Towards a unified theory
of task-specific motivation
Cornelis J. de Brabander
Rob L. Martens
Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Inhoudsopgave
Woord vooraf
3
Summary
4
Introduction
4
Theories of task-specific motivation
Self-determination theory
5
5
Flow theory
6
Expectancy-value theory of achievement motivation
Social cognitive theory
8
Theory of planned behavior
8
Person-object theory of interest
Integration
7
11
12
Affective and cognitive components
Person and context
12
18
Outline of a unified model of task-specific motivation (UMTM)
References
Colofon
22
24
28
Eerder verschenen rapporten en publicaties
29
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Woord vooraf
LOOK (Wetenschappelijk Centrum Leraren Onderzoek) van de Open Universiteit verricht
praktijkgericht wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar de professionalisering van, door en met leraren. Dit
onderzoek wordt uitgevoerd in nauwe samenwerking met de beroepsvereniging van leraren, de
Onderwijscoöperatie.
Om de bestaande kloof tussen onderwijsonderzoek en de -praktijk te overbruggen, geeft LOOK het
onderzoek vorm samen met leraren: co-creatie. Zij nemen actief deel aan het (reflecteren op)
onderzoek. Vier wetenschappelijke onderzoeksprogramma’s zijn hierbij leidend: Wat beweegt
leraren?, Sociaal leren, Reflection in action en Professionele identiteit.
Onze werkwijze is waardevol voor het gehele onderwijs: van wetenschap tot de dagelijkse praktijk.
Het leidt tot lokale oplossingen, tot praktische kennis en instrumenten die leraren kunnen gebruiken en
tot wetenschappelijke publicaties.
De voorliggende wetenschappelijke publicatie is een Engelstalige paper, gepresenteerd tijdens de
International Conference on Motivation, 28-30 augustus 2012 in Frankfurt am Main (Dld). Hierin
worden grove lijnen geschetst voor een mogelijke nieuwe ‘verenigde’ motivatietheorie, gebaseerd op
elementen uit bestaande motivatietheorieën. De focus ligt op taakspecifieke motivatie, dat wil zeggen
motivatie voor concrete (professionaliserings)activiteiten. Resultaat is een model waarin gevoel,
verstand en ervaren waardering cruciaal zijn. Leraren die plezier hebben bij het uitvoeren van
concrete taken, die weten dat die taken iets opleveren en die zich gesteund weten door hun
omgeving, zijn gemotiveerde leraren.
J.J.M. (Jos) Kusters Msm
Directeur LOOK
Open Universiteit
3
Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Cornelis J. de Brabander & Rob L. Martens
Open University of The Netherlands
Summary
In search of an integration of the scattered theoretical scene of motivational research we reviewed
existing theories to collect useful building blocks for a unified model of task-specific motivation
(UMTM). A conceptual analysis of extrinsic and intrinsic kinds of motives, seen by some as opposed
and by others as additive, lead us to adopt a third possible view on their relationship, originally
proposed by Krapp, namely as interacting, but fundamentally independent. Central components of the
UMTM are affective valences, feelings of liking and disliking, and cognitive valences, expectations of
positive and negative outcomes. Affective and cognitive valences are produced in separate, though
interacting processes and as a result can reinforce, but also undermine each other. Affective and
cognitive valences both are distinguished in positive and negative valences, leading to approach
respectively avoidance motivation. Cognitive valences are furthermore divided in personal and nonpersonal components. The intricate interaction of all these valences eventually produces a resultant
expected value that determines readiness for action. Affective and cognitive valences are influenced
by a complex of factors. Task-specific factors that generally are relevant are action autonomy, action
feasibility, and relatedness in the action context. Action autonomy and action feasibility are
distinguished in a personal and a contextual aspect. Furthermore, subjective norm, the tendency to
comply with normative views of other participants in the action context, is influenced by personal
sense of relatedness and in turn influences at least affective and cognitive valences.
Introduction
In the field of educational psychology, and not only there, we may notice a vast proliferation of theories
of motivation. These theories often partly overlap, sometimes implicitly, sometimes conceptually. All
this makes it difficult to derive conclusions or to combine insights derived from various studies in the
field of motivational science (for an overview see Boekaerts, Van Nuland, & Martens, 2010). At first
sight, theories appear to conflict in many ways. We think, however, that it is possible to reconcile these
apparent contradictory theories and to develop an outline of a unified model of task-specific motivation
(UMTM). That is precisely what this article attempts to do.
Since motivation is a very broad concept, the model proposed does not cover all aspects of motivation.
Its focus is restricted to task-specific aspects of motivation, that is, to motivation for rather concrete
action options that are available to the actor. The model does not refer in its current specification to
motivation for broad fields of action, like sport or mathematics, or as interest theorists (Renninger, Hidi,
& Krapp, 1992) would say, for personal interests, fields of interest that have a more enduring
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
significance for a person. It is limited to rather specific acts like reading job relevant books/papers or
preparing for a math test. Of course, that is not to say that more general interests have no impact on
motivation for specific acts. Furthermore, for the moment, we concentrate on motivation in foresight,
that is, on motivational processes that occur when people consider activities that are open to them in
the near future. We disregard motivational aspects that enter the game once the actor has decided to
engage in an activity. Neither do we pay attention to feedback loops, although, of course, these play
an important role in the build up of motivation for future activities. What we are trying to do here is to
develop a momentary picture of the global factors and their mutual relations that are the immediate
antecedents of the level of readiness for impending actions. Thus, we tried to put ourselves in a
favorable position to succeed in our effort to reconcile conflicting theories in an integrated framework.
Once this limited enterprise is completed, we may have a sound core for further extensions.
The constituent parts of our model stem from, or are inspired by several motivation theories, like selfdetermination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000a, 2000b), flow theory of
Csikszentmihalyi (1990), the person-object theory of interest proposed by Krapp (2002, 2005), socialcognitive theory of Bandura (1977, 1986, 1992, 1997), expectancy*value theory of achievement
motivation (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) and theory of planned behavior of Ajzen and Fishbein (Ajzen,
1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2008). Most of these theories have a broader scope, of course, than a welldefined activity in the near future, but we select from them what is relevant to our objective. First, we
will shortly describe the task-specific aspects of these theories to collect the building blocks of our
model. Secondly, we will discuss some crucial relations between these elements, in order to develop
an integral model of task-specific motivation in foresight.
Theories of task-specific motivation
Self-determination theory
Self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000b) is built on the dimension extrinsic versus intrinsic
motivation. As early as in the seventies of the previous century, Ryan and Decy, as founding authors,
observed that traditionally in education extrinsic sanctions, like grades or impositions, were widely
used as means to engage children into learning and, in addition, that this type of motivation produced
different adverse effects, like disinterest, superficial learning, quickly forgetting of what was learned
after administration of the accompanying reinforcement, and drop-out. This so-called extrinsic
motivation was contrasted with intrinsic motivation, which capitalizes on natural curiosity of the student:
a drive from within instead of external pressure. The positive effects of this type of motivation are
currently broadly agreed upon and are hardly subject to debate (e.g. Alexander & Murphy, 1998;
Brophy, 2004; Hidi, 2001, 2006; Martens, Gulikers & Bastiaens, 2004; Van Nuland, Dusseldorp,
Martens & Boekaerts, 2010).
According to self-determination theory, motivation is intrinsic when an activity is driven by inherent
satisfactions provided by the activity itself and not by an external positive or negative reward that is
contingent on completion of that activity. Motivation is extrinsic when an activity is done to acquire or
to avoid an outcome that is separable from the activity itself. The notion that students have an internal
need or drive to learn is associated with a very different philosophy of man than most parents or
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
teachers have. The student is not regarded as an empty vessel that needs to be filled up, but more as
a sponge that naturally sucks up the liquid that is available. The learning environment should prevent
any disturbances and has to provide enough ‘tasty’ liquid to enable the learning process to continue.
Deci and Ryan (2000) identify three basic psychological needs that must be met to foster intrinsic
motivation, namely the need for autonomy, competence and relatedness. Autonomy relates to the
absence of external forces and the opportunity to be self-responsible. Competence is connected to the
experience to undertake activities that are within the reach of a person’s capacity. Relatedness refers
to a feeling of being connected to the fellow humans that are part of the activity context.
Ryan and Deci (2000b) argue that extrinsic motivation emphasizes a separate reward, for instance a
grade, prestige, or a financial return. They stipulate, however, that not all forms of extrinsic motivation
are as sharply in contrast with intrinsic motivation. For instance, a person who is not interested in
French language as such, might be highly motivated to take a course French in order to fulfill his
deepest wish, namely to work in a French company. To counteract this problem self-determination
theory provides for a continuum of motivation types that is characterized by an increasing
internalization of an in principle extrinsic motive. At the lowest level the motive for action is purely
external: compulsive force or a fully unrelated reward. At the highest level the reward is also not an
inherent satisfaction by the activity itself, but this reward is optimally congruent with the goals that the
person endorses as totally compatible with his/her identity. A state of amotivation at one extreme and
a state of intrinsic motivation at the other complete this one-dimensional scale of motivation.
Flow theory
Flow is a phenomenon that everybody knows by personal experience, namely being completely
absorbed in an activity, forgetting time and all things around you. This state of utmost concentration is
characterized by a loss of self-consciousness in the sense that the person becomes one with his or
her activity. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) established this commonly known experience as an object of
scrutiny. In a sequence of studies flow was explored. LeFevre (1988) revealed, for instance, that flow,
in contrast to what intuitively might be assumed, occurs more frequently under work than under leisure
conditions. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) theorized that flow comes about when an activity represents a
challenge to the person and the performance of this activity is within the reach of his/her competence.
Level of challenge and level of competence roughly define four types of states (Table 1). Flow arises
from a high challenge and a high level of competence. However, when no challenge is present and the
level of competence is low, the person is sentenced to apathy. When the challenge is low, but the
level of competence is high, the person is likely to experience boredom. And a high challenge and a
low level of competence is a frightening combination. Unfortunately, Csikszentmihalyi appointed level
of challenge and level of competence as defining elements of the flow construct. To our understanding,
challenge and competence are causal factors and, consequently, flow should be understood as the
state of highest concentration that springs from them.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Table 1
Possible states produced by level of challenge and level of competence.
challenge
low
high
high
boredom
flow
low
apathy
anxiety
competence
To investigate flow, Csikszentmihalyi developed the Experience Sampling Method (ESM). Participants
receive a pager that signals at predefined moments, when they have to fill out a questionnaire. This
questionnaire contains various questions, of which we mention (in relation to our enterprise) the most
important. In the first place the subject has to describe the activity (s)he was engaged in at the specific
point in time when the pager signaled. Second, (s)he is asked to indicate to what extent this activity
was challenging and how competent (s)he felt at it. The flow index is determined as the geometric
mean of both estimates (square root of the product of challenge and competence). Furthermore,
questions are presented with respect to the subject’s emotional state, level of intrinsic motivation, level
of concentration, and, surprisingly, the relevance of the activity for future goals.
Expectancy-value theory of achievement motivation
Expectancy-value theories of motivation explain motivation essentially from two factors, namely
expectancies about the performance of an activity and expectancies about the value of its outcomes.
In expectancy-value theory of achievement motivation (Wigfield and Eccles, 2000), the expectancy
part is distinguished in ability beliefs, defined as the individual’s perception of his/her competence for
an activity, and expectancy of success, defined as the estimate of doing well on an activity in the
future. However, Wigfield and Eccless notice that empirically these constructs appear not to be
distinguishable (p. 74). Expectancy is in principle task-specific, but the level of specificity can vary.
The value aspect (subjective task value) is also distinguished in different facets: attainment value,
intrinsic value, utility value, and cost. Attainment value is defined as the importance of doing well on a
given task. As such, this aspect of subjective task value seems to be connected to the identity of the
person: attainment value becomes higher when performing a task is more strongly connected to one’s
identity. Intrinsic value is the enjoyment one gains from doing a task. Utility value refers to the
relevance of an accomplishment for future activities. Wigfield and Eccles explicitly refer to the
resemblance of intrinsic value and utility value with the concepts of intrinsic respectively extrinsic
motivation of self-determination theory, but seemingly do not suffer from cognitive dissonance as a
result of that comparison. Cost refers to the load of emotional and other resources taken up by a task
and the exclusion of alternative options for action. In the research based on this conceptualization the
cost aspect is seldom referred to. In confirmatory factor analyses, the remaining three aspects proved
to be empirically distinct, though younger children usually don not differentiate yet attainment value
and utility value. Though being different variants of value, all are considered to represent value of
outcomes and therefore they simply add up to a total value.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Social cognitive theory
Bandura (1986, p. 409) rejected expectancy*value theories because of its supposedly Tolmanian roots,
which is to say that the concept of outcome expectancy was developed to explain how animals learn
to solve mazes. In contrast Bandura proposes self-efficacy as the chief factor in motivated behavior,
because humans in contrast to animals have a possibility to reflect on what they can or cannot do. In
an earlier presentation of his social cognitive theory, Bandura (1977, p. 193) distinguishes between
efficacy expectation and outcome expectancy. Outcome expectancy is defined as a person’s estimate
that a given behavior will lead to certain outcomes. An efficacy expectation on the other hand is a
conviction that the person can successfully execute the behavior required to produce the outcomes.
Bandura (1997) criticizes expectancy*value theorists to have focused on outcome expectations,
whereas efficacy expectations are more predictive of choice and performance. Also the valuing of the
outcomes remains implicit in his definitions. Nevertheless, Bandura’s conceptualization is still another
representative of expectancy*value theory. Bandura underplays the role of outcome expectancies, but
they are distinguished from efficacy expectations: “In social, intellectual, and physical pursuits, those
who judge themselves highly efficacious will expect favourable outcomes, self-doubters will expect
mediocre performances of themselves and thus negative outcomes.” (Bandura, 1986, p. 392). Thus,
Bandura supposes a sequence of efficacy expectations that determine outcome expectations, which in
turn determine behavior.
Theory of planned behavior
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) of Ajzen and Fishbein (Ajzen, 1991) is the third branch on the
expectancy*value theory tree. This theory offers a fruitful perspective on behavioral change (Ajzen,
2001; Armitage & Conner, 2001). We will spend relatively more space to this theory, in the first place
because the theory is complex, and in the second place because some characteristics, especially of
operationalized variables in the theory, play a pivotal role in the development of our unified model.
According to TPB, behavioral intentions are affected by three factors: attitude toward the behavior,
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. A concise summary of the theory is presented in
Figure 1. To understand the theory, it is important to realize that its origin lies in research on the
problematic relationship between attitude and behavior. An attitude toward behavior is conceived as
the subjective value of likely outcomes of that behavior. Every behavior has multiple consequences. A
subjective probability that the behavior will have that consequence is linked to each of them.
Furthermore, every consequence has a subjective value. True to expectancy*value tradition (Vroom,
1964) the attitude toward a behavior is proportional to the sum of products of subjective probability
and subjective value across all consequences. In a typical TPB-study, important consequences that
respondents associate with an attitude object are inventoried in a pilot investigation. In a main
investigation, these outcomes are then rated on a 7-point scale according to how probable they are
and how valuable. An attitude measure is obtained by summing the products of probability and value
per outcome. In addition the attitude is measured globally. For that purpose often a semantic
differential is used with bipolar items such as: bad – good, harmful – beneficial, useless – useful,
unpleasant – pleasant, unenjoyable – enjoyable, and boring – exciting. A global attitude score is
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
calculated as the mean score on these items. A validation of the multiplicative measure of attitude is
given by the correlation with this global measure.
Figure 1 Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 2006)
Attitude toward a behavior is just one factor that influences behavioral intentions. Subjective norm and
perceived behavioral control are two other factors that determine the development of intentions to
perform behaviors. These two concepts are also explained as multiplicative relationships between
more elementary constructs. Subjective norm results from normative beliefs and the tendency to
comply with them. Normative beliefs represent the perceived likelihood that important others would
approve or disapprove of a given behavior. Important others can be, for instance, friends, parents,
spouse, colleagues, in short any referent or group of referents whose relationship with the actor is
meaningful in the performance context. Perceived likelihood is expressed as a proportional value for
each relevant referent. Next, the actor connects to each referent also a specific tendency to comply
with his or her approval. Subjective norm is then defined as a sum of tendencies to comply with
individual referents, proportional to their corresponding likelihoods of approval. In practice, each
referent’s likelihood of approval is multiplied with the actor’s corresponding tendency to comply and
subjective norm is directly proportional to the sum of these products. Usually, also a global measure of
subjective norm is obtained by asking respondents to rate the extent to which important others would
approve or disapprove of their performing a given behavior.
The third factor that determines the evolvement of behavioral intentions deals with the presence or
absence of requisite resources and opportunities. Again, this factor, perceived behavioral control, is
conceptualized as products of likelihood beliefs and corresponding valuations. In this case likelihood
beliefs are about the presence of opportunities and impediments and the valuation aspect involves the
power of a control factor to facilitate or inhibit performance of the behavior. Multiplying each belief by
perceived power of a control factor and summing across all control factors results in a measure that is
directly proportional to perceived behavioral control. Of course, a global measure is also possible and
simply involves an assessment of the ease or difficulty of engaging in an activity. Control factors can
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
be external (action opportunities, dependency on other people, obstacles in the context, time
restrictions) as well as internal (knowledge and skills, intellectual capacities, emotional stability,
anxiety). In the literature about the theory of planned behavior frequently comparisons are made with
the self-efficacy concept of Bandura (Ajzen, 2002; Bandura, 1992). Ajzen (1991, p. 184) more or less
equates perceived behavioral control to self-efficacy. Conner and Armitage (2001) claim that selfefficacy emphasizes internal factors, whereas perceived behavioral control, though broadly defined, in
practical application appears to stress external factors. We encounter here a variation on the
distinction between personal and contextual efficacy as advocated by De Brabander, Rozendaal, and
Martens (2009).
Although a full scale application of the theory of planned behavior requires an elaborate measurement
procedure to obtain an estimate of the three factors attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral
control with respect to specific behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fisbein, 2008), studies using global and
extremely short inquiries to measure the three factors are not uncustomary either. Bamberg, Ajzen,
and Schmidt (2003, p. 178), for instance, measure attitude toward behavior simply by two items: “For
me, to [perform a specific behavior] would be good – bad” and “For me, to [perform a specific behavior]
would be pleasant – unpleasant”. Responses are collected on a 5-point scale. Subjective norm is also
measured with two items: “Most people who are important to me would support my [specific behavior]”
and “Most people who are important to me think that I should [perform a specific behavior]”, followed
by a 5-point scale with endpoints labeled likely and unlikely. And perceived behavioral control again
was assessed with two items using a 5-point scale: “For me to [perform a specific behavior] would be
easy – difficult” and “My freedom to [perform a specific behavior] is high – low”. This last question
might very much surprise a follower of self-determination theory. What is relevant here, however, is
that a TPB-study does not necessarily involve a complex procedure, which is the more reassuring,
because the expectation*value formulations of the TPB-constructs are not straightforward (Ajzen,
1991; Ajzen & Fisbein, 2008).
Problematic in this theory, to our opinion, is the relation between likelihood estimates of behavioral
consequences (outcomes) and perceived behavioral control. To understand these notions it is
important to keep in mind their origin. The theory of planned behavior was developed to explain the
problematic relation between attitude and behavior. This relation shortly entails that people often do
not act in agreement with their attitude. Attitude objects were often taken from some ongoing social
debate like abortion, race discrimination or global warming. Taking global warming as an example, the
attitude is defined as products of beliefs about likelihood of outcomes like rising see level, expansion
of subtropical deserts, and more frequent occurrence of extreme weather conditions, with their
valuation. In the theory of planned behavior, which succeeded the theory of reasoned action,
perceived behavioral control was introduced, because intentions could only find expression in
behavior if that behavior is under volitional control (Ajzen, 1991). The relation between beliefs about
the likelihood of outcomes and perceived behavioral control becomes problematic, when not an issue
in a social debate, but a person’s activity is taken as attitude object. If we take sport activities as an
example, relevant outcomes are for instance weight control, physical fitness and good health. In this
case the likelihood of these outcomes is dependent on perceived behavioral control: internal and
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
external resources and opportunities the person sees at his/her disposal to actually bring forth these
outcomes. This conceptual problem is only resolvable by an adjustment of the theory. For our purpose,
we will solve it by loosening the tight bonds of the expectancy*value construct, which is already
provided for by the more global attitude measure by means of a semantic differential.
Person-object theory of interest
Person-object theory of interest (Krapp, 2002, 2005) defines interest as a relational concept: interest is
a specific relationship between a person and an object in his or her life space. This object can refer to
concrete things, but also to a topic, an abstract idea or any other cognitively represented content. This
relationship can be conceived of as a focused attention to and/or engagement with the affordances of
a particular content (Hidi, Renninger, & Krapp, 2004). An interest can vary in broadness (for instance
light refraction by lenses versus understanding physics) and in stability (momentary versus lifelong).
Interest researchers distinguish between situational and personal or individual interest. A situational
interest is primarily caused by factors external to the individual, whereas an individual interest stems
from internal factors. This distinction does not coincide with a distinction between state and trait: a
working interest as a state may be induced both by situational conditions and by individual interest.
Krapp (2002, p. 388) distinguishes two facets of an interest. Any interest, whether situational or
individual, is composed of value-related and feeling-related valences. Value-related valences refer to
the personal significance of an interest. An activity gains in value to the extent its goals and intentions
are relevant to his or her personal identity. Feeling-related valences refer to the experiential states
while being engaged in an activity: feelings of pleasure en being focused. Krapp refers explicitly to
flow as an extreme form of positive feeling. Of course, also the resemblance with intrinsic motivation
as defined in self-determination theory has not escaped him.
As a foundation for the two facets of interest Krapp (2002, p. 401) postulates the existence of two
interacting but separate systems of behavior regulation. The first is said – rather oddly – to have a
strong biological component. It is based on emotions that provide the individual immediate feedback in
dealing with the requirements of his or her action situation. The action tendencies that arise from this
regulation system may become subject to critical reflection, but they do not require conscious and
active self-regulation. The second system is cognitive and conscious by nature. This system is
responsible for the cognitive-analytic development of behavioral intentions. Since time immemorial,
common sense provided labels for these two systems: heart and brain, feeling and knowing.
The two regulation systems are fundamentally independent. To what extent an activity provokes
positive feelings is not necessarily related to the cognized value that is assigned to it and vice versa.
In general, however, positive feelings will be coupled with high value expectations and negative
feelings with low value expectations. But conflicts between feelings and value expectations are by no
means exceptional. It might be hypothesized that positive feelings and low valuation are not a problem
to the individual, unless under conditions of time pressure. Another case, however, is the combination
of negative feelings and high values, which, as all of us know from personal experience, is not
uncommon in educational settings: in this case high valuation might still lead to behavioral intentions,
but only by way of exception to persistent behavior.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Krapp engages in theorizing about the development of interests en tries to relate the “concertation”
between situational and personal interest to the development of a personal identity. In this endeavor
several questions are addressed like, whether the development of stable interests is stage bound, or
how and under what conditions situational interests actually evolve into personal interests.
Integration
We compiled the inventory of motivational concepts and notions as summarized above to collect the
building blocks for a unifying theory of task-specific motivation. This integration is shaped by a critical
reflection of two central problems: the relation between affect and cognition, and between person and
environment.
Affective and cognitive components
The theories that passed in review are sometimes categorized in ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ theories. Selfdetermination theory and flow theory belong to the first group, and the expectancy*value theories to
the second. Person-object theory of interest is generally categorized as a ‘hot’ theory, but actually
proposes an integration of both. The difference is that ‘hot’ theories emphasize affective experiences
of an activity, namely being interested and having pleasure while performing, whereas ‘cold’ theories
stress rational reflection on consequences of an activity.
Our tour of inspection revealed, interestingly, that virtually no ‘one-sided’ theory did escape from giving
space to the neglected or less emphasized aspect. Self-determination theory poses that intrinsic
motivation is the ultimate driving force of motivated action, but creates an elaborate structure of
extrinsic motivation categories to be able to keep apart detrimental from less detrimental, or even
beneficial extrinsic motives. Flow theory does officially not refer to ‘cold’ aspects of motivation, but in
the Experience Sampling Method, the research instrument that represents the flow paradigm, the
subject is asked about the significance of current activities for future goals. Social cognitive theory
discards outcome expectations as unimportant, and consequently does not pay attention to the nature
of outcomes, but in the examples of outcomes that are used in theoretical argumentations all kind of
outcomes are represented, affective experiences as well as cognized consequences.
Expectancy*value theory of achievement motivation addresses affective aspects explicitly, but simply
as just another kind of (cognitive) subjective value.
The theory of planned behavior provides also a very illustrative case. Ajzen (1991, p. 200) states that
in the theory of reasoned action (which is extended subsequently into the theory of planned behavior)
there is no clear distinction between affective and evaluative responses with respect to a given
behavior. Nevertheless, he immediately goes on to report on a study in which the relation between the
two is further investigated. The semantic differential that is customarily used as a global attitude
measure, contains bipolar scales that clearly classify either as “affective” (pleasant – unpleasant) or
“evaluative” (good – bad). Based on factor analysis two global attitude measures were built: one
affective and the other evaluative. Furthermore, salient consequences of behavior that – using the
standard TPB-procedure of a pilot study in which respondents generated possible outcomes of the
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
behavior under study – were incorporated in the investigation, could also be classified as more
affective or more evaluative. With respect to spending time at the beach, for instance, “developing skin
cancer” and “meeting people of the opposite sex” were assessed as evaluative, while “feeling the heat
and sun on your body” and “watching and listening to the ocean” were identified as more affective. By
means of the standard multiplicative procedure, two summative attitude measures were constructed
based on this distinction, an affective version and an evaluative version. Global and summative
attitude measures turned out to correlate significantly and substantially only when of corresponding
nature. We may conclude, therefore, that, at least implicitly, also the theory of planned behavior,
although categorized as a cognitively oriented theory, includes both affective experiences and
valuated consequences as motivating factors. For our argument, furthermore, is relevant that,
according to the study referred to here, affective experience and evaluated consequences at least to
some extent are independent. The appearance of affective and cognitive components in different
theories is concisely summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Comparison of central concepts in motivation theories.
Theory
Social cognitive theory
Self-determination theory
Expectancy*value theory of achievement motivation
Person-object theory of interest
Flow theory
Theory of planned action
“hot” notions
“cold” notions
outcome expectancies
intrinsic motivation
extrinsic motivation
intrinsic value
attainment value, utility value, cost
feeling-related valence value-related valence
flow
importance to future goals
affective judgments
evaluative judgments
The reader might surmise that our argumentation is moving towards a conception of affective and
cognitive aspects of motivation neither as opposed endpoints on a single dimension nor as additive
components, but as relatively independent factors. Before we arrive at such a definite conclusion, we
have to deal with the emphatic claim of self-determination theory that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
are each other’s opposites and with the more implicit additive hypothesis of expectancy*value theories.
Most of the arguments we have to offer run counter to both hypotheses. We start however with the
opposition between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
We attributed the origin of the oppositional interpretation of self-determination theory to the disclosure
by self-determination researchers of the detrimental effects of sheer pressure and completely
unrelated rewards that were (and are) typical in traditional educational practices and the beneficial
effects when people learn out of interest. As noted at the start of our enterprise, the validity of these
insights is since the seventies of the previous century frequently and sufficiently confirmed and is
hardly open for debate any more. However opposing effects do not also imply conceptual opposition.
And three lines of argument will lead us to conceptual independence.
The first part of our argumentation is theoretical. In self-determination theory intrinsic motivation is
defined as motivation that flows from the inherent satisfaction that stems from performing an activity.
Furthermore, strictly speaking, no consequence that is separable from the activity proper may play a
role in the motivation for that activity. In the first place it remains in the dark what “inherent” might
mean and what should be understood under “satisfaction”. Taking a closer look at the origin of our
pleasure in an activity quickly reveals that the inherent satisfaction of doing an activity is not
necessarily a unitary construct. It is possible to like different aspects of, for instance, playing tennis:
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
the effort and exhaustion, the ability to place a ball exactly at an particular spot in the court, putting
your opponent on the wrong leg, playing in a team, etc. And indeed, people apparently value (!) these
different aspects differently. Therefore, what in the self-determination theory passes for inherent
satisfaction of doing an activity very well may be a composite of distinguishable elements. However,
as soon as these different satisfying components are identified, they turn out to be extrinsic motivators,
because now that activity appears to be done to acquire separable outcomes. And consequently,
intrinsic motivation is vanishing out of sight. So it is unclear what it could mean that an activity is done
for its own sake. To say it differently, when an activity is satisfying, then there also need to be some
need and the satisfaction of that need is separable from the activity itself. A better understandable way
of conceptualizing therefore, would be to say that an activity gives rise both to feelings and to thoughts
which simply coexist.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the second requirement, that no consequence that is separable from the
activity itself may play a role in the motivation for that activity, could ever be met. A large part of what
is moving humans is hidden for consciousness. Recently, a body of research, for instance, is
published on goal contagion. This research evidenced that people, without being aware, adopt goals
that are prevalent in their social environment and that these subconscious goals guide action in the
same way as consciously chosen goals would (for an overview see Eren, 2009). Goals adopted from
the social context would certainly be categorized as extrinsic, and they appear to be intrinsic only as
long as the actor does not realize their hidden existence.
Indeed, it is not difficult to bring up examples of cases in which people affectively are strongly involved
in an activity and only much later become aware of ‘separable consequences’ that contributed
significantly to their spending of effort. Imagine, for instance, the anecdotal, but nevertheless true story
of a shy young man, gifted with a talent for piano playing. There is no reason to doubt why he would
not experience a lot of pleasure while playing the piano. Otherwise it would have been very difficult for
him to persist in mastering complex techniques to become a proficient player. However, presumably
equally valid is his personal conclusion as an adult that in hindsight his persistence partly stemmed
from a desire to impress women with his fabulous play, which eventually would entice one of them to
swim in his arms. Equally easy to imagine are cases in which expected and intended profits contribute
to positive feelings while acting. Classical in this context is the fictitious example of a share broker at
the stock exchange. Trading profit is the separable consequence par excellence. Nevertheless, there
is basically nothing that inhibits a share broker to like his job and the activities it calls for, indeed very,
very much.
According to this line of argument then, intrinsic motivation as defined in self-determination theory is, if
not conceptually weak, at least unworkable: it is impossible to determine in any concrete situation
whether the condition of pure intrinsic motivation is actually a matter of fact. And, indeed, when it
comes to concrete investigations, intrinsic motivation is simply operationalized as feelings of pleasure
while acting, and the concomitant criterion of the absence of extrinsic motives is dropped. Of course,
this is not an argument to disregard intrinsic motivation in its entirety. On the contrary, feelings of
pleasure play a pivotal role in motivation. A better way of conceptualizing is to characterize them
simply as such: feelings about doing an activity, that exist next to thoughts about outcomes.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
A second and persuasive argument stems from neuroanatomical research. Already in the second half
of the previous century, evidence is brought forward about separate brain structures for affect and
cognition (Zajonc, 1984). Recent neuro-imaging research convincingly supports the existence of two
separate regulation systems. With respect to cognition, in the context of this research labeled
“cognitive control”, Van Leijenhorst (2009, p. 10) refers among others to estimating the probability of
positive and negative outcomes and weighing the potential benefit against negative consequences.
For cognitive control, cortical regions like the prefrontal and the parietal cortex appear to be the most
important brain structures. Affect, on the other hand, is associated with “reward” and “motivation
systems” as they are labeled in neuro-imaging research and these systems rely on subcortical
(evolutionary older) regions, like the amygdala, the nucleus accumbens and the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. Of course, these descriptions are too rough to do justice to the very complicated
processes that take place in the brain, but they strongly favor the hypothesis of interacting, but
basically separate regulation systems. A corroboration of their independence is served by research on
risky behavior of adolescents. This research indicates that the protracted development of cognitive
capacity to value consequences of activities is accompanied by a heightened sensitivity to rewards
during adolescence. This hazardous combination lures adolescents easily into apparently attractive
situations of which they are yet unable to foresee the (possibly detrimental) consequences (Van
Leijenhorst, 2009). For our argument it is relevant that different developmental paths almost by
necessity imply separate regulation systems.
A last argument is also empirical. In all investigations that we know of, in which expected profit from an
activity is related to pleasure of doing an activity, there is always a positive correlation between the
two. That is why, for instance, Wigfield and Eccles (2000) were able to identify intrinsic value and
utility value as to some extent different components that, however, both contribute to subjective task
value. When empirically extrinsic and intrinsic motivation correlate substantially, it is difficult to stick to
a conceptual opposition.
The remedy of self-determination theory for this problem is to split up the scale of extrinsic versus
intrinsic motivation in two parts: controlled motivation, comprising external regulation and introjected
regulation, and autonomous motivation, comprising intrinsic regulation and identified regulation, which
is the ‘highest’ level of extrinsic motivation (Vansteenkiste, Sierens, Soenens, Luyckx, & Lens, 2009).
According to this view, identified regulation implies that an activity has personal significance, which is
why people experience a sense of psychological freedom while acting. However, identified regulation
still is a suboptimal type of motivation, because only intrinsic motivation “is fully autonomous or selfdetermined” (p. 672). We have no problems with all the beneficial effects of the so-called autonomous
motivation the authors refer to. However, their conceptual manipulations fail to address the opposition
between different types of regulation fundamentally. The differences between them are simply blurred.
In conclusion, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation cannot be conceptualized as opposing endpoints on
one single dimension. Likely, connected to each and every activity are both a feeling about doing it
and a valuation of expected consequences. The person-object theory of interest (Krapp, 2002) already
traced both aspects back to two basically independent systems of behavior regulation. Following
Krapp, we will define the two aspects as two separate constructs, that one could label intrinsic
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
respectively extrinsic motivation. However, to avoid unwanted connotations and to be more precise
about them, we prefer labels inspired by Krapp: affective and cognitive valences. Affective valence is
defined as the total amount of pleasure one expects to experience when doing an activity. Affective
valence arises from an emotional behavior regulation system. Affective valence appears as a certain
level of liking to do an activity. It is an automatic (unavoidable) and mechanical, that is unintentional
response to an action ‘object’ the person apperceives. Any action that comes to mind immediately
brings about a feeling about that action. The important characteristic of affective valence is not that the
action has no reason or function, but that its reason or function is not necessarily consciously known
and regularly is not known or not consciously present. Cognitive valence, on the other hand, implies
an articulation and valuation of expected consequences of activities once they are performed.
Cognitive valences are explicit and brought about by active reflection of the prospective actor. The
quality of cognitive valences, of course, depends on the actor’s anticipatory competence and his
experience with a specific field of action. Affective and cognitive valences of a course of action are in
principle independent, but, because the two systems interact, they will empirically correspond
substantially. In the first place there is no reason why affective valence and cognitive valence would
be incongruent and, most of the time, what one (dis)likes to do will also be (un)profitable. In the
second place the need for closure and meaning not seldom will induce people to rationalize (the lack
of) affective valences into (the lack of) cognitive valences. Incongruities between affective and
cognitive valences, however, are equally possible. Any person knows instances of actions that are not
profitable or even harmful, but are very attractive. And the other way around, any person who has
experienced our educational system, knows that some activities are utterly boring, but promise
unprecedented profit.
Expectancy*value theories presume that affective and cognitive aspects of subjective value are
variants of the same process, which simply add up to a total subjective value. Indeed, affective and
cognitive valences eventually lead to a resultant value that is the immediate antecedent of readiness
for action, but the examples given above clarify that this resultant value is produced by at least two
different processes and is therefore not a simple addition. The resultant value of a high affective
valence and a low cognitive valence is different from the resultant value of a low affective valence and
a high cognitive valence.
Thus, produced by separate but interacting behavior regulation systems, the specific configuration of
affective and cognitive valences connected to a course of action produce a specific resultant value,
which we label as the expected value of that course of action. Expected value is high when both
affective valence and cognitive valence are strong, and low when both are weak. When affective or
cognitive valence is weak, but the other strong, expected value will be mitigated accordingly, but the
absence of affective valence presumably will have a stronger effect. Expected value roughly
corresponds to attitude in the theory of planned behavior, subjective task value in the
expectancy*value theory of achievement motivation, outcome expectancy in social cognitive theory
and to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in self-determination theory. There is no direct partner in flow
theory, presumably because flow is not an expectation, but an actual state.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
There is much left to be studied and theorized about valences. Neither affective valence nor cognitive
valence is necessarily a unitary construct. Action schemes are multifaceted. They contain certain
activities, but also goals. The same activity can serve different goals for different persons or for the
same person at different times. A cyclist can, for instance, drive around in the mountains during his
whole vacation to enjoy sweeping panoramic vistas or all the same to enjoy his athletic power.
Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, a.o. (2004) convincingly show that, when framing students with different
types of goals for a study course on recycling, the quality of goals matters for the resulting motivation:
framing in terms of community contribution alone proved to increase motivation more than framing in
terms of monetary benefit or framing in terms of both types of goals. There is also ample evidence for
the fact that the promise of unrelated rewards to be earned by performing an otherwise interesting
activity actually diminishes (‘intrinsic’) motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 2001). We agree that these
findings contradict the additive hypothesis of intrinsic value and utility value in expectancy*value
theory, however, they neither favor unequivocally the opposition hypothesis of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation held by self-determination theory. These findings can be explained very well within the
framework of affective and cognitive valences as resulting from relatively independent regulation
systems. They make it perfectly clear, however, that combinations of different types of goals have
different effects on expected value.
A related argument stems from the difference between approach and avoidance motivation (Elliot,
2006; Elliot & Church, 1997). This contrast actually refers to the possibility of valences to be negative,
thus far not explicitly addressed in our argumentation. Negative valences call for activities that promise
to escape their realization. In contrast, positive valences call for activities that promise to realize them.
Approach and avoidance motivation are believed to be managed by “two partially distinct selfregulatory systems” (Carver, 2006, p. 105). Carver also refers to speculations during the forties and
fifties of the previous century that these systems are based on different structures in the nervous
system, at the moment still the more favorite hypothesis, though as yet only partially supported in the
literature (Elliot & Covington, 2001). Also the effects of the two types of motivation are very different.
Avoidance motivated action can maximally result in maintenance of the status quo and is generally
stressful, whereas approach motivated action leads to enrichment and is generally pleasant (Carver,
2006). Combining the distinction between approach and avoidance motivation with the proposed
distinction between affective and cognitive valences allows for four relatively independent forms of
behavior regulation (Table 3): approach motivation for positive affective valences and also for positive
cognitive valences and avoidance motivation for negative affective valences and for negative cognitive
valences. This conceptualization implies that it might be necessary to split up both affective valence
and cognitive valence in two aspects: level of positive valence and level of negative valence. There is
not a single dimension from positive to negative, but there are two dimensions: level of positive
valence, from neutral to high, and level of negative valence, also from neutral to high. And these
dimensions are relatively independent. Such a conceptualization is very much compatible with the
notion of multiple consequences (including costs!) combining into cognitive valence of an act or a
course of action. And as noted above, affective valence presumably also has multiple aspects. Some
aspects of an act may be pleasurable, where other aspects may be less pleasurable and even
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
unpleasant (in varying degrees). This fourfold conceptualization thus promises to be a strong
competitor in the explanation of complex motivational phenomena.
Table 3
Fourfold classification of valences.
cognitive
affective
approach
level of positive valence
level of positive valence
avoidance
level of negative valence
level of negative valence
Person and context
With respect to the conditions that are conducive to motivated action, self-determination theory
appears the most complete. From this theory we adopt three psychological needs as important factors
that determine motivated action: the need for autonomy, the need for competence, and the need for
relatedness. It is important to realize that we restrict our discussion to the task-specific level. There is
presumably a lot to theorize on the relation of competence, autonomy and relatedness with motivation
in general, but that is outside the scope of the present article. Krapp (2005) also accommodates these
needs as determining factors in his person-object theory of interest. In expectancy*value theories only
competence is explicitly addressed. Expected competence is in all these theories basic to valuation of
(outcomes of) activities. Here and there however, scrutinizing operationalized variables, we observe
references to other constructs as well. In an example of an investigation in the theory of planned
behavior paradigm we notice the question whether the respondent’s freedom to exhibit the target
behavior is high or low (Bamberg, Ajzen, & Schmidt, 2003, p. 178). The authors place this question
under the umbrella of perceived behavioral control, a concept that is related to competence. Selfdetermination theory, of course, would classify this question under the autonomy construct. To clarify
these and other obscurities in the conditions that influence motivated action, it is necessary to
distinguish between conditions internal and conditions external to the prospective actor. Successively
we discuss the task-specific aspects of competence, autonomy and relatedness.
Expected feasibility
We rename competence in advance to expected feasibility to reflect the distinction between person
and context. For any pursuit, it is a prerequisite that the person thinks it is possible to accomplish it
successfully. Naturally, one is inclined to think in the first place of the personal capacities that are
relevant to a course of action. And in most investigations exclusively this personal competence is
taken into consideration. However, judgment of the possibility to succeed does not only depend on
personal capacities, but also on arrangements in the context: are the circumstances favorable or are
there any obstacles that block or hinder a certain course of action. The two estimates are very
different and have different consequences, for instance in terms of attribution. Perceived behavioral
control in the theory of planned action (Ajzen, 1991) explicitly deals with all factors that are relevant
and not only with personal capacities. In the context of education, De Brabander, Rozendaal, and
Martens (2009) advocate the necessity to distinguish perceived efficacy in personal efficacy and
organizational efficacy. Personal efficacy matches with the usual question: does the person feel
capable to complete this activity successfully. Organizational efficacy refers to the capacity of the
organizational context to facilitate successful performance. Their investigation evidences that
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
organizational efficacy is distinct from personal efficacy. In an other analysis of efficacy expectancies
of primary teachers and principals Imants and de Brabander (1996) showed that the distinction
between personal and school efficacy sheds an interesting light on the position of male versus female
teachers and of teachers versus principals with respect to instructional and school-related tasks: the
proportional relation between both types of efficacy expectancies for different type of tasks appeared
very different in different groups. It is necessary, therefore, to define feasibility as a complex of two
aspects. The first aspect is a personal part, personal sense of competence, describing the extent to
which one estimates oneself capable of successfully performing an action scheme. The other aspect
is contextual and is identified as sense of external support: the extent one expects the context to
facilitate the performance of an action scheme. Expected feasibility is the resultant of both estimates in
which presumably personal feeling of competence is more important than sense of external support.
Autonomy
The distinction between person and context is also helpful to the conceptualization of autonomy. With
respect to this distinction, the majority of investigations neglects at the operational level not the
contextual aspect but the personal aspect. Though the concept of autonomy generally is defined in
personal terms (for instance as the extent to which one experiences oneself as the origin of one’s
behavior), measurement of autonomy is most of the time based on questions about the freedom one
has to act as one likes to do. Such questions, however, do not refer to personal autonomy, but to the
perception of the level of autonomy that is granted by the context. Reeve, Nix, and Hamm (2003, p.
376-377) even distinguish three aspects of the autonomy construct: locus of causality, will, and
perceived choice. Locus of causality can be internal or external and refers to the question whether a
person’s behavior is seen as initiated and regulated by a personal or an environmental force. The
second aspect is volition. Volition centers on how free versus forced people feel while doing what they
want to do, or while refraining from what they do not want to do. The third aspect is perceived choice,
which refers to the perception of the extent the environment affords the individual with decisionmaking flexibility and opportunities to choose among options. The difference between locus of
causality and volition is easiest to illustrate by the case of an addiction: the regulating force is internal,
but volition is certainly not free. A series of investigations of the relations between these concepts and
intrinsic motivation as conceived and measured in the tradition of self-determination theory, showed
that locus of causality and volition contributed to the personal aspect of autonomy, but that perceived
choice did not. In not yet published research of our own, in which a distinction was made between
sense of autonomy and sense of freedom of action, a regression analysis showed that sense of
freedom of action did not contribute uniquely to the prediction of reported interest, although bivariate
correlations of both variables with interest were substantial.
The necessity to divide autonomy into three aspects is doubtful, however. In the structural equations
models that Reeve, Nix, and Hamm (2003) used to analyze the relations between their three aspects
of autonomy, they employed a priori-measures as indicators of the three autonomy aspects. The
question remains open as to whether a confirmatory factor analysis indeed would have confirmed
these three factors. And if so, whether that might have been caused by distinctive item-formulations.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
And, concluding, it is possible that the concept of volition in its operationalized form was degraded into
a hybrid concept, because of the use of elements both of locus of causality and perceived choice in
one item: “While…., I felt a relaxed sense of personal freedom”, “During …., I felt free” and “During ….,
I felt pressured”. Conceptually the distinction between locus of causality and volition may be
sustainable. It is possible, after all, to establish whether the force that initiates and regulates an activity
is internal or external and to investigate in a second step whether this force can be diagnosed as
pressure-free volition. However, whether this is functional to do, is another matter. A more useful
conceptualization of the personal aspect of autonomy is volition as such: is an activity initiated and
regulated by a force that represents the individual’s personality or any other external or internal force
the person feels subject to.
We restrict our concept of autonomy to two aspects: personal sense of autonomy defined as the
extent to which one experiences oneself as origin in choosing and performing an action scheme and
sense of freedom of action as the extent to which one experiences liberty to take decisions about
selection and performance of an action scheme. The relation between both aspects is not the same as
between personal sense of competence and expected external support, where both are needed to
allow successful performance. Of course, in a context where freedom of action is completely and
always absent it would be difficult to develop self-responsible activities, but not impossible. Activities
that are chosen and designed not by the actor, but by others in his or her context can nevertheless be
performed in a self-responsible manner. Already in 1976, deCharms clarified this apparent
contradiction by pointing out that “origins” and “pawns” do not in the first place have different amounts
of constraints imposed on them, but rather handle these constraints differently: as “pawns” primarily
complain about their impotence and feel condemned to slavish behavior, “origins” choose their
personal goals and design a course of action to realize them through the requirements and restrictions
they encounter.
Katz & Assor (2007) discuss the inconsistent findings concerning the benefits and drawbacks of
providing choice on motivation. They refer to studies demonstrating positive and negative
consequences of choice. They point out that sense of autonomy and perceived choice are different
constructs and tentatively conclude that “what students perceive as being highly valuable is probably
not the mere act of choosing, but mostly the value of the options to the participants’ self and personal
goals” (p. 432). Not the freedom of action is important as such, but the possibility it offers to select
actions that have self-realizing and self-determining potential.
For our theory these arguments imply that the influence of sense of freedom of action on motivation is
mediated by personal sense of autonomy: sense of freedom of action only enhances motivation to the
extent it reinforces personal sense of autonomy. And not all forms of freedom of action appear to have
a positive effect on personal sense of autonomy: freedom can be too much.
Relatedness
In principle, relatedness could also be divided in a personal and a contextual aspect. The personal
aspect, sense of relatedness is the extent to which one personally feels connected to the people that
belong to the context of an action scheme. The contextual aspect, perceived relatedness, would be
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
the measure of connectedness between the people that belong to the context of an action scheme.
This distinction is very subtle, however, and we do not know of any research that has taken it into
study. For the time being, we do not recognize a clear relevance of the distinction to motivation.
Therefore, we discard the contextual aspect and choose only one aspect, personal sense of
relatedness.
Of course, in principle there exist as many personal senses of relatedness as there are people in the
action context. In general, however, sense of relatedness is a variable on the group level. In the theory
of planned behavior the measurement procedure would involve an aggregate based on measurement
of relatedness with different people moderated by their importance.
When the people populating the action scene are clearly classifiable in different categories, like fellow
teachers and students, for instance, different categories of relatedness are relevant.
Cognitive valences
The distinction between person and context is not only relevant to the conceptualization of basic need
aspects, but for still one more aspect: cognitive valence (De Brabander, Rozendaal, & Martens, 2009).
Naturally, when reflecting on profit derived from action schemes, the first thought is on profit for the
actor personally. And these personal profits presumably will be relatively the most important
determinants of motivation. However, this does not preclude people from considering benefits that
might result for other people. Reflecting on possible courses of action, people do take into account
non-personal benefits, benefits that might result for their social support group, for the organization they
work for, or even planet earth. Indeed, in many contexts, the primary goal of action schemes that
people undertake is not personal benefit, but benefit for other people. Teaching, for instance, is a preeminent example in this regard. It is to be expected that personal and non-personal profit to some
extent are related. Sometimes non-personal profit could be conceived as well understood personal
interest. In other cases non-personal benefits might actually be rationalized masquerades of personal
needs, the person may very well be unaware of. And sometimes, they may be only facades the person
puts forward to consciously hide his or her socially less acceptable objectives. Related as they are,
however, personal cognitive valence and non-personal cognitive valence are theoretically distinct
categories. How they are related is a matter of further research. Personal cognitive valence is the total
value a person expects to gain for himself personally from the performance of an action scheme, while
non-personal cognitive valence is the total value for other people or entities outside the person
anticipated from performing an action scheme. Non-personal cognitive valence again is an umbrella
concept. It may encompass different types depending on who or what is the beneficiary of the
expected value.
It may not go without notice that the distinction person-context is not relevant to affective valence. One
can only experience one’s own feelings. If feelings of other persons are taken into account, that is, if a
person thinks that the intended activity might be pleasurable for somebody else, then they have the
character of cognized consequences, and as such they are part of non-personal cognitive valence of
that activity. If, on the other hand, one likes very much to do something together with somebody else,
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
this anticipation is part of affective valence, because that other person becomes part of the activity.
Therefore, affective valence has no contextual aspect.
Outline of a unified model of task-specific motivation (UMTM)
Above we collected and defined the elements that populate our initial model of task-specific motivation.
A depiction of the UMTM is presented in Figure 1. A lot of relations between these elements have
been touched upon already, but some of them have yet to be explicated. Motivation was defined as
readiness for action. Readiness for action is a prerequisite for the implementation of, but by no means
a sufficient condition for actual behavior. There are lots of other factors that determine actual behavior.
Here, we disregard them, because they are outside the scope of our argument.
Readiness for action is influenced in the first place by expected value. Expected value is the outcome
of the interaction between affective and cognitive valences of the intended action. The interaction
between affective and cognitive valences is not a simple addition. How affective valences and
cognitive valences produce expected value depends on how the intended course of action is defined,
for instance in terms of goals and concrete activities. A pleasurable activity, as a completely free
option to choose, is already different from that same activity accompanied by a promise of monetary
reward if completed successfully, which is again very different form the very same activity
accompanied by the prospect of a penalty if not completed successfully. Therefore we envisage
expected value as the result of an intricate interplay of affective and cognitive motivators.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Figure 2: Outline of a unified model of task-specific motivation.
The theory of planned behavior would hypothesize that readiness for action is also directly determined
by expected feasibility and subjective norm. Subjective norm is the willingness to abide by the norms
of other people that are important in the context of the intended course of action. According to selfdetermination theory, however, the influence of competence is mediated by the level of (intrinsic)
motivation. In other words, and translated into the UMTM, self-determination theory would hold that
expected feasibility contributes to readiness for action, to the extent it contributes to expected value,
while the theory of planned action states that expected feasibility, among others, directly adds to
readiness for action. The same type of relations might be formulated with respect to subjective norm:
does subjective norm directly add to readiness for action or does it contribute, because, for instance, it
strengthens utility expectations of the outcomes? We think that the mediated effect of both variables is
more sensible and the first tests of the model (De Brabander & Martens, 2011) indicate that selfdetermination theory indeed offers the more likely interpretation, but more tests are needed. Therefore,
for the time being we incorporate both paths of influence in the model.
The theory of planned behavior would suggest that expected feasibility influences actual behavior.
That may or may not be the case, but we leave what happens after a decision to act has been taken,
to the further development of our model, as it exceeds the scope of our enterprise in this article.
Furthermore, we theorize that need-related aspects in the model affect not only affective valences, but
also cognitive valences. We address some peculiarities of these influence paths rather speculatively.
As noted before, we surmise that sense of freedom of action is relevant to the extent it supports
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
personal sense of autonomy. From early empirical data of yet unpublished research, we speculate that
personal sense of autonomy and affective valence are reciprocally related. If I experience myself as
origin of my actions, it is very likely that I experience also pleasure during performance, and the other
way around: if I experience pleasure performing an activity, it is very likely that I feel personally
responsible. Personal sense of autonomy and affective valence in concrete situations act like
communicating vessels. Presumably, leaving feedback effects from actual performance out of account,
there is no such reciprocal relation between personal sense of autonomy and cognitive valences.
Expected feasibility is conceived as the result of two factors: personal sense of competence and
sense of external support. Presumably, personal sense of competence will prove to be the most
important determinant, a hypothesis that was confirmed in the first empirical test of the UMTM (De
Brabander & Martens, 2011). Expected feasibility influences both affective valence and cognitive
valence. Better performance expectations, whether brought about by personal competence or by
external support will lead to higher pleasure expectations and better profit expectations. The same
relations apply to personal sense of relatedness. Closer bonds with people that participate in the
context of a course of action, will make performing an activity more pleasurable, but also more
profitable.
The scattered theoretical scene of motivational research is in need of integration. As said before, the
unified model of task-specific motivation that is developed in this article is a rough outline and provides
only the principal factors that have proven to be relevant for motivated choice and performance of
activities. Much is left to further investigation. But our model does provide an integration of different
theories. By characterizing affective and cognitive aspects as evolving from different and separate
processes, the UMTM has the potential to accommodate both the effects of different and often
contradictory types of motives and the additive effects in situations where affective and cognitive
aspects of motivation reinforce each other, both phenomena that in the past have gained substantial
empirical support.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Colofon
Uitgave
LOOK
Open Universiteit
augustus 2012
Bezoekadres
Valkenburgerweg 177
6419 AT Heerlen
telefoon 045- 576 22 22
Postadres
Postbus 2960
6401 DL Heerlen
Auteurs
Drs. C.J. de Brabander
Prof. dr. R. Martens
U kunt deze publicatie downloaden via www.look.ou.nl. Dat geldt ook voor eerder verschenen
publicaties. Een overzicht daarvan vindt u achterin deze publicatie.
28
Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Eerder verschenen rapporten
Aalsma, E., & Jansen, F. (2012). Inzet van critical friends bij professionaliseren van leraren.
Rapport 39. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, LOOK.
Beers, R., Berkers, R., Kreijns, K., & Wassink, H. (2012). Digitaal leren moet je leren. ICT-ontwikkeling
in teams op SG Were Di. Rapport 38. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, LOOK.
Hulsbos, F., Andersen, I., Kessels, J., & Wassink, H. (2012). Professionele ruimte en gespreid
leiderschap. Rapport 37. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, LOOK.
Nijland, F., Kruif, R. de, & Diepstraten, I. (2012) Inspireren tot leren. De Opleidingsschool 2010-2011.
Rapport 36. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, LOOK.
Hermans, V., Perreijn, S., & Bie, M. de (2012). Docent Zorg 2.0. Rapport 35. Heerlen: Open
Universiteit, LOOK.
Bruin, M., & Münstermann, H. (2012). Specifieke beroepscompetenties van docenten in het
middelbaar beroepsonderwijs. Rapport 34. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, LOOK.
Janssen, S., Goes-Daniëls, M., & Wassink, H. (2012). Een vliegende start. Hoe houd je dit vast?
Rapport 33. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Hooijer, J., Amersfoort, D. van, & Willemse, S. (2012). Welearning. Samen werken en samen leren
binnen de Bisschop Möller Stichting. Rapport 32. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor
Centrum.
Jansen, F., Aalsma, E., & Janssen, S. (2011). Professionaliseren in het hart van de vernieuwing.
Rapport 31. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Das, L., & Walhout, J. (2011). Informatievaardigheden en de mediathecaris. Rapport 30. Heerlen:
Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Hooijer, J., & Amersfoort, D. van. (2011). Leren, innoveren en netwerken in po en pabo in Fryslân.
Rapport 29. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Lutgerink, J., Evers, A., Jans, E., Deuss, E., Stuker, E., Almekinders, R., & Maagdenberg, W. (2011).
Misconcept of preconcept? Rapport 28. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Schuit, H., Vrieze, I. de, & Sleegers, P. (2011). Leerlingen motiveren: een onderzoek naar de rol van
leraren. Rapport 27. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Goes-Daniëls, M., Berkers, R., Hulsebosch, J., & Coenders, M. (2011). Professionaliseren en
versterken praktijknetwerken VM2. Rapport 26. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor
Centrum.
Schreurs, B., Evers, A., & Alphen, L. van (2011). Leren op de werkplek in samenhang organiseren
met 360-gradenfeedback. Twee casestudies. Rapport 25. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de
Moor Centrum.
Korenhof, M., Coors, P., Meijs, C., Amersfoort, D. van, & Moolenaar, N. (2011). Netwerkleren in het
primair onderwijs. Twee casestudies. Rapport 24. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor
Centrum.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Beumer, M., Jeninga, J., Münstermann, H., & Perreijn, S. (2011). Op weg naar een individueel
ontwikkelingsplan in het praktijkonderwijs. Rapport 23. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de
Moor Centrum.
Martens, R., Hooijer, J., Kreijns, K., Laat, M. de, Vermeulen, M., & Wassink, H. (2011). RdMConderzoek: vijf programmalijnen. Rapport 22. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor
Centrum.
Schuwer, R., Lutgerink, J., Bie, M. de, Dieleman, A., Hermans, V. & Timmermans, G. (2011).
Ontwikkelen van leermateriaal in leerlijnen. Rapport 21. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de
Moor Centrum.
Leeuwestein-Verbeek, P., Meulen, M. van der, Perreijn, S., & Heeroma, N. (2011). Teamontwikkeling
basisschool Aan de Bron. Rapport 20. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Janssen, S., Dresen, M., Heeroma, N., & Berkers, R. (2011). Inzicht in teamontwikkeling door
praktijkonderzoek op het vmbo van Scholengemeenschap Were Di. Rapport 19. Heerlen:
Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Wenger, E., Trayner, B., & Laat, M. de. (2011). Promoting and assessing value creation in
communities and networks: a conceptual framework. Rapport 18. Heerlen: Open Universiteit,
Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Stijnen, P., & Martens, R. (2011). Jaarverslag onderzoek. RdMC 2010. Rapport 17. Heerlen: Open
Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Janssen, S., Jansen, F., Schaepkens, H., & Groot, M. de. (2011). Van teamontwikkeling naar
persoonlijke ontwikkeling en omgekeerd. Evaluatie van een aanpak voor teamontwikkeling bij
het ROC Koning Willem I College. Rapport 16. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor
Centrum.
Goes-Daniëls, M., & Vermeulen, M. (2011). Teamontwikkeling in de Dutch Health Tec Academy. Het
gebruik van datafeedback bij het handelen van leraren in de CGO. Rapport 15. Heerlen: Open
Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Goes-Daniëls, M., & Vermeulen, M. (2011). Teamontwikkeling in de opleiding facilitaire
dienstverlening. Het gebruik van datafeedback bij het handelen van leraren in de CGO.
Rapport 14. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Vermeulen, M., Klaeijsen, A., & Martens, R. (red). (2011). De lerende leraar.
Docentprofessionalisering in de praktijk. Bundel met deelrapporten Ruimte voor
professionalisering, Professionalisering in het buitenland en Professionalisering in het primair
onderwijs. Rapport 13. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Martens, R., & Stijnen, P. (2010). Jaarverslag onderzoek. RdMC 2009. Rapport 12. Heerlen: Open
Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Kessel, N. van, Rens, C. van, & Vrieze, G. (2010). Ruimte voor professionalisering. Formele
regelingen voor professionalisering van leraren en het gebruik ervan. Rapport 11. Heerlen:
Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Goes-Daniëls, M., Vermeulen, M., & Jansen, D. (2010). Competentiegericht Opleiden in de Uiterlijke
Verzorging. Onderzoek naar het handelen van leraren in CGO bij ROC Eindhoven. Rapport 10.
Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Brand-Gruwel, S., & Walhout, J. (2010). Informatievaardigheden voor leraren. Rapport 9. Heerlen:
Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Hovius, M., & Kessel, N. van. (2010). Professionalisering van leraren in het buitenland. Een
inventarisatie van de stand van zaken in twaalf Europese landen. Rapport 8. Heerlen: Open
Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Kuijk, J. van, Gennip, H. van, Wester, M., Smit, F., & Claassen, A. (2010). Samen professionaliseren,
samen uitvoeren. Evaluatie vraaggestuurde projecten 2009 Ruud de Moor Centrum. Rapport
7. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Frietman, J., Kennis, R., & Hövels, B. (2010). Managen van informeel leren: hoe ver kun je gaan? Een
verkennende studie naar kwaliteitsmanagement van het informeel leren van leraren. Rapport
6. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Dungen, M. van den, & Smit, W. (2010). Meerdere wegen naar professionalisering. Rapport 5.
Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Zwaneveld, B., & Rigter, H. (2010). Over drempels naar meer ict-gebruik in het voortgezet onderwijs.
Rapport 4. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Someren, K. van, Doornebos-Klarenbeek, D., & Walhout, J. (2010). Een pakkend begin! Vakdidactiek
en economie. Ruim 30 concrete voorbeelden voor het economieonderwijs om goed van start
te gaan. Rapport 3. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Goes, M., Beeksma, M., Delea, P., & Hooijer, J. (2010). Verbreding en verdieping competentiegericht
opleiden van docenten binnen de NHL Hogeschool Leeuwarden. Eindverslag van de
samenwerking tussen de NHL Hogeschool Leeuwarden en het Ruud de Moor Centrum, de
activiteiten en de resultaten in de periode 2005-2009. Rapport 2. Heerlen: Open Universiteit,
Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Goes, M., Delea, P., & Laat, M. de (2010). Onderzoek naar de succes- en faalfactoren bij het
leernetwerk Consortium VMBO-MBO. Rapport 1. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor
Centrum.
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Towards a unified theory of task-specific motivation
Eerder verschenen publicaties
Kessels, J.W.M. (2012). Leiderschapspraktijken in een professionele ruimte. Inaugurele rede. Heerlen:
Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Nieuwenhuis, L.F.M. (2012).Leven lang leren on the roc’s! Een visie op werken en leren in het mbo.
Inaugurele rede. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Diepstraten, I., Wassink, H., Stijnen, S., Martens, R., & Claessen, J. (2011). Professionalisering van
leraren op de werkplek. Jaarboek Ruud de Moor Centrum 2010. Heerlen: Open Universiteit,
Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Stevens, L.M. (2010). Zin in onderwijs. Inaugurele rede. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, Ruud de Moor
Centrum.
Martens, R.L. (2010). Zin in onderzoek. Docentprofessionalisering. Inaugurele rede. Heerlen: Open
Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
Martens, R.L. (2009). RdMC onderzoeksprogramma 2009-2011. Succesvol leven lang leren op de
werkplek: onderzoek naar de praktijk van docentprofessionalisering. Heerlen: Open
Universiteit, Ruud de Moor Centrum.
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