Were economic factors the main reason for the fall of the Safavids in 1722?
The Safavid empire was the longest lasting dynasty in Persia from the early medieval
period to the fall of the Shah in 1979, lasting 222 years in its totality. Its decline has been
attributed to a number of economic factors including reforms in property rights, reforms in
taxation and corruption. A number of non-economic factors have also been attributed
including the rise of the importance of the ulama and the harem, the increased moral
decadence of Shahs and the decline in military spending. Ultimately many of these factors
are intertwined and often one was the cause of another, overall however I have attempted
to split the factors into economic ones and cultural ones to determine whether the cause of
the Safavid decline was mostly economic or not.
Arguably one of the primary reasons for decline was the shift in property rights from
mamalik to khassah from the late 17th century until 1722. It was a shift from 'state lands'
(mamalik) administered by local chieftains and replacing them with crown lands (khassah),
administered by bureaucrats responsible only to the Shah. This led to an economic decline
as the bureaucrats were far more punitive in their taxation of the populace and the funds,
that weren't gained from corruption, went immediately to the Shah and the harem. Under
the mamalik system there would be a local court and the local chieftain would act as a
provincial viceroy, this meant that taxed wealth often returned to the local economy and
wasn't a complete drain on the region1. Under the khassah system that money was not
spent in the province but by the Shah and this led to economic decline in many provinces 2especially as the nation was regarded as a series of regional economies and not a united
one3. Trade between major towns had customs duties as well as trade with foreign
merchants and so this sort of redistribution naturally led to a collapse of some of the local
economies4 (Chardin notes Shiraz lost 80,000 citizens due to the change). As well as this
the Shah lost political support among outlying regions as this economic change took effect.
Another factor for the decline of the Safavid empire was increased military neglect as the
period of peace grew longer, that ultimately there was a 'disaster myopia' about war. The
Safavid dynasty was the longest of a millennium (1501-1722) and there was an
unprecedented level of peace after the founding of the dynasty (by the mid 16 th century). It
has been noted that as there was a fiscal deficit from the late 17th century onwards.5
Military spending suffered as the harem convinced Shahs that it was military spending that
should be reduced. Chardin estimated that spending on the harem was 11.8% of the total
in the 1670s (with other royal functionaries and personal spending making up 29.4%) yet
later under Sultan Husayn the harem expanded exponentially; Krusinski (quoted by Foron)
states that Sultan Husayn had 'trebled the Expence (sic) of it [the harem] to what it was in
the Time of his Predecessors.'6 The increased political power of the harem (as well as its
size) meant that the military suffered to the point where it became vastly insufficient when
1
Chardin, Jean. Voyages, 5: 252-253
Foron, John. The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving Beyond the Standard Views (1992) Foron notes
that other historians such as Savory have gone as far to say that this policy 'contributed largely to the Safavid decline'
whilst he states that 'These judgements are on the whole valid' pg 290
3
Floor, Willem. The Economy of Safavid Persia (2000) pg 64
2
4
5
Bausani, Alessandro. The Persians (1962) pg 153
Foron, John. The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving Beyond the Standard Views (1992) pgs 284, 286
Foron points out there was a decline in demand for Iranian silk as Bengal increased production from the 1650s onwards
and also corruption became a major issue- Foron states 'Mirza Muhammad Taqi, the grand vizier from 1634 to 1645...
known for his integrity, he used a system of spies to crack down on corruption, which led to a murder plot against him
that succeeded on 11 October 1645'. No other grand vizier attempted this anti-corruption strategy and this partly explains
why oppressive taxes still failed to solve the fiscal problem.
6
Foron, John. The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving Beyond the Standard Views (1992) pg 286
border incursions from 1700 onwards took place. As well as this, the mamalik system that
was replaced had been as system built on the local chieftain supporting the Shah militarily;
as it was eroded and replaced, the Qizilbash and other traditionally military important tribes
had no loyalty to the Shah. This culminated in the Shah's isolation in 1722.
As already alluded to, the rise of the harem, the rise of factionalism and royal moral
decadence are also seen as reasons for the decline of the Safavids. As the empire
progressed with time the royal court morally stagnated. Increasingly Shahs became known
for being drunks primarily concerned with the harem. Because of this the political
importance of the harem increased. For example, under Shah Sultan Husayn his greataunt Maryam Begum became dominant.7 It was said that Shah Sulayman spent seven
years straight in the company of the harem alone.8 From the late 1600s, the increased
political power of the harem was only matched by the power of the ulama. Mohammed
Baqer Majlesi was the most powerful cleric of the era and he used his influence at court to
ban taverns, brothels and public music among other things. His aim for an era of piety and
a Shi’ite Islamic revolution, of sorts, led to a fall in revenues equal to '50kg of gold per
day'.9 This was disastrous at a time of fiscal deficit but also showed the weakness of the
Shah in his court of warring factions.
Though economic repression, a worsening military situation and an increasingly decadent
and introverted court certainly all contributed to the rise of discontent in the tribal
provinces, it is also true that the religious repression of the late Safavids united opposition
against the regime into military force. In the era of Majlesi's religious revolution, all nonMuslims but also Sunni and Sufi Muslims were persecuted. This led to religious grievances
in areas with sizeable Sunni populations, leading to rebellion, viz. in Afghanistan. But more
importantly this led to an alienation of other Sunni areas that the Shah relied on for military
defence, such as the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and Khurasan.10 This meant at the siege of
Isfahan no reserves were forthcoming and as a short term factor, this undoubtedly this led
to the fall of the dynasty.
To conclude, the military negligence of the late Safavids, as well as the religious
persecution, certainly played a significant part in the downfall of the dynasty. Nevertheless,
the military deteriorated as a result of reduced fiscal revenues and the change to the
mamalik system. Though a decline in trade had an impact on the economy that would
have hampered any ruler, the fact that politically the Shahs chose to allow the harem to
take up increasing amounts of state spending and that the ulama were allowed to pass
draconian measures that reduced revenues shows that the Shahs neglected their role in
keeping security the main priority of the state. And though economic factors certainly
played a role, the Shahs neglected the security of the empire at their peril and it was this
inaction that caused the total downfall of the dynasty in 1722.
Bibliography:
Axworthy, Michael Iran Empire of the Mind (2007)
Bausani, Alessandro The Persians (1962)
Floor, Willem The Economy of Safavid Persia (2000)
Foron, John The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving Beyond the Standard Views
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May, 1992)
7
8
9
10
Axworthy, Michael. Iran Empire of the Mind (2007) pg 149
Foron, John. The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving Beyond the Standard Views (1992) pg 293
Axworthy, Michael. Iran Empire of the Mind (2007) pg 148
Foron, John. The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving Beyond the Standard Views (1992) pg 294
Banani, Amin Reflections on the Social and Economic Structure of Safavid Persia at Its
Zenith Iranian Studies Vol. 11 (1978)
Chardin, Jean. Voyages (1711)