1
CHAPTER TEN – SMART BORDERS OR THICKER BORDERS? HOMELAND SECURITY
AND PUBLIC SAFETY
So Near and Yet So Far: Influencing American Policies towards Canada Geoffrey E. Hale ©
Department of Political Science
University of Lethbridge
TEACHING DRAFT – 30 Nov. 2009
Few issue areas illustrate the central features of U.S.-Canada relations – proximity, asymmetry
and intensity – as well as the overlapping fields of ―homeland security‖, border management, and
public safety. The Canada‘s border with 10 of the ―lower 48‖ American states stretches for
3,961 miles (6,416 kilometers). The Canada-Alaska border covers another 1,529 miles (2,477
km.). Once described as the world‘s ―longest undefended border‖, it now appears to have very
different qualities in the eyes of American and Canadian governments and publics.
Public or ―homeland‖ security policies in both countries are driven by overlapping but somewhat
different policy agendas and threat perceptions which enable much cooperation but also
constrain the development of fully-integrated security policies and systems between the two
governments. The greater the degree which these agendas and perceptions vary, the more likely
that policy actors will attempt to insure themselves both against particular threats and the
possibility of inadequate cooperation by other governments (or their agencies), and citizens and
businesses in addressing them.1 This reality is visible in the institutionalization of post-9/11
security policies by the Bush Administration and Congress, most of which have been extended
under the Obama administration.
However, the greater the extent to which security policies or threat perceptions of neighbouring
countries diverge, the more they are likely to contribute to the paradoxes of border management
and related security policies. Security analyst Stephen Flynn describes this phenomenon as the
―hardened border paradox‖. He notes that unilateral efforts to insulate nations from the risks
posed by neighbouring countries or their residents increase the likelihood of countervailing
efforts by other governments, their citizens (ordinarily law-abiding or otherwise), and indeed by
citizens and organized groups within their own countries to protect their interests and
accustomed forms of behaviour from what they view as arbitrary actions.2 This assessment is
consistent with Charles Doran‘s discussion of ―intervulnerability‖: the concept that shared or
overlapping risks from foreign countries tend to increase in the absence of cooperative efforts to
reduce those risks.3
American homeland security policies are driven primarily by domestic policy imperatives
relating to the core functions of democratic governments in protecting their citizens from
avoidable harm, the assertion of national sovereignty, the competing priorities of domestic
bureaucratic institutions – especially those of the sprawling Department of Homeland Security,
and a variety of competing societal interests for whom Canadian interests are of marginal, if any
interest. In recent years, American border management policies have been linked directly to
ongoing concerns over illegal immigration, especially from Mexico, drug trafficking and related
violence.
2
In Canada, the pursuit of these shared objectives is filtered through another priority: Canada‘s
economic interdependence on the United States and its resulting need to maintain secure access
to US markets and transportation systems as a central element of its economic policies and
citizens‘ well-being. This difference in emphasis is critical to Canada‘s efforts to engage U.S.
homeland security and border management policies aimed at maintaining a secure border that is
open to trade and travel, but closed to terrorism and other undesirable by-products of
globalization and growing economic and social integration within North America.
Canada shares a fundamental interest in protecting the security of the American public, both as a
good neighbour and to avoid the potential for retaliatory action in the event that some future
event is seen to result from the negligence or indifference of Canadian governments or the
hostility of anti-American elements within Canada. As one U.S. diplomat put it in discussions
with the author, ―the most important thing is not if there is a terrorist attack in the United States,
but a terrorist act that could have been prevented by you.‖4
In sharp contrast to the priorities of the 1990s, security issues have ―trumped trade‖5 in shaping
Americans‘ attitudes towards cross-border relations in the aftermath of 9/11. Canada‘s greater
dependence on trade and its substantial dependence on U.S. export markets make Canadians‘
economic well-being largely dependent on maintaining the confidence of American policymakers and public that Canada and Canadians are reliable partners in securing their northern
border against potential threats. In practice, it also requires that they work closely with U.S.
domestic interests whose well-being depends on efficient border management – not just
enhanced security.
As a result, Canadian efforts to influence American homeland security policies towards Canada
attempt to balance collaboration on broader security goals, sector-by-sector cooperation in
program design and implementation affecting citizens of both countries, and the protection of
Canadian interests where ―security-first‖ measures and the peripheral importance of managing
the northern border to many U.S. interests create disproportionate risks to Canadian and related
U.S. interests.
This chapter examines the politics of border security and their implications for bilateral relations.
It compares institutional and societal paradigms for homeland security in both the United States
and Canada, considers the competing security paradigms informing U.S. policies, and their
applications to five broad policy areas: external trade, especially container and other cargo
security, cross-border travel, cross-border security collaboration, immigration and visa policies,
and border infrastructure. Three case studies related to issues discussed in this chapter – the
Container Security Initiative, the land-preclearance project, and ongoing issues related to
proposed U.S. entry-exit controls for all persons crossing American borders – the Section 110
and WHTI initiatives will be discussed in Chapter 11.
3
HOMELAND SECURITY AND BORDER MANAGEMENT
Each definition (of homeland security) represents a set of interests that claims a niche in
the homeland security ecosystem.‘
Christopher Bellavita6
The U.S. and Canadian governments have overlapping and sometimes parallel approaches and
institutions for the definition and management of homeland security or ―public safety‖. Security
policies and their relationship to broader perceptions of homeland security are driven in both
countries by institutional interests, expanding political mandates, and competition for financial,
personnel and (often unproven) technological resources which have not expanded as fast as the
policy mandates they are intended to implement.7
Congress passed legislation in November 2002 creating the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) from elements of 22 ―legacy agencies‖ in the largest US government reorganization since
the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. The Department‘s mandate defines the
dominant approach to homeland security in the United States – although several other outlooks,
rooted in different bureaucratic contexts, compete for policy recognition and funding.8 Its
evolution in recent years may be seen from comparing the 2003 and 2008 versions
We will lead the unified national effort to secure America.
We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks
and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation.
2003
2008
We will ensure safe and secure borders,
We will secure our national borders,
welcome lawful immigrants and visitors,
while welcoming lawful immigrants,
and promote the free flow of commerce.9
visitors and trade.10
The 2007 Homeland Security Strategy of the United States notes at least six core missions. Three
– border and transportation security, protection of critical infrastructure, and emergency
preparedness and response – are primary responsibilities of DHS and its various agencies. They
address not only risks of terrorism, although it has been the top priority since 2001, but also
efforts to control illegal immigration, and to prepare for, respond to and recover from natural and
man-made disasters. Three others: intelligence and warning, domestic counter-terrorism, and
defence against catastrophic threats are ―inter-agency‖ functions involving numerous other
federal departments and agencies.11 More recently, security concerns have expanded to include
public health risks, driven by the spread of the H1N1 (―swine flu‖) virus by international
travelers. Table 10.1 summarizes DHS‘ key objectives as outlined in its 2008 strategic plan.
The presence of multiple missions ensures that security objectives driven by risks of terrorism
co-exist and often compete with ―all hazards‖ perspectives of public safety. They also respond to
pressures for more efficient border operations in the name economic security, as well as the
protection of civil liberties. The emerging discipline of homeland security studies suggests that
these objectives can often be reconciled by integrating counter-terrorism goals within the day-to-
4
Table 10.1
Strategic Goals: U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 2008
Objective # 1 – Protect Our Nation from Dangerous People
1.1 – Achieve effective control of our borders
1.2 – Protect our interior and enforce immigration laws.
1.3 – Strengthen screening of travelers and workers.
1.4 – Enhance security through improved immigration services.
Objective # 2 – Protect Our Nation from Dangerous Goods
2.1 – Prevent and Detect Radiological / Nuclear Attacks
2.2 – Prevent, Detect, and Protect Against Biological Attacks
2.3 – Prevent and Detect Chemical and Explosive Attacks
2.4 – Prevent the Introduction of Illicit Contraband while Facilitating Trade
Objective # 3 – Protect Critical Infrastructure
3.1 – Protect and Strengthen the Resilience of the Nation‘s Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources
3.2 – Ensure Continuity of Government Communications and Operations
3.3 – Improve Cyber-Security
3.4 – Protect Transportation Sectors
Objective # 4 – Strengthen Our Nation‘s Preparedness and Emergency Response Capabilities
4.1 – Ensure Preparedness
4.2 – Strengthen Response and Recovery
Objective # 5 – Strengthen and Unify DHS Operations and Management
5.1 – Improve Departmental Governance and Performance.
5.2 – Advance Intelligence and Information Sharing
5.3 – Integrate DHS Policy, Planning and Operations Coordination.
Source: One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland
Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008-2013 (Washington, DC: 18 September 2008), 6-24.
day operational processes that serve the interests of a wider range of government agencies and
societal groups.12
However, in practice, counter-terrorism policies tend to be driven by ―security first‖ perspectives
that lend themselves to prescriptive (or ―command-and-control‖) approaches to regulation and
top-down approaches to other governmental and societal stakeholders (including counterparts in
foreign countries). Defence policy analysts in both countries tend to argue for a greater
integration of defence and homeland security policies and command structures, but this approach
has yet to win high level political support in either country.13
U.S. border management policies are therefore a subset – or more accurately, several different
components – of more comprehensive homeland security policies. Border management policies
seek to combine security measures to regulate migration, ensure compliance with trade
agreements and other national commercial regulations, and combat criminal activities. Critically
5
since 9/11, they also seek to provide ―layered security‖ to defend against potential terrorist
attacks while attempting to facilitate or encourage the efficient processing of ―low-risk‖ trade
and travel across national borders. The underlying concept of ―layered security‖ is that, perfect
security being unattainable in any real world setting, the existence of complementary layers of
security at, within and beyond national frontiers makes it progressively more unlikely that
prospective foreign terrorists can penetrate each successive layer without greatly increasing the
likelihood of detection.14 This concept is sometimes referred to as ―pushing out the broder‖ by
attempting to screen goods and travelers before they arrive at ―ports of entry‖.
By contrast, border management encompasses five of the six elements of Canada‘s National
Security Strategy published in 2004, including ―intelligence, emergency management, public
health, transportation, and border security‖.15 This mandate is even broader than that of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, although heavily qualified by the primary or coordinate roles
of provincial governments in three of these five areas. However, while border management also
involves several components of DHS‘ broader mandate, the challenges of structuring mutually
beneficial cooperation can be seen by comparing the focusing events which have helped to
define the political and administrative contexts for the two countries‘ homeland security policies
since 2001.
Arguably, in the United States, three key events have helped to define these policies. Most
important among these were the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and political responses to them,
including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (The impact of these
events on public opinion and public attitudes is noted in Chapter 4.) The bi-partisan 9/11
Commission Report pointed to internal flaws in domestic security and coordination systems that
made 9/11 possible. It made forty recommendations that became the basis of Congressional
legislation, sometimes going beyond the initial preferences of the Bush Administration.
However, only two of the Commission‘s recommendations directly addressed questions of
border security.16
DHS‘ shambolic response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 was
another key event – pointing to the degree to which counter-terrorism concerns had diverted
resources and management attention away from other key homeland security functions.
Coverage of emergency preparedness and disaster response in the United States suggests
significant improvements in inter-agency cooperation and filling gaps.
A third dynamic results from the bitter debate over the breakdown of U.S. immigration policies
which gridlocked Congress for much of the period between 2005 and 2007, which resulted from
the rapid growth of illegal immigration, largely from Mexico and Central America, now
estimated at between 12 and 14 million people. Related political pressures resulted in attempted
crackdowns along the US-Mexican border and the passage of legislation – such as the REAL-ID
Act – aimed at strengthening the security of ―foundational‖ identification documents and limiting
access to them to legal U.S. residents. Congress has also attempted to control illegal immigration
through the construction of security fences, supported with new electronic monitoring
technologies, along heavily populated stretches of the border. Many border security advocates
ask why the ―porous‖ northern border with Canada should be treated any differently from that
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with Mexico.17 These outlooks contributed to legislation requiring all persons entering the US to
carry passports or ―other secure documents‖ – the so-called Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative (WHTI). They have also led to the mandatory fingerprinting of aliens entering the
United States (not yet including most Canadians, except for visa holders) under the partially
implemented US-VISIT entry-exit screening program. These issues – and Canadian efforts to
influence related US government policies – are discussed at greater length in Chapter 11.
A fourth, offshore event, the proliferation of nuclear technologies to rogue states such as North
Korea and Iran, along with continuing political instability in Pakistan, has raised significant
concerns among security specialists of risks that a foreign terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda
could obtain nuclear weapons and use them for attacks against American territory.18 Such fears
help to explain the emphasis placed on the screening of shipping containers destined for
shipment to the United States.
Each of these factors has had implications for Canada and the environment for bilateral border
management. Although 9/11 was critical in prompting a reevaluation of Canadian public and
border security policies, even more so was the post-9/11 closing of the US border and the effect
on cross-border traffic of subsequent security initiatives. These events demonstrated Canada‘s
vulnerability to US responses to the risks of terrorism and the need for close cross-border
collaboration to reduce these vulnerabilities which was soon embodied in the December 2001
Smart Border Agreement19 between the two countries.
Three other focusing events have identified the risks of overlapping but poorly coordinated
security measures. The ―rendition‖ of dual Canadian-Syrian citizen Maher Arar to Syria by US
security officials in 2002, largely on the basis of information provided by the RCMP which were
ultimately found to overstate security concerns had a temporarily chilling effect on the sharing of
intelligence information20, and a more permanent effect in making Canadian security cooperation
subject to tighter legal and judicial protections for civil liberties.21
The WHTI legislation, passed in December 2005 as part of a broader counter-terrorism bill,
raised further concerns about the balancing of security concerns with border facilitation. The
resulting two- year lobby to delay its passage and broaden the range of ―secure‖ identification
acceptable to DHS was successful – but at some cost to mutual trust on other border initiatives.22
The June 2006 arrests of 18 aspiring young jihadis in Toronto on charges of plotting terrorist
attacks in Canada drew intense public attention to the risks of ―home-grown terrorism‖ on both
sides of the border, partly validating US security concerns and demonstrating the importance of
effective intelligence and police cooperation to preventing such attacks. So have a series of less
visible arrests and prosecutions which are currently winding their ways through the Canadian
courts.23
Although these events have shaped the political and institutional contexts for homeland security
border management policies in each country, day-to-day policy making and implementation are
the product of substantially different institutional structures. Understanding these structures is as
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central to engaging policy processes as is an understanding of the broader political and cultural
contexts shaping these policies.
Institutional Contexts
The years since 9/11 have seen an institutionalization of homeland security policies in the United
States. However, the cross-cutting efforts of the White House, competing domestic agencies and
diverse elements of Congress have contributed to the development of what one observer
describes as ―an environment (that) is more complex, both organizationally and politically‖ than
the well-established command structures of the U.S. Department of Defense and its regional
commands around the world.24
Four main sets of institutions shape this process: the National Security Council (NSC) and its
supporting bureaucracy within the Executive Office of the President, which absorbed the
Homeland Security Council created by President Bush in May 2009; the Department of
Homeland Security and its subordinate agencies, especially the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection; specialized ―subject-matter‖ agencies with different policy responsibilities bearing
directly or incidentally on border management, such as the Department of Justice and FBI, the
State Department‘s Bureau of Consular Affairs, responsible for issuing passports and
adjudicating citizenship, or various agencies of the U.S. Department of Agriculture; and the
diverse committee structures of Congress discussed in Chapter 5.
Reporting to the President, the NSC is an ―inter-agency‖ body composed of cabinet and senior
sub-cabinet officials whose departments or agencies have responsibility for some aspect of
homeland security. Its staff directorates are located within the Executive Office of the President.
Its predecessor agency, the Homeland Security Council published its first National Strategy for
Homeland Security Strategy in July 2002, with subsequent revisions in 2004 and 2007, along
with several Presidential Directives, a non-regulatory form of policy-making.25
There is little evidence that cross-border issues with Canada are dealt with at this level of the
U.S. government. Rather, the principal political linkages are between the Secretary of Homeland
Security and his Canadian counterpart, the Minister of Public Safety. On operational issues,
multiple parallel linkages exist at the level of senior departmental officials, agency executives
representing national police (the FBI and RCMP), border services (CBP and CBSA), food safety
(APHIS and CFIA) and coast guard agencies, among others, and assorted working level contacts
as well as departmental officials posted to each country‘s respective embassies.26 The DHS
Secretary meets with her Canadian counterpart at least twice a year, although other meetings
may take place on the sidelines of other international events.
One DHS official interviewed for this study commented in early 2006 that:
the personal relationship at all levels is important and makes an appreciable difference if
the relationship is strong and favourable. Down from the senior leadership and Canadian
counterparts, the relationship is quite solid and very healthy. That is attributed to a fairly
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stable workforce in the two countries. . . . The ADM levels and DG levels (in Canada)
tend to stay in place so that you develop relationships of long-standing. Building trust,
that‘s important for any relationship.27
However, this perception is not always shared. Former DHS Assistant Secretary Paul
Rosenzweig suggests that shifts in U.S. counter-terrorism policy after 9/11 led to American
greater concerns over policy divergence, and Canadian reluctance to align its immigration laws
and traveler-screening processes with those of the United States.
Canada has much greater openness to the rest of the world than does the U.S. Canadian
asylum policies are more liberal; Canada extends the privilege of visa-free travel to the
citizens of many more countries. And, more fundamentally, Canada takes a much lighter
hand in screening arriving travellers. . . . What had earlier been very modest divergences
in immigration policy now loomed larger as differences in counterterrorism policy. Some
Canadians have yet to come to grips with the new reality that Canada can‘t have it both
ways—it can‘t both exercise its own sovereign authority over its border policies, and
expect the United States not to do the same thing.28
Rosenzweig also suggests a decline in trust in cross-border relations among senior officials,
reflected in a reluctance to share information due to political sensitivities arising from the Maher
Arar affair, discussed above, and Canadian reluctance to engage U.S. proposals for overseas
―synchronization‖ of screening for goods and travelers entering Canada.29 Other officials
interviewed by the author have suggested considerable resentment of Canadian lobbying of
Congress on the WHTI passport requirements, discussed in Chapter 11.
The size and scale of DHS and the diverse mandates of its many legacy agencies have created
major challenges for the department‘s management and for Congressional oversight.30 They also
complicate more effective two-way communication between DHS and many societal actors,
particularly in integrating efforts to promote security with the day-to-day activities and
operations of other government agencies, private businesses, business supply chains, border
communities and ordinary citizens.31 External analyses of DHS often refer to ―stovepipe‖
tendencies and internal competition among different segments of DHS, as well as with other
federal agencies – despite efforts to build ―partnerships‖ with key stakeholder groups.32
These tendencies have been reinforced by frequent turnover among the Department‘s senior
management, if not of career officials,33 and the tendency of Congressional barons to protect
their political turf – reflected in the 86 Congressional committees and subcommittees to which
various elements of DHS may be required to report.34 The latter also enables various
constituencies to use the multiple access points of the Congressional process to challenge DHS
policies which fail to respond adequately to their interests or agendas. (See Chapter 11.)
Such activities are also reflected in the use of Congressional appropriations processes to finance
pet projects of Congressional leaders, and to engage in log rolling in support a wide variety of
local projects35 – without much regard for principles of risk management or cost effectiveness.
These processes are also used regularly by the losers in previous rounds of policy maneuvering
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to challenge previous decisions or to make them more responsive to their own interests – as with
protracted disputes over the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI).
DHS‘ Bureau of Transportation and Border Security oversees three broad major border security
agencies with responsibilities for different aspects of border security. The Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for the operations of border points (―ports of entry‖) ,
security between border points (the ―Border Patrol‖), as well as the administration of
immigration laws, compliance with customs regulations and other trade laws and agricultural
regulations at the border. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for
enforcement issues away from ports-of-entry. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for the
maritime aspects of homeland security, including port security, enforcing U.S. laws on
commercial ships in American waters, and other aspects of maritime law enforcement. The
Transportation Security Administration is responsible for securing domestic air and rail
transportation systems, including screening air passengers and baggage, airport and air cargo
security.36 DHS and CBP officials routinely acknowledge the importance of operational
efficiency for both their agency and the businesses and citizens who use various ports of entry.
However, the Department‘s predominant culture is widely seen to be one of law enforcement and
command-and-control approaches to regulation – an approach that rarely lends itself to customer
or stakeholder responsiveness in any public setting.37
These complex institutional structures have two main implications for Canadian governments
attempting to influence U.S. policies towards Canada and U.S. policies which affect Canada. The
scale and scope of homeland security functions in the United States ensure that the politics and
interests associated with homeland security and border management policies are largely
domestic. As a result, the international aspect of border issues, while significant, is essentially a
small subset of DHS‘ broader international relationships and those of other federal executive
agencies. Canada is seen as an external actor – an ―international security partner‖ whose actions
are seen as important to complementing U.S. domestic security efforts, but essentially
supplemental to them.
In this context, advancing Canadian interests requires a capacity to engage four parallel policy
processes simultaneously. Senior Canadian policy-makers must manage their own domestic
processes as coherently as possible, given their multi-dimensional character, while anticipating
or responding to the spillover effects of many American policies. They must also engage the
attention and often opaque processes of relevant agencies of the U.S. executive branch – while
recognizing that Canadian concerns are often peripheral to the political and policy challenges of
their American counterparts.
The third set of processes – engaging senior U.S. leaders in high level diplomacy – involves a
series of judgment calls for Canadian officials. Major issues for Canada may be relatively routine
administrative issues for their U.S. counterparts. ―Going political‖ may involve risks to the
personal relationships critical to the effective management of cross-border issues. It may also
involve yielding control of issues management to other Canadian departments, especially
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, whose priorities may be somewhat different from those
of police or public safety officials. While strong personal relations between cabinet officers may
10
be able to resolve some of these issues, a resort to high level diplomacy is generally effective
only when both governments perceive significant policy or political issues to be at stake – and
when administration officials have the latitude to make decisions independently of Congress.
Finally, Canadian diplomats must have the capacity to engage domestic interest groups and
elements of Congress which are often independent policy actors capable of inserting their own
priorities into the policy mix – either in ways that can accommodate, help or harm related
Canadian interests. The inherent complexity of this balancing act is not always appreciated either
by domestic Canadian interests or by American officials who sometimes wonder ―what the
Canadians are up to‖ on particular files.
Varied Threat Perceptions and Paradigms for Homeland Security
Being in favour of coordination … has come to be like being against sin; everyone lines
up on the right side of the question. In fact, coordination has become … a word which
defines precise definition but sounds good and brings prestige to the user.38
Public safety and homeland security policies may be informed by a variety of different
professional perspectives: those of law enforcement, military planning, public administration,
risk management, emergency preparedness (or management), as well as those of the citizens and
businesses who lives and livelihoods may be affected by these policies.39
The two principal approaches within the U.S. homeland security community may be
characterized as the ―security first‖, ―risk avoidance‖ or ―frontier defence‖ paradigm and a ―riskmanagement-based‖ or risk-adjusted cost-benefit paradigm. The first perspective tends to be law
enforcement oriented, and oriented towards command-and-control approaches to regulation. It
typically privileges security issues over other considerations – whether economic, societal or
those related to civil liberties. Its primary objective is to reduce the likelihood of selected risks to
the public.
The second approach combines prescriptive regulations, intergovernmental cooperation, and
incentives to secure the active collaboration of economic and societal communities in reducing
risks to broader publics while enabling citizens and businesses to go about their normal business.
It is more likely to accommodate the interests of these groups in pursuing security objectives. In
the context of border security, it does so by creating systems to facilitate pre-screening and
systems engineering that allow officials of relevant agencies to focus a greater share of available
resources on combating crime and the screening of higher risk activities – including those
normally associated with emergency management processes. In practice, there is an ongoing
dialogue between proponents of the two perspectives, whether for tactical purposes or in
recognition of the need to accommodate elements of both perspectives to secure political
support. Other perspectives tend to focus primarily on issues of civil liberties, personal privacy,
and the protection of identifiable social groups against prescriptive security measures.40
Canadian governments deal with similar issues, but with very different emphases. Security
objectives have been largely integrated with day-to-day law enforcement efforts, with a strong
11
emphasis on risk management perspectives. Canada‘s much greater economic dependence on
export markets, especially the United States, increases the relative importance of integrating
economic and security issues, while investing in the border infrastructure necessary to make
these systems work effectively. Civil liberties perspectives, mediated primarily through the
courts, provide more significant constraints on the autonomy of government policy-makers, and
of security and law enforcement agencies that implement these policies. Demographic
considerations also play a significant role – particularly given the importance of immigration in
offsetting Canada‘s aging population and the implications of related societal dynamics on the
policy choices of governments.
Although the Chretien government introduced several new pieces of security legislation after
9/11, including a new Anti-Terrorism Act, to provide police, intelligence and immigration
agencies with powers to deal with domestic and external terrorist threats, comments by security
officials in both Ottawa and Washington suggested continuing concerns over Canada‘s
immigration and refugee policies, and the ease with which persons suspected of terrorist links
could escape detection, detention or expulsion.41
A more challenging issue, for both countries, is the problem of home-grown terrorism – whether
arising from small groups of extremists from diaspora communities or alienated loners mobilized
through the internet.42 Although police and security experts differ43 on their assessments of the
relative importance of or risks posed by such groups compared to international networks such as
Al Qaeda, these groups account for most of the terrorism-related arrests made in the US and
Canada during the past three or four years. Such individuals and groups pose an ongoing
challenge to police and intelligence agencies – but one that is qualitatively different from
conventional approaches to counter-terrorism while potentially spreading police resources thin
enough to allow other attacks to ―get through‖.
Most business groups express support for the ―layered defence‖ paradigm that is central to U.S.
Homeland Security strategies – although they tend to lean far more strongly towards its
interpretation on the basis of ―risk management‖ principles and stakeholder engagement, rather
than ―risk avoidance‖. However, business groups in both countries have been critical of poorly
designed and implemented policies and program that either fail to deliver promised benefits for
businesses cooperating with security measures or do so at costs sufficient to discourage
participation by all except the most trade dependent industries and firms.44 Such concerns have
been acknowledged by both the Bush and Obama Administrations, but have tended to be
peripheral to Congressional policy priorities in recent years. However, they are central to
Canadian priorities in attempting to influence U.S. security and border management policies.
SECURITY, FACILITATION AND THE BORDER: STRATEGIC DRIFT, OPERATIONAL
SEGMENTATION
The question we have to answer is how do we make moving from Detroit to Toronto like moving
from Detroit to Chicago? . . . The answer has to do with national policies on things like
immigration and border security. Unless you have symmetrical approaches to national policies,
you won‘t have symmetrical approaches to security.
David Heyman45
12
The Canadian government‘s initial response to 9/11 was to propose a series of joint initiatives for
policy coordination across a wide range of security and border management operations that
would combine a high level political commitment to cross-border cooperation with detailed steps
to address commonly perceived risks and take joint steps to maintain the operational efficiency
of borders for ―low-risk‖ travelers and business activity. Subsequent initiatives have sought to
balance cooperation with adaptation to unilateral American actions – often driven by Congress –
in ways that preserve varying degrees of policy discretion, together with respect for or
accommodation of Canadian legal and constitutional norms inherent in the concept of
―sovereignty‖.46
The Smart Border Declaration of December 2001 was a bilateral agreement that provided for
joint action on a wide range of security and border management issues outlined in a 30-point
action plan. This initiative demonstrated the potential for Canadian-initiated action on these
issues – but also, ultimately, its inherent limits. Bilateral cooperation during this period was
anchored by President Bush‘s Homeland Security Advisor, former Pennsylvania governor Tom
Ridge, who later became the first Secretary of Homeland Security in January 2003, and Canadian
Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, who coordinated Canada‘s response to 9/11. One senior
official comments that:
(Manley) had a counterpart with whom he just hit it off. He and Ridge were very similar
people. That‘s why it worked. They both had mandates from their bosses and mandates
that would help them ride over some of the personal fiefdoms that people had.47
This cooperation survived a cooling of high-level relations over the Chretien government‘s
opposition to the Iraq War, and its shift towards a more cautious, incrementalist approach to
bilateral relations – already discussed in Chapters 2 and 4.48
The ―Ridge-Manley‖ process was followed by an equally cordial, functional relationship
between their successors, Michael Chertoff and Anne McLellan after mid-2004. However, the
entrenchment of more restrictive US domestic homeland security policies, shaped by growing
Congressional engagement in the policy-making process, was not matched by any corresponding
process for North American coordination. Facing an early election, the new Martin government
in Canada preferred to maintain a ―below-the-radar‖ approach to bilateral security relations in
order to hold together its own shaky alliance of (generally pro-American) business Liberals and
Canadian nationalists – many of whom visibly and vocally despised the Bush administration.
This tactical combination of private cooperation and public distance became entrenched after
Martin lost his parliamentary majority in June 2004.
Senior Canadian officials sought to recover the close working relationship of the immediate post9/11 period when cobbling together the Security and Partnership Partnership (SPP) process with
Washington and Mexico City, announced in March 2005. The SPP process provided a regular
forum for meetings of US, Canadian and Mexican cabinet secretaries and ministers, based on
agendas flowing from the working group processes. However, in practice, this process remained
one of dual bilateralism – with Canada-US and US-Mexican processes defined by different
13
problems, agendas, domestic interest group and societal environments on the two borders. These
meetings, which have continued since the Obama Administration‘s suspension of the SPP
process, pending a broader review of its North American policies, tend to be characterized by a
number of small, incremental policy or program-based measures intended to provide the
impression of ongoing cooperation on border security and facilitation issues.
In practice, however, the SPP process appears to have had little impact on the substance of
policy, although providing a forum to discuss current issues. Its highly diffuse, segmented
nature, which initially included more than 300 specific sectoral and micro-level initiatives,
resulted in its being rapidly shunted to the margins of U.S. domestic policy priorities. This trend
was reinforced by growing Congressional assertiveness on border, port and immigration security
issues, as the Bush administration proved unable to build effective coalitions with either
Republican or Democratic leaders in Congress – as well as by the reluctance of Canadian
officials to see US-Canada border issued addressed in the same context as those on the southern
border.49
Under such circumstances, proposals by some Canadian business leaders to pursue the creation
of a North American security perimeter with the harmonization of a wide variety of security and
economic regulations50 failed to gain much political traction either in Ottawa or Washington.
Indeed, both domestic political pressure and concerns over security risks from anti-American
elements within Canada – combined with the principles of ―layered security‖, led DHS officials
to take a ―belt and suspenders‖ approach that combined efforts to ―push out‖ national borders
within and beyond North America with intensified border security measures.51
Various groups in both countries raised concerns over civil liberties related to post-9/11 security
measures. However, while these concerns were reflected in broader political debates, and
ultimately in technical changes to Canadian anti-terrorism laws, their practical effect on security
and border management policies and practices emerged from a series of court rulings on
individual cases.
Officials interviewed following the election of the Harper government in January 2006 suggest
that it initially took a ―wait and see‖ approach to the cross-border security agenda before
deciding how to manage the growing number of security files. Rather than a strategic approach
suggested by some groups, or a systematic effort to accommodate American security concerns
feared by some Canadian nationalists and civil liberties activists, the policies of the Harper
government have been relatively minor extensions and adaptations of previous Liberal policies –
often reflecting internal bureaucratic debates.52 One key factor in this process may have been the
decentralization of responsibility for major cross-border files from the Privy Council Office to
individual departments with different perspectives of the cross-border preferences – although the
personalities and priorities of individual ministers appear to have played a role in some cases.53
Another was the Harper government‘s minority status, which enforced political caution and a
limited willingness to take political responsibility for American policies introduced without prior
consultation with Canada.54
14
As a result, rather than a strategic approach, cross-border cooperation has taken on a wide variety
of forms in different institutional and policy settings – depending on similarities and differences
in threat perceptions, relative levels of trust both among cabinet officers and working level
officials in different agencies, the agendas of relevant domestic interest groups, and the degree to
which political conditions and legal requirements either enable or constrain movements towards
parallel or harmonized policies.
The following section examines four major policy sub-fields of U.S. homeland security policies
and cross-border collaboration – security and law enforcement, external trade, especially
container security, cross-border travel, immigration and visa policies, and border infrastructure –
and the relative effectiveness of Canadian governments in influencing the application of these
policies towards Canada. These policies reflect the full range of American policies towards
Canada, as discussed in previous chapters – shaped by the dynamic character of U.S. homeland
security policies and the active and repeated intervention of Congressional actors.
FRAMING SECURITY, FACILITATION AND THE BORDER – AMERICAN POLICIES
TOWARDS CANADA
The scale and scope of homeland security and border management policies, some preceding the
events of 9/11, others resulting directly from them, has resulted in the proliferation of American
policies that affect Canada directly or indirectly by virtue of the two countries‘ long border, and
their extensive, diverse cross-border economic and societal relations. The rapid growth of
Washington‘s homeland security bureaucracy, the multiple dimensions of US homeland security
strategies, and the capacity of dozens of Congressional committees to shape US domestic
policies in these, as other areas, ensure that there is no overarching U.S. homeland security
policy towards Canada – any more than such statements could be made for foreign, trade, or
energy policies studied elsewhere in this volume.
Chapter 11 outlines six major areas of homeland security policy addressing different sectors
involving more than a dozen separate U.S. policies and programs affecting Canada directly and
indirectly – together with three case studies of specific policy initiatives. Despite initial steps
towards cross-border cooperation noted in the ―Smart Border Accord‖ of December 2001, most
of these policies are either domestic policies with significant effects on Canada, if often small
components of broader U.S. policies, or ―policies towards allies‖ – some aspects of which may
be specifically tailored to accommodate the extent and depth of US-Canadian relations.
Cross-Border Security and Law Enforcement
A central focus of cross-border homeland security responses to 9/11 and ongoing threats of
terrorist attacks on the United States and, to some extent, Canada has been on an increased
emphasis on law enforcement cooperation. This relationship is scarcely new. Even before 9/11,
U.S. and Canadian police forces exchanged intelligence information, maintained liaison missions
in the neighboring country, and cooperated in activities targeting organized crime and other law
enforcement issues.
15
When viewed in the context of periodic media reports on security cooperation with other
countries, these patterns suggest that much cross-border security collaboration falls into the
category of ―policies towards allies‖. However, the extent of cross-border cooperation through
bi-national groups such as the Cross-Border Crime Forum, the development of Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams in thirteen border regions across the continent, discussed further in Chapter
11, take on aspects of ―exceptionalism‖, particularly when contrasted with the limited trust or
coordination characteristic of relations between US and Mexican law enforcement officials.
In May 2009, President Obama‘s Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, announced a
joint threat assessment process to be conducted by U.S. and Canadian security and law
enforcement officials. However, this process is a work in progress, and security restrictions make
it difficult to determine whether it will have a significant effect on border policies in the future.
North American and External Trade
U.S. policies relating to the management of foreign trade – whether inside or outside North
America – display elements of ―policies towards allies‖ and some efforts to accommodate the
exceptional degree to which market-driven integration have resulted in the integration of
production processes and distribution networks with those in Canada. However, while the latter‘s
dependence on U.S. markets for more than three-quarters of its exports make these issues a
central priority of Canadian governments, they are only one of many concerns facing DHS and
Congressional oversight committees.
Enhanced screening processes for maritime, truck and rail freight shipments entering the United
States are driven largely by perceived threats that nuclear, biological or other weapons could be
smuggled into or through American ports-of-entry – either placing American citizens at risk of
terrorist attacks or significantly disrupting American transportation networks should a truck or
shipping container be detonated at a major port or cross-border bridge.
The Smart Border Declaration and subsequent U.S. policies introduced after 9/11 contemplated
considerable integration of port, rail and truck security policies – as discussed in Chapter 11.
Canada served as a pilot project for the introduction of the Container Security Initiative – many
of whose elements are now embedded in the policies of the World Customs Organization (WCO)
and International Maritime Organization (IMO). As such, CSI is a classic case of ―policies
towards allies‖, with certain elements of exceptionalism built into specific ―secure freight‖
programs such as the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the FAST
program used to screen truck shipments and drivers engaged in cross-border trade with Canada.
However, the introduction of subsequent layers of security, often at the insistence of Congress
over the objections of DHS officials, may have added to port and freight security at the margins,
but in ways that significantly ―thicken‖ borders with Canada (and other countries), thus shifting
the security / trade facilitation balance in the direction of ―risk avoidance‖ and higher non-tariff
barriers to cross-border business dealings.55 The efforts of Canadian governments and business
interests to engage American policy-makers on these issues will be explored further in Chapter
11.
16
Technology and Infrastructure: Bridging Borders, Breaking Bottlenecks, Securing Open Spaces?
Interdependence between Canada and the United States contributes to mutual vulnerability –
whether related to physical, economic or other forms of security. Even though the rapid growth
of trade between the United States and its neighbours has leveled off since 2000,56 the renewal
and expansion of border infrastructure has not kept up with growing traffic levels, much less the
added layers of security which have contributed to growing delays and rising costs of border
thickening.57
However, the challenge of border security – and of allocating the resources necessary to increase
it – is expanded by the rapid growth of demands on even the rapidly growing budgets of U.S. and
Canadian border agencies. For the United States, in particular, border security means security
between ports-of-entry as much as at formal border crossings. The introduction of new, often
untested technologies is widely seen as a means of allocating inherently limited staff and
financial resources more effectively across competing functions.
Such initiatives are difficult enough to conceive, organize, test and deploy in the context of
national governments attempting to reconcile overlapping and competing mandates served by
different administrative systems and legislative mandates – including security, trade and travel
facilitation, civil liberties and personal data security. They become even more challenging when
attempting to integrate with parallel or complementary systems national borders and different
orders of government within each country.
Cross-Border Travel, Immigration and Visa Policies
The conflation of cross-border travel, immigration and visa policies offers the single biggest
example of diverging threat perceptions and competing priorities between U.S. and Canadian
authorities since 9/11. American policies have been driven by two dominant concerns: limiting
the risks of terrorism from travelers entering the United States, whether as casual visitors or as
visa holders, and controlling the flood of illegal immigration from Mexico, Latin America and
other countries, including Canada at the margins. Initial efforts to design and enforce such
policies have complicated entrenched social relations that transcend national borders – hence, the
characterization of borderlands by Brunet-Jailly and others – triggering societal and political
resistance leading to accommodation by Congress, state and federal agencies, including DHS. 58
American policies towards Canada are heavily shaped by the different regulatory regimes
affecting different modes of transportation, interaction with each country‘s immigration and visa
policies, perceived level of security risk, and exposure to the cross-cutting concerns of interest
group politics and domestic constituencies in the United States. Policies governing air passengers
are governed in large measure by international agreements, with US officials – and often their
counterparts from the European Community – seeking to negotiate ways to project their national
and regional standards into international regulations. As such US policies towards Canada are
often variations of policies towards allies – although U.S. preclearance facilities in Canadian
17
airports and bi-national trusted traveler programs such as NEXUS, which are also used at
selected land crossings, may be seen as evidence of ―exceptionalism‖.
The regulation of land border crossings and the coordination of visa policies, both reciprocal and
those affecting other countries – also discussed at greater length in Chapter 11 – are more
complex issues that defy easy categorization given the complex mixes of domestic, cross-border,
bureaucratic and wider international politics involved. These issues overlap with the
management of cross-border and border region infrastructure – including bridges, highways and
border control complexes. Although traditionally viewed as domestic concerns, the growth of
cross-border trade and overlapping bi-national clusters of interests in border communities have
created new channels for ―intermestic‖ policy-making and the complex balancing of local,
regional and national interests.
CONCLUSION
The discussion of security and border facilitation issues overlaps in important ways with
discussions of North American integration in Chapters 3 and 4. U.S. and Canadian governments,
while recognizing the global, regional, national, and more localized dimensions of these issues,
tend to approach them from different ends of the proverbial telescope.
Executive branch policies in the United States face the daunting challenge of managing ―whole
of government‖ issues which overlap with broader national security questions which have global
dimensions. Relations with Canada, if not peripheral to these concerns, inhabit a variety of
niches within domestic or international policy subsets of homeland security and trade facilitation
– at least in the absence of a sufficient degree of integration to allow for full reciprocity and
mutual recognition of systems.
However, the creation of such arrangements, such as the idea of bi-national border agency
circulated by some academics and business groups,59 inherently challenge deeply entrenched
institutional interests and national sentiments in each country. Most important among these are
Congressional prerogatives over domestic legislation, budgetary policies and oversight of the
executive branch in the United States, and the right of an independent judiciary in both countries
to interpret and apply national laws: not least, constitutional guarantees of due process, civil
liberties and human rights. They also evoke deeply held views of national sovereignty in all three
countries of North America – ranging from patriotic devotion to national institutions and the
democratic accountability of governments to their citizens, to chauvinistic and sometimes
conspiracy-driven displays of fear and loathing for cosmopolitan elites whose agendas are seen
to threaten these values.60 The inherent differences in size and power between the United States
and its neighbours further increase the challenges of introducing ―European-style‖ institutions
for border security and management into a North American context – even before the substantial
differences in security conditions between the Canadian and Mexican borders are taken into
account.
Proposals for the introduction of a ―North American‖ security perimeter might be feasible if
political and societal interests in each country were to approach the issue on the basis of mutual
18
recognition and verification – much as customs inspectors now conduct inspections of exportoriented firms away from national borders, while remaining subject to the primacy of host
countries‘ laws. Such measures would leave national governments (or provinces and states) with
the freedom to adapt their laws and regulations to changing circumstances, as long as they did
not discriminate against partner countries or their citizens. Governments could negotiate
agreements on processes for consultations on prospective regulatory changes that might prove
unduly disruptive to cross-border interests, much as existing regulatory processes in the United
States provide for structured public consultations on a wide range of regulatory impact criteria.61
However, the levels of mutual trust and shared interest required for such measures are hard
enough to introduce during periods of relative peace and prosperity – when create policy-makers
can locate the resources necessary to compensate prospective ―losers‖ from such policies in
order to secure the broader social and economic benefits that might emerge from them. They are
far more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve during periods of pervasive economic insecurity,
particularly when the political and administrations of each country are so deeply divided among
themselves – let alone in relation to their national counterparts in North America.
The other option available to policy-makers and societal interests is to identify shared interests
and objectives on a smaller scale in addressing different aspects of the policy elephant of security
and facilitation. The next chapter explores these challenges and opportunities in greater detail.
ENDNOTES
1
Frank P. Harvey, ―Canada‘s Addiction to American Security: The Illusion of Choice in the War on Terrorism‖,
American Review of Canadian Studies 35:2 (Summer 2005), 265-94; Richard J. Kilroy, ―Perimeter Defense and
Regional Security Cooperation in North America: United States, Canada, and Mexico‖, Homeland Security Affairs,
Supplement # 1, (December 2007); Paul N. Stockton and Patrick S. Roberts, ―Findings from the Forum on
Homeland Security after the Bush Administration: Next Steps in Building Unity of Effort”, Homeland Security
Affairs IV;2 (June 2008).
2
Stephen E. Flynn, ―The False Conundrum: Continental Integration vs. Homeland Security‖, in The Rebordering of
North America, eds., Peter Andreas and Thomas Bierstecker, (New York: Routledge), 112; see also Emmanuel
Brunet-Jailly, ―Borders, Borderlands and Security: European and North American Lessons and Policy Suggestions‖,
in Borderlands: Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, ed., (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press), 351-57.
3
Charles Doran, Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1984), page.
4
Confidential interview, U.S. Department of State, November 2005.
5
Paul Cellucci, Unquiet Diplomacy (Toronto: Key Porter, 2005), 15, 131-46.
6
Christopher Bellavita, ―Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security‖, Homeland Security Affairs
IV:2, (June 2008), 1; online at http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.3 (07/07/08)
7
Christopher Bellavita, ―Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security‖, Homeland Security Affairs
IV:2 (June 2008).
8
Bellavita, ―Changing Homeland Security‖.
9
United States. Department of Homeland Security. ―Mission Statement‖ (Washington, DC: 2003)
10
United States. Department of Homeland Security. One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: U.S.
Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008-2013 (Washington, DC: 16 September 2008),
2; online at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf (30/11/09).
11
Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era (Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2005),
51.
19
12
Ibid.; Flynn, ―The False Conundrum: Continental Integration vs. Homeland Security‖, 110-27; Daniel Prieto,
―The Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security‖, Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland
Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century, ed. Bert B. Tussing (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2006), 85-110.
13
United States. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report
(Washington, DC: GPO), 406; Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era (Montreal: McGillQueen‘s University Press, 2005), 70-94; Clark Murdock and others, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government
and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July
2005), 67-69. For a contrary perspective, see several essays in Bert J. Pilling, ed. Threats at our Threshold:
Homeland Security in the New Century (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006).
14
See Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Ian Macleod,
―Obstacle Course‖, The Ottawa Citizen, November 17, 2007, A3.
15
Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, April
2004); Patrick J. Smith, ―Anti-terrorism in North America: Is there Convergence or Divergence in Canadian and US
Legislative Responses to 9/11 and the US-Canada border‖, in Borderlands: Comparing Border Security in North
America and Europe, ed., Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007), 282.
16
United States. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report
(Washington, DC: July 2004), esp. pp. 387-89.
17
Confidential interview, Department of Homeland Security, November 2005. [HS-1]
18
For example, see Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 2004); Michael Levi, Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Matthew
Bunn, ―Thwarting Terrorists: More to be Done‖, The Washington Post, September 26, 2007, A19; David Ignatius,
―Portents of a nuclear al-Qaeda‖, The Washington Post, October 11, 2007, A25.
19
Canada. Smart Border Declaration: Building A Smart Border for the 21 s Century on the Foundation of a North
American Zone of Confidence (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, December 11, 2001) –
online at: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/main/border/smart_border_declaration-en.asp
20
Confidential Interviews, Department of Homeland Security, Dec. 2005 [HS1]; Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Canada, December 2005, April 2006 [F18, F32].
21
Canada. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the
Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, December 2006);
online at: http:epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca
/eng/26.htm (15/07/08); Stewart Bell, ―CSIS made bad deals, report says‖, National Post, October 27, 2006, A1;
Andrew Duffy, ―The secret trial‖, The Ottawa Citizen, June 22, 2008; A1; Colin Freeze, ―Are security certificates
obsolete?‖, The Globe and Mail, September 25, 2009, A9..
22
Geoffrey Hale, ―People, politics and passports: contesting security, trade and travel on the US-Canadian border‖,
in Geopolitics 15:4 (forthcoming, 2010); confidential interviews, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada,
Department of Homeland Security, May 2008. [F63, F71, HS9]
23
For example, see Doug Struck, ―Terrorist allegations detailed in Canada.‖ The Washington Post, June 7, 2006,
A01; Joshua Kurlantzick, ―Canada‘s terrorism problem.‖ The New Republic, June 7, 2006; Brigitte McCann,
―Bienvenue à Montréalistan‖, Le Journal de Montreal, March 16, 2007; Ian Macleod, ―The warning lights are all
blinking red‖, The Ottawa Citizen, February 23, 2008, B1-3; Graeme Hamilton, ―Terror plotter undone by online
activities‖, National Post, October 2, 2009, A6.
24
Christine E. Wormuth, ―Is a Goldwater-Nichols Act Needed for Homeland Security‖, in Threats at our Threshold:
Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century, ed., Bert B. Tussing (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 84; [Full: 71-84]online at:
http://www.csis.org/images/storeis/HomelandSecurity/071022_ThreatsAtOurThreshold.pdf. [16/07/08]
25
United States. Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: The
White House, July 2002); online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf;United States.
Homeland Security Council. National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: The White House, October
2007); online at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf; United States.
Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Presidential Directives (Washington, DC: last modified,
June 4, 2008); online http:/www.dhs.gov.xabout/laws/editorial_06. 07.shtm
20
26
Dieudonné Mouafo and others, ―Building Cross-Border Links: A Compendium of Canada-U.S. Government
Collaboration‖ (Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service, 2004); online at www.myschoolmonecole.gc.ca/Research/publications/pdfs/p128_e.pdf
27
Confidential interview, Department of Homeland Security, February 2006. [HS-3]
28
Paul Rosenzweig, ―Why the U.S. doesn‘t trust Canada‖, macleans.ca, October 5, 2009.
29
Ibid.
30
For example, Spencer S. Hsu, ―DHS strains as goals, mandates go unmet‖, The Washington Post, March 6, 2008,
A01; Ellen Nakashima, ―Reports citer lack of uniform policy for terrorist watch list‖, The Washington Post, March
18, 2008, A02.
31
For example, see United States. Department of State and Department of Homeland Security. Preserving our
Welcome to the World in an Age of Terrorism – Report of the Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory Committee
(Washington, DC: January 2008.)
32
Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald, ―Prelude to Disaster: The Making of DHS‖, The Washington Post,
December 22, 2005, A01; Daniel Prieto, ―The Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security‖,
Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century, ed. Bert B. Tussing
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 85-110; Paul N. Stockton and Patrick S.
Roberts, ―Findings from the Forum on Homeland Security after the Bush Administration: Next Steps in Building
Unity of Effort”, Homeland Security Affairs IV;2 (June 2008), 1.
33
Spencer S. Hsu, ―DHS plagued by turnover in top positions‖, The Washington Post, July 16, 2007, A08;
confidential interview, Department of Homeland Security, February 2006. [HS-3]
34
David Heyman and and James Jay Carafano, DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security
(Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Heritage Foundation, December 13, 2004);
online at www.csis.org/hs/041213_dhsv2.pdf; David Ignatius, ―Homeland Security‘s struggle‖, The Washington
Post, March 6, 2008, A21.
35
Robert O‘Harrow Jr. and Scott Higham, ―Post-9/11 Rush Mixed Politics with Security‖, The Washington Post,
December 25, 2005, A01; William Finn Bennett, ―Hunter touts 700-mile border fence‖, North County Times,
Escondido, CA, December 30, 2005.
36
Blas Nunez-Neto, ―Border Security: Key Agencies and their Missions‖, # RS 21899 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, May 13, 2008).
37
Interviews, Department of Homeland Security; Foreign Affairs and International Relations Canada; Public Affairs
Canada.
38
Ray S. Cline, ―Is Intelligence Over-Coordinated‖, Studies in Intelligence 1:4 (Fall 1957), cited in Daniel Prieto,
―The Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security‖, Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland
Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century, ed. Bert B. Tussing (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2006), 85.
39
Christopher Bellavita, ―Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security‖, Homeland Security Affairs
IV:2 (June 2008).
40
Ibid.; Geoffrey Hale, ―People, politics and passports: contesting security, trade and travel on the US-Canadian
border‖, in Geopolitics (forthcoming).
41
Patrick J. Smith, ―Anti-terrorism in North America: Is there Convergence or Divergence in Canadian and US
Legislative Responses to 9/11 and the US-Canada border‖, in Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, ed., Borderlands:
Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007), 277-310;
Martin Collacutt, ―Canada‘s inadequate response to terrorism: the need for immigration reform‖ (Vancouver, BC:
Fraser Institute, February 2006); Greg Weston, ―A case of border insecurity‖, The Ottawa Sun, May 30, 2006; Colin
Freeze, ―Get tougher on terrorism, FBI director tells Canada‖, The Globe and Mail, July 19, A6; Associated Press,
―3 Texans arraigned on terror charges‖, The Washington Times, August 13, 2006; Jeff Sallot, ―CSIS kept tabs on
274 terror suspects last year‖, The Globe and Mail, October 27, 2006, A1; Brigitte McCann, ―Bienvenue à
Montréalistan‖, Journal de Montreal, March 16, 2006; Christopher Sands, ―Fading Power or Rising Power: 11
September and Lessons from the Section 110 Experience‖, in Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds.,
Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007), 249-64; Rosenzweig, ―Why the
U.S. doesn‘t trust Canada‖; Colin Freeze and Tu Thanh Ha, ―Canadian charged in newspaper plot‖, The Globe and
Mail, October 28, 2009, A1.
21
42
Michelle Shephard, ―Made in Canada threat worries CSIS‖, The Toronto Star, February 11, 2006; Stewart Bell
and Adrian Humphreys (2006), ―Terrorism‘s ‗New Guard‘‖, National Post, May 4, 2006; Spencer S. Hsu, ―FBI
disrupts New York City tunnel plot‖, The Washington Post, July 7; Colin Freeze, ―U.K. spymaster raises alarm‖,
The Globe and Mail, November 11, 2006; Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, ―Radicalization in the West: The
Homegrown Threat‖ (New York: NYPD Intelligence Division, August 2007), online at
http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf (16/07/08);
Ian Macleod, ―The warning lights are all blinking red‖, The Ottawa Citizen, February 23, 2008, B1-3; Marc
Sageman, ―The Next Generation of Terror‖, Foreign Policy, (March-April 2008); Stewart Bell, ―Solo terrorists pose
new threat: report‖, National Post, June 10, 2008, page A1.
43
For contrary perspective, see Bruce Hoffman, ―The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism‖, Foreign Affairs, MarchApril 2008.
44
Danielle Goldfarb, Is Just-in-Case Replacing Just-in-Time? How Cross-Border Trading Behaviour Has Changed
Since 9/11 (Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, June 2007); North American Competitiveness Council, Building
a Secure and Competitive North America: 2007 Report to Leaders (Washington, DC: August 2007); United States.
Department of State and Department of Homeland Security, Preserving our Welcome to the World in an Age of
Terrorism – Report of the Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory Committee (Washington, DC: January 2008);
Canadian Chamber of Commerce and United States Chamber of Commerce, ―Finding the Balance: Reducing Border
Costs While Strengthening Security (Ottawa, Washington, DC: February 2008); US Chamber of Commerce and
Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Finding the Balance: Shared Border of the Future (Washington and Ottawa: 21
July).
45
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, Interview, March 2006.
46
Geoffrey Hale, ―Political Economy and Intermesticity”, in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, eds.
Brian Bow and R. Peter Lennox, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
47
Interview, former DFAIT official, June 2008. [B22]
48
Geoffrey Hale, ―Cross-Border Relations: Moving Beyond the Politics of Uncertainty?‖, in How Ottawa Spends:
2005-2006, ed. G. Bruce Doern, (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2005), 121-42.
49
Ibid.; Geoffrey Hale, ――Sharing a Continent: Security, Insecurity, and the Politics of ‗Intermesticity‘‖, Canadian
oreign Policy 12:3, Winter 2005-06), 31-43; Anne McLellan, Comments in Roundtable: ―New Leadership in U.S.Canada Relations‖ (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Relations, June 27, 2006); confidential
interviews, Privy Council Office, December 2005.
50
For example, see: Wendy Dobson,, ―Shaping the Future of the North American Economic Space: A Framework
for Action‖, Commentary # 162 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, April 2002); George Haynal, ―The Next Plateau in
North America: What‘s the Big Idea?‖, Policy Options 25:6, June-July 2004, 35-39; John P. Manley, Pedro Aspe,
and William Weld, Building a North American Community:Report of an Independent Task Force (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2005.)
51
Joel J. Sokolsky and Philippe Lagassé, ―Suspenders and a Belt: Perimeter and Border Security in Canada-U.S.
Relations‖, Canadian Foreign Policy 14:3, (Winter 2005-06), 15-29.
52
Geoffrey Hale, ―Getting Down to Business: Rebuilding Canada-US Relations‖, in How Ottawa Spends: 20072008, ed. G. Bruce Doern (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 65-86; confidential
interviews, government of Canada, March 2006 through May 2007. [F32, F33,
53
Confidential interviews, Privy Council Office, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Public Safety
Canada, May 2006 – May 2007; F12, F46, F62.
54
Confidential interviews, government of Canada. [F45, F46].
55
Geoffrey Hale, ―In search of more effective border management‖, Canadian International Council, December
2008.
56
Robert A. Pastor. ―The future of North America‖, Foreign Affairs 87:4, (July-August 2008), 87-89; see also Table
3.1.
57
For example, see Anne Goodchild, Steven Globerman and Susan Albrecht, ―Service time variability at the Blaine,
Washington International Border Crossing and the Impact on Regional Supply Chains‖, Research Report # 3
(Bellingham, WA: Border Policy Research Institute, June 2007); Canadian Chamber of Commerce and United
States Chamber of Commerce, ―Finding the Balance: Reducing Border Costs While Strengthening Security (Ottawa,
Washington, DC: February 2008)
58
Brunet Jailly, 2007; Hale, forthcoming 2009.
22
59
Michael Kergin and Birgit Mathiessen. Border Issues Report: A New Bridge for Old Allies. (Toronto: Canadian
International Council, November 2008)
60
For example, see Jerome R. Corsi, The Late, Great USA: The coming merger with Mexico and Canada (WND
Books, 2007).
61
For example, see Daniel Schwanen, ―Deeper, Broader: A Roadmap for a Treaty of North America?‖, Folio 4, in
The Art of the State, Volume II: Thinking North America, eds. Thomas J. Courchene, Donald J. Savoie, and Daniel
Schwanen (Montreal: Institute for Research in Public Policy, 2004).