Baron d’Holbach
Hard Determinism
Yo are at the merc of ph sical la s
You are at the mercy of physical laws
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Baron d’Holbach
Baron d
Holbach
• D’Holbach
D Holbach is a hard determinist. is a hard determinist.
(Determinism is true, and so free will is an illusion.)
• “Thus
Thus man is a being purely physical … he is
connected to universal nature, and submitted to
y and immutable laws that she
the necessary
imposes on all the beings she contains …”
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•N
N.B. d
B d’Holbach
Holbach doesn
doesn’tt argue for determinism argue for determinism
itself, but just takes it for granted, as something that science is telling us
something that science is telling us.
• SScience isn’t nearly as deterministic today as it i
i ’
l
d
i i i
d
i
was in d’Holbach’s time (1770).
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Contrast with Libertarianism
Contrast with Libertarianism
“human
human vanity accommodated itself to a
hypothesis which, unquestionably, appears to
distinguish man from all other physical beings,
beings
by assigning to him the special privilege of a
total independence of all other causes …”
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“Man’s
Man s life is a line that nature commands him
to describe upon the surface of the earth,
g able to swerve from it,
without his ever being
even from an instant …”
(p. 397)
Similar to the rail yard metaphor, not at all
like the garden of forking paths.
like the garden of forking paths.
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Theory of the Will
Theory of the Will
• The will (the part of us that makes choices, decisions) (
p
,
)
is a physical system.
• Acts of will are determined by the “forces” that act upon it, i.e. desires, impulses, to do different things.
d
l
d d ff
h
• The rough idea seems to be that the will is like a vertical pole being pulled in different directions by
vertical pole, being pulled in different directions by ropes attached to the top.
p
p
g
• The pole ends up falling toward the direction of the greatest pull. (Falling = deciding)
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• Suppose, for example, you are trying to decide pp ,
p ,y
y g
whether to tell the truth, or tell a convenient ,
lie. You want to tell the truth, for its own sake, but also you want to avoid the messy consequences of this.
q
• These are two competing desires, pulling in opposite directions
opposite directions.
• The strongest desire, according to this model, will determine your will (So you have no
will determine your will. (So you have no control over the outcome.)
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• Imagine
Imagine a person
a person “tormented
tormented with violent
thirst”, who “perceives a fountain, whose
limpid streams might cool his feverish want”
want .
• Th
The man will, of necessity, drink from the ill f
i d i kf
h
stream. He has no power to do otherwise.
• “What if,” someone might object, “he’s told ,
g
j ,
that the water is poisoned? Then he will g
y
g
abstain, showing that he is yet a free agent.”
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• Not
Not so, says d
so, says d’Holbach.
Holbach. For in that case, the For in that case, the
desire to live is simply stronger than the desire to drink, and overpowers it.
• “the
the second motive becomes stronger than the
preceding, that is, the fear of death, or the
g himself, necessarilyy
desire of ppreserving
prevails over the painful sensation caused by
his eagerness to drink …” (p. 397)
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• But
But people can be persuaded
people can be persuaded to change their to change their
conduct!
• This only shows that a person’s will is susceptible to pressure, even just verbal ibl
j
b l
pressure, or the pressure of social expectations.
i
• In every case, we see that a person is at the y
mercy of external forces.
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The phenomenology (“what it feels l k ”) f d l b
like”) of deliberation
• The struggle of the will between opposing desires may take some time to resolve, as the forces may i iti ll b
initially be well balanced.
ll b l
d
• The strength of each force may vary with time.
• “This
“
mechanism … suffices to demonstrate why
uncertainty is painful, and why suspense is a violent
state for man”
man (p. 398) The brain gets fatigued. It
(p 398) The brain gets fatigued It
“suffers a kind of compression”.
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Effort of will?
of will?
• Does
Does this really explain the apparent effort
this really explain the apparent effort of of
will, that exists in some cases?
• It feels like I
It feels like I am pushing, against external am pushing against external
pressures, in order to make some choice. (Like walking into a strong headwind )
(Like walking into a strong headwind.)
• It doesn’t feel like being squeezed, or stretched, by opposing external forces.
h d b
i
lf
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Feeling of freedom
• It feels like it
It feels like it’ss “up
up to me
to me”.
• I feel like I could have done otherwise.
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choice  free will
A person can make choices without having A
person can make choices without having
“free will”. The outcome of each choice is fully determined by the laws of physics so
fully determined by the laws of physics, so that one has no power to affect the outcome. Even a voluntary act is therefore not free, says d’H lb h
d’Holbach.
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Political freedom  free will Political freedom 
free will
• Political
Political freedoms, like freedom of speech, freedom freedoms, like freedom of speech, freedom
of religion, etc. aren’t the same as free will.
• Political freedom is just non‐interference. E.g. in j
f
g
Canada you can say “Harper is an idiot” and not go to jail.
• Political freedom doesn’t create free will, any more than the right to play a violin creates the power to d
do so. (According to incompatibilists, anyway.)
(
d
bl
)
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D’Holbach
D
Holbach on libertarianism
on libertarianism
• “It
It has been believed that man was a free agent
because he had a will with the power of
choosing; but attention has not been paid to the
fact that even his will is moved by causes
independent of himself; is owing to that which
is inherent in his own organization …” (p.
399)
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D’Holbach on libertarianism
• We humans have an illusion of free will, d’H lb h thinks, because we are unaware
d’Holbach
thi k b
of f
the causes which move us. We are very complicated with countless simultaneous
complicated, with countless simultaneous causes working together. Many of these are unconscious.
•A
A typical human imagines that
typical human imagines that “he
he moves
himself by himself; that he determines himself
without a cause”
cause
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• “he moves himself by himself; that he determines
himself without a cause”
• This is d’Holbach’s
h
d’ lb h’ (rather unfair) description of a ( h
f )d
f
libertarian view. It makes libertarianism sound impossible, like lifting yourself by your own
impossible, like lifting yourself by your own bootstraps.
• But libertarianism does seem very mysterious, even ‘magical’. How can you be self‐determining? How can you determine your own actions which were
can you determine your own actions, which were undetermined by previous causes?
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“That man should have free agency it were needful
that he should be able to will or choose without
motive, or that he could prevent motives coercing his
will.”
• If one acts from reasons, then they determine the choice. If not from reasons, then one is choosing h i
If t f
th
i h i
arbitrarily. Either way then …
(Similar logic to the dilemma of free will )
(Similar logic to the dilemma of free will.)
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Questions
• Does
Does d
d’Holbach’s
Holbach s position undermine position undermine
Christianity, specifically the free will solution to the problem of evil?
to the problem of evil?
•D
Does d’Holbach’s
d’H lb h’ position undermine the ii
d
i
h
practice of holding people accountable for their actions, and punishing them in some h i
i
d
i hi
h
i
cases? “But I couldn’t help it!”
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