Explaining Australian Nuclear Policy
Brian Hoxie 1
This paper examines three different models for their ability to explain recent trends in
Australian nuclear policy in response to North Korean nuclear proliferation and other concerns.
It analyzes Australian policy through use of T.V. Paul’s concept of prudent realism, Jacques
Hymans’ National Identity Conception (NIC), and the constructivist theory of International
Relations. It concludes that current Australian nuclear policy is part of a long-standing
normative stance towards nuclear weapon abolition, which is best explained through
constructivism.
Introduction
During the second half of the 20th century, Australian defense policy focused on more localized
threats from in the South Pacific while continuing to rely on the U.S. for nuclear security. Yet,
over the past several years, Australia has heightened its defense and foreign policy focus more
on Northeast Asia – including direct engagement with Japan – rather than more regional
engagement. However, if Australia has assurances of conventional and nuclear extended
deterrence from the U.S. and is not openly threatened by North Korea or China, then why focus
attention and develop foreign policy around this area of the world? The puzzle then is how to
explain this Australia’s shift in nuclear policy and the open concern of nuclear security among
foreign policy scholars. Is this a reaction to genuine security threats to Australia in the region or
can one explain this behavior by other means?
In 1952, a treaty between the United States (U.S.), Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS)
created an alliance that provided both Australia and New Zealand with a U.S. conventional and
nuclear extended deterrent. Largely due to U.S. policy to contain Chinese and Soviet expansion
into the South Pacific during the Cold War, the ANZUS treaty signified the dependence of
Australia and New Zealand on Washington for guaranteeing their security. 2 While New Zealand
was “ignored” from the treaty in 1986, 3 the alliance between Australia and the U.S. remains
strong after more than 50 years. 4 Even though it has the capability to develop its own nuclear
weapons, ANZUS provides Australia with a security guarantee against nuclear threats, allowing
it to forgo an indigenous nuclear weapons program.
The U.S. has additional nuclear extended deterrence guarantees with two other nations
in the Pacific: South Korea and Japan. Like Australia, both have the infrastructure necessary to
develop an independent nuclear program, but have chosen not to pursue one, in large part due
to the U.S. security agreement. However, in spite of the U.S. nuclear “umbrella,” Japan and
Australia have voiced concerns over the emergence of North Korean nuclear capabilities and the
buildup and modernization of Chinese military forces.
1 Brian Hoxie is a recent graduate of the University of Washington graduate school in Seattle WA with a
M.A. in public administration from the Evans School of Public Affairs and a M.A. in international studies
from the Jackson School of International Studies.
2 William Tow, “The ANZUS Dispute: Testing U.S. Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics,” Political
Science Quarterly 104, no. 1 (Spring 1989): p. 117.
3 Ibid., p. 129.
4 Ibid., pp. 153-173.
55
While Australia is in the south Pacific and not immediately threatened by North Korean
nuclear developments, they have also expressed uneasiness over nuclear proliferation in
Northeast Asia. In March of 2007, Australian Prime Minister (PM), John Howard, signed a
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Japan, whereby Australia sought to calm
Japanese security fears and strengthen Japan against Chinese influence in the region. 5 Later
that year in a Defence Update to the 2000 Australian White Paper, significant attention was
given to security concerns in the Broader Asia-Pacific region including China, North Korea and
the Northeast-Asia-stabilizing alliance between the U.S. and Japan. 6 Shortly after PM Kevin
Rudd took office, he met Japanese leaders in Tokyo to discuss worldwide nuclear disarmament
programs and ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. 7 Most recently, in the 2009
Australian Department of Defense White Paper, officials reiterated the importance of the
Japanese alliance with the U.S. and the extended deterrence guarantee in maintaining regional
security. Concerning Japan’s reliance on that guarantee, it states, “[w]ere Japan unable to rely
on that alliance, its strategic outlook would be dramatically different, and it would be compelled
to re-examine its strategic posture and capabilities,” 8 highlighting the Australian’s concern over
actions taken in response to regional tensions.
Japanese reaction to North Korea and China’s actions has also garnered attention by
Australian policy experts and scholars. One expert on Australia’s nuclear policy stated, “if Japan
decides on an independent nuclear option, Australia will have to reconsider its policies,” 9
suggesting an Australian nuclear option. Others have suggested that the increase in Chinese
power would create an environment that could “erode Washington’s relative margin of strategic
superiority” in the region 10 and as a result, diminish the effectiveness of U.S. extended
deterrence in alleviating pressure to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to this possibility, the
argument is that Australian decision-makers must begin to address the potential nuclear threat
from proliferating states in the region. 11
Theoretical Explanations
Literature explaining Australia’s nuclear policy is largely explored in two books. The first, by T.V.
Paul in 2000, explores the nuclear choices of Australia from his concept of “prudent realism.”
This framework combines the International Relations (IR) theories of realism and liberalism. In
both these traditional IR theories, the main actors in international relations are states who
rationally pursue their own fixed interests. While Paul uses these common criteria, he also
combines one important difference. In realism, states exist in an anarchic international system,
where nuclear choices are a reflection of relative capabilities and threats from other states. In
liberalism, states are part of an international system based on rules and institutions and their
nuclear choices reflect international norms, level of cooperation, and mutual interests. However,
Paul argues that state nuclear choices actually involve both perspectives. States are not only
concerned with most probable threats from adversaries under realism, but are also concerned
5 Robyn Lim, “Australia's New Security Agreement with Japan,” Defender: The National Journal of the
Australia Defence Association Vol. XXIV no. 1 (Autumn 2007): p. 12.
6 Brendan Nelson, Australia's National Security - A Defence Update 2007 (Canberra: Australian
Department of Defence, April 13, 2007), pp. 20-21.
7 Kevin Rudd, “Building a Better World Together” (speech, Kyoto University, Japan, June 9, 2008).
8 Joel Fitzgibbon, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper
2009 (Canberra: Australian Department of Defence, May 2, 2009), p. 33.
9 Robyn Lim, “Taking offence,” The Australian, October 10, 2006.
10 Raoul E. Heinrichs, “Australia's Nuclear Dilemma: Dependence, Deterrence or Denial?” Security
Challenges 4, no. 1 (Autumn 2008): p. 61.
11 Ibid., p. 62.
56
about the level of cooperation and coordination with other states in its geostrategic environment,
which is a concern of liberalism. In the end, according to Paul, context and situations matter
significantly with respect to state nuclear choices. 12 When using this view to analyze Australia,
Paul concludes that “the benign security environment” is the leading factor explaining
Australia’s nuclear policy decisions during the latter half of the 20th century.
The second argument, which specifically addresses Australian state nuclear choices, is
Hymans’ (2006) social psychological explanation. Hymans explicitly disagrees with Paul’s
conclusion that Australian nuclear choices are a result of a “benign security environment” 13 but
are instead a consequence of how a state’s leader views their state in relation to the rest of the
world or their adversarial “other” state or entity. Hymans argues that nuclear decisions are
primarily a result of state leaders and because of this, explaining nuclear policy can be achieved
by analyzing the head of state’s individual understanding of his or her nation’s identity, which
Hymans defines as the National Identity Conception (NIC).
A final theory explaining Australia’s nuclear policy is constructivism. While there is no
literature specifically discussing Australia nuclear choices from this viewpoint, there are papers
that directly discuss constructivism in terms of international regimes, such as the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the “taboo” on nuclear weapon use, and global nonproliferation
norms - all of which Australia strongly supports. This theoretical framework challenges realism
and liberalism’s key assumptions that state interests are fixed to maximize power and material
gain. In constructivism, states are the primary actors. However, instead of having fixed interests,
their continual interaction and exposure to new social facts constructs (or reconstructs) their
identities, interests and, therefore, further interactions. 14 According to Hymans’ theory, the
development of a particular leader’s NIC is not important, only that he or she arrives in office
with their own stable NIC upon which to draw when making nuclear decisions. 15 However, the
idea of a ‘stable NIC’ contrasts directly with constructivism. Under constructivist theory, we
expect to see a reconstruction of a state’s position over time, potentially during a single leader’s
tenure, due to changing security realities in the world, not a fixed conception of its relative
position in the international community.
While each theory has its own merits, it is not clear which theory most clearly explains
the development of Australia’s nuclear policy and its increased focus on Northeast Asia. This
paper will attempt to resolve this issue by carefully applying each of these theories to Australian
nuclear policy decisions and actions. Studying Australian nuclear policy shifts could improve
future understanding of these decisions given different security situations, such as a reduction in
nuclear arsenals in a global nuclear disarmament era, the reconstitution of the North Korean
nuclear program, or changes in U.S. strategic supremacy and the effect on extended deterrence
guarantees in the region.
12 T.V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Quebec City: McGillQueen's University Press, 2000), pp. 4-5.
13 Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign
Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 114.
14 Jo-Ansie van Wyk et al., “The international politics of nuclear weapons: A constructivist analysis,”
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 35, no. 1 (2007): p. 24.
15 Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 19.
57
Theoretical Background
Prudent Realism
In Power versus Prudence, Paul utilizes a combination of aspects from realism and liberal
institutionalism and interdependence to explain two puzzles: why do states not acquire nuclear
weapons when they have the technology to do so and why do certain states that have weapons,
such as South Africa or Ukraine, forgo them? 16
Paul builds his theory, determining when a state decides to acquire nuclear weapons or
forswear them, by combining aspects of two prominent international relations theories –
realism and liberal institutionalism and interdependence. Paul argues that realism is sufficient
to explain why states choose to acquire nuclear weapons but not why states choose not to obtain
them. Under realist IR theory, nuclear choices should reflect the constraints of an anarchic
international system of ‘self-help,’ where states seek to maximize relative power. If nuclear
weapons exist in the international community, then under realism, states would make the
rational decision to develop the same capability to protect their interests. However, we see a
large number of non-nuclear states in this environment and wide support for the NPT. 17
Paul also examines how well liberal institutionalism and interdependence predict
nuclear decisions. Under this theory, international institutions and reciprocal effects of
economic interdependence make military conquest difficult. 18 With smaller powers, acquiring
nuclear weapons would put interconnected economic interests at jeopardy. In addition, with a
robust and widely supported NPT regime, states can derive a stronger sense of security from
knowing that their economic partners are less likely to develop nuclear weapons; doing so would
clearly put these economic interests at risk. 19 Thus, economic interdependence begets security
interdependence. Additionally, institutions and regimes such as the NPT regulate state behavior
in many ways. Paul argues that this view supports non-acquisition of nuclear weapons as a
result of the NPT and IAEA, whereby these regimes alter actors’ interests as well as capabilities.
However, this theory does not explain why states would openly break the rules of these regimes
and leave them after adhering to their requirements. Because of this, Paul concludes that liberal
institutionalism and interdependence explain why states do not acquire nuclear weapons but
not why they chose to break from international regimes and obtain them.
To solve these issues, Paul draws on insights from both realism and liberalism to form
the idea of “prudent realism.” In “prudent realism,” interests drive national choices, but not
always in the direction of maximizing power through acquisition of arms. 20 Military policy
choices are driven by most probable threat assessments instead of worst-case scenarios, and
“the contexts and situations matter significantly in explaining the nuclear choices of nationstates.” 21 These nuclear choices depend largely on the level and type of security threats a state
faces; the nature of interactions and conflict with key adversaries and allies in their “immediate
geo-strategic environment” is important. 22 To describe these environments, Paul uses three
designators based on conflict. These are high, moderate, and low conflict zones with hybrid
zones of high/low, high/moderate, and moderate/low. He shows that states in high conflict
16 Paul, Power Versus Prudence, p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 7.
18 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
19 Ibid., p. 15.
20 Ibid., p. 5.
21 Ibid., p. 4.
22 Ibid.
58
zones are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons or break from international nuclear
nonproliferation regimes than those in zones of moderate or low conflict. Paul argues that
Australia is in a low conflict region that lacks credible threats, which explains their nonacquisition of nuclear arms. 23
National Identity Conception
The psychological effect of leaders on decision making in potential nuclear states is the focus of
Jacques Hymans’ book, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, and serves as a unique lens
through which to view Australian nuclear choices. This contrasts with Paul’s security-centric
approach by analyzing the effect of individual leaders and their conception of their nation’s
identity on the state’s nuclear policy.
Hymans states that the decision to go nuclear is “a leap in the dark,” which standard
political science theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism have difficulty explaining.
Hymans argues that this is due to the nature of nuclear decisions, where relevant information
about the consequences of a foreign policy decision is highly contradictory or unavailable; a
leader cannot wait for delivery of clarifying information. As a result, the leader’s individual
understanding of their state with respect to the rest of the world ultimately influences the
decision. 24 Because of this and the failure of current political theory to explain these decisions,
Hymans builds a new theoretical foundation, the National Identity Conception (NIC), which he
applies not to the government as a whole but to the leader of the nation in order to explain its
nuclear choices. 25
Each leader of a state has an “individual” understanding of their nation’s relationship to
other states in the international community. According to Hymans, this identity conception is
not a perception of contemporary reality but “an ongoing process of self-other comparison.” 26
He defines an NIC as “an individual’s understanding of the nation’s identity – his or her sense of
what the nation naturally stands for and of how high it naturally stands, on comparisons to
others in the international arena.” 27 A leader’s NIC is based on “a set of deep-seated, essentially
unfalsifiable beliefs about the ‘true’ nature of the nation, which are developed through
comparison and contrast with the ‘true’ nature ascribed to certain external others.” How a
leader’s NIC develops is not important – only that the leader has a stable NIC when coming into
office to draw from when making nuclear choices. 28
Hymans utilizes the two dimensions of the NIC, “what the nation stands for” and “how
high the nation stands,” to view the “us” versus “them” comparison to an adversarial “other”
state. He divides this comparison into interpersonal social comparisons of solidarity and status.
The solidarity dimension views the world either as an “us and them” or “us versus them”
dichotomy, which Hymans terms as “sportsmanlike” or “oppositional,” respectively. For the
status dimension, Hymans labels the comparison to other states as “nationalist” if the leader
views the “other” as lesser or equal to his or her own state, and “subaltern” if the leader’s state is
viewed as less than the “other.” These comparisons result in four possible outcomes:
oppositional nationalist, sportsmanlike nationalist, oppositional subaltern, and sportsmanlike
subaltern. These are listed in Table 1. Hymans argues that the combination of fear of external
23 Ibid., p. 79.
24 Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 12-13.
25 Ibid., p. 12-13.
26 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
27 Ibid., p. 13.
28 Ibid., p. 19.
59
threat and pride in their nation’s relative power can cause leaders with oppositional nationalist
NICs to move more easily towards developing nuclear weapons.
Table 1 - Four Ideal Typical NICs and Evaluation Values 29
Status Dimension
Solidarity Dimension
Us and Them (0 value)
Us versus Them (1 value)
We are Naturally their Equals
if not their Superiors (1 value)
Sportsmanlike Nationalist
(0,1)
Oppositional Nationalist
(1,1)
We are naturally below them
(0 value)
Sportsmanlike Subaltern
(0,0)
Oppositional Subaltern
(1,0)
Hymans’ NIC theoretical framework is useful in understanding Australia’s nuclear policy
because it can also answer “ancillary nuclear policy questions” like the decision to develop a
nuclear technology capability, resist the restraints on nuclear technology development in the
NPT, and decisions regarding superpower protection in the form of a nuclear “umbrella.” 30
While Hymans notes these decisions are not as important as deciding to obtain nuclear weapons,
they do reflect the NIC implicit in leaders’ nuclear choices. In the case of Australia, PMs’ NICs
can possibly explain their recent decisions on uranium enrichment technology and the
connection to Japan in terms of Australia’s concern over the strength of the U.S. extended
deterrence.
Constructivism
Constructivism regards the facts of international politics not as a reflection of objective material
reality, but as an inter-subjective social reality. 31 In other words, these interactions result in
creation and reconstruction of state interests and identities over time instead of a continual
pursuit of power or material gains argued by realism and liberalism. “Constructivism sees the
world as a project under construction, as becoming, rather than being.” 32
Concerning nuclear weapons, constructivism suggests that multilateral institutions and
state interaction can socialize states and transform their basic preferences so that nuclear
weapons are no longer acceptable or needed as a part of national defense. 33 This change in basic
preferences results in institutions with rules and norms regarding the acquisition of nuclear
weapons such as the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ).
Methodology
Prudent realism’s explanation as to why nation-states acquire nuclear weapons or forswear
them is useful in studying Australian nuclear policy because it analyzes the security threats and
interactions of states in the region with an emphasis on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For
29 Ibid., p. 25.
30 Ibid., p. 37.
31 van Wyk et al., “The international politics of nuclear weapons,” p. 24.
32 Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations - The Epistemic Foundations of
International Relations, New International Relations (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 95.
33 Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, GA:
University of Georgia Press, 2009), p. 3.
60
evaluating Paul’s “prudent realism” theory, I will draw upon government statements,
bureaucratic documents, security threats and regional dynamics with other states. In this
evaluation, I will examine Australia and the greater Pacific region in terms of Paul’s conflict
region designation and determine if the context and situation that Australia faces determines
their security-based interaction with other states. If “prudent realism” best explains Australia’s
nuclear policy, we would expect to see a relationship between variances in security threats and
changes in nuclear policy.
To evaluate Hymans’ theory of NICs, I will specifically use the method outlined by
Hymans to evaluate the current Australian PM, Kevin Rudd, who took office in late 2007, as well
as the previous PM, John Howard (1996-2007). The selection of these PMs will be sufficient to
capture the period of Australian involvement in Northeast Asia and their resulting nuclear
policies.
Hymans’ quantitative research methodology is recreated by analyzing public references
to other countries and international groups by the PMs in speeches emulating the U.S. State of
the Union. If these speeches are unavailable, lesser options such as broad foreign affairs
speeches to national audiences or foreign policy issue speeches will suffice. With this evidence, I
will assess both the solidarity and status dimensions by calculating a value for each on a scale of
zero to one. If the speaker is more sportsmanlike on the solidarity dimension, then we would
expect a dimension value closer to zero, if more oppositional the value would be closer to one.
On the status dimension, a value closer to zero signifies that the speaker has a subaltern view
and closer to one represents a nationalist one. Table 1 shows the dimension values and
corresponding NICs. After determining the dimensions of each, I will analyze the results and
assign one of the NICs listed in Table 1 to evaluate their stance on ancillary nuclear choices such
as extended deterrence, pursuit of nuclear technology, and nonproliferation.
If the PM has an NIC of oppositional-nationalist, suggesting they want to obtain a
nuclear weapon, we would expect them to begin indigenous nuclear technology programs, resist
the NPT, and likely accept extended deterrence guarantees or maintain their application. 34 If the
PMs’ NICs were oppositional subaltern, then due to their oppositional but low relative power we
would expect them to have a stronger concern for extended deterrence guarantees from a
superpower than other NICs, in addition to stronger support for the NPT and less support for
developing indigenous nuclear technology. 35 The sportsmanlike nationalist NIC would not likely
fear an adversarial “other” but would seek to maintain national prestige and standing. Thus, we
would see the PM move to build nuclear technology and resist the NPT, but not accept nuclear
security guarantees or seek weapons. 36 Finally, if the PM held a sportsmanlike subaltern NIC,
then we would not expect any movement to build a nuclear program, resist the NPT or seek an
extended deterrent due to their low conception of relative standing and desire to maintain
international interconnectivity. 37
For analyzing Australian nuclear policy utilizing constructivist theory, I will examine
international rules, norms, and interests and whether Australia adheres to, supports, and rejects
them. In addition, I will examine their actions in international regimes and interactions with
other states with respect to nuclear weapons. I will draw on bureaucratic programs, government
speeches, and participation in international nuclear regimes to determine international norms
and rules, as well as how Australia identifies with nuclear weapons.
34 Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 38.
35 Ibid., p. 39.
36 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
37 Ibid., p. 40.
61
If constructivism best explains the Australian nuclear policy, then we would expect to see
Australian interests based on global rules and norms with respect to nuclear weapons. One
specific way to analyze a shared norm is by analyzing whether Australian actions reflect a
general norm to limit nuclear weapons or if their actions are part of the larger “nuclear taboo,”
which focuses on maintaining the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. In either case, this
analysis will provide insight on the applicability of constructivism to Australian nuclear policy.
Analysis
Prudent Realism
Following Paul’s initial survey of Australian nuclear choices, the focus of Australian nuclear
policy should depend on the immediate geo-strategic environment of the South Pacific.
Evaluation of the level of conflict or cooperation with neighbors in this region shows that since
Paul’s analysis, regional security, at-least in the eyes of Australian leadership, has only increased,
as Australia has formed bilateral development agreements with Papua New Guinea 38 and
Indonesia. 39 While Australia has engaged militarily in East Timor and the Solomon islands in
recent years, these threats constitute low-level regional conflicts and not anything that would
openly threaten Australian security and thus possibly change Australia’s calculus on nuclear
issues.
If the immediate environment of Australia is a relatively low conflict area, then why
formulate policy and focus on Northeast Asia? If we assume the immediate geo-strategic
environment includes Northeast Asia, one possibility is that Australian security primarily
depends on the U.S. extended deterrent. A loss of confidence in the credibility or effectiveness of
U.S extended deterrence in the region, possibly by other states under the “umbrella” such as
Japan or South Korea, could increase Australian nuclear security concerns. Some foreign policy
scholars, who have suggested that the foreign policy objectives of Australia should not rely on
the strength of the U.S. extended deterrent, support this view. 40 Highlighting the level of conflict
in the area, Australia and Japan signed a security agreement in 2007, which some believe is to
ameliorate Japanese military strategic anxiety while strengthening against Chinese military
influence. 41 Additionally, Paul states that the region is a high/moderate conflict zone, and that
recent actions by North Korea, the ongoing conflict over the Taiwan Strait, and sometimescontentious Japanese and Chinese relations support this assessment. Economically, Australia
has increased its trade with both China and Japan over the past decade. These increases, as
highlighted by PM Rudd, suggests that economic interconnectivity has increased in the region. 42
Incidentally, the former state was once the main security concern for Australian leaders when
assessing their options on nuclear weapons. 43 For Paul, the economic interconnectivity of states
in a region supports prudent realism, because the more interconnected states are with their
neighbors, the less likely they are to make nuclear choices that would create security anxieties in
the region.
38 Kevin Rudd, “Address to the PNG Business and Alumni Breakfast” (speech, Port Moresby, Papua New
Guinea, March 7, 2008).
39 Kevin Rudd, “Australia and Indonesia – Inseparable Partners Working Together and Working
Together in the World” (speech, Jakarta, Indonesia, June 13, 2008).
40 Robyn Lim, “Australia and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence, ” Centre for Independent Studies Issue
Analysis no. 82 (March 1, 2007); Heinrichs, “Australia's Nuclear Dilemma.”
41 Lim, “Australia's New Security Agreement with Japan,” p. 12.
42 Kevin Rudd, “Address to the East Asia Forum in conjunction with the Australian National University,
Advancing Australia's Global and Regional Economic Interests” (Sydney, Australia, March 26, 2009).
43 Paul, Power Versus Prudence, p. 74.
62
However, with regard to Japan and U.S. extended deterrence, the 2009 Defense White
paper explicitly emphasizes the continued integration and stability of the U.S. and Japanese
alliance. The report notes that if Japan were unable to rely on the U.S. security guarantee, their
strategic outlook would look very different and it would be “compelled to re-examine its
strategic posture and capabilities.” 44 Additionally, the White Paper specifically states that the
government considers that a stable extended nuclear deterrent “will continue to be a feature of
the international system for the foreseeable future, and in this context extended deterrence will
continue to be viable.” 45 Therefore, this implies that Australian security interests connected to
U.S. extended deterrence are not a likely reason for increased Australian focus on Northeast
Asia unless serious doubts arise about the wisdom in relying on the U.S. to maintain a regional
security balance.
Concerning the security agreement with Japan, Australia’s new PM, Kevin Rudd, had
been “circumspect” about possibly expanding Japanese military power. 46 This position is likely
due to the history of Japanese troops arriving on Australian shores during World War II,
something many Australians still remember. 47 This suggests a conflict on how best to integrate
Northeast Asia into Australian security planning. Furthermore, the new Defense White Paper
highlights the importance of maintaining a strong alliance with the U.S. – a partner whose
involvement in the region is unlikely to change in the near future – rather than increasing
Australian involvement, as the key to maintaining regional security.
Prudent realism does not adequately explain threats to the effectiveness of U.S. extended
nuclear deterrence efforts or security interdependence. From a security standpoint, the
government does not directly support assertions that Australia should not rely on U.S. extended
deterrence for security. Furthermore, the security environment in the immediate area is unlikely
to change significantly to the point that would openly affect Australia and raise security
concerns. Finally, security interdependence is not a strongly supported explanation, as we must
extend Australia’s geo-strategic environment into Northeast Asia to find a high/medium conflict
region where Australia’s actions begin to adhere to prudent realism’s assumptions.
National Identity Conceptions
In determining John Howard’s NIC, analysis of selected speeches from 1996 to 2007 revealed
that the “other” he most referred to was Iraq, with 24 mentions. 48 Terrorism and Afghanistan
were mentioned less frequently, suggesting that his primary comparison “other” was in the
Middle East and a reflection of history during his tenure. Howard referenced other international
entities that Iraq and Australia were both part of only 13 times. Using these values, I calculated
his solidarity value as 0.65, 49 which indicates a more oppositional NIC as indicated earlier in
44 Joel Fitzgibbon, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, Defense White Paper 2009, p. 33.
45 Ibid., p. 39.
46 Lim, “Australia's New Security Agreement with Japan,” p. 14.
47 Ibid., p. 12.
48 An official list of John Howards’ speeches was not available online or was no longer in print for
analysis. However, many speeches were archived on internet sites and used for this analysis. While there
are limitations to using this method, the analysis indicates that these results are within expected values of
Liberal Party membership, which was also argued by Hymans. A more systematic approach to analyzing
John Howard’s NIC may be necessary in future studies.
49 The solidarity dimension is calculated by taking the number of other references and dividing them by
the sum of other and international group references.
63
Table 1. For the status dimension, PM Howard referenced Iraq unscreened 50 six times versus 10
screened references. This results in a 0.38 value 51 on the status dimension, suggesting a
subaltern conception. These results indicate that PM Howard’s NIC is oppositional-subaltern.
After analysis of Kevin Rudd’s speeches since 2007, I calculated that his most referenced
country or entity is China with 31 references, and that he mentioned Japan and Terrorism 15
times each. Using China as the “other,” I then utilized referenced groups that China and
Australia where both part and calculated 53 references. The resulting .37 value for Kevin Rudd’s
solidarity dimension, suggests a more sportsmanlike view. For the status dimension, I took the
references to China and calculated six unscreened references to 25 screened. The resulting
calculation provides a value of .19 on the status scale, signifying a subaltern conception of
Australia by Kevin Rudd. Thus, the results of my analysis conclude that Kevin Rudd has a
sportsmanlike-subaltern NIC.
NIC Application
Howard’s oppositional-subaltern NIC helps explain Australia’s decision not to pursue nuclear
weapons during Howard’s time in office. On ancillary choices, this NIC suggests he would focus
attention on a nuclear guarantee, not resist the NPT, and not develop autonomous nuclear
technology with respect to Iraq and the Middle East. Howard’s government did maintain a longstanding relationship with the United States and supported them in the Afghanistan and Iraq
wars by sending troops. Additionally, the Howard government was a supporter of the NPT, not
an opponent of it. In fact, Howard refused to sell Australian mined uranium to India unless they
signed the NPT. 52 However, with regard to nuclear technology, Howard indicated the possibility
of developing indigenous nuclear enrichment technology. 53 The main impetus for this decision
was to support the U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, where states would buy uranium for
nuclear power from a group of suppliers and return the spent fuel to them. While this decision
would seem unrelated to the threats to Australia and nuclear choices, foreign policy scholars
have indicated that Australia may want to build an indigenous nuclear “lead-time” capability by
developing an enrichment program. 54 This capability would allow Australia to obtain the
technology required to begin a nuclear weapons program more quickly if security threats
warranted. The program to enrich uranium did not begin as Howard left office in 2007.
Rudd’s sportsmanlike-subaltern NIC also explains continuance of the decision not to
develop nuclear weapons, and predicts that he is likely to view international security issues as
requiring international cooperation or multilateral solutions. This NIC suggests he would not
choose to reject the NPT, develop indigenous nuclear capabilities, or rely on a nuclear security
guarantee. In the first two of these criteria, Rudd’s actions support his NIC. Thus far, Rudd has
fervently upheld the ideals of the NPT, supporting many of the positions made by the Howard
government. Additionally, he has not signaled the development of an enrichment capability.
However, Rudd seems to support the alliance with the United States much more than Howard
did. In the latest Defense White Paper, there are numerous mentions of the alliance with regard
50 Screened references are those where the state references an ally or group when citing the “other” such
as “Australia joins the United States in fighting terrorism.” Unscreened references are specific state and
“other” comparisons.
51 The status dimension is calculated by taking the number of unscreened references to the “other”
divided by the sum of unscreened and screened references.
52 Mark Dodd, “No uranium sales until India signs NPT,” The Australian, January 16, 2008.
53 Paul Maley, “PM backs nuclear enrichment plan,” The Australian, June 15, 2007.
54 Heinrichs, “Australia's Nuclear Dilemma,” p. 66.
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to security in Northeast Asia and specific attention to the importance of extended deterrence,
not something expected from a sportsmanlike-subaltern NIC according to Hymans.
Using Hymans’ theory of NICs can explain some of the nuclear choices made by both
Howard and Rudd, but does not explain everything. Howard did express interest in creating an
Australian enrichment program, which if needed would decrease the time required to start an
independent nuclear program. Howard indicated this interest in 2007, within a year of North
Korea’s nuclear test. So far, there is nothing to suggest that this was in reaction to a perceived
threat, but his NIC does not imply that, if there were one perceived, this would be the result.
With respect to Rudd, his sportsmanlike-subaltern NIC does not completely explain the
attention to the U.S. alliance and extended deterrence to maintain security in the Asia-Pacific
region.
Constructivism
In the case of Australia, there are prominent indicators that a state identity with respect to
nuclear weapons exists and can help in understanding Australian nuclear policy choices.
Australia’s involvement in the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction runs long and deep.
Australia created an international export control regime – the Australia Group – to limit the
spread of chemical and biological weapons materials, is part of all nuclear and missile export
control regimes, and has initiated several other efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.
While Australia was a reluctant supporter of NPT early on, they have since become a strong
proponent of its continued success, recently supporting the 6-party talks to solve the North
Korean nuclear issue. 55 In 1983, Australia initiated the creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
(NWFZ) in the South Pacific, created the independent Canberra Commission on the Elimination
of Nuclear Weapons in 1995, and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
Additionally, public support for nuclear power and weapons has remained low since the
1970’s. 56 This trend reflects not just the decreasing legitimacy of nuclear weapons in public
opinion, but also an effort to institutionalize the international norm on the prohibition of
nuclear weapons. 57 Furthermore, the construction of this norm occurred over the span of
multiple changes in leadership.
Although Australia has a distinct history of developing a norm against nuclear weapons
proliferation, can constructivism explain their recent connection to Japan and North Korean
nuclear proliferation? While the most recent Defense White Paper discusses the security
concerns of the region, and a link exists between Japan and Australia through U.S. extended
deterrence, two facts suggest a normative explanation. First, North Korea and China are not
directly threatening Australia. North Korean nuclear capabilities are not likely to threaten
Australia significantly nor has North Korea threatened them openly, as they have Japan. 58
Furthermore, China does not target Australia with nuclear weapons, while it does target
Japan. 59 While one could argue that the extended deterrence guarantee to Australia is a reason
55 Alexander Downer, “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons” (statement, New York, NY, May 2, 2005).
56 Andrew Macintosh, “Who Wants a Nuclear Power Plant? Support for nuclear power in Australia,” The
Australia Institute, no. 50 (March 2007): 1-12; Elizabeth Keenan, “Plugging into Nuclear,” Time, June 12,
2006.
57 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear NonUse,” International Organization Vol. 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): p. 436.
58 Johnathan Tirone, “North Korea Threatens War Against Japan Over Missile,” Bloomberg News,
March 31, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aoXwM34Au.xI.
59 Heinrichs, “Australia's Nuclear Dilemma,” p. 64.
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for this, Japan is under the same guarantee and yet faces nuclear threats and targeting. The
second fact is that Australia has a strong, ongoing relationship with Japan regarding nuclear
disarmament. Both of these revelations indicate that there may be more involved than security
concerns alone, and that Australia’s history of supporting international nonproliferation norms
exerts influence on its nuclear policy decisions, including those in Northeast Asia.
Beginning with the Howard government, we see a continued effort to support the NPT,
suggesting an adherence to the norm against nuclear weapons. Although the Howard
government was not as fervent a supporter as its predecessors, it did not openly, or secretly, try
to thwart NPT provisions. With regard to uranium sales, Australia has had a long-standing law
prohibiting sales of uranium to non-NPT members. In 2006, India sought to purchase uranium
from Australia. The Howard government responded by stating that it would only sell uranium if
India agreed to adhere to the safeguard rules and regulations of the NPT, 60 bringing them
partially under the NPT without ratification. Furthermore, the Howard government was a key
supporter of many U.S. initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
and the Proliferation Security Initiative, aimed at combating illicit trade of nuclear technology
and material. While the Howard government did not pursue international disarmament efforts
with the urgency of earlier PMs, the underlying position has not changed, 61 as indicated by PM
Rudd’s action. Upon entering office, PM Rudd quickly reversed course on the Howard
government’s uranium sale compromise with India, 62 and met with Japanese leaders to
continue support for nuclear disarmament. 63 Furthermore, Australia and Japan formed the
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in June 2008 “to
reinvigorate international efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in the context
of both the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and beyond.” 64 Recently,
Rudd’s foreign defense minister reiterated Australia’s commitment to working with Japan to
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. 65 Although PM Rudd has only been in office a short
time, based on public opinion towards nuclear weapons and Australia’s long history in support
of the norm against nuclear weapons acquisition, it is unlikely that he would drastically change
course and develop an Australian weapons program.
A long history of building on the international norm against acquisition of nuclear
weapons is readily apparent in Australia. From early PMs to the Rudd administration, one can
see consistent institutionalization of this norm in the actions of each government. Furthermore,
explaining Australia’s interest in Northeast Asia and its interaction with Japan through
constructivism more strongly supports the notion that these actions are a continuation of
upholding an international norm on the prohibition of nuclear acquisition.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to determine the best model for explaining Australian nuclear
policy in order to provide insight not addressed by current literature. To approach this puzzle, I
chose not to use the traditional theories of realism and liberalism, instead focusing on works
60 ABC and AFP, “PM ready to re-examine uranium policy,” ABC News Online, March 6, 2006,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200603/s1584452.htm.
61 Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 140.
62 Dodd, “No uranium sales until India signs NPT.”
63 Rudd, “Building a Better World Together.”
64 AFP, “Australian PM proposes new non-proliferation body,” Google News, June 9, 2008,
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hxoy74gUFWTFDZlsr0D8fCdAT27w.
65 Stephen Smith, “Japan and Australia: A Vision for the Future” (speech, Australian National University,
Canberra, March 18, 2009).
66
that offered new perspectives on nuclear choices and Australia, specifically. After utilizing the
theories of “prudent realism,” National Identity Conceptions, and constructivism to explore
Australia’s foreign policy, the evidence indicates a constructivist explanation more readily than
“prudent realism” or NIC analysis. Prudent realism does not sufficiently explain Australian
actions and interests in Northeast Asia due to prudent security calculations, nor does the
evidence support a strong focus on security interdependence in the region. While the NIC theory
does well in explaining some nuclear choices, it does not clearly explain possible nuclear
enrichment programs or the reliance of PM Rudd on the U.S. extended deterrent. However,
when analyzing the normative history of Australian nuclear choices and comparing those
choices to recent relations with Japan, concerns over North Korean proliferation, and regional
interests, constructivism best explains Australian policy. Only by understanding the normative
history of Australia and nuclear weapons can one see their recent nuclear policy decisions as an
extension of support for that normative identity.
Finding Implications
Concluding that Australian nuclear policy is best explained through constructivism has
implications on future nuclear decisions and is important for two reasons. First, it is unlikely
that Australia would quickly develop a nuclear weapons program should Japan or other U.S.
allies do so. The normative identity that Australia has developed since the 1970’s is unlikely to
be reconstructed quickly or radically. Secondly, a drawdown in nuclear weapon stockpiles, as the
“Global Zero” movement advocates, would not likely change Australian security choices, since
they are one of its primary proponents. Indeed, it is an integral part of their non-nuclear identity.
Further Research
While constructivism does well to explain Australia’s actions, it is in what T.V. Paul describes as
a low conflict region of the world. Can constructivism explain state actions in high conflict
areas? Japan offers an interesting case in this regard, as they are in a high conflict region, yet
adhere to a strong nuclear nonproliferation norm. However, they also have a highly advanced
nuclear power industry and infrastructure, which could quickly be turned towards creating a
weapons program if needed. Thus, exploring Japan’s nuclear choices from a purely
constructivist approach would be the next logical step in exploring this paper’s implications on
other states and regions.
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