Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel
Springfield, Illinois | www.iadtc.org | 800-232-0169
IDC Quarterly | Volume 20, Number 2 (20.2.23)
Property Insurance
By: Tracy E. Stevenson
Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd.
Use of Signs On or In Front of Private Property –
Then and Now
Our home is our castle. Does any liability attach when we place a sign in front of our castle to let the world
know our thoughts on a particular issue or even, simply, the name of our residence? The liability may be the
property owner’s or it may become a concern for the municipality within which the property lies. This article
will address some of the issues related to the placement of signs, advertising or billboards on private property.
Then – 100 Years Ago in Illinois
Almost 100 years ago, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed issues related to sign placement on private
property in Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911). In that
case, the court considered the zoning regulation in effect in the city of Chicago prohibiting erection of
billboards on private property within certain distances of public parks or boulevards. The court found that that
prohibition was an unreasonable attempt to limit the proper use of private property in violation of the Illinois
Constitution. The Illinois court’s analysis with respect to use of private property was remarkably similar to the
1994 U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), discussed below, despite
the myriad changes of time.
In Haller, the plaintiffs built an electric sign 40 feet in length and 4 feet in width, which advertised a
sanatorium. The Illinois court was asked to construe a 1909 legislative act which deemed it:
unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to erect or cause to be erected a structure of any kind or
character within 500 feet of any public park or boulevard within the limits of any city in this state
having a population of 100,000...; and that all billboards and advertising signs of whatever kind or
character that are occupying space contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be removed within one
year after the passage of the Act.
“An act restricting the erection of structures for advertising purposes near parks and boulevards, and
providing a penalty therefor.” Laws 1909, p. 290.
The Illinois Supreme Court conceded, based upon its analysis of City of Chicago v. Rogers Park Water
Company, 214 Ill. 212, 73 N.E. 375 (1905) that “all uses of property or courses of conduct which are injurious
to the health, comfort, safety, and welfare of society may be prohibited under the sovereign power of the state,
even though the exercise of such power may result in an inconvenience or loss to individuals. In this respect,
individual rights must be subordinate to the higher rights of the public.” Haller, 249 Ill. at 440, 94 N.E. at 922.
The Haller court noted that while the general principle was uniformly recognized, it was equally true that the
owner of property had the right to make any use of it he desired that does not endanger or threaten the safety,
health, comfort, or general welfare of the public. Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court held that a statute may not be automatically deemed a proper exercise of the
police power of the state merely because it has been enacted for the ostensible purpose of guarding the safety,
health, and comfort of the general welfare. Id. Under that analysis, the court noted that the Chicago statute
prohibited every character or structure that might be erected for advertising purposes within 500 feet of a
public park or boulevard without discretion as to the right of an individual to use his private property. There
was nothing inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in structures that are erected for
advertising purposes. As such, the scope of that statute was too great and interfered with an individual’s right
to use private property. Id. at 441-42, 94 N.E. at 922.
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded:
[T]he statute in question is an attempt to exercise police power purely from aesthetic considerations,
disassociated entirely from any relation to the public health, morals, comfort, or general welfare....
The citizen has always been supposed to be free to determine the style of architecture of his house, the
color of the paint that he puts thereon, the number and character of trees he will plant, the style and
quality of the clothes that he and his family will wear and it has never been thought that the legislature
could invade private rights so far as to prescribe the course to be pursued in these and other like
matters. The courts of this country have, with great unanimity, held that the police power cannot
interfere with the private property rights for purely aesthetic purposes.
Id. at 443, 94 N.E. at 923. The statute was deemed an improper violation of private property rights.
Now – The U.S. Supreme Court Weighs In
The United States Supreme Court addressed some of these issues in the case of City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43 (1994). In Gilleo, the parties sought direction as to the enforcement of an ordinance which banned
virtually all residential signs upon private property. The City of Ladue, Missouri enacted an ordinance which
prohibited homeowners from displaying any signs on their property except for those identifying the residence,
indicating that the property was for sale and warnings concerning safety hazards upon their property. The same
ordinance permitted commercial establishments, churches, and non-profit organizations to erect signs that were
not permitted at residences. The United States Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the City of
Ladue ordinance violated the right to free speech of a city resident and property owner. The ordinance was
broad in its definition of the term “sign” as well as the issue of placement including “wherever placed out of
doors in view of the general public or wherever placed indoors as a window sign.” The plaintiff placed in her
yard and subsequently, in a window, a sign related to her personal viewpoints with respect to the Persian Gulf
War.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment, finding the ordinance improper. The City of Ladue appealed. The appellate court, relying on
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) found the City of Ladue ordinance to be invalid as a
“content-based” regulation. The appellate court, however, conceded that the city’s interests in enacting its
ordinance were substantial. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 986 F.2d 1180, 1182 (8th Cir. 1993). The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
Freedom of expression pursuant to the free speech clause is an important right in the United States.
Nevertheless, signs are a unique form of freedom of speech distinct from oral speech and may be subject to
municipalities’ police powers. The United States Supreme Court stated:
[U]nlike oral speech, signs take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace
alternative uses for land and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation. It is common
ground that governments may regulate the physical characteristics of signs—just as they can, within
reasonable bounds and absent censorial purpose, regulate audible expression in its capacity as noise.
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City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 48.
The Supreme Court had previously looked at the issues of private and public use of signage and found that
content justification as well as traffic safety and aesthetics may be a basis for limitations on sign usage. See,
e.g., Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) and Metro-media, Inc. v. San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981). In City of Ladue, the Supreme Court reviewed the City of Ladue’s ordinance with respect to
the city’s failure to impose a flat ban on signs. The court noted that the city, by its exceptions, had determined
that some signs were too vital to be banned. The court also opined that the posting of signs on one’s property is
a form of communication that is “unique and important. [Ladue] had foreclosed that medium to political,
religious, or personal messages. Signs that react to local happenings or express a view on a controversial issue
both reflect and animate change in the life of the community.” Gilleo, 453 U.S. at 54. The United States
Supreme Court voiced concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression including those related
to distribution of pamphlets, handbills, door-to-door distribution and live entertainment. The Court also found
that residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication, especially for persons of
modest means or limited mobility. Thus, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute. Further,
because the signs were on private property, the speaker of a viewpoint or, in this case, the writer of a sign, may
have an impact on the overall meaning of the sign and the connection to the residence may affect the viewer’s
response to this form of speech.
With respect to the city’s claim of a right to control the aesthetics within its borders by implementation of
an ordinance, the court discounted the argument, “[i]t bears mentioning the individual residents themselves
have strong incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent ‘visual clutter’ in their own yards
and neighborhoods – incentives markedly different from those of persons who erect signs on other’s land, in
other’s neighborhoods, or on public property.” Id. at 58.
Conclusion
Rarely do we contemplate century-old case law in order to evaluate the rights a landowner has with respect
to his or her private property. While there have been some changes during that time, ordinances which affect
the right of a private property owner to place signage on his property balance the rights of the individual’s
freedom of speech and right to uninhibited use of his or her property against the state’s rights to invoke
municipal, local, and statutory actions to protect the public rights so as not to be interfered with by a single
individual. The analysis of the above two cases, reminds us that the use of private property continues to be on
the forefront.
About the Author
Tracy E. Stevenson is a partner in the Chicago firm of Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., where she concentrates her practice in medical
malpractice defense and insurance defense. She has defended cases on behalf of physicians and hospitals and represented various major insurance
companies in claims involving fraud. Ms. Stevenson also represents corporations in litigation matters including TRO’s and shareholder actions.
She is licensed in Michigan as well as Illinois and speaks at various seminars around the country.
About the IDC
The Illinois Association Defense Trial Counsel (IDC) is the premier association of attorneys in Illinois who devote a substantial portion their
practice to the representation of business, corporate, insurance, professional and other individual defendants in civil litigation.
For more information on the IDC, visit us on the web at www.iadtc.org.
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Statements or expression of opinions in this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the association.
IDC Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 2. © 2010. Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. All Rights Reserved. Reproduction in whole or in
part without permission is prohibited.
Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel, PO Box 3144, Springfield, IL 62708-3144, 217-585-0991, idc@iadtc.org
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