BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
497
The amendment by its terms provides that it shall take effect immediately
upon its becoming a law. The amendment became a law on June 11,
1945 without the governor's approval and was on that date filed in the
office of the secretary of state.
From and after the 11th day of June, 1945, county judges had the
right to collect the license charge prescribed by this law, and, of course,
where such was done they would be entitled to the fee allowed under
the 1945 act, but unless their license collection from the applicant for the
license was predicated upon the 1945 act, they could not charge as their
fee the increased amount provided for in such 1945 act for such fee.
The reason I say above that the county judge "may" collect the in­
creased 1945 license charge, rather than "must," is that I understand
the occasion for your inquiry for this opinion arises because of one county
judge in the state insisting upon payment to him of the fee for licenses
issued by him subsequent to June 11, 1945, which the 1945 act prescribes;
whereas it was understood from the president of the County Judges As­
sociation previous to the passage of this 1945 act. that all county judges
would issue the licenses in q'uestion under the old law up until October 1,
1945, and would charge the old law fee for so doing. Of course, under
the terms of the 1945 act the license fee of that act should have been
charged subsequent to June 11, 1945, bot if it wasn't by virtue of the
understanding and agreement nobody was hurt except the state revenue
and the license payor would be the beneficiary therefrom.
.
Inasmuch as the sales of the licenses and the collection of the sales
agent's fee is a matter under the law for the county judges to carry out,
I repeat that a county judge who sold the license under the old law
cannot claim to be entitled to the fee prescribed under the new law, and
this, to me, is the real question with whichy~)U are confronted. Of course,
if any judge issues licenses under the new law after June 11, 1945, he is
entitled to the fee accordingly.
.
.
September 14, 1945.-045-289.
REVOCATION OF LICENSES-RESTORATION
QUESTION: Several automobile operators have had their drivers'
licenses revoked in Flagler county for a period of one year. In several
instances the parole commission has restored the operators' license on a
restricted basis covering a longer period of time than that for which the
license was revoked, but, after the restoration order was entered by the
parole commiSSion, the operator refused to accept the license on tl1e
restricted basis and said operator now expects to get full unrestricted
license after the one year period of revocation has expired. Is he entitled
to same?
To Honorable E. W. Johnston, County Judge, Flagler County, Bunnell,
Florida:
When you revoked the said license I assume that you did so because
of one or more of the grounds set forth in Section 322.26, Florida Statutes,
1941.
Such a revoca.tion terminates the operator's privilege to drive a motor
vehicle under that license.
.
Said operator was not compelled to accept the restricted license
offered him by the parole commission unless he desired to operate his
motor vehicle.
The operator whose license has been revoked may, at the end of
one year from said revocation, apply to tl1e Department of Public Safety
for a new license. The Department of Public Safety can give him an
unrestricted license, or it may, because of certain cO:lditions, give him a
restricted license. See Section 322.16, Florida Statutes, 1941. It is not
for the operator to say whether he will get an unrestricted or restricted
license. This will depend upon the deci8ion of the Department of Public
Safety as governed by said Section 322.16, Florida Statutes, 1941.
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SE:ptember 12, 1946.-046-387.
REVOCATION-LENGTH OF TIME
QUESTTO)~S:
s'
1. J'". the Department of Public S'1fe t y aut.horiz3Q to """'voke Jicep . . ('·~i,..'"l)e(l for the operation of a motor vehicle fora period in excess of one year? Cl
2. May the period of . . u"pension or rev(,n"ltio"'1 of )'l. '1icen"'e to oper~,te
fl, motor vehicle be extenoed as a penalty for th") operation of a motor
vp'"kicle rlnrin~ tho r"1'!'dod for which a license to so operate has been
p;
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suspended or revoked?
To the Depa.rtment .of Public Safety, TallahMsee, Florida:
Re('tion 3?? .n, Flo"'i(1a.
thl1t the department more than on,e year, and: upon re~'oking a licen:"e rhaH not in any event grant a new license until the expiration of one year after such revocation. fraU not suspf'n1 a driver's
S+l'1.tu+~~. 1941. nrovidel'
li~pn'lefor a period of
Under the n'l'(W'''''(''1'<:; C'fth'" quotpo c-"ctjon, the denartmimt is not,
p·uthorizen. to .mspend the effectivenp.~s of l1 driver's license for a' period
of more t.hqn one year. It may ma:k-p. such su"pen<iion effective for any
period of time less than one year.. Upon thp revoking of a license the
;"''''1')Q'I'tment i<; not authorized .to grant J1, new license to t.he holder of thl')
".. . "o1<eo. license until the expiration of one year after the date of such
revocation.
Sr-ction ??2.r·!). H'lorir>q. Statute<;. 1941. provides th<tt the rlepart.ment
ch9H not. is:"up. airy driver's licem;e "to any person when the oirecto"t' has
i"'('''l r<),Uf'e h believe tha.t t.hp, opf>'I'l1tion of hi~ motor vehicle on the high­
-~qVi'l bv surh perl:'on would be detrimeIitl1l to public safety or welfare."
TT't'l.oe'" th<"<'e ~e('t;on~ of the ~tat·utp<; the nep<,,'tment uoon the revocation
d a !icen,"~ may not issue a new license
the expin'ltionof one year
~fter the date of sl1('h revo~at.ion, but if the director of the department
ha8 good cause to bp1if've th~t the operation ofa motor vehicle by the
Ji('.en"ep, wou'f'l be detrimental to publie'saJet~T or w~lfare, he may in his
discretion extend the .periodof
revocationlhdefinitely.
,
'until
~ ~.....
'
the ::ln~Wer to thi::; oue~tion i<; that 11'1.1er justifiable
f".j""cum1:'tancE'1' the license to onerate a motor vehkle may by the director
l'e inrJefinitely postponed; provided, however, that the period of revocation
chall not in any instance be less than a period of one year, . .
,A ("('orningl".
S"C.t·](lll ::l?2.34. F 1oTir 9 st"'tutps. J Q41. Makes it l'l mi<;demepnor for
::lnV perron who"e f'lriving li('en"'e rh!'lll h<l,ve bl')en ,c.u<;penoed or revoked to
r''I';ve any motor v"hi~le upon the highways of th~ state ~uring t.he Deriod
within whkh ~u('h lic<'n"'e or privil"'p'e ha.s been revoked. ~m1 furth,,)T
provif'les for fl nenalty. to he impo<:!pd for such act, bv Wl1Y of fine awl im­
pri"onment. The fnvc--rning statute (loes not in terms provide for an
""'.rlitio'1BI penalty by W~y ('f susDen"ion 0 1' "'''voc.''ltion 'of l1 license for
the violation of t·h~ "n"'ov~~i"n<; of s~"t.jO"'1 :i?? ~.. Rl'ction 322.27 p"ovioe<;
thllt. the dep8rtrn"n t , i.e, "1,Lhorizeil to l"Uf'r~T"'1 th~ llcpn<;e of an on"''''''l.to.,.
,·.Hhrq,t. h~~"';'1!T if H- ,~ "'''''''Hj th<>t, hI' ic:; PJ"1nuO' ('t'her thinq<; "an habitu"tl
violator of the traffic laws." If the dep<trtment clirecto'" unner the Olwton
~pl"ti('n. 171101 11 "1. rlett'>l'mine thqt an applicant for '1. li.p.f'l1<i1" is !!l.n hll,bit.1l"l.1
v;ol"tor of the traffic laws, I:),S is evidenced by the fact that he has after
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