Afghanistan, Taliban and ”the unruly border”
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Afghans experience what they name an increasing betrayal by the
international community.
The developments in Afghanistan today, promoted by the international
community and the Kabul government, is seen as an attempt to strengthen
central power, undermining the autonomy of the regions, and having
limited if any benefits for local population.
The change in balance between the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan
emerging as a result of more than 25 years of struggle is not taken into
consideration when a new formula for power sharing is developed.
The mobilization of supporters to Taliban and Taliban-related forces in
Afghanistan today occurs for two main reasons:
o The international presence after the ousting of Taliban in 2001 has
neither given security nor development, and there is a growing
tendency to oppose all foreign involvement, as was what happened
after Soviet invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
o The present government in Kabul has not managed to establish a
strong legitimacy in local communities, neither through security
nor through rule of law. For an increasing number of people
Taliban represent an alternative for the better, as they did in mid
90’s.
The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the position of the
Tribal areas need to be clarified if the border region is to play a
constructive role in the future relation between the two countries and
promote an economic development benefiting the region.
1
News from Afghanistan during this year indicates an increasing resistance facing the
international military forces and the Afghan army, in particular in the southern part of the
country. Nearly on a daily basis we hear about attacks on the international forces, suicide
bombers or military operations to quell the insurgents. In particular the Taliban is back in the
headlines; the movement forced out of Kabul in October 2001 as US in cooperation with other
international forces and different Afghan forces attacked.
Why does Taliban still remain as a force in Afghanistan to be reckoned with?
To answer this question I believe there are several issues we should address; in particular:
- The ethnic composition of Afghanistan and the consequences of 25 years of struggle
against an occupying force and internal struggle on the future balance between ethnic
groups and between the central state and the regions.
- The resistance against the Soviets from 1979; mechanisms behind the mobilisation of
forces against the Soviets and their supporters in Kabul.
- The growth of Taliban from 1993 and the reasons why they in the beginning got an
astonishing support in the Pashto areas.
- The history of the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan; the role of
Pashtonistan in the political discourse.
- The contradictory interests represented within the international community and the
government of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era and the lack of results in the
rebuilding of the country since 2001 that strengthen the confidence of the population
that this process is in their interest.
No doubt the resistance against the Soviets and their supporters from 1979 till 1992 has
resulted in a substantial change in the relation between the ethnic groups in Afghanistan and it
has changed their attitude towards Kabul as the capital and the county’s power centre. The
development of different resistance organisations (parties) often dominated by one ethnic
group and with its strongholds in one particular part of the county has created regional power
centres not willing to abide by a Pashto rule in Kabul.1
1
Examples are Jumbesh-i-milli headed by Dostum and dominated by Uzbeks, Shura-e-nezar headed by Rabbani
and dominated by Tadjiks and a variety of organisations dominated by Hazzaras. Several of the resistance parties
as Hezb-i-Islami headed by Gulbuddin and Hezb-i-Islami headed by Khales were dominated by different tribes
among the Pashtons as was later Taliban.
2
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National identity in a multi ethnic state – the ethnic field of tension
The change in balance between the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan emerging
as a result of more than 25 years of struggle is not taken into consideration when a
new formula for power sharing is developed.
Afghanistan is a multi ethnic and multi linguistic state where several of the different ethnic
groups live on both sides of the national borders. The state of Afghanistan was established as
a kingdom in 1747, but got its present borders in the 19th century as a buffer between at that
time expanding great powers Great Britain and Russia. The final shape of Afghanistan and its
borders were established to avoid a situation where the two mighty players in the region at
that time had common border in Central Asia.
This role as a buffer has strongly supported the development of the national identity among
Afghans, regardless of important and strong contradictions, both between regions and
between urban and rural areas, between ethnic groups and to some extent with religious
dimension. This process was supported by what Dupree (1980) describe as “internal
imperialism” waged by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan during his reign 1880-19012. Through
forced migrations, military operations and appointments he strengthened the power of Kabul
in the whole country and increased the dominance of the Pashtons as the major ethnic group.
The contradictions between the dominant ethnic group the Pashtons and the Hazzaras has its
roots back in the 19th century. It has a religious dimension, Shia Muslims against Sunni
Muslims, a socio-economic dimension with the Hazzaras as the far worse off social group in
society and it has been important not the least when regional players have chosen their
partners in the different periods of conflict since 1978. At the end of the 19th century Kabul
2
Louis Dupree, ’Afghanistan’, 1980, pp. 417-
3
initiated a systematic campaign against the Hazzaras in Central Afghanistan, resulting in a
substantial number of refugees fleeing to neighbouring Baluchistan (in today’s Pakistan).
At the end of the 19th century and early in the last century (in the 20s) a substantial number of
Pashtons were forces to move into areas inhabited by other ethnic groups, in particular in the
Northern Afghanistan. The aim was again to strengthen the control by Kabul and to weaken
Pashto tribes competing with the Durrani's in the south3. During the last 25 years many of
their descendants have fled to Kabul or into exile. Attempts in recent years to move back have
been countered by often fierce reactions in the local communities.
It is worth noting that never during this prolonged period of conflict has any ethnic group
expressed a wish to leave the national entity Afghanistan. Likewise no one has expressed the
view that one or several ethnic groups should be excluded from the same national entity. This
is an important strength when addressing the challenges related to re-establish the state of
Afghanistan today.
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The tension between central power and local players:
The developments in Afghanistan today, promoted by the international community
and the Kabul government, is seen as an attempt to strengthen central power,
undermining the autonomy of the regions, and having limited if any benefits for local
population.
With its particular history and composition Afghanistan has traditionally not had what we
would call a strong central power. The different regions have to a great extent had extensive
autonomy. The largest ethnic group, the Pashtons, with around 50% of the population, has
3
Dupree (1980), p. 419 describes how Ghilzai Pashtons in the south were the main enemies of Amir Abdur
Rahman Khans Durrani-rule in Kabul, while they as migrants in the north changed their loyalty to become
supporters of Pashto rule against the other ethnic groups in their new locations.
4
with a short break in 1929, had the royal power in Kabul since 18th century till 1973, when the
Republic was introduced.4
The Soviet invasion in 1979 and the subsequent resistance lasting till 1989/1992 had
consequences in the Afghan society often neglected; with extensive foreign support the
resistance was organised and to some extent based regionally and ethnically. Different from
the situation in the country before the Soviet invasion, we witnessed the establishment of
armed organisations all over the country. Among these several were ethnically based as
Shura-e-nezar (Tadjiks), Dostum’s Jumbesh-i-milli (Uzbek) and several Hazzara
organisations. Several of the organisations were Pashto based, as was the Taliban. What soon
became reality was that the former balance between the ethnic groups, forming the base for
the Pashto control of the royal power in Kabul, was something of the past. A future regime in
Kabul would, if it should gain the support all over Afghanistan, have to base its power on a
changed relation to the different regions and the different ethnic groups and that way accept
this change.
Louis Dupree raises this issue ahead of the changes as a result of decades of struggle, when he
in a paper in 1976 discusses Afghanistan in a regional context and the internal structures
inhibiting development. He focuses on the need to restructure the country and its provincial
structure, a change that should be accompanied by ‘geographical consolidation based on
consideration of the overall ecology, river drainage patterns, logical lines of trade and
communication, ethno-linguistic unity, and internal economic potential. Along with this
consolidation must come a degree of actual regional autonomy. Once the populace is
consolidated into viable administrative units, the government can begin to reorganize itself
away from the centre and to establish a balanced program of economic, political, and
intellectual growth.’5 No doubt his advice gives important guidelines how the question of
governance and the relation between central and local power should be addressed. This
Nancy Dupree (2006) characterised ’the strong state’ established under Amir Abdur Rahman Khan as a state
where the provinces furnished Kabul with taxes and conscripts. Else the provinces governed themselves with
little interference from Kabul.
5
Louis Dupree, ’Imperialism in South Asia’, South Asia Series, Vol. XX, No. 3, June 1976, p. 5
4
5
contradicts the position outlined by the present government in Afghanistan through its
‘Afghanistan Compact’ and ‘Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy’6
Reestablishment of the state with its institutions is a goal expressed through national strategic
documents and by the donor community. The lack of a realistic and sensitive approach to the
issue both by the government in Kabul and by major donors till today, taking into
consideration the turbulent history of the country, the particularities and changes
characterising the relations between the central state power and the provinces and regions and
the role of local war-lords and Taliban forces in different parts of the country, have clearly
undermined several of the attempts to do something in this field. With its overall goal to crush
the Al Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan the US forces have developed alliances with several
of the war-lords detested by the local population since the 90’s and at that time often the
reason for them giving support to the Taliban. Likewise president Karzai and the government
in Kabul have focused on a policy of co-opting several of these war-lords appointing them as
governors and police chiefs, strengthening the critical attitude in the population. Even worse
both the US and Kabul have quietly accepted that several of these have continued their
involvement in illegal economic activities like narcotics.
The strong focus on Kabul in the state re-building process have also mobilised critical
responses. A substantial use of foreign consultants combined with lack of capacity building
on the provincial and local level has rather intensified the division between the city and the
countryside and thereby the conflict.
 Contradicting economic interests:
In the aftermath of the resistance against Soviet and its supporters in Afghanistan, several of
the established organisations developed into a power base for leaders from different ethnic
groups and different regions. Often these leaders based their influence on military power and
foreign support, contrary to the traditional power structures, often based on a council system
where the words of the elders played a decisive role. Several places we witnessed the
emerging of local ‘war-lords’ using their established military power to secure an economic
6
Both documents were presented at the London meeting in January 2006 and endorsed. Comments on these
documents have been forwarded by Norad to MFA head of the meeting in London, focusing among others on the
problems rising from the concept of a strong central state in Afghanistan.
6
base through taxing of the local population and encouraging the informal economy, including
narcotics production. Militia, earlier supporting the Soviets, took a similar position (Dostum).
With the infrastructure established in Afghanistan during centuries for informal trading,
supported also by the nomads, it was easy to develop an extensive smuggling, both of
traditional commodities but also of weapons and narcotics, domestically and across the
national borders.
More recently one has become aware of the substantial unexplored natural resources in
Afghanistan, including large quanta of gas reserves in the ground under the province of
Faryab. Already in 1968 the first gas pipeline from Shibarghan approximately 100 km east of
Maimana to at that time Soviet Union was established. A period of more than 20 years where
the Afghan gas reserves played a crucial role in the economic cooperation between
Afghanistan and Soviet Union started. The World Bank has in 2006 allocated funds for a
project to facilitate private involvement in the sector. It remains to be seen how this might
interfere with the contradictions between Kabul and the concerned regions and particular warlords in those areas.
Likewise other battles over natural resources are there and might in addition to fuelling the
internal contradictions in the country, add to the tension in relation to neighbouring countries
and regional powers. The water rights in the border river to the north Amu Darya and the use
of water in Kunar River, running through Pakistan and Afghanistan might turn out as
conflicting interests.
 The resistance against Soviet
Soviet, and before that Tsar Russia, has been a regional power in Central Asia with ambitions
of expansion and consolidation. As already mentioned Afghanistan was finally defined as a
buffer between the two contending powers in the region in the 19th century.
As Britain during the 19th and 20th century tried to strengthen its influence and control over
Kabul, Russia and later Soviet did the same. Afghanistan from 1920 achieved full control of
its foreign policy.7 For successive Afghan Amirs (Kings) the preferred policy was to balance
between the main powers in the region.
Through the 1950’s the Soviet influence in Afghanistan increased. This was partly due to a
decrease in assistance from the US. The first agreement with Soviet to deliver military
equipment was signed in 1956, since US refused the Afghan request for such. Through the
60’s and 70’s we witness a steady increase in the Soviet influence economically as well as
7
Reached through a political and financial settlement in Mussooree in British India in 1920 between the British
administration and Afghanistan. See also Louis Dupree, ‘Mahmud Tarzi: Forgotten Nationalist’, in South Asia
Series, Vol. VIII, No. 1. January 1964.
7
politically. President Daoud, nephew of the former King Zahir Shah and former Prime
Minister under the King, took power and declared Afghanistan a republic in 1973 with
support of the Pro-Soviet political parties in Afghanistan. These parties in turn removed
Daoud in a military coup in April 19788 and established a Republic under the leadership of
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Through several reform movements, in
particular focused on land rights, literacy and abolishment of dowry (bride price), they
initiated a political process which mobilised the conservative and tribal related forces in the
country to resist the proposed changes. Less the content of the reform, but more the way they
were initiated and implemented sparked the reactions according to Roy.9 According to him
the Marxist rhetoric used and how the reforms were aimed at strengthening the central power
in Kabul, were base for increasing opposition. Both religious and tribal leaders were
mobilised for the same purpose: To fight the intruders and infidels and the attempts to
undermine local autonomy. Important was also the Afghan national identity closely linked to
the question of pride, on behalf of the family, the tribe and the country.10 That the regime in
Kabul also used brutal force to achieve its goals and to fight its opponents further increased
the resistance. The forerunner to the armed resistance against the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan was a reality.
After the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan 27th December 1979, under the pretext of having
been invited by Afghan authorities, the resistance grew steadily in the countryside. As a
consequence of the Cold War, the West with US and Saudi Arabia in the lead initiated a
substantial support to the resistance or Mujahedin, both financially and militarily. Apart from
the influence of these developments on the ethnic balance in Afghanistan and the balance
between central power and regional/local powers, it is worth mentioning another
characteristic with the emerging resistance: The international community mainly accepted the
resistance parties establishing themselves in Pakistan, under the auspices of Pakistani
authorities, as the main recipients of international assistance. What was less understood was
the development of locally based resistance organisations all over the country, often linked to
a particular ethnic group, a tribe or an extended family. This ‘internal front’ often changed its
affiliation with the different ‘external parties’ in Pakistan depending on availability of
resources and changes in personal relations. Roy (1986) argue against this understanding
characterising this as ‘a mainly Western understanding’, while several people following the
The so called ’Saur Revolution’ 27th April 1978.
See Olivier Roy, ’Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan’, Cambridge University Press, 1986
10
It is often referred to Pashtonwali, the Pashto moral codex governing a lot in the Pashto tribal society.
8
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8
developments in Afghanistan in these years experienced the changing alliances.11 Whatever is
the best way of characterising the relation, what is important here is that several of the
resistance leaders inside Afghanistan kept a certain independence from the parties in Pakistan
(and Iran) and established their own powerbase related to ethnicity, region or tribal links.
Some of these are today among those termed ‘war lords’ raising to power through their
military career, sometimes combined with involvement in the illegal economy and not
through the traditional mechanisms in the Afghan society.

Taliban; a tool for Pakistani influence and against lawlessness developing post1992
With the ousting of the pro-Soviet regime from Kabul in 1992, attempts were made to
establish a Mujahedin-based Government in Kabul. Without any established agreement on
how to share power, and with a number of candidates ready to get hold of Kabul, the first
months of calm was soon changed to an increasing infighting among the Afghan parties, in
changing alliances and with disastrous consequences, not the least for the civilians. Local
warlords established their rule several places in the country, based on their merits as leaders in
the resistance against the Soviets supported by control of arms and sometimes an emerging
opium production. In Afghanistan and among some Mujahedin leaders these developments
created a reaction voicing a wish to ‘restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law
and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan’.12
For Pakistan the developments in Kabul and in Afghanistan were alarming. Since Pakistan
was established in 1948, the fear of an unruly regime in Kabul while facing the threats from
India had been decisive for the policy towards its neighbour.
Afghanistan has a history as a melting pot of migrations, trading expeditions and military
campaigns. Control of this difficult accessible country has been important for regional players
with the aim of strengthening their positions. Both Great Britain and Russia tried during the
period the two countries competed for hegemony in Central Asia, to get control in Kabul. This
has added to the strong feeling of independence always praised by Afghans and still of
importance to them. Great Britain as well as Soviet Union has experienced this.
When the infighting among the Mujahedin parties started after 1992, Pakistan started the
search for another partner in Afghanistan. The emerging Taliban movement from 1993 are
closely linked to such assessments. Rashid (2000) presents some interesting observation on
the relation between Pakistan and Taliban, indicating that Taliban had an extensive relation to
different parts of the Pakistani society. He even indicates that Taliban rather than a tool for
Pakistani influence in Afghanistan became a problem for Pakistan to control.13
The contradictions between the neighbouring countries India and Pakistan have also all the
time influenced the policies of the two countries towards the conflicts in Afghanistan.

The foreign presence in Afghanistan in 2006 more and more compared to
previous attempts of foreign influence
11
Rashid (2000) describes the mechanism of changing loyalties depending on where the best support could be
achieved. See page 19.
12
Rashid (2000), pp. 22-25
13
Ahmed Rashid, ‘Taliban. Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia’, I.B.Tauris, 2000, ch. 14.
9
The mobilization of supporters to Taliban and Taliban-related forces in Afghanistan
today occurs for two main reasons:
o The international presence after the ousting of Taliban in 2001 has neither
given security nor development, and there is a growing tendency to oppose
all foreign involvement, as was what happened after Soviet invaded
Afghanistan in 1979.
o The present government in Kabul has not managed to establish a strong
legitimacy in local communities, neither through security nor through rule
of law. For an increasing number of people Taliban represent an
alternative for the better, as they did in mid 90’s.
In particular in 2006, but with clear signs also previous years, there is a growing frustration in
the population in Afghanistan related to the lack of security, the lack of economic
developments and the steadily more militaristic foreign presence. The news can tell about the
local population more and more tempted to contact Taliban related groups rather than
representatives of the Kabul government to solve conflicts. A recent report on the
developments in Afghanistan describes the situation: “Far from being perceived as pursuing
terrorists, providing security or stabilising and developing the country, all international
military coalition forces are considered as the allies of the Karzai government and coresponsible for the lack of security and the spread of corruption. Rather than neutral elements
fighting for the good of the Afghan people, international military coalition forces are
perceived as taking sides in a civil war situation between two groups competing for power in
Afghanistan”.14
Observers focus on the lack of priority given to the strengthening of rule of law in the country
with a strong legal sector with integrity. Attempts to fight corruption widespread also within
the administration have so far had negligible effects.
What is interesting here is that in discussions with Government officials in Kabul in February
2006 it was said that Taliban was part of the political spectre in Afghanistan. They were a
group deprived of influence and a group even the government had to relate to when
implementing national development programmes in the south of the country. 15 Also
international NGOs indicated the same.
The question of security, or rather lack of security for the population, becomes crucial, as it
did when the local population in the same regions rendered support for Taliban in the mid
90’s to get rid of the despotic rule of the new warlords. And the consequences, as described
by the Senlis Council in their recent report: “Despite the international community’s concerted
five-year focus on military operations, the security situation in Afghanistan is worse than in
2001. The Taliban now have a strong grip on the southern half of the country. Afghans
perceive that the US and NATO troops in southern and eastern Afghanistan are being
defeated by the Taliban. The legitimacy of the international community’s presence in
Afghanistan is undermined by its incapacity to protect the Afghan population.16
The Senlis Council, ‘Afghanistan Five Years Later - The Return of the Taliban’, 2006, Ch. 1,
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014_publication/chapter_01
15
From discussions with the coordinator of the National Solidarity Program, implemented under Ministry for
Reconstruction and Rural Development (MRRD).
16
The Senlis Council (2006), Ch. 1,
14
10
Obviously we are witnessing a dramatic change in the perception of the local population
concerning the international presence. Their view today resembles more and more what the
British experienced in the 19th and 20th century and what the Soviets experienced in the
1980’s. “When international military forces first intervened in Afghanistan, much was made
of the “winning of hearts and minds”, but this campaign has been lost. Locals assert that
neither the “foreigners” nor the Afghan government had made any efforts to counteract the
detrimental effects of drought, poverty and poppy eradication in their provinces, and locals’
apparent fear of the international military forces show that the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign
has failed. Anger is now commonly expressed in southern Afghanistan, and many Afghans
who supported the international forces now speak of them with hatred.”17
The international focus on rebuilding Afghan governance has shown few results and “in
several of Afghanistan’s provinces, the Taliban is now providing governmental services such
as justice and economic security. It provides physical security through fighting the eradication
forces that come to destroy farmers’ livelihoods and in doing so is far more effective at
winning ‘hearts and minds’ than the international troops. The Taliban now has psychological
and de facto military control of half of Afghanistan. Unless the international community takes
account of these realities, integrates the Afghan Government with local institutions, and
improves the political security and legitimacy of the Kabul government, Taliban control is set
to engulf the rest of Afghanistan.”18 What we experience is that “Increasingly, Afghans
perceive that their government is accountable to these international donors, and not to the
Afghans themselves.”19 Both the Karzai government in Kabul and the international presence
are on the brink of loosing what might be left of credibility in the population.
Afghans experience an increasing betrayal by the international community.
“Overwhelmingly, Afghans feel that they have been betrayed by the international community.
Unless the priorities of the international community are immediately and radically shifted,
support for the Taliban will continue increasing, and will lead to the collapse of the country.
17
The Senlis Council (2006), Ch. 1,
The Senlis Council (2006), Ch. 4, In Le Monde Diplomatique it is recently indicated that Taliban commanders
have been in dialogue with Tadjik and Uzbek leaders in the north of Afghanistan to discuss further cooperation.
19
The Senlis Council (2006), Ch. 4,
18
11
The prioritisation of Western domestic security needs in Afghanistan means that Afghans are
now paying with their lives. The success of the initial invasion in 2001 has not been followed
by real changes in the everyday lives of Afghans.”20 This is dramatic, no doubt. What we
witness is a development where a hostile attitude towards foreign involvement in Afghanistan
joins hand with a desperate search for security and rule of law resulting in a growing support
for Taliban and similar forces opposed to the government in Kabul. “For many Afghans, the
results of the international community’s nation-building efforts in Afghanistan are largely
symbolic and are more in line with the ‘homeland security’ objectives of the foreign forces
rather than the real needs of Afghans. A rejuvenated Taliban is exploiting such widespread
resentment to stir up instability.”21

The question of Pashtonistan
The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the position of the Tribal areas
need to be clarified if the border region is to play a constructive role in the future
relation between the two countries and promote an economic development benefiting
the region.
For regional players Afghanistan has through its history been seen as a strategic and a
threatening country some how. For the British it was of utmost importance at the end of the
19th century to pacify the border areas between British India and Afghanistan. A demarcation
line was drawn in 1893 (the Durand line), by Louis Dupree described as “an artificial political
boundary”.22 Later on Afghans (and successive Afghan Governments) has denounced this line
as an administrative demarcation clarifying roles and responsibility between Afghanistan and
the British, while the British have stated and states that this line is to be regarded as a national
borderline.23 The disagreement on this issue was the reason for Afghanistan as the sole
country in 1948 voting against Pakistan’s membership application to the UN. In the 50s the
border between the two countries from time to time was closed. Knowing that half the Pashto
tribal population is living on the Pakistan side of the Durand line, we can envisage strong
national forces playing on the unification of all Pashtons.24
In their attempts to pacify the ‘unruly border’ towards Afghanistan the British administration
in India had to reach several agreements with the tribal leaders, respecting their power and
autonomy.
20
The Senlis Council (2006), Ch. 5,
The Senlis Council (2006), Ch. 5,
22
Dupree (1980), p. 425 with reference to Dupree, “The Durand Line of 1893”, in T. Cuyler Young Sr. (ed.),
Current Problems in Afghanistan, Princeton, 1961
23
Louis Dupree in several articles in South Asia Series (1963, 1967, 1971, 1973, and 1974) describes the attitude
of King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Daoud, later President Daoud on Pashtonistan and the relation to
Pakistan, strongly favoring the right to self-determination for the Pashtons in Pakistan. He also discusses the
position of President Ayoub Khan in Pakistan. See also Dupree (1980), p. 426.
24
Afghanistan from 1951 till 1989 every year in end August or beginning of September issued stamps to
commemorate ’Pashtonistan Day’. One year the stamp issued carried a map of Pashtonistan covering more or
less today’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan in Pakistan.
21
12
From the Pakistani side the importance of a friendly Government in Kabul not raising the
issue of ‘Pashtonistan’ (the land of the Pashtons) has been of importance when they were
going to chose allies during the last 25 years. The active support given from Pakistan to the
resistance (Mujahedin) fighting the Soviet occupation was guided by the wish to secure a
moderate and cooperative government in Kabul, leaving the claim for ‘Pashtonistan’ a dead
option.25 Likewise similar arguments were behind the support for Taliban. With a friendly
government in Kabul Pakistan hoped for a prosperous economic development in relation to
the Central Asian Republics.
At present the insurgents are limited to the Pashto parts of the country. During Taliban in the
90’s we witnessed the emerging of a far more multi-ethnic movement than what we see today.
For president Musharaf in Pakistan the increasing unrest in the tribal areas towards
Afghanistan, knowing that the Pashto insurgents in Pakistan had full support of their ethnic
brothers and sisters in Afghanistan, and knowing the legacy related to the tribal area inherited
from the British, an agreement for ceasefire was the best option.26
In February 2006 representatives for the Independent Human Rights Commission of
Afghanistan could tell about how Parliamentary elections in Afghanistan also mobilised
voters on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. Recently we have seen news about payments
to leaders in the Tribal areas of Pakistan from the government of Kabul to secure loyalty.
There is a clear indication that the government of Afghanistan and its Pashto elements still
have an ethnic agenda including the border areas towards Pakistan.
Conclusions:
A very difficult and dangerous situation is continuously developing in the southern parts of
Afghanistan with adjacent tribal areas in Pakistan. With the international presence in
Afghanistan more and more seen as a threat towards Afghan dignity and independence than as
assistance in re-establishing the country after decades of war, a growing portion of the
population seems to be willing to join hands with Taliban and Taliban-like forces to fight
25
Rashid (2000), p. 26
Newsweek October 2, 2006 publish a very critical analysis of the situation in southern Afghanistan, warning
of the rise of a ‘Jihadistan’ in the area.
26
13
back. The experiences with the present government in Kabul working to establish a strong
central power, adds to this frustration. Lack of rule of law and economic developments does
likewise.
Regional historical disagreements related to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan
frames and fuels the insurgents, securing a safe haven among Pashto tribes. With the Pashto
card played actively from the government in Kabul, the close links across the borderline have
political backing of great importance. Without an internationally brokered agreement on the
national border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the future position of the Tribal areas,
we will witness a continuous outbreak of unrest and the use of these territories for insurgents
and unlawful economic activities.
The international community with a strong voice, supported by some of the Afghanistan
specialists, argue for a strengthened military presence to crush the insurgents. Experiences
indicate that this strategy will probably not succeed. The contrary is more probable with an
increasing mobilisation around Taliban and other insurgents. Observers don’t exclude the
possibility that the insurgencies rather sooner than later will spill over to the other parts of
Afghanistan involving more of the ethnic groups in the country.27
It seems that a focus on state-building with due respect for the local structures and demands
for autonomy, focus on re-establishing rule of law and building a legal system with integrity
has better chance of success in particular if all Afghan groups, also the Taliban are included in
the dialogue. Supported by a regional dialogue involving Pakistan and Iran, the Central Asian
Republics and India, to reduce their involvement in the existing conflicts in Afghanistan and
mobilising them for the support of a viable and united neighbouring country, Afghanistan
might after some years end its position among the fragile states and as the major opium
producing country. With mainly a military approach to the present situation the feeling of
neglect and abuse of Afghan dignity by the international community with further instigate
resistance and the development of a hotbed for unruly forces.
Written by
Petter Bauck
petter@bauck.com
Illustrations:
All the illustrations are Postage Stamps issues by the Government of Afghanistan. Apart from
the illustrations on page 7, 8 and 11, the stamps have been issues in the end of
August/beginning of September every year from 1951 till 1989 commemorating “Pashtonistan
Day”. The stamp on page 13 has a map of Pashtonistan covering more or less all of North
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan Province in Pakistan, including Karachi. The stamp
on page 7 is in connection with the agricultural reforms initiated by the pro-Soviet regime
after 1978. The stamp on page 8 is in commemoration of the Saur revolution in April 1978.
The stamp on page 11 is issued by the present regime after 2001.
In the Norwegian Broadcasting television news October 12th 2006 …….. said that the mobilisation around
Taliban would continue and that also the Norwegian soldiers in the north of the country sooner or later might
experience to be kicked out.
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