Unification of Germany Example Essays.
Bismarck Master Planner or Opportunist?
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INTRODUCTION:
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STAGE 1
MASTER PLAN
Bismarck later declared that he had carefully planned
unification of Germany in 5 clear steps from 1862. He
said that he had planned: 1.To Obtain Russian
Neutrality; 2.To trick Austria into declaring War; 3.To
ensure French Neutrality; 4.To Treat Austria Leniently
after Defeat; 5.To Trick France into Declaring War.
Other Historians have recently claimed that rather than
plan unification, Bismarck was a skilful diplomat who
used events as opportunities to promote Prussian
interests.
Regardless of whether Bismarck planned unification or
used events as opportunities he definitely had a
favourable ‘hand of cards’ which he inherited when he
became Minister-President in 1862 which allowed him to
unify Germany by 1871.
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1. To obtain Russian Neutrality.
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Evidence for Plan:
He obtained Russian neutrality for the later War with
Austria through the Alvensleben Convention of 1863.
This meant Russian Poles who escaped over the border
into Prussian Poland would be returned to the Tsar.
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Evidence against Plan:
It is unlikely that Bismarck knew the Poles would revolt
in advance and it seems more likely that he helped the
Tsar to prevent the Prussian Poles rebelling too.
The International condemnation at Alvensleben led
Bismarck to play down the event’s significance which
outraged the Tsar.
It almost led to him being sacked by William I.
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Analysis:
Despite gaining Russian neutrality in the following War
against Austria Bismarck achieved it through luck
rather than planning. The Tsar was angrier at Austria
not supporting Russia in the Crimean War than at
Bismarck’s public back down over Alvensleben. He did
achieve neutrality but it seems unlikely that he would
have planned such a dangerous route.
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To trick Austria into declaring War.
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Evidence for the Plan:
He created a situation where Austria and Prussia were
becoming more hostile to one another. This was created
through War with Denmark 1864 when Bismarck
persuaded Austria to join them in War. Once victorious
The Gastein Convention gave Prussia administrative
control of Schleswig and Austria control of Holstein.
Prussia’s and Austria’s relationship now deteriorates
rapidly and when Prussia proposes plans to change the
Constitution in Schleswig Austria appeals to the Diet
which is forbidden in the Convention and Austria
mobilises troops in case of War.
Prussia now accuses Austria of being the aggressor and
starting War invades Holstein.
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STAGE 2
MASTER PLAN
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STAGE 3
MASTER PLAN
Evidence Against Plan:
It is unlikely Bismarck could have foreseen the
inheritance crisis in Schleswig and Holstein.
Also there is strong evidence to suggest that Bismarck
was only attempting to annex Schleswig and Holstein and
not force a War with Austria.
There are letters to his wife that explain he is open to a
‘diplomatic solution’ to the crisis and was willing to
prevent War with Austria through diplomacy.
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Analysis:
Whilst not as clear as Stage 1, it still seems likely
Bismarck was acting as a Prussian expansionist rather
than planning war with Austria as he was still trying to
resolve tension through diplomacy until Austria
mobilised her troops in 1866.
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To gain France’s neutrality.
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Evidence for Plan:
Bismarck meets Napoleon III in Biarritz in October
1865 to appeal for neutrality in War with Austria.
Napoleon verbally agrees and would persuade Italy to
join the War with Prussia. Once Austria was defeated
Napoleon would gain Venetia which would be passed to
Italy.
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Evidence against Plan:
Bismarck could never be totally sure of Napoleon’s
neutrality. Despite gaining a verbal agreement details
are very sketchy as to definite areas of agreement. Also
Napoleon later double-crossed Bismarck and made a
secret agreement with the Austrians that for French
neutrality, if Austria won, Napoleon would be given some
Prussian land as a reward.
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Analysis:
Yes the Biarritz meeting was planned and yes the
French remained neutral, but it seems through more
luck than detailed planning as Napoleon made
agreements with both sides and Bismarck could not
guarantee French neutrality.
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Treat Austria Leniently after Defeat.
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Evidence for Plan:
The Treaty of Prague 1866 was lenient on Austria and
this was down to Bismarck. Both William I and Von
Moltke wanted to advance on to Vienna and press home
defeat to humiliate Austria. It took all of Bismarck’s
persuasive abilities to prevent this from happening.
Austria had to agree to return to her Empire and leave
German interests alone, disband the Old Confederation
and allow the formation of The North German
Confederation under Prussian control. Secret military
agreements were then made with the southern states.
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STAGE 4
MASTER PLAN
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Evidence against Plan:
Instead of deliberately planning to treat Austria
leniently, it is more likely that Bismarck wanted to
consolidate gains and to prevent France or other
European Powers from joining the War in support of
Austria which could have jeopardised gains made.
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Analysis:
Although Bismarck’s diplomatic skill in persuading
William and von Moltke to go no further after the
Battle of Koningratz (Sadowa,) it seems more likely that
he did it to prevent French hostilities and to keep the
gains made by Prussia during the War.
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To trick France into declaring War.
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Evidence for Plan:
Bismarck goes against the French claim of Luxembourg
by proposing a German prince instead, which certainly
angered Napoleon.
In 1868 when the revolutions in Spain forces out the
Queen they offer the throne to Leopold of
Hohenzollern (related to Prussian Royal family) in 1870.
Bismarck could accept to gain Spain as an ally but it
would worry France (who would be encircled).
Finally 12th July 1870 it was decided to withdraw
Leopold as a candidate. On the 13th July French foreign
Ambassador Benedetti meets William I at German town
of Ems and William accepted withdrawal of Leopold but
refused to promise what the French were demanding;
the withdrawal of all future accession rights. William
sent the telegram to Bismarck recalling the events.
Bismarck’s genius comes into his own and releases his
own version of the telegram to the press which is so
inflammatory that French declares War on Prussia on
the 19th July 1870.
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STAGE 5
MASTER PLAN
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Evidence Against the Plan:
Bismarck initially supported the French claim to
Luxembourg but later changes his mind.
He also allows the withdrawal of Leopold as a candidate
which doesn’t suggest he was trying to provoke the
French.
Although the Ems telegram was deliberately doctored
by him to cause the French to declare War on Prussia it
is more likely that he made the decision after he
received the telegram rather than planning the events in
advance.
How could he have anticipated such aggressive French
foreign policy in the demands Benedetti made on
William.
Analysis:
Although there is more evidence here to suggest
Bismarck planned to get the French to declare war; it is
unlikely that he planned it prior to 1862 as he suggests.
There is more evidence to suggest he decided to
provoke France after receiving the Telegram, so
therefore taking events as opportunities when they
arose.
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CONCLUSION
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Bismarck was a skilful politician who was most probably a
Prussian Supremacist who wanted Prussian expansion at
the expense of the Austrians. It is most unlikely that he
planned unification from the start in 1862 and more
likely that he used opportunities when they presented
themselves to benefit Prussia, initially and later, for
Germany.
It is more likely that he first wanted to expand Prussian
territory into Schleswig and Holstein, but thwarted by
the Austrians was forced into war with them in 1866.
Similarly in order to consolidate the North German
Confederation under Prussian control, the Treaty of
Prague was lenient so not to provoke the French.
Finally once the military agreements were in place with
the southern states, Bismarck used the opportunities
presented as a result of the Luxembourg Situation and
the Hohenzollern Candidature Crisis to re-write the Ems
Telegram. This again was where he saw the opportunity
of expansion to include all German states under Prussian
leadership.
The only people who believe the Master plan were
Bismarck himself and early German historians who were
still in awe of the great statesman that had unified
Germany. Most other historians realise that he was
more likely an incredibly skilful opportunist and able
politician.