Investigation Report
Executive summary of
the independent investigation
into aspects of
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary’s
Operation Sofia
INTRODUCTION
1.1
This executive summary concerns an independent investigation
conducted by the Independent Police Complaints Commission
(IPCC) into aspects of Devon and Cornwall Constabulary’s murder
investigation Operation Sofia; in particular the evidence provided
by a witness concerning their alleged sightings of Ms Julie Ms
Crocker (deceased).
1.2
This document has been produced to provide the family of Ms Ms
Crocker with written evidence of the IPCC investigation, findings
and recommendations.
For the purpose of this summary the identities of the police officers
and other persons have been withheld. The identities of the
officers and other involved individuals will not provide substance to
the report. During the course of the IPCC investigation there was
no evidence of misconduct or criminal actions found against any
officer. The absence of any misconduct or criminal actions is also
a further reason why the identity of the police officers is not
necessary.
1.3
Operation Sofia ran intermittently for almost two years in total and
accumulated a vast amount of documentation throughout this
period. It was managed on HOLMES II (Home Office Large Major
Enquiry System). In December 2006, Michael Woodman was
convicted for the murder of Ms Crocker.
HOLMES II is a computer system used to organise the
documentation gathered during the course of an investigation. This
system allows material to be researched quickly and effectively,
allows each line of inquiry to be recorded and monitored, and aids
the effective deployment of personnel.
IPCC INVESTIGATION
2.1
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary referred this inquiry to the IPCC
on 6 December 2006. A brief report from the force outlined events
from the previous few days and stated that a member of the
Operation Sofia team had come across, through conversation with
another colleague, further evidence from a witness that they
believed had not been recorded into the investigation. Specifically
that this was a reported sighting of Ms Crocker by a witness who
had already supplied testimony to the investigation - this officer will
be referred to as the ‘standard’s reporter.’
2.2
The standard’s reporter provided written statements to the IPCC.
On becoming initially aware of this sighting the standard’s reporter
made some discreet checks on the HOLMES II system in an
attempt to ensure that the sighting had been recorded. The
standard’s reporter was unable to find any material relating to the
evidence they had been told about. On establishing this
inconsistency the officer reported the matter to a more senior and
trusted colleague who was outside of the Operation Sofia
investigation. Together they decided that the matter needed to be
referred to their line management. A decision that took great moral
fortitude and courage.
2.3
The standard’s reporter requested anonymity following their report.
The IPCC supported this request and have attempted to provide
this anonymity.
2.4
The standard’s reporter and their trusted colleague met with three
more senior officers to report the matter. The course of action
decided by the most senior officer present was that they would
personally conduct further enquiries into the HOLMES II system to
establish if additional evidence from the witness was recorded in
the investigation but perhaps under a higher permission level.
Note: sensitive material can be effectively hidden to staff and
officers who have not been allocated a high enough permission
level on the HOLMES system. This is a recognised practice.
2.5
The senior officer carried out these checks and failed to find the
material that had been brought to his attention by the standard’s
reporter. As such the officer then took the matter to their superior
officer in order to seek guidance as to how to handle the incident.
Having found nothing on HOLMES II the concern was that there
may have been some form of manipulation of the evidence against
Woodman. As such all of the staff working on the investigation
became potential suspects.
2.6
The matter was referred to the IPCC and an independent
investigation was started under the oversight of Commissioner Ian
Bynoe. Senior Investigator Mike Benbow was appointed to lead
the investigation and Investigator Dan Budge his deputy.
2.7
The IPCC investigation was split into two parts. Part one was in
respect of the believed sighting of Ms Crocker and gathering of
that witness evidence. Part two was in respect of the decision
making of the senior officers who failed to inform the Counsel prior
to Woodman’s conviction and the end of the court case.
PART ONE
3.1
The IPCC investigation immediately secured all of the Operation
Sofia material and ensured that access to the HOLMES II account
was closed to all of the police officers and staff.
The investigation then began a review of the material relating to
the witness identified by the standard’s reporter and took a new
statement from this witness concerning the incident.
3.2
The witness stated that they had reported their alleged sighting of
Ms Crocker to a police officer working on Operation Sofia. The
witness was able to provide some detail of this event and was also
able to state that they had subsequently seen the same person
they had believed was Ms Crocker, after her body had been found.
3.2
The notebooks of the police officer who was identified as seeing
this witness were taken and evaluated. From the material within
these books further parties were identified and enquiries
undertaken.
3.3
It was established through a detailed evaluation of the material
held in the Operation Sofia investigation, and then subsequent
inquiries, that the evidence of the believed sighting provided by the
witness had been recorded in the officer’s notebooks, albeit in
scant detail. The believed sighting had also been brought to the
attention of prosecution counsel and the Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS). Counsel made the decision, following a briefing
about the witness evidence, that they wished for the reporting
officer to produce an Officer’s Report and submit it into the
investigation. Following further consideration and evaluation of this
Officer’s Report counsel would decide if a further statement was
required.
3.4
It was discovered that representing the Operation Sofia team at
this meeting with counsel and CPS were five police officers. Three
of the officers worked in the Major Incident Room on the HOLMES
II system. Between them they had devised a system to record the
work required to be carried out by the investigation from the
meeting with counsel and CPS and input the tasks into the
HOLMES II system on their return.
It was discovered during the IPCC investigation that the action to
obtain an Officer’s Report was overlooked and never inputted into
the HOLMES II system. As such the reporting officer who had
obtained the further evidence was never asked to write the
requisite Officer’s Report.
3.5
After being overlooked the action to record this additional evidence
in an Officer’s Report was never revisited. It was not identified by
any party involved in Operation Sofia as failing to be completed.
Neither the CPS nor counsel, who requested the report in the first
place, noticed its absence.
3.6
Somewhat unusually, the defence team of Woodman were granted
full unfettered access to the documents held in Operation Sofia.
No documents were held back and unlimited disclosure was
granted. While there were some references to the witness’s
additional evidence the defence team did not pick up on the
additional witness sighting.
Indeed the Operation Sofia disclosure officer did not pick up on the
additional witness evidence either.
Officer Interviews
4.1
The officer who saw the witness and was told of the believed
sighting of Ms Crocker was interviewed under caution by IPCC
staff - this officer shall be referred to as officer A.
Officer A recalled being told of this sighting by the witness. Officer
A also recalled being told not to write an Officer’s Report by their
senior manager while the matter was taken to Counsel. Officer A
stated that they were never approached by their line management
to write an Officer’s Report or anything else. As officer A had
passed the information to their line management and not been
asked to conduct any further task, they assumed that the matter
had been appropriately dealt with.
On reviewing officer A’s work during the course of Operation Sofia
it was clear that it was unusual for the officer not to submit an
Officer’s Report regarding their work. In fact, officer A had at one
time been given guidance by their line management about
submitting too much work into the Major Incident Room.
4.2
The senior officer to whom officer A reported the witnesses
believed sighting of Ms Crocker was also interviewed under
caution by IPCC staff - this officer shall be referred to as officer B.
Officer B recalled being told of the witness’s alleged sighting of Ms
Crocker by officer A. Officer B also recalled making the decision to
take the matter to a counsel and CPS meeting in order to obtain
their opinion as to what to do about the matter. As such, officer B
recalled informing officer A that there was no need for an Officer’s
Report. This meeting with counsel and CPS was already
scheduled to take place two days after the information had been
obtained by officer A. Due to the meeting with counsel and CPS
being only days away, officer B stated that they felt no need to
write down the material given to them by officer A as they felt that
they could remember it adequately.
Officer B was unable to recall the detail of the meeting with
counsel and CPS. However the officer’s workbook notes clearly
stated that the witness was not required to be re-interviewed and
that only an Officer’s Report was required. Officer B stated that the
three officers who went to the counsel and CPS meeting were
responsible for recording the actions and then inputting them into
the HOLMES II system. Officer B stated that it was not part of their
role to check the work of these three officers and that all three
were very experienced. As such officer B stated that there was an
expectation for the actions from counsel and CPS to be recorded
into HOLMES II without being told.
The roles of each individual in a Major Incident Room are clearly
laid out in the Major Investigations Room Standard Administrative
Procedures Manual (MIRSAP). Officer B was not required to
monitor the detailed work of the MIR members as part of their role.
Part One RECOMMENDATIONS
A dedicated briefing or notebook should be used to minute
the investigation meetings. This would mean that important
decisions and notes are not recorded randomly in any
officer’s notebook and that the investigation would have a set
protocol in recording this information. A dedicated briefing
book could be accessed at all times in the MIR and provide a
detailed insight into various discussions and decisions.
It had been noted that the standard Operational briefings were
minuted in the chosen officer’s notebooks. While this was not
wrong it was not best practice as it made finding the briefing
material difficult. It is recognised that producing all material in an
easily recordable format is best practice so that research of the
investigation can be conducted effectively at any time by any party.
A dedicated briefing book would allow this to happen.
A protocol between CPS, counsel and the investigation with
regard to agenda’s and minute taking would be beneficial.
This could be a force-wide recommendation or done on a
case-by-case basis. It would allow a more structured meeting
to occur, focussing on individual cases as required, and
would also allow the reasoning behind the decisions made at
these meetings to be recorded formally.
Such a protocol will ensure that the meetings between the police
force, counsel and CPS are recorded. The notes of these meetings
were poor from all parties in the Operation Sofia investigation. As
such the rationale behind some of the decisions was not recorded
and therefore lost. It is best practice to record the justifications of
all decisions so that any future review will understand the thought
process behind the issue.
MIR roles and responsibilities are clearly allocated and
maintained. The MIRSAP manual clearly prescribes the duties
and responsibilities of various roles.
The roles of the three officers who attended the counsel and CPS
meeting were clearly allocated at the beginning of Operation Sofia.
It was apparent however that these roles had somewhat
overlapped during the progression of the investigation due to
operational requirement. However, this overlapping responsibility,
which seemed to have emerged with the best interests of the good
of the investigation as a whole, led to a blurring of responsibility.
As such, the action to obtain an Officer’s Report about the alleged
sighting was allowed to be missed. It is presumed that each
thought the other was responsible which meant that no-one
conducted the task.
With regard to the Major Incident Enquiry Note Books officers
should ensure that their entries are date and time specific,
legible, continuous and sufficiently comprehensive to aid
their recall or allow other officers, e.g. the disclosure officer,
to follow lines of thought and inquiry. It is recommended that
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary give consideration to
reviewing the CPIA 1996 requirement notes at the start of the
Major Incident Enquiry Note Books and expanding them to
include explicit best practice guidance notes on the above.
From examining a number of officers’ workbooks it was apparent
that some officers were not providing enough detail with regard to
their entries. As such it was on occasion difficult to assess the
content of the work books in context to the IPCC investigation. It is
best practice for all the investigation material, including the
information in these workbooks, to be in an easily retrievable
format.
Words of advice are given to the three officers who attended
the Counsel and CPS meeting in relation to the recording of
all investigation material, and its collation into the HOLMES II
system.
The responsibility to record the counsel’s investigation directions
fell to these three officers. As such it was appropriate for them to
receive words of advice regarding their oversight. It would appear
that the oversight was accidental and that the officers have
otherwise conducted their efforts in a diligent manner. There was
no apparent misconduct and as such it was felt that acknowledging
the failure was sufficient redress.
One of the three officers had retired from Devon and Cornwall
Constabulary prior to the IPCC investigation. As such no words of
advice were given to this officer.
Words of advice are given to officer A in regard to their poor
contemporaneous notes from the alleged sighting of Julie
Crocker by a witness. The purpose of a workbook is to allow
an officer to account for those notes at a later date if required.
Officer A was unable to do so.
Officer A’s notes in their workbook were poor. While the officer did
take notes, as is right and proper, the notes lacked detail. Indeed
the notes were supposed to be a memory aid for the officer to
account for their actions and decisions. The notes at times proved
less than helpful for Officer A.
Words of advice are given to officer B in regard to their lack of
contemporaneous notes, their poor decision-making and
rationale identified in this report.
Officer B failed to make any notes regarding their decision to tell
officer A not to write an Officer’s Report. While officer B did take
the matter to counsel only days later it was poor practice not to
note any decision and the rationale behind that decision.
Words of advice are given to [an officer] with respect to [their]
duties . . . to preserve all material gathered by an investigation
in line with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
1996.
During the course of the IPCC investigation it became apparent
that an officer destroyed some paperwork following Woodman’s
conviction. While this material was not of evidential value it was
still material that belonged to the Operation Sofia investigation and
should have been stored with all the other documents.
PART TWO
As described earlier in this report a senior officer conducted further
higher permission checks on the HOLMES II system prior to the
matter being referred to the IPCC - officer C. The more senior
manager to whom officer C reported the matter after making the
higher permission checks on the Operation Sofia HOLMES II
system shall be referred to as officer D.
The IPCC seized the policy books and notes made by both officer
C and officer D. Both officers provided written responses to the
misconduct allegations put to them by the IPCC. These responses
adequately covered the IPCC enquiries into their actions
surrounding dealing with this matter.
Officer C immediately began a policy book detailing what the
standards reporter had said, what actions they (officer C) had
carried out and why. This was recognised as good practice. On
discovering that it appeared that the witness evidence concerning
a believed sighting of Ms Crocker was not recorded in HOLMES II
officer C approached officer D, a more senior manager, to discuss
the matter.
Officer D stated that they discussed the best course of action with
officer C. Officer D stated that they did so because they were
aware that officer C was experienced in working in investigations
such as these. Officer C recommended the course of action of not
immediately telling prosecution counsel about the apparently
missing
evidence
and
instead
informing
the
Professional
Standards Department (PSD) so that a covert investigation could
commence immediately. Officer D accepted this recommendation
and tasked officer C to take the matter to PSD in order to start the
appropriate dealings. Officer D also tasked officer C to record all of
these decisions and dealings for disclosure purposes.
Officer D reported that officer C telephoned them the next day for a
second time about the incident. This second enquiry was in regard
to whether officer D still wished the matter referred to the
Professional Standards Department after the verdict had been
returned. Officer C had not taken the matter to PSD immediately
after the decision had been made and by the time they had done
so the verdict had already been returned.
Officer D stated that they had expected officer C to report the
matter straight after the decision to bring the matter to PSD had
been made.
Part Two RECOMMENDATIONS
That Devon and Cornwall Constabulary establish a protocol to
address situations where new material relating to an
investigation is discovered during trial.
If new information comes to the notice of the investigation
regarding a case that is at trial then it is imperative that this new
information is passed onto the prosecuting team as soon as
practicable. This was not done in the case of Operation Sofia. The
lack of procedural guidance led to the two senior officers
exercising their judgement as what to do. Unfortunately, this
judgement was not as well placed as it might have been. A
protocol for senior officers to follow will hopefully negate a
reoccurrence of this matter.
That all Devon and Cornwall investigations are made aware of
the duties of disclosure as prescribed in the Disclosure
Manual.
The Disclosure Manual provides guidance on the requirements of
the investigation staff in disclosing material gathered in the course
of the investigation to the defence. It is recommended that Devon
and Cornwall investigations are reminded of these requirements so
that the procedures are followed more closely in future. This will
hopefully lead to better notes, minutes, documented rationale and
material not being destroyed.
Words of advice are given to officer D with regard to ... duties
… in relation to disclosure. In particular, the need to inform
the Crown immediately where material comes to light that has
an impact on an ongoing criminal trial.
Given the experience and seniority that officer D has it was felt that
they exercised poor judgement in the decision not to bring the new
information to the prosecution counsel immediately.
Words of advice are given to officer D with regard to the need
to make contemporaneous notes of their decisions and
rationale.
It was apparent that officer D did not make notes about the matter
reported to him by officer C immediately. While officer C did keep
notes of their meeting and decisions it is recognised that officer D
should have made their own notes, especially given the
seriousness of the matter.
Words of advice are given to officer C with regard to their
duties in relation to disclosure.
Given the seniority and experience of officer C it was felt that they
exercised poor judgement in the decision not to bring the new
information to the prosecution counsel immediately. While the
decision ultimately rested with officer D, it was officer C who
proffered the advice not to disclose the matter immediately to the
prosecution based on their past roles in such matters.
Words of advice are given to officer C with regard to their job
role in Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. Officer C no longer
holds a position in the Professional Standards Department
and
given
their
experience
should
have
realised
the
importance of passing this information to the appropriate
department immediately.
Officer C had been employed by the force in a role which dealt
with similar incidents and matters previously. It was based on this
previous job role that officer C proffered the advice not to disclose
this new information immediately to the prosecution counsel. While
officer C carried out the higher permission HOLMES II checks and
confirmed that the information given by the Standards Reporter
was in good faith, officer C should have known that they were no
longer employed in that role and should have passed the matter to
the Professional Standards Department straightaway.
Dan Budge
May 2007