen also i n c e r t a i n
areas of the recent case law as we w i l l now
see.
We have already noted the trend towards making l i a b i l i t y
stricter
10
by r a i s i n g the standard of care i n c e r t a i n circumstances.
I n addition
to t h i s there are p a r t i c u l a r areas of substantive law i n which modern
developments have l e d t o a wider and s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y i n
negligence and a move towards a r i s k rather than a f a u l t basis of
liability.
the
One of the more important of these areas i s that covered by
11
case of Donoghue v Stevenson
which l a i d down a general p r i n c i p l e
of l i a b i l i t y f o r a r t i c l e s which are dangerous when n e g l i g e n t l y manufactured.
I n that case the o r i g i n a l p l a i n t i f f drank a b o t t l e of ginger
beer which a f r i e n d had bought from a r e t a i l e r and given t o her.
The
b o t t l e was alleged t o contain the decomposed remains of a s n a i l which
could not be detected because of the opacity of the b o t t l e .
as a r e s u l t and sued the manufacturer f o r damages.
She was i l l
The House of Lords,
by a three t o two m a j o r i t y , held t h a t the manufacturer was l i a b l e , Lord
12
Atkin saying:
"a manufacturer o f products which he s e l l s i n such a
form as t o show that he intends them t o reach the u l t i m a t e consumer i n
the
form i n which they l e f t him w i t h no reasonable p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r -
mediate examination, and w i t h the knowledge t h a t the absence of reasonable
10.
See page «|5
11.
1932 A.C. 562.
97.
care i n the preparation of p u t t i n g up the products w i l l r e s u l t i n an
i n j u r y to the consumer's l i f e or property, owes a duty t o the consumer
to take t h a t reasonable care."
P r i o r t o t h i s case the courts had followed
13
the
decision i n Winterbottom v Wright
i n 19^2 which was i n t e r p r e t e d as
deciding t h a t conduct which c o n s t i t u t e s a breach of a contractual o b l i g a t i o n t o B could not at the same time f u r n i s h a cause of action f o r breach
of a t o r t i o u s duty t o A.
I n 18^2 the court f e l t that the growth of
industry should not be impeded by increasing i t s p o t e n t i a l range of
l i a b i l i t y ; i n 1932 the House of Lords f e l t that i n cases such as t h i s
i t was r i g h t that the manufacturer should bear the r i s k of i n j u r y
i n j u r y to the u l t i m a t e consumer.
Clearly i n such a case as Donoghue v Stevenson i t w i l l be almost
impossible f o r the p l a i n t i f f t o prove the defendant's knowledge.
Lord
Macmillan however s a i d t h a t "there i s no presumption of negligence i n
such a case as the present nor i s there any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r applying
the
maxim, res ipsa l o q u i t u r . "
15
Australian K n i t t i n g M i l l s
The l e g a l p o s i t i o n was seen i n Grant v
as being t h a t " i f excess sulphites were l e f t
i n the garment, t h a t could only be becuase someone was at f a u l t .
The
appellant i s not required t o l a y h i s f i n g e r on the exact person i n a l l
the
chain who was responsible, or t o specify what he 61x1 wrong.
Negligence
iS found as a matter of inference from the existence of the defects taken
i n connection w i t h a l l the known circumstances." I n Daniels and Daniels
16
v White and Sons L t d . and Tarbard
where the contents of a lemonade
acid
b o t t l e included carbolic/ scA i t was held that the defendants had not
rebutt.ed.r the inference of negligence.
This c l e a r l y establishes a r u l e
of evidence f o r cases of t h i s nature which i s , despite what Lord HacM i l l a n s a i d , the equivalent of res ipsa l o q u i t u r .
This p r i n c i p l e
stemming from Donoghue v Stevenson now has wide a p p l i c a t i o n - manufacturer
f o r example includes assembers and repairers and products includes h a i r dye and even motor cars.
The i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the l e g i s l a t u r e i n recent years has also shown
a desire t o create s t r i c t e r l i a b i l i t y i n the law of t o r t .
Thus the
employer's common law duty o f care t o h i s workmen was summed up by
17
Lord Wright i n Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. v English
as being "a duty
which r e s t s on the employer and which i s personal t o the employer, t o
take reasonable care f o r the safety o f h i s workmen, whether the employer
be an i n d i v i d u a l , a f i r m or a company, and whether or not the employer
takes any share i n the conduct of the operation." The duty according t o
the
House o f Lords i n t h a t case i s t h r e e f o l d
- the p r o v i s i o n o f a com-
petent s t a f f of men, adequate m a t e r i a l , and a proper system and e f f e c t i v e
supervision.
The duty i s personal but any l i a b i l i t y i s s t i l l f o r negligenc
and i s not imposed regardless o f f a u l t - "the o b l i g a t i o n i s f u l f i l l e d by
the
exercise of due care and s k i l l " (Lord W r i g h t ) . The l e g i s l a t i v e
considered that i n one important respect t h i s common law duty was not
s u f f i c i e n t l y severe f o r the Adequate p r o t e c t i o n o f workmen and thus i n
1969 the Employers' L i a b i l i t y (Defective Equipment) Act was put on the
Statute book.
This Act applies only t o defective equipment which includes
plant and machinery, v e h i c l e s , a i r c r a f t and c l o t h i n g provided by the
employer f o r the purpose o f h i s business.
Even where the defect can be
a t t r i b u t e d t o the negligence o f a t h i r d party o r independent contractor
the
employer w i l l be l i a b l e f o r personal i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d by the-
employee i n the course of h i s employment.
This, then, i s one small
i l l u s t r a t i o n o f the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s inew t h a t i n modern times a s t r i c t e r
form o f l i a b i l i t y should be applied i n c e r t a i n circumstances than was
previously the case.
L i a b i l i t y f o r the acts o f animals i s another area i n which s t a t u t e
has recently strengthened the o l d law o f negligence.
There has always
been a duty t o take care that an animal under one's c o n t r o l does not
become a source o f harm t o others.
17.
18.
Thus the House o f Lords held i n
1958 A.C.57 at page 84.
1932 A.E.R. 81.
99.
1932 i n Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington
t h a t " q u i t e apart faom the l i a b i l i t y
imposed upon the owner of animals or the person having c o n t r o l of them
by reason o f knowledge of t h e i r p r o p e n s i t i e s , there i s the ordinary
duty o f a person t o take care e i t h e r t h a t h i s animal or h i s c h a t t e l i s
not put t o such a use as i s l i k e l y t o i n j u r e h i s neighbour
"
There was however an exception t o t h i s l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence which
flowed from the anomalous r u l e that an owner o r occupier o f land owes
no duty t o users of an adjoining highway t o maintain fencing and prevent
his l i v e s t o c k from s t r a y i n g i n t o the road.
the
This r u l e o r i g i n a t e d before
i n c l o s u r e movement of the eighteenth century reshaped the English
countryside and before the advent o f the motor car which increased the
t h r e a t of roaming c a t t l e t o the t r a v e l l i n g p u b l i c .
As l a t e as 19^+6,
19
i n Searle v Wallbank,
the House o f Lords refused toieconsider t h i s r u l e .
Thus when the l e g i s l a t u r e c o d i f i e d a l a r g e part of the law r e l a t i n g t o
animals i n the Animals Act o f 1971 the Act both made e x i s t i n g l i a b i l i t y
more s t r i c t i n many cases by, f o r example, imposing s t r i c t
liability
f o r damage done by an animal which belongs t o a dangerous species (S2(1))
and f o r damage caused by any other animal i n consequence of i t s mischievous
propensity of which the keeper i s aware and also introduced f o r the f i r s t
time l i a b i l i t y f o r animals s t r a y i n g on t o the highway.
S8(1) Animals Act
thus states that 'so much of the rules of the common law r e l a t i n g t o
l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence as excludes or r e s t r i c t s the duty which a person
might owe t o others t o take such care as i s reasonable t o see t h a t damage
i s not caused by animals s t r a y i n g on t o a highway i s hereby abolished.*
This then i s another example of modern reform of the law of negligence
r e s u l t i n g i n both a widening o f the l i m i t s o f the law and i n an i n c r e a s i n g l y
s t r i c t form o f l i a b i l i t y .
A f u r t h e r example o f t h i s new type o f negligence i s the recent
18.
19.
1932 A.E.R. 81.
19^7 A.G. 3^1.
20.
1971
P q n.
r'ljr C c . f l . ) 1972 2 w , L . n .
100.
iai?
(ILL.)
development i n the f i e l d of v i c a r i o u s l i a b i l i t y .
Vicarious l i a b i l i t y
e x i s t s where one person i s held l i a b l e f o r the misconduct of another
although he himself i s free from f a u l t .
Thus, although f a u l t
i s present,
as f a r as the person held l i a b l e i s concerned t h i s i s an instance of
strict liability.
Vicarious l i a b i l i t y has been a part of the English
20
law f o r many years but the recent case of Morgans v Launchbury
has
brought i t t o the f o r e f r o n t as a means of extending r i s k r a t h e r than
f a u l t concepts i n t o an area of law which had previously been the domain
s o l e l y of t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of negligence.
I n Morgans v Launchbury
the defendant owned a motor car which v/as insured i n her name but which
was driven r e g u l a r l y by her husband.
On the n i g h t i n question he asked
a f r i e n d of h i s t o d r i v e the car because he had had too much t o drink
and had promised h i s w i f e t h a t i f he was u n f i t t o d r i v e he would get someone else t o do so.
Due t o the f r i e n d ' s negligence there was an accident
i n which both husband and f r i e n d were k i l l e d and the p l a i n t i f f , who
a passenger i n the car, was i n j u r e d .
was
The t r i a l judge ^bund i n favour
21
of the p l a i n t i f f .
Normally i n such cases as t h i s the court asks whether the d r i v e r
was d r i v i n g as the owner's agent - w i t h the owner's permission and f o r a
purpose which v/as at l e a s t p a r t l y the owner's purpose.
22
Megaw L.J., who dissented i n the Court of Appeal,
On t h i s basis
considered that the
husband was using the car f o r h i s own purpose - a pub-crawl - and therefore the wife could not be l i a b l e .
The m a j o r i t y disagreed, however, and
upheld the v e r d i c t of the t r i a l judge.
I n doing so they put l i a b i l i t y
on a risk-bearing basis and they d i d t h i s f o r reasons of p o l i c y ; i n t h i s
case because of c e r t a i n f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g t o insurance.
Under the insurance p o l i c y i n force the insurers were obliged t o
indemnify only the w i f e .
Thus by holding the w i f e l i a b l e the court
secured the b e n e f i t of the insurance p o l i c y f o r the v i c t i m s of the
20.
1971 2 Q.B. 2^5 (C.A.), 1972 2 W.L.R. 1217 (H.L.)
21.
See 1971 C.L.J. 195 and 1972 L.Q.R. M*9.
22.
1971 2 Q.B. 2^5 at page 261.
accident and also saved the w i f e from c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y and from
p o t e n t i a l c i v i l l i a b i l i t y (against which she was not insured) under
23
the
r u l e i n Monk v Warbey
(the p o l i c y d i d not contain the usual
extension t o persons d r i v i n g on her orders or w i t h her permission and
under S.201
of the Road T r a f f i c Act 196O i t i s unlawful f o r one person
to permit another t o use a motor vehicle on a road unless there i s i n
force a p o l i c y of insurance i n r e l a t i o n t o the user of the v e h i c l e by
t h a t other person).
S t r i c t l y speaking these p r i n c i p l e s o f insurance should have no
relevance when deciding such cases as Morgans v Launchbury and that
the
was
approach taken by Megaw L.J. , Edmund Davies L.J. avoided any discus-
sion of the insurance but he d i d appear t o bend h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
Zh
the
facts t o take account of the insurance p o s i t i o n .
Lord Denning
was more r e a l i s t i c i n admitting the a f f e c t of insurance on h i s judgment.
He stated, r i g h t l y i t i s submitted, that the p o l i c y behind vicarious
l i a b i l i t y i s " t o put the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on t o the person who.ought i n
25
j u s t i c e to bear i t . "
He then went on t o say that the owner should
usually bear t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y because i t w i l l be he or she who put
the
car on the road and should be insured i n respect of i t . I t seems,
though, that t h i s i s an unjust burden t o put upon the w i f e f o r she
cannot reasonably be expected t o be insured f o r a l l e v e n t u a l i t i e s .
The
r e a l reason f o r p u t t i n g t h i s burden on the w i f e was revealed when Lord
Denning said t h a t since the w i f e owned the car "when her husband was
using i t , he was using i t as her 'agent' i n the sense t h a t , i f he
was
involved i n an accident, she ought t o bear the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , especially
26
as she was the one who was insured."
Thus Lord Denning c l e a r l y put the
moral p r i n c i p l e of a l l o t t i n g the r i s k t o whoever could best a f f o r d t o
bear i t above p r i n c i p l e s of substantive law.
This then i s an outstanding
example of a court deciding a case on the basis of who i t thinks ought
to bear the r i s k and not on whether the w i f e was i n any way at f a u l t
2 6
However the House of Lords
unanimously allowed the appeal and
r e j e c t e d Lord Denning's 'modern' approach t o the question. Their Lordships
recognised the inadequacy of the law i n modern conditions but considered
that i t was beyond the power of the courts t o a l t e r the l e g a l p o s i t i o n by
taking such f a c t o r s as insurance i n t o account - that can be done only by
27
Parliament.
Jolowicg, w r i t i n g i n the Cambridge Lav; Journal,
considers
t h a t Parliament should act on t h i s matter and that the owner of the car
should be made c i v i l l y l i a b l e f o r the negligence of a l l permitted d r i v e r s .
The Lords also d e c i s i v e l y r e j e c t e d such references t o substantive law made
by Lord Denning as h i s statement t h a t "the owner of h i r e r i s at common
law responsible f o r a l l i n j u r y or damage done by h i s permitted d r i v e r i n
28
29
the negligent d r i v i n g of the car."
Lord Wilberforce said t h a t " i t has
never been held that mere permission i s enough t o e s t a b l i s h v i c a r i o u s
l i a b i l i t y " and that the car was c l e a r l y being used f o r the husband's purposes at the time of the accident.
Thus the Court of Appeal's decision
i n Morgans v Launchbury i s not good law but that does not a l t e r the f a c t
t h a t Lord Denning, w i t h assistance from Edmund Davies L.J., attempted t o
r e s t a t e substantive law so t h a t i t would f i t i n w i t h risk-bearing r a t h e r
than f a u l t theories.
This l i n k between p o l i c y , insurance and new p r i n c i p l e s
of t o r t law w i l l be studied again i n the next chapter but i t i s worthy of
note at t h i s stage as an example of the ease w i t h which the courts can
increase (and therefore also decrease) the s t r i c t n e s s of l i a b i l i t y i n a
p a r t i c u l a r case.
We can thus see that we are r e t u r n i n g t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which the
emphasis i s placed on the compensatory function of the law of t o r t .
Negligence i s i n many ways a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y than i t has ever
been; i t i s , as v/e have attempted t o show, quite frequently as s t r i c t
as
i s l i a b i l i t y under the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher and negligence has, of
27.
28.
29.
1971 CL.J. 195.
At page 2551972 2 W.L.R. 1217
at page
1220.
103.
course, the a d d i t i o n a l advantage o f l a c k i n g the a r t i f i c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s
which such concepts as escape and non-natural user of land impose upon
the
r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher. Negligence has gained f o r i t s e l f a
p o s i t i o n o f pre-eminence i n the law o f t o r t and Rylands v Fletcher has
had l e f t t o i t only a l i m i t e d f i e l d o f s e r a i - s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y whose
independence from the p r i n c i p l e s o f negligence i s constantly lessening.
Negligence has shown i t s e l f t o have a capacity f o r growth and a d a p t a b i l i t y
which i s e n t i r e l y foreign t o the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher.
I r o n i c a l l y , j u s t a t the time when negligence has a t t a i n e d such
30
growth, the f i r s t signs of i t s decline are d i s c e r n i b l e .
As M i l l n e r
puts i t so a p t l y : "fostered by the i n d i v i d u a l i s m o f the nineteenth
century, whose needs and s p i r i t s i t accurately r e f l e c t s , negligence i s
i n some ways b a s i c a l l y unsuitable t o the p a t e r n a l i s t i c society o f the
t w e n t i e t h century."
the
Negligence, despite i t s recent changes, s t i l l
links
r i g h t t o compensation f o r the p l a i n t i f f w i t h the proof of f a u l t on
the
p a r t o f the defendant. Legal f a u l t .can perhaps be shown more e a s i l y
ifc-i II U s y UerMiiiket.
~TJiy Mere. / favcf-A fkei^ &Jb<&*f*i*
than i n the past but i t ^ s l o u l d be a r i g h t of the i n j u r e d party - a f e e l i n g
31
0
s a
voiced among others by Lord Kilbrandon
during the thalidomide controversy.
i n 1966 and r e c e n t l y i n Parliament
This whole area of the law of t o r t ,
negligence and Rylands v Fletcher included, i s r i p e f o r change and the
f i r s t signs of a new approach are nov; evident.
30.
31.
'Negligence i n Modern Law' pages ZJ>h and 235*
Hamlyn Lectures 'Other People's Law'.
104.
CHAPTER IX
The New Approach
The i n i t i a l i n t e r e s t i n t h i s new approach came w i t h the increasing
r e a l i s a t i o n that a victim's loss could be deemed t o be an i n e v i t a b l e
expense of a p a r t i c u l a r enterprise and should therefore i n j u s t i c e be
d i s t r i b u t e d t o a l l those sections of the public which benefit, from the
activity.
This w i l l r e s u l t i n the f u n c t i o n of the law of t o r t being
a l t e r e d from t h a t of s h i f t i n g t o t h a t of d i s t r i b u t i n g losses.
The
established r u l e s p e r t a i n i n g t o negligence are of course concerned
with
the apportionment of f a u l t and r e l y f o r t h e i r moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n on the
premise t h a t the person who i s held t o be negligent i s genuinely at f a u l t
and ought i n j u s t i c e t o have h i s i n t e r e s t subordinated t o that of the
plaintiff.
The new approach, where i t i s applied, i s more r e a l i s t i c and
so more s o c i a l l y acceptable^ f o r inherent i n i t i s the view that i n c a r r y i n g
on the a c t i v i t y which r e s u l t e d i n the accident the p l a i n t i f f i s usually
t a k i n g part i n a s o c i a l l y desirable but hazardous a c t i v i t y , whose i n e v i t a b l e
by-product i s the occurrence of such mishaps and t h a t therefore i t i s r i g h t
t h a t these expenses of the a c t i v i t y should be borne; not by t h i s one
unfortunate p l a i n t i f f alone but by a l l those who b e n e f i t from the a c t i v i t y
concerned.
This s e l e c t i o n of 'defendants' by reason of t h e i r s o c i a l res-
p o n s i b i l i t y and f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y t o absorb the costs of the a c t i v i t y
be termed 'loss d i s t r i b u t i o n ' .
may
This l i n e of reasoning was seen a good
many years ago when, i n the r e a l i s a t i o n that i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r i e s were the
i n e v i t a b l e product of modern industry and despite the p r o t e s t s of the
l e g a l profession that t o compensate employees regardless of f a u l t would
make them less c a r e f u l and r e s u l t i n an increase i n accidents. Canada,
beginning i n 1912, abolished the p r i n c i p l e of f a u l t - f i n d i n g so f a r as
i n d u s t r i a l accidents were concerned.
Industry i n Canada now bears the
cost of a l l accidents t o workmen regardless of f a u l t and a l l redress t o
105.
the courts has been abolished.
Loss d i s t r i b u t i o n does not mean, however, that there w i l l be no
circumstances i n which i t i s not best t h a t one of the p a r t i e s involved
i n the accident should bear the l o s s .
Thus as long ago as 1951* i n White
2
v White , Denning L.J., as he then was, said that "recent l e g i s l a t i v e and
j u d i c i a l developments show t h a t the c r i t e r i o n of l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t i s not
so much c u l p a b i l i t y , but on whom should the r i s k f a l l . "
The r i s k , as
t h i s statement i m p l i e s , should not always f a l l away from the p a r t i c i p a n t s
i n the accident.
Although we must accept that the primary function of
the law of t o r t i s compensatory i t also has i t s use as a means of discouraging
the person responsible from committing f u r t h e r such acts although i t s e f f e c t
i n t h i s respect i s less than i s the e f f e c t of the l i k e l y increase i n
insurance premiums f o l l o w i n g the accident.
There w i l l be c e r t a i n cases i n
which i t i s r i g h t t h a t the s u f f e r e r should bear the burden - f o r example
householders i n v a r i a b l y carry f i r e insurance and thus the courts consider
that i t i s unwise t o s h i f t the loss as the householder i s the best bearer
of i t ^ - but i n the m a j o r i t y of cases i n which i t i s r i g h t t h a t one party
should accept the loss that party w i l l be the one whose conduct caused the
accident.
I n any event English Lav; has decided, at l e a s t i n p a r t , t o
f o l l o w Canada over the question of workers' compensation f o r i n response
t o the growing f e e l i n g that workers were having t o subsidise i n d u s t r y by
frequently bearing the costs of accidents t o themselves a system of s o c i a l
insurance was inaugurated i n 1 9 ^ f o l l o w i n g the Beveridge report so tha t
a workman i s now e n t i t l e d t o compensation f o r i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y regardless
of f a u l t .
Large changes, then, have taken place i n the apportionment
of
l i a b i l i t y f o r t o r t i o u s acts i n recent year, changes v/hich f r e q u e n t l y go
1.
2.
3.
See Wright 'The Adequacy of the Law of Torts' 1961 C.L.J, page kk at page 5 1 .
1950 P. 39 at page 59.
See Atkinson v Newcastle Waterworks 1877 2 Ex. D. 4 *+1.
106.
beyond simple statements i n law reports i n t o the realms of j u d i c i a l and,
where applicable, j u r y psychology.
By f a r the most s i g n i f i c a n t influence
on these changes has been the steady growth of insurance against l i a b i l i t y .
The presence of insurance has the e f f e c t t h a t a judgment against the defendant does not s h i f t the loss from the p l a i n t i f f t o the defendant but rather
d i s t r i b u t e s the loss amongst a l l those persons who are insured against t h i s
type of r i s k .
Thus i n any case i n which the defendant i s insured w i t h
regard t o the claim being made against him he i s i n r e a l i t y no more than
a nominal party t o the l i t i g a t i o n .
One of the major r e s u l t s of t h i s general insurance i s the removal
of any p u n i t i v e e f f e c t which an adverse judgment and r e s u l t i n g damages
might have on the defendant.
We have noticed that fears were expressed
i n Canada as t o whether t h i s would lead t o an increase i n the number of
if
accidents.
Fleming
quotes s t a t i s t i c s t o show that t h i s has not been the
case i n England but i t i s suggested that w i t h the large number of factors
i n f l u e n c i n g accident s t a t i s t i c s these
f i g u r e s prove very l i t t l e and that
i n f a c t the deterrent value of the fear of paying large sums of money i n
damages has been replaced, although perhaps w i t h less e f f e c t , by the fear
of having t o pay increased insurance premiums f o l l o w i n g an accident, and,
more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , by the fear of i n c u r r i n g penalties under the c r i m i n a l
law, i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r d r i v i n g offences where drink i s involved.
The influence which the absence or presence of insurance has on
the minds of j u r i e s i n those countries f o l l o w i n g the common law system
which s t i l l employ j u r i e s i n personal i n j u r y cases i s considerable.
5
Fleming
makes the point t h a t j u r i e s i n A u s t r a l i a are w e l l aware, p a r t i c u -
l a r l y i n cases i n v o l v i n g motoring accidents, t h a t i f they f i n d i n favour
of the p l a i n t i f f the defendant, f o r whom they might otherwise f e e l equal
sympathy, w i l l not be g r e a t l y out of pocket and that they can be generous
4-. At page 1 1 .
5 . At page 12.
107.
i n the award of damages f o r the money w i l l come not from the defendant
but from the seemingly l i m i t l e s s pocket o f an insurance company. This
has l e d t o recent suggestions that the assessment o f damages should be
taken altogether out o f the hands of j u r i e s and made an exlusive respons i b i l i t y of the j u d i c i a r y - indeed the Winn Committee on Personal I n j u r i e s
6
Litigation
went so f a r as t o suggest that i n c e r t a i n circumstances the
question o f damages should be assessed only by appellate c o u r t s .
This does not a l t e r the f a c t that judges have been a t l e a s t as
much influenced by the growth o f insurance as have j u r i e s .
This v/as
seen i n the consideration in'the l a s t chapter o f the Court of Appeal
7
judgments i n Launchbury v Morganfrs where Lord Denning and Edmund Davies
L.J. were greatly influenced by the presence o f insurance. This i n t e r e s t
g
i n insurance was seen also i n the Court o f Appeal i n S.C.M. v W h i t t a l l
and more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Spartan S t e e l and Alloys L t d . , v Martin and Co.
(Contractors) L t d .
9
where Lord Denning
10
said that the previous t e s t s o f
negligence should be discarded and that the court should instead "consider
the
public r e l a t i o n s h i p s of those concerned i n the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances
and see whether, as a matter o f p o l i c y , economic loss should be recoverable."
I t can therefore be said w i t h some c e r t a i n t y that f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g t o
insurance now have a considerable influence on judgments i n personal i n j u r y
cases.
From a l l t h i s emerges the f a c t that the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f losses
between members o f a section of society has become increasingly prevalent
i n recent years.
This system, though, i s s t i l l l i n k e d t o the existence
of t o r t l i a b i l i t y - before deciding how the loss i s t o be d i s t r i b u t e d a
decision has t o be reached as t o whether there i s i n f a c t any l i a b i l i t y
on the f a c t s of a p a r t i c u l a r case.
The system v/hich i s becoming increas-
i n g l y favoured as the ultimate answer t o compensation f o r accidents i s a
system of f u l l and d i r e c t compensation payable t o the v i c t i m without
regard to v/ho caused the i n j u r y or t o the allotment o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
the
accident.
This new system would mean t h a t the s u f f e r e r would auto-
7".
8.
1971 2 Q.B. 245.
1971.1 Q.B. 337.
(? 0* J.U1i
108.
n
9 . 1972 3 W.L.B. 502.
1 0 . At page 508.
m a t i c a l l y obtain h i s damages without the need t o go through the long and
c o s t l y procedures of l i t i g a t i o n .
The law o f t o r t would be e n t i r e l y
removed from personal i n j u r y cases f o r the purposes o f compensation and
the p c i n i t i v e element i n damages would be replaced by increased insurance
premiums and by present and perhaps new c r i m i n a l sanctions where appropriate.
The arguments f o r and against such a system of d i r e c t compensation
11
were analysed a t length i n the Woodhouse report
i n New Zealand, a country
whose laws a t t h a t time were very s i m i l a r t o the present p o s i t i o n i n England.
12
This report was the work of a Royal Commission
which was set up i n New
Zealand i n 1966 t o i n q u i r e i n t o the law r e l a t i n g t o compensation and claims
f o r damages f o r incapacity or death a r i s i n g out o f accidents suffered by
persons i n employment.
The Commission was t o i n v e s t i g a t e any need f o r
change i n the law, the administration o f any new scheme suggested and the
d e s i r a b i l i t y o f adopting any system o f compensation i n operation elsewhere.
The Woodhouse Committee considered the common law a c t i o n o f negligence i n some depth. They f e l t t h a t the guiding p r i n c i p l e s f o r a system
of compensation are community r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , comprehensive e n t i t l e m e n t ,
13
complete r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , r e a l compensation and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e f f i c i e n c y .
I t was f e l t that the common law a c t i o n of negligence f a i l e d t o achieve
13
these objectives i n four major respects.
These were that the moral
basis of the action i s f a l s e i n that i t i s i n f a c t not the nature of the
defendant's conduct but i t s r e s u l t s which d i c t a t e the question o f damages,
that l i t i g a t i o n so often r e s u l t s i n the f a i l u r e of an award t o accurately
r e f l e c t the losses i t i s supposed t o be compensating f o r , t h a t the procedure
i s slow and c o s t l y and that the whole process acts as an impediment t o the
obtaining o f compensation and t o r e h a b i l i t a t i o n .
The members concluded
t h a t the common law process leads t o a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s where few o f the
many persons who are i n j u r e d are ever able t o b e n e f i t under i t and where
11.
12.
13.
'Compensation f o r Personal I n j u r y i n New Zealand.'
The members were Mr. J u s t i c e Woodhouse (Chairman), H.L. Brockett and
{p.A. Parsons.
paragraph 55«
only a small p r o p o r t i o n of these receive a f u l l indemnity - Lord
Parker
has said that o f those i n j u r e d on the roads only three out
of ten recover compensation.
The Committee f e l t t h a t the f a u l t p r i n c i p l e
i s e r r a t i c and cannot l o g i c a l l y j u s t i f y
the existence of the Common law
remedy, the adversary system hinders the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of i n j u r e d
persons,
the remedy i t s e l f provides a f u l l indemnity f o r very few and the system
as a whole i s cumbersome and i n e f f i c i e n t .
The Committee then went on t o recommend the scheme which they
wanted t o see i n f o r c e .
This was a scheme which would provide
*a
u n i f i e d and comprehensive system o f accident prevention, r e h a b i l i t a t i o n
and compensation which w i l l avoid the disadvantages
o f the present
processes and w i l l i t s e l f operate on a basis o f consistent p r i n c i p l e . '
This scheme, amounting t o a comprehensive system o f s o c i a l insurance,
was i n the main p a r t implemented i n New Zealand i n the Accident Compensa16
t i o n Act 1972
. We w i l l consider now t o what extent English Law already
has such a scheme as t h i s , t o what extent we can and should t r y t o evolve
a s i m i l a r .system t o t h a t now applying i n New Zealand and, most
important,
where, i f at a l l , Rylands v Fletcher s i t u a t i o n s would f i t i n t o the scheme
for while we must accept that the c r i t i c i s m s which can be made o f personal
injury litigation
include Rylands v Fletcher actions there are elements
p e c u l i a r t o the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher which may mean that a d i f f e r e n t
type of approach would be desirable.
The only important reppect i n which English law already operates
a scheme comparable t o t h a t envisaged by the Woodhouse Committee i s i n
the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l accidents.
By the end o f the nineteenth century
common law negligence was no longer able t o cope w i t h the s o c i a l problems
created by the vast volume of i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r i e s .
The view took hold
that i n d u s t r y ' s f i r s t charge was the welfare o f i t s workers and that
compensation ought t o be given by i n d u s t r y and t o be regarded as p a r t o f
the costs o f production.
Thus the Workmen's Compensation Acts introduced
the f iIQfiS
r s t C.L.P.1
system o f s o c i a l insurance i n t h i s country
t h entitlement
as
14.
16. w iSee
3*f H.L.R. 5*f2.
^
«-M-l
of r i g h t without regard t o the proof of f a u l t .
Workers' compensation
i s now the f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of i n d u s t r y , although i n p r a c t i c e
the increased costs are d i s t r i b u t e d even more widely through being
passed on t o the p u b l i c .
I t i s worth n o t i n g i n a d d i t i o n that accidents
i n v o l v i n g automobiles have a t t r a c t e d a new approach
i n recent years.
Technically they are s t i l l governed by common law negligence but the
presence of insurance and i n p a r t i c u l a r of compulsory t h i r d party
insurance has had a profound p r a c t i c a l influence and has l e d t o a s i t u a t i o n where very few cases reach the courts and i n those that do there i s
a v i r t u a l abandonment of the f a u l t p r i n c i p l e .
Despite these instances of s o c i a l insurance England has a long
way t o go before i n reaches the s t a t e envisaged i n New Zealand i n the
Woodhouse r e p o r t .
That i t should do so i f reasonably p r a c t i c a b l e i s , i t
i s submitted, desirable f o r the arguments put forward i n the report against
the present system of compensation (common law damages i n p a r t i c u l a r ) and
i n support of a comprehensive system of s o c i a l insurance are strong.
We must now b r i e f l y study the recent developments i n England which
have increased the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a system being implemented i n
not too d i s t a n t f u t u r e .
the
Committees have been set up i n t h i s country t o
consider the question. Notably there was the 1966 Committee on Personal
17
Injuries
under Winn L.J. whose terms of reference were too narrow, which
came t o the remarkable conclusion that i t was-: the human element i n the
system, and not the system i t s e l f , which was at f a u l t and which i n t o t a l
d i d more t o r e f l e c t than t o reconcile the d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion. Just
before the Winn Report Lord Parker, i n h i s P r e s i d e n t i a l address t o the
18
Bentham Society
, said t h a t the time had come f o r us t o recognise the
inadequacy of the present methods and t o seek some new approach and i t
i s strange that only i n recent months has the type of action been taken
which seems as i f i t may lead t o p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s .
Something was needed
t o provide the i n i t i a l impetus, t o t u r n the Government thoughts i n t o
17. Cmnd. 3 6 9 1 .
action and t o concentrate public opinion on t h i s matter and t h i s came
i n l a t e 1972
the
w i t h the controversy over the thalidomide c h i l d r e n where
prospect of a long and complicated l e g a l tussle between the parents
and the D i s t i l l e r s Company which manufacturered the drug l e d t o demands
f o r a s t a t e compensation scheme t o be introduced t o meet such cases and
to by-pass the common law process.
At the height of the controversy the
Prime M i n i s t e r announced to the House of Commons on December 19th
the
1972
s e t t i n g up of an i n q u i r y i n t o the basis of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y f o r the
19
causing of death or personal i n j u r y .
The terms of reference of the
Royal Commission are: t o consider t o what extent, i n v/hat circumstances
and by what means compensation should be payable i n respect of death or
personal i n j u r y ( i n c l u d i n g ante-natal i n j u r y ) suffered by any person
(a)
i n the course o f employment
(b)
through the use of a motor v e h i c l e or other means of transport
(c)
through the manufacture, supply or use of goods or services
(d)
on premises belonging t o or occupied by another
(e)
otherwise through the act or omission of another where
compensation under the present law i s recoverable only
on proof of f a u l t or under the rules of s t r i c t
liability.
Mr. Heath envisaged a committee of fourteen or f i f t e e n people
i n c l u d i n g insurance actuaries, doctors, economists and representatives
of employers and Trade Unions - the type of body which succeeded i n New
Zealand as opposed t o the disappoint i n g Winn Committee which was composed
almost e n t i r e l y of lawyers.
Pearson.
The Chairman of the i n q u i r y i s t o be Lord
I t i s t o be hoped that the Pearson Commission w i l l i n t e r p r e t
i t s terms of reference as widely as seems intended.
I t w i l l be some time
before the r e s u l t s of i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s are known but what s o r t of view
are the members l i k e l y t o take of the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y and a d v i s a b i l i t y of
implementing i n England a scheme along the l i n e s of t h a t now i n force i n
New Zealand?
19.
The Times.
December 20th
1972.
I t i s important t o r e a l i s e t h a t d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l and economic
conditions p r e v a i l i n t h i s country t o New Zealand.
England i s a f a r
more densely and heavily populated country w i t h a correspondingly f a r
greater number o f accidents i n v o l v i n g personal i n j u r y .
t i o n o f a comprehensive
The administra-
scheme o f eompensation i n England would be
expensive and, almost i n e v i t a b l y , slow.
I f lawyers are t o be b r i e f e d
to appear before the t r i b u n a l s assessing compensation, i f expense
necessitates that t r i b u n a l s are kept r e l a t i v e l y few i n number thus
causing a large backlog o f hearings; and i f appeals, even i f only on
a p o i n t of law as the Woodhouse report recommended, are t o be allowed
as they must be, then i t i s possible that the whole process i n terms o f
time and cost w i l l not be g r e a t l y d i f f e r e n t from the common law process
i t i s designed t o replace. I t i s worth noting also that the common law
system o f l i a b i l i t y i s f a r more entrenched i n our society than i t was i n
New Zealand where i t was transplanted i n i t s l a t e r stages o f development.
This, though, i s a less e f f e c t i v e l i n e o f argument f o r i f the common
law process i s r e a l l y as d e f i c i e n t as i t i s made out t o be then we must
be prepared t o accept some iconoclasm.
Then there i s the problem o f the
presence of vested i n t e r e s t s i n the common law process i n t h i s country
which have a f a r greater r e s t r i c t i v e influence on change i n our more
s t a t i c society than i n the developing nation of New Zealand.
This, again,
i t i s submitted, i s of l i t t l e importance; f i r s t because lawyers and most
of the others involved i n the common law process may s t i l l have t h e i r
parts t o play i n the new system o f compensation and secondly because
•R
such f a c t o r s must not be allowed t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h ou|g endeavour t o f i n d
the
best possible system f o r the population as a whole.
Vested i n t e r e s t s of c e r t a i n groups i n society w i l l have t o be
appeased, but accepting t h i s and t h a t the new system o f compensation
w i l l i n procedure be only marginally b e t t e r than the common law process,
113.
i t i s u l t i m a t e l y on the merits of the two a l t e r n a t i v e s t h a t our decision
must r e s t .
I t was not because of s o c i a l or economic conditions t h a t
New Zealand accepted the compensation system but because of the manifest
f a i l i n g s of the l i a b i l i t y process. The time has come, i t i s submitted,
t o throw o f f the r e s t r i c t i v e shackles of our common law system and t o
venture i n t o the new, more equitable and more e a s i l y understandable
realms of a system of compensation f o r a l l i n j u r i e s .
Many f u r t h e r
d e t a i l s on the precise extent of the scheme and on the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
f o r entitlement would have t o be worked out but i n p r i n c i p l e such a
scheme must be most s t r o n g l y recommended.
Having said t h i s one must confess that the Pearson Commission,
i f i t adopts the usual a t t i t u d e s taken by committees i n t h i s country,
may be f a r too cautious i n i t s recommendations.
I t might f o r example
recommend that the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher should be l e f t out of
the scheme. Such caution would be disastrous as we v / i l l now see.
The c r u c i a l question then, having accepted the p r i n c i p l e of
such a scheme, i s where the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher w i l l f i t i n
20
to i t , i f a t a l l .
The element i n the r u l e which i s the major reason
f o r i t being a t o r t of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s the 'dangerous' q u a l i t y of
Rylands v Fletcher objects.
There i s no doubt that a reasonable case
can be made out f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that whereas i n most accidents i t
i s f a i r that the state should bear the l o s s , i n cases i n which the defendant brings onto h i s land and keeps there some dangerous object i t
i s r i g h t t h a t the defendant should personally accept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
the consequences.
Thus i t can be argued that while i t i s f a i r t h a t the
State should accept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r an accident caused during the
manufacture of lemonade we should not c o l l e c t i v e l y accept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r an accident caused i n the manufacture of explosives or i n a nuclear
establishment.
20. The p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher does not apply
to i n j u r i e s t o the person has been rejected - see Chapter I I I .
The f a l l a c i e s i n t h i s argument are numerous however.
First
there i s the p o i n t , t h a t we would s t i l l have t o d i s t i n g u i s h betv/een
dangerous and non-dangerous objects - t h i s might lead t o two separate
processes of law, f i r s t the hearing before a t r i b u n a l under the
new
compensation scheme which might r e s u l t i n a decision t h a t the circumstances are outside the scheme and then i n t h i s case a hearing before
the courts under the present system w i t h a l l the disadvantages pointed
out by Woodhouse and w i t h the wastage i n time almost doubled.
And
then
what i f the court considered t h a t a dangerous object was involved but
t h a t the user of land was n a t u r a l or t h a t there had been no escape?
Surely i n t h i s case we can not say t h a t no damages are recoverable
or
are we to say t h a t i f the Rylands v Fletcher a c t i o n f a i l s , compensation
w i l l be automatically payable under the new scheme i n which case the
v i c t i m must f i r s t go to a t r i b u n a l t o determine whether he prima f a c i e
comes w i t h i n the compensation scheme, then go t o court t o sue i n Rylands
v Fletcher and then, i f unsuccessful, go back to the t r i b u n a l ?
The
t h i r d stage could be avoided by the t r i b u n a l making an award c o n d i t i o n a l
on the Rylands v Fletcher a c t i o n f a i l i n g but nevertheless the p r a c t i c a l
d i f f i c u l t i e s are enormous.
And what i f the r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher
c l e a r l y covers a s i t u a t i o n but negligence can also be established?
For
the s t a t e to give compensation would be absurd i f we are going to d i s t i n g u i s h Rylands v Fletcher f o r t h i s w i l l mean t h a t the defendant w i l l
himself have t o pay damages unless he i s negligent i n which case the
1
state ; w i l l pay f o r him.
Thus such an 'overlapping' a c t i o n would have t o
go t o the ordinary courts of law which would immediately mean t h a t the
many negligence actions now brought t o which the r u l e i n Rylands v
Fletcher would also be applicable would be excluded from the system of
compensation.
The only sensible conclusion one can come t o from t h i s i s
t h a t a l l actions should be heard by the t r i b u n a l s under the system of
115.
compensation and i f any d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s required t o discourage extrahazardous a c t i v i t i e s t h a t must come from some other source.
I t i s thus submitted that there are compelling reasons f o r b r i n g i n g
the
r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher i n t o t h i s new system of compensation f o r
personal i n j u r y .
The prospect of having two p a r a l l e l systems of redress
- one f o r negligence ar.d the other f o r s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y - i s unedifying
and smacks indeed of a return t o the medieval forms of a c t i o n which
s t u l t i f i e d our l e g a l system f o r so long.
To have only one system of
conipensation f o r personal i n j u r y makes sense; i t i s simple, unambiguous
and understandable by the population as a whole.
the
This however leaves
argument t h a t some deterrent may be required against firms who indulge
i n ultra-hazardous a c t i v i t i e s which are not f o r the public b e n e f i t .
Such
a deterrent could be created i n two ways; f i r s t by making such firms pay
a higher c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the s t a t e insurance fund and secondly by widening
c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y so t h a t i f there i s a breach of duty i n such circumstances a prosecution can be brought while the i n j u r e d party w i l l
be allowed the advantages of the new scheme of compensation.
still
Many d e t a i l s
w i l l c l e a r l y have t o be worked out - f o r example w i l l the new scheme apply
to purely f i n a n c i a l loss and t o damage t o property?
( L o g i c a l l y i t ought
to or the u n s a t i s f a c t o r y common lav/ system w i l l s t i l l be c a r r i e d on i n
those respects although t h i s scheme cannot be l i m i t l e s s f o r defamation
damages, f o r example, should not f o r reasons of p o l i c y be paid out of a
s t a t e fund and c r i m i n a l penalties would riot be an appropriate s u b s t i t u t e )
but
i n p r i n c i p l e i t i s suggested that the advantages of a comprehensive
system of compensation such as that o u t l i n e d are great.
"We are now i n
England at the stage New Zealand had reached seven years ago when the
Woodhouse Committee reported.
Let us hope t h a t the Pearson Committee
w i l l have as b e n e f i c i a l r e s u l t s f o r our law as one a n t i c i p a t e s that the
Woodhouse Committee's w i l l have f o r the law i n New Zealand.
116.
CONCLUSIONS
1
1.
The r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher
as expounded by Blackburn J.
2
and modified on appeal by the House of Lords
was a new p r i n c i p l e
of lav/ not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the case lav; which preceded
2.
it.
For the r u l e t o apply there must be an escape o f o r caused by
the dangerous object from land under the c o n t r o l o f the defendant.
I n j u r i e s t o the person as well as i n j u r y t o property are actionable
per se under the r u l e .
3.
The escape must have taken place i n the course o f a non-natural
user o f the defendant's land.
The defendant can be l i a b l e under the
r u l e f o r things which are brought on t o h i s land or a r t i f i c i a l l y
created or c u l t i v a t e d there with h i s knowledge or through h i s negligence
but can not be l i a b l e f o r things n a t u r a l l y on the land v/hich r e s u l t i n
a spontaneous escape.
k.
The r u l e applies only t o something which i s l i k e l y t o do mischief i f
i t escapes.
Any object i s capable o f being dangerous and thus the true
d i s t i n c t i o n i s not between the dangerous and non-dangerous character o f
the t h i n g but between those circumstances i n which the defendant w i l l be
able t o deny the dangerous q u a l i t y i n h i s act and those i n which he w i l l
not.
5.
The r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher i s c e r t a i n l y not one o f absolute
l i a b i l i t y and can only w i t h d i f f i c u l t y be termed a r u l e of s t r i c t
liability.
I t s basis o f l i a b i l i t y now l i e s a t some stage i n between
the f a u l t concept found i n negligence and the r i s k concept o f s t r i c t
liability.
6.
The t o r t of negligence has recently shown signs of moving from a
f a u l t concept o f l i a b i l i t y i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a r i s k concept. Res
ipsa l o q u i t u r and the growth and increasing awareness o f the presence
1.
2.
1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265.
L.R. 3 H.L. 3 3 0 .
of insurance have played a leading p a r t i n t h i s s h i f t i n emphasis.
Today a powerful f e e l i n g i s developing t h a t compensation should
be a r i g h t of the i n j u r e d p a r t y . Loss d i s t r i b u t i o n between, members
of a section of society has become increasingly prevalent but the
system which i s becoming more and more favoured as the u l t i m a t e
answer t o the problem of compensation f o r accidents i n v o l v i n g personal
i n j u r y i s a system of f u l l and d i r e c t compensation payable t o the
v i c t i m without regard t o r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the accident.
A Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Pearson has
now been set up t o consider the whole question and i t s findings w i l l
have a great influence on the f u t u r e of a l l t o r t s of t h i s nature.
The r u l e i n Rylands v Fletcher has now been w i t h us f o r more than one
hundred years but the end of i t s existence as an independent p a r t of
the law of t o r t may now be i n s i g h t .
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L**-\J 1
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1
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1
1
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42 L.Q.R. 37
(1926)
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(1929)
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(1P47)
(1947)
(1948)
(1949)
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