Judicial Reform as a Cornerstone of Public Service
[Speech delivered by Chief Justice Renato C. Corona of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
during the Philippine Constitution Association celebration of Philippine Independence Day, 11
June 2010, Manila Hotel.]
Officers of the Philippine Constitution Association,
fellow scholars of the law, distinguished guests, ladies and
gentlemen, a pleasant evening to you all. Before anything
else, my sincerest gratitude to your Chairman of the Board,
Minister Conrado F. Estrella, and President, Atty. Manuel
M. Lazaro, for inviting me to be your guest of honor and
speaker
tonight,
as
our
nation
celebrates
its
112th
Independence Day.
One
month
ago,
our
country
had
its
first-ever
automated elections. Come June 30, we will have an
entirely new administration. Perhaps, for the first time in
our history, the heads of the three branches of government
are or will be newly installed. This is significant because
the situation presents great opportunities to heal the
2
painful wounds our country is suffering from and thereby
usher in a new golden age of unity and economic strides.
As our 22nd Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno so eloquently
expressed
it
during
the
Justice
Sector
Coordinating
Council Special Session –
True, these institutions are independent and have
their own functions, but it ought to be clear and cannot be
denied that the justice sector must work in an
environment where there is interconnectivity. For reforms
in one institution entail consequences for others. Hence,
the success of reforms in one institution may be diluted by
the lack of reforms in another justice sector agency. In
effect, an injustice perpetuated in one justice sector agency
threatens the entire administration of justice in our
country.
The proposition is that if we want to have successful
reforms in our justice system, we must act as one, move
forward together, be guided by the singular goal of giving
justice to our people all in accord with the command of our
Constitution.
As the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, allow
me to speak on behalf of the judicial branch. Regrettably,
the judiciary has often been denigrated as the most benign
and least powerful branch of government. The celebrated
3
Montesquieu wrote that “[o]f the three powers above
mentioned,
the
judiciary
is
next
to
nothing.”1
The
perception that it is merely reactive and not proactive,
remedial and not protective, admittedly finds its roots in
traditional
orthodoxy.
Alexander
Hamilton
in
The
Federalist, No. 78, wrote –
The judiciary x x x x has no influence over either the
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of
the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor
WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments.
x x x x It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is
beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments
of power; that it can never attack with success either of
the two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it
to defend itself against their attacks x x x x
This view, however, no longer seems accurate in the
light of our fundamental law which has infused vigor,
muscle and intensity into the Court’s role in the nation’s
political life.
1
Indeed, in our jurisdiction, the days of
Spirit of Laws, vol. I, p. 186 – Publius.
4
Montesquieu and Hamilton, and the traditional role of the
judiciary, may have long been dead and gone. Sec. 1, Art.
VIII of the 1987 Constitution established a powerful
judiciary by expanding its judicial power to inquire into
political
questions.
Section
1
has
substantially
reformulated the political question doctrine which had, for
many years, limited the power of judicial review, as clearly
defined by Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel “with deft strokes and
in bold lines” in the seminal case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission,2
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, an eminent
member
2
of
the
63 Phil. 139 (1936).
Constitutional
Commission
of
1986,
5
authored the expanded jurisdiction and explained its
rationale:3
x x x x [t]his is actually a product of our experience
during martial law x x x x [t]he role of the judiciary during
the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
Solicitor General set up the defense of political question
and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus x x x and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of
political question x x x x The Committee on Judiciary feels
that this was not a proper solution to the question
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon
the rights of the people, but in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime x x x x
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits
of power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is
the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch
of government, or any of its officials, has acted without
jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature x x x x (this) means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
3
I Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, pp. 434-436 (1986).
6
And pursuant to this expanded power, the Supreme
Court
nullified
the
Memorandum
of
Agreement
on
Ancestral Domain or MOA-AD, ruling that the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the consultation
process as mandated by law. The Court struck down the
agreement between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel (GRP) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), holding that the government
negotiation panel’s failure to consult the local government
units or communities constituted a departure from its
mandate under Executive Order No. 3. The Court held that
the “furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed
and crafted (ran) contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority,
and
amounts
to
a
whimsical,
capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.”4
4
The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, G.R. No. 183591, 14 October 2008.
7
In
Kabataan Party-List v. COMELEC,5
the
Court
nullified COMELEC Resolution No. 8585, insofar as it
encroached on the period provided by the system of
continuing voters’ registration, and extended the October
31, 2009 deadline to January 9, 2010 as prescribed by the
system of continuing registration. More recent is the case
Guingona Jr. v. COMELEC,6 where the Court ordered the
Comelec to disclose the complete details of its preparations
for the automated elections.
The Court held that the
Comelec “(could) not shirk from its constitutional duty to
disclose
fully
to
the
public
complete
details
of
all
information relating to its preparation for the May 10, 2010
elections without violating the Constitution and relevant
laws. No less than the Constitution mandated it to enforce
and administer the election laws.”
5
6
Kabataan Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189868, 15 December 2009.
Guingona Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191846, 06 May 2010.
8
In Aldaba v. Commission on Elections,7 the Court
nullified Republic Act No. 9591, the law creating a
congressional district for Malolos City, Bulacan and held
that laws creating legislative districts, as well as justiciable
subsidiary questions impacting on the constitutionality of
the said Republic Act, such as compliance with the
population requirement under Article VI8 of the 1987
Constitution, are within the ambit of judicial power of
review.
“To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial
review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court
has no power to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government, a duty mandated under Article VIII of the
Constitution.”
7
8
Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, 15 March 2010.
Only cities with at least 250,000 constitutents are entitled to representatives in Congress.
9
Similarly, in Navarro v. Ermita,9 the Court declared as
unconstitutional RA 9355, the law creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands, and nullified the proclamation of the
election of the officials thereof. The Court noted that the
Province of Dinagat Islands, containing an approximate
land area of 802.12 square kilometers, fell short of the land
area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Province
likewise failed to comply with the population requirement
of not less than 250,000 inhabitants, the census conducted
by the NSO showing that the Dinagat Islands’ population
was only 106,951. The Court added that, while it respected
the doctrine of separation of powers, it “(could) not renege
on its duty to determine whether the other branches of the
government had kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution, and determine(d) whether illegality attached
to the creation of the province in question.”
9
Navarro v. Sec. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, 12 May 2010.
10
Most certainly, the Supreme Court is ordained to be
the final interpreter of the meaning and intent of the
Constitution.10
“We are under a Constitution, but the
Constitution is what the Court says it is,” then New York
Governor, and later Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Charles Evans Hughes once said. “It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,” wrote Chief Justice John Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison.11 Thus, we continue to interpret the
Constitution, especially the “invisible” Constitution, as
referred to by Harvard Professor and renowned legal
scholar Laurence H. Tribe.
Thus, in Penera v. Comelec,12 the Court clarified that,
under the law, the word “candidate” is defined as “any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who
10
11
12
Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173, 191 (1999).
1 Cr. 137 (1803).
Penera v. Comelec, G.R. No. 181613, 25 November 2009.
11
has filed a certificate of candidacy,” and that “any person
who files a certificate of candidacy within the period for
filing shall only be considered a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy.” In Quinto v. Comelec,13 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of three provisions in the election laws
that
deemed
appointive
officials
to
be
automatically
resigned upon filing their certificates of candidacy, holding
that they did not violate the equal protection clause.
In
February of this year, the Court held that the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) was not exempt from
payment of legal fees imposed under the Rules of Court.
The Court ruled that the Constitution and jurisprudence
did not mean to include legal fees in the exemption from
“fees, charges or duties of all kinds” because the payment
of legal fees was a vital component of the rules promulgated
13
Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010.
12
by the Court, and it (could) not be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress.14
But as Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson, in Brown v.
Allen15 said of the Court, “We are not final because we are
infallible, we are infallible only because we are final.”
Paragraph
Constitution
“[p]romulgate
(5),
also
Section
authorizes
rules
5,
Article
the
Supreme
concerning
the
VIII,
1987
Court
protection
to
and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.”
14
15
Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees, AM No. 08-2-01-0
(2010), 11 February 2010.
344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
13
Accordingly, with its rule-making power, the Court
underscored and fortified our people’s individual, civil and
political rights by the promulgation of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.
Indeed, one cannot deny the potency of this
Rule when, mere days after its promulgation, several
persons detained by the military on suspicion that they
were communist rebels, regained their liberty.
This was
closely followed by the promulgation of the groundbreaking
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, which obliges state
officials
to
permit
families
of
victims
of
enforced
disappearances access to official documents by invoking
the formerly nebulous “right to truth.”
Just a month and a half ago, we completed the circle
of human rights by focusing on our people’s rights to a
healthy
environment,
intergenerational
equity
and
sustainability. The newly-launched Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, at the crux of which are the Writ of
14
Kalikasan and the Writ of Continuing Mandamus, are a
sound testament to this.
We likewise persevered to increase the poor’s access to
effective and efficient justice by promulgating the Rule on
Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, which
requires all practicing lawyers to render a minimum
number of hours every year of free legal aid to indigents as
a
pre-condition
to
their
continued
good
standing.
Corollarily, the Court likewise approved the Rule on the
Exemption from the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of
the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and the Legal
Aid Offices of the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
Furthermore, cognizant of the adage “[j]ustice delayed
is justice denied,” the Court has gone to great lengths to
15
decongest court dockets and expedite the resolution of
cases.
In 2008, for example, the Court promulgated the
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases to accelerate the
resolution of civil cases involving the poor and the
oppressed.
In 2009, it promulgated the Special Rules of
Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution to encourage and
promote the use of ADR, specifically arbitration and
mediation, as a means to de-clog the dockets of the courts.
The Court has also literally brought people to justice,
and justice to the people, when it launched the Enhanced
Justice on Wheels (EJOW) project.
By April 2010, these
mobile courtrooms have released 3,545 inmates, either
because they were acquitted or they had served the
maximum penalty for the crimes they were accused of.
5,606 cases have also been successfully mediated.
2,270
individuals have benefited from free legal aid, and 9,056
16
inmates have received medical and dental attention.
Pursuant to my commitment to Chief Justice Puno to
continue the EJOW, we launched the EJOW Project in
Marikina last week.
Before noon, 75 inmates had been
released, 130 given medical and dental aid, 50 extended
legal assistance, while 4 out of 4 cases considered were
successfully mediated.
Indeed, the judiciary as empowered by the 1987
Constitution is certainly far from being benign. Indeed, it
has become a misconception to say that it is the least
powerful of all the branches of government because the
judiciary can make a distinct and significant difference for
the good, and in ways that directly impact on our people’s
lives.
We hope to complete the construction of both the
Manila and the Angeles Halls of Justice, both of which are
17
designed
as
models
courts.
We
are
going
to
fully
computerize all our courts from Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to
Balut
Island,
Davao
del
Sur.
Hopefully,
these
improvements in infrastructure and equipment will aid in
creating a more efficient working environment for our court
personnel. These reforms shall also be complemented by
developments within the judicial system.
Among the
programs we intend to pay close attention to are the
decentralization of functions of the Office of the Court
Administrator and the strengthening of the integrity values
in the Judiciary. The objective is to bring our courts closer
to the people and make the judiciary more responsive and
relevant to the needs of the court users.
In this light, and with all candor, I acknowledge that I
have stepped into gigantic shoes.
Former Chief Justice
Puno, truly an intellectual aristocrat, has instituted far-
18
reaching
and
significant
judicial
reforms
whose
consequences, without doubt, will resonate well into the
future.
However, as I pledged when I entered upon the
duties of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, I will serve
with utmost fidelity to this call of public duty to serve God
and country.
We shall not have a dormant judiciary in my watch.
To be sure, a strong, competent, incorruptible and
independent judiciary is the protector of our rights and
liberties,
and
democracy.
without
doubt,
the
last
bulwark
of
I shall thus continue the reforms we have
begun, aim to improve the judiciary even further in every
aspect possible, and strengthen the great institution of the
Supreme Court. Certainly, much still remains to be done
as the quest for fairness, justice and right is a never-ending
pursuit. Mindful of the spectrum of public opinion, as well
19
as the fact that I have more than eight years to serve our
people, I say with all humility: let history be the inerrant
judge of the Corona Court.
Thank you and a happy Independence Day to all of
you. Mabuhay ang Pilipinas!