American National Security and the Philippines, 1957-1961
A fiery plane crash on March 17, 1957 echoed across the Philippines and
American national security policy in respect to this Asian ally. The accident killed
President Ramon Magsaysay and the most trusted members of his cabinet. An
“incorruptible” Philippine politician widely popular with the masses for his
reformative policies, Magsaysay was also strongly pro-American. His death
caused a backlash in Washington regarding policy that remained stagnant and
confused for the remainder of the Eisenhower administration.
The Eisenhower administration during the period focused clearly upon
only one issue in respect to the Philippines, that of access to the ever-important
military bases that increasingly dominated American military strategic thinking in
the region. The most significant threat facing Eisenhower’s second
administration in the region was the threat of internal destabilization and military
rule within the Philippines. Such an event posed the possibility of eliminating any
benefit previously garnered by showcasing the Philippines as an American
democratic student and ally. The drift and indecision of American policy during
this period reflected a growing drift and indecision within the Eisenhower
administration as a whole during the latter half of the presidency.
Fear of communism encroached on all aspects of foreign policy during
these years, and forced Americans to significantly re-evaluate foreign policy
towards individual nations within a greater whole. Economic policy was
subordinated to national security issues. Specific to the Philippines, the
Eisenhower administration’s policies towards the Philippines gave primacy to the
issue of base negotiations and insular security, reversing President Eisenhower’s
earlier opinion that the Philippines was more important as a friend that as a
military base. 1 Fears of communism dominated American ideology and
practices, blinding officials to individual local realities of single countries.
American policy towards its recent Philippine colony during the
Eisenhower presidency consisted of a mixture of procedures and efforts that
combined pre-World War II colonial practices and conceptions with the newly
emerging American global thought, practice and domination. Defense, state and
economic organizations and departments involved themselves in a multitude of
actions within the region, including education, land reform, politics, and
propaganda. However, one primary theme dominated foreign policy in the new
country, American military and national security efforts in the region and
economic stimulus, which in the Eisenhower lexicon meant privately developed
trade practices in place of government aid. All policies during the Eisenhower
presidency were of course subordinate to the president’s desire to quash deficit
spending and balance the national budget.
1
“Secretary of War Patterson to Secretary of State Byrnes, November 29, 1946,” in Foreign
Relations of the United States. 1946, Volume VIII, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing
Office), 934-35. Further Citations for Foreign Relations volumes will be as FRUS with appropriate volume
identifiers.
2
National security requirements dictated economic development priorities
and funding in the Philippines, at least from the perspective of the United States.
Military and security issues targeted at the country revolved around two key
areas, the development and maintenance of internal security forces against the
threat of communist subversion and the creation, maintenance and strengthening
of major regional military bases for the United States Navy and Air Force.
Surrounding, but in many ways peripheral, to these concerns was the creation of
the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Philippines as an
Asian representative of western-style democracy and close American ally in the
region. Such American policy objectives in turn led to the use of economic and
military grants, loans and aids as negotiating levers against the Philippine
government. Close ties between the new nations, however, led to the rise of
charges of American dominance of the Philippine government by the political
opposition.
Analysis of the various policies of the American government and the
United States negotiations with the island nation indicate that the American policy
makers, including President Eisenhower, failed to understand or chose to ignore
the special situation the Philippines occupied in regards to American policy, at
least from the Philippines’ perspective. Top-level American leaders, including
those such as Eisenhower with extensive experience in the region, made
decisions that, while in many ways concurrent with American policy towards
other allies and base providers, proved open to charges of continued colonialism
and domination due to the nature of the Philippines as a former colony. Policies
3
that included extensive neo-colonial rights for American businessman and parity
of the peso to the American dollar kindled the coals of resentment within the
country towards the United States. Banked resentment would eventually serve as
the threshold from which anti-Americanism would spring to life during the
problems of the Marcos era.
A brief summary of the historical relationship between the United States
and the Philippines is required to understand the situation in which the
Eisenhower presidency operated. The United States embarked haphazardly on
its first major colonial venture after wresting the Philippines from the original
Spanish colonizers at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1899. The
Americans then proceeded upon a mission of re-conquest for the next three
years against Filipino revolutionaries, who had originally allied with American
forces until it became obvious that the United States intent was not only to help
drive the Spanish rulers out but to remain as the new rulers. Although president
Teddy Roosevelt declared the Philippine insurrection over in 1902, intermittent
insurgency continued to flare in the islands until 1917. 2
With the acquisition of the Philippines as a base for American naval and
economic power in the Pacific, the nature of American policy and strategic
doctrine changed in reference to the region. Career officers within the army
served at some point in the Philippines during the pre-World War II era, as
2
Two works provide the best contrasting perspective on the acquisition of the Philippines and the
resulting conquest period. For a more purely military perspective, see Brian Linn The Philippine War,
1899-1902. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000. Linn tends to be more supportive of
American actions during the conflict. Much more critical is Stuart C. Miller’s Benevolent Assimilation:
The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). Miller’s
introduction sets the stage of his work, as he laments the fact that Americans did not oppose the Philippine
war in similar ways that the recently completed Vietnam War had been.
4
overseas service became a requirement. The navy, although desirous of an
eastern naval base, limited service in the region and relied upon the army to
maintain control within the Philippines. Advocates of colonial policy within the
new territory also varied, ranging across the spectrum of individuals interested in
colonial rule for extended periods of time to advisors who felt that independence
should be granted immediately to the region. However, several things held true
throughout the colonial period. Americans of all spectrums advocated the use of
local elites as administrators and leaders, and hesitated to push land tenancy
reform to alleviate the dire straits of farmers and families who barely lived at
subsistence levels. 3
The by-product of confused and hesitant American policies resulted in a
mixture of local rule with general governance by the executive branch of the
American government, with an eventual promise of independence to be granted
sometime in the future. By the early 1930s, events such as the worldwide
depression had led to a resurgence in isolationist behavior within the United
States. Such isolationist tendencies also led to specific policy objectives in the
Philippines, specifically the creation of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to
govern for ten years and the planned granting of eventual independence in 1945.
A mixture of American polities compromised on the Commonwealth in the
passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Protectionism for agricultural products and
isolationism combined to push American colonial policy towards the granting of
independence to the Philippines.
3
For the best review of early colonial policy, see Glenn A. May’s Social Engineering in the
Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1980).
5
The Second World War interrupted the timeline of independence. Unlike
other colonial territories Japan conquered, the Philippines became the only area
in which widespread guerilla warfare continued, resulting in tremendous loss of
life by Philippine soldiers. In many ways, such loyalty of colonial defense
increased the belief in the Philippines of a special relationship between the two
countries, as well as a special debt owed by the United States to the Philippines
for the burden the Philippines had borne. After the end of the war, limited
compensation (compared to aid for European allies and former enemies
Germany and especially Japan) for war debt and casualties laid additional seeds
among uncompensated veterans for anti-American resentment within the new
nation. 4
After independence, the Hukbalahap rebellion within the Central Luzon
plain exploded in the latter half of the 1940s, becoming a national crisis for the
Philippines. Basically a rebellion against changes in the structure of land tenure
and the relationship between patron and tenant, the rebellion took on some
communist tactics, because of a small percentage of communist proponents in
the highest levels of the rebellion leadership. Remarkable for the extent to which
the rank and file continued to be pro-American, the rebellion was brutally
opposed for many years by the Philippine government, with military aid and
advice from the United States. Not until Secretary of Defense Ramon
Magsaysay cleaned up the corruption and brutality of the army and internal
4
For the best view of American policy during the Commonwealth period as well as Philippine
leadership during the period, see Theodore E. Friend, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the
Philippines, 1929-1946 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)
6
police forces and fought for proposals for land reform did the rebellion start to fall
apart. 5
In 1950, President Harry Truman approved the following policy objectives.
Truman and the United States National Security Council advocated three primary
objectives regarding American policy towards the Philippines; an effective
government to strengthen pro-American orientation of the populace, a military
establishment capable of restoring and maintain internal order and security, and
lastly, a stable and self-supporting economy. 6 Thus, the situation stood upon
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s election to the American presidency in late 1952. The
Eisenhower’s administration’s initial review of the Truman presidency’s actions
toward the Philippines indicated no need for significant change. 7
After the late 1953 elections bringing Ramon Magsaysay to the Philippines
presidency, the Eisenhower administration’s policy towards the Philippines
expanded greatly upon that of the Truman administration’s goals. Changes had
two causative factors that Eisenhower used for his general foreign policy. These
lay in the realms of foreign economic aid and basic national defense policies. In
addition, Eisenhower heeded the advice of his defense advisors and continued to
5
Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), et al. Kerkveliet’s work is the most comprehensive
available within the United States. For a Philippine historical perspective, see Eduardo Lachica’s HUK:
Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971
6
National Security Council Report by the Under Secretary of State on the Implementation of “The
Position of the United States Policy with Respect to the Philippines” (NSC 84/2), July 16, 1953, Philippines
(2), Box 62, Disaster File, White House Office: National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961,
Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS (The National Security Council Staff records from the
Eisenhower Library will be subsequently abbreviated as WHO: NSCS Papers with appropriate folder, box
and sub-series identified individually).
7
Ibid.
7
push the Philippines as a primary base of American military operations, reversing
his previous pre-presidential and more overtly military position.
In regards to foreign economic aid, the Eisenhower presidency focused on
shifting the economic development of lesser-developed nations into the hands of
private investment instead of government aid or loans to the respective nation.
Defensive economic planning recognized that the creation and maintenance of
stable democracies in the developing world revolved around eliminating the
fertile fields of communist growth. Such policies required the increase in the
economic well being and raising of the basic standard of living in most of these
nations. In addition, American policy planned on stimulating investment into
these regions by tax incentives domestically and other similar policies. The basic
policy was at risk due to the dual conflict inherent within the reliance of one upon
the other. Basically, American firms proved unwilling to risk substantial private
investment without government guarantees in less stable nations. The premise
behind the stabilization of such nations relied upon the growth of economic well
being. In essence, the American leaders, including Eisenhower and his
economic advisors, caught themselves in a catch-22, with firms unwilling to
invest in less stable countries and the primary mode of stabilizing the countries
dependent upon additional investment to spur economic growth. 8
General national defense policies that modified the relationship between
the United States and the Philippines included the Eisenhower administration’s
change in direction as to military strength. Cutbacks in the United States army
8
Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
8
and navy increased the need for the enlargement of centralized regional bases
for the navy in the Philippines at Subic Bay. In addition, the Air Force’s focus on
strategic bombing enhanced the requirement for strategic bases in the
Philippines. Thirdly, the Eisenhower allied defense structure which pushed the
development of close working relationships with Allied forces increased American
beliefs in the need for control of access to the military bases within the
Philippines, including authorization of allied aircraft, vessels and personnel
without prior approval by Philippine government officials.
The Eisenhower administration’s overt policy directions for the Philippines
relied on several general considerations. First, the Philippines were important
not only to the United States, but also to the overall health of the free world for
three reasons. The Philippines served as a principal link in the strategy of the
Far Eastern defensive perimeter and its geographic location in relation to eastern
allies and enemies; it also served as a reminder to Southeastern Asian nations
and other Asians to the value of western-style democracy, and lastly, as the
principle American source of copra and hemp, and large sources of sugar and
chrome. 9 It is interesting to note the co-relation between American objectives
and the transliteration of good for America as good for the free world.
Several other general considerations underlay the development of
American policy. The Philippines government was headed by the Magsaysay-led
coalition of parties. 10 The problems inherent within coalition rule were missed,
9
National Security Council: U. S. Policy Towards the Philippines, April 5, 1954, Philippines (2),
Box 62, Disaster File, WHO: NSCS Papers.
10
Ibid.
9
however, by the National Security Council. Although Magsaysay himself was
pro-American, his election had been successful due to a marriage of several
different polities, which had to be appeased, his personal public popularity
notwithstanding. American failure to recognize such internal political issues
eventually caused the United States problems because of the cautious mode in
which Magsaysay had to operate in furtherance of his campaign objectives.
Minimal progress was made in achieving either American or Philippine
goals in relations between the two countries during the first administration of both
Magsaysay and Eisenhower. Americans involved in the recessed base
negotiations hoped that Magsaysay’s re-election in late 1957 would provide him
with more centralized power, which in turn would allow more negotiating room on
both sides to address the varied issues surrounding the bases, including criminal
jurisdiction and administration. 11 However, such was not to be the case.
Magsaysay’s death in March of that year vaulted Vice-President Carlos Garcia to
the head, a man with none of Magsaysay’s good qualities.
Analysis completed by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) of the
National Security Council (NSC) in early 1957 indicated no policy changes were
required by the Eisenhower administration. 12 Magsaysay’s death changed that
assessment, but the confusion around his death and the instability in Philippine
politics prevented quick completion of a new assessment. Necessarily, the
11
“Memorandum from the Special Representative to the Philippines to the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, December 19, 1956,” FRUS, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia, (Washington, DC:
United States Government Printing Office), 1989, 701-707.
12
Briefing Note for the 313th National Security Council Meeting, February 14th, 1957, Philippines
(3), Box 62, Disaster File, WHO: NSCS Papers.
10
administration adopted a wait-and-see attitude that quickly stagnated with little
guidance in overall policy provided.
Americans negotiators had learned some lessons regarding military bases
and negotiations for such rights in Allied countries as a result of the failed and
recessed Philippine base negotiations. Previously, all negotiations had included
the appointment of a special representative, which escalated the talks above
normal embassy and country relations. The negotiations in the Philippines
taught American state department leadership that such an increase indicated a
higher level of importance, thus giving the host country the idea that additional
price tags could be attached to the negotiations, making it more difficult for the
United States to reach its goals within original negotiating parameters. 13
President Eisenhower himself indicated his growing disillusionment with
developing nations and a euro-centric view when he commented to his top
advisors that he felt it would be better if the United States would get rid of bases
in countries like the Philippines and concentrated on places like England. 14 Such
sentiments almost assuredly increased the president’s desires to force allies to
field their own ground forces to be supported by American nuclear, air and naval
forces.
Military base issues continued to be a primary focus in American affairs
with the Philippines, and proved to be the most damaging and tense issue in the
13
“ Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant
(Bennett),” in FRUS. 1955-57. Volume XIX. National Security Policy. Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1990, 410-412.
14
“Memorandum of Discussion at that the 313th Meeting of the National Security Council,
2/21/1957,” in FRUS, 1955-1957. Volume XXII. Southeast Asia. Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1990, 708-9.
11
rise of nationalism and limited anti-Americanism within the Philippines. Such
issues as criminal jurisdiction, ownership of the bases, access control to landing
and naval facilities, and administration of civil communities highlighted the lists of
concerns from a Philippine perspective. In fact, on the very day of Magsaysay’s
death, newspapers within the United States were reporting that certain
appointments within the Philippines of anti-base nationalists, especially to the
Philippine Supreme Court, increased the likelihood that jurisdiction would
become and even greater problem. 15
Each type of concern surrounding the base negotiations impacted
American national security in different way. Although criminal jurisdiction over
offenses of Philippine law remained controversial for the entire time bases
existed in the Philippines, its direct impact to American security was minimal.
Military commanders and administration officials continuously worried about the
affects on morale if American personnel were liable to be punished under the
Philippine judicial system. Of more immediate concern were actions taken by
American personnel while on duty and in securing such bases, as occurred at
various times with injury and even death to various Filipino citizens who
attempted to breach base security for theft or other reasons. 16 Nonetheless,
even such incidents were rare enough to warrant little concern although the
damage such incidents inflicted on American-Philippine relations was at times
enormous, as similar incidents have been when involving American personnel
15
New York Times, 3/17/1957, 8.
16
New York Times, 11/22/1959, 24.
12
stationed in other allied host countries. Negotiations regarding this particular
issue were never completed successfully during the Eisenhower administration,
although the United States eventually conceded to offering similar plans as were
in place in Japan and NATO, which the Philippines rejected without indicating
reasons for such rejection, when initially such similar proposals had been at
Philippine request. 17 Such negotiation issues led to internal administration
claims that President Garcia used the base issue to inflame nationalism and
direct attention away from his corrupt administration and country’s economic
problems. 18 Certain members of the United States Congress echoed such
claims, in certain instances claiming not only were the charges incorrect but that
the Philippine government was actively harassing United States forces and
personnel and promoting theft of American property. 19
Although criminal jurisdiction remained unsettled, as did formal base
agreements, the United States did react to other areas of Philippine concern that
the Eisenhower administration and, specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff under
Admiral Radford had resisted in the first administration years. The American
embassy had been instructed to ignore the actual land ownership issue
surrounding the bases. After the catastrophic opinion issued by Attorney
17
“Briefing Paper Perpared by the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs (MacFarland),
9/16/1960,” FRUS, 958-60. Volume XV. South and Southeast Asia. Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1992, 971-2.
18
National Security Council: Operations Coordinating Board Report on The Philippines (NSC
5813/1), 3/30/1960, Philippines, Box 6, Subject Sub-series, OCB Series, White House Office, Office of the
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records, 1952-1961, Eisenhower Presidential Library,
Abilene, KS. (Future references to the same document collection will be as WHO: OSA/NSA, Records
with appropriate location identifiers).
19
New York Times, 11/26/1959, 14.
13
General Herbert Brownell in 1953 asserting outright ownership by the United
States, public opinion in the Philippines against the bases had skyrocketed. 20
Negotiators and state department officials spent considerable time trying to allay
Philippine anxieties, and as a result, efforts on base negotiations in the latter
1950s centered around concluding agreements without discussion on ownership,
adding to the list of complications that kept formal agreements from being
reached. However, several questions had been previously raised regarding the
civil administration of the community of Olongapo, within the reservation of the
Subic Bay Naval Complex. The community had grown to over 60,000 Filipino
inhabitants, completely subordinate to United States naval authority, definitely a
clear contravention of Philippine sovereignty. Previous negotiations had failed to
address Philippine concerns regarding such naval rule, and had been pushed off
at the end of 1956 with the rest of the base negotiations. For a variety of
reasons, Admiral Radford has pushed against relinquishing naval control in
contravention of embassy official wishes. 21
Embassy negotiators made progress in early 1958, reaching limited
agreement with Philippine authorities on the transition of Olongapo to Philippine
civil control. 22 As a result, with security and sanitation questions addressed over
20
“Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State - Joint Chiefs of Staff
Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, Feb 10, 1956,” in FRUS. 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII,
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), 1989, 629-30.
21
“Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs
(Young) to the Assist Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, September 22, 1955,” FRUS, 1955-1957,
Southeast Asia, Volume XXII, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), 1989, 606608. Also, “Telegram from the Department of State to the American Embassy in the Philippines,
September 28, 1955,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII, (Washington, DC: United States
Government Printing Office), 1989, 611-13.
14
the next eighteen months, and in late 1959, the United States relinquished
control of the civil administration of Olongapo, thereby reducing criticism
surrounding one of the most blatant appearances of neo-colonial control by the
American military. 23 In addition, along with reaching agreement surrounding the
Olongapo issue, embassy officials negotiated a return of the Manila Air Station
from United States Air Force control to the Philippines, eliminating a highly visible
American military presence within the capital city as well as returning highly
valuable real estate back to the Philippine government. 24
The most pressing issue surrounding the base negotiations remained
Philippine demands for consultation on use, correlated defense agreements and
preferential allied status in return for United States utilization of the bases. The
United States could not agree to any of the conditions that the Philippine
negotiators stressed, and disagreed for a variety of public reasons, but primarily
because the military and the administration agreed, at least within Southeast
Asian, that the United States needed to remain in control of all aspects of such
base utilization. To justify denial of such claims, the state department instructed
Ambassador Charles Bohlen to cite affects on other Southeast Asian Treaty
22
National Security Council: Operations Coordinating Board Report on The Philippines (NSC
5413/1), 4/2/1958, Philippines (4), Box 62, Disaster File, WHO: NSCS Papers.
23
National Security Council: Operations Coordinating Board Report on The Philippines (NSC
5813/1), 3/30/1960, Philippines, Box 6, Subject Sub-series, OCB Series, WHO: OSA/NSA, Records.
24
National Security Council: Operations Coordinating Board Report on The Philippines (NSC
5413/1), 4/2/1958, Philippines (4), Box 62, Disaster File, WHO: NSCS Papers.
15
Organization (SEATO) members in regards to preferential treatment and to
denounce consultation in war-time efforts as cumbersome. 25
Philippine nationalists and negotiators such as Secretary of State Serrano
continued to push the issue of access control to the bases, especially as it came
to Allied vessels and aircraft, citing customs and sovereignty issues. 26 Since the
Philippines appeared to have no wishes to begin immediate formal negotiations
regarding the varied base issues, Ambassador Bohlen also recommended that
an agreement be reached to satisfy issues surrounding customs, jurisdiction and
access control for third-power aircraft and Washington agreed. Washington
authorized expedited negotiations for liaison officers to oversee such instances
as well as the creation of a Military Defense Board to jointly oversee the officers
assigned to liaison duties. 27 As a result, public announcement of a successful
accord regarding this particular issue was reported in early May, 1958. 28
Nonetheless, as Garcia’s administration proved increasingly corrupt and
incapable of dealing with needed domestic reforms, Garcia drifted closer to the
United States in order to take advantage of the perception that he continued to
have the familial relationship with the former colonial master, which still bore
25
“Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, 3/12/1958,” FRUS.
1958-60. Volume XV. South and Southeast Asia. Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1992, 836-9.
26
“Telegram from the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, 3/31/1958,” FRUS.
1958-60. Volume XV. South and Southeast Asia. Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1992, 841-2.
27
“Telegram from the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, 4/10/1958,” 843-45,
and “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, 4/14/1958,” 846-47 both in
FRUS. 1958-60. Volume XV. South and Southeast Asia. Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1992.
28
New York Times, 5/16/1958, 4.
16
considerable prestige even amongst rising nationalism. In response, the
opposition blasted him and the United States even further, passing resolutions
requiring consent of the Philippine legislature prior to the transport thru or storage
in the island nation of nuclear weapons. Garcia himself had become more
rapidly anti-communist and used communism and his nation’s strategic location
to strongly request that the United States utilize the Philippine bases for all
weapon systems, while at the same time allowing his negotiators and senior
advisors to attempt to restrict or change conditions of the existing base
agreements. 29
Although Garcia eventually bowed to internal pressure to begin
exploratory talks regarding the bases and the issues outlined above, the
Philippine president had little interest in reaching formal agreements as the issue
allowed him to focus attention away from domestic issues and at the same time
attempt to play American fears of base access into attempts to generate higher
fees in aid, grants, and military assistance to help stimulate the stagnant
Philippine economy. Access to the bases and Philippine involvement in
“consultation” regarding such access remained the most important issue of the
negotiations, regardless of public sentiment regarding ownership and jurisdiction.
A growing concern about the tenor surrounding this issue arose within the
confines of the American embassy in the Philippines. Questions of United States
utilization of the bases in a conflict in which the Philippines remained neutral
29
“Telegram from the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, 5/20/1958,” FRUS.
1958-60. Volume XV. South and Southeast Asia. Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1992, 848.
17
were voiced. 30 Although Serrano emphasized to Bohlen that criminal jurisdiction
remained the primary issue, he knew that America’s weak point surrounded the
question of control and utilization of the bases. Thus, in the same conversation,
Serrano strongly stressed that the bases were for the mutual defense of the
Philippines and the United States as outlined in the earlier bilateral defense
treaty and that the bases could not be utilized for aggressive maneuvers or
combat operations outside of that treaty. In addition, Serrano argued that the
American military forces could not operate missions from the bases for use in
other nations that did not have defensive agreements and commitments also in
place with the Philippines. 31 Thus, the nature of the argument used by later
Philippine presidents that prevented the United States from operating combat
missions to Vietnam in the next decade became apparent in the early years of
the second Eisenhower administration.
As it became apparent that the Garcia administration was proving more
and more corrupt and incapable of handling domestic political and economic
necessities, the Eisenhower national security staff directed the OCB to review
existing policy as it stood from that last promulgated in 1954, address the
changes and progress since that time, and propose suggestions for an up to date
national security policy that would more readily comply with overall American
30
“Telegram from the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, 9/4/1958,” FRUS.
1958-60. Volume XV. South and Southeast Asia. Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1992, 893-94.
31
“Telegram from the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, 11/12/1958,” FRUS.
1958-60. Volume XV. South and Southeast Asia. Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1992, 904-7.
18
policy and still maintain a close relationship with the Philippines. Upon
completion, the members of the National Security Council reviewed, modified
and finally approved new policy guidelines regarding relations with the
Philippines to take effect immediately.
Key officials such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA chief
Allen Dulles, and JCS Chief General Twinings agreed on the importance of the
Philippines to American security and health and the policy reflected that
assessment and the reasons for such high importance in rating the former
colony. The most important remained access to the military bases and the
strategic location of the Philippines in the geographical defensive perimeter. The
second most important in American views proved one of the most contradictory.
American officials, including the president himself, believed that the Philippines
democratic style of government and close relations with the United States both
reinforced the positives of countries aligning themselves to the American sphere
as well as serving as a strong example of independent, democratic ideals within
Asia. In addition, American business remained strongly entrenched with the
economy of the Philippines. 32
American objectives remained largely unchanged from those discerned in
1954, excluding the transition from internal security concentration as a result of
the Huk rebellion that had been widely eliminated. The various United States
agencies involved in foreign affairs (such as defense, intelligence, economic, and
state department organs) were to operate towards the following: the continued
32
National Security Council: U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines (NSC 5813/1), 6/4/1958,
Philippines (4), Box 62, Disaster File, WHO: NSCS Papers.
19
utilization of military bases as previously discussed, a Philippine military capable
of providing for internal security as well as certain contributions to regional
defense, a continued close working relationship in multinational affairs with the
Philippines supporting American positions, and, lastly, a strong, stable, and
democratic Philippine government capable of carrying out necessary social and
economic reforms. 33 Although the last seemed important enough to lead the list
within policy statements, it proved the item least important within administration
circles, especially as it came to democratic and independent or even stable.
Concerns around the stability of the government were reflected in
journalist reports early in the Garcia administration. Reported rumors of coup
planning and attempts abounded and Garcia made several key appointments
within the defense and military forces. 34 Such appointments reflected a growing
paranoia within the Garcia administration as well as a further politicization of the
Philippine Army. Although the reports by the press were minimized, the CIA and
the State Department expressed serious concern that the Philippines could be
ripe for a military takeover or coup and estimated that such an action rated a fair
possibility within the next two years. 35
American concerns regarding such an event were heightened in late 1960
when President Garcia became extremely ill and intelligence reported that Garcia
may die or become otherwise incapacitated. Sources high within the Philippine
33
Ibid.
34
New York Times, 11/2/1958, 17.
35
Special Report on Military Training in the US of Foreign Nationals from Selected Countries,
3/18/1959, Military Training – Foreign Nationals, Box 3, Subject Sub-series, OCB Series, WHO:
OSA/NSA, Records.
20
government reported that the Philippine Army may not support a peaceful
transition of power to the current Vice-President, Diosdado Macapagal. Such
reports reflected the earlier shakeup within the military organization which had
led to the appointment of Garcia supporters with little talent for command and the
shuffling of more capable officers to lesser positions. 36 If successful, such
leadership changes most likely would not have damaged American access to the
bases, but military rule would have put paid to any ideas that American colonial
leadership had been any more beneficial than other struggling, developing
countries. American assertions of the benefits of democracy in Asia would also
have been seriously diluted when its “showcase” of democracy and “special” ally
had turned to military dictatorship.
American leaders recognized the dangers of such activities and debated
at various times about additional intervention within domestic Philippine politics, a
practice long sanctified during colonial rule and more secretly performed since
independence. The Eisenhower administration certainly had no compunctions
about interfering within the internal affairs of other nations when national security
seemed to warrant such action, as can be seen in its actions in Guatemala, Iran,
and Lebanon. Although explicit intervention was not required, support of specific
politicians remained constant, and American agencies continued to utilize
targeted propaganda as needed. The idea of intervention was also intimately
discussed and options studied throughout the Eisenhower administration, but
36
Telegram from Ambassador Hickerson to Secretary of State Herter, 8/17/1960, Philippines (2)
June – November 1960, Box 13, International Series, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary,
Records, 1952-1961, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas. (Further citations of the same
collection will be as follows WHO: OSS Records).
21
especially in response to the corruption and perceived instability of the Garcia
presidency. Even prior to Garcia’s own election in 1957, Dulles discussed the
possibilities with Ambassador Bohlen of intervening more directly in the
upcoming presidential election to support a more desirable candidate. 37
Eisenhower also advocated similar ideas of intervention, although his beliefs
hardened only after Garcia’s corruption became readily apparent and
widespread. Eisenhower believed that Vice-President Macapagal would
probably make a better leader and provide more stability with the Philippine
political system, a man who happened to have close ties with various CIA
personnel as had Magsaysay. 38 Regardless of sentiment and obvious precedent
in action in other nations, the Eisenhower administration never quite pulled the
trigger, limiting interference to more mundane efforts such as propaganda and
public and international oversight of elections.
American policy towards the Philippines during the latter half of the
Eisenhower administration drifted in indecision. A sense of lost opportunity with
the death of Magsaysay and the obvious corruption of the new Garcia
administration left American leaders with few good immediate good choices.
Military base access remained the primary objective of relations with the
Philippines, although the obvious threat of military dominance of the Philippine
37
Memorandum of conversation with Ambassador Bohlen, 4/29/57, Memos and Conversations
General – A thru D (2), Box 1, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Dulles, John Foster:
Papers, 1951-59, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas. (Additional Citation of the Eisenhower
Library Dulles collection will be as JFD Papers).
38
Discussion at the 393rd NSC Meeting, 1/15/1959, 393rd Meeting of the NSC, January 15, 1959,
Box 11, National Security Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.
(Additional citations of the Ann Whitman collection will be as AW).
22
political scene proved the most dangerous threat to American goals in the region
during the period. Informal agreements reduced the tensions over the jurisdiction
issues, and transfer of some territory and the city of Olongapo to Philippine
civilian control proved that to many Filipinos that American policy could be
modified to be less onerous and still allow for a close, familial relationship
between the two countries. The drift in Philippine policy seems to also reflect a
reflected drift in direction that the Eisenhower administration suffered as a whole
after the president’s own illnesses and the death of John Foster Dulles.
23
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