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Clay Chastain
Dr. Heil
Philosophy 1301-3
25 October 2006
On Descartes’ Understanding of Knowledge
In Descartes’ Meditation on First Philosophy in Which the Existence of God and
the Distinction between the Soul and the Body Are Demonstrated, Descartes offers a
strong, well composed viewpoint on the nature of human knowledge – along with several
important reasons in which our knowledge, and its foundation, should be doubted.
Although his thoughts may be considered to be unorthodox and irregular upon first
conception, his ideas begin to stress a series of firm, realistic points within each person’s
scope of knowledge, and the perception thereof.
Largely stemming from Descartes’ idea of dualism, the concept of a distinct
separation of the mind and body, he creates an argument which puts into doubt our very
foundation of knowledge. Realistically, Descartes’ meditations go so far as to indirectly
state that there is no definite foundation of knowledge in the first place as understanding
the concept of a foundation is based on a foundation of some sort in itself. However,
before this argument, Descartes analyzes his own dreams and their implications on our
perception of reality and, in turn, our perception of human knowledge. Despite a
significant number of meditations over this topic, no meditation brings a more bold point
to the discussion than his first: human knowledge may not be definite. He expresses this
viewpoint in relation to his own story of building his principles upon existing false
implications, creating a cycle of false knowledge. Because of his decision to raze the
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foundation of his original ideas, Descartes examines the perception of reality in order to
justify his viewpoint that knowledge may not verifiable, especially in terms of
teleological evidence. His prime, most prominent example involves a dream; in this state
of the mind, it is clear that the mind is acting to deceive him as a dream is clearly not
reality (as its vividness is expressed less). His argument follows the concept that if
sometimes senses can deceive us, even when we are awake and not in a dream-like state,
we may be constantly and continuously deceived and completely unable to realize it.
Therefore, it is impossible to truly and confidently “know” something in the typical sense
just because we are able to use our senses, such as sight and hearing, to justify something.
His conclusion to this argument throughout the meditations is that nothing is actually
verifiable, except that we exist, as our every thought confirms this.
Overall, this argument appears to take a very logical stance to the nature of
knowledge. If indeed our senses are unable to be trusted and therefore sometimes deceive
us, it is impossible to confirm the difference between our reality and our illusion. Further,
if our senses are interpreted by our own mind, which is highly likely as what affects the
body also affects the mind (for example, a lack of physical rest in the body will make the
mind dull and unfocused), our mind is incorrectly processing information. And if our
mind is unable to be confident and justified in some situations, it is, like the senses,
incapable of being trusted completely. Ergo it is equally impossible to trust beyond a
reasonable doubt that our knowledge as a whole is correct if the mind is also unable to be
trusted. Ironically, because the nature of our knowledge can be doubted, this “logical
stance” that Descartes has presented could very well indeed be an illogical stance,
unbeknownst to Descartes’ mind. Because of the possibility that both his (and my own
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ideas are incorrect), I have found that the argument may have an exception to some
degree. In a majority setting, although our perception may be skewed and distorted at all
times, most people have a uniform, or partially uniform, distortion. Yet, can a distortion
be uniform? For an example of a uniform distortion, it is common knowledge that the sky
is blue. While every person may see blue as a different color, our reality is that the sky is
blue and a majority of people believe this. Although, this understanding is completely
unverifiable (unless done scientifically, which still does not explain our mental
perception of color). Therefore, it is most likely reasonable to say that although we may
have distortions which cause us to perceive color differently than another person, our
knowledge is still backed by a majority of people who understand the rational concept of
what blue really is.
Due to this idea that the majority establishes what reality is, even though it may
be incorrect, our fundamental foundations distinctly reside within an agreement with
other people. A minority of people, for example, are “insane” in that their perception of
reality is not exceedingly similar to the majority’s concept of reality. That is not to say
that Descartes view is incorrect. In the individual, our knowledge is completely
unverifiable – and even in a large majority, nothing can be known for sure. Rather
through our majority of similar knowledge, we believe what is “universal” to most people
to be true. Still, this concept does not justify our knowledge as being true, but rather
checks it against a variety of people, each person with a different mind. Despite this
system of checks, Descartes view on knowledge is exceedingly correct: nothing can be
said for certain, except for our existence. It is with a trust in a majority that we must
assume what we know is true, even if it is not, as there is no known way of testing the
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actual nature of the human mind and how it can interpret the senses. Even if there did
exist such a test, it would be impossible to confirm that the test was not a distortion of
reality and instead was just an illusion. As previously mentioned, the foundation of
knowledge is equally unable to be confirmed for these same reasons; how do we know
that anything besides our existence is actually real?
The key ingredient to determining the difference between reality and illusion,
however, is what Descartes describes as trusting in what is “clear and distinct”. In this
sense, Descartes believes that what is built upon the foundation of our existence is in fact
reality. Although Descartes does not connect vividness of our perception to what is clear
and distinct (meditations one and three, respectively), I find it arguable that the two are
inherently defined by the same rules: there is no way to trust what is more vivid or what
is clear and distinct. If our minds are not always to be trusted because they can interpret
senses wrong, I feel it to be logical to believe that nothing in the mind (except our
existence) can be confirmed to be true, even what we deem to be a clear and distinct idea
with a foundation built upon the realization of our existence. As I feel vividness and clear
and distinctness are both not to be trusted, a dream is subject to the same theory. Largely,
a dream would be less vivid than real life. When we wake from a dream, we realize that
we were dreaming -- sometimes. However, at the time of the dream, our “reality” is an
illusion in which it is quite possible for a person to feel equally vivid and real effects;
despite the fact that the person is dreaming, a dream can still manage to evoke such
strong feelings. Unfortunately, there is no clear distinction between what reality is and
what illusion is. Although we logically assume that a dream is less vivid, it is impossible
to weigh the scale of vividness, especially when each person differs in their dreams and
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the fact that we are unable to examine others’ dreams in their exact state. Despite the
personal feeling that my dreams are less vivid than reality, it is improbable, if not
impossible, to determine how vivid another’s dream could be. The same could be said for
any range of hallucinatory illnesses or psychotropic substances; are their effects on the
mind of the same vividness as in real life? The answer is that they can be equally vivid
because many people believe their distortions of reality to be their actual reality (this is
evident as some people are hospitalized for being unable to perceive the world
“correctly”). Because of the simple possibility that people can have vivid experiences
which are not what the majority perceives to be reality, I, along with Descartes, disagree
in the idea that vividness is always an indicator of reality. But due to the fact that we
cannot confirm anything, distinct and clear ideas which are based on a largely different
principle are still subject to the same skepticism.
It appears to be impossible to determine what reality is and what is merely an
illusion, and therefore, what knowledge comes from “true” understanding and what
knowledge comes from our potentially misleading senses and understandings. Although I
find that the majority is a source in which a degree of trust can be placed about the nature
of our natural world and our knowledge, it is merely an assumption because it is not
verifiable in the slightest. Even such concepts as mathematics could be subject to doubt.
Although two objects combined with two other objects combines to a total of four
objects, it can still not be ruled out that there is a possibility that we are all just deceived
(possibly by a deceitful god of some fashion) into believing that four is the answer. Even
though the answer makes sense to me as there is physical evidence to justify it, Descartes
presents the view that really nothing can be known for sure because we cannot trust our
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senses, which are a physical extension of our mind. Even through his concept of
weighing reality by what is more distinct, we cannot be certain that what is distinct is
actually distinct at all; again, distinctness could be a deception of our senses. There
appears, as previously stated, only one thing that a person can know: I exist. I exist
because I can think; even if I were to doubt my existence, the act of thought negates any
reason for doubt. Unfortunately, there is no way to confirm anything else, including our
knowledge. We cannot place ourselves in others minds, nor can we have any Earthly
proof of our existence which is able to be proved beyond a doubt to not be a deception.
Descartes’ response to this argument is boiled down to the idea that we must be
able to confirm God’s existence in order to tell if our senses incapable of being trusted.
Simply stated, if we could understand the nature of God, we would know how reliable
our senses are. Yet again, before even delving into the argument, I find an immediate
flaw: how can we know that our rationale to come to the conclusion we just did is logical
when it may just be a deception? There is no way to verify this, unfortunately. At this
point, the argument becomes nothing but a cycle, unable to be proved further.
In all, there appears to be no definitive reason to trust human knowledge, apart
from trusting in a majority (albeit blindly via our assumptions). Conversely, it appears
that there is a reason to distrust human knowledge because of a lack of proof. Of course,
it also appears that every theory here, both for and against human knowledge, could be
irrational, marred by the state of constant deception. In the end, there is simply no answer
which can be considered correct.