Summary of 2013 Summer Workshop Presentations
During the 2013 Summer Workshop, each participant presented a paper for discussion with their peers.
These topics engage with the subject of “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Challenges,
Opportunities and Perspectives”. A summary of each participant’s presentation, written by Hisae
Kawamori, can be found below.
A complementary Understanding of International Nuclear Security Instruments:
Focusing on Physical Protection and Criminalising Related Offences
By Onur Güven
The collection of international instruments on nuclear security has been developed
relatively recently and is faced with certain challenges. For example, neither the CPPNM
(Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material) nor the CPNNMNF
(Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material) have
reached universality. In case of CPPNMNF, it hasn’t even been ratified by two thirds of
the State Parties to the CPPNM.
Besides, the collection of international instruments on nuclear security is not a holistic
system. They have various scopes and definitions in use whereby it becomes
challenging to correctly adopt these instruments into national policies. There is a risk
that non-state actors may exploit the weakest chain in the international network as
their base or target for a criminal offence. In addition, many of the instruments
adopted by the IAEA in the Nuclear Security Series are not always suitable to function
as instruments like treaties do in the legislative sense.
Finally, UNSC 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) are not vital instruments and do not have
the jurisdiction to adopt legislative measures which fall within the mandate of the
General Assembly. They are a pleasant reinforcement to the regime on nuclear security
and a means to measure and align support by UN Member States, but they could expose
weaknesses of nuclear security, should the support on implementing these resolutions
weaken and should States interpret the resolutions strictly, using the textual and
historical limitations of the UN Charter.
Much more work needs to be done for nuclear security and there is a need to bring all
these instruments together to establish a global network of regime.
Coherence, Fragmentation and Exclusions in the International Legal Regime to
Counter Nuclear Terrorisms
By Matthew Hoisington
For fear of nuclear terrorism and its unique transnational nature, concerted action has
been taken at the international level. Legal instruments, such as the International
Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and its 2005 amendment), Security
Council resolution 1540, and other legal instruments such as Non-Proliferation Treaty
have been adopted. Specially, ICSANT was drafted expressly to address the threat of
nuclear terrorism, and it provides a formally coherent system of rules to counter the
particular issue of nuclear terrorism as well as the mechanism to enhance functional
coordination between the different prominent actors who are seized with addressing
the threat.
However, the fragmentation of this international legal regime makes the Convention
difficult to be an organizing force. The implementation of these legal instruments at
the national level is also questionable.
For these problems, preliminary suggestions might include amending ICSANT’s
provisions to allow for increased practical cooperation between the various prominent
actors, particularly on the issue of prevention and threat-monitoring, operationalizing
article 20 of ICSANT as a vehicle for convening formal meetings of States Parties and
undertaking a thorough review of the domestic implementation of ICSANT’s obligations.
It will also be useful to obtain a clear understanding from representatives of State
Parties and the relevant specialized agencies on the utility of ICSANT as the central
instrument to counter nuclear terrorism.
The fragmentation in the legal order has created fragmentation operationally, which,
although not without certain advantages, necessitates effective institutional methods
of cooperation. Particularly, international administrative law can be put to use to
effectively organize the administrative and interactive functions of the different actors.
Putting in place the bare minimum of administrative structures, such as secretariats,
mechanisms for continuous review and mandated lines of communication, and
combining them with a generally applicable set of operating principles, could, if
properly planned and executed, achieve this objective.
In addition, a better understanding of the juridical justifications offered by terrorists in
their pursuit of nuclear terrorism and related activities must be achieved. This will
enable the international community to address one important aspect of the conditions
conducive to nuclear terrorism, namely, the use and issue of juridical reasoning by
terrorists to justify clearly odious acts.
Partial Nuclear Disarmament Measures and the Step-by-Step Approach
By Michael Spies
The step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament still remains active and is supported.
The prevailing notion of this approach goes back to 1957, [when then United States
President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a two-year suspension of nuclear weapon
testing with an inspection system], and since then, treaties on elimination of
production of fissile materials, nuclear testing, constraint of the State’s ability to
manufacture nuclear weapon and technology, and reduction of the stockpile of nuclear
weapons have been created.
The step-by-step approach is still considered the only pathway since State’s domestic
interest is a real barrier to comprehensive nuclear disarmament.
Today, alongside the step-by-step approach, there is an effort to enhance the UN’s
ability to reduce the military expenditure of its Member Sates. A lot of civil societies
have also been active in promoting nuclear disarmament, which has given rise to a new
approach to disarmament, the humanitarian approach. Since it was introduced in 2010,
this approach has been a vehicle for support of nuclear disarmament.
A Rights-Based Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
By Mutony Mubiala
A competitive approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (NDNP) is
prevalent but it is problematic. Over two decades, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been promoting the application of a
rights-based approach to UN international cooperation programmes and activities,
including in the field of peace and security. Integrating the human rights-based
approach contributes to a shift from competitive approach to NDNP.
States possessing nuclear weapons are categorized into two categories: democratic
weapon States and non-democratic weapon States. For democratic weapon States,
disarmament and non-proliferation policy should be implemented at the national level
and the serious and massive consequences of use of a nuclear weapon should be
stressed as a massive violation of human rights. These States are party to the Human
Rights Treaties, which will protect their population from such violations.
In addition, unilateral measures may encourage other countries to take the same
measures. When Gorbachev came into power, the USSR was facing an economic crisis,
and he took unilateral measures, withdrawing nuclear arsenals from Eastern Europe.
Unilateral and a confidence-building approach is important for NDNP. UN SecretaryGeneral, Ban Ki-moon addressed the Monterey Institute for International Studies with
the following: “Be a first mover. Don't look to others or to your neighbours to start
disarmament and arms control measures.”
The Challenge of Non-State Actors in a State-Based Regime
Fiona Simpson
Regime theory was created in the 1970s and many of the political theories in the 80s
were about the regime; for example, in 1982, the journal International Relations was
entirely dedicated to regime theory. Once the regime is established, there was not
much room for discussion on why a regime occurs in the first place and why it matters.
After that, a neo-liberal approach was introduced to theory, which focuses less on
power but more on cooperation.
At the end of the 80s, the rise of the cognitivist’s approach influenced regime theory.
This approach is concerned more with dynamism and the process of how the regime is
made. According to this theory, the regime constantly needs to be changed.
Since the 1990s, regime theory has fallen out of favor. A non-nuclear proliferation
regime is a counterpoint to all of these previous regimes. The first example was India’s
nuclear weapons test in 1974. India was not part of the NPT. International reaction to
this test varied and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed to check
international nuclear proliferation. What was shocking to the Western world politically
was the nuclear capability of developing countries.
The revelation of Iran’s nuclear programme in 1991 lead IAEA to do an entire
verification, giving the agency a role in the regime, from accounting to verification. In
1997, an additional protocol was added to the NPT and the verifying approach was put
in place.
The 1981 bombing by Israel revealed that Iraq was developing a nuclear programme
contrary to the IAEA recommendations, but nothing really happened afterwards. Cluster
events happened in the early 2000s, such as 9.11, the Iraq War and Libya’s nuclear
development, yet little development in political theory has been seen since the last
change.
Academic theories of the regime hold up the reality of how a non-nuclear proliferation
regime works in practice, and practitioners should cooperate more with academia.
Understanding how a regime changes and strengthening the regime rather than
undermining it may help us prevent future conflicts.
Deterring the ‘Undeterrable’
Mark MacKew
Deterrence theory was developed during the Cold War but it can still be used today for
extreme terrorist organizations. Deterrence can be categorized into two types;
deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. For deterrence theory to work, we
have to have certain conditions. Most importantly, we have to assume or presume that
the other actor is rational and one must have leverage over something the other actor
values. The more these conditions are met, the more the theory works.
Deterrence by punishment is losing value in academia and in policy-making. Its validity
was questioned even during the Cold War. On the other hand, deterrence by denial
seems more valid and supported by the US government. It is based on the assumption
that if both actors are rational, the adversary is able to formulate a cost- benefit
analysis of their actions. This deterrence can be realized by increasing the perceived
costs of the value item or decreasing the perceived benefits of the value item.
As for the tools of the UN and the global system against nuclear terrorism, there is
UNSCR 1540, which is universal and gives incentives to States to achieve the goal of
the resolution. Others are the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and
materials of mass destruction, and Zangger Committee and Non Suppliers Group, which
work well with UNSCR 1540.
For the future of deterrence and the UN’s role, it is important to develop non-nuclear
security, which assists non-nuclear States and develop States in forming and increasing
their security, especially in terms of supply-chain security. It is also necessary to
understand the complexity of different systems, such as law enforcement, border patrol,
finances, as well as to anticipate new risks through macro-prudential policy and
continue to form policy with deterrence as an objective.
The Humanitarian Initiative to Non-Nuclear Proliferation
Junko Hirakawa
The total elimination of chemical weapons is almost impossible and it’s not even
covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention. About 2 years ago, one chemical
component actually killed around 40,000 people within 24 hours, causing extensive air
and marine pollution. The same chemical component damaged another community last
year. Since 1990, civil society has been calling for the total ban on this chemical
component, but so far no State has created a law actually banning it. This is actually an
analogy and the chemical component discussed here is water – but as you know, no one
can really prohibit water- but this analogy is a good example to question the State’s
ability to completely control anything.
The outcome of 2010 NPT RevCov expresses its concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and appeals to Member
States to comply with applicable international law. However, can we really eliminate
nuclear weapons because of the humanitarian impact they may cause?
In fact, the Humanitarian Initiative promoted at the Oslo conference in 2013 as the
consequence of 2010 NPT RevCon is not the first time when the international
community tries to prohibit nuclear weapon in light of its humanitarian consequences.
In 1996, the advisory opinion of the ICJ, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons”, says “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the
principles and rules of humanitarian law” but it implies that the use of nuclear weapons
may be legal if it’s exercised as self-defense, and it did not really touch upon the
legality of nuclear threat. But the new development in the outcome of the 2010 NPT
RevCon is that it omitted the word “threat” and condemns only “any use of nuclear
weapons.” You can interpret it as saying that nuclear deterrence is permitted. Even
Pope John Paul II mentioned that nuclear deterrence could be morally acceptable in his
speech in 1982. So the question lies in whether the Humanitarian Initiative is logical
enough to achieve what its promoters want, nuclear non-proliferation.
Red Line Politics: Why Do States Place Thresholds on Foreign Nuclear Programs?
Todd C. Robinson
On September 27, 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu identified a nuclear
red line for Iran that, if crossed, may lead to the use of military force to prevent Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Israel’s red line for Iran would be the enrichment of
uranium beyond the 90% threshold typically considered necessary for the production of
uranium-based nuclear weapons. Shortly before this pronouncement, the Obama
administration also stated that they would not allow Iran to manufacture nuclear
weapons but stopped short of publicly stating a threshold beyond which Iran would not
be allowed to cross.
Even if the United States or anyone else places a red line, it remains unclear how much
it is able to influence Iran’s decision to develop nuclear weapons or not. Under the
terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is guaranteed the right to
enrich uranium to any level they desire, as long as it is not used in the production of
nuclear weapons. The “dual-use problem”- the fact that virtually all of the
technologies required to produce nuclear weapons may be obtained as a part,
byproduct, or under the guise of other nuclear technologies – makes it difficult to
determine whether the State is developing a nuclear weapon or not. Placing a red line
may also strengthen Iran’s resolve to actually produce nuclear weapons.
This research attempts to develop an understanding of whether the placement of red
lines in general, or specific types of red lines, makes it more or less likely that the
target State acquiesces to the sender’s demands. In addition, it will seek to develop an
understanding of the various factors that may influence whether States, and the United
States in particular, place formal nuclear red lines when proliferation by another State is
suspected. The research first reviews the extant literature on bargaining, international
negotiations, and nuclear proliferation, then turns to a brief review of the literature on
red lines before moving on to an explanation of our new approach to the empirical
study of red lines, which includes a detailed theoretical argument on the logic of red
line creation and placement. Next, it tests the theory using a focused comparison of a
select number of cases. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of our findings and the
implications of the research for both the academic and policy communities.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
Isabelle Anstey
This research aims to question why the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exists: what
factors led to its creation, why did it take the form it did, and why did it behave the
way it did. The NSG is an informal, non-binding ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by a group of
States to enact certain domestic legislation. It has no foundation in international law
and has no way to be monitored. There is no obligatory reporting, verification or record
of successes or failures. Nevertheless, it is credited with introducing and later
improving the level of control exercised over sales of sensitive nuclear technology, the
benefit of non-proliferation efforts. The informal, secretive, ad hoc nature of the group
is a key feature of both its success and its limitations. Therefore understanding why it
has developed the way it has is crucial.
There are a number of key explanations competing for primacy suggested by different
theoretical approaches and studies into similar organizations. Some factors bring
pressure to bear from outside forces: commerce, politics, and legitimacy. There are then
internal factors inherent to the Group itself: membership, technology, and nonproliferation. These six factors will form the analytical framework of this research. What
pressures they bring to bear, how they are treated, the way they interact and how and
when individual factors dominate will bring a powerful understanding to the nature and
actions of the NSG.
Has the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) lost its relevance?
The case of North Korea and Iran
Maryam Kamali
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is still generally regarded as the centerpiece of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, recent nuclear proliferation by some
Member States of the NPT has led to renewed criticism of the Treaty. The two pillars of
the NPT, namely non-proliferation among non-nuclear-weapon States and the
obligation to eliminate nuclear arsenals among nuclear-weapon-States, may be in
danger of crumbling.
One shortcoming of the NPT is that while it proscribes non-nuclear member States from
acquiring nuclear weapons, it has yet to deal with non-signatory States and their
ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Other weaknesses of NPT include the ability for
Member States to withdraw from the NPT easily, such as the case of North Korea’s
withdrawal in 2003. In addition, there is a tension between the ability of members of
the NPT to pursue peaceful nuclear energy use, while at the same time empowering
them to get close to developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, as is the suspicion with
Iran.
Despite its shortcomings, the international community cannot abolish NPT. There is no
other way that 190 countries sit together for nuclear disarmament. Therefore an
amendment to NPT is necessary. For example, nuclear weapon States could make clear
and binding statements to non-nuclear weapon States of non-use of nuclear weapons
against them if such States are members of the NPT. Another idea is that if a State
violated its safeguards agreement prior to withdrawal from NPT, it should be punished
for that non-compliance even once it has completely withdrawn from the treaty. The
IAEA could also help incorporate the non-NPT States into the system as much as
possible by signing project-specific safeguards agreements with them. It is also
necessary to pursue more forcefully the requirement that nuclear weapon States disarm
for the treaty to have legitimacy.
The Iranian Nuclear Issue: Ongoing Stalemate and Possible Ways Out
Xiaoning Huang
The Iranian nuclear issue is extremely complex and can be examined from many
different perspectives. From a legal standpoint, Iranians say it’s their right under the
NPT to have peaceful nuclear technology and there is a debate as to whether the IAEA
exceeds its mandate regarding Iran. There is also a question regarding whether the
relevant Security Council resolutions against Iran should prevail the NPT. From a
technical standpoint, there is no consensus on whether Iran has nuclear weapons or
not and there is disagreement among the IAEA and Member States on how far away
Iran is from getting nuclear weapons. In political terms, Iran accuses the international
community of politicizing its nuclear programme and using a double standard to
address its nuclear programme. The Iranian nuclear issue has serious implications for
international peace and security and the most talked-about risk is the possible military
attacks by Israel and/or the US on Iran’s nuclear facility.
To address deep-rooted suspicions about Iran’s nuclear programme, the international
community has been employing a dual-track approach: on the one hand, while seeking
a negotiated political solution with Iran, the P5+1 impose a wide range of sanctions to
force Iran to the negotiating table; on the other, sanctions are reversible if the
conditions set by the P5+1 are met. However, despite unprecedented sanctions on Iran,
little progress has been made on the political front.
The possible ways out for the Iran’s nuclear problem includes: 1) Iran giving up its
nuclear programme or obtaining nuclear weapons [unlikely]; 2) the status quo
[unsustainable]; 3) A Middle East free of WMDs [unlikely]; 4) military solution [cannot
be ruled out but with devastating consequences]; 5) political solution [likely but
difficult: the key is US/Iran direct talks.]
There are high expectations for Dr. Rouhani’s presidency. He is a moderate cleric and a
former nuclear negotiator known as the “Diplomat Sheikh.” However, questions remain
as to whether the Supreme Leader delegates sufficient authority for Dr. Rouhani to cut
a deal with the US and whether the US is really ready for direct talks with Iran.
The Future of the Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East:
Challenges and Opportunities
Mina Rizk
Even forty years after the first initiative to create a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ)
in the Middle East, the efforts to create such a zone today are still centered on the
same regional security question. However, the fast-paced changes occurring in the
Middle East have multiplied the political dynamics and augmented the challenges to
reach a disarmament agreement, especially since these changes are closely related to
the main stakeholders of the initiative, namely the Arab States, Iran and Israel.
Understanding the development of the Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone
(WMDFZ) in Middle East initiative, and identifying the interests of it stakeholders verify
that the current changes in the Middle East present both challenges and opportunities
that the stakeholders and international co-sponsors should exploit in order to reach a
primary set of guidelines for the WMDFZ framework.
As for the policy recommendations for the international co-sponsors, the postponed
Helsinki Conference should be held before the RevCon in 2015 as well as more meetings
and regional conferences to discuss proposals and observations about the Confidence
Building Measures in the potential free zone. For civil society, spreading the culture of
disarmament is very important for non-proliferation. Having more work on the
grassroots level would work and give more pressure to governments to work on a
Nuclear-Free Zone. For the regional organizations, more discussions are needed and
holding the conference should be emphasized as an effective means to achieve a
Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East.
Obstacles to Nuclear Zero World
Dominique Hatiar
The idea of nuclear elimination was first mentioned by Albert Einstein. This idea was
submitted to the Oslo conference in 2008. In December 2008, the new initiative called
Global Zero was launched, bringing 300 political and visionary leaders together and
proposes a world free of nuclear weapons by 2030. The Global Zero does not accept
deterrence theory. The theory worked during the Cold War but today, countries in Asia
and Middle East might not enjoy the distance America and the USSR had during the
Cold War. The rise of new threats, such as terrorism, has been seen in recent years and
Global Zero finds it important to make an action immediately.
With the current nuclear non-proliferation regime, there is the danger of the domino
effect; in the long run, it is incredibly difficult to sustain the regime, including the
NPT. A moral argument (human-rights based approach) should also be considered. It is
necessary to zoom out of the national security system and move to more normative
ideas.
Some ideas for realizing a world free of nuclear weapons are: control of civil nuclear
activity; possible international ownership of fuel cycle facility; the building of
institutions to face the challenge of a nuclear free world; reduction of nuclear
stockpiles of the US and Russia; and creation of internationally controlled deterrence in
case someone cheats. As for verification methods, transparency is necessary and civilsociety monitoring is expected in the era of booming SNS.
“Safety of the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space: Measures at the
International and National Levels”
Sergiy Negoda
Space Nuclear Power Sources (NPS) have been developed and used in space applications
where unique mission requirements and constraints on electrical power and thermal
management precluded the use of non-nuclear power sources. According to current
knowledge and capabilities, space NPS are the only viable energy option to power some
space missions and significantly enhance others. Several ongoing and foreseeable
missions would not be possible without the use of space NPS. Past, present and
foreseeable space NPS applications include radioisotope power systems and nuclear
reactor systems for power and propulsion.
NPS have unique safety considerations compared with terrestrial applications. Unlike
many terrestrial nuclear applications, space applications tend to be used infrequently
and their requirements can vary depending upon the specific mission. Space NPS
regulations exist in the Russian Federation and the US. Argentina and China, as well as
the European Space Agency (and EC) have confirmed that their regulations are in the
development phase. These national regulations are in strict compliance with
international instruments and governments ensure continuous supervision.
UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was established by GA
resolution 1472 in 1959. It is mandated to review international cooperation in the
peaceful uses of outer space, devise programmes in this field to be undertaken under
the auspices of the UN, encourage continued research and dissemination of information
on outer space matters, and study legal problems arising from the exploration of outer
space. Its members are 74 Member States and 32 international, intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations with permanent observer status. In June 2013, two
more States were recommended for membership.
Recent achievements are the establishment of the UN Platform for Space-based
Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER) (2006),
establishment of the International Committee on Global Navigation System[s??????]
(ICG)(2006), Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (2007), and Safety Framework for the
Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (2009).
There is general satisfaction among existing and potential operators of space NPS. They
call for the strengthening of the relevant international framework through
implementation of the Safety Framework. A proposal should be made to develop
detailed and technical guidelines that might help to alleviate the concerns of many
developing countries about the effectiveness of the Safety Framework. It is also
necessary to promote a process that would create international norms and modify those
already in existence to regulate the use of NPS in outer space.