The United States and the Soviet Union are two systems with opposing
ideologies-CAPITALISM VS.COMMUNISM which generated major
conflict in the past. This conflict, popularized by American journalist
Lippman in 1947 as the ‘Cold War’, has been characterized by tension
and the shifting struggle for power and prestige between the US and the Soviet Union,
remaining in a constant non-violent state of hostility. While the US trusts in individual
competition& private ownership, the Communist Soviet Union supports a noncompetitive system of fair share.
The erection of the Berlin Wall has been stimulated by the ‘Cold War’. Isaacs interprets
that ‘The Wall came to symbolize Europe’s division, at the heart of the Cold
War’.1Nevertheless, to elucidate why the Berlin Wall was ‘erected’ on the 13th
August,1961, one must consider the split-up of Post-World-War-II Germany into zones of
the American, the British and French forces, occupying West Germany& West Berlin as
well as of the Soviet Union, occupying East Germany& East Berlin. While West
Germany& West Berlin become under the sphere of Western influence, the Soviet Union
exerts its Communist influence in East Germany & East Berlin- with pronounced effects.
The exodus of 2.8 Million East Germans to West Germany from 1949-1961 raised major
concerns for the GDR (German Democratic Republic) as ‘…it was depriving the GDR of
precisely the people it needed to compete with the FRG (Federal Republic of
Germany)’2. Among many refugees were young industrial workers, doctors, intellectuals
and other professionals who according to Major abandoned the East particularly ‘…for
economic reasons, seeking a higher standard of living in the West’.3 This exodus of
young and skilled caused panic in the East as Downing describes it was not only ‘…a
humiliating sign of the failure of the socialist utopia’4 but ‘…created a serious labor
shortage5’ in the first place. It is thought that ‘The presence in Berlin of an open,
uncontrolled border between the socialist and capitalist worlds prompts the population to
make a comparison between both parts of the city6’ which does not turn out in favor to
Soviet-occupied East Germany& East Berlin. As First Secretary of the Communist Party,
Khrushchev who supported the GDR, felt committed to establishing an East German
Communist state and hence was determined to put an end to this exodus of East
Germans. He implied this determination in a public speech on the 10th November, 1958,
to present the specific demands that (1) Western Powers& the Soviet Union should sign
a four-power peace treaty, acknowledging East German sovereignty and that (2) Berlin
should become a ‘free city’ therein. Historian Gaddis argues that ‘…Khrushchev had
resisted this option because he hoped by means of his ‘free city’ proposal- to detach
West Berlin from West Germany- not to isolate it from East Germany’.7 At the heart of
this proposal was to free Berlin from the Western occupation powers but to place it
under complete Soviet control. Two weeks later, he radicalized his demands in
expounding to the West a six-month ultimatum in which he put forward that he’d sign a
1
Jeremy Isaacs& Taylor Downing, Cold War, Transworld Publishers Ltd., UK, 1998, p.164
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press, UK, 1998, p.143
3
Patrick Major, The Berlin Wall crisis: the view from below, University of Warwick, UK, 2006
http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/cold/articles/major.html
4
Jeremy Isaacs& Taylor Downing, Cold War, Transworld Publishers Ltd., UK, 1998, p.170
5
Jeremy Isaacs& Taylor Downing, Cold War, Transworld Publishers Ltd., UK, 1998, p.170
6
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press, UK, 1998, p.143
7
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press, UK, 1998, p.147
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separate peace treaty with the GDR under the leader Ulbricht, placing all of Berlin under
East German sovereignty and even threatened with war if there would be no agreement
in relation to these demands. US-President Eisenhower remained reluctant to this, as it
was crucial to him that ‘…the American people would never allow anyone to grab the city
unilaterally. Two million people lived there; Washington was obliged to protect their
security’.8 His failure to convince the US of these demands demonstrated to him that his
was no more a viable policy. Even at the Vienna summit in June 1960, held between
John F. Kennedy and Khrushchev the Berlin question could not be resolved since
Kennedy stressed to Khrushchev the US’ unwillingness to compromise on a withdrawal
from Berlin. Khrushchev conclusively considered another alternative-the erection of a
wall on the 13th August, 1961 whereby the border between East and West Berlin was
sealed off with a barrier of barbed wire, light fencing to become a series of walls, fortified
fences and gun positions. The Berlin Wall allowed the Soviets to end the exodus of East
Germans to the West. Khrushchev’s determination to get rid of Western influence in
Berlin, also acted as a catalyst in the erection of the Berlin Wall. Without a doubt, he was
absorbed by the vision ‘…that communism would prevail over capitalism’9 and to
implement this, he considered the radical solution of a wall, separating his sphere of
Communist influence East Berlin from Capitalist West Berlin if he couldn’t seize the
whole of Berlin without risking military confrontation with the US. Although, the Berlin
Wall might have been viewed as a radical solution internationally, there’s no denying the
fact that it marked a significant moment in the ‘Cold War’, creating a stalemate to avoid
the possibility of a confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, escalating in a
potential nuclear war. Thus, Kennedy acknowledged that ‘It’s not a very nice solution,
but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war’10, likewise, Khrushchev who insisted that
they ‘…didn’t want a military conflict…only wanted to conduct a surgical operation.’11 To
both, the Berlin Wall consequently prevented the outbreak of a military confrontation
over Berlin.
8
Fred Kaplan, Why Berlin Matter-How could one city mean so much? , Slate, 06/11/09
http://www.slate.com/id/2234900
9
Jeremy Isaacs& Taylor Downing, Cold War, Transworld Publishers Ltd., UK, 1998, p.166
10
Robert Wilde, The Berlin Wall, About. European History, 2010
http://europeanhistory.about.com/od/coldwar/p/prberlinwall.htm
11
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press, UK, 1998, p.149
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