Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
1
Rangoon Suspense
Report Card, Burma
1 December 2001 - 31 March 2002
includes “coup plot” & chronology
ALTSEAN Burma
Published July 2002
CONTENTS
ISBN:974-90486-0-1, Bangkok, July 2002
2 RANGOON SUSPENSE
3 DEMOCRACY
THE TALKS, POLITICAL PRISONERS, POLITICAL FREEDOM
8 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEME: ‘DEMOCRACY’, CHINA V. INDIA
9 INTERNATIONAL AID, UPDATE
JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA
11
ECONOMIC SITUATION
HEADING FOR ECONOMIC COLLAPSE, THE KYAT: DOWNHILL ALL THE WAY,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, PRESSURE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
19
DRUGS
PRODUCTION, UWSA, ERADICATION & PREVENTION, REGIONAL PROBLEM,
UNDCP & FUNDS
24
THAI – BURMESE RELATIONS
DRUGS, FIGHTING ON THE BORDER, AIDING REBELS, PEOPLE FROM BURMA IN THAILAND
27
MILITARY REGIME
THE ‘COUP PLOT’, USDA, POLICE, THE WEAPONS KEEP COMING, REGIONAL SECURITY
THE NUCLEAR REACTOR
31
WOMEN & CHILDREN
WOMEN AWARD, VIOLENCE, CHILDREN SEX WORK, VIOLENCE
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
2
33
HUMAN RIGHTS
PROF. PINHEIRO’S 2ND TRIP TO BURMA, FORCED LABOUR, EXTORTION,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, LABOUR RIGHTS
39
ETHNIC
CHAVALIT’S INTERVENTION, KAREN, SHAN, KARENNI, LAHU, MON
42 RELIGION
43 HEALTH
PROSTHESIS, HIV/AIDS, THAILAND & THE HEALTH OF PEOPLE FROM BURMA
45
EDUCATION
MONASTIC EDUCATION, STUDY ABROAD, CLOSURE
47
DISPLACEMENT
IDPS, REFUGEES THAILAND, ROHINGYA
MIGRANT WORKERS, THAILAND HIGHLY VULNERABLE, REGISTRATION
50
ENVIRONMENT
IVORY, LOGGING & FURNITURE SMUGGLING
51 CHRONOLOGY
55 APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW WITH DR. CHAO TZANG YANGHWE
59 BIBLIOGRAPHY
60
ERRATA
RANGOON SUSPENSE
A new thriller hits the international press. Daughter of former dictator Ne Win, plots a
coup to over-throw the military government in Rangoon. While Sandar Win is under
house arrest with her father at one end of University Avenue, her husband, sons and
other conspirators are under arrest. They will be charged for treason.
Meanwhile, at the other end of the street, another woman unappreciative of the
government’s ‘good intentions’ is also under house arrest. The military regime of
course insists Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains housebound in the interests of security.
The two women are in different ways, threats to the ‘men-only’ boat of Rangoon,
headed by Sr-Gen Than Shwe. Neither woman is a stranger to politics: One the
favourite daughter of dictator Ne Win, widely disliked for her greed and the thuggish
behaviour of her family. The other daughter of independence hero General Aung San,
and a national hero in her own right. Gossip and glee over Sandar Win and her family’s
comeuppance compete with speculation of the next possible date Aung San Suu Kyi
will be released.
Has Burma ever seen anything like it?
The answer, simply: Yes.
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
3
The people of Burma are used to the regime’s propaganda evoked in the name of
National Security. The highly publicised ‘coup plot’ is a diversion tactic by the
generally media-wary junta. In its name, the military regime has increased security,
gone on an intelligence rampage, and most disturbingly, postponed – for the second
time – UN Special Envoy Razali’s visit to Burma in connection with talks between the
regime and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
If the regime was truly determined to act in the best interests of the people of Burma its
tactics would be radically different. Soap operas like this ‘coup plot’ would not be the
focus of attention.
The real suspense gripping the international community should be focused on matters
that would improve the daily lives of the peoples of Burma: When and how will talks
with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi progress beyond the confidence-building stage? When
talks would be announced to the Burmese public and would be extended to involve
ethnic nationalities? Will an unconditional national cease-fire be called to halt the
killings and decrease the sufferings of the people? When will all political prisoners be
released?
We are still waiting.
4
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
DEMOCRACY
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
The national reconciliation process in Myanmar is at a delicate stage… [E]fforts to
build confidence have not progressed as quickly as many had hoped or expected.
Therefore, much more needs to be done over the next 12 months to make the
process irreversible. Specifically… there is a clear need to move the national
reconciliation process from the present confidence-building stage and to begin
dialogue on substantative political issues.
– UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, 18 Mar 02
THE TALKS
The talks are not going as fast as they should.
– UN Special Envoy, Razali, Feb 02
Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the talks continued to lack any real substance.
Although U Lwin commented in February that the talks were “very much alive,” the
alleged March 2002 ‘coup-plot’ [see Military] has posed problems. Despite assurances
by Maj-Gen. Kyaw Win that the talks would not be affected, the political changes that
have transpired in its aftermath must have implications for the talks. To quote UN
Special Envoy Razali, “Obviously, all events like this are serious. They have a direct
impact.”1
The 1st direct impact has been the postponement of Razali’s 7 th trip, from 19 March
until 22 April (the trip was earlier postponed in February), the official reason being that
officials were too busy dealing with the ‘coup attempt’. (An earlier report held the
deputy Foreign Minister’s health responsible.) As the US stated, Razali’s delayed visit
casts doubt over the regime’s commitment to dialogue.2
Hopes for genuine progress were earlier dashed on Independence Day (4 Jan). On 13
December U Lwin, NLD spokesperson and
We are waiting for Independence Day
Secretary, spoke in anticipation of the release
on January 4. We are hoping for a big
and amnesty of political prisoners and/or the
change, mainly in the shape and
start of substantive dialogue towards national
pattern of the discussion, to have a
proper dialogue.
- U Lwin, Dec 01
reconciliation. U Lwin was encouraged by
greater political freedoms that he said
constituted confidence-building measures. Razali’s positive comments of were also
reason for optimism.3
AFP, Kuala Lumpur (20 Mar 02) Coup must not derail Myanmar’s reconciliation process: UN envoy
AFP, Washington (19 Mar 02) US chastises Myanmar over UN visit cancellation; for further discussion on the
‘coup attempt’ and the talks, see Altsean-Burma (Apr 02:9-11)
3
see AP, Rangoon (13 Dec 01) Myanmar opposition sees sign of reconciliation on Independence Day; AP (10
Jan 02) UN envoy sees ‘significant progress in Myanar talks’, DVB (30 Jan 02) Junta postpones UN special
envoy Razali’s February visit to March
1
2
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
5
As is too often the case in Burma however, those who held hope were disappointed.
Independence Day came and went, the only mention of the talks being in the NLD
statement which reiterated calls for greater speed, the start of meaningful tripartite
dialogue, release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners and political
freedom. NLD Chairperson, U Aung Shwe, urged Burma to unite and strive for a
“genuine democracy that everyone long desired.” This is the first formal statement the
NLD has issued since the talks began. This breaking of silence signifies extreme
discontent with the progress of the talks and release of prisoners. 4
On 22 January, expectations and rumours again ran rife as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi left
her home for the 1st time since her house arrest began in Sept ’00. Escorted by military
personnel, it was suspected that Suu Kyi was taken to meet a top Burmese official,
possibly even Sr-Gen Than Shwe, to
Razali is noted for his good relations with
discuss the talks. The regime denied
both the military and Daw Aung San Suu
such a meeting and it remains unknown
Kyi. However, he appears so concerned in
where Daw Suu Kyi was taken that day.
keeping the generals smiling that he is
losing some support from the people of
Burma. As one lawyer says, ‘Inside he is
called a rescuer of the generals,’ and
another civilian questions, ‘Is he a peacebroker or a fundraiser?’ Fundraiser for his
courting of the international community to
bestow humanitarian aid.
- see Irrawaddy, Jan 30
The only thing that is clear is that Suu
Kyi expressed frustration over the talks
to former Japanese foreign minister,
Kabun Muto, in December. Suu Kyi
reportedly stated that real dialogue has
not yet started and that “it is necessary
to pursue dialogue at high level by
restoring confidence soon.”5
Ongoing conflicts and uncertain movements within the regime apparatus, most recently
visualised by the follow-up to the ‘coup attempt’, do not inspire confidence for the
talks but merely increase the unpredictable and vague climate within which they are
occurring. It was strongly hoped and rumoured that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would be
released from house arrest in time to celebrate Thinjan (Burmese New Year) in midApril. It is vital that the international community insists that the talks go on and
develop into dialogue as, to quote a UN spokesperson, “The process must continue.”6
tripartite talks
In the spirit of the 1947 Union Day (12 Feb) agreement between ethnic groups and
General Aung San, 6 ethnic political parties released a joint statement urging the talks
become tripartite so that a federal system of democratic government may evolve. They
4
5
6
United Press International, Rangoon (30 Jan 02) Release on horizon for Suu Kyi
AFP, Tokyo (11 Dec 01) Myanmar is struggling to launch full dialogue: report
AFP, Kuala Lumpur (20 Mar 02)
6
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
continue to stress there cannot be peace unless ethnic groups are included on an equal
playing field.
The NLD Union Day statement called for national unity
Only with national unity can
and urged the regime to declare cease-fires and
we establish the muchamnesties to armed ethnic groups. Over 500 opposition
desired democratic state.
members, UN Special Rapporteur Pinheiro, and
- Aung Shwe, Union Day
diplomats from Britain, France, USA, Japan and South
Korea attended the Union Day ceremony.7
[see ‘Ethnic’ for further discussion on relations between the junta & ethnic groups]
SPDC talk
If the regime is to be believed, the talks are progressing well. ‘Imminent success’,
‘positive direction’, ‘steady progress’ and other such encouraging catch-phrases all
have a place in the regime’s vocabulary. Other popular lines excusing the lack of
concrete progress include: opposition groups need to be ‘patient’ and ‘understanding’,
‘the time must be right’ for the release of political prisoners, Burma will not be ‘kicked
from behind’, Burma will develop its own ‘functioning democracy’ and it ‘cannot be
rushed’.8
international response
Many players in the international community have met the regime’s enthusiastic talk
with scepticism. In its February report to congress, the US government stressed it is
time the talks moved beyond the confidence-building stage, to “genuine political
dialogue [...] aimed at returning the country to democracy and civilian rule.” The US
has warned that it is growing increasingly impatient over the lack of progress. While
the regime tried to dismiss this criticism, they cannot be too aware that tangible
progress could mean an easing of US-led sanctions.9 [see p8 for further discussion]
POLITICAL PRISONERS [see chronology for release dates of political prisoners]
The fact is that those persons [Pinheiro] refers to [as political prisoners] are the
offenders who are serving their respective sentences for their infringement of the
existing laws and not for their political beliefs or activities.
– U Mya Than, 28 Mar 02, response to Pinheiro’s statement
All indicators suggest the talks have not moved beyond the confidence-building stage
because, to quote U Lwin (Dec 01), “there are many prisoners still waiting to be
released.”10 Even Razali, who has become less encouraged with the progress of the
7
Associated Press (12 Feb 02) Myanmar opposition urges national unity at Union Day ceremony
see BBC (9 Jan 02) Burma FM calls for opposition patience; Channel- J News Agency, Japan (30 Dec 2001)
Interview with Col. Hla Min; AFP (10 Dec 01) Myanmar responds to Nobel laureates by pledging support for
democracy
9
Agence France Presse (13 Feb 02) Myanmar talks making progress, success imminent: junta
10
Reuters, United Nations (3 Dec 01) UN wants Myanmar to release political prisoners
8
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
7
11
talks since the new year, has stressed that all remaining political prisoners must be
released to create a space for political dialogue. Similar requests have been, and
continue to be, consistently made by U Lwin, pro-democracy activists, retired
politicians on National Day, 28 Nobel Peace laureates as part of an international
campaign for freedom in Burma, 12 and the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in
Myanmar, most recently in March 2002.
RSF & BMA campaign for release of U Win Tin on 72nd birthday
sentenced: 4 July 1989, 20 years
crime: sent document on prison conditions & mistreatment to UN Special Rapporteur
campaign: petition carrying 2,500 signatures presented to Burmese embassy, launched 12
March 2002 (72nd birthday)
grounds of release: medical; ailments have included hernia, high blood pressure, diabetes
& inflammation of the vertebra.
occupation: journalist
At the end of January there were 52 prisoners, including Min Ko Naing (student
democracy leader), who had served their original sentences but remained detained
under State Protection Law 10(A).13 U Lwin claimed in December that there were still
822 NLD members incarcerated,14 almost ½ the total number of political prisoners. The
regime disputes this, categorically refusing the existence of political prisoners in
Burma at the UN Human Rights Commission in March. In summation, releases have
been pitiful and large numbers of people continue to be unlawfully detained according
to international standards.
Only when prisoners are released en masse, rather than strategically coinciding with
visits by UN officials, will a genuine commitment to political change begin to be
proven. Upon such a move, Suu Kyi has reportedly vowed to push for the start of
political dialogue.15
Futures World News (10 Jan 02) UN Envoy Sees ‘Significant Progress’ In Myanmar Talks; BBC (12 Feb 02)
The occasion was the Nobel Peace Prize centennial anniversary & Suu Kyi’s 10th Anniversary as a laureate.
Numerous key events were organised & statements made, giving high international profile to the Burma prodemocracy movement.
13
Under State Protection Law 10(a) sentences can be subject to up to 5 one-year extensions by order of Ministry
of Home Affairs. [The Irrawaddy (25 Jan 02) Student Leader's Sentence Increased]
14
Kyodo (19 Dec 01) 822 Myanmar dissidents still in jail, NLD secretary says
15
AFP, Tokyo (11 Dec 01) Myanmar is struggling to launch full dialogue: report
11
12
8
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
POLITICAL FREEDOM
There's no climate of change. It's just wishful thinking.
- Aung Zaw, Irrawaddy editor
I think that Myanmar is destined to change… I continue to believe that there is a will
within the State Peace and Development Council to pursue a transition from political
exclusion to cooperation with the National League for Democracy and other
components of society.
- Pinheiro, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar
The NLD has received authorisation to reopen offices in Mandalay, Mergui and
Irrawaddy divisions, in addition to their 39 township offices in Rangoon division. (As
of the end of January 8 offices in Rangoon division remained unopened.) While
important gestures are being made and
name: Dr. Salai Tun Than
some NLD members have greater freedom
sentence: 7 years, 8 Feb 02, Insein prison
of movement,16 the wider picture is still
penal code: Article 5(J), 1950 State
one of political oppression with strict MI
Emergency Act
(military intelligence) surveillance and in
arrest: November 2001
which people can be, and are, arrested for
crime: holding 1-person peaceful political
protest in front of Rangoon City Hall
peaceful political dissent.
age: 74
health: serious eye condition needs
surgery in next 6 months
ethnic nationality: Chin
religion: Christian, rector
education: PhD Agronomy, University of
Wisconsin
occupation: former university professor
details: distributed pamphlets demanding
political reform & elections supervised by
UN & ASEAN, appealed to military to stop
all killings and stated, “It is better to die
than to live under the military regime.”
Human Right’s Watch’s response to the
sentence of Dr. Salai Tun Than was justly
harsh: “With this sentence, the Burmese
government is making it clear that it will
crush any and all dissent… The harshness
of the sentence suggests that, political
dialogue notwithstanding, the Rangoon
regime is fundamentally unchanged.”17
Similar statements ring through the
networks of Burma observers, claiming
that this highlights the regime’s noncommitment to political change.
It is discouraging that Pinheiro reads the signs so differently as it suggests that the
regime have proved their commitment. They have done nothing of the kind.
16
17
see Democratic Voice of Burma (29 Jan 02) NLD branch to re-open 30 January; Reuters (10 Dec 01)
Human Rights Watch (2002) World Report, Burma
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 Improving
 Stagnant

9
Deteriorating
THEME: ‘DEMOCRACY’
The US and European Union (EU) will only reassess their foreign policies towards
Burma when there has been a genuine commitment to change by the regime.
Should there be significant progress toward [democratic] goals, the US would look
seriously at measures to support a process of constructive change.
- US Department of State, 11 Feb
Anything which would advance the situation in Burma promoted through Bangkok,
through specific co-operation or specific input... will be of course supported.
– Spanish ambassador, EU, 23 Jan
Senior members of the Burmese regime have said that a return to democracy is
planned. But we now need unmistakable evidence that change is underway… I urge
the regime not to let this opportunity pass them by… The United Kingdom stands
ready to respond to any such positive developments.
- Jack Straw, UK foreign minister, 8 Dec
Immediate indicators of positive development include Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s
release from house arrest, release of all political prisoners, an end to forced labour, an
unconditional cease-fire, and open discussion of the talks in the Burmese media. The
EU has offered incentives for change, including assistance for HIV/AIDS and a
promised invitation for the Burmese foreign minister to the ASEAN-EU meeting in
Europe later this year.18
UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw spoke with Thai Prime Minister Thaksin, expressing
the EU position that active international cohesiveness is vital in supporting the
dialogue.19
Also making their support for a democratic Burma clear, 16 Philippines congressmen
crossed party lines to sign a manifesto of support for the NLD.
CHINA V. INDIA
Tensions abound between China and India in their missions to dominate Burmese
markets, particularly in the supply of military hardware and expertise, and trade.
Rangoon hopes to exploit the growing rivalry between India and China (along with
Japan, Russia and other smaller players) to its own advantage.
China: President Jiang Zemin’s 12-15 December visit to Burma was clearly highly
regarded by the regime, welcoming him with a red carpet, rows of flag-waving students
along roadsides and the release of 200 Chinese prisoners.
18
19
Bangkok Post (23 Jan 02) EU unlikely to ease restrictions
Bangkok Post (29 Jan 02) Face-off on Burmese refugees
10
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
Such a high-level and unprecedented visit indicates China is eager to remain Burma’s
most influential international ally. To cement its influence and business relationships,
China promised US$100million in investment to fund 12 projects and signed several
pacts on co-operation and border security. 20 China also reiterated Burma’s right to “be
allowed to choose its own development path suited to its own conditions.”21
China must now compete for Burmese markets and good relations as others also want a
piece of the pie. As one Rangoon-based analyst said, “Before, Burma had only one
friend. Now it has more and this makes the Chinese nervous… (Burma) had little
choice but to embrace the Chinese. Now they have more options.”22
India: While consulates in Calcutta and Mandalay re-open after closing in 1988,
military links between India and Burma strengthen. Director-General of Indian Armed
Forces Training Maj-Gen Ashok Vasudeva visited Rangoon for a study tour
representing the army, navy and airforce. Analysts consider this a high-level visit
reflecting increasing co-operation. Outside intelligence and analysts believe Burma
wishes to benefit from India’s knowledge of handling Russian MiG fighters. 23
Despite agreements to coordinate activities on rebel groups, India announced Burma’s
release of almost 200 Manipuri rebels arrested in November 2001. It is thought this
will create distrust between the 2 countries. 24
INTERNATIONAL AID, UPDATE
JAPAN
Baluchaung ODA
The Japanese government was expected to approve an Official Development
Assistance (ODA) grant of approximately 3billion yen (US$26million) to repair
Baluchaung Hydroelectric Power Plant by the end of 2001. Legislature on this ODA
has been stalled, but the project has not been abandoned.
MP Nobuhiko Suto stated at a symposium in December that he generally did not forsee
any problems with the project. He did however note that it is necessary to monitor the
situation to ensure problems do not arise. (Note: when the MP visited Burma he was
guided by Burmese officials.) Officials eager to push the project say, “This is not a
simple ODA project… it is a emergency humanitarian project because any halt to
power supplies from the Baluchaung plant would cause great troubles for many
20
Stratford Analysis (18 Dec 01) China Trying to Keep Hold Over Myanmar; China Economic Review (4 Feb 02)
Jiang Signs Security Pact With Burma
21
New York Times, Mandalay (30 Dec 01) For Many Burmese, China Is an Unwanted Ally
22
Irrawaddy (13 Dec 01) Jiang Zemin Arrives in Rangoon
23
BBC (7 Dec 01) Indian and Burmese forces bond afresh
24
BBC (23 Feb 02) Burma releases captive Indian guerrillas
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
Myanmar citizens. But at the same time, it has a
strategic significance. We want to encourage
dialogue between Suu Kyi's NLD and the SPDC
through ODA like this.” 25
11
The Japanese government must
understand that such assistance
is not only premature, it is also
misguided. Money is certainly the
language of the thugs and thieves
in Burma, but it cannot buy peace
and stability in that mafia state.
- US Senator McConnell
However, Japan’s resumption of ODA continues
to attract widespread condemnation for being
irresponsible, including from the KNPP.26 It is
widely seen as a premature ‘reward’ to the
regime at a time when commitment to political change is far from concrete. Many fear
that the ODA will undermine commitment to the talks and that it will benefit the
military at the expense of local communities, and intensify conflict.
figures
ODA: The Japanese embassy announced in December that Japan is extending its
programme and providing grant aid totaling 800million yen (US$6.5 million) for road
construction and electrification projects in Kokang, northern Shan State. 27 Japanese
embassy figures show that in 2001 Japan provided 1.689billion yen (US$13.8 million)
in ODA with similar aid of 203 million yen (US$1.65million), for a human resources
development scholarship project, extended in January. 28
grassroots grant: The Japanese government provided US$331,184 ‘grassroots’ grant
assistance for 13 projects from December 1, 2001 to February 1, 2002 29, another
US$317,940 in February and a further US$612,267 for 15 more projects in early
March30 (including construction of schools, vocational training centers, water supplies
and medical equipment supplies). The total amount of grassroots grant in 2001-02 was
US$3,072,420.31
technical aid: Japan provided about US$20million of technical aid in the fiscal year
ending Mar ’02. (Japan International Cooperation Agency)
While many observers and INGO workers in Burma are highly critical of the Japanese
setting bad and dangerous precedents in assistance allocation, 32 UN Special Envoy
Razali has praised the Japanese government for its assistance to Burma. Razali has
25
Japan Times (8 Mar 02) Myanmar aid stalled but not finished
for example see DVB (10 Jan 02) Opposition party denies killing villagers
Xinhua (13 Dec 01) Japan to Aid Myanmar's Construction, Electrification Projects
28
Xinhua, Rangoon (4 Feb 02) Japan Provides Grant Assistance to Myanmar
29
Xinhua, Rangoon (4 Feb 02)
30
Xinhua (29 Mar 02) Japan Extends More Grant Assistance to Myanmar
31
Xinhua (29 Mar 02)
32
see Irrawaddy (Dec 01) Inside INGOs: Aiding or Abetting?
26
27
12
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
urged the government to continue with such assistance, saying that stability must be
supported in parallel to efforts for democracy. 33
Burma activists agree with the need for stability and sustained support but oppose the
view that stability can be supported by granting money to a dictatorial regime that has
proven time and time again to be abusive and unreliable.
SOUTH KOREA
The Republic of Korea (ROK) International Cooperation Agency is training 100 people
from Burma in agriculture, economic and industrial development. The agency comes
under the ROK Foreign Ministry and people from Burma have been trained in recent
years under an aid programme. The programme will reportedly be broadened.34
ECONOMIC SITUATION
 Improving
 Stagnant

Deteriorating
Improvement has been seen in the country's economic sector every year. An
economic growth rate of between 5.1 per cent and 7.5 per cent was achieved during
the short-term 4-year economic plan for the 1992-93 to 1995-96 period. An economic
growth rate of 6 per cent was targeted for the 1996-97 to 2000-01 period, but the
economic growth rate reached 8.4 per cent. The third five-year plan for 2001-02 to
2005-06 period is being implemented.
– Sr-Gen Than Shwe, Armed Forces Day (27 Mar 02)
This is the worst of all times; we have hit the bottom.
- Rangoon based journalist (quoted Feb 02)35
HEADING FOR ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
Just about the only piece of good news in Burma is in its reported GDP growth rates.
The official figures provided by Burma’s Central Statistical Organisation and published
by the International Monetary Fund36 report GDP growth for Burma at 10.9% in 2000.
This makes Burma the fastest growing economy in Asean, and among the fastest
growing in the world. How this reported growth can be reconciled with the reality in
Burma is however, a complete mystery.
For a start, all other economic indicators in Burma (such as public sector borrowing,
foreign debt and reserves, foreign exchange rates, and inflation) show sharply
contradictory figures. There is virtually no evidence that economic growth has led to
any of the positive signs of wealth normally associated with a growing country –
rather, these indicators point to an economy on the verge of collapse.
33
Kyodo, KL (10 Jan 02) Japanese Premier in Malaysia discusses Burma democratization with UN envoy
Xinhua, Rangoon (7 Feb 02) About 100 Myanmar to Undergo Training in ROK
The Straits Times, Singapore (12 Feb 02) Myanmar sliding into economic catastrophe
36
International Monetary Fund (Jan 01) IMF Country Report No. 01/18: Myanmar
34
35
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
13
Figure 1: Currency Exchange (Kyat:US$) Year 2001
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review
Kyat/US$
Ja
4-
n
r
ct
c
v
r
pr
ug
ep
b
n
l
-A 3-S 1-O -No -De
Fe -Ma -Ap 0-A -Ju -Ju
55
2
3
4
9
13
1
1
8
6
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
Kyat/US$
Linear (Kyat/US$)
Secondly, assessments by international agencies continue to place Burma at the
bottom of their list. The Heritage Foundation, which classified Burma as ‘repressed’ in
their 2002 Index of Economic Freedom37, says that the SPDC has ‘done little to
advance the cause of development during the past year’. The World Health
Organisation ranks the efficacy of Burma’s health system at 190 out of 191 countries.
Thirdly, and perhaps most urgently critical, the social impact of what a foreign
diplomat in Rangoon calls a ‘shrinking economy’ is disastrous, with more people than
ever living in or at the edge of poverty. Food and fuel prices have skyrocketed, public
services – sanitation, public transport, and water - are collapsing, and power blackouts
regularly engulf Rangoon for 20 hours at a time. 38
Perhaps the only reason why a total collapse of the Burmese economy has not
happened is due to the existence of an unrecorded parallel black economy, estimated to
account for more than 50% of the country’s trade and finance, and which is fuelled by
smuggling and drugs.
THE KYAT: DOWNHILL ALL THE WAY
The level of confidence in the SPDC’s handling of the Burmese economy is well
represented by its long-suffering currency, the kyat. At the beginning of 2001, the open
market rate of exchange between the kyat and US Dollar stood at Kt430. By the end of
the year, one dollar could have been exchanged for 725 kyat on the streets of Rangoon
– representing a massive discount of 69% on the year. As the trend-line in Figure 1
37
38
Heritage Foundation (Jan 02) 2002 Index of Economic Freedom
The Straits Times, Singapore (12 Feb 02) Myanmar sliding into economic catastrophe
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
14
shows, the kyat’s value has been on a general downward slide all year. Attempts by the
SPDC to stem the fall of the kyat by various means ranging from the revocation of FEC
currency licences to import restrictions have had little effect, except for brief respites of
stability before plunging to a new low. The ridiculously unrealistic official rate of
exchange of approximately 6.3 kyat to the dollar is still maintained.
Figure 2: Asean Currencies 1999-2001
Malay
0.00%
% Chg v.$
-20.00%
Camb
Brunei
Vietm
Spore
Thai
Laos
-40.00%
Philps
Indon
-60.00%
-80.00%
-100.00%
-120.00%
-140.00%
Burma
Brunei
Burm a
Cam b
Indon
Laos
Malay
Philps
Spore
Thai
Vietm
% Change -10.87% -119.70% -5.45% -47.17% -23.95% -0.01% -29.16% -11.32% -20.05% -7.68%
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review
Over the 2-year period from 1999-2001, the kyat has more than halved its value in US$
terms. Although all Asean currencies depreciated against the US$ during the period,
none fell as dramatically as the kyat whose value plummeted by nearly 120%. [see
Figure 2]. The kyat resumed its fall in the new-year, reaching a low of 750 kyat against
the US$ in January 2002. [see Figure 3]
In early March, Major General Kyaw Win denied the SPDC will introduce 5,000 and
10,000 kyat notes and withdraw all others in circulation. This is the 2 nd time in 5
months the regime has had to make such an announcement, indicating lack of public
confidence in the kyat.39
One major impact of the depreciation of Burma’s currency over the last 2 years has
been inflation, now spiralling out of control. Prices of basic foods and fuel have risen
by more than 50% during 2001, and the black market price of petrol has increased by
600% in less than 1 year.40
39
40
Agence France Presse (6 Mar 02) Myanmar quashes rumours of bank note withdrawal
TheStraits Times, Singapore (12 Feb 02)
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
15
The situation has deteriorated further since the ‘coup plot’, with both commodities and
consumer goods rising in price,41 particularly dairy products and medicines. According
to a doctor in Rangoon, “The cost of medicines are so prohibitive now that many
people are not seeking medical attention because they know they can't afford the
prescriptions.”42 Even the price of rice is increasing, 20% between mid-February to
mid-March in Rangoon, and up to 300% in some rural areas. 43
Continually escalating prices of basic goods are leading many, including UN officials,
to fear that Burma will soon face a widespread humanitarian crisis.
Figure 3 : Exchange rate Kyat:US$
source: FEER
6D
e
17 c
-D
31 ec
-D
7- ec
Ja
14 n
-J
21 an
-J
28 an
-J
11 an
-F
18 eb
-F
25 eb
-F
4- eb
M
a
11 r
-M
18 ar
-M
25 ar
-M
ar
date
710
kyat:US$1
720
730
740
750
760
In response to spiraling prices of essential goods, the regime established tax-free
markets and forced private firms to provide products to government-run markets.
However, demand and supply remain largely out of sync and residents in Rangoon are
still forced to queue at the markets as early as 5am in order to purchase rationed basic
goods, such as eggs, before stocks run out and are reportedly sold at inflated prices
elsewhere. An article in the Irrawaddy suggested the regime must open more tax-free
markets with greater supplies in order to properly tackle the problem of runaway
inflation.44
41
Irrawaddy Magazine (12 Mar 02) Smokes and Gold on the Rise
Bangkok Post (12 Mar 02) Analysis / Burma Under Siege: Economic crisis raises real fears
The rising domestic price in rice could be partially attributed to the regime’s export target of 1million tonnes by
the end of April.
44
Irrawaddy Magazine (5 Mar 02) Tax-Free Markets Flop
42
43
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
16
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
In a country where the government is not answerable to a democratic constituency, it is
capable of making somewhat arbitrary decisions…
- John Bray of Control Risks, on the 8 Investment Funds who warn against trading with Burma
Burma’s foreign trade increased for the first 10 months of 2001 as compared with the
same period of 2000.45 Exports increased by 41% to US$1,889 million (primarily due
to larger exports of rice,46 beans and pulses, jute and other agricultural products).
Imports increased by 21% to US$2,416 million, despite the introduction of import
restrictions. The resultant trade deficit of US$527 million – despite being an
improvement over the deficit of $1,408 million in the previous year - will continue to
put a strain on the country’s dwindling foreign reserves.
US$ million
Figure 4: Trade Deficit
0
-200
-400
-600
-800
-1000
-1200
-1400
-1600
-1800
2001 (10
months)
1998
2000
1999
Source: Xinhua, CSO
The SPDC are therefore looking at alternative means of paying for imports, and plans
are afoot for the introduction of a formalised account trade system – or barter trade –
between Burma and Thailand, and Burma and Malaysia. 47 (The barter trade system is
already in effect at an informal level due to skewed exchange rates.) A formalised
account trade system is particularly crucial for Burma as inter-Asean trade, comprising
46% of Burma’s total foreign trade during the first ten months of 2001, is likely to
increase in the coming years.
Xinhua (20 Jan 02) Myanmar’s imports, exports up in the 1st 10 months of 2001
Myanmar Times (29 Nov 01) Rice exports expected to reach one million tons this year
47 Reuters (12 Jan 02) Myanmar to improve trade for entry into AFTA
45
46
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
17
PRESSURE
Burma continued to receive bad news on the economic front when eight of the world’s
largest investment funds48 warned against investing in and trading with Burma. 49
Although not an outright call for companies to withdraw from Burma, the wording of
the statement which asks companies to think before they invest “in the light of the risks
that such activity poses to shareholders” effectively puts any company with
investments in or trading links with Burma in a position of disadvantage. The statement
also calls for firms to “justify their involvement” with Burma, adding that by operating
in a “politically unstable” environment, companies run the risk of “loss of shareholder
confidence”. In other words, companies operating in or trading with Burma are likely
to be excluded from these funds’ investment portfolios. In a related move, a petition
was filed in late March calling on Dutch authorities to refuse to do business with IHC
Caland – a construction company, unless it agrees to stop doing business in Burma.
Already, pressure from consumers and investors for companies to adopt greater
corporate responsibility and to pursue ‘ethical’ investments has made some companies
realise that engaging with Burma is more trouble than it is worth. Some of the biggest
names in United States – including Pepsi, Wal-Mart, Tommy Hilfiger, The Spiegel
Group, Ames Department Stores, Jones Apparel Group, Phillips Van Heusen Triumph
and Texaco - have already chosen to withdraw and/or not buy merchandise from
Burma. Major apparel makers including Liz Claiborne Inc. and Levi Strauss & Co.
pulled out of Burma a decade ago.
However, some existing corporate supporters of the junta remain, outwardly at least,
undeterred by this statement from the investment funds. Oslo-based Searunner
Shipping continues to transport imports from Burma and has commented it does not
“feel any pressure towards closing down.”50 The Norwegian Oil Fund has increased
investments in corporations with interests in Burma and the Norwegian Smedvig
Group recently entered a 5-year contract with UNOCAL.51
In an interview with London-based Guardian newspaper, Premier Oil’s chief executive
Charles Jamieson commented that the oil company already had a strategy for managing
risk in Burma.52 This strategy apparently includes Premier giving human rights training
to Burma’s military, police and home affairs ministry, adding that the company is “at
the forefront of corporate social responsibility”.
48
The 8 Investment Funds - PGGM, Cooperative Insurance Society, Universities Superannuation Fund,
Henderson Global Investors, Jupiter Asset Management, Morley Fund Management, Friends Ivory & Sime, Ethos
Investment Foundation – together manage over US$400 billion worth of assets.
49
BBC (3 Dec 01) Fund giants warn against Burma trade
50
Osloposten (6 Mar 02) Burma Trade: Norwegian shipping company represented in Burma
51
Worldview Rights (6 Mar 02) Norwegian Oil Fund Heavily Involved with Burma
52
Premier Oil, an oil exploration company, is one of the largest investors in Burma. Premier is listed on the
London Stock Exchange.
18
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
What investors cannot and will not deal with is a government that summarily
disregards contracts when it is expedient to do so.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit
The SPDC, who sees every dollar invested in Burma as a proxy vote for the regime,
like to trumpet their successes in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). According
to the latest official report53, a total of US$7.39 billion worth of FDI have been
contracted since 1988. Although 25 countries are reported to have invested in Burma,
the three largest investing countries - Singapore, Britain and Thailand – have each
contributed approximately a fifth of all investments into Burma since 1988. FDI is also
concentrated in a few select areas: nearly 70% of all investments are in 3 sectors,
namely oil and gas, manufacturing, and tourism. [see Table 1]
Table 1: FDI Top Three Source: CSO, Xinhua
By Sector
Sector:
Oil and gas
Manufacturing
Tourism
US$ bn
2.563
1.6
1.1
% of total
32
22
15
By Country
Country:
Singapore
Britain
Thailand
US$ bn
1.5
1.4
1.3
% of total
20
19
18
What the SPDC report fails to mention is that both approved and actual FDI into
Burma have been on a declining trend since 1997. In fact, the SPDC have done much
to scare away potential investors who see Burma’s bureaucratic systems, inconsistent
application of rules, regulations and policies, and institutionalised corruption as a major
deterrent to doing business there.
The Heritage Foundation, which ranks Burma among the least (economically) free
countries54, says that “government policies actively, if not officially, deter foreign
investment.” Although the SPDC state that Burma’s Foreign Investment Law protects
“the rights and interests of investors…creating an indispensable condition for foreign
entrepreneurs”, the experience of these investors suggest otherwise.
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reports that the actions of pro-democracy
activists to dissuade investors from Burma “have not done nearly as much damage as
have the unpredictable, sometimes bizarre, policies of the junta itself.”55 Perhaps this
53
54
55
Xinhua (11 Dec 01) Myanmar actively develop foreign economic, trade ties
Burma ranks 145 out of 155 countries in the 2002 Index of Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation (Jan 02)
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
19
brewing up a storm56
In November 1998, sixty fully armed soldiers stormed the premises of the profitable and 45%
foreign-owned Mandalay Brewery on direct orders of Sr-Gen Than Shwe. The soldiers then
ordered Win Win Nu, whose Singapore-based company paid US$6.3 million and Kt8 million
for its 45% stake, out of the factory on tenuous charges that she had been misappropriating
funds. Ignoring its own Foreign Investment Law 57, the SPDC then terminated the joint
venture, nationalised and later dissolved the profitable company. At the time, Mandalay Beer
was the strongest competitor to Myanmar Beer – a product of Myanmar Brewery, the newly
established joint venture between the junta-owned UMEH and Singapore-based Tiger Beer.
After the demise of Mandalay Brewery, Myanmar Beer has been able to assume an almost
monopolistic position in Burma: prompting the SPDC to showcase Myanmar Brewery as a
foreign investment ‘success’58.
After 2 years of trying unsuccessfully to recoup her lost investment through Burmese courts,
Win Win Nu has taken the case against the SPDC to the International Court of Justice in The
Hague. The SPDC - furious with Win Win Nu for exposing this story - is now also taking her
to court: She is being blamed for the dearth of FDI’s into Burma!
explains Indonesian company Medco Energi International’s withdrawal from Burma
this year – an oil venture valued at US$12.8 million.59
The seizure of profitable foreign-owned businesses like Mandalay Brewery [see text
box] have done little to instill confidence in the junta. To quote the EIU, “widespread
corruption, heavy taxes, poor infrastructure, and policies forcing foreign firms to
repatriate profits only at the skewed official exchange rate” make profitable
operations, for most companies, almost impossible.
56
Irawaddy (Dec 01) The Burmese junta is suing Win Win Nu
Ministry of National Planning & Economic Development states: No.146 Guarantee: The (Foreign Investment)
Law guarantees that foreign investments undertaken under the FIL shall not be nationalised. It also guarantees
the repatriation in foreign currency the rightful entitlement of the foreign investor after the termination of the
business. The repatriation of savings of the foreign employees engaged by the foreign investor is also allowed.
58
Xinhua (11 Dec 01)
59
Asia Pulse (14 Mar 02) Indonesia's Medco To Sell Stake In Myanmar Oil Venture
57
20
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
DRUGS
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
PRODUCTION
Instead of addressing widespread malnutrition and starvation, Burma continues to
devote its productive capacity to drugs. Burma is the largest global opium producer overtaking Afghanistan. In 2001, Burma produced 68% (865 tonnes) of global opium
Burma (thought to be enough to make over 80 tons of heroin), while Afghanistan
produced only 23%, reversing 2000 production (UNDCP).
Meanwhile, the estimated 60 amphetamine laboratories along the Burmese side of the
border with Thailand are rapidly increasing production. 60 Total production in Burma
now stands at 800million - compared to 100million 2 years ago61 - with 600million
thought to be produced by Wei Hsueh Kang and those under his command in the
UWSA.62
Drug production looks set to increase further. Drug lords in the ‘Golden Triangle’ are
supplying growers with new technology,63 more land is being cleared for poppy
cultivation – including areas opposite Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son. A
further incentive is the rising price of opium and heroin – raw opium has more than
doubled from US$450 to over $900 per kilo in approximately 6 months.64 At the same
time, most of Khun Sa associates arrested in the 1994 Thai-American drug operation
‘Tiger Trap’ have been released early and are thought to have returned to Burma. 65
Even the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) is concerned
that drug production may escalate. This is highly significant as the UN body is widely
considered overly optimistic about reduction rates and the regime’s commitment to
drug eradication – the office in Bangkok recently naming Burma as one of the most
committed states in the fight against drugs. 66
UWSA
Wei Hsueh Kang, the rumoured appointed chair of United Wa State Army (UWSA), is
a drug fugitive and friend of SPDC intelligence chief Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt. Khin Nyunt
is well known for his relationships with drug lords and it was reported that the 2 met as
for further discussion see International Narcotics Control Board’s annual report 2001 (27 Feb 02)
BBC News (18 Jan 02) Burma 'joins' fight against drugs
Bangkok Post (13 Jan 02) Drug Dealer’s Days are Numbered
63
Reuters, Bangkok (9 Jan 02) Afghan war boosts Thai and Myanmar opium output
64
The Economist (16 Feb 02) Rush to market
65
Shan Herald Agency for News, No: 02–14 (14 Feb 02) Khun Sa cronies released by US [Khun Sa is becoming
stronger in health thanks to ‘The King of Opium’, Lo Hsinghan, who has provided herbal treatment for Khun Sa’a
severe stroke.]
66
BBC News (18 Jan 02) Burma 'joins' fight against drugs
60
61
62
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
21
Wei Hsueh Kang’s rival, Wei Hsaitang, was ordered out of Mongyawn and dismissed
as leader of the 894th Brigade.
An alliance between Wei Hsueh Kang and Khin Nyunt is mutually advantageous. If
Khin Nyunt is directing structures and relations in the UWSA, the group is weakened
as an ‘autonomous’ army. Rangoon’s growing influence and deployment of troops in
Mongyawn (absent since 1996) will enable Rangoon to launch a stronger attack on the
Shan State Army (SSA). Predecessor Wei Hsaitang was known for not wanting the
UWSA to fight the SSA. 67 If Khin Nyunt emerges as a key protagonist in Rangoon’s
war against the SSA it will be a significant notch on his belt, particularly as he lacking
in army credits when compared to Maung Aye. [see p28 for brief discussion on rivalry
between Khin Nyunt & Maung Aye]
As for Wei Hsueh Kang, there are indications that his sphere of influence has been
widened as the UWSA desperately need his dirty-money to help them during a period
of financial difficulty.68
Meanwhile, a rumour circulated at the end of March spoke of a drug pact between Wei
Hsaitang and the SSA. While the SSA denies the alliance 69 recent events make it clear
that there remains a role for the illegal drug trade and its lords.
Wei Hsueh Kang’s emerging role in the area at the expense of Wei Hsaitang has
intensified the rivalry between the 2 men. Intensified rivalry, drug deals and increased
troops can only have disastrous implications for peace and civilian well-being in the
area. Power dynamics already appear to have culminated in a shootout (10 February)
which killed 7 Burmese soldiers and wounded 3 others, seemingly Wei Hsaitang’s
revenge.
how clean are the Wa?
There are numerous well-documented connections between the regime and the Wa,
with many observers unconvinced by the anti-narcotics commitments of both. To quote
from the Bangkok Post, 10 Dec 01:
The powerful Wa drug cartel of northern Burma continues to expand and refine its
extensive heroin and methamphetamine industries.
For this reason, US officials have recently listed the UWSA as a major drug cartel and
clearly stated that drug trafficking is a source of terrorist funds.
Burmese Foreign Minister Win Aung claims the money behind drugs comes from
Chinese, not Wa. Win Aung appears to be contradicting himself as notorious drug lord
67
68
69
SHAN (21 Feb 02) More Burmese troops pouring in to flush out Wa from drug town
SHAN (21 Feb 02)
Bangkok Post (25 Mar 02) Rumoured Rebel Pact Expected To Boost Trafficking
22
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
and UWSA faction leader Wei Hsueh Kang is Chinese. Win Aung did not specify
whether he was talking about Chinese nationals or ethnic Chinese. It would appear his
intention is to blame the drug problem on an ‘other’, and capitalise on the history of
racism towards ethnic Chinese. This tendency to blame ‘foreigners’ is consistent with
previous attempts to put the blame on Thais.
The Wa and their supporters portray Kokang as the real problem area in Burma in an
attempt to divert attention away from Wa areas. Collaboration with the Chinese
government has served to refine this twisted view. 70
UNDCP appears convinced the Wa anti-drug position is genuine, with Dr Calvoni
(head of UNDCP, Bangkok) stating “the Wa have honoured every agreement they have
ever made.”71 In this context, the report of the UNDCP inspection of Wa Special
Region-2 (Feb-Apr 02) is unlikely to be truly reflective.
Thailand’s position has been inconsistent. On the one hand, Foreign Minister Surakiat
Sathirathai has praised Burma for increased cooperation72 and Prime Minister Thaksin,
on behalf of the Office of Narcotics Control Board, has pledged Burmese authorities
and the Wa 20million baht (and further non-monetary assistance) to help fund a cropsubstitution programme. 73
On the other hand, deputy Secretary-General of the Office of the Narcotics Control
Board Mrs Rassamee Witthaves holds the Wa responsible for smuggling in millions of
amphetamines. (see below) Continued drug-related activity has led the vice-chairman
of the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee to urge the US to consider military
action against the Wa if they do not end narcotics activities by 2005. 74 Even comments
by Prime Minister Thaksin at the beginning of 2002 suggest the Thai government does
not truly believe the regime is serious. 75
70
12 Burmese anti-narcotics officers went to Kunming (Yunnan province) in March for a 6-week training course &
agreements were reached at a bilateral meeting in early March.
71
BBC News (18 Jan 02) Burma 'joins' fight against drugs
72
Bangkok Post (13 Jan 02)
73
for discussion of this programme see Altsean-Burma (Feb 02, pp20-21)
74
Bernama (16 Jan 02) Thai Politician Urges US To Strike Wa Ethnic Army
75
see Bangkok Post Editorial (8 Jan 02) Thailand has no need for speed
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
23
ERADICATION & PREVENTION
Of course, the military regime continues to speak loudly of its drug eradication
exercises and commitment. In January, for example, the regime reported seizing 157
kilos of ephedrine powder in Mandalay and arresting the owners, 76 and the Myanmar
Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control stated that between 23 Jan-5 Feb they
destroyed 661 hectares of poppy fields in northern Shan state. Seizures of poppy fields
in the fiscal year 2000-2001 reportedly came to 9,317 hectares.77
Poster 1: Avoid drugs if you want a better life A genuine and concerted commitment to
effective resolution of the dug problem
in Burma remains far from proven.
Seizures remain a small fraction of drug
production and there is no real
education programme, only scare tactics
and orders (for example see Poster 1).
8 civil society groups based in Burma - including the Association of Medical Doctors
of Asia, Border Areas Development Association, Myanmar Anti-Narcotic Association,
Myanmar Council of Churches and Young Men's Buddhist Association - signed an
MOU with UNDCP to work in cooperation on the drug problem as part of UNDCP’s
Civil Society Initiative.
REGIONAL PROBLEM
Increase in seizure of drugs and arms smuggled from Myanmar is a clear sign of an
increase in narco-terrorism through the state, and it has become a major concern of
law enforcement agencies in the state and the whole region.
- Indian official, Jan 0278
The drugs industry poses a threat to regional stability and peace. Drug related crimes
and deaths in the region are common, in both smuggling and drug-related crime79 and
by capital punishment.80
Regional and international networks such as the Joint Special Task Unit 2002
(Thailand, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and China) 81 may ultimately be doomed
by a failure to systematically deal with the obvious conflicts of interest surrounding
76
Myanmar TV (16 Jan 02) Burma: Police Seize 157 Kilos Of Ephedrine Powder, Arrest Three In Mandalay
Xinhua News Agency (15 Feb 02) Myanmar Destroys 661 Hectares of Poppy Fields
The Press Trust of India, Aizawl (12 Jan 02) Narco-terrorism through Myanmar on rise
79
see Bangkok Post (10 Dec 01) Army hunts gang after fatal clash; AP (12 Dec 01) Three suspected drug
dealers killed in shootout with police; AFP (5 Jan 2002) Thai army kills three fighters of Myanmar drug baron
80
see AP (11 Dec 01) Four sentenced to death for trafficking methamphetamine
81
Thailand and Burma coordinate from a border town in Chiang Rai’s Mae Sai district and Thachilek,
respectively.
77
78
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
24
Table 1: 2001 reported statistics, released in this period
Country
Burma
(1st 6 months)82
Thailand83
85
Arrests
2,187
(punished)
3,115
86
China
1,574
Mizoram State,
India87
??
Seizures
Comments
Opium
474.91
kg
??
Heroin
27.89
kg
??
Pills
6.14m
2.8
tons
??
13.2
tons
3 kg
2.07m
7m
670
also seized: 1,889 kg ephedrine,
269.28 litres phensedyl
pills sold: 400 million (Bt50 billion);
total drugs seized ~15% market84
record high seizures; also seized:
4.8 tons ice
heroin worth over 30million
rupees
Burma. While Thai seizure of assets worth hundreds of millions of baht from Wei
Hsueh Kang’s wife, and China making the largest reported drug seizure in Asia 88 are
positive results, there remains much to be done.
Regional stability remains unachievable until the Burmese regime makes firm and
comprehensive anti-narcotic commitments at all levels – in terms of finance,
accountability, democratic participation and clearly breaking all ties with the drug
industry. It is important to note that Wei Hsueh Kang is still a free man and is believed
to be hiding in Burma.
Thailand
Thai deputy secretary-general of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board Mrs
Rassamee Witthaves, said Thailand was being ‘flooded’ with methamphetamines from
Burma to such an extent that it has become a ‘major security threat’. 89 According to
Internal Security Operations Command, 700million tablets are expected to be sold in
Thailand this year to 2,411,500 people (this is 91% of the total reported drug ‘addicts’
who allegedly constitute 4.3% of the population).
As part of its campaign to enforce social order the Thai government was considering
making all school and university students undergo urine tests to check for drug use, as
the average age of first-time users is 13.90
To motivate Thai police to be vigilant in anti-narcotics activities, officers receive Bt2
(US5 cents) per methamphetamine pill seized, reportedly to compensate for their ‘high
risk’ activities.91
82
Xinhua (18 Dec 01) Myanmar Seizes Large Amount of Stimulant Drugs
Thai Farmers Bank Research Centre, Bangkok Post (13 Jan 02) Drug Dealers’ Days Are Numbered
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (22 Jan 02) Bumper crop of S.E. Asian opium, methamphetamines expected in 2002
85
Xinhua News Service (31 Jan 02) China Launches New Campaign to Crack Down on Drugs
86
Xinhua news agency (3 Jan 02) Shanghai police seize record amount of illicit drugs in 2001
87
The Press Trust of India, Aizawl (12 Jan 02) Narco-terrorism through Myanmar on rise
88
Xinhua (5 Jan 02) Yunnan Police Seize 672.9 Kg of Heroin
89
Bangkok Post (14 Jan 02) China's Help Sought In War Against Drugs
90
BBC (10 Jan 02) Drug tests for Thai schoolchildren
83
84
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
25
UNDCP & FUNDS
Despite its fears, UNDCP say the international policy of isolating Burma should be
reversed to allow more humanitarian funds to areas undergoing opium crop reduction
programs. Resident representative in Burma, Jean Luc Lemahieu, said the reduction of
about 40% of drug production since 1996 cannot be sustained without a three to
fourfold increase in funds. (The US and Japan currently contribute US$12million and
Australia contributes $US400,000.)92 His bottom line is that without an increase in
funds the Wa region will not be drug-free by 2005 as planned.
European states and human rights groups are however calling for severe limits on aid to
the regime until real improvements are made in its human rights record. The direction
of US funds to support Thai efforts (such as Taskforce 399) is perhaps indicative of the
over-riding distrust felt towards the military regime in Burma. 93
THAI-BURMESE RELATIONS
 Improving
 Stagnant

Deteriorating
Thai Foreign Minister Surakiat Sathirathai and armed forces supreme commander
Adm. Narong Yutthawong both visited Rangoon on separate trips in February. It was
Surakiat’s 2nd visit and was at the invitation of Burmese counterpart Win Aung while
Narong met with Generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye. Both trips were part of a
mutually ochestrated effort to rebuild relations.
The Thai-Burma Joint Commission, the highest institutionalised level of working
relationship between the 2 governments, was re-established after 2 years for its 6th
meeting on 7-9 January. Areas of mutual concern were discussed, including
repatriation of refugees, joint anti-narcotics efforts, fishing and economic cooperation.
Despite these seeming advancements however, an article in The Nation tells of Thai
army and government officials and Bangkok-based diplomats who believe hard
feelings, tensions and deep-rooted suspicions remain prominent. One expressed his
sentiments by saying: “It will take more than just a few official visits and handshakes
to close this extraordinarily complex chapter in Thai-Burmese history.”94 Former
deputy Foreign Minister Sukhumbhand Paribatra openly challenged ‘improved
relations’, condemning it a façade that merely benefits specific personal interests. 95
91
AFP (11 Feb 02) Thailand ups drugs bounty for amphetamines seized by police
AAP Newsfeed (30 Jan 02) UN drug control officials call for more funds to Burma
FEER (31 Jan 02) Terror War Targets Burma Drug Lord
94
The Nation, Bangkok Post (5 Jan 02) Hard talk seen on Thai-Burmese relations
95
Bangkok Post (8 Jan 02) Thai-Burma Relations: Govt's claim challenged
92
93
26
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
Even Surakiat admitted in January there was “still have a long way to go in the
building of resilient, strong and enduring relations… which would enable [the 2
countries] to withstand frictions and pressure that may arise naturally from time to
time between neighbours all over the world.” 96
The point is of course that Thailand and Burma are not like most neighbours. While
drugs remain the most serious problem between the 2 countries, border fighting has
routinely spilled into Thailand, Rangoon charges Thailand with aiding rebels, and
repatriation is still a contentious issue. [see p47,49] These are only some of the issues
that continue to be thorns in the side of good relations.
DRUGS
Despite ongoing frictions between the 2 countries - one is the biggest drug producer in
the world, with millions of methamphetamines flooding the others market and drug
addiction levels increasing - Thailand is hedging its bets and offering Burmese and Wa
authorities US$2m and other non-monetary assistance for a crop-substitution
programme. [see p21 for further discussion]
FIGHTING ON THE BORDER
Reports Rangoon urgently ordered military outposts along the border to build heavy
artillery batteries, missile launching pads, bunkers
We have been ordered to avoid
and bomb shelters by March 2597 to prepare for
any unnecessary clashes with
attacks on the Shan State Army (SSA) [see p40] is
the Burmese forces, but if any
straining good relations as fighting is sure to spill
incursion is intentional then we
over into Thailand. Rangoon even requested that
will have to counter fiercely.
the Burmese army be permitted to use Thai
– Thai officer on border
territory as a springboard to attack the SSA.98
When permission was refused, Lt-Col Tun Aung requested Thai understanding and
‘leniency’ if artillery shells stray into Thailand. 99
Thailand made it clear it would not tolerate fighting on Thai soil and stated warning
shots would be fired if armed fire crossed the border. While Thai troops were ordered
to avoid all unnecessary conflict in the interest of good relations, tough retaliation for
serious damage in Thailand has not been ruled out and Burmese troops have been
warned not to damage Thai property. 100
AFP (8 Jan 2002) “Thailand calls for greater fight against narcotics trade
DVB (7 Feb 02) Burma orders military posts on Thai border to strengthen fortifications
The military is unlikely to be able to capture SSA headquarters unless they approach from the Thai side. Last
year, Burmese troops crossed into Thailand without permission and suffered heavy casualties.
99
Bangkok Post (16 Feb 02) Burmese Troops Cautioned
100
Bangkok Post (17 Jan 02) Bordering on trouble
96
97
98
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
27
A Wa commander (Battalion 616) reportedly apologised over a late March clash with
Thai soldiers in Wiang Haeng district. Apologies do not go far in rectifying conflict
however and Thai security measures were increased with plans to evacuate 3 villages if
fighting resumed. Thai cavalry refused to open talks with the Wa battalion. 101
AIDING REBELS
In November Burmese authorities asked Thailand to hand over rebel leaders they say
live in Thailand, specifically Karen National Union (KNU) President Pado U Ba Thin
Sein and military leaders Gen Bo Mya and Col Saw Soe. The regime claims the KNU
launched attacks from Thailand and warned this could jeopardise Thai-Burmese
relations.102
More virulent accusations of support came in December when the SPDC’s ally, the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Association (DKBA), accused the Thai military of helping
the KNU attack them. The Thai army denies ever supporting KNU attacks in Burma. 103
PEOPLE FROM BURMA IN THAILAND
Burmese nationals no longer receive a 30-day visa upon entry into Thailand. Burma
was among a number of countries to have this privilege removed, for the reason that
some people were “commit[ing] crimes, such as prostitution, trafficking narcotics and
humans, as well as overstaying their visas to seek jobs.”104
[for discussion of refugees, irregular migrants & repatriation see ‘Displacement’]
101
Bangkok Post (31 Mar 02) Wa Says It Regrets Wiang Haeng Raid
Bangkok Post (29 Nov 01) Burma claims rebels use Thailand as base
Bangkok Post (19 Dec 01) Army accused of helping KNU fighters
104
Xinhua (19 Dec 01) Thailand Strips 81 Countries of Visas on Arrival Privileges
102
103
28
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
MILITARY REGIME
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
An army that thinks of itself as a national vanguard, as the savior of the nation, as
more patriotic than anyone - this kind of army is a threat to everyone.
- Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, Feb 02
THE ‘COUP PLOT’
In early March, the authorities detained Sandar Win (former dictator Ne Win’s
favourite daughter), her husband Aye Zaw Win and their 3 sons for allegedly plotting a
coup. It has been announced that they will be tried for high treason, with Sandar Win
the alleged mastermind.
Four high-ranking officials were arrested and dismissed from their posts for being part
of the plot: Air Commander in Chief Maj-Gen Myint Swe, Golden Triangle Region
Commander Brig-Gen Chit Than, Coastal Region Commander Maj-Gen Aye Kyway
and Police-Chief Maj-Gen Soe Win. A significant number of other senior officers, both
serving and retired, have also been detained and interrogated. Officers of mid-rank and
above in Rangoon and Pegu Divisions were ordered to cancel any leave and return to
their units, pending investigation.
The SPDC has held an unusual number of press conferences about this ‘coup plot’. If
the regime is perceived to be able to clamp down on a violent coup (numerous weapons
were reported confiscated) and protect Burma’s security, then perhaps it is hoping its
popularity may grow.
Maj-Gen Kyaw Win was very quick to (erroneously) guarantee that the ‘coup plot’ was
not motivated by the talks, nor would it impede their progress. 105 Of course, the talks
have been adversely affected, most clearly by UN Special Envoy Razali’s trip being
postponed. Razali has stressed his concerns, publicly stating “I hope the events
surrounding the coup plot don’t derail the reconciliation process.” 106 [see p3 for
further details] It is feared the regime may invest all its energy into ‘internal matters’,
to the detriment of the talks. There is sound basis for such anxiety as the talks stalled
and nearly collapsed after Secretary-2 Lt-Gen Tin Oo’s death in the February 2001
helicopter crash.
The people of Burma are not convinced by this alleged conspiracy. Ne Win’s family
may well be guilty of crimes including corruption and unlawful bids for power, but a
coup-plot is widely considered unstrategic and unfeasible. Deeper reasoning suggests
105
There has been reference to a UN officer who suggests that these moves may actually help move the talks
along, but this person remains unidentified and this is only speculation. [see BBC (18 Mar 02) Behind Burma’s
‘non-coup’]
106
Bangkok Post (29 Mar 02) Top brass celebrate Army Day but time is not on their side
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
29
the arrests are more likely connected to the regime’s dislike of Ne Win clan’s business
deals and political exercises aimed at increasing their influence. This has included
Sandar Win’s active cultivation of friendships with various diplomats.
The family’s attempts at being more prominent players in the power game have been
deal a raw and sweeping hand by the regime. Their moves have been brought to a
halting stop with charges of treason. In dubbing the scenario a ‘coup conspiracy’, the
regime is claiming ‘legitimate’ space to exert influence, increase security measures and
modifying power structures as it desires.107
It is unclear who is the primary benefactor of this ‘coup-plot’ label. Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt
heads the MI (military intelligence) which has undertaken numerous interrogations and
arrests. It is suggested that up to 1,000 soldiers, police and civilians have been
questioned.108 The junta confirmed sacking 4 top soldiers (among others), including 2
regional commanders. (Khin Nyunt gained in power in the November 2001 reshuffles,
notably dismissing 2 top generals and allies of Gen. Maung Aye.)
While observers remain convinced of a power struggle between Khin Nyunt and
Maung Aye (head of army), reports in the Burmese media portray the top powers as
united.109 Establishment of the Bureau of Special Operations in November 2001 was
thought to strengthen power at the regime’s centre, 110 while intelligence battalions have
reduced from 27 to 12, perhaps to reduce tensions between Khin Nyunt and Maung
Aye.111
BBC Correspondent Larry Jagan suggests that rather than extending Khin Nyunt’s
influence, the ‘coup-attempt’ has cast shadows of doubt over his future. Khin Nyunt
rose to power through his connection with Gen. Ne Win and used to be close to Sandar
Win. Jagan comments that events surrounding the ‘coup plot’ will make his position
“increasingly untenable” and that “Gen Than Shwe has now emerged as the
unchallenged power,”112 consolidating his strength as the premier and reigning the
factions in.
USDA
The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) have been engaging in
community development activities. Dubbed kyant phont (literally meaning monitor
lizard; in this context ‘stupid creature’) in a DVB February report, the USDA received
money from authorities in Kawthaung District, Tenasserim Division for border
107
for details of the reshuffle see Altsean-Burma (Feb 02:27-28)
Bangkok Post (29 Mar 02)
For example, Larry Jagan (BBC correspondent) has described as “almost unprecendented” a photograph of
the 2 men inspecting troops in preperation for Armed Forces Day (27 Mar). [see Bangkok Post (29 Mar 02)]
110
The BSO was set up to run all 12 regional commands, 7 states and 7 divisions.
111
The Irrawaddy (11 Jan 02) Behind The Military Shake-up
112
Bangkok Post (29 Mar 02)
108
109
30
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
development activities including primary school, health facilities, agriculture and
water.113 (Note that development activities have proved damaging and politically
charged in many cases.) It has been suggested that this is part of a wider campaign to
improve the group’s image. Any gains in USDA influence should be taken seriously as,
set up under Sr-GenThan Shwe, it is ultimately an increase in military influence.
USDA money-raising activities are cause for concern in themselves. Additional funds
in Kawthaung District are raised through selling confiscated poached fish, imposing
‘illegal’ border, traffic and visitor registration fines. Similar strategies are employed in
Tachilek district where over 140 vehicles and 100 drivers were reportedly fined 500
and 100 baht each, respectively, raising over 80,000 baht.114
POLICE
Khin Nyunt issued an order that from the new year all Defence Services personnel
transferred to the police force should wear police and not military uniforms. It is
thought this is to ‘prove’ the police force is united, not split into 2 sections - military
and civilian, as an internal rift would indicate. 115
THE WEAPONS KEEP COMING
On 15 Dec, China sent another military shipment into Burma at Lashio; a 40-vehicle
convoy carrying an artillery battery, gun carriages and communication equipment, 116
with 5 sophisticated radar warships, guided missile launchers and anti-aircraft guns
arriving in February.117 The 10 MIG-29 fighters purchased from Russia in 2001 were
welcomed with an expanded runway at Meiktila Air Base.118 Guns on the ground have
been upgraded,119 a 4th mobile surface to air missile system battalion is being
established120 and machinery used in ammunition production on its way to Burma was
confiscated in Slovakia.121
New artillery and light infantry battalions are planned for Putao Township, Kachin
State122 and Thai intelligence believe Burma desire helicopters and training from
India.123
113
Democratic Voice of Burma (9 Feb 02) Border Projects Planned To Gain Public Trust
Network Media Group (9 Dec 01) Vehicles and drivers without licenses charged by USDA
/3 of police are former Defence Service personnel who never gave up their uniforms, and top positions have
always been filled by senior military officers. [DVB (2 Jan 02) Junta moves to control rift in police, former soldiers
shed uniforms]
116
Previous packages were in Jul & Aug ‘01 [Arms Trade Newswire (26 Dec 01) China ships arms to Burma]
117
Democratic Voice of Burma (6 Feb 02) Warships Ordered From China Arrive
118
see Altsean-Burma (Oct 01:21-22); DVB (27 Jan 02) Burmese Runway Expanded For Russian-Made Jets
119
Independent Mon News Agency (30 Jan 02) Burmese Army Has Installed New Guns
120
Democratic Voice of Burma (14 Feb 02) Junta plans new mobile missile battalion
121
Associated Press, Bratislava (4 Feb 02) Customs officials seize machinery used in ammunition production
122
Democratic Voice of Burma (11 Jan 02) Burmese junta to build new artillery, infantry battalions in north
123
Burma already receives tanks, guns, ammunition and military uniforms from India. BBC (7 Dec 01) Indian and
Burmese forces bond afresh
114
115 1
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
31
REGIONAL SECURITY
Increasing militarisation in Burma and the regime’s continual support for armed
conflict is both a national and regional concern. The entire military and their allies are
involved, with DVB reporting military officers and Wa groups are involved in the gun
running business into India. Kokang groups are also implicated. 124
Defence
Minister
Gen
Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh dismissed as groundless a
6 Feb report in Time Magazine that
quoted an arms trader as saying, “The
Thai army openly sells weapons… They
are the biggest source of protection for
the people involved in this business.”
Much as Chavalit may say “I do not
believe,” (Nation, 6 Feb) it is indeed
plausible that Thailand is hub for arms
trading as it surrounded by countries that
have seen huge numbers of weapons
employed in the last few decades.
Ongoing conflict in Burma means these
weapons remain in high demand. This is
yet another external cost of Burma’s
instability and violent chaos.
In January the US Department of
Defence was ordered to submit a report to
Congress by April 2002 on Thailand’s
security needs in reaction to Burma’s
increasing weapon accumulation.125 It is
clear where US sympathies lie.
Burma is a hub for armed activity, not
only hosting its own battles but also the
recipient
of neighbouring battles,
something that such internal chaos cannot
prevent. The United Liberation Front of
Asom are reportedly consolidating their
bases in Burma with the active support of
the Chin Independence Army and the
National
Socialist
Council
Of
Nagaland.126
More alarming is the claim of 52 surrendered members of the Naga armed group who
claim they have “cordial relations with the Burmese army […who] often supply arms
and ammunition.”127 If this is true, the military really are intent on causing chaos and
destruction to any extent in order to maintain what can loosely be termed ‘control’.
THE NUCLEAR REACTOR
Observers have doubts that Burma can maintain the nuclear reactor due to be delivered
from Russia in 2003 at a cost of US$25million, 128 particularly after the International
Atomic Energy Agency rendered safety standards unacceptable. To quote British
nuclear expert John Large, “There is little evidence that the Myanmar authorities
understand, let alone would be able to implement, the necessary safety regime to be
able to prevent the dangerous accumulation of radioactive material.” 129 The European
124
DVB (3 Dec 01) Indian customs arrest Burmese national with smuggled weapons in Mizoram, FBIS Translated
The Nation (28 Jan 2002) Junta's new jets alarm
Mizzima News, Guwahati (25 Feb 02) ULFA insurgents killed
127
Mizzima News, Guwahati (7 Jan 02) Surrendered militants say they had cordial relations with Burmese army
125
126
128
129
Science, Vienna (1 Feb 02) Planned Reactor Ruffles Global Feathers, Vol.295
Straits Times (18 Jan 02) Yangon's nuclear ambitions alarm Asia and Europe
www.sciencemag.org
32
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
Commission has spelt out that without an independent regulatory body to ensure
standards, radioactive leaks may occur.130
The Deputy Foreign Minister has said the reactor (due to be delivered in 2003) will be
used “for the peaceful intention of acquiring modern technology for the country, radio
isotopes for peaceful use, training and production of experts, and studying the
prospects of producing electricity from nuclear energy.”131 A statement by Russia
declared the reactor incapable of making nuclear weapons. 132 and reports of Pakistani
nuclear scientists seeking refuge in Burma after September 11, 2001 were probably
coincidental and not linked to Burma increasing its nuclear capacity.
However, the acquisition has raised concerns of what the future holds with a nuclear
Burma under military control. The US specifically addressed these concerns on January
22 by warning Burma it must honour obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and not pursue production of nuclear weapons.133
WOMEN & CHILDREN
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
WOMEN
award
Dr Cynthia Maung, director of Mae Tao clinic, was the recipient of the 6 th annual
Female Human Rights Award at a ceremony held by the Foundation for Human Rights
in Asia, Tokyo, on 7 Dec.
violence
Violence against women continues unabated; both gender specific torture and violence
- such as rape, and non-gender specific –such as forced labour. (Note: many women
forced labourers do suffer gender specific violence on top of the humiliations and
abuses of forced labour itself.) Women continue to be conscripted as forced labourers
with reports from this period highlighting 37 women in Hsihseng, 36 in Mawkmai, 40
in Langkher and 38 in Mongpan; 151 in total.134
130
BBC (24 Jan 02) Concerns over Burma's nuclear plans
TV Myanmar (21 Jan 02) Burma gives reasons for planned nuclear research reactor project (The use of such
reactors is generally for isotopes for medicines.)
132
RIA-Novosti (23 Jan 02) Specialists To Make Nuclear Reactor For Burma
133
Agence France Presse (22 Jan 02) US warns Myanmar on nuclear reactor
134
SHAN (13 Dec 02) Forced labor: 10 townships in road construction projects
131
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
33
CHILDREN
sex work
Mae Sai focused in the 2nd World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of
Children (18 Dec 01). The border town is a prominent trading centre for child sex
workers, an estimated 1/3 of whom are between 12 and 17.
Many of the children sold are from Pa Tek, a Thai village with a large immigrant
community from Burma. Most have no legal status and live in poverty and are
therefore extremely vulnerable. Child trafficking is so established in Pa Tek that it is a
‘cottage industry’ – to coin Phil Marshall’s phrase (UN) - most agents are friends or
relatives of the children’s families. An estimated 70% of the 800 families in the village
have sold at least 1 daughter, with prices ranging from 5,000 - 40,000 baht (US$110900).135
The demand for virginity means that HIV/AIDS is a desperate problem for these
children (and their clients). The coordinator of the Child Protection and Rights Center
(Mae Sai) said that 50 girls from Pa Tek village have died this year from AIDS.136
violence
An interesting article appeared in Burma Issues (Mar ‘02) about the socialisation of
children to embrace violence, and the role games play in this. To quote from the article
(drawn from the reflections of 2 Karennis), “Whenever they play games, they usually
divide into 2 groups, Burmese and Karenni, and then they fight each other.” Replace
‘Karenni’ with any ethnic group from Burma and the situation is sure to be similar.
Play with guns made of bamboo and dried gourd ‘bombs’ are common in areas where
the sound of gunfire and bombs can be heard by villagers, young and old. 137
Whether there is a direct causal link between these games and violence in communities
is a contentious issue, but for many the limited scope of children’s play is disturbing.
Children who live through conflict are intimately aware of abuse, death and
destruction, usually of one group by another. As the author highlighted, this in itself is
severely problematic as ethnic tensions become internalised at a young age.
135
136
137
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (18 Dec 01) Meeting to fight child sale to brothels
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (18 Dec 01)
Burma Issues, Vol.12, No.3 (Mar 02) Games Children Play
34
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
HUMAN RIGHTS
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
The overall human rights situation in Burma remains deplorable, and widespread
human rights abuses continue.
- US Department of State (11 Feb 02)
The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Professor Pinheiro’s2 nd
report to the UN Commission on Human Rights (Mar 02) is based upon the
information of his fact-finding mission in October and information received until
December15, 2001. The report comes at a time when the SPDC and high-level envoys
are under pressure from the international community and opposition groups to
demonstrate progress.
Pinheiro again showed his eagerness to commend the military on its supposed
advancements, and gradual improvement of the situation. Pinheiro comments that
progress is fragile which is in line with his delicate criticism of the regime and
widespread abuses still occurring. In Pinheiro’s 1 st public statement he said, “I saw
everyone I wanted to and I am satisfied with the government’s cooperation.”138
PROF. PINHEIRO’S SECOND TRIP TO BURMA
Pinheiro’s Itinerary:
10 Feb Rangoon Meetings: Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, Foreign Minister Win Aung, Home Ministry
officials, other Government officials, UN country team
12 Feb Kachin State: Ethnic leaders & Kachin prison
17 Feb Insein Prison: NLD political prisoner Win Tin
18 Feb Rangoon Meetings: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi & top NLD aides, NLD Central Executive
Committee, Human Rights Committee, Home Minister Col Tin Hlaing, Police Director
Maj-Gen Soe Win.
Agenda focus: political prisoners, conditions in the jails, child soldiers & forced labour.
political prisoners & prison conditions
Consistent with SPDC maneuvers of taking action surrounding the visit of a high-level
official, 41 political prisoners and a further 318 female detainees were released from
prison in honour of Pinheiro’s arrival in February. 139 Following Pinheiro’s criticism of
the military not releasing any students or activists, Yin Htwe - whose sentence expired
in 1999 - was released. UN officials are not convinced this reflects any commitment of
the military to speed up the release of remaining political prisoners – currently
averaging 10 releases a month.140
138
139
140
BBC (19 Feb 02) UN Envoy “Satisfied” with Burma Trip
AFP (29 Mar 02) Myanmar Junta Frees Seven Democracy Activists
BBC (19 Feb 02)
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
35
Pinheiro neglected to try and devise a schedule for prisoner releases, but he did present
the idea of using amnesty. However, this will entail revoking laws that prohibit
released prisoners to engage in politics.
Pinheiro congratulated the military for “dramatically declining” political arrests.141
With talks beyond the 18-month mark and over 1,500 political prisoners, this is not an
improvement but rather a crisis these arrests are still occurring.
Pinheiro spent 9 hours at Insein Prison and visited another prison in Kachin State. He
reports speaking to NLD prisoners, including Win Tin, a renowned journalist currently
in hospital, as well as Dr. Salai Tun Than. Pinheiro reports an improvement in prison
conditions, but Myo Myint Nyein, a magazine editor recently released, says prison
restrictions are relaxed when such inspections take place with harsh conditions
reimposed after.142
Likewise, Pinheiro reported improvements in labour-camps conditions but failed to
denounce them as institutions. Pinheiro disregarded allegations of corruption and
physical abuse of prisoners by saying he was “not in a position to assess their
extent.”143
human rights developments
Since Pinheiro’s last visit, the SPDC sponsored Human Rights Committee has done a
few things. There was preparation of human rights books, manuals for policy makers
and 11 human rights workshops, predominately funded and orchestrated by the
Australian Government and corporate oil companies. It is assumed the attendees were
junta officials, and there are no known plans to include members of the public or
human rights defenders in such workshops. Pinheiro called for prevention and
monitoring of human rights violations, as well as holding State agents accountable.
political rights
Pinheiro acknowledged that only 10 parties, about 5% of those registered in the 1990
elections, are legal under the SPDC rule. (8 of these parties represent ethnic
nationalities, although their ability to operate is effectively curtailed.) Some NLD
offices have re-opened but Pinheiro is concerned that “stringent restrictions” 144
hamper their functioning. Pinheiro did not report on the state of Aung San Suu Kyi’s
house arrest other then repeating she should be released.
141
Pinheiro (28 Mar 02) Report to UN Commission on Human Rights
Radio Burma (14 Feb 02) Freed Reporter Attacks Burmese Prison Sham
Pinheiro (28 Mar 02)
144
Pinheiro (10 Jan 02)
142
143
36
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
forced labour
Contradictorily, Pinheiro asserts the ‘government’ is committed to eradicate forced
labour but says the greatest violations are where the military is active. He declared
“forced labour on civil infrastructure appears to have ceased,”145 although he offers
no firm evidence to support his statement.
The ‘government’ has not used the media or translations into ethnic languages to
publicise information or Order No. 1/99 against forced labour, nor has it prosecuted
any cases of forced labour although it has supposedly taken “administrative action” on
38 cases.146
Pinheiro asserts “people have no faith in the effectiveness of the courts or police, or
they are afraid of the consequences.”147 This comes at a time when 7 Shan villagers are
reported to have been killed after complaining about forced labour in September last
year.148 (Followed up by the ILO team in their Feb 02 visit, see below.)
humanitarian aid
Pinheiro is encouraging international humanitarian aid to help combat great concerns
about HIV/AIDS and basic medical functioning. He also said the international
community should help “strengthen the fiscal and administrative capacities of the
Government… to maintain momentum,”149 a position that seems premature and
unsubstantiated. Pinheiro seems to disregard the regime’s culpability in this crisis, in
that less than 1% of GDP is reportedly devoted to health expenditures.
conclusion
Overall, Pinheiro’s report was slightly more critical then his last, but he repeatedly
comments on commitment and change by the ‘government’ without much evidence to
substantiate his claim. While the regime may call the most recent US human rights
reports “incorrect and outlandish… based again on repeatedly incorrect and
outlandishly disoriented information,”150 there has not been a truly significant
commitment made by the regime to improve the human rights situation.
Pinheiro appears to be advocating for the regime when he says, “If the international
community wants to see political and human rights progress, it should support their
efforts in a spirit of principled engagement.”151 Finally, while Pinheiro has lavishly
praised the regime for its cooperation and supposed developments, he has largely
ignored the efforts and cooperation of the NLD and other opposition groups.
145
Pinheiro (28 Mar 02)
Pinheiro (28 Mar 02)
Pinheiro (28 Mar 02)
148
Bangkok Post (21 Feb 02) Rights Record Under Close Watch
149
Pinheiro (10 Jan 02)
150
AFP (5 Mar 02) Myanmar rejects US human rights report as 'outlandish'
151
AFP (28 Mar 02) UN Rights Expert Says Myanmar Destined for Democratic Change
146
147
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
37
FORCED LABOUR
It is very difficult to make a living here. We spend most of our labour working for the
army.
– Chin State villager (CHRO, 15 Dec 01)
Reports of forced labour continue, both among civilian and convict 152 populations, and
are one of the underlying factors of increasing numbers of displaced persons – both
IDPs and in other countries. [see ‘Displacement’]
Reports by Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO), and Karen Human Rights Group
(KHRG), show despite an order issued by the home ministry prohibiting the use of
forced labour, the army was still using forced labour and civilian porters. Examples of
forced labour reported in this period include:153
 In remote areas of Chin State, 10 villages in were forced to construct a 20-mile
motor road linking Vuangtu and Ngaphaipi villages in February. CHRO (3 Mar 02)
 Reports from Arakan State claim villagers from areas surrounding Ponnagyun
township are again being used as forced labour in military rubber plantations, after
a break during the ILO visit to Burma in September 2001. Villagers had been
threatened against telling ILO delegates anything about forced labour should they
visit the area. Narinjara (2 Mar 02)
 Over 100 military porters, men and women, conscripted by the growing numbers of
troops deployed near the Thai-Burma border in anticipation of an offensive against
the Shan State Army (SSA). A further 150 civilians were reportedly conscripted as
porters (50 each from Maeken, Mongharng and Poongpakhem tracts) between 1525 February. SHAN (25 Feb 02)
International Labour Organization (ILO) returns
A 4-member ILO delegation, led by Francis Maupain, Special Adviser to the ILO
Director-General, returned to Burma (19-25 Feb 02) with the primary purpose of trying
to establish a permanent presence in Rangoon and evaluating the SPDC’s progress in
eradicating forced labour.
An agreement was reached, however it was not of the scope ILO officials had hoped
for.154 There will be an appointment of an ILO liaison officer instead of an appointed
ombudsman; the regime reportedly said the liaison officer could lead to an ombudsman
at a “later time.” Maupain was disappointed with the regime’s lack of cooperation and
said “there was no basis to pursue a dialogue.”155 The provisions for the liaison must
be put in place by June 2002 when the ILO will reevaluate its position on Burma.
152
see Network Media Group (24 Feb 02) Prisoners should get one day rest, ICRC
for further examples see CHRO (15 Dec 01) Civilians forced to repair army camp; SHAN (13 Dec 01) Forced
labour – 10 townships in road construction projects; KHRG #2002-01 (8 Feb 02) A Compendium of SPDC Order
Documents Demanding Forced Labour Since November 2000
154
The ILO is looking to set up an office to monitor forced labour and an independent watchdog to receive and
investigate complaints.
155
AFP (27 Feb 02) Myanmar Junta Defends Handling of ILO Team Barred from Seeing Suu Kyi
153
38
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
The team reported the military was unwilling to accept assistance to end forced labour.
While the junta has declared forced labour illegal for the 1 st time, it is unclear how and
if it is enforced. The team identified 2 major obstacles to the end of forced labour.
Firstly, the military’s de facto immunity from persecution. Secondly, the lack of
‘government’ funding for unskilled manual labour on public work projects as an
alternative to forced, cost-free labour.
Although the team found that a “certain decrease in the imposition of forced labor had
taken place,” it was unconvinced that this could be sustained.156 None of the 3
recommendations made by the Commission of Inquiry, and accepted by the
Government, have been met in reality.157
The regime’s lack of cooperation during the team’s mission (including preventing them
from meeting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) and its apparent unwillingness to make a firm
commitment towards eradicating forced labour, may suggest the visit was nothing more
than a public relations exercise. If the regime is seen to be engaging with the ILO over
this controversial issue then it hopes the international community may be placated and
pressure will ease.
However, observed non-cooperation is unlikely to favor well with the ILO in June
2002 when they reevaluate their sanctions on Burma.
EXTORTION
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt visited Maungdaw, a town in Arakan State, on 29th December to
open the new annexe of Basic Education Secondary School and receive donations from
what the junta described as ‘philanthropists’ of the locality. The philanthropists were
actually bullied business people and households - each household had to give 1,000
kyat to bear the cost of Khin Nyunt’s reception.158
In late January, villagers in Ponnagyun township (near Sittwe) were fined for not
attending a ‘meeting’ for what the junta call ‘collection of purchased rice’. 12 villagers
were fined 3,000 kyat each, while other villagers were charged with ‘open
disobedience to the state order’. As a result of fear, it is reported that 4 families have
moved from a village that is currently home to 40 families. 159
156
Kyodo (19 Feb 02) ILO Fact-Finding Mission Arrives in Myanmar
These include: amending the Village and Towns Act, devising budgetary provisions to effectively replace
forced labour with decent wages and working conditions and prosecution of those responsible for the exaction of
forced labour. [CEACR (Mar 02) Observations Concerning ILO Convention No. 29, Forced Labour – Myanmar]
158
Narinjara News, Maungdaw (31 Dec 01) Myanmar Junta Secretary Number One Visits Maungdaw
159
Narinjara news, Ponnagyun (25 Feb 02) Villagers Fined For Not Attending 'Rice Collection' Meeting
157
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
39
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
If you haven't been in jail you haven't been a reporter here.
- retired Burmese newspaper-editor
Journalist Myo Myint Nyein was freed after 12 years in prison on 13 February,
coinciding with Pinheiro’s visit. Although released 2 years before the end of his
sentence, his arrest contravened his right to freedom of expression. Reporters Sans
Frontiers and Burma Media Association voiced the regret of many that he was not
released long ago in view of his poor health.
Reflective of ongoing political censorship in
Burma, the Committee to Protect Journalists
issued a report in February 2002 condemning
the “harsh regime of censorship, licensing,
and threats” forcing journalists to apply
clandestine techniques, with many ultimately
harassed, imprisoned and forced into exile.160
Myo Myint Nyein’s release is not a sign
of change. Just the evening before, Ko
Tin Saw (alias Tharkhan) was arrested
for passing information to foreign radio
stations. It is believed he was tortured
and interrogated until confessing and
giving 5 other names.
DVB, 14 Feb
Meanwhile, on the Indo-Burma border, Chin youths have established the 1 st
independent Chin media group Khawnutum.
LABOUR RIGHTS
The Seafarers’ Union of Burma (SUB) demanded the Burmese Marine authority
immediately revoke reprisal action - including a ban from maritime employment - on
seafarers seeking assistance from the International Transport Workers’ Federation
(ITF) and affiliated unions. The regime provides little to no protection to Burmese
seafarers and, to quote Ko Ko Khaing General Secretary of the SUB, “seeking trade
union or ITF help is the last desperate option for Burmese seafarers abandoned in
foreign ports.”161 The regime’s assurances of no reprisal against seafarers contacting
ITF have not been upheld.
SUB, operating in exile since 1991, also demanded Burmese authorities observe and
implement ILO convention No 87, ratified in 1955, guaranteeing Freedom of
Association and protection of the Right to Organise.
160
161
OneWorld.net (15 Feb 02) Burmese Journalists Battle the Blue Pencil
ITF (28 Feb 02) Violation of Burmese Seafarer’s Basic Rights Continues Unabated
40
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
ETHNIC
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
Military rule is a cancer.… It is the responsibility of everyone - every good sons and
daughters of all ethnic segments in Burma - to remove this cancer from the body of
our politics and our society.
- Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, Feb 02
In an interview in February, Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe spoke of how ethnic racism,
or ‘ethnic chauvinism’ is an integral part of the suffering in Burma. He discussed the
politics of ethnicity and identity and stressed that ethnic identity must be used
strategically, in such a manner as to foster co-opertaion and support as opposed to
intensified chaos and conflict. He reminded his audience that the military regime is
Burma is keen on intensifying ethnic conflict as it is an ideological weapon that helps
them further their power over the ethnic nationalities of Burma. 162 [see Appendix 1 for
full transcript of interview]
CHAVALIT’S INTERVENTION
In late March it was reported that Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister
Chavalit has been mediating truce talks between Rangoon and the Karen National
Union (KNU) and Shan State Army (SSA). This procedure is questionable as in public
statements Chavalit not only accepts, but extends, the regime’s theory that peace is
unattainable because of unreasonable demands by the KNU and SSA.163 There has
been no report on solid progress.
KAREN
Despite Chavalit’s ‘mediating’, conflict
continues. In mid-March the KNU attacked a
military camp, killing 6 soldiers. Civilian life
remains full of uncertainty and fear, with 1
attack alone causing 300 villagers to
temporarily flee to Myawaddy.164
Now again, we would like to solve
the problem politically by negotiation
with the SPDC… The SPDC must
contact the KNU officially. Then we
will welcome negotiations.
- Mahn Nyein Maung,
KNU central committee member
In January, at a secret ceremony held for Karen New Year (14 Jan), the KNU urged the
SPDC to begin peace talks.165 A similar report a few months earlier was denied by
KNU leadership.166
In the context of continued and deadly armed conflict between the KNU and the SPDC
and its ally the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the KNU extended a brave
hand. As recently as January, the regime publicly accused the KNU, on scant evidence,
162
Kao-Wao News, interview (16-26 Feb 02) An evening with Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe
Bangkok Post (29 Mar 02) Chavalit helping bring ethnic groups and Rangoon together
Kyodo (14 Mar 02) Ethnic Karen rebels attack Myanmar army camp, 6 killed
165
AP, Nya Li Phyo Hta Camp, Burma (14 Jan 02) KNU Want Talks With Junta
166
see Altsean-Burma (Feb 02, p50)
163
164
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
41
167
of planning a terrorist plot to destroy Mingaladon Airport, Rangoon. A couple of
days later, Radio Myanmar held the KNU responsible for killing a family in
Kaleinmadaw village, Mon State on 22 December. The transmission was explicit in its
contempt for the KNU.168
SHAN
While the SSA has been receptive to Thai officials mediating peace talks between rebel
leaders and Rangoon, the latter has not publicly responded. 169
Tensions and fighting continue with large numbers of Burmese troops being deployed
along the border. By December 9 approximately 1,000 Burmese and Wa were present
along the Thai-Burma border in advance of attacks on the SSA.with thousands of
troops deployed by the beginning of February.
The large number is unusual, according to a military observer, as only a few hundred
Shan troops have been operating in the area. It is thought the target may be the Gor
Wan headquarters, a failed target last year.170
Removal of Wei Hsaitang from Mongyawn [see p20,21] may adversely affect relations
between theWa and the Shan State Army (SSA) as Wei Hsaitang has generally
opposed Wa troops fighting the Shan. With Rangoon’s control and Wei Hsuehying
(drug fugitive Wei Hsuehkang’s brother) handling 171 st division, a fiercer fighting
force appears to be exerting itself. 171
Ramifications of the ongoing conflict are great. Not only is loss of life continuing
between armed factions, but civilians remain extremely vulnerable, particularly as
conflict areas are inaccessible. (Loi Kawwan was closed off – especially to media – on
25 February amid speculation of an imminent attack. 172) The implication is that
conditions for survival become increasingly tenuous. With battalions and headquarters
very close to the border, Thai villagers and officials continue to fear the conflict will
spread into Thailand. [see p25]
KARENNI
A 36-person negotiation team (made up of township representatives) has been
established to provide space for negotiations between the Karenni National Progressive
Party (KNPP) and the regime. This team was barred from entering Thailand in March,
167
Myanmar Information Committee (9 Jan 02) Terrorist Act Thwarted
Radio Myanmar (11 Jan 02) KNU Responsible for Thanbyuzat Killings; posted on BurmaNet (10-11 Jan 02)
Issue # 1952
169
The Nation (4 Jan 02) Softer approach to border conflicts
170
Bangkok Post (6 Feb 02) Burma army moves in on Shan bases
171
SHAN (25 Jan 02) Burmese troops move into Mongyawn; SHAN (21 Feb 02) More Burmese troops pouring in
to flush out Wa from drug town; SHAN, Issue 02-23 (25 Feb 02) More troops, weapons and supplies coming to
the border; SHAN , Issue 03-09 (Mar 02) Locals fear escalation of Shan-Wa fight
172
SHAN, Issue 02-25 (27 Feb 02) Threatened Shan stronghold becomes off-limits
168
42
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
postponing the meeting between the negotiation team and KNPP. The last meeting was
in December.173
The SPDC issued a statement on 10 January alleging that the KNPP murdered 7
villagers from villages near the Lawpita hydroelectric power plant, Karenni State, an
area with tight security. As with allegations against the KNU, evidence is lacking.
KNPP secretary U Raymond Htoo denied the allegations. 174
LAHU
The Lahu National Democratic Front (LNDF) issued a statement on 10 January (29 th
Anniversary of Lahu Revolutionary Day) urging the SPDC to stop committing human
rights violations against national races, including the use of landmines. The statement
also stated that LNDF will continue its armed struggle to achieve a genuine federal
union.175
MON
SPDC troops continue their aggressive search for the armed and active Mon splinter
group, led by Col. Pan Nyunt. On November 27, Htee Wah Doe Karen village was
burnt down for allegedly supporting the group. In early December, 200 SPDC troops
entered cease-fire areas, one near Halockhanee Mon refugee camp. This move has
deeply concerned villagers and the New Mon State Party and makes the cease-fire
increasingly tenuous.
While some villagers have expressed their support for the splinter group, they are
reportedly ‘collecting taxes’ and have held a village headman as a hostage to raise
revenue. Generally life is becoming increasingly hard and travel is more dangerous. 176
173
Network Media Group, Mae Hong Son (6 Mar 02) Peace delegates fail in their attempt to meet KNPP
DVB (10 Jan 02) Opposition party denies killing villagers
DVB (11 Jan 02) Lahu Group To Continue Armed Struggle; Urges Junta To Stop Landmine Use
176
Kao Wao News Group (4-14 Dec 01) Burma Army Intrudes Cease-fire Zone
174
175
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
RELIGION
 Improving

Stagnant

43
Deteriorating
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt and other SPDC officials attended the Catholic Bishops
Conference of Myanmar on January 11. No details were given about the conference
proceedings and it is unlikely any controversial issues were raised. The press release by
the Myanmar Information Committee merely reiterated the familiar propaganda of
“over 100 national races living in unity. Although it is a predominantly Buddhist
country, all the people have freedom of faith.”177
Time and time again in Burma this line has been proven to be an abominable lie. In
order to maintain strict control over Burma, the regime is complicit in increasing
agitation along lines of difference. It is not only Christian and Islamic communities that
are targeted. Any persons appearing to have strong standing and respect in a
community would be singled out, including Buddhists.
Democratic Voice of Burma radio reported in December that 11 Buddhist leaders were
arrested in May 2001 for distributing copied photos of the Buddha images destroyed by
the Taleban. Clearly the regime is primarily concerned with reining in those
commanding respect and amputating their influence. 178
An abbot in Sittwe who forbids student monks from listening to radio broadcasts
further illustrates this point. The abbot used to be engaged in political activities and
following the Buddhist-Muslim riots in 1994 the MI (military intelligence) forced him
to sign a paper declaring abstention from political activity. 179
177
Myanmar Information Committee, Rangoon (11 Jan 02) Secretary-1 meets with archbishops and bishops of
Catholic Bishops
178
DVB (15 Dec 01) Burma jails 11 over photos of Taleban-destroyed Buddha images
179
Narinjara News, Sittwe (19 Dec 01) Monks forbidden from listening to radio broadcasts
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
44
HEALTH
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
The Burmese Medical Association’s 48 conference reported an increase in health
services and doctors since 1988, and US$12 million state funds used to purchase
modern equipment.180 According to the report there are currently:
th





14,893 doctors
750 hospitals (including 13 township hospitals & 37 station hospitals in the border areas)
346 dispensaries
1,402 rural health centers & 64 regional health centers
13 institutes of medicine & other health sector universities
These statistics do not alter the glaring reality that Burma’s healthcare system fails to
meet the most basic health needs of the country. One of the main reasons for this is
corruption and severe mismanagement from the top down. US$12 million spent over
13 years for a population of 48 million is a drop in the ocean. The junta’s definition of
what passes off for a civilian hospital is an outrage. An example of misplaced priorities
is the regime’s request for financial assistance to develop an ‘e-Health’ System at the
WHO Board of Executives Meeting (11-14 Jan).181 While computers are still so new
and so few have access to them in Burma, money could surely be better spent.
PROSTHESIS
A new International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) limb-production and fitting
center to assist landmine victims in Hpa-An, capital of Karen State, will be completed
by May and fully operational by July. It is expected that after one year the centre will
rehabilitate 40 amputees a month – free of charge. According to a statement put out by
the ICRC, prosthesis production in 2001 was 2,150.182
HIV/AIDS
There continues to be severe lack of
information and subsequently ignorance about
the Burmese AIDS epidemic. Illustrative is the
absence of details released about the AIDS
advocacy/prevention meeting held by the
Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare
Association (1 Feb). In the name of ‘cultural
sensitivity’, there remains an effective ban on
reporting on HIV/AIDS.
180
181
182
diagram 1: AIDS poster
To fight against AIDS is our national duty.
Myanmar Information Committee (17 Jan 02) Myanmar Medical Association 48th
The New Light of Myanmar (18 Jan 02) Health Minister arrives back from Geneva
International Committee of the Red Cross, Burma (18 Jan 02) Cornerstones laid for limb-fitting centre
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
45
Health workers complain HIV/AIDS education pamphlets are outdated, insufficient,
confusing and ostracising. Sex and condoms remain taboo, men who have sex with
men and intravenous drug users are not mentioned
Over 80% of people in Thakata
in education programmes. Unsurprisingly therefore,
[in Rangoon division] do not
know how HIV is transmitted.
knowledge regarding transmission remains
– health worker in Burma
dangerously low.183
Unfortunately, as the Irrawaddy (Jan 01) reported, the Burmese community in
Thailand are also unhealthily quiet about HIV/AIDS. To quote directly from the report:
Little knowledge and widespread misconceptions about HIV/AIDS afflict migrant
workers. Many believe that HIV can be contracted from toilet seats, mosquito bites,
kissing or coughing… Some worry that releasing precise figures could further damage
the already negative image of Burmese migrant workers and lead the Thai authorities,
who attribute soaring health problems largely to the migrants, to intensify their
crackdown on them.
THAILAND & THE HEALTH OF PEOPLE FROM BURMA
The Thai Public Health Ministry has warned people to “exercise extreme caution”
around migrant workers in order to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. The
call came after a random survey reportedly found 89.5% of 567 workers from Burma in
Rayong had hepatitis of some type. The health of workers under 15 was found to be
particularly fragile.184
While the survey may have highlighted an important health issue, urging “extreme
caution” around migrant workers will only exacerbate racial tensions and xenophobia.
It is important that the Thai health authorities make a positive response.
Thai-Burma cooperation along the border (in Chiang Rai, Tak, Kanchanaburi and
Ranong provinces) to control the spread of AIDS (by encouraging 100% condom
usage), malaria (5% caseload reduction per annum) and tuberculosis (TB) (caseload
reduction of 85%) has enjoyed “satisfactory results” over the past year according to
the Thai Public Health Minister. While malaria has reportedly been reduced by 25%,
the decrease TB caseloads has only been slight.
The joint-initiative will continue, seeking approximately US$3million from
international organisations to supplement Thai and Burmese funds. 185
183
184
185
Irrawaddy Magazine (Jan 01)
The Nation (14 Mar 02) 90% of Burmese workers surveyed have hepatitis
The Nation (27 Feb 02) Inflow of diseases slowed
46
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
EDUCATION
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
The government has neglected to provide the essentials of modern textbooks and
school equipment, and has more significantly failed to bring about the necessary
changes in the political and social conditions of Burma that would allow for true
educational improvement… Burma’s education system is seriously damaged and the
future for the students and the country is terrifying.
- ABFSU ‘01, p12
In December 2001, the All Burma Federation of Student Unions’ Foreign Affairs
Committee (ABFSU-FAC) released an education report, The Current Education
Situation in Burma: Education Report Year 2000, documenting the deterioration of the
Burmese education system since 1988 within a wide political and social context. Some
highlights include:








universities & colleges have only been open for 40 months since 1988.
illiteracy is increasing from the 1990’s rate of 23%.
textbooks are outdated & strictly censored to promote military ideology
“Corruption is commonplace at the university level for passing grades.” (p11-12)
universities relocated out of towns makes education both harder to access and afford.
education & health are only 7.7% of national budget; military spending is over 40%.
disproportionate funds & energies are channeled into military education, compared to
civilian education. The Maritime University, due to open in August 2002 with 300
students, is an example of this.186
9.5million children cannot access basic education, many because of the expense; only
37% enrolled complete primary school with only 24.59% proceeding to middle level.
In contrast, official statistics boast Burmese authorities have built 110 universities and
colleges since 1988, totaling 142 with student numbers increasing by 416,719 to
556,456.187 However, ABFSU states that nearly 2/3 of university students are actually
enrolled in the University of Distant Education (UDE), 188 as a result of disruptions,
closures and other factors. As ABFSU note, “The UDE programs sorely lack in
opportunity for students to actively learn.”189
MONASTIC EDUCATION
Monastic education is reportedly becoming increasingly popular in Arakan State, as the
quality is thought to be superior to State schooling and less costly. According to the
186
Xinhua (9 Dec 01) Myanmar to Open First Maritime University
Xinhua (9 Dec 01)
ABFSU (2001,p41)
189
ABFSU (2001,p12)
187
188
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
47
report there are about 500 students enrolled in just one monastery near Wingaba
ground in Sittwe.190
STUDY ABROAD
In January, Japan announced it will provide 203million yen under its ODA programme
for a scholarship fund - The Human Resources Development Scholarship - enabling
students from Burma to study a wide range of Master’s degrees in Japan. A statement
released by the Japanese embassy in Rangoon stated the intention is to further Burma’s
development through increased knowledge. 191
Three hundred students from Burma currently study in Russia and the ambassador has
expressed eagerness in granting further assistance to the regime, especially in the fields
of science and technology and the Aerospace Engineering and Maritime
Universities.192
It is not known at this time whether either country intends to support the
‘government’s’ skill building, as is the case in Japan’s Cambodia programme
(implemented in 2000).193 If so then it is predictable the regime will siphon their own
and particularly chosen children into these much-desired courses while excluding the
wider community and further widening the gap between military and civilian
education.
It is vital that countries wishing to provide similar ‘assistance’ assess programmes
within the wider educational and political context.
CLOSURE
After fights in mid-February, thought to be between the Scorpion Gang (led by Kyaw
Ne Win, Ne Wins’ grandson currently under arrest after the alleged ‘coup plot’) and
the White Snake Gang, the Institute of Economics and the Culture University
(Ywarthargyi, South. Dagon) were raided by War Office troops and closed. The fights
reportedly involved over 200 students and were labeled a riot.194 (It is unknown by
Altsean at the time of publishing if/when the universities were reopened and what the
details of arrests were.)
190
Narinjara (24 Mar 02) Private monastic education in demand in Arakan
Kyodo News Service (15 Jan 02) Japan to extend 203 mil. yen scholarship grant to Myanmar
Myanmar Times (7-13 Jan 02) New Russian envoy offers help with education
193
Embassy of Japan, Cambodia (29 Jun 01) PRESS RELEASE: Japanese ODA News, Human Resource
Development Scholarship Reception (Award Ceremony); www.bigpond.com.kh/users/eojc/p010629.htm
194
Democratic Voice of Burma (20 Feb 02) Junta Temporarily Closes Two Universities following Gang Brawls
191
192
48
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
DISPLACEMENT
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
IDPS (INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS)
The use of forced labour, forced relocations and other human rights abuses continues to
result in large numbers of IDPs in ethnic nationality areas such as the Karen, Karenni,
Shan and Chin States. [see p36]
In Shan State, hundreds of households, particularly from the Nayao area opposite
Chiang Rai province, Thailand, have been relocated or pressured to move to make way
for Wa settlers (who have themselves been relocated). Many of these are now IDPs. 195
According to a Shan relief worker in Mae Sai, the population of the IDP village of
Piang Fah, opposite Mae Fah Luang District, Mae Sai, Thailand, has swollen to over
1,000 as a result of the Wa relocations. 196 Others have sought refuge in Thailand.
REFUGEES
THAILAND
The position of refugees and asylum seekers from Burma remains tenuous. There are
about 110,000 refugees in Thailand now under the care of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).197
Royal Thai government (RTG) statements in December clearly indicated a populist
desire to close refugee camps and work towards the eventual repatriation of all
Burmese refugees. One spokesperson set a 3-year time-limit for complete repatriation.
(Note: there have been similar timeframes set in the past. It has been impossible to
meet them, one of the main obstacles continuing to be Rangoon’s refusal to allow
return.)
Also in December, the RTG refused asylum to approximately 700 Karen villagers
fleeing from Burmese military attacks on the village of Htee Wah Doh in late
November. The Karen remained stranded across the border from Kanchanaburi
province in western Thailand, with the threat of further military attacks and forced
labour preventing them from returning to their homes. 198
The UK Foreign Ministry has urged Thailand to ensure “international standards of
treatment are maintained in every case” of asylum claim. This follows 2 official
protests by the UK, EU, Canada and US to the RTG concerning the forced repatriation
195
Many of the relocations of Wa into Shan areas are the result of a Thai-initiated crop-replacement project.
[SHAN (6 Feb 02) <www.shanland.org>].
196
SHAN (9 Feb 02)
197
Bangkok Post (6 Feb 02) Military, businesses to help fund road project in Burma
198
AP (8 Dec 02) Amnesty urges Thailand to protect 700 Karens at Myanmar border
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
49
of 63 Karen asylum seekers in November 2001, against the advice of UNHCR. While
conflict continues in the area concerned, the Thai army insists the area is safe. 199
Maneeloy
Maneeloy camp, a holding-centre for student dissidents and political refugees, was
closed by the RTG on December 27, 2001. Approximately 100 residents had been
refused ‘Person of Concern’ (POC) status by UNHCR and were therefore considered
ineligible for resettlement as a refugees. They were to be turned over to Thai
immigration authorities but the majority fled before the camp was closed, while 28
were given POC status at the last minute by UNHCR due to intensive lobbying by
human rights groups and refugee advocates.
Several hundred refugees were taken from Maneeloy Centre to Tham Hin, a border
camp dangerously close to Burmese forces, under over-crowded conditions and lacking
previously accessible facilities. Most of these politically sensitive refugees are awaiting
resettlement in third countries.200
ROHINGYA
Bangladesh has tightened border security in order to reduce the number of people who
continue to cross over the border from Burma. 201
In early 2002, the Burmese government verbally agreed with the government of
Bangladesh to accept approximately 5,000 Rohingya refugees. According to UNHCR,
the majority of those cleared 202 are prepared to return home, although there are still
many not prepared to return until the human rights situation has improved.
Rohingya refugees living in camps in Bangladesh continue to report harassment by
camp authorities, local authorities and local villagers, and fear of punishment and
violence.203
28 Rohingyas were arrested in January by the Malaysian police after seeking asylum
from religious persecution in Burma in the UNCHR compound in Kuala Lampur.
UNHCR allowed police to arrest the asylum seekers after deciding the group had no
claims to refugee status. UNHCR in Malaysia has a poor record of granting refugee
status to Rohingya asylum seekers, despite the widely known religious persecution they
continue to suffer in Burma. 204
199
Bangkok Post (29 Jan 02) Face-off on Burmese refugees
see AFP (27 Dec 01) Thailand closes Myanmar refugee camp; BBC (27 Dec 01) Thailand closes Burmese
camp; Kao-Wao News Group (2 Mar 02) Political Refugees Denied Fair Treatment
201
AFP (8 Dec 01) Bangladesh tightens border security with Myanmar
202
It is unclear to the author at the time of publishing exactly what ‘clearing’ entails.
203
Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland (Mar 02) pp.24-25
204
AP (26 Jan 02) Malaysian Police Arrest 28 Myanmar Muslims in UN office compound; The Star (27 Jan 02)
Rohingyas give themselves up to cops; BBC (25 Jan 02) Burmese seek refuge in UN office
200
50
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
MIGRANT WORKERS, THAILAND
HIGHLY VULNERABLE
People from Burma take big risks when they decide they have no other options but to
migrate to Thailand. An unknown number die each year.
Some migrants from Burma die during the process of human smuggling, 13 in just one
incident in March.205 In another case, 20 ethnic Karen were found brutally killed in Tak
province on the Thai/Burma Border in February. Thai authorities believe the victims
may have been migrant workers killed by human trafficking gangs, while other sources
speculated the murderer may have been a Thai boss, disposing of ‘surplus workers’
who may have demanded their pay. 206
It is reasonable to believe that many similar deaths are never discovered and reported,
along with other forms of oppression and abuse.
REGISTRATION
The Royal Government of Thailand (RTG) completed its 1 st round of registration for
migrant workers in October 2001, and announced in January 2002 that those migrant
workers who had not registered within the allotted timeframe would be deported. The
RTG came to an agreement with the Burmese Government during the Thai-Burma
Joint Committee on 7 January regarding the return of illegal migrant workers to Burma,
with Burma agreeing to set up a holding centre in Myawaddy for illegal workers
repatriated from Thailand.207
After Foreign Minister Surakiat’s February 6 visit to Burma, the RTG announced plans
to return over 100,000 Burmese migrants. Thailand returned 400 ‘illegal’ Burmese
workers to the holding area in Myawaddy that same month and by March had
repatriated over 817 to the centre. Conditions in the centre are not monitored by
independent agencies.208
The RTG set-up another round of migrant worker registrations with 25 March as the
new cut-off date, announcing that Burma and the RTG are discussing the repatriation
of Burmese workers to Myawaddy, and possibly Ranong and Mae Sai, holding centres.
Workers not registered by March 25 or who fail the health test will be sent back. 209
205
Xinhua (8 Mar 02) Human Trafficking Responsible for Deaths of 13 Myanmar Workers in Thailand
see VOA (3 Feb 02) 14 Ethnic Karen Found Dead on Burma-Thai Border; AFP (5 Feb 02) Death toll from
apparent massacre at Myanmar border climbs to 20; South China Morning Post (7 Feb 02) Murdered migrants
may be someone's surplus workers
207
The Nation (10 Jan 02) Differences linger over refugees; The Nation (9 Jan 02) Burma will act Bangkok Post
(8 Jan 02) Junta Agrees To Take Back Illegal Workers; AFP (8 Jan 02) Thailand calls for greater fight against
narcotics trade
208
see Thai Press Reports (13 Feb 02) Thailand And Myanmar Reach Resolutions In Discussion On Deporting
Alien Workers; Kyodo News Service (6 Mar 02) Over 800 Myanmar migrant workers repatriated from Thailand;
The Irawaddy (6 Feb 02) Building Stringer Ties
209
Bangkok Post (5 Mar 02) Repatriation Of Workers To Be Discussed
206
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
51
The registration system for migrant workers in Thailand is fraught with problems,
providing ID cards to migrant workers but not their families, placing an unfair financial
burden on the workers themselves to pay for registration fees, and being open to abuse
by employers. [for discussion on health and people from Burma in Thailand, see p44]
ENVIRONMENT
 Improving

Stagnant

Deteriorating
As a result of ongoing protests by residents in Mae Sai concerned about pollution,
work on a power plant in Tachilek has been suspended.
IVORY
Tourists’ desire for ivory souvenirs is decimating the Asian elephant population. The
number of wild elephants in Burma has decreased by about 1,000 since 1990 to an
estimated 4,820. According to a report by Save the Elephants, “the [Burmese] army
poaches elephants, and customs and the police can be bribed to permit exports.”210
LOGGING & FURNITURE SMUGGLING
Illegal logging and furniture smuggling continues along the Thai-Burmese border with
groups in Burma trading without logging concessions or official consent. The KNU has
been specifically named, along with the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). 211
This has officially constituted a threat to Thai national security and imports, other than
those via the Friendship Bridge, have been banned since November 7, 2001. It is
thought businesspersons circumvent a Thai teak logging ban by sending logs on a
circular production route, with at least indirect help from local Thai police and forestry
officials – as charged by Thai Forestry department chief Plodprasop Suraswadi and
investigated by the House committee on agriculture.212
In mid-December over 200 Thai furniture merchants protested, claiming the closed
checkpoints mean many merchants lose hundreds of millions of baht (tens of thousands
of US$).213 Around the same time Burmese soldiers arrested 7 Thais (including a
pregnant woman) and 4 Karens from Burma for logging, 214 later sentencing the Thais
to 5 years in prison. 215 The fate of the Karen villagers was not reported. (Indiscriminate
tree felling in Burma has resulted in a teak shortage. The teak plantation plan cannot
compensate and timber revenue must increasingly depend on other logs. 216)
210
Reuters, London (25 Feb 02) Tourist Lust for Ivory Wiping Out Asian Elephants
Bangkok Post (17 Dec 01) Army chief is against log imports
Bangkok Post (10 Jan 02) Plodprasop Says Police Negligent; (7 Feb 02) Officials Face Bribery Probe
213
AP, Mae Sot (12 Dec 01) Furniture traders block bridge at Thai-Myanmar border
214
Bangkok Post (10 Dec 01) Burma nabs Thais for log poaching
215
Xinhua (11 Mar 02) Thai villagers sentenced by Myanmar for illegally cutting trees
216
Xinhua, Rangoon (10 Jan 02) Myanmar Runs Short of Teak for Export
211
212
52
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
CHRONOLOGY
3 Dec 01 Razali ends 6th visit to Burma, asks SPDC to release more political prisoners,
meets Aung San Suu Kyi AFP, 2 & 3 Dec States he is ‘satisfied’ with talks BBC, 3
Dec
29 Nov 01 Prof Salai Tun Than arrested for peaceful demonstration at City Hall
30 Nov 01 UNGA adopts human rights resolution on Burma AFP, 3 Dec
Dec 01 National Day NLD statement: talks must start yielding more tangible results
Reuters, 10 Dec
1 Dec 01 Burma speaks of improved relations due to rapport between leaders AFP, 1 Dec
6 Dec 01 President Bush, USA, sent letter in support of ASSK to Nobel Peace celebrations
7 Thai villagers & 4 Karen villagers arrested by Burmese soldiers for illegal logging
BP, 10 Dec
8 Dec 01 Launch of Nobel Peace campaign for release of ASSK AFP, 4 Dec; AP 8 Dec
Indian MPs sign for release of ASSK Mizzima, 8 Dec
About 1,500 attend concert in Bangkok for anniversary of ASSK Nobel Peace Prize
AFP, 8 Dec
An NLD office reopens in Kamayut township, Rangoon AFP, 8 Dec
9 Dec 01 Sources at Myanmar Ministry of Transport announces plans for Maritime University
to open in Aug 02 Xinhua, 9 Dec
Burmese soldiers arrest 7 Thais & 4 Karens for illegal logging BP, 10 Dec
10 Dec 01 AAPPB launches website with detailed information on political prisoners Irrawaddy,
10 Dec
10th Anniversary of ASSK receiving Nobel Peace Prize & prize centenial
14 Burmese dissidents hold 36-hour hunger strike for release of ASSK Kyodo, 10
Dec
SPDC says working towards ‘functional democracy’ with ASSK AFP, BBC 10 Dec
11 Dec 01 Former Japanese foreign affairs minister reports Aung San Suu Kyi said dialogue
has not started but is only at stage of overcoming mutual distrust AFP, 11 Dec
Churches around Britain hold prayer for peace & democracy in Burma PA News,
10 Dec
Desmond Tutu, Nobel Laureate, calls for release of ASSK & democracy 11 Dec
12-15 Dec 01 President Jiang Zemin is 1st Chinese President to visit Burma
13 Dec 01 4 NLD members released AFP, 13 Dec
18 Dec 01 Ethnic groups warn talks will fail if not tripartite South China Morning Post, 18 Dec
Mae Sai focuses on agenda of 2nd World Congress against Commercial Sexual
Exploitation of Children (Yokohama, Japan) Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 18 Dec
19 Dec 01 U Lwin makes statement 194 NLD-affiliated political prisoners have been released
since Jan 01, but 822 still incarcerated Kyodo, 19 Dec
25 Dec 01 1.3 million methamphetamines seized in Chiang Rai BP, 26 Dec
26 Dec – 2 Jan Kachin Manau festival
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
53
27 Dec 01 Bangkok Post reports seizure of over US$2.3 million worth of assets linked to Wei
Xieu-Kang
28 Dec 01 UNDCP receives permission to inspect Wa region
29 Dec 01 Report that Khin Nyunt visits Maungdaw, Rakhine State. Money extorted from
villagers for his reception, Narinjara News, 31 Dec
30 Dec 01 Regime posts interview of role of National Convention & military in future politics &
asks for patience Channel-J News Agency, Japan
1 Jan 02 Khin Nyunt order that all Defence personnel transferred to police should only wear
police uniform, not military uniforms, comes into force DVB, 2 Jan
4 Jan 02 Independence Day expectations for ‘breakthrough’ in the talks are dashed
NLD make 1st formal statement calling on talks faster progress AFP, BBC 4 Jan
52 members of Naga armed group surrender to India & claim Burmese military
supplied them with weapons DVB, Mizimma, 7 Jan
7 Jan 02 SPDC Defence Services team choose sites for new artillery & light infantry
battalions in Putao Township, Kachin State
50 forestry officers & soldiers raid illegal sawmill & furniture factory in Tha Song
Yang district BP, 10 Jan
Former Thai deputy foreign minister challenges RTG’s warm ties with Burma BP,
7 Jan
7-9 Jan 02 Thai-Burma Joint Commission, Phuket Nation, 5 Jan
8 Jan 02 Start of USDA rallies in Rangoon AFP, 16 Jan
9 Jan 02 5 political prisoners released; Cho Aung Than, Tin Maung Kyi, Kyaw Min, Kyi Lwin,
Tin Maung BBC 9 Jan
Foreign Minister says force will not be used against Wa in fight against drugs
Nation 10 Jan
10 Jan 02 29th Anniversary of Lahu Revolutionary Day Lahu National Democratic Front
issues statement urging SPDC to stop oppression against national races DVB, 11
Jan
Razali meets Japanese PM in Malaysia, welcomes aid to Burma Kyodo, 10 Jan &
says talks are making ‘significant progress’ Future World News, 10 Jan
SPDC statement alleges KNPP murdered 7 villagers from villages near Lawpita
hydroelectric power plant, Karenni State DVB, 10 Jan
11 Jan 02 Radio Myanmar accuses KNU of killing family in Mon State on 22 Dec MR, 11 Jan
11-14 Jan 02 WHO Board of Executives Meeting (Geneva), Burma asks for financial assistance
NLM, 18 Jan
14 Jan 02 Karen New Year KNU urge SPDC to begin peace talks AP, 14 Jan
ICRC launch construction of new limb-production & fitting center to assist landmine
victims (Hpa-An, Karen State)
14-16 Jan 02 Thailand & China bilateral meeting on drugs BP, 17 Jan
15 Jan 02 Hearing of Aung San property case, to be continued Irrawaddy, 25 Feb
Japan announces it will provide JPY203 million to set up scholarship fund to
enable students from Burma to study in Japan Kyodo, 15 Jan
54
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
16 Jan 02 USDA organise rallies in cities AFP, 16 Jan
17-20 Jan 02 4 country (TH, Burma, PRC, Laos) narcotics meeting, Chiang Mai BP, 17 Jan
22 Jan 02 Former university professor, Dr. Salai Tun Than, arrested for handing out
brochures asking for monitored elections within a year, sent to Insein prison
Irrawaddy, 22 Jan
23 Jan 02 8 NGOs based in Burma & UNDCP sign memorandum to cooperate on drug
problem Xinhua, 23 Jan
25 Jan 02 Report that Min Ko Naing has had another year added onto sentence Irrawaddy,
25 Jan
29 Jan 02 Latha township allowed to open NLD branch DVB, 29 Jan
30 Jan 02 Rumour ASSK has met with top army general, she left home escorted for about 2
hours BBC, 30 Jan
Razali’s 7th trip postponed until March DVB, 30 Jan
Irrawaddy publish article criticising Razali, particularly request for increased
Japanese ODA
31 Jan 02 U Lwin says talks still in confidence building stage, although there have been some
positive changes DVB, 31 Jan
Than Shwe denies meeting ASSK AFP, 31 Jan
KNU leader, Saw Ba Thin Sein, renews calls for tripartite dialogue Kyodo, 31 Jan
PRC announces nationwide anti-drug campaign 12 Feb-July Xinhua, 31 Jan
1 Feb 02 Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association holds HIV/AIDS advocacy
meeting
5 Feb 02 Meeting for USDA development projects in Kawthaung District DVB, 9 Feb
7-8 Feb 02 Thai army supreme commander visits Burma meeting Gen Than Shwe & Gen
Maung Aye
6-9 Feb 02 Thai Foreign Minister visits Rangoon
8 Feb 02 Dr Salai Tun Than, democratic protester, (arrested Nov 01) sentenced for 7 years
under Article 5(J), Insein prison AHRC 20 Mar
10-19 Feb 02 Pinheiro visits Burma, meets Aung San Suu Kyi & Dr Salai Tun Than, visits Kachin
State & Insein prison & 11 political prisoners released during stay AHRC, 20 Mar;
Reuters, 19 Feb
11 Feb 02 US State Dept. delivered Conditions in Burma and US Policy toward Burma for the
period 28 Mar 01 – 27 Sept 01 to Congress
12 Feb 02 Union Day & Lahu New Year NLD calls for national unity & 6 ethnic political party
representatives make joint statement for tripartite dialogue AP, 12 Feb
PRC nationwide anti-drug campaign starts Xinhua, 31 Jan
U Win Tin’s 72nd birthday, RSF & BMA campaign for his release AFP, 11 Mar
13 Feb 02 5 political prisoners released, incl. Myo Mying Nyein – incarcerated for 12 years,
coincides with Pinheiro’s visit RSF & AFP, 13 Feb
SPDC representative states success in talks is ‘imminent’ AFP, 13 Feb
Indonesian defence ministry visit’s Burma AFP, 13 Feb
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
55
14 Feb 02 Myo Myint Nyein says prison conditions are improved only during Pinheiro’s visits
Radio Burma, 14 Feb
CPJ issues ‘Under Pressure: How Burmese journalism survives in one of the
world’s most repressive regimes’ OneWorld.net, 15 Feb
18-19 Feb 02 ICRC visit Tavoy prison, recommend a day off from hard labour, Network Media
Group, 24 Feb
19 Feb 02 Junta says sanctions are slowing democratisation process Reuters, 19 Feb,
Morning Star, 20 Feb
Aung San property case continues, Irrawaddy, 25 Feb
19-25 Feb 02 ILO HLT returns to Burma BP, 21 Feb
21 Feb 02 13 Sri Lankan MPs express solidarity with NLD, call for release of political
prisoners, tripartite dialogue & recognition of 1990 general election Mizzima, 21
Feb
22 Feb 02 Burmese Foreign Minister says Japan's stalled grant aid worth US$26million is
'nothing' compared with national pride Japan Economic Newswire, 22 Feb
22-27 Feb 02 ILO team to Burma, denied access to Aung San Suu Kyi AFP, 27 Feb
25 Feb 02 Save the Elephants report on dwindling elephant population Reuters, 25 Jan
5 Mar 02 Regime rejects US human rights report AFP, 5 Mar
6 Mar 02 Kyaw Win denies SPDC will demonetarise kyat
7 Mar 02 Ne Win’s son-in-law & 3 grandsons arrested for ‘coup plot’ FEER, 21 Mar
8 Mar 02 3 political prisoners released & 20 women prisoners AFP, 8 Mar
9 Mar 02 Burma human rights day
13 Mar 02 EU delegation to Burma, release of 25 more women prisoners BBC, 13 Mar
KNU attack military base, killing 6 soldiers Kyodo, 14 Mar
Thai Public Health Ministry warns extreme caution should be taken around migrant
workers to prevent spread of communicable diseases Nation, 14 Mar
19 Mar 02 Razali’s 7th trip to Burma postponed until 22 Apr due to ‘coup plot’
ILO & SPDC sign document for “Liaison Officer” in Burma
UN Human Rights Commission session starts, Pinheiro to give report on Feb 02
visit to Burma
21-22 Mar 02 Thaksin cancels trip to Burma
25 Mar 02 Wa battalion clashes with Thai soldiers & refuses to return belongings of dead
soldier BP, 31 Mar
Reported deadline for Burmese outposts along Thai border to build heavy artillery
batteries & missile launching pads DVB, 7 Feb
27 Mar 02 Armed Forces Day, unprecedented security
28 Mar 02 Piheiro presents to UNCHR, Geneva
29 Mar 02 Release of 7 NLD members; Thein Zaw, Than Swe, Tin Myaing, Khin Mg Lin, Win
Ni Oo, Thein Htay & Aung Kyi Myint AFP, 29 Mar
30 Mar 02 Thai cavalry task force refuses to talk with Wa battalion BP, 31 Mar
56
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
APPENDIX 1
AN EVENING WITH DR. CHAO TZANG YAWNGWE
Interview conducted by Kao-Wao News, February 16-26, 2002
Son of the former President of the Union of Burma, Sao Shwe Thaike, Dr. Chao Tzang
became one of the leading founders and served in the Shan resistance movement of the
Shan State Army from 1963-1977, after Gen Ne Win’s military coup.
A Bachelor’s Degree graduate from Rangoon University, Chao Tzang completed a Master’s
degree and Ph.D. in political science at the University of British Columbia, Canada.
Chao Tzang is committed to social justice, democracy and freedom for Shan State and
Burma and has years of hands-on experience in the political arena. Today he works with the
Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee (ENSCC), the Strategy
Consultation Committee (SCC), heads the Program Team of the NRP (National
Reconciliation Program), and is an Advisory Board member of the United Nationalities
League for Democracy-Liberated Area.
Question: Your Experience Being An Ethnic Nationality In Burma?
CTY: Personally I have had no problem. I am not obsessed with ethnic identity
although I am a Shan nationalist in the sense that I consider it my duty to fight for the
Shan people. The Shan people are cultured, peaceful, pious, humble, and aspire only to
live quietly as dignified human beings, not subject to oppression by anyone. They have
been unable to do so for more than fifty years.
Ethnic nationalism is by definition narrow. It is like racism. It is ugly. I believe that
everyone must fight against ethnic nationalism, especially chauvinism or ethnic-racism.
The Burma Army and its leaders are ethnic-chauvinists. This is why the whole country
is suffering in so many ways for so many years.
Some of us choose to fight Burman ethnic-chauvinism with ethnic-patriotism. It is
necessary to do so. But one must be careful because the politics of ethnicity can lead to
confusion and result in chaotic conflict - and when this happens, the ordinary and
decent folks suffer. In chaotic conflict, the people do not win. Most likely the oppressor
regime will win because it will manipulate all the chaos and confusion, and it will
create and encourage conflicts, the more the better.
It is a duty of everyone to love his people, to treasure his ethnic identity. But one
should be able to think strategically, to see the big picture of any situation and/or the
struggle. It is not useful in any way to be obsessed only with ethnic patriotism.
In addition, one has to consider the fact that ethnic patriotism is a useful ideological
weapon for politicians and leaders aspiring to be an autocrat or dictator. Slobodan
Milosovik was such a leader, as was Adolf Hitler. Ne Win is also of this type. He used
Burman ethnic chauvinism to take away the rights and freedom of everyone and to
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
57
make himself an autocratic de-facto king - thereon destroying the lives of the people of
Burma.
Q: Your Experiences In The Shan Armed Movement?
CTY: My experience in the Shan State Army/SSA was very eventful. This is more so
because we operated in the interior, in the frontlines - far away from all borders. The
SSA did not have any border bases, unlike other resistance armies. We were always
surrounded by the enemy.
We - I and my comrades - built up quite successfully an armed movement and
organization that was not wholly dominated by military officers and men. They had to
respect those serving in the civil administrative capacity, and were not allowed to
interfere in administrative matters. Also, the people were organized into political,
youth, women, self-help groups and organizations, and they were also responsible for
local security.
Discipline in the SSA at that time was very strict. Soldiers and officers were not
regarded as superior to the people, or as more patriotic than others. They were not
above the law. An army that thinks of itself as a national vanguard, as the savior of the
nation, as more patriotic than anyone - this kind of army is a threat to everyone.
Q: How You Handle The Differences Between Armed Struggle And Non-Violence?
CTY: As noted by many thinkers and democratic leaders - including Daw Aung San
Suukyi - if you win by violent means, you will rule with the same violence-prone
mind-set when you win.
If we look at successful armed and violent revolutions all over the world and
throughout history, such revolutions "eat their own sons and daughters", and the best
and the brightest are among the first to be eliminated by the revolution. Because the
brightest and the best are no longer around, the revolution invariably becomes corrupt,
tyrannical, and self-serving.
Armed struggle is a science. Shooting up and killing lowly or low-ranking enemy
(government) soldiers is not science. It is also not armed struggle. It is shooting and
killing without strategic thrust. For example, the Burmese communist, CPB, waged this
kind of "armed struggle". It said its aim is to kill a lot of Ne Win's soldier - as many as
possible. The CPB did kill a lot of lowly enemy soldiers, but it was directionless
fighting, a war without strategy and direction. In the end the CPB was defeated.
Therefore to wage an armed struggle, the first requirement is to have the ability to fight
strategically, i.e., to use one's army - and brain power -- to change the strategic
situation, to immobilize the enemy.
As a negative example, I would like to point out the way war was waged by the CPB.
They concentrated on storming government garrisons mainly in the jungles and
58
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
mountains. It was successful and the CPB killed a lot of lowly soldiers. But there was
no strategic value to their victories. Ne Win had a lot of low-ranking soldiers to waste.
The CPB almost never staged effective ambushes on army convoys on the roads, near
towns - the nearer the better. When a large convoy is ambushed and destroyed near a
town, this shakes up the enemy's morale very badly. Fear grips the top officers, and
they can’t hide their defeat from the public.
Fighting strategically therefore is the key. War is not about killing. War is about
brainpower, and it is won firstly up here, in the head. War is about psychology, making
the enemy feeling weak although they may be many times stronger, more numerous.
As many philosophers of warfare say, war is politics. At the heart of war is politics. If
one loses the political war, the armed might that one possess, no matter how mighty,
becomes useless. Ten, twenty battlefield victories can be neutralized, cancelled-out, by
one political move.
Q: What Motivated You To Carry On The Movement?
CTY: I don’t like what the military has done to the country and the people. Military
rule is a cancer. And military rule was not necessary, and it is still not necessary. In
fact, military rule is never needed nor necessary in any country.
It is the responsibility of everyone - every good sons and daughters of all ethnic
segments in Burma - to remove this cancer from the body of our politics and our
society.
I believe we can do this. This is why I am still in the fight. If I did not believe that this
putrid cancer can be removed, I would not be doing what I am doing now.
Q: Why Is The State Constitution So Important For The Future Of Burma? How Far
Along Is The Shan State Constitution?
CTY: State constitutions are at the heart of any federal arrangement. Federalism means
the de-centralization of power so that power is distributed to the people, the local
communities, through power structures that empower the people.
No one can dispute the fact that the Union or Pyidaungzu was founded because the
Panglong Accord was signed in 1947. This country which was created jointly by
Burman and non-Burman leaders and rulers in 1947 at Panglong, was granted
independence a year later, in 1948. So, the Panglong Accord and its principles or the
Panglong spirit is at the very heart of our past, present, and future.
The Panglong vision - shared by all non-Burman leaders and by U Aung San - was to
establish a democratic, federal Pyidaungzu based on federalism: an arrangement based
on the equality of states and their self-determination. Further, no one state was
envisioned as being the mother-state (Pyi-Ma), superior to or above other states.
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
59
One goal of the state constitution drafting (SDC) process is to make leaders, activists,
intellectuals, and politicians, etc., examine and explore their own future, their goals,
visions, and to work out among themselves the kind of state they would like to live in.
When they begin the exercise of actually drafting their state constitutions, they will not
only begin to understand federalism, democracy, etc., but to also understand how the
people can be empowered to govern themselves through their local governments, their
state governments, and the federal government. They will also be compelled to think
seriously about ethnic self-determination and will also be compelled to think about how
to incorporate this legitimate aspiration of all ethnic groups in their state constitution.
In short, the state constitution drafting process is both learning and a working process,
and it is needed if the political slogans are to be translated into concrete and rational
reality.
The Shan State constitution drafting process is in the bottom-up consulting stage. The
drafting commission thinks that this is the most important stage, more important than
the actual drawing up of the document.
I think the Shan drafting commission is on the right track. Consulting with the people
(bottom-up), consulting among leaders and political parties, consulting between
activists and cadres, discussions on constitutional matters - they are very crucial. The
next stage will be discussions between the different drafting committees about the
articles, clauses, provisions, etc. of the drafts (or "model" constitutions).
Q: Why do you think the Panglong Spirit is important? What are the challenges ahead?
CTY: As indicated above, the Panglong Accord gave birth to the Union/Pyidaungzu,
and it also led to the obtaining of independence. That is why Panglong is important.
The Panglong spirit is important because it provides a solid and historical basis for
democracy, peace, and real people's power. It is because our leaders aspired to these
goals in 1947 - fifty five years ago - that they met at Panglong. The goals they aspired
to, and which the people also wanted, is not fulfilled up till now, today. This is sad.
The challenges are many - basically because the military and successive military
regimes have done much violence to the Panglong spirit, although they pay shallow lipservice to Panglong and the Panglong spirit - every year without fail since 1962. Very
hypocritical.
It is most likely that the Panglong spirit will be a very hotly contested in the dialogue,
if dialogue happens. The military camp will oppose federalism because it is opposed to
the idea of equal status for all states.
Furthermore, there are still a lot of people, Burmans and non-Burmans alike, who do
not understand federalism. Some non-Burmans like to equate federalism with
Burmanization or being dominated by the Burman or by the Burman mother-state (Pyi-
60
Report Card: 1 Dec 01 – 31 Mar 02
Ma). Some Burmans equate federalism with separatism, secession, balkanization, and
so on. These elements can cause a lot of problems and also inflame emotions. This
would be dangerous.
Q: How do you want to see the future of Burma? The future of Shan people?
CTY: Like everyone, I would like to see a Union of Burma as a peaceful and
prosperous place: a country where the people of all ethnic-belonging can live in
freedom under the protection of the law and the constitution - of both the Union and
state constitutions.
I would like to believe that the future of the Shan people is bright and hopeful. If Shan
State leaders are politically skillful, and if they are also wise, there is no reason why the
Shan State cannot become the most prosperous state within the new, really federal,
really democratic Union. Society in the Shan State will and can become the most free,
democratic, harmonious society on earth.
On the other hand, if Shan leaders are witless, emotion-driven, hot-headed, and do not
know or understand politics, i.e., if they are politically illiterate and intellectually
infantile, I fear life will be worse. It will be an endless hell, a slide down an endless
slippery slope.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
All Burma Federation of Student Unions, Foreign Affairs Committee (Dec 01) The Current
Education Situation in Burma: Education Report Year 2000
Altsean-Burma (Apr 02) Some Talk, Little Action; Special Report: Burma’s Secret Talks
Altsean-Burma (Feb 02) Labour Pains; Report Card: 1 Sept – 30 Nov ’01
Altsean-Burma (Oct 01) Burma’s Plea; Report Card: 1 May – 31 Aug ’01
Annan, K (18 Mar 02) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar, Commission on human rights, 58th session, Item 9, E/CN.4/2002/35
Committee to Protect Journalists (Feb 02) Under Pressure: How Burmese journalism
survives in one of the world’s most repressive regimes
International Labour Office CEACR 2001 (Mar 02) Observations Concerning ILO Convention
No. 29, Forced Labour: Myanmar
Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland (Mar 02) 10 Years For the Rohingya Refugees in
Bangladesh - Past Present and Future
Pinheiro (28 Mar 02) Report to UN Commission on Human Rights
Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) Report to UN Commission on Human Rights
US Department Of State (11 Feb 02) Conditions In Burma And Us Policy Toward Burma For
The Period March 28, 2001 – September 27,2001
Report Card: Rangoon Suspense
61
ERRATA
Some Talk, Little Action: Burma’s Secret Talks, Special Report
(published April 2002)
p20, para.1, sentence 1
Without a constitution a government cannot be formed.
meant to read:
The SPDC unconvincingly argue that without a constitution an elected government
cannot be formed. Despite the fact that Britain has had a democratically elected
parliament without any written constitution, the regime is sticking to its guns on this
point.
p41, THAN SHWE
political history: SLORC Chairman (September 1988-November 1997)
meant to read:
political history: SLORC Chairman (September 1992-November
1997)
p44, photograph of Maung Aye incorrect replace with………………...
Burma’s Plea: Report Card 1 May – 31 Aug ’01
(published October 2001)
p7, para.1, sentence 1
Recent releases of U Aung Shwe (NLD Chairman) and U Tin Oo (NLD Deputy Chaiman) on
26th August (a day before Razali’s trip) are welcome but many hundreds more (estimated at
1,500 by Amnesty International) remain imprisoned with Aung San Suu Kyi still under house
arrest and denied diplomatic visitors.
meant to read:
Recent releases of U Aung Shwe (NLD Chairman) and U Tin Oo (NLD Deputy
Chaiman) on 26th August (a day before Razali’s trip) are welcome but many hundreds
more remain imprisoned with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi still under house arrest and
denied diplomatic visitors.
Altsean-Burma apologises for any confusion that may have been caused