An Explanation of Self-Knowledge
Chienchih Chi
The 2003 New York Conference on Asian Studies
ABSTRACT Self-knowledge is one of the main concerns in Eastern philosophy. However,
what is self-knowledge? How do we learn self-knowledge? Taking Confucianism as an example,
according to Weiming Tu’s view, the acquisition of self-knowledge is simultaneously to perfect
oneself. He suggests that self-knowledge is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how. It is a
different kind of knowledge. The way we obtain self-knowledge is through an intellectual intuition.
The process begins from (social) practice. Through the practices and intellectual intuition, we may
obtain a new inner experience, which shows the hidden self to us.
Modern science and democracy, which have dramatically changed human lifestyle, are both
developed from the Western philosophical approach. The learning approach that is used to
obtain Western philosophical knowledge is highly respected. Although Eastern philosophical
theories have gradually been considered more interesting, the importance of the approach to
obtaining Eastern philosophical knowledge is still mostly ignored. Based on the new
developments in cognitive science, we can reconsider what can be learned from the Eastern
philosophical approach.
The new development in cognitive science finds that there are at least two different
primary ways for human beings to obtain knowledge. The first one is the theoretical way; we
can learn through factual statements and rules. For example, “The Earth is round.” We can
learn this by being told. This type of knowledge is easier to organize by a logical system. This
approach develops theoretical (also called factual) knowledge. The second one is the practical
way; we can learn through practice. Through practice, we may acquire new experiences and
based on these new experiences, we know something new.1 These two approaches have
different cognitive processes, and more importantly, it is believed that neither of these
1
Learning through practice is not necessary to obtain new experiences. New connections between experiences
may also make us learn something. For example, a dog can learn a new thing by connecting the experience of
seeing a red light and the experience of smelling food. However, in some sense, this kind of new connection can
also be viewed as a new experience. In this paper, the term new experience is used to include this kind of new
connection.
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approaches can be used to obtain both types of knowledge. However, we can still use a
scientific view to analyze both cognitive processes.
In its development, Eastern philosophy, unlike Western philosophy, mainly adopts the
second approach in obtaining knowledge. This situation largely differentiates the philosophical
theories between the two sides of the world for thousands of years. In fact, all of us possess
both learning abilities and use them to learn necessary knowledge in daily life. There should be
no difference in the cognitive mechanisms. However, in philosophical developments, different
concerns result in different requirements, which makes people use different approaches in
dealing with problems, and therefore produce different types of theories and knowledge.
One of the main concerns in Eastern philosophy is about the self - how to develop oneself,
how to know oneself, and even how to perfect oneself. Practice, not logical reasoning, is the
primary route for achieving these goals. In one respect, Confucianism is considered to be a
theory of self-perfection. Weiming Tu points out, “To know oneself is simultaneously to perfect
oneself” (Tu 1985, p.20). According to this view, self-knowledge, or the process of coming to
know oneself, can make one change to be a perfect or a profound person in the Confucian sense.
How is it possible that self-knowledge can make a person perfect? From Tu’s point of view, to
learn about the self is not only self-realization but also self-development (Tu 1985, p.26).
Through the developmental process, people can perfect themselves. This statement corresponds
to an important paragraph in the first chapter of the Chung-yung, known as the Doctrine of the
Mean. It says:
“What Heaven (T’ien, Nature) imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our
nature is called the Way (Tao). Cultivating the Way is called education” (Chen 1963,
p.98).
This paragraph is believed to describe a central Confucian thought. One of the main goals of
Confucianism is to discover our nature. The learning and developmental processes cultivate the
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Way that follows nature. As one discovers his nature, he becomes a profound (or a perfect)
person2.
If we believe that this kind of self-knowledge that enables a person to become perfect
exists, it is reasonable to believe that self-knowledge is not to be learned simply by being told.
One of the main reasons is that a profound person, according to Confucianism, should be wise
and virtuous; such a person knows how to act properly in a certain situation. This ability can
only be learned through (social) practice rather than through knowing a set of facts and rules
(Dreyfus 1986; Searle 1992). In addition, if we believe that this kind of self-knowledge exists,
based on Confucianism, the process of acquiring self-knowledge is also the process of
self-development and only the perfect person really knows himself. Thus, the developmental
process does not really change a person, but reveals his true self. Thus, self-knowledge plays
the central role in Confucianism.
Tu Weiming on Confucian self-knowledge
Tu explains that self-knowledge is basically an understanding of one’s mental state and an
appreciation of one’s inner feelings (Tu 1985, p.19). Because a profound person possesses
wisdom and virtues that cannot simply be learned by being told but by a process of
self-development through practice, we can say that self-knowledge is knowledge about one’s
own mental states that can only be learned through practice. However, not all mental states are
the self-knowledge that Tu indicates, because he emphasizes the true and hidden self. Only the
knowledge of those mental states that reveal the true or hidden self can be properly called
self-knowledge. Based on these explanations, we can conclude that Confucianism is a theory
2
Like Buddha in Buddhism, a profound person has the highest status in Confucianism. A profound person is
supposed to possess self-knowledge and bring people peaceful lives.
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that can only be learned through a certain type of practice, by which we discover our true (or
hidden) selves. Tu calls this process of revealing true selves as self-realization (Tu 1985,
pp.25-27). Thus, self-development in Confucianism is in fact self-realization. We develop
ourselves by knowing ourselves.
Here, we can find a fundamental difference between Eastern and Western philosophy. The
most important philosophical knowledge in Eastern philosophy can only be learned through
practice, rather than through arguments or theories. Although virtue ethics in Western
philosophy also mentions practice (through practice to develop virtues), it does not focus on
knowledge that can only be learned through practice. However, the problem is what kind of
knowledge could Confucian self-knowledge be? Also, why can it only be learned through
practice?
Tu suggests that self-knowledge is neither knowing-that (also called factual knowledge)
nor knowing-how (also called practical knowledge); it is, in essence, an objectless awareness, a
realization of the human possibility of intellectual intuition (Tu 1985, p.20). Self-knowledge is
the third kind of knowledge, which can be obtained through the method of intellectual intuition.
In order to understand the process of gaining self-knowledge, we must connect the concept
intellectual intuition to the concept self-knowledge. By doing so, we need another concept,
inner experience. Inner experience provides a basis for self-knowledge (Tu 1985, p.21). Based
on these expressions, we can consider self-knowledge as knowledge about a sort of inner
experience, which can be known through intellectual intuition that is developed through
practice.
This process of acquiring self-knowledge is also self-cultivation, and when a person
achieves total self-knowledge he becomes a profound person. Theories in Confucianism are
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full of this sort of view. For example, Wang Yang-Ming3 says:
“Knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the completion of knowledge.
Learning to be a sage involves only one effort. Knowledge and action should not be
separated” (Chen 1963, p.674).
Because the knowledge Wang emphasizes is the awareness or introspection of our conscience,
this knowledge tells us how to act. If we can focus our attention on our conscience, we will
grow sensitive to it. Because this sensitivity will offer us more information about our mental
states, we will obtain more knowledge about our conscience and gradually combine our minds
with our conscience. In so doing, one also develops himself into a profound person. Despite the
excellent discussions on the relation between self-realization and self-development, I will focus
on the cognitive process of acquiring self-knowledge. Thus, following Tu’s explanation of
self-knowledge, the whole cognitive process can be simply summarized as follows: Through a
process of practice we obtain a kind of intellectual intuition, and through this intellectual
intuition we may obtain (or notice) certain sorts of inner experience, which reveal something
about our hidden or true selves. The understanding of our true selves is also self-development
into a profound person.
Self-knowledge is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how
Tu claims that self-knowledge is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how. It is another kind of
knowledge. Knowing-that (or factual knowledge) always refers to knowledge that expresses
facts (or fact-like statements) and rules, such as “The Earth is round.” We can learn this type of
knowledge by being told. Knowing-how (or practical knowledge) often refers to knowledge of
skills, such as knowing how to ride a bicycle. This type of knowledge is hardly described by
3
Wang Yang-Ming, 1472-1529, is a highly influential philosopher in the history of Chinese philosophy. He also
believes that universal moral law is innate and discoverable through self-cultivation.
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language, so that we cannot learn this type of knowledge by being told. We can learn it only
through practice. So, what is self-knowledge?
Tu explains that self-knowledge is basically an understanding of one’s mental state and an
appreciation of one’s inner feelings (Tu 1985, p.19). Based on Tu’s explanation, in one respect
self-knowledge should be a kind of factual knowledge (knowing-that), because the knowledge
that is used to express a mental state can be described as a factual statement. For example, “I
know I feel guilty now” or “if I do a certain thing I will feel guilty” or even “I have a
conscience”. There are also examples in Chung-Yung. It says, “A profound person knows that
human nature is imparted from Heaven and the Way is to follow that nature; the goal of
education is to cultivate the Way” (Chan 1963, p.98). Tu quotes Chang Tsai4 as an example:
“Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother. … All people are my brothers and sisters, and all
things are my companions” (Tu 1985, p.33). This kind of knowledge looks like factual
knowledge. Except for the descriptions of our mental feelings, Tu also believes that knowing
ourselves involves realizing the deeper principle inherent in one’s nature (Tu 1985, pp.32-33).
Because principles can also be expressed as factual knowledge, self-knowledge is similar to
factual knowledge in this respect.
However, we cannot categorize self-knowledge as factual knowledge because unlike
factual knowledge, self-knowledge cannot be learned or understood by being told. We must
engage in a certain practice and then experience it in order to know what it is. From this point
of view, self-knowledge is closer to practical knowledge (or knowing-how) because we can
acquire the knowledge only through practice. For example, the only way to understand guilt is
to do something wrong and then to experience a mental feeling that emerges after doing the
wrong thing. Through practice, we learn from whence guilt originates and how to act to avoid it.
4
Chang Tsai (1020-1077) is one of the main philosophers who revitalized Confucian thought after centuries of
ignorance. His theories are helpful for the development of Neo-Confucianism.
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Although we can express self-knowledge through factual (or sentential) statements, we must
acquire or understand it through practice. This kind of knowledge is based on inner experiences,
which can be learned only through practice. Through such experiences, one understands what
expressions of self-knowledge really indicate and then believes them. This means that if we
learn this kind of knowledge only through language, we do not understand what they really
mean and then we do not really believe them because we lack the fundamental practice-based
inner experiences.
Because self-knowledge has features of both sorts of knowledge, it does not belong to
either category. We may consider it as the third kind of knowledge, which is similar to factual
knowledge that can be expressed by language, but can be learned only through practice. In fact,
there is a lot of this kind of knowledge in our daily life. For example, we can only have
knowledge of green by practicing (seeing green things). Self-knowledge should belong to this
category. We must engage in some practice in order to experience something and then obtain
the knowledge about the (true or hidden) self. However, what kind of practice is necessary for
acquiring self-knowledge?
This kind of practice is not limited solely to bodily movement. We may learn practical
knowledge only through repeated (bodily) practice. For example, in order to learn how to ride a
bike or drive a car, one must perform this activity over and over. However, according to Tu,
this method fails to give us self-knowledge. He argues that one cannot become a profound
person by bodily model learning because the Way can neither be determined by a limited set of
rules nor be divided into discrete stages in a unilinear procedure (Tu 1989, p.31). Because Tu
also argues that self-knowledge is about our own mental states, there is no way to understand
our own mental states through bodily movements. In this case, what we can learn from bodily
practice is not the most important part of self-knowledge, rather mental practice.
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However, there is another type of knowing-how we need to consider. Following Gilbert
Ryle’s definition, knowing-how is not merely a type of knowledge about bodily skills, but also
about intellectual skills. For example, Ryle says, “the chess-player must run over in his head all
the relevant rules and tactical maxims of the game before he can make correct and skillful
moves” (Ryle 1949, p. 29). He adds that to do something thinking what one is doing is always
to do two things: (1) to consider certain appropriate propositions, and (2) to put into practice
what these propositions enjoin (Ryle 1949, p. 29). Here, we see that Ryle also emphasizes the
importance of mental practice. Knowing-how is also about knowing how to behave
intellectually, so that the practice for learning how to behave intellectually demands mental
practice. This type of knowing-how is often discussed in moral philosophy, especially in virtue
ethics, known as practical knowledge (Simon 1991; Wallace 1996) or practical wisdom.
Aristotle called it practical wisdom and explains that a man with practical wisdom knows how
to properly act in different situations, and that his actions are virtuous (Aristotle 1966). Because
Confucianism can also be considered a type of virtue ethics, can we use this practical wisdom
to understand what self-knowledge is? There are two reasons that self-knowledge is not a type
of practical wisdom. The first reason is, as Jiyuan Yu indicates, that there is no Aristotelian
notion of practical wisdom in Confucius’ thinking. Yu argues:
“Confucius insists on the continuity and authenticity of tradition. It is out of this belief
that Confucius devotes much of his life to the transmission of the ancient classics,
which record the li or civilization of Zhou . … Confucius’s notion of yi seems to open
the door for an Aristotelian practical wisdom, but he fails to work it out. He has a
major virtue called “wisdom” (zhi), but it must also be based on conformity to li” (Yu
1998).
Although Confucius’s thinking lacks the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom, we can still
find the idea in his words, even though he does not express it in a philosophical manner. For
example, in the Analects 2:17, Confucius says:
“Yu, shall I teach you [the way to acquire] knowledge? To say that you know when you do
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know and say that you do not know when you do not know – that is [the way to acquire]
knowledge” (Chen 1963, p.24).
Also, in Analects 2:15, Confucius says, “He who learns but does not think is lost; he who
thinks but does not learn is in danger.” These paragraphs warrant the belief that Confucius may
have the idea of wisdom without having developed it, since self-reflecting and thinking are
probably the most important ways of gaining wisdom. In addition, Tu indicates that mere
bodily modeling cannot change one into a profound person, thus merely following li cannot
change one into a profound person. But, since Tu claims that self-knowledge is the primary
focus of Confucianism (Tu 1985, p.19), this undeveloped idea of practical wisdom could not be
the core foundation of Confucius’s thought. Hence, self-knowledge is neither Aristotelian
practical wisdom nor a type of practical knowledge.
The other reason to claim that self-knowledge is not practical wisdom is that Tu indicates
that self-knowledge is knowledge about our inner feelings or mental states. We can describe
our inner experiences by using factual statements, unlike Aristotelian practical wisdom, which
cannot be clearly expressed through factual statements. Therefore, it is better to consider
self-knowledge as another kind of knowledge, which is about inner experiences, and can be
expressed through factual statements, but must be learned or understood through practice,
especially a certain sort of mental practice.
Tu also emphasizes that self-knowledge is about the true self and the hidden self. The term
hidden suggests that we are not aware of the inner experiences of self-knowledge in our daily
lives. Nevertheless, Tu emphasizes that we can experience it in our daily lives. Here, we must
understand the term hidden in another way. It is possible that in our daily lives we experience
self-knowledge without noticing it. Thus, we can only notice it through a certain process of
practice.
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From intellectual intuition to self-knowledge
Tu says, “Self-knowledge is nothing more than the manifestation of one’s real nature.” He also
indicates that self-knowledge is, in essence, a realization of the human possibility of
intellectual intuition and explains the idea of intellectual intuition as direct knowledge of reality
without logical reasoning or inference (Tu 1985, p.20). Thus, according to Tu, we can learn our
real nature through self-knowledge and learn self-knowledge, which is a direct knowledge of
reality, through intellectual intuition. However, what is intellectual intuition?
At first, Tu’s explanation of intellectual intuition seems mystical. However, he emphasizes
that intellectual intuition has very little to do with revelation; moreover it is not a sort of
primitive animist view (Tu 1985, pp.20-21). Clearly Tu does not intend to make a mystical
explanation of the process of acquiring self-knowledge. He suggests that inner experience
provides a basis for self-knowledge (Tu 1985, p.21). According to these explanations, we can
connect these important concepts, self-knowledge, inner experience, and intellectual intuition,
in an explanation of a cognitive process as follows: Through a series of practices, one obtains
the ability that is intellectual intuition, which makes us directly perceive an inner experience
and this inner experience reveals the true self (self-knowledge).
We can express this inner experience (a kind of mental state) through factual statements as
self-knowledge. Based on this cognitive process, we find that this knowledge is only about the
self, and not about other people, because all knowledge comes from personal inner experiences.
Tu agrees that all knowledge comes from personal inner experiences, but he does not agree that
all the knowledge is only about the self. He says that inner experiences are not at all private;
self-knowledge is a form of inner experience precisely because it resonates with the inner
experience of others (Tu 1985, p.23). This explanation points out a difference between
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Confucianism and other practice-based philosophies like Taoism and Buddhism. In order to
make one’s own inner experiences resonate with the inner experiences of others, the practice of
learning self-knowledge necessitates the inclusion of others. This means that social practice is a
required feature of Confucianism, but not of Taoism or Buddhism. Although Confucianism,
like Taoism and Buddhism, emphasizes the transformation of oneself to the universe through
the quest for self-knowledge, it is the only one that highly emphasizes social practice (Tu 1985,
p.74). Tu says, among the Three Teachings (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism) only
Confucianism unequivocally asserts that society is both necessary and intrinsically valuable for
self-realization (Tu 1985, p.26). Therefore, we may make a brief conclusion to explain Tu’s
view as follows:
In Confucianism one of the main goals is to acquire self-knowledge, which is the same
as being a profound person. In order to reach this goal, a type of social practice is
necessary. Through this practice we can develop (or create) an intellectual intuition,
which is the key to perceiving a kind of inner experience that is about our true selves.
Thus, social practice or intellectual intuition can help us directly obtain self-knowledge
without logical reasoning.
There are two main issues in this cognitive process. The first one is about inner experiences.
How can inner experiences reveal a real self or the real nature of human beings, and why can it
only be found through a series of social practices? The second issue is about intellectual
intuition. Does intellectual intuition really exist, and can it work as Tu expects? Through an
analysis of Tu’s explanation in a cognitive respect, we can discuss these issues clearly. This is
the project of another paper.
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Reference:
Aristotle (1966) Metaphysics, Translated with commentaries and glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press).
Chen, Wing-Tsit. (1963) A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton University Press).
Dreyfus, H. & Dreyfus, S. (1986) Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise
in the Era of the Computer (The Free Press).
Ryle, Gilbert. (1949) The Concept of Mind (London, Hutchinson).
Searle, J. R. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind (The MIT Press).
Simon, Y. R. (1991) Practical Knowledge, ed. by Robert J. Mulvaney (New York, Fordham University
Press).
Tu, Wei-Ming. (1985) Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (SUNY Press).
Tu, Wei-Ming. (1989) Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness (SUNY
Press).
Wallace, J. D. (1996) Ethical Norms, Particular Cases (Cornell University Press).
Yu, Jiyuan. (1998). Virtue: Confucius and Aristotle, Philosophy East & West, V.48, No.2, pp. 323-347.
Chinese Glossary
Chang Tsai
Ch’eng
Chung-yung
li
T’ien
Tao
Tu Weiming
Wang Yang-Ming
yi
zhi
zhou
張載
誠
中庸
禮
天
道
杜維明
王陽明
義
知
周
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