Chapter One:
INTRODUCTION
Does democracy promote development? Should we view regime-change as a development
policy? Or should we view it as “development-neutral,” or even as a negative factor in
development? What is the effect of regime type on economic growth, infrastructure, human capital,
social equality, and the overall quality of life?1
Few questions in the post-Cold War era have engaged politicians and policymakers with
such intensity. While democracy has always been an objective of U.S. foreign policy, perhaps at no
time in our history has it been cast in such a central role. At the same time, democracy has come to
be incorporated into the mission of the World Bank, the United Nations, and other development
agencies. All presume that the causal effects of democracy on development are, on balance,
positive.
Yet the scholarly evidence for this proposition is thin. Political scientists, economists, and
sociologists generally view the effect of regime type on development as inconsistent, at best. It is
not clear whether democracies produce better policies and policy results than autocracies. Some
argue, with an eye towards the East Asian NICs, that economic growth is most likely to be achieved
through a period of strict authoritarian rule, deemed necessary to instill discipline in the labor force,
to prioritize long-term savings and investment over current consumption, and to resist the rentseeking pressures of organized groups.2 Democracy is often associated with policy sclerosis3 and
with skewed political representation, a situation in which relatively educated and well-organized
voters (e.g., public sector unions and urban elites) are able to monopolize state resources and
prevent measures to redistribute resources to the rural poor.4 Democracy may also encourage a
clientelist, rent-seeking style of politicking in which side-payments to special interests trump the
provision of collective goods.5 Democracy may even open the floodgates to ethnic conflict and
social disorder.6 In short, there are many reasons—and a considerable amount of anecdotal
evidence—to suggest that democracy does not stimulate positive development outcomes.7
Evidence for these judgments is drawn from case studies and, increasingly, from crossnational statistical studies. The latter typically focus on the relationship between regime type and
economic performance. Here, the median finding is a null result. The net effect of regime type
appears to be neutral or inconsistent. Scholars are somewhat more optimistic about the causal
effects of democracy on social development; yet, even here there is great ambiguity. Democracies
do spend more on social policies, but it is not clear that there is a robust association between
Granted, development may also condition the arrival and persistence of democracy (Boix, Stokes
2003). The relationship is, quite possibly, reciprocal. However, the causes of democracy are not our concern
in this study (Geddes 1999; Boix, Stokes 2003; Whitehead 2002). Naturally, we shall have to take some
account of these factors in our analysis of democracy’s causal effects.
2 Amsden (1989), Chan (2002), Haggard (1990), Kohli (2004), Pempel (2002), Woo-Cumings (1999).
3 Olson (1982).
4 Lipton (1977).
5 Buchanan, Tollison, Tullock (1980), Kahn (2005).
6 Snyder (2000).
7 Hippler (1995), Leftwich (1996, 2005).
1
spending levels and policy achievements in the developing world (e.g., longer life expectancy, higher
literacy, and so forth). The social policy bucket is very leaky.8
These arguments are reviewed at greater length in subsequent chapters of the book. At
present, it is sufficient to observe that the scholarly view of these matters is ambivalent. While
democracies may prevent certain domestic policy disasters, such as widespread famine,9 their
positive accomplishments appear to be quite thin. Democracy has not proven to be associated with
development, as that term is commonly understood.
Of course, democracy might still be defended for other reasons, e.g., because it enhances
citizen participation, civil liberties, and civil society. While these are important outcomes, it should
be pointed out that this sort of argument is unlikely to inspire great enthusiasm among those
currently forced to live on less than one dollar a day—roughly one fifth of the world’s population.
In summarizing the results of a recent poll in eighteen Latin American countries the authors note
that “the preference of citizens for democracy is relatively low; many Latin Americans value
development above democracy and would even stop supporting a democratic government if it
proved incapable to resolving their economic problems.”10 Indeed, the demand for “food first”
sounds more sensible than the call for “democracy first.” Democracy is emphatically not equivalent
to justice; it is, at best, a component of justice.11 Thus, it would be quite wrong for first-world actors
to presume that a democratic organization of politics is preferable for countries in the developing
world if another regime-type promises greater material reward.12
Is democracy a luxury to be enjoyed only by countries rich enough to afford it?
We think not. Our reasoning hinges on a matter of conceptualization and measurement, as
well as a larger theory of regime dynamics. We begin by sketching the overall argument and proceed
to a discussion of possible causal mechanisms
THE ARGUMENT
The academic literature provides scant evidence for the proposition that democracy fosters
development, as we have observed. Yet, it is notable that these empirical probes examine focus
largely on the immediate or short-term causal effects of regime type. Whether a country is
democratic or authoritarian today is expected to influence its developmental trajectory in the next
year or decade (as defined by a given study’s research design).13 The theoretical issue is thus framed
along a single dimension. Countries are classified according to their regime-status in the present or
recent past.
We believe that this expectation is implausible. A change in regime is unlikely to produce
marked changes in the quality of governance in the immediate term. A fortiori, it is unlikely to
produce marked changes in the quality of policy outcomes in the years immediately following a regime
Filmer, Pritchett (1999), Ross (2005). For a general review of democracy’s effect on a host of
policies see Mulligan, Gil, Sala-i-Martin (2004).
9 Dreze, Sen (1989).
10 UNDP (2004: 6).
11 Arneson (2004). Nelson’s (1980) well thought-out justification for democracy rests on its
propensity (he claims) to reach just decisions, thus identifying the virtue of democracy with the larger virtue
of justice.
12 See Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in The Economist, August 27, 1994, 15.
13 Among extant studies we have found only a few that approach the concept of democracy over
time (e.g., Weede 1996) and none that stretches back over the course of the twentieth century.
8
2
change. Regime changes are often periods of extreme instability and unpredictability. It would be
surprising, therefore, if the performance of countries moving from authoritarian to democratic rule
were substantially improved during a period of transition. It is no surprise, then, that empirical tests
often fail to reject the hypothesis that regime type is uncorrelated with a particular development
outcome.
Our contention is that the effects of political institutions are likely to unfold over time—
sometimes a great deal of time—and that these temporal effects are cumulative. Regimes do not
begin again, de novo, with each calendar year. Where one is today depends critically upon where
one has been before. Countries build their political institutions over long periods of time.
Historical work suggests that democracy and authoritarianism construct deep legacies, extending
back several decades, perhaps even centuries.14 It follows that we should concern ourselves with the
accumulated effect of these historical legacies, not merely their contemporary status.
Thus, we introduce a second dimension – time – to our judgment of regimes. This means
that, for purposes of discussion, there are four theoretically relevant ideal-types, not two: A) old
authoritarian regimes, B) young authoritarian regimes, C) young democratic regimes (newly
democratized countries), and D) old democratic regimes. There are also a corresponding set of
transition possibilities among these four regimes, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Our supposition is that
the quality of governance increases from A to B, from B to C, and from C to D. The worstgoverned polity is an old autocracy, the best-governed polity an old democracy.
14
Collier, Collier (1991), Hite, Cesarini (2004), Linz, Stepan (1996), Mahoney (2002).
3
Figure 1.1:
Regime-types in Time
Democratic
C
D
B
A
RegimeType
Authoritarian
Young
Old
History
A=Old autocracy; B=Young autocracy; C=Young democracy; D=Old democracy. Arrows represent possible regime
transitions.
4
However, in our view, both dimensions of this phenomenon are rightly conceptualized as
matters of degree. The concepts “Old democracy,” “Young democracy,” et al. are therefore
regarded as heuristic tools rather than discrete political entities. Indeed, there are an infinite number
of regimes that fall in between these sharp categories and, equally important, there are no theoretical
end-points. Hence, Figure 1.1 is constructed as a line graph, rather than a 2x2 matrix.
In short, democracy is a good thing and its goodness is cumulative. The more a country has
of it the better off it will be, all other things being equal. The less a country has of it the worse off it
will be, ceteris paribus. These are matters of degree, hinging upon the twin components of the
underlying concept.
It follows that we wish to consider democracy as an accumulated stock concept rather than as
a level concept, as it has traditionally been understood. We conceive of this stock as the
accumulation of democratic experience over time, so it is comprised of both dimensions displayed in
Figure 1.1: regime-type (a country’s degree of democracy-authoritarianism at a given point in time)
and regime history (how long it has had those characteristics). The expectation is that the greater a
country’s stock of democracy, the greater its “flow” of good governance.
CAUSAL MECHANISMS
In what ways might a country’s democratic stock contribute to its developmental potential?
Why might old democracies experience improved economic development, political development,
and human development relative to autocracies and young democracies?
Identifying causal mechanisms is a daunting task. The theoretical variable of interest –
“democracy” – encompasses a wide range of features, and the policy outcomes associated with
“development” are even broader in scope, and perhaps more difficult to reach agreement on. As a
result, the causal story we have to tell is necessarily quite complex. Democracy affects development
through multiple channels.
In this initial discussion we focus on seven causal mechanisms that we suspect have
important implications across a variety of policy areas: 1) transparency, 2) civil society, 3)
accountability, 4) learning, 5) equality, 6) consensus, and 7) institutionalization. (Later chapters will
concentrate on causal pathways specific to particular policy areas.)
These are not new concepts. Indeed, they are common elements in the usual contrast
among regime-types. Democracies are often said to enjoy advantages in transparency, civil society,
accountability, learning, equality, consensus, and institutionalization. Our contribution is to point
out that these traditional arguments are much more persuasive if applied to established (consolidated)
democracies, for the development of these distinctively democratic virtues takes time, sometimes a
great deal of time.
TRANSPARENCY
Democracies, almost by definition, operate with a greater degree of openness than
autocracies. Leaders and issues must be paraded before the electorate, institutions enjoy a degree of
autonomy from each other (and are often in direct competition with each other), and the most
important information-dispensing institution, the press, is comparatively free from political control
5
(freer, that is, than it would be under authoritarian rule).15 In a democracy, politics is everybody’s
business. This means that the mechanisms by which political transparency might be achieved are
generally much more prevalent in a democracy than in an autocracy.
The basic point is not contested. What deserves emphasis, from our perspective, is that the
mechanisms by which transparency becomes realized are not achieved simply by the installation of
multi-party elections and constitutionally guarantees of freedom of the press. Indeed, the very goal
of transparency may take time to establish as a valued good. This is especially true for countries
emerging from a long period of authoritarian rule, where post-transition elected governments are
likely to champion strong government, disparage the goal of openness, and be intolerant of critical
views in the public sphere. In any case, it takes time for institutions that produce transparency –
principally, government agencies, legislative committees, the media, the judiciary, and NGOs -- to
become skilled investigators of public malfeasance and monitors of the public weal. They must first
carve out their respective roles, develop constituencies, defend their independence, gain knowledge
of complex issues, create knowledge networks across institutions, and develop a reputation for
perspicacity and probity such that their word on a subject carries weight.
CIVIL SOCIETY
The creation of a strong civil society – a sphere independent from politics and from the
market – is virtually impossible under circumstances of authoritarian rule. Indeed, neither the strong
authoritarian state nor the weak authoritarian state can effectively guarantee the flourishing of
voluntary associations. In the first instance, the institutions of the state or ruling party tend to
pervade all public deliberations. In the second instance, there is no space safe for public
deliberations because there is no public order. Thus, it may be argued that civil society is premised
on the existence of a democratic regime.16
However, voluntary associations representing diverse purposes, interests, and ideals do not
spring up immediately following the declaration of multi-party elections. In some cases, there is
scarcely a semblance of civil society prior to the instauration of multi-party competition. In other
cases, where such organizations are already in place, it takes some time for them to gain traction, i.e.,
to reach out to new constituencies and to mobilize resources. Even in well-educated and
comparatively developed societies such as the former Soviet bloc the development of civil society
has lagged behind the democratization process.17
Yet, over time, the density and diversity of voluntary associations seems to grow under
conditions of democratic rule. Despite the decline of party organization in some longstanding
We realize that sometimes freedom of the press is regarded as a core definitional trait of
democracy and at other times it is seen as secondary. For our purposes, it matters little.
16 Democracy is not a necessary condition for the presence of a strong civil society, as can be seen in
cases like Zimbabwe, a less than democratic state with a strong network of AIDS-related NGOs (Batsell
2005). (We are grateful to Even Lieberman on this point.) But it is likely that, all else being equal, civil
society networks will be stronger in a democratic system than a non-democratic one. Note that in semiauthoritarian or semi-democratic regimes such as France and England in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, civil society flourished among sectors of the populace who were granted civil liberty, namely the
aristocracy. Yet, even in these instances, the right of privileged actors to project dissenting views prominently
in the public arena was limited by a jealous state. Thus, civil society maintained a covert quality, quite similar
to the role of the intelligentsia in semi-authoritarian regimes around the world, who are free to talk amongst
themselves but dare not engage a broader public.
17 Howard (2003).
15
6
democracies, the general pattern of civil society is one of persistence and increasing diversity. In
developing societies, the trend is even more marked.18 Thus, it seems fair to regard civic
associations as a hallmark of established democracies.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Where conditions of democracy hold, we expect that mechanisms of accountability will, over
time, become more established.19 In this principal-agent relationship, the principal is the electorate,
composed of all citizens (we leave aside the precise definition of the citizenry), and the agent is the
class of elected officials (acting through appointed members of the bureaucracy). The class of issues
to which such mechanisms apply constitute the domain of the principal-agent relationship. In order
for mechanisms of accountability to exist the principal must have some way to monitor the activity
of the agent; otherwise, there is no connection between what the agent does, and potential
punishment or reward that the principal might bestow.
In order for mechanisms of accountability to be fully operative across a nation several
conditions must hold: a) the agent must be identifiable and relatively coherent (otherwise, there is
no person or persons to reward or punish); b) the principal must have monitoring capacity; c) the
members of the class of principals must be large (a mass electorate rather than a narrow selectorate),
and, most importantly; d) mechanisms by which the principal can regularly reward or punish the
principal must be available.
It follows that mechanisms of accountability are likely to be weak and/or limited in purview
in an authoritarian regime. To be sure, there is likely to be an identifiable agent. However, this
agent will be difficult to monitor because authoritarian regimes tend not to operate in an open,
transparent fashion. Equally important, the class of persons with an accountability relationship to
the agent is generally very small, extending perhaps to the military, an aristocracy, a landowning
class, or the agent’s ethnic grouping. The “selectorate” is much smaller than the potential electorate.
Of course, the citizens at the base can exact revenge upon an irresponsible leader by overthrowing
him or her. But this is a crude, irregular, and generally ineffective mechanism of accountability, and
operates (to the extent that it operates at all) only in the most extreme cases of malfeasance. This
means that the class of issues to which mechanisms of accountability can be said to apply in a
dictatorship is limited to those of concern to the selectorate and/or those which might anger the
broader citizenry to the point of open revolt. In sum, accountability is not a concept with much use
in a typical authoritarian regime.
On this score, there is general agreement. The point we wish to stress is that the
establishment of effective mechanisms of accountability in a democracy requires a good deal of time.
Indeed, the immediate effect of multi-party elections is quite limited. Leaders must pay verbal
homage to what the electorate wants (or thinks it wants), at least during election periods, but such
rhetorical flourishes may be only that, unless and until leaders realize that they will be punished or
rewarded for what they do once in office. The various facets of accountability, as defined above,
generally require multiple iterations of an electoral cycle to become fully effective. We have already
demonstrated that it takes time for the ideal of transparency to become realized. It also requires
time for the assignment of responsibilities – e.g., between executive, legislature, and judiciary,
between elective and unelective bodies, between national and subnational authorities – to become
clear. Until then, there is no “agent” who can plausibly be praised or blamed for their performance.
18
19
Boone & Batsell (2001), Parker (1994), Webb (2004).
For helpful discussions of the meaning of accountability see Fearon (1999) and Schedler (1999).
7
It takes time for mechanisms of “horizontal” accountability to develop.20 Most important, it takes
time for electoral institutions to develop such that the electorate can exact revenge (or heap rewards)
upon officeholders.
The accountability relationship between elites and masses is particularly evident in the arena
of economic policy for the simple reason that the fate of the economy is a high-salience issue. Here,
mechanisms of electoral accountability are highly plausible.21 Perhaps the most important lesson
that democratically elected elites learn is that growth performance matters for their political future.
They are more likely to retain their jobs if the country prospers, and very likely to lose their jobs if it
does not.22 Note that in new democracies, politicians frequently adopt short-term policies intended
to pay off political supporters and stimulate the economy during election seasons.23 Short-term
goals dominate because there is no assurance that elites would be able to make good on longer-term
promises. However, once elites and voters have experienced a series of electoral and economic
cycles, longer time horizons may prevail. Voters who have directly experienced the effects of
populist economic policies are likely to be skeptical of claims that soaking the rich, inflating the
economy, abrogating debt agreements, or resorting to massive expropriation of property will
enhance their livelihoods.24 Indeed, various studies have shown it takes time for voters in a newly
democratized country to begin to link their votes to the country’s economic performance.
Economic voting appears only as the electorate develops trust in new institutions and begins to treat
elected politicians as guardians of the economy.25 Consequently, leaders in established democracies
may be willing to impose sacrifices over the short term to facilitate stronger growth performance
over the course of their administration.26 Thus, as democratic experience accumulates we expect a
slow transition away from a populist style of politics and policy-making. As a result, we expect
countries with longer democratic histories to institute better policies than transitional democracies or
authoritarian regimes.
LEARNING
Politics is not simply a product of power and interests. It is also, to some considerable
extent, a product of cognition, i.e., of learning.27 As we use the term, learning refers to any cognitive
development that is rational (a product of reason), true (as near as one can tell), and helpful in
realizing basic values or objectives (assumed to remain fixed). For example, citizens may learn that a
party or politician is corrupt, or that a party’s promises are credible (or non-credible). Politicians
may learn that a particular issue is of great salience to the electorate, or that it should be framed in a
particular way in order to be palatable to the electorate. And politicians and citizens may learn that
one policy works better than another to achieve a given policy objective. These are all examples of
O’Donnell (1999).
Samuels (2004).
22 Lewis-Beck, Stegmaier (2000).
23 Dornbusch, Edwards (1991).
24 Weyland (2002).
25 Anderson, Dodd (2005), Duch (2001).
26 Stokes (2001, 2002).
27 Hall (1993), Heclo (1974), Mantzavinos (2004), Preuss (2006), Weyland (2004).
20
21
8
learning as it pertains to the political sphere.28 Over time, politicians learn to be better politicians,
and citizens learn to be better citizens.
Our expectation is that there are more opportunities for learning in a democratic context
than in an authoritarian context. As we have already observed, policymaking processes in
authoritarian regimes is usually closed (non-transparent), and is generally monopolized by a small
number of elite actors – typically, a single leader and his or her coterie (though they may be assisted
by a large bureaucracy).29 There is generally little turnover among the leadership cadre, and when
turnover does occur, e.g., by natural death or by coup, it is usually not the sort that is propitious for
policy learning. In a democracy, by contrast, opportunities for learning are much greater because the
policy process is more open, the number of actors is greater (each of whom may bring a different
perspective to a policy problem),30 turnover happens more frequently, and it happens in a context
where new elites are able to build upon prior experience.
Since learning takes time we expect its benefits to accrue over time, as democratic stock
accumulates. Consider that political learning is largely experiential. Since general theories of politics
and policymaking offer only the most general guidance (and few politicians pay heed to political
science anyway), citizens and policymakers must learn by doing. And undoing. A new policy is
tried, its effects are evaluated, and a new course of action is considered. Occasional bold
experiments are followed by long periods of muddling through. Learning occurs in the political
realm as new issues are trotted out before the electorate, the framing of these issues is adjusted,
leaders enter and exit the political stage, and the public’s response – via elections and opinion polls –
is registered. The process is time-consuming and error-prone. “Lessons” are learned only after
many miscues. Not only must governing politicians learn what constitutes good policy; voters must
also learn to recognize good policy. There may even be a third stage, during which politicians learn
that voters have learned to distinguish good policies from bad.31
EQUALITY
We have already noted the importance of mechanisms of accountability, ensuring that
political elites in a democracy will be responsive to the electorate at-large (or at least a majority or
plurality of that electorate). Here, we explore the possibility of an egalitarian thrust that gains its
power from other aspects of a democratic constitution.32
28 In Weberian terms, learning involves instrumental rationality while deliberation involves more
basic substantive rationality, where the goals themselves are called into question. The concept of deliberation
covers both aspects of cognitive development. It is of course quite possible that democracies encourage not
only learning but also deliberation over matters of substantive rationality. However, this claim is perhaps
harder to sustain and is unnecessary, we think, to the broader argument.
29 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
30 The sheer number of decisionmakers may, by itself, enhance the quality of decision making, as
suggested by recent research in social psychology (Surowiecki 2004). As yet, there have been only a few
attempts to test the “wisdom of crowds” in political settings (Blinder & Morgan 2005; Lombardelli,
Proudman & Talbot 2005).
31 In Sartori’s (1987: 152) words: “Elected officials seeking reelection (in a competitive setting) are
conditioned, in their deciding, by the anticipation (expectation) of how electorates will react to what they
decide. The rule of anticipated reactions thus provides the linkage between input and output, between the
procedure . . . and its consequences.” Sartori refers to this as a “feedback theory of democracy.”
32 As will become clear, this is an institutional argument (following Schattschneider), not a cultural
one (following Tocqueville).
9
Note that the formal basis of power in a democracy is votes, a fact that separates this
regime-type from an autocracy, where power is based on factors such as coercion, money, loyalty,
connections. Even though power in a democracy does not rest solely on votes, votes matter quite a
lot. This means that every citizen has equal power while standing in the polling booth, and this
central fact may prompt political elites to pay attention to those without money, status, connections,
or other resources than they would in other circumstances.
Second, because every citizen’s vote matters we can expect that political conflicts in a
democracy may exhibit an expansionary quality. Just as the loser of a fight appeals for support from
the crowd, a losing faction is likely to appeal to those who were not initially involved (or perhaps
even aware) of the conflict. Thus, while most political conflicts begin in small spheres, and may be
restricted to elite players, outsiders are continually being appealed to. Their participation is
demanded. And this expansionary quality of conflict in a democracy promises to reach out to
previously excluded groups. E.E. Schattschneider called this the contagiousness of conflict, and
viewed democracy as “the greatest single instrument for the socialization of conflict.”33
For this reason, we expect that the vote-seeking dynamic of multiparty democracy will lead
politicians from the losing (or minority) party to craft policy platforms that will appeal to voters who
are currently excluded, or poorly served, by established parties. There is a natural affinity between
an out-party and an out-group. Both are excluded. So long as the out-party is allowed to campaign
freely (as even the most minimal definitions of democracy presume), leaders of that party should
find their natural constituency among the discontented. While autocrats characteristically seek to
limit access to the public sphere, democrats seek to expand access – registering voters, getting them
to the polls, educating them on the issues, and seeking their allegiance. In this fashion, competitive
multiparty democracies have successfully integrated new voters and nonvoters.
Finally, it is important to note that the institutions of democracy are, in form and in spirit,
egalitarian, for democracy presumes the political equality of all citizens.34 Once it is accepted that all
citizens are equal members of the polity, this may engender a certain degree of cognitive dissonance
if certain members of the polity are grossly mistreated (i.e., treated in a manner unbecoming of a
citizen). In this way, the status of citizenship may lead to greater respect across social groups.
Similarly, citizenship may serve as a template and a political fulcrum for out-groups to assert their
rights within a community.35
Thus, for both normative and power-seeking reasons, we expect that democracies will do a
better job of representing out-groups, and we expect that this will contribute to the social and
economic empowerment of these groups, whether defined by social class, ethnicity, race, religion,
language, caste, or sex. However, none of the processes that we have identified is quick and easy.
Indeed, all take a good bit of time to materialize. The American civil rights movement, to take an
extreme example, occurred a century and a half after the instauration of democratic rule and a
century after the principle of equal suffrage was enunciated. Thus, like other mechanisms leading to
better governance, we theorize that egalitarian tendencies will be most marked in old democracies
and of uncertain import in new democracies, where xenophobic and parochial tendencies often hold
sway. We suspect that the constitutional system of democracy helps to account for the ubiquity, and
the eventual success, of campaigns for social justice undertaken by working classes, peasants, and
ethnic and racial minorities in democracies around the world.36
Schattschneider (1960: 12).
Beitz (1989).
35 Thompson (1963), Wilentz (1984).
36 Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar (1998: 17), Armijo & Kearney (2007), Dominguez (1994), Myrdal
(1944).
33
34
10
Few analogues can be found in the history of authoritarian states. To be sure, regimes such
as the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China have been quite successful in
suppressing ethnic strife, at least for a period of time. Yet, authoritarian rule in these countries has
not led to a popular acceptance of the principle of minority rights; nor has it led to an enhancement
in the status of most minority groups. These groups have remained, for the most part, cultural
outsiders. Rarely, if ever, have they been included in the process of governance. This cannot be
considered a healthy outcome. It is important to keep in mind that social exclusion, while
intrinsically bad, also has negative externalities. It reduces levels of trust across a society, removes
large portions of society from active participation in higher education and in high-skilled sectors of
the labor market, lowers the quality and reach of social service provision, and may fuel ethnic
conflict at some point in the future.
We are of course cognizant of the various exceptions to our argument. Thus far, democracy
has not worked toward the inclusion of out-groups in Sri Lanka (with respect to the Tamils), or in
Thailand (with respect to the Muslim population in the south). Similarly, there are examples of
authoritarian regimes (e.g., the Ottoman Empire) and semi-authoritarian regimes (e.g., Malaysia) who
successfully deter, or at least defer, ethnic conflict. Nonetheless, it is notable that these regimes have
not done so through processes of inclusion. Rather, they have practiced the art of ethnic separation,
a solution that rarely provides a workable long-term solution to the problem of ethnic conflict, for
the principle of equal rights and equal citizenship is explicitly disavowed, or at best downplayed.
CONSENSUS
Over time, we expect that the operation of a democratic system will lead to greater
consensus in a society. 37 This does not mean that contending ideologies will disappear.38 It means,
rather, that there will be areas of agreement that stretch across the major parties and social
groupings, and that such areas of disagreement as persist are unlikely to engender violent conflict.
The argument for consensus is not self-evident. A large literature on democratic overload
posits that democracy engenders costly and destabilizing power struggles among subgroups.39 And
the literature on democratization is replete with examples of the difficulties encountered by newly
democratizing countries—particularly when those countries are poor or ethnically divided or where
the question of nationality is open to question.40 The problem of democratization in the modern era
is enhanced by a surfeit of expectations, accumulated over many years. Citizens have been told to
expect great achievements from self-government, and they generally expect these goods to
materialize in a hurry. It is the fashion of political leaders during the long and dangerous struggle for
democracy to overpromise, and transitions offer little preparation for the humdrum nature of
everyday politics. Thus, when the transition finally occurs, it may be greeted with extravagant
expectations. Almost inevitably, democracy experienced is never quite the same as democracy
envisioned.41 The democratic process of give-and-take among competing priorities may seem to
barter away what had initially been gained, a corruption of the democratic ideal into brokerage
politics. Needless to say, such disillusionment does not augur well for political stability. In addition,
democratization frequently stimulates a surge of demands on the part of previously quiescent and
Dahl (1966), Eckstein (1966), Graham (1984), Horowitz (1962), Keman (1997), Lijphart (1999).
Fukuyama (1992).
39 Crozier, Huntington, Watanuki (1975).
40 Chua (2003), Fein (1995), Mousseau (2001), Papaioannou, Siourounis (2004), Snyder (2000).
41 O’Donnell, Schmitter (1986).
37
38
11
perhaps even actively repressed groups. These might be lower classes, excluded ethnic or racial
groups, or some other category of out-group.42 Such mobilizations from below may be destabilizing
and may have negative externalities for the climate of social and economic opportunities.43
We are not making any claims about the conditions under which new democracies will
survive or fail. Our point is simply that if they do survive their tumultuous youth, democratic
societies are likely to experience a tempering of political conflict. Consider that the inclusionary
tendencies of democratic polities (noted in the previous section) create opportunities for elite
members of all sizeable social groups. These are the cadres who assume leadership positions in
social movements, political parties, and perhaps even revolutionary insurrections. Once granted a
taste of political power as leaders of legitimate (and legal) entities, these elites may find it in their
interest to work within, and to uphold, the democratic polity. It is not just a matter of personal gain
(the power and pelf they may receive from their leadership position), but also a matter of political
logic; they are now in a position to bargain, to achieve real gains for their social group or political
cause.
Additionally, the relatively open nature of deliberation in an established democracy may
diminish the appeal of conspiracy theories, which tend to flourish in the deep fog of authoritarian
rule.44 It is possible to know, with a reasonable degree of certainty, who is in charge and who is
responsible for a given decision. Over the long run, the open-ness of a democracy may serve as the
strongest weapon against intrigue and, indeed, against any surprising political developments. Where
all parties can express their views, organize freely, and where a vigilant press reports on all salient
political developments, the uncertainties of politics are greatly reduced.
In any case, whatever centripetal tendencies are inherent in democracy are more likely to be
in evidence when those democratic arrangements have been in operation for some time. For these
reasons, the thesis of democratic overload is much more compelling when applied to new
democracies than when applied to old. New democracies tend to be boisterous, obstreperous
affairs. Established democracies, by contrast, tend to be more restrained. In particular, the norm of
incremental change is more likely to be accepted. Thus, given sufficient time and given a sufficient
degree of political institutionalization, we expect that democracies will develop greater consensus
than authoritarian regimes.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Many of the comparisons that we have been drawing -- between established democracies on
the one hand and autocracies and recently democratized societies on the other – hinge upon a more
general and abstract process known as institutionalization. Although the concept is rather difficult to
define, there is little dispute over its central importance to the quality of governance.
“The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable . .
. structure to human interaction,” writes Douglass North.45 Political institutions thus offer a
mechanism for solving society’s myriad coordination problems. What does this mean, in practical
terms? How do we differentiate a well-institutionalized polity from a poorly-institutionalized polity?
March and Olsen suggest the following:
Eckstein (1989), Escobar, Alvarez (1992), Stepan (1989), Tarrow (1998).
Haggard, Kaufman (1995: 184-6).
44 Tilly (1997).
45 North (1990: 6).
42
43
12
(1) that there are key social institutions that are viewed as existing over time,
enduring through generations of individuals, and accumulating a collection of
practices and rules that reflect generations of social and political experience. And . . .
(2) that individuals act within the political system as trustees of those institutions,
rather than as autonomous individuals. When a farmer sacrifices current crops to
maintain the water table for future generations of his family, he acts as a trustee of
his family. When a political official refuses to increase the public debt even though it
would ameliorate immediate problems of unemployment, inequity, or injustice, he
acts as trustee of the future community.46
Drawing on the passages quoted above, as well as on other works devoted to the subject, we
stipulate that a well-institutionalized polity is functionally differentiated, regularized (and hence
predictable), professionalized (including meritocratic methods of recruitment and promotion),
rationalized (explicable, rule based, and nonarbitrary), and infused with value.47
We surmise that relatively few authoritarian regimes in the modern era are well
institutionalized. Ethiopia, for example, has enjoyed sovereignty for centuries but has yet to develop
a well-articulated set of governing institutions: as in most authoritarian states, power remains highly
personalized and informal.48 In contrast, virtually all long-standing democracies have highly
developed, highly differentiated systems of governance, involving both formal bureaucracies and
extra-constitutional organizations such as interest groups, political parties, and other
nongovernmental organizations. Thus, the length of time a democracy has been in existence serves
as a rough indicator of its degree of institutionalization, while the length of time an authoritarian
regime has been in existence may have less of a bearing on its level of institutionalization. Indeed,
reversals are common, as in the latter days of the Soviet Union or in Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
There are a few exceptions to this general rule, i.e., longstanding authoritarian states with
highly institutionalized systems of rule such as China and Singapore, or longstanding democracies
with poorly institutionalized public spheres such as Bangladesh and Papua New Guinea. But these
are notable exceptions to what appears to be a strong general trend. When indicators of state
capacity are regressed against a measure of democracy stock the relationship is strong and robust, as
shown in Table 1.1. [Insert table showing the Kaufmann indicators regressed against democracy
stock, along with the usual controls – GDPpc, urbanization, regional dummies, English colony,
trade openness,…]
We suspect that the reasons for this stem directly from their systems of rule. Where power
is personalized, as it is in most authoritarian settings, the development of legal-bureaucratic authority
is virtually impossible. In particular, leadership succession is difficult to contain within regularized
procedures and promises a period of transition fraught with uncertainties. Thus, even if a monarch
or dictator adheres to consistent policy objectives during his or her rule, there may be little
continuity between that regime and its successor (“regime” is employed here in its broader sense).
The hallmark of a long-standing democracy, by contrast, is its ability to resolve the problem of
leadership succession without turmoil and without extraordinary discontinuities in policy and in
political organization. The framework remains intact, and this means that the process of
institutionalization may continue.
March & Olsen (1995: 99-100).
Huntington (1968), Levitsky (1998), March, Olsen (1995: 99-100), Polsby (1968). The concept of
institutionalization has deep intellectual roots and may be traced back to work by Henry Sumner Maine,
Ferdinand Tonnies, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons, among others (Polsby 1968: 145).
48 Marcus (2002).
46
47
13
More importantly, we suspect that the institutionalization of power leads to greater gains
within a democratic setting than in an authoritarian setting. Institutionalization matters more under
democracy. Consider the task of establishing social order and stability in a polity and resolving
problems of coordination.49 Noninstitutionalized polities are unstable and inefficient, almost by
definition, for there are no regularized procedures for reaching decisions. However, in an
authoritarian setting a Hobbesian order may be established simply and efficiently by fiat and force.
Rule by coercion, insofar as it is successful, can be imposed without loss of time and without
negotiation; the threat of force is immediate. Consequently, there is less need for highly
institutionalized procedures for reconciling differences and establishing the force of law. The
sovereign may rule directly. Thus, the authoritarian transition period, during which actors accustom
themselves to a new set of rules, should be fairly quick.
In a democratic setting, by contrast, resolving conflict is complicated. Somehow, everyone
must agree upon (or at least agree to respect) the imposition of societywide policy solutions that
involve uneven costs and benefits. In order to handle these quintessentially political problems, a
democratic polity has little choice but to institutionalize procedures for negotiation among rival
constituencies and organizations. Establishing these procedures takes a good deal of time, and no
little struggle. An electoral law, for example, is not fully institutionalized until patterns of behavior
have adapted to that particular set of formal stipulations – in this case, one may judge the degree of
institutionalization by the percentage of “wasted votes” and by the degree of churning among the
parties. The process of adjustment always involves mutual interaction between elites and masses.
One side’s behavior is contingent upon the other (and indeed, may be fully “rational” in light of the
other’s suboptimal behavior). However, once a stable equilibrium becomes established, we expect it
to be more effective in resolving differences and finding optimal solutions than would be fiats
imposed from above.
Another product of successful political institutionalization under democratic auspices is that
nebulous state of grace known as the rule of law. In a state governed by the rule of law
1) laws must be general; 2) laws have to be promulgated (publicity of the law); 3) retroactivity
is to be avoided, except when necessary for the correction of the legal system; 4) laws have
to be clear and understandable; 5) the legal system must be free of contradictions; 6) laws
cannot demand the impossible; 7) the law must be constant through time; and 8) congruence
must be maintained between official action and declared rules.50
The rule of law is generally acknowledged to be a key ingredient in the establishment of secure
property rights and in the achievement of credible commitment to those policies, which underpin
growth in a market economy.
While a limited rule of law has been successfully established in some authoritarian states, it is
usually difficult to maintain and can never, by definition, bind the ultimate decision makers. With
respect to the legislature, the judiciary, and other arms of government authoritarian states usually
find it difficult to depersonalize political authority, a key requisite of the rule of law. In no autocracy
is it possible for present-day rulers to effectively constrain decisions taken by their successors. This
means that long-term credible commitment is impossible in an authoritarian setting.
By contrast, the institutionalization of power in a democratic regime is closely linked to the
establishment of rule of law. The same forces that rationalize channels of power also tacitly endorse
the rule of law—so much so that a fully institutionalized democracy (as described above) is
impossible to imagine in the absence of rule of law. While we have granted causal precedence to
49
50
Hardin (1999).
Sanchez-Cuenca (2003: 68).
14
“institutionalization,” it will be seen that these two processes are so closely aligned that they are
difficult to disentangle empirically. In any case, the key point is that it takes a great deal of time to
establish a formal framework to create and administer the law in a new regime, to ensure
compliance, and to allow for the slow diffusion of norms sanctioning this delicate arrangement.
Thus, it may be argued that there are two necessary conditions for the firm establishment of the rule
of law: democracy and a well-institutionalized public sphere.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that democracy, if maintained over time, is likely to foster transparency, civil
society, accountability, learning, equality, consensus, and institutionalization. If this argument is
plausible, tertiary benefits should also materialize. These might include a) greater political stability,
b) longer time-horizons, c) a more credible commitment to policies (once adopted), and d) greater
legitimacy accorded to political leaders and to government policies. And this, in turn, should
eventuate in better governance outcomes across a wide range of policy areas. These putative interrelationships are summarized in Figure 1.2.
Accordingly, we believe that the argument for a democratic “development effect” is quite
plausible if one considers regime type through a historical lens. Schematically: democracy + time =
development.
15
Figure 1.2:
Overview of the Argument
Exogeneous Cause
Democracy
(multi-party elections,
civil liberties,
broad suffrage,...)
+
Time
Principal Causal
Mechanisms
Tertiary Benefits
1. Transparency
2. Civil Society
3. Accountability
4. Learning
5. Equality
6. Consensus
7. Institutionalization
1. Stability
2. Long timehorizons
3. Credible
commitment
4. Legitimacy
16
Expected Policy Outcomes
1. Growth
2. Economic policy
3. Infrastructure
4. Policy continuity
5. Environmental policy
6. Education
7. Public health
8. Gender equality
Of course, this is a highly schematic view of what is bound to be an extraordinarily complex
set of causal relationships. Several of these complexities deserve notice (each will be discussed at
greater length in the following chapters).
First, the key theoretical variable of interest -- “democracy” -- is exceedingly difficult to
define. In our view, minimalist democracy (multi-party competition) is good for development, but
the deepening of democracy (including, e.g., civil liberties and multiple avenues of participation) is
even better. Thus, we adopt a continuous conception of this key concept; countries are more or less
democratic across a variety of dimensions. For ease of exposition, we sometimes refer to
democracies and autocracies as if they were crisp categories, i.e., regime-types. However, our
theoretical conception of democracy is non-dichotomous. The breadth of this concept introduces
some degree of ambiguity into the causal theory, for it is not clear what the “treatment” might
consist of. The saving grace is that most of the recognized components of democracy co-vary, so
that even a loose conceptualization of the concept does not introduce a huge degree of error into
the empirical analysis.
Second, the five causal mechanisms identified by the theory are highly abstract. As a
consequence, they are rather difficult to measure and hence to test. They also have a tendency to
overlap with one another. It is difficult to say, for example, where “learning” begins and
“institutionalization” ends. Even so, they represent conceptually distinct causal mechanisms that,
we suppose, have strong effects on a wide range of governance outcomes. Although one might
prefer a more concise theoretical framework, this should not tempt us to abandon accuracy and
comprehensiveness. Insofar as democracy affects development, it seems quite likely that all five of
the causal pathways sketched in this chapter are at work. Thus, we retain them in our general
argument.
Subsequent chapters will provide a more nuanced picture of these causal relationships as
they pertain to specific policy areas (chapters 3-10) or specific country cases (chapters 11-13).
Evidently, the causal mechanisms connecting regime history with economic policymaking may be
somewhat different from those that extend from regime history to social policy. Even so, we
believe that there is an essential consistency to the overall argument about democracy and
development. Insofar as learning affects economic policy, it should also affect social policy and
environmental policy. To this extent, the causal theory presented in this book is coherent and
consistent, applying across a broad range of policy outcomes.
Finally, we expect that there are multiple feedback loops in the diagram contained in Figure
1.2. For example, the development outcomes listed in the diagram are by no means independent of
each other. Economic policies affect growth, and growth presumably affects everything else, to
name only one example. A second type of feedback loop concerns the effect that developmental
outcomes might have on a country’s regime-type. A country’s economic success, for example, may
affect its ability to achieve, or maintain, a democracy (a matter that is disputed among scholars).
These feedback loops lie outside the purview of the theory (though, naturally, they pose problems
for the empirical analysis).
After so many caveats and qualifications, the reader may be perplexed. Evidently,
democracy’s putative relationship to development is not easy to articulate. However, it is important
to keep in mind that the principal argument of the book is about the causal relationship between
regime history and development. As such, the question of causal mechanisms is secondary. We are
of course concerned to present a plausible account of how the accumulation of democratic
experience might influence a variety of developmental outcomes. This is critical to the argument.
But we are not concerned to specify precisely how this happens. This sets the bar much too high for
an analysis of structural causes and distal outcomes in the social sciences, where causal pathways are
often multiple, overlapping, and resistant to measurement.
17
Consider, for example, the causal effects of economic development (as measured by per
capita GDP or urbanization) on human development, social policy, or state capacity. These three
causal relationships are well established. Indeed, there is a virtual unanimity among scholars that
economic development fosters these outcomes (though it is certainly not the only factor that
matters). At the same time, there is great disagreement over which causal mechanisms might be at
work, and which might be most significant. The point is, uncertainty about mechanisms, and the
fact that we are well short of a unified “theory” explaining any of these outcomes, has not led
anyone to doubt the existence of causality. Our theory, which also relates a structural cause to a set
of distal outcomes, suffers from the same ambiguity. Again, the reasonable and achievable goal for a
theory of this nature is plausibility, not precision, in the specification of causal mechanisms.51
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
[To write]
To this, the chary reader might respond that the solution to ambiguities introduced by vague
macro-theories is the avoidance of macro-theorizing. Yet, the cost of sacrificing macro for micro, if adopted
as a general strategy in the social sciences, would be to eliminate discussion of virtually all structural causal
arguments. The exception would be instances where macro theories could be successfully broken down into
their constituent parts, which could be individually theorized and tested. We have already seen that this is
virtually impossible to accomplish with the concept of regime type, and we suspect it is similarly challenging
for other important causal factors such as economic development. Thus, our position is that the current
enthusiasm for micro-level research, while warranted, should not become a new dogma. There are still many
circumstances in which the messy reality of macro-level variables is all we have to work with. For further
discussion of these points see Gerring (2007c).
51
18