This research paper has been commissioned by the International Commission on
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, but reflects the views of the author
and should not be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the
Commission.
REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE
ON NUCLEAR ISSUES
Ken Berry, Research Coordinator, ICNND
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... (iv)
1.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
MAIN THEMES AND FINDINGS ....................................................................................... 2
SELECTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ............................................................ 3
NPT .................................................................................................................................... 4
Non-Proliferation Generally .............................................................................................. 4
Disarmament ...................................................................................................................... 4
Civilian Uses of Nuclear Energy ....................................................................................... 5
Verification & Compliance ................................................................................................ 5
Terrorism ........................................................................................................................... 5
Missiles .............................................................................................................................. 6
2.
A GENERAL GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE ............................................................... 6
3.
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) .......................................... 8
The Grand Bargain................................................................................................................. 9
NPT challenges and controversies ....................................................................................... 10
Proposals for Change ........................................................................................................... 11
4.
NON-PROLIFERATION GENERALLY ....................................................................... 13
US-Russian nuclear arms reductions—a SORT of START ................................................ 18
Tactical Nuclear Weapons Reductions ................................................................................ 19
Future weapons .................................................................................................................... 20
A Unilateralist United States ............................................................................................... 22
International Non-proliferation Efforts ................................................................................ 25
Cooperative Threat Reduction ......................................................................................... 25
The G8 Global Partnership .............................................................................................. 27
Other Arrangements ......................................................................................................... 27
(i)
The Nuclear Suppliers Group .......................................................................................... 27
US–India Nuclear Deal .................................................................................................... 29
The Proliferation Security Initiative ................................................................................ 29
The Private Sector ............................................................................................................ 31
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) .............................................................. 31
Entry into force ................................................................................................................ 32
Fissile Material Control ....................................................................................................... 33
Enhancing transparency in nuclear warhead and fissile material inventories .................. 36
Regional approaches ............................................................................................................ 37
Nuclear-weapon-free zones.............................................................................................. 38
5.
DISARMAMENT ............................................................................................................ 40
Outlawing Nuclear Weapons ........................................................................................... 45
A Nuclear Disarmament Treaty? ..................................................................................... 46
6.
CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR.......................................................................... 48
The Article IV Dilemma ...................................................................................................... 48
Growing NNWS Resistance ................................................................................................ 52
Prospects for a Nuclear Renaissance ................................................................................... 53
Engaging the Nuclear Industry ............................................................................................ 55
7.
VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE ......................................................................... 55
IAEA initiatives to secure nuclear materials and facilities .................................................. 57
Adequacy of safeguards arrangements ................................................................................ 58
Compliance and Enforcement .............................................................................................. 60
8.
NUCLEAR TERRORISM ............................................................................................... 62
UNSCR 1540 ....................................................................................................................... 67
9.
MISSILES ........................................................................................................................ 69
Ballistic Missile Defence ..................................................................................................... 70
Space Launch Capacity ........................................................................................................ 72
The Situation Today............................................................................................................. 72
(ii)
Limiting Missile Proliferation.............................................................................................. 73
The Missile Technology Control Regime ........................................................................ 74
The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation .............................. 75
Other missile control proposals ....................................................................................... 76
(iii)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There is a wide variety of literature on just about every aspect of the nuclear debate.
This review has left aside the mainly historical and descriptive accounts, and focused
instead on books, monographs and articles which analyse or speculate on motives or
likely outcomes, and those which make substantive proposals to overcome identified
obstacles or to achieve desired goals. Some of the literature is by academics, and
some by researchers working for non-governmental organisations and think-tanks.
Much of it is detailed and balanced, although ultimately favouring one preferred
outcome over another. Much of it is also these days freely available on the internet,
which has led to the wide dissemination of shorter commentaries on topical issues.
This paper first summarises the main trends to emerge from a review of the literature
on the main nuclear issues. Subjects which could benefit from further research are
listed. It then goes on to examine seven substantive areas relevant to the international
nuclear debate.
First, given that a primary objective of the Commission is to help ensure a positive
outcome to the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), the paper examines the state of that review process. There has been a
renewed focus in the literature on the perceived shortcomings of the original five
nuclear weapons states (NWS) in meeting their NPT obligations. Many states and
writers argue that these include a failure of the NWS to move meaningfully towards
actual nuclear disarmament. The rejection by the current US Administration of a
series of seemingly firm commitments made by the NWS at the 1995 and 2000
RevCons has been the focus of particular criticism.
Spurred by this perceived lack of movement towards nuclear disarmament, a growing
group of disgruntled non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) has been increasingly vocal
in asserting an unfettered right under Article IV of the NPT to develop or obtain the
full nuclear energy cycle for peaceful purposes, regardless of whether or not they have
any intention of actually developing such an energy program. The literature examines
the increasing resistance to these efforts, led principally by Western NWS and other
leading civilian nuclear powers, who wish to restrict the spread of the types of
technology which are susceptible of conversion to nuclear weapons programs. This
debate has become increasingly confrontational, and the situation reached the stage
where the 2005 RevCon could not even agree on a final document.
The literature thus contains many warnings about the imminent danger of collapse of
the NPT regime, which has hitherto been regarded as perhaps the most successful
treaty in history in that it has 188 state parties. Only India, Israel and Pakistan have
refused to become party to it, and North Korea purported to withdraw in 2003. The
literature contains a variety of proposals on how to engage the non-parties in NPT
objectives, even if they are not willing to sign on to the letter of the Treaty itself.
There is wide agreement that amending the NPT is not feasible, though reinforcing it
with additional protocols is not ruled out by some.
(iv)
Progress on non-proliferation issues more generally has been encouraged in the past
two years by authoritative statements and practical proposals from a number of former
statesmen from a variety of countries, led by four prominent Elder Statesmen from the
United States. The literature broadly endorses the view that efforts to save and
consolidate the NPT regime require the leadership of the US and Russia, and to a
lesser extent the other NWS. There are a variety of suggestions as to the steps which
the NWS should be taking to assess the conditions under which eventual nuclear
disarmament might meet their own security needs. Many observers view the 2008
Presidential elections in the US with some optimism as leading to a more progressive
attitude towards non-proliferation and disarmament generally.
There is a considerable body of literature on reductions in US and Russian arsenals
pursuant to bilateral treaties such as the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I) and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT). Some writers
see these reductions in a positive light, indicating that the US and Russia are moving
slowly, but positively in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Others, however,
believe that many of the cuts were for operational reasons or to retire ageing stock.
There is also a large body of literature examining cooperative programs by the US and
Russia, and increasingly, the European Union, to dismantle existing weapons and to
secure and dispose of excess fissile material.
There is a wide consensus nevertheless that the US and Russia need to do far more to
reduce their current arsenals to significantly lower levels. Smaller, tactical nuclear
weapon holdings by both countries also remain a concern, as do indications that the
US, Russia and China might be interested in developing new nuclear weapons or at
least upgrading current arsenals. The impact of recent events in Georgia on future
US/Russian nuclear cooperation has not yet been widely analysed, but this is bound to
change.
Much of the literature in the past eight years has focused on the perceived dangers of
the unilateral policies pursued by the current US Administration, and in particular its
2002 national defence doctrine which developed a new concept of pre-emptive war
and counter-proliferation (military action to counter perceived proliferation threats).
Under this doctrine, nuclear weapons have moved from their former deterrent status,
to the possibility of their actual use both in retaliation against attack on the US by
other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and in certain battlefield situations.
These considerations have also led to numerous analyses of the concept of nuclear
deterrence. Russia and China in particular are seen as having serious concerns about
US conventional force superiority, as well as US programs to install ballistic missile
defence systems near their borders. For these countries, retention of, or even an
increase in, their nuclear deterrence capabilities could be a central element in their
national security strategy.
This is also seen by many writers as the reason why states such as North Korea, Iran
and Syria, and until relatively recently Libya, may have been pursuing covert nuclear
weapons programs. Case studies abound on civilian nuclear energy programs which
raise broader proliferation concerns. These cover mainly the Middle East, but also
increasingly South East Asia, and to a very much lesser extent Latin America.
(v)
Regional responses to these concerns are advocated by many writers, and the creation
and expansion of regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) is seen as an
effective non-proliferation tool.
The efforts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are widely covered in the literature.
The NSG is a group of 45 nuclear supplier countries which coordinate national export
control policies in an effort to prevent countries of proliferation concern from
acquiring dual use material which could be diverted to nuclear weapons programs.
Proposals have been made for tightening NSG guidelines, though some writers
believe the NSG may already have achieved all it can, given the increase in the
number of countries outside the NSG which are developing their own nuclear
programs and willing to trade in related items and technology. Given that the NSG
Guidelines prohibit its members from engaging in nuclear trade with countries not
party to the NPT, the September 2008 NSG waiver granted to the US–India civil
nuclear cooperation deal remains highly controversial.
Similarly, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has been extensively examined.
The PSI, launched by the US in 2003 and having the varying participation of up to 80
countries, calls for the interdiction of ships and aircraft believe to be transporting
goods relating to nuclear weapons programs. While it has had some successes, the PSI
is criticised for its uncertain basis in international law and lack of transparency.
A lot has been written about getting the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) to finally enter into force. US ratification will be an important step in
this regard, though a number of other states will also be required to follow suit. The
CTBT will be a key element to bolster not only the non-proliferation regime, but also
help guarantee eventual nuclear disarmament.
In addition, there has been considerable discussion of a Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (FMCT) to regulate the materials used in nuclear weapons. Most of the
nuclear-armed states only want a ban on future production, though many other states
want such a treaty to also include current holdings of fissile materials. The US in
particular does not believe such a treaty can be properly verified, though most
observers disagree. Negotiation of an FMCT has never commenced due to the
inability of the Conference on Disarmament to overcome a number of issues. A
principal sticking point has been the insistence by China and others that, given US
moves to weaponise outer space, any FMCT negotiations should also see parallel
negotiations banning the stationing of weapons, including nuclear weapons, in outer
space.
There are divergent views in the literature on whether the time is ripe for a more
serious effort to move towards full nuclear disarmament. There are many proposals on
diminishing the importance placed on nuclear weapons by certain countries, and then
on moving to outlaw, first, the use of such weapons, and eventually even their
possession. The timeframe in which such developments might occur remains
uncertain. There is also a detailed and relatively balanced draft nuclear disarmament
treaty which is attracting growing support.
(vi)
Climate change and a growing international energy crisis have refocused attention on
the civilian nuclear energy sector. An increasing number of states have expressed
interest in developing their own nuclear energy programs, thus exacerbating concern
about proliferation risks. A variety of proposals have been made for international
nuclear fuel banks and the development of low-risk alternate technologies. Greater
involvement by the nuclear power industry, and a possible industry code of conduct,
are advocated.
Verification of existing civil nuclear energy programs and activities, and of future
treaties such as those covering fissile material and full nuclear disarmament, have
attracted considerable attention by the writers. There are many suggestions as to the
tightening of existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and
the IAEA has itself been very active in this regard, including through an Additional
Protocol which seeks to give IAEA inspectors expanded access to nuclear-related
facilities and technologies. Calls for improved verification measures include
formalised arrangements for Security Council intervention and creation of an
international verification regime and body for all WMD. Enforcement of compliance
measures is widely regarded as a weak link in the chain, and too dependent on
political decisions. This is exacerbated by the fact that possession of nuclear weapons
is not yet illegal under international law. Practical suggestions for improving
enforcement are, however, few on the ground.
The asymmetric nature of the ‘war on terror’ since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US
has seen the growth of literature that considers the issues and problems related to nonstate actors including the possible acquisition of nuclear and radiological weapons and
missiles by terrorist groups. While well-funded terrorist groups could build a basic
atomic bomb if they could obtain sufficient fissile material, they are more likely to opt
for a ‘dirty bomb’ spreading radioactivity through a conventional explosion. Measures
to counter smuggling of nuclear materials are discussed, and stricter security for such
materials called for. The adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1540
relating to nuclear terrorism, is praised by many writers, but criticised by others for
going beyond the Council’s UN Charter powers.
Finally, there appears to be a growing consensus among writers that the point has
been reached where concerted international action may be possible to impose greater
control on missile proliferation. Missiles are an important delivery platform for
nuclear weapons and other WMD, yet there is no multilateral treaty at all which deals
with them. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a group of 34
countries, similar to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, seeking to control the acquisition or
transfer of missiles and materials relevant to missile programs through coordination of
national export control legislation. It has had its successes, but like the NSG is seen
by some as being increasingly circumvented by an increasing number of states outside
the MTCR who have their own missile development programs and willing to trade
with others. The 2002 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
developed by the MTCR is seen by many writers as a useful start. However, it is
criticised by others since it is purely voluntary and does not cover cruise missiles.
----0000---(vii)
Page |1
REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE
ON NUCLEAR ISSUES
Ken Berry, Research Coordinator, ICNND*
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1
The main objective of this review of recent literature on the many aspects of
the international nuclear debate is to summarise the main findings, themes and ideas
canvassed in that debate. This may in turn help the Commission identify the areas in
which it might wish to focus its work. The review also seeks to identify areas which
are either not covered adequately in the existing literature, or not covered at all. The
Commission may thus wish to commission studies in some or all of those areas in
order to fill the gaps.
1.2
The review has drawn on all the principal kinds of literature: books, journals
and newspapers, including those posted on the internet, as well as publicly-available
government documents and those from international agencies and non-governmental
bodies. In the time available, it was simply not possible to examine every available
document relating to nuclear issues. The study sought to focus on problems of current
or continuing relevance, and therefore excluded nearly all literature examining very
directly and specifically the cold war period. Thus the review cannot claim to be
comprehensive; nor does it seek to express an opinion on the value of the conclusions
reached in the many documents nonetheless examined. However, it does seek to cover
the major points of contention and the opposing sides of the many different aspects of
the nuclear debate itself so as to give as comprehensive view as possible of where the
debate currently stands and where it might be headed.
1.3
The document is divided into seven substantive sections. Given that a primary
focus of the Commission will be on ways to facilitate a successful outcome of the
2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),1 issues
relating directly to the NPT will be considered in the first section. Non-proliferation
more generally, arms control and issues such as counter-proliferation and pre-emptive
war, are covered in the second section. A selection of cross-cutting issues and
* This paper draws in part on, and seeks to update, some of the sections of the SIPRI paper “Review of
Recent Literature on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” prepared for the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
1
“It is intended that the Commission and the subsequent conference will help pave the way for the
NPT Review Conference in 2010. We cannot simply stand idly by and allow another Review
Conference to achieve no progress – or worse to begin to disintegrate.” Excerpt from speech made by
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, in announcing formation of the Commission, Kyoto University,
9 June 2008.
Page |2
instruments, such as export controls and cooperative threat reduction measures, are
included here. The third section deals with nuclear disarmament and efforts not only
to reduce current arsenals of nuclear weapons to significantly smaller sizes, but to
eliminate them completely.
1.4
The fourth section covers the other principal pillar of the NPT bargain—
civilian nuclear energy and proliferation concerns stemming from it. Underlying
much of the debate surrounding non-proliferation, disarmament, and nuclear energy
are the requirements for verifiable safeguards and compliance. These are handled in
the fifth section.
1.5
In view of heightened international concern in recent years over the possible
acquisition and use by terrorist groups of nuclear weapons or radiological material,
the applicability of existing programs and instruments to such actions by non-state
actors is covered in section six. However instruments and programs being developed
to address terrorist activities in general (such as blocking of finance and general
judicial or intelligence cooperation) are excluded from the review. Finally, section
seven covers issues relating to the main delivery platform for nuclear weapons—
missiles.
MAIN THEMES AND FINDINGS
1.6
Taking a broad view of recent literature, several trends emerge:

First, while focusing heavily on ways to prevent the emergence of new nuclear
weapons states and further proliferation, there has been a renewed focus—
particularly since the abortive 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)—on
the perceived shortcomings of the original nuclear weapons states (NWS) in
meeting their NPT obligations. In this regard there has been a perceptible
focus on the perceived dangers of the unilateral policies pursued by the current
US Administration, in contrast to the lead position in consolidating the NPT
regime which most observers argue it should be playing. There are, however,
divergent views on whether the time is ripe for a more serious effort to move
towards full nuclear disarmament. However, serious movement towards this
objective has been encouraged in the past two years by authoritative
statements from a number of former statesmen from a number of countries, led
by four prominent Elder Statesmen from the United States.

Second, there is a growing tendency to focus on the claimed rights and wrongs
of states seeking application of their claimed unfettered rights under Article IV
of the NPT to civilian nuclear energy and the associated technology and
equipment. The literature also examines the increasing resistance to efforts,
led principally by Western NWS and other leading civilian nuclear powers, to
restrict the spread of such technology, which is cast in an ‘us’ and ‘them’
dichotomy similar to the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ division of the original
nuclear weapons debates.
Page |3

Third, few recent studies advocate the drafting of new multilateral treaties,
although there are suggestions for more regional and bilateral agreements and
arrangements which might plug some of the existing and emerging gaps in the
current regime. There is wide agreement that amending the NPT is not
feasible, though reinforcing it with additional protocols is not ruled out by
some. Otherwise, the focus of recent literature is on identification of violations
of existing treaties and agreements, how to respond to such violations, and
ways of improving verification and compliance more generally.

Fourth, perhaps unsurprisingly, given the concentrated debate in the past five
or so years on the nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran and Syria, and the
cessation of WMD programs by Libya, there is an increasing tendency for the
literature to take a country-specific approach to some nuclear issues,
particularly relating to proliferation and civilian nuclear energy programs.
Case studies abound, and there are increasing numbers of regionally-focused
studies, concentrating principally on civilian nuclear energy programs which
raise broader proliferation concerns. These cover mainly the Middle East, but
also increasingly South East Asia, and to a very much lesser extent Latin
America.

Fifth, while there is still a considerable focus on the nuclear arsenals and other
holdings of the NWS, there is an increasing tendency to contrast this with the
conventional forces of those states, with the US in particular—and NATO by
association—portrayed as having overwhelming conventional superiority.
This in turn is seen as pull factor by some writers, which should encourage the
US in particular to assess that it has no further need of its nuclear arsenal. But
equally, that superiority is seen by others as a push factor which encourages
other states either to hold on to their existing nuclear arsenals, or to seek to
obtain them.

Sixth, the asymmetric nature of the ‘war on terror’ has seen the growth of
literature that considers the issues and problems related to non-state actors.
These issues and problems include the possible acquisition of nuclear and
radiological weapons and missiles by terrorist groups in particular, as well as
the influence such actors may have on the acquisition efforts of some states,
and the desire of others to retain existing nuclear arsenals.

Seventh, and finally, there appears to be a growing consensus among writers
that we may already have reached, or may soon be reaching, a tipping point
where concerted international action may be possible to impose greater control
on missile proliferation generally, and on cruise missiles in particular.
SELECTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Page |4
1.7
Although a vast amount of literature has been written in recent years about
most aspects of the nuclear debate, there are some subjects which have either not been
covered at all, or have been covered inadequately. There are also areas which have
been covered in a piecemeal or scatter-gun approach with one aspect covered in one
paper, another aspect in another paper and so on. With those areas, there is a need for
a single new paper to draw the disparate pieces together in a unified whole.
1.8
Some of the areas which could benefit from further research include:
NPT
1.9
An analysis of the extent to which the interests of NWS are disadvantaged by
the difficulty of persuading NNWS to accept further strengthening of nonproliferation measures, due to the discontent of NNWS over lack of progress on
nuclear disarmament.
1.10 Is there anything to be gained by a companion international treaty to the NPT
which would extend NPT obligations—such as Articles I, II and VI—to the nonParties.
Non-Proliferation Generally
1.11 Maintaining existing security relationships without nuclear weapons. Is there a
role for non-nuclear deterrence in a nuclear weapon free world? An analysis of the
potential role of regional mechanisms, as opposed to global approaches, to ensuring
stability and security could be useful in this regard.
 This in fact could be two papers, one focusing on Europe and the other on
North East Asia.
1.12 Addressing security imbalances: conventional arms control in a nuclear
disarmament environment.
 How to address the massive superiority in conventional forces of some states,
and particularly the United States, which may be regarded by other nucleararmed states and nuclear arms aspirants as justifying opposition to nuclear
disarmament or encouraging active nuclear proliferation?
 How would a world in which all nuclear-armed states had 200 weapons, say,
work? Would it be more or less stable than the current one?
1.13 A fundamental review of the highest-priority risks of proliferation of weapons
capability and expertise and the best means to address them.
Disarmament
1.14 Creating the Strategic Environment for a Nuclear Weapon Free World:
Political Issues.
Page |5

Possible new political undertakings and other diplomatic action that would
change the present divisive and unproductive international climate on nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation issues.
1.15 How would the transition from bilateral strategic reductions between the US
and Russia segue into cuts by all the nuclear weapon states, particularly by involving
China? (This paper might usefully be prepared by a Chinese and/or, say, a French
writer.)
 What practical steps would a nuclear armed state need to take to verifiably
decommission all its nuclear weapons?
1.16 A comprehensive study of the possibility and implications of ‘breakout’ in a
nuclear weapon free world and what effective multilateral/regional/unilateral
measures might be possible to counter breakout, including non-nuclear measures.
 It should be noted that such a paper would probably require a longer term
project by a government or a research institute like RAND. A paper by an
individual researcher might still be useful, though time constraints might of
necessity limit its depth.
Civilian Uses of Nuclear Energy
1.17 How can the international civilian nuclear energy industry become more
involved in the non-proliferation/disarmament debate? Would a Code of Conduct
help? If so, what should it contain and how should it be developed?
1.18 Should there be a transition from national to multilaterally/internationally
owned enrichment occur? If so, how might it occur in a way that is commercially,
technically and politically acceptable?
Verification & Compliance
1.19 Is there anything not already covered in existing literature that might
strengthen existing verification regimes, particularly as the world moves towards zero
NW?
 The extent of transparency and surrender of national sovereignty that would be
required to verify a nuclear weapons elimination regime.
1.20 What practical, politically realistic (and innovative?) steps could be taken to
strengthen compliance and enforcement? How can the UN Security Council help
create the political circumstances for movement to nuclear disarmament and
strengthening the non-proliferation regime? What role can inducement play in
enforcement?
Terrorism
1.21 A comprehensive, prioritized list of which nuclear inventories around the
world pose the highest risks of nuclear theft for terrorist or proliferation use.
Page |6
Missiles
1.22 The impact of ballistic and cruise missile proliferation in the context of missile
defence deployments. Now that missile defences have been deployed in the Middle
East and Northeast Asia, a growing body of empirical evidence has become available
to examine these offense-defence interactions with greater analytical rigor. This could
also include an examination of the role of incentives and security guarantees in the
decision of states to give up ballistic missile programs. An important sub-set of this
subject would be
 The role and potential effectiveness of regional missile agreements, including
both offensive and defensive systems.
2. A GENERAL GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE
2.1
There is almost literally a mountain of literature available, in all shapes and
sizes, covering just about every aspect of the nuclear debate. The mountain is
composed of traditional books and articles in learned journals, with an even larger—
and growing—segment of articles by think-tanks and interest groups. As the internet
has become a consolidated part of international society, not only in the Western
world, but increasingly also in at least the urban areas of just about all developing
countries, much of the international nuclear debate is today conducted on the web.
While books on the subject remain for the most part only available in hard copy,
increasing numbers—particularly those produced by think-tanks and interest groups—
are now available for download. Some, though by no means all, of the learned
journals, also allow at least some of their articles on the subject to be downloaded,
while some have uploaded all their earlier issues going back to at least 2000 or the
date of first publication in some cases. And most—though again not all—major thinktanks and interests groups with an international security focus, make all of their
publications—detailed reports and analyses, shorter commentaries and monographs,
newspaper articles and op-eds, and fact sheets—all freely available on their websites.
The medium is the message writ large.
2.2
An important point to bear in mind in all this is that just about all the literature
is based on open-sourced information for fairly obvious reasons. Sometimes, this will
include previously classified material which has been released by governments in
sanitised forms for parliamentary or public hearings, or because the information is too
old to any longer risk endangering national security (e.g. fifty or thirty year rules in
force in some countries). Rarely does classified nuclear-related material come to
public attention though leaks, sanctioned or otherwise—though interestingly enough,
some such leaks would be not only encouraged, but legalised, under some verification
proposals which have been made (and discussed later in this paper).
Page |7
2.3
The categories of available literature have been described in detail elsewhere.2
Essentially, the main categories include purely historical or descriptive works, which
contain often quite detailed descriptions of national nuclear arsenals, civilian or
military nuclear infrastructure and programs, and the policy decisions which drove
them. Such literature will often contain little by way of judgment on whether a
country should or should not have pursued a particular policy or nuclear weapons or
energy program. However, they provide a valuable repository of information which is
useful for putting the current debate into a wider context.
2.4
There is also today an increasing sub-set of largely factual literature on nuclear
issues which can be broadly described as educational. Although the idea of producing
instructional material in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation goes back 30
years, it was only in 2000 that the UN Secretary-General set up a group of
governmental experts to study the matter. The group’s report was released in October
2002, and since that time annual General 2.5 Assembly resolutions have been adopted,
endorsing the initiative and calling for further efforts to expand the program.3 Some
governments, including Russia and the United States, see such material as playing a
positive role in discouraging university students and young graduates from pursuing
careers in nuclear weapons-related establishments. In this way, important nonproliferation goals are achieved by making such establishments less viable because of
the unavailability of trained personnel.
2.5
By far the greatest part of current nuclear-related literature is of a variety
which could be called ‘analytical/speculative’, and just about all of it can be found on
the internet. Much of it, moreover, is prepared for or by think-tanks and interest
groups which take one side or the other on the many controversial issues in the
nuclear debate. It has to be said, though, that some of these bodies, while reaching
speculative conclusions, tend also to be very analytical and relatively balanced in their
approach to the analysis. While they would like to see a particular set of results
emerge, they are at least realistic enough to know that some proposals are unlikely to
find political favour at least for now. Other groups are equally dedicated to particular
outcomes, but tend to take a more idealistic approach. They start with the same
information base as the other group, but then more often than not blithely ignore
political realities and simply postulate that their preferred outcome ‘should’ occur as it
is the only logical one in their view and, they surmise, the view of likeminded readers.
This is in no way meant to denigrate either those writings or their conclusions; nor
does it in any way diminish the value of reading such writings, whether one is
likeminded or not.
2.6
As just noted, the information on which this literature is based is often drawn
from the same sources. It can be based on events about which a lot or little is known
2
See for instance the "Review of Recent Literature on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and NonProliferation" prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2004.
3
Toki, Masako, and Wehling, Fred. “U.N Study on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education
Presented to the General Assembly”, CNS Research Story, 7 October 2002.
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/021007.htm
Page |8
in terms of the degree of confidence in the information and its reliability. It can be
based on government statements, publicly-released policy or programs being
considered or actually being implemented. It can be based on the outcome of meetings
and conferences, or on the letting of public tenders. But the common feature of this
class of literature is that, after more or less rigorous analysis of the facts, there is
speculation about the reasons and implications for a particular event, statement, policy
or program. And there is almost inevitably suggestions for the next steps which
should be taken or which should be avoided.
3. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
3.1
One of the principal aims of this Commission is to help ensure a constructive
outcome for the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). The NPT was signed in
1968 and entered into force in 1970. The Treaty provides that the Parties should hold
such conferences to review its implementation every five years, and indeed they have
been held regularly since the first in 1975. The Treaty was originally seen as a
transitional document, incorporating measures that would prevent the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, until such time as full nuclear disarmament could be
achieved. Despite the misgivings of some Parties, the decision was taken at the 1995
RevCon to make the term of the NPT indefinite and unconditional.
3.2
The NPT is widely regarded—and continues to this day to be so described in
just about all the literature on the subject—as perhaps the most successful multilateral
treaty in history. It currently has 188 States Party to it, though it is not universal since
three states (India, Israel and Pakistan) have never signed it, and North Korea
purported to withdraw from it in 2003, though the legality of this has not been
determined. It is also regarded as the principal legal foundation of the broader regime
of rules and constraints designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as well as
of weapon-usable fissile material and technology.
3.3
Despite these very positive features, the NPT has been regarded widely from
the very beginning as being an essentially discriminatory treaty since it creates a very
clear distinction between the states that had exploded a nuclear device prior to
19674—who are known in treaty parlance as nuclear-weapon states (NWS)—and the
far greater number of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) who are prohibited from
undertaking to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices.
Moreover, the NNWS with civilian nuclear energy programs are required to conclude
safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
covering all their nuclear material, designed to verify that they are not diverting
nuclear materials or equipment from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices. The NWS are not required to have safeguards agreements, though
4
As defined in Article IX, only states that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1
January 1967 are recognized as nuclear-weapon states. By this definition, China, France, Russia, the
UK and the USA are nuclear-weapon states (NWS). India, Israel and Pakistan (and by most
assessments, North Korea) are de facto nuclear-weapon states, but they are not legally recognized as
being NWS under the NPT.
Page |9
in practice they all do. These are ‘voluntary’ agreements covering designated
facilities. However, all NPT parties are prohibited from exporting nuclear materials or
equipment to any non-nuclear-weapon state unless that material or equipment is
subject to the safeguards arrangements specified in the treaty.
The Grand Bargain
3.4
Despite this overt discrimination, the NNWS accepted the NPT mainly
because of two of its central provisions, which together are seen by them—and the
literature—as being the ‘grand bargain’ of the treaty. Article VI provides that all
parties must ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’.
Despite its relatively conditional wording, which amounts to little more than an
undertaking to use best endeavours,5 Article VI has come to be regarded by many
NNWS—and many writers—for better or for worse as an iron-clad guarantee by the
NWS that they will move to full nuclear disarmament at some as yet undetermined
time in the future.
3.5
The other element of the ‘grand bargain’ is Article IV which provides that
nothing in the treaty should be interpreted as affecting the perhaps, in retrospect,
injudiciously worded ‘inalienable right’ of all parties to participate fully in the
international exchange of equipment, materials and scientific information for the
development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As the NWS are seen by many
to be showing little or no sign of living up to their perceived Article VI commitments,
increasingly vocal numbers of NNWS have seized on Article IV as giving them
essentially unfettered rights to develop their own nuclear fuel cycle, including the use
of technology which is the most susceptible of being converted to military uses. This
is the basis on which Iran, for example, has pursued its own nuclear program. It is
also worth noting here that other NNWS also conveniently overlook the fact that the
NPT makes it clear that Article IV must be read subject to the provisions prohibiting
the development of nuclear weapons and the transfer of materials and technology
which could be used for such a purpose.
3.6
At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, apart from extending the NPT
for an indefinite duration, delegations agreed on a detailed set of ‘Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’ to guide the parties to the
treaty in the next phase of its implementation. An enhanced review process was also
agreed to govern future RevCons. According to most of the literature, hopes were
high when, at the 2000 RevCon, the NWS made an ‘unequivocal undertaking to
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals’ as part of a 13-step program
Ford, Christopher A. “Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, The Nonproliferation Review, November 2007, Volume 14, No. 3.
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/143/143ford.pdf See also Kasprzyk, Nicolas. “Nuclear Nonproliferation and Regional Changing Strategic Balances: How Much Will Regional Proliferation
Impinge Upon the Future of the NPT?”, Chapter 11 of Nuclear Weapons Into the 21st Century, Studies
in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Volume 8, Peter Lang, Bern, 2001.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=A878D856-926FE11F-D91D-BAB41876CE7B&lng=en
5
P a g e | 10
of action on arms control and disarmament contained to which they also committed
themselves.6
NPT challenges and controversies
3.7
The optimism generated in 2000 soon evaporated. The then new Bush
Administration, in the wake particularly of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United
States in 2001, began moving towards action which was either unilateral or in the
company of ‘coalitions of the willing’. This was seen by many others, friend and foe
alike, as signalling a lessening US commitment to international treaty regimes and
obligations, including the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) of 1996 which it has refused to date to ratify. Russia and the United States
have also unambiguously declared their intention to retain nuclear weapons for the
indefinite future. Moreover, with the exception of the United Kingdom and more
recently France, the NWS all have significant modernization programs underway for
their nuclear forces; and the US in particular has been attempting to update its nuclear
weapon production complex and studying new nuclear weapon designs. In doing so,
however, it is facing increasing Congressional resistance.
3.8
By 2005, the situation had degenerated to the point where the NPT RevCon of
that year failed to even agree on a final document. The US made it clear it regarded
the 13-step program from 2000 to be a dead letter. And essentially there the situation
rests. There have been one or two hopeful indications that things might be better for
the 2010 RevCon.7 However, these are few and far between, and the 2008 Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2010 RevCon was unable even to endorse the
Chairman’s purely factual account of the meeting (though the Chairman then issued it
as a Working Paper of the PrepCom).
3.9
The literature since 2005 has tended to reflect the general doom and gloom
engendered by these developments, with a particularly common theme in nearly all
publications being that the NPT regime itself is in danger of imminent collapse. There
also appears to be a fairly general view among writers that efforts to date to
delegitimize the use or threat of use, and even the possession, of nuclear weapons
have been severely undermined. Moreover, there is a widespread feeling among
observers that any timetable for eventual nuclear disarmament will at the very least be
a lengthy and incremental one.
3.10 Despite these generally negative assessments, interestingly and surprisingly
enough, some writers have taken a more positive line.8 Some even see describing the
NPT as a failure as itself undermining confidence in the treaty and non-proliferation
regime more widely. It is suggested that this in turn may encourage some states to
seek nuclear weapons, or wage preventive war or develop new nuclear weapons, all of
This NWS ‘unequivocal undertaking’ is contained in para. 6 of the 13-step program of action,
contained on pp. 14–15 of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT RevCon Volume I
NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts 1 and II).
7
Johnson, Rebecca. “2008 NPT PrepCom adopts report but not Chair's factual and balanced
Summary”, ACRONYM Report, 9 May 2008. http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/08pc07.htm
8
See, for example, Rebecca Johnson, “2008 NPT PrepCom adopts report but not Chair's factual and
balanced Summary”, ACRONYM Report, 9 May 2008. http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/08pc07.htm
6
P a g e | 11
which will certainly undermine the NPT regime.9 These writers are also inclined to
give credence and weight to claims by both the US and Russia that, far from not
moving towards nuclear disarmament, they have substantially reduced their nuclear
arsenals and done so in advance of deadlines set by bilateral treaties. Others, while
acknowledging these reductions have indeed taken place, note that they occurred not
as a result of NPT commitments, but because of changed geopolitical circumstances
and the practical need to retire aging parts of the nuclear arsenals. One thoughtful
comment is that the actual numbers of nuclear weapons are relatively unimportant:
what is important is steady reduction in numbers and a devaluation of the importance
of nuclear weapons.10
3.11 There is nevertheless a tendency among all recent writers, including those who
are pessimistic about progress to date, to place considerable hope in the possibility of
the next US Administration taking a more positive, less unilateral and more leading
direction across the board in the nuclear debate. A considerable amount of hope has
also been generated by the calls in 2007 and 2008 by four former leading US
statesmen for more accelerated steps to achieve total nuclear disarmament.11 These
calls will be discussed more fully in the next two sections.
Proposals for Change
3.12 Most writers also suggest a variety of steps needed to rectify perceived
weaknesses or lacunae in the NPT generally, or more specifically to ensure a
successful outcome of the 2010 RevCon.12 The great majority of these tend to repeat
much the same set of themes, and are essentially encapsulated in the proposals made
by the four elder US statesmen, though many of the proposals predate the latters’.
Some writers, however, go well beyond these well-worn (though nonetheless worthy)
Walsh, Jim. “Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Nonproliferation” Paper
commissioned for WMD Commission, September, 2006.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No41.pdf
10
Dokos, Thanos P. “The Future of the Global Consensus on Nuclear Non-proliferation: Can the NPT
be Kept Together Without the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons?”, Chapter 10 in Nuclear Weapons Into
the 21st Century, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Volume 8, Peter Lang, Bern,
2001. http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=CC2268E6F31C-197D-30E7-AA911C467D99&lng=en
11
George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons”, The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007; and “Toward a Nuclear-Free World”, The Wall
Street Journal, 15 January 2008.
12
See Applegarth, Claire and Tyson, Rhianna, Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty: A Resource Guide, Arms Control Association and Women's International
League for Peace & Freedom, April 2005
http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/NPTRevConf2005_MajorProposals.pdf
which contains a useful compilation of proposals made by states and NGOs on all aspects of the NPT.
Though produced for the 2005 RevCon, it remains relevant today. See also Weapons of Terror,
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report, 2006; and Lüdeking, Rüdiger. “Safeguarding the
Future of the NPT: Preparing for the NPT Review Conference 2010”, Chapter NATO and the Future of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO Defense College, Rome, May 2007.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=1D68413B-74613624-2235-959C1B17BBBD&lng=en
9
P a g e | 12
menus, and offer new suggestions.13 Some writers would be happy if the NPT had a
permanent secretariat and/or governing council.14 Other writers have made
suggestions aimed at bringing the non-signatory states into the NPT ambit by
negotiation of a protocol to the NPT or even a whole new treaty, 15 though others
warn that such proposals could disenchant the NNWS who have remained faithful to
the NPT.16 The suggestion has even been made that such a protocol might be drafted
in such a way as to allow Israel to accede to it without necessarily clarifying its
nuclear status. (Israeli policy is to neither confirm nor deny it has nuclear weapons.)
There are also still suggestions for the amendment of the NPT itself, though most
writers agree that at best this would be impossible, and at worst, dangerous because
the whole fabric of the treaty would be thrown open for review, and could fail
entirely.17
3.13 There have also been suggestions that the UN Security Council expand on the
legislative role it assigned itself in adopting UNSCR 154018 (see Nuclear Terrorism
section below) and take a more active role in overseeing the implementation of the
NPT. Other writers suggest a more limited role for the Security Council in impeding
any future attempts to withdraw from the NPT.19
3.14 This particular aspect of the debate arose in the wake of the withdrawal of
North Korea from the NPT in January 2003, after it had already removed IAEA
monitoring equipment from its installations and halted all verification activities by the
agency. Article X of the NPT gives parties the right to withdraw from the treaty, with
a three-month notification period, should they decide that ‘extraordinary events’,
related to the subject matter of the treaty, have jeopardized their ‘supreme national
Du Preez, Jean. “Half Full or Half Empty? Realizing the Promise of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty”, Arms Control Today, December 2006. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_12/DuPreez
14
Dhanapala, Jayantha. “What further steps could Non-Nuclear Weapon States take to strengthen the
Non-Proliferation Regime?”, Paper presented at the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament,
Oslo, 26 – 27 February 2008. http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wpcontent/uploads/2008/02/Paper_Dhanapala.pdf See also Johnson, Rebecca. Is the NPT up to the
challenge of proliferation?, Disarmament Forum, 2004, No. 4, pp. 9-20.
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2186.pdf
15
Asculai, Ephraim. “Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”, Memorandum No. 70, Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, June 2004. See also Dutto, Caterina. “ElBaradei
Remarks at Georgetown University”, Proliferation Analysis, 24 October 2006. Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18816&prog=zgp&proj=znp
p
16
Nielsen, Jenny. “Engaging India, Israel and Pakistan in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”,
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 86, Autumn 2007. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd86/86jn.htm
17
Ibid.
18
Goldschmidt, Pierre, Saving the NPT and the Nonproliferation Regime in an Era of Nuclear
Renaissance, Testimony before the US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, July 24, 2008
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20321 which contains the
draft of a generic UN Security Council resolution for dealing preventively with cases of noncompliance.
19
Bunn, George, and Rhinelander, John, Right to Withdraw from the NPT: Article X Is Not
Unconditional, Disarmament Diplomacy, Vol. 79, April/May 2005.
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd79/79gbjr.htm
13
P a g e | 13
interests’. The North Korean case itself—and speculation that Iran may follow suit—
has raised concerns that a determined proliferator currently can ‘legally’ put in place
all necessary capabilities to develop nuclear weapons under the pretext of developing
a peaceful nuclear program and then, when convenient, invoke Article X to withdraw
from the NPT at a point when a nuclear weapon capability is within close reach. This,
not surprisingly, has led to calls for at the very least a reinterpretation of Article X.
3.15 To address this concern, some US analysts have proposed that if the IAEA
cannot determine that an NPT party is in compliance with its safeguards agreements,
then that party should not be allowed to free itself from its legally-binding obligations
simply by announcing its withdrawal from the treaty. Rather, the state party should
first have to satisfy the IAEA Director-General and Board of Governors that it is in
full compliance with its obligations. It should also be required to completely
dismantle all nuclear facilities it may have failed to declare to the IAEA, as mandated
by its safeguards agreement with the agency. As already noted, some authors would
also assign a similar warning role to the UN Security Council. Indeed the suggestion
has even been made that under the terms of both the NPT and more specifically the
United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council could have the authority to take
action against NPT withdrawals that could lead to threats to international peace and
security.20
4. NON-PROLIFERATION GENERALLY
4.1
Debate about specific issues relating to the provisions of the NPT reflects
wider concerns about many aspects of nuclear non-proliferation more generally.21
This has been particularly exacerbated in recent years by the North Korean and
Iranian nuclear programs,22 Libya quitting its WMD program, and suspicions that
Syria was also attempting to develop nuclear weapons.23 This has led to speculation in
the literature about the intentions of other countries.24 There is wide agreement
See Bunn and Rhinelander, op. cit., and by the same authors “NPT Withdrawal: Time for the
Security Council to Step In”, Arms Control Today, May 2005.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_05/Bunn_Rhinelander
21
Ahmar, Moonis et al., Nuclear Weapons into the 21st Century, Studies in Contemporary History and
Security Policy series, Peter Lang, Bern, Switzerland, 2001,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?fecvnodeid=121925&fecvid=21&v21=121925&lng=en&or
d61=alphaNavi&ord60=PublicationDate&id=327 See also Ball, Desmond. “The Probabilities of On
the Beach: Assessing ‘Armageddon Scenarios’ in the 21st Century”, SDSC Working Paper 401, May
2006. http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp_sdsc_401.pdf
22
IISS, US military options against emerging nuclear threats – The challenges of a denial strategy, IISS
Strategic Comment, Volume 12, Issue 3, April 2006 http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategiccomments/past-issues/volume-12---2006/volume-12---issue-3/us-military-options-against-emergingnuclear-/
23
Froscher, Torrey C. “Anticipating Nuclear Proliferation: Insights from the Past”, The
Nonproliferation Review, November 2006, Volume 13, No. 3.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/133froscher.pdf
24
Lavoy, Peter R. “Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy
Responses”, The Nonproliferation Review, November 2006, Volume 13, No. 3.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/133lavoy.pdf See also Potter, William C. “The New Proliferation Game”,
Paper commissioned by the WMD Commission, 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No12.pdf
20
P a g e | 14
amongst writers that Japan,25 for instance, is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons, and
a similar assessment is made of Saudi Arabia by some writers.26 Discussion also
continues about India and Pakistan’s present nuclear posture and future plans,27 as
well as on ways of bringing them and Israel into the non-proliferation regime.28 There
has also been discussion of the increasing profile that non-state actors, including
transnational corporations, quasi-governmental entities, terrorist groups, and
individuals operating on the fringes of government control in weak or failing states,
may come to play in proliferation in coming years.29 Proliferation concerns
surrounding civil nuclear energy programs and technologies will be discussed in a
later section of this paper. As has already been seen above, the stalemate in recent
NPT RevCons and PrepComs has only added fuel to the fire. As a result, there is a
veritable mountain of literature on all aspects of non-proliferation, counterproliferation, arms control and reductions, and ultimately nuclear disarmament.30
4.2
Indeed, some writers have even claimed that more work needs to be done to
develop a shared international assessment of what the proliferation threats are and the
priority that should be assigned to each threat.31 One particularly gloomy view is that
there are almost no areas relating to proliferation where there is sufficient broad-based
; and Sager, Abdulaziz, Stracke, Nicole, Menon, Radhika (Eds.). “Nuclearization of the Gulf”, Gulf
Research Center Security and Terrorism Bulletin, No. 7, December 2006.
http://www.grc.ae/index.php?frm_module=contents&frm_action=detail_book&frm_type_id=&sec_typ
e=h&op_lang=en&sec=contents&frm_title=&book_id=43792&publ_type=57&publ_id=65
25
Mochizuki, Mike M. “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo”, The Nonproliferation Review, July 2007,
Volume 14, No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/142mochizuki.pdf See also Endo, Tetsuya, How
Realistic Is A Nuclear Armed Japan?, Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
Commentary No. 8, 20 July 2007. http://www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/200707/20-1.html ; and Green,
Michael J., and Furukawa, Katsuhisa. “New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and Its Search for an
Arms Control Strategy”, Arms Control Today, July/August 2000.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_07-08/japanjulaug
26
Lippman, Thomas W. “Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy”, Middle East Institute Policy Brief No.
5, January 2008.
27
Karnad, Bharat. India’s Nuclear Policy, (Praeger, Westport, Conn.) October 2008.
http://www.cprindia.org/morepub.php?s=62 For a Pakistani viewpoint, see Khan, Feroz Hassan, Brig.
Gen. “The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia”, Arms Control
Today, October 2003. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/Khan_10 See also Jones, Rodney.
Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, 1 October 2001. http://www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/southasia.pdf
28
Miller, Marvin, and Scheinman, Lawrence. “Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT
States in the Nonproliferation Regime”, Arms Control Today, December 2003.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman
29
Russell, James A. “Peering into the Abyss: Non-State Actors and the 2016 Proliferation
Environment”, The Nonproliferation Review, November 2006, Volume 13, No. 3.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/133toc.htm
30
Perkovich, George; Tuchman Matthews, Jessica; Cirincione, Joseph; Gottemoeller, Rose; and
Wolfsthal, Jon. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment Report,
March 2005. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16593 ; Price,
Owen C.W., and Mackby, Jenifer (eds.). Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues”, (Project on Nuclear
Issues (PONI/Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.), 24 July 2007.
31
Cirincione, Joseph. “A Global Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Threats”, Paper commissioned by
the WMD Commission, 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No10.pdf
P a g e | 15
agreement to arrive at a common approach.32 Others have suggested that, by studying
the likely technical and political pathways individual countries may take toward
achieving a nuclear capability, the intelligence community may be able to identify
early indicators of possible interest in nuclear weapons and help policymakers
develop strategies for impeding or complicating progress along those pathways.33 And
some writers have taken a more critical approach, arguing against representing
dangers in ways that obscure both the dangers inherent in the continued maintenance
of existing nuclear arsenals and the fact that a party’s own actions are often a source
of the instabilities.34
4.3
The WMD Commission, of course, released its Report in 2006, though there
has been little indication of movement on most of its recommendations.35 The four
elder US statesmen, in their first statement in 2007, asserted that the world was ready
for serious moves towards total nuclear disarmament. They listed a number of steps
which would consolidate nuclear non-proliferation and help prepare the way for
disarmament. It may be useful to include these in extenso:






Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase
warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized
use of a nuclear weapon.
Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that
possess them.
Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.
Initiating a bipartisan process with the [US] Senate, including understandings
to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical
advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.
Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons,
weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the
world.
Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the
guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a
reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international
reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by
spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.
Parrish, Scott, and Potter, William C. “Nuclear Threat Perceptions and Nonproliferation Responses:
A Comparative Analysis”, Paper commissioned for WMD Commission, August 2005.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No36.pdf
33
Einhorn, Robert J. “Identifying Nuclear Aspirants and Their Pathways to the Bomb”, The
Nonproliferation Review, November 2006, Volume 13, No. 3. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/133toc.htm
34
Gusterson, Hugh. “A Double Standard on Nuclear Weapons?”, Audit of the Convention Wisdom, 068, MIT Center for International Studies, April 2006.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=5CB71376-C3C8D69F-EDB5-6AC5DE7A8001&lng=en
35
Burroughs, John. “The WMD Commission One Year On: Impact and Assessment”, Disarmament
Diplomacy, No. 85, Summer 2007. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd85/85wmd.htm
32
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

Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out
the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weaponsusable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the
materials safe.
Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that
give rise to new nuclear powers.36
4.4
In their second major joint statement a year later, in January 2008,37 they
outlined a number of steps which the United States and Russia should take together
immediately:








Extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991. …The
key provisions of this treaty, including their essential monitoring and
verification requirements, should be extended, and the further reductions
agreed upon in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions
should be completed as soon as possible.
Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all
nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or
unauthorized attacks.
Discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain
from the Cold War days.
Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballisticmissile defense and early warning systems, as proposed by Presidents Bush
and Putin at their 2002 Moscow summit meeting.
Dramatically accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of
security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in
the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb.
Start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating
the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their
security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their
eventual elimination. These smaller and more portable nuclear weapons are,
given their characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist groups.
Strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) as a counter to the global spread of advanced
technologies.
Adopt a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into
effect, which would strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring of
nuclear activities.
Schultz, George P., Perry, William J., Kissinger, Henry A., and Nunn, Sam. “A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons”, The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html
37
Schultz, George P., Perry, William J., Kissinger, Henry A., and Nunn, Sam. “Toward a Nuclear-Free
World”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries
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4.5
The four elder statesmen went on to suggest that, in parallel with these steps
by the U.S. and Russia, the dialogue should be broadened to include non-nuclear as
well as nuclear nations. They added that:
“Key subjects include turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into
a practical enterprise among nations, by applying the necessary political will to
build an international consensus on priorities. ...
“Another subject: Developing an international system to manage the risks of
the nuclear fuel cycle. ... The purpose should be to provide for reliable supplies
of nuclear fuel, reserves of enriched uranium, infrastructure assistance,
financing, and spent fuel management—to ensure that the means to make
nuclear weapons materials isn't spread around the globe.
“There should also be an agreement to undertake further substantial reductions
in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces beyond those recorded in the U.S.-Russia
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. As the reductions proceed, other
nuclear nations would become involved.
“... Completing a verifiable treaty to prevent nations from producing nuclear
materials for weapons would contribute to a more rigorous system of
accounting and security for nuclear materials.
“We should also build an international consensus on ways to deter or, when
required, to respond to, secret attempts by countries to break out of agreements.
“Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal. Indeed,
this is the only way to build the kind of international trust and broad
cooperation that will be required to effectively address today's threats. Without
the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation
required to stop our downward spiral.”
4.6
All of these points will be considered in the course of this paper. But there
have also been many proposals for measures beyond this list, including, for instance,
for the creation of a counter-proliferation body linked to the UN Security Council;
and perhaps also a more general nuclear governance body to deal with long-term
proliferation and non-proliferation issues, as well as the large number of adjacent and
linked issues of nuclear energy governance.38 Others conclude that the best defences
against nuclear proliferation may be political and economic, rather than military, and
may involve both carrots and sticks which make it just not viable for an adversary to
pursue or continue to pursue nuclear weapons.39
Simpson, John. “The nuclear non-proliferation regime: back to the future?”, Strengthening
Disarmament and Security, UNIDIR, 2004.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=ED8D55F0-4ECC3166-5434-AD7850418174&lng=en
39
Sokolski, Henry D. (Ed.) Prevailing in a Well-Armed World: Devising Competitive Strategies
Against Weapons Proliferation, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, March 2000.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB304.pdf
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US-Russian nuclear arms reductions—a SORT of START
4.7
Just as they do in the NPT context, the United States and Russia, and to a
lesser extent the other nuclear-armed states, are cast, consciously or not, in the roles
of international stars or villains, depending on the point of view of the writer. But
there is nonetheless widespread agreement in the literature that any improvements in
the international non-proliferation landscape must be led by those countries. The
essential reason is obvious: Russia and the United States between them have nuclear
arsenals which are many times larger than the combined arsenals of all the other
nuclear-armed states. The general view is that until Russia and US drastically reduce
their current holdings, change their current reliance on nuclear deterrence,40 and take
or endorse measures which devalue the worth of nuclear weapons generally, little
progress can be expected of, let alone be achieved by, other countries.
4.8
Current US policies aimed at achieving regime change in proliferant countries
are also criticised.41 The point is made that democratisation is far from being
tantamount to de-nuclearisation.42 Instead, it is suggested that strategies combining
diplomatic, social, and economic benefits with credible threats and clear red lines, are
more likely to succeed, particularly if aimed at countries supporting or assisting
proliferation states.43
4.9
The fact of the matter is that the US and Russia have, since the end of the Cold
War, embarked upon both unilateral and treaty-mandated cuts to their nuclear
arsenals. Further measures have been proposed but not yet implemented.44 The
ground-breaking instrument was the bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of
1991 (START I). It set an upper limit of 6000 on the number of nuclear warheads
each party could place on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, and bombers. The maximum number of ICBMs was set at
1,600. By the time of its final implementation in late 2001 around 80% of all strategic
nuclear weapons then in existence had been removed. START II, aimed at restricting
the number of warheads each missile could carry, never entered into force, first
because of Russian delays in ratification, then because of the US decision to withdraw
Chamberlain, Nigel. “Nuclear Deterrence: a tried and tested defence strategy or an elaborate belief
system masquerading as scientific theory?”, BASIC Notes, Occasional Papers on International Security
Policy, 20 July 2006. http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060720.htm See also Russian Academy
of Sciences, “Reducing Nuclear Tensions: How Russia and the United States Can Go Beyond Mutual
Assured Destruction”, Moscow, 19 January 2005. http://nti.org/c_press/analysis_mad_011905.pdf
41
Perkovich, George. “Democratic Bomb”: Failed Strategy, CEIP Policy Brief No. 49, November
2006. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB49_final1.pdf
42
Tertrais, Bruno. “The New Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation”, ESF Working Papers, Centre for
European Policy Studies, Brussels, April 2003.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=4EB01484-A5B5A8B6-980C-74B7334D19D9&lng=en
43
Montgomery, Alexander, Ringing In Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network,
International Security, Vol. 30 no. 2, page(s) 153-187, Fall 2005. http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/21033/Montgomery_IS.pdf
44
National Academy of Sciences, "Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action" August 2005.
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11302
40
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from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002. At that point Russia withdrew
from START II.
4.10 It had in any case been overtaken by the 2002 US–Russian Strategic Offensive
Reduction Treaty (SORT).That treaty requires the parties to reduce the number of
their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700–2200 each by 31
December 2012—two-thirds the number allowed under START I. SORT was
particularly important as it embodies the concept of equal security for both parties,
given that the US is committed under it to a sharp reduction, at least on paper, in its
nuclear forces to levels similar to Russia. SORT was also significant in that it marked
a break from the protracted and painfully detailed negotiations and documentation
that characterised the two START treaties and Cold War instruments before them.
Unlike those documents, it contains no verification procedures—which some
observers regard as a weakness, and others, a strength. In effect SORT amounts to
unilateral reductions by each side, with unprecedented flexibility as to how those
reductions are achieved. This was very much in line with the approach taken by the
Bush Administration in rejecting the painstaking previous approach, which they
believed unnecessarily constrained the United States in adapting to the changed
geopolitical circumstances prevailing in the post-Cold War world. And it is an
approach which finds some endorsement in the literature.45
4.11 One other thing that SORT has been criticized for by some observers is that it
did not encapsulate what it had originally been thought would be incorporated in a yet
to be negotiated START III, namely the actual verified destruction of the warheads
which had been removed from operational deployment. This had been agreed in
principle by both US and Russian negotiators as far back as 1998. Agreement in
principle had also been reached on the secure and verifiable disposal of the fissile
material from the warheads. The absence of such provisions from SORT have caused
a number of writers to lament that while the overall size of nuclear forces has been
reduced, there is no guarantee that such cuts will remain permanent. A touch of
Russian fatalism may be relevant here: “In the end, the post-SORT period is likely to
become the time of missed opportunity.”46
Tactical Nuclear Weapons Reductions
4.12 Apart from the foregoing, which relates to strategic nuclear forces, both
Russia and the USA have large numbers of tactical (or nonstrategic) nuclear warheads
which continue to have military roles and missions and assigned to them.47 The US is
thought to have a total of around 1120 of these tactical nuclear weapons. Some 150 of
these are in the form of bombs which can be dropped from aircraft. They are deployed
at US air bases in a number of European NATO members, while the rest are held in
Kartchner, Kerry M., and Pitman, George R. “Alternative Approaches to Arms Control in a
Changing World”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 62, February 2002.
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd62/62op1.htm
46
Sokov, Nikolai. “The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT”, Arms Control Today,
April 2003. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/sokov_apr03
47
One sub-category of this class of weapon captured public imagination at few years ago: see Sokov,
Nikolai. “’Suitcase Nukes:’ Permanently Lost Luggage”, CNS Research Story, 13 February 2004.
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/040213.htm
45
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central storage depots in the United States. The European holdings have caused a
number of writers to call on NATO or the states concerned not to allow the weapons
to be deployed. And indeed, the final US nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom
were removed in 2008. Estimates of Russian holdings of tactical nuclear weapons
tend to vary. However, it is thought to have more than 3 000 active weapons ready for
possible use, and many thousands more held in reserve or awaiting dismantlement.48
4.13 None of the existing bilateral treaties between the US and Russia cover tactical
nuclear weapons. The only limitations are unilateral, though parallel, undertakings
given by each side in 1991 and 1992. This has naturally led to proposals to develop a
treaty on the subject or some other legally-binding limitation.49 One difficulty in
achieving such an outcome will be arriving at a mutually acceptable definition of
what a tactical nuclear weapon is—something which is currently lacking. A more
difficult task would be the need for strong verification procedures which could
involve more transparency on nuclear warhead holdings than either side has been
willing to contemplate to date.
Future weapons
4.14 Although both the US and Russia have significantly reduced their nuclear
arsenals, that is not to say that they no longer see such weapons as being a significant
part of their future security policies. Some writers even claim that both sides would
probably have reduced their arsenals anyway for operational reasons and as their
weapons aged. Others argue that US conventional forces have reached a level where
they offer a greater practical deterrence than nuclear weapons ever did.
4.15 A continuing US interest in maintaining some sort of nuclear arsenal50 has
been shown by the continuing interest there on the part of both the military and
weapons laboratories in developing low yield and nuclear ‘bunker buster’ nuclear
weapons aimed at deeply buried or hardened targets.51 Another interesting suggestion
has been that there is a significant danger that nanotechnology—which is a product
originally of nuclear weapons laboratories—could be used to create dangerous and
destabilising refinements of nuclear weapon design, particularly in relation to
miniaturised and low-yield weapons.52 And thinking laterally, another new threat to
be identified are cyber-weapons which could interfere with nuclear command and
Withington, Thomas, ‘The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Game’, ISN Security Watch, 12 August 2008,
[International Relations and Security Network] http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=19300
49
Potter, William C. “Practical Measures to Reduce the Risks Presented by Non-Strategic Nuclear
Weapons”, Paper commissioned by the WMD Commission, 2004.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No8.pdf
50
Doyle, James. “U.S. National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21 st Century”, Proliferation
Analysis, 23 August 2007, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19530&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl
,znpp,zted
51
Drell, Sidney, Goodby, James, Jeanloz, Raymond, and Peurifoy, Robert. “A Strategic Choice: New
Bunker Busters or Nonproliferation”, Arms Control Today, March 2003.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/drelletal_mar03
52
Gsponer, André. “From the Lab to the Battlefield? Nanotechnology and Fourth-Generation Nuclear
Weapons”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 67, November 2002.
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/67op1.htm
48
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control systems.53 Equally, however, there are studies on the development in both the
US and Russia of ‘conventional’ weapons which have the same power, or exceed that
of nuclear weapons, linked with suggestions that such developments could be of
obvious interest for development by countries such as India.54
4.16 In September 2008, Russia’s President Medvedev gave an unequivocal
undertaking that Russia’s nuclear arsenal would be renewed and updated—though this
development has yet to be analysed in the literature.55 While directly linked to events
in Georgia in August 2008, this Russian decision was likely also the result of Russian
concerns over the positioning of American ballistic missile defence (BDMs) systems
near its border. More generally, perceptions of a severe imbalance in Russian
conventional forces vis-à-vis the United States, have given rise to speculation in the
literature that Russia may place some reliance on maintaining its nuclear deterrence
for some time to come. Moreover, its tactical nuclear weapons could play a significant
role in this regard, particularly given that they are not subject to any agreed bilateral
or multilateral limitations. There has also been speculation that Russia may maintain
or even further develop its inventory of multiple-warhead land-based missiles
(MIRVs) rather than retiring them, given the demise of START II.56
4.17 There have also been a number of studies in recent years of known Chinese
efforts to modernise its nuclear forces generally,57 though hard information in this
regard is difficult to find.58 Britain for its part has taken some steps in preparation for
eventual nuclear disarmament, including extremely useful technical work on the
verification of nuclear weapon dismantlement. At the same time, the British
government has stirred controversy by deciding to renew its fleet of nuclear-armed
submarines. Despite this generally positive record, some writers have expressed
optimism that a change of government may bring positive changes to Britain’s
security policies, and particularly those relating to nuclear weapons.59 French
Hundman, Eric. “Information Warfare: Relevance to Nuclear Weapons Security”, Center for Defense
Information, 2008. http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/InformationWarfare.pdf
54
Lele, Ajey. “Looking Beyond Nuclear Weapons”, IDSA Strategic Comments, Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses Delhi, 15 January 2008.
http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/AjeyLele150108.htm See also Levi, Michael A. Fire in
the Hole: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options for Counterproliferation, Carnegie Paper No. 31,
November 2002. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp31.pdf
55
But see Stulberg, Adam N. “Russia’s Nonproliferation Tightrope”, Russian Analytical Digest, 30/07
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=1082A6BE-750F7BBD-5B47-AEAF44CC97A5&lng=en
56
For example, see Rose Gottemoeller, ‘Nuclear necessity in Putin’s Russia’, Arms Control Today,
April 2004.
57
Lewis, Jeffrey. The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age,
(The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007). Link at
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=194 (See also
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/the_minimum_means_of_reprisal.pdf for the doctoral
dissertation on which this book was based.)
58
Robert A. Manning, Brad Roberts, Ronald Montaperto, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control,
Council on Foreign Relations, 1 April 2000.
59
Wheeler, Jamie. “Preventing a new age of nuclear insecurity? Analysis of William Hague’s July
Address to the IISS”, BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 5, 29 July 2008.
http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz05.htm
53
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President Sarkozy in March 2008 outlined a plan to reduce French reliance on nuclear
deterrence which included a number of practical steps.60
A Unilateralist United States
4.18 Since coming to office, but particularly since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in
2001, there has been an increasing tendency for the United States to take unilateral
action, or in small ‘coalitions of the willing’61 on international security issues. The
parallel US tendency to divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ has also seen the
emergence of discriminatory US policies under which the ‘good guys’ can get access
to civilian nuclear technologies and materials, while the ‘bad guys’ or ‘rogue states’
are to be locked out of receiving such largesse.62
4.19 Not a few writers—and indeed no small number of states63—have regarded
such actions as US abrogation of the ABM Treaty, its scuppering of the Biological
Weapons Protocol in 2002, its policy on pre-emptive attack and counter-proliferation,
and revised nuclear doctrine released that same year, as at the least straining, or at
worst undermining, international nuclear non-proliferation norms.64 Or to put it
succinctly, “the US is seen by others as a country to be deterred, rather than one
deterring against aggression by others.”65 In partial mitigation, however, it has been
suggested that if other great powers hope to reverse the U.S. trend toward unilateral
policies, they will have to make great power cooperation more effective in dealing
with the hard cases.
4.20 The 2002 US nuclear doctrine resulted from a Nuclear Posture Review
conducted after the Bush Administration came to office.66 Apart from reaffirming the
importance of nuclear deterrence, its central thrust was that non-proliferation is
preferable but counter-proliferation (that is, the creation of military responses to
hostile proliferation) may be necessary if non-proliferation fails. This does not differ
Tertrais, Bruno. “France and Nuclear Disarmament: The Meaning of the Sarkozy Speech”,
Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 May 2008.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20090&prog=zgp&proj=znp
p
61
Cooper, Andrew F. “Re-Shaping Diplomacy: Stretching the Model of ‘Coalitions of the Willing’”,
CIGI Working Papers, Issue No. 1, October 2005.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=07A75F72-312D6AB8-3C20-97126ADC6BBC&lng=en
62
Chyba, Christopher F., U.S. Nuclear Posture, Remarks at the June 21-22, 2004 Carnegie Conference
on Non-Proliferation in Washington, D.C. http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/20737/Chyba_CEIP_remarks.pdf
63
Ferguson, Charles D. “Beyond the NRA Doctrine”, Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2007.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12384/
64
Stanley Foundation. “International Implications for and Levers on US Nuclear Weapons Policy”,
Results of the ‘International Impacts of US Nuclear Weapons Policy Workshop, Washington, 31 June
2008. http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/IntlImpliPDB1008.pdf
65
Simpson, Erika, New Opportunities to Question US Reliance upon Nuclear Weapons, INESAP
Bulletin 28, April 2008. http://www.inesap.org/bulletin28/inesap.php?page=4
66
See also Departments of Defense and Energy, U.S. “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the
21st Century”, Official Policy Paper, 23 September 2008.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf
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greatly from the previous Clinton Administration’s view.67 But a new, and troubling,
aspect was added. Under the new doctrine, apart from responding to nuclear attack
with its own nuclear weapons, the United States would even be prepared to retaliate—
or attack pre-emptively68—with nuclear weapons if attacked, or was under imminent
threat of a major attack, with chemical and biological weapons by another state. The
new doctrine also made it clear that nuclear weapons could be used on certain
battlefields,69 thus no longer acting merely as a deterrent.70 Pre-emptive or preventive
strikes have been particularly controversial in the literature.71
4.21 In February 2004 President Bush announced a series of measures which the
United States would take both alone and in concert with others to further stem the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was little of substance in the statement as to
how exactly these results were to be achieved, or how they jibed with other
arrangements, including Article IV of the NPT. There was a view in the literature that
others would merely see this as further US meddling.72
4.22 It has been argued that these unilateralist policies of the US, together with its
major military presence in Asia, and China’s increasing force projection in the area,
will cause India in particular to hold on to its nuclear deterrent, and indeed could lead
to upgrading of existing Indian nuclear weapons.73 There is also concern in Pakistan
that preemption could be used against it both in the Afghan border areas by the US
and its allies, and in Kashmir by India. It is also argued that US unilateralism has had
a negative impact on US ties with China (and North Korea).74 In fact, it has even been
suggested that China itself may now seriously be considering the use of pre-emptive
force as part of its security doctrine.75
Kristensen, Hans M. “US National Security Strategy and pre-emption”, Revue Défense Nationale,
No. 7, July 2006.
http://www.defnat.com/gb/fs_accueil+rf.asp?cchemin=acc_frames/fs_resultat.asp(pi)ccodoper(eg)4(ec)
cid(eg)200607(ec)ctypeencours(eg)(ec)cid_article(eg)20060718
68
The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House Sept. 2002, p. 15.
69
Kristensen, Hans M. “White House Guidance Led to New Nuclear Strike Plans Against Proliferators,
Document Shows”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 5 November 2007.
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/11/white_house_guidance_led_to_ne.php
70
Martin, Patrick. “US plans widespread use of nuclear weapons in war”, World Socialist Web Site
News & Analysis, 11 March 2002. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/mar2002/nuke-m11.shtml See
also Gray, Dr. Colin S. “Maintaining Effective Deterrence”, Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute of
the US Army War College, 1 August 2003.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB211.pdf
71
Reiter, Dr. Dan. “Preventive War and Its Alternatives: The Lessons of History”, Monograph,
Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 21 April 2006.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB651.pdf
72
Wolfsthal, Jon. “The President’s Proliferation Initiative”, CEIP Proliferation Analysis, 11 February
2004. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=14969&proj=znpp
73
Karnad, Bharat. “India's Thermonuclear Force as Strategic Safety-Net and Security Stabilizer in the
Indian Ocean Region”, CPR Occasional Paper 8, Centre for Policy Research, Delhi, March 2004.
http://www.cprindia.org/papersupload/1215247498-Karnad_Thermonuclear.pdf
74
Weidi, Xu. “Unilateral Security? U.S. Arms Control Policy and Asian-Pacific Security”, The
Nonproliferation Review, July 2002, Volume 9, No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92xu.pdf
75
Wortzel, Dr. Larry M. “China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control
and Campaign Planning”, Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 11
May 2007. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf
67
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4.23 While attracting considerable criticism, the current US doctrine was not
without some supporters—though some of these nonetheless questioned whether the
US would in fact ever use nuclear weapons in the circumstances described.76 Despite
this, considerable optimism continues to be expressed in changed US policies
following the 2008 Presidential elections.77
4.24 It might be noted in this general context that the United States refuses to give
general negative security assurances (NSAs) not to use nuclear weapons against NPT
states-parties that have promised not to acquire them. Although this policy is not
dissimilar to that of most of the P5, the Bush Administration compounded the issue by
voting against a traditional resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for
negotiation of a binding treaty on NSAs. For many years, non-nuclear weapons states
have sought such binding commitments and the nuclear weapon states have
traditionally resisted it.78 An acrimonious debate about security assurances was
among the reasons for the failed 2005 NPT review conference.79
4.25 Some studies suggest that NSAs are most likely to be issued as unilateral
declarations and that such pledges are the worst possible manner in which to handle
the issue of security assurance.80 On the other hand, it has been suggested that
agreements among states could reinforce “no-first-use” commitments by requiring
appropriate revisions in force structures and doctrines, or in other words, reducing
these forces to a “minimum deterrence” role without first-strike capabilities.81 In a
similar vein, it has also been argued that if the US adopted a no first use policy, it
would change the debate domestically and internationally considerably. Before doing
so, however, the US might wish to ascertain whether its conventional forces can fulfill
the first-use role nuclear weapons have traditionally played.82
Bernstein, Paul I., Caves, John P. Jr., and Reichart John F. “The Future Nuclear Landscape”, NDU
Center for the Study of WMD Occasional Paper No. 5, April 2007.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=D1F97673-71707AE2-BECF-7FAA00762F71&lng=en
77
Holum, John D., and Biegun, Stephen. “How Will the Next President Reduce Nuclear Dangers?
McCain and Obama Campaign Represenatives Discuss Candidates’ Strategies”, Arms Control
Association seminar on current and future challenges to the global nonproliferation system.
Washington D.C., 15 June 2008. http://armscontrol.org/events/20080617_Presidential_Debate
78
Bunn, George. “U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States”, The
Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, Volume 4, No. 3.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/bunn43.pdf
79
Bunn, George, and du Preez, Jean. “More Than Words: The Value of U.S. Non-Nuclear-Use
Promises”, Arms Control Today, July/August 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_0708/NonUse
80
Blair, Charles P., and du Preez, Jean P. “Visions of Fission: The Demise of Nuclear Negative
Security Assurances on the Bush Administration's Pentomic Battlefield”. The Nonproliferation Review,
March 2005, Volume 12, No. 1. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/121toc.htm
81
Dowty, Alan. “Making ‘No First Use’ Work: Bring All WMD Inside the Tent”, The Nonproliferation
Review, March 2001, Volume 8, No. 1. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/81dowty.pdf
82
The Stanley Foundation. “A New Look at No First Use”, Policy Dialogue Brief, 4 April 2008.
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NoFirstUsePDB708.pdf
76
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International Non-proliferation Efforts
4.26 The bilateral and unilateral nuclear force reductions by the United States and
Russia have been supplemented by a number of bilateral and plurilateral arrangements
of varying degrees of formality and effectiveness. The literature also contains many
proposals for the strengthening of international non-proliferation efforts.83
Cooperative Threat Reduction
4.27 In the immediate wake of the Cold War, the United States enacted legislation
in 1993 to help the countries of the former Soviet Union destroy nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction and associated infrastructure, and establish verifiable
safeguards against the proliferation of those weapons. This program became known as
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) but is also commonly referred to as the NunnLugar program after the two US Senators—Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar—who were
its main proponents.84 While applying originally to the countries making up the USSR
and Eastern bloc, the term CTR has, in recent literature, been used more widely to
describe similar efforts which could be made elsewhere in the world.
4.28 The literature is replete with warts-and-all studies of the original CTR
program and other bilateral US–Russian assistance programs.85 A smaller number of
more recent studies have looked at similar programs carried out by countries other
than the United States, including the EU.86 Ironically, this heightened interest in CTR
has come at a time when the ongoing utility of the original CTR program has been
increasingly questioned by the United States, and, more recently, Russia as it strives
to re-establish its international image as a great power.87
4.29 Some critics of the ongoing and widening application of CTR argue that the
value of such efforts is increasingly doubtful in the changed geopolitical conditions
that now prevail in the world, since the threats being covered are not particularly
serious in the non-proliferation sense. In effect, this is a value-for-money argument.
Others argue that, in relation to CTR in Russia, the principal remaining tasks,
including disposal of plutonium, are no longer achievable because the Russians no
longer appear to share the same priorities. Yet others suggest that if the US has been
Bunn, Matthew, Next Steps to Strengthen the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Efforts to
Prevent Nuclear Proliferation, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Appropriations,
United States Senate, 30 April 2008. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-nnsa-nonprolbudget-test-08-mod.pdf
84
Lugar, Senator Richard G. “The Next Steps in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy”, Arms Control Today,
December 2002. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_12/lugar_dec02
85
The National Defense University "Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era" September 2004.
http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/CTR.htm
86
Anthony, Ian. Reducing Threats at the Source: A European Perspective on Cooperative Threat
Reduction, SIPRI Research Report No. 19, (Oxford University Press, 2004).
http://books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR19.pdf See also Pullinger, Stephen, and Quille, Gerrard. “The
European Union: Seeking Common Ground for Tackling Weapons of Mass Destruction”,
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 74, December 2003. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd74/74europe.htm
87
Stulberg, Adam N. “Russia’s Nonproliferation Tightrope”, Russian Analytical Digest, 30/07
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=1082A6BE-750F7BBD-5B47-AEAF44CC97A5&lng=en
83
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pursuing CTR simply to ensure its military dominance, this could have the reverse
effect of increasing the value of the deadliest, indiscriminate weapons in the hands of
extremist states and individuals.88
4.30 Supporters of continuation of CTR efforts, both in Russia and beyond,
including even North Korea,89 argue that the chief benefit lies in prevention: by
eliminating significant quantities of nuclear materials, would-be proliferators and
potential nuclear terrorists are to that extent prevented from obtaining the wherewithal
to create new nuclear weapons. Another strong argument in favour of CTR is that the
cooperation implicit in the program is precisely what helps to build better
understanding between the various parties to a CTR program.
4.31 There are also arguments that this sort of arrangement can only strengthen the
norms created in treaty regimes, and in some cases even substitute for treaty regimes
where efforts to strengthen them have not proved possible.90 Moreover, because CTR
arrangements are by their nature not required to impose reciprocal obligations on all
parties, they can be better tailored to specific circumstances, without having to take
into account the sort of strategic considerations which bedevil treaty negotiations.
Furthermore, by contributing to transparency, they can also build a sense of
confidence that undertakings are being implemented, particularly in situations where
verification procedures might otherwise be considered insufficient or lacking. In
specific terms, some writers also argue that CTR is one of very few instruments
available to address some problems, such as preventing the ‘brain drain’ of scientific
knowledge about WMD.
4.32 The question of staff at former Soviet Union nuclear facilities which have now
been decommissioned or are in the process of being so, has been the subject addressed
by a number of writers.91 An important aspect of the subject has been on how to
discourage excess personnel or personnel about to retire from offering their services
in countries of potential proliferation concern. An interesting poll conducted with
former Soviet nuclear personnel indicated that this may not be of such concern as it
has formerly been made out to be since the great bulk of departing personnel had gone
to the United States, Western Europe or Israel, and the remainder could probably be
easily induced to follow suit with suitable incentives. A more radical suggestion is for
international cooperation to track the movements of travelling nuclear personnel from
and to countries of proliferation concern.92
Krepon, Michael. “Needed: a Comprehensive Framework for Eliminating WMD”, Paper
commissioned by the WMD Commission, 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No13.pdf
89
Lugar, Senator Richard G. “Revving Up The Cooperative Nonproliferation Engine”, The
Nonproliferation Review, July 2008, Volume 15, No. 2.
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol15/152_viewpoint_lugar.pdf
90
Krepon, Michael. “Prisms and Paradigms”, The Nonproliferation Review, March 2002, Volume 9,
No. 1. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/91krep.pdf
91
Bunn, Matthew, Next Steps to Strengthen the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Efforts to
Prevent Nuclear Proliferation, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Appropriations,
United States Senate, 30 April 2008. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-nnsa-nonprolbudget-test-08-mod.pdf
92
Berry, Ken. “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Moscow-Washington Alliance”, EWI Policy Paper
2, 7 February 2007. http://www.ewi.info/pdf/TerrorNukesFeb7.pdf
88
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The G8 Global Partnership
4.33 In addition to the original CTR, the G8 leaders in 2002 agreed on a Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The
objective of the Global Partnership was to supplement existing non-proliferation and
disarmament assistance programs and provide more funding for them. This would be
provided primarily by European countries and, potentially, by the European Union.
4.34 One interesting aspect of the Global Partnership which differentiates it from
CTR is that it aims to encourage participation by a wide variety of states, including
recipients of assistance under it. Then Russian President Vladimir Putin in fact stated
in 2002 that Russia stood ready to take part in weapons dismantlement and
elimination not only on its own territory, but also in other states where WMD and
associated materials existed.
4.35 Quite detailed descriptions and analyses of Global Partnership projects and
funding appeared in the literature, with many writers offering suggestions on how the
program might be improved or expanded. Nor were shortcomings exempt from
scrutiny.93 Some publications also sought to analyse the role of the partnership against
the wider background of other non-proliferation and disarmament norms and regimes.
Little has been written, however, about whether Global Partnership projects should
include difficult security problems such as securing commercial radioactive sources
used for scientific research, nuclear medicine or in industry, or whether this might be
better carried out by the IAEA. Indeed, the precise relationship between the
Partnership and the IAEA, and the compatibility of the political and other priorities of
the partners themselves, do not appear to have received much coverage in the
literature.
Other Arrangements
4.36
In addition to CTR, the United States also launched the Enhanced Threat
Reduction Initiative (ETRI) in 1999 to fund cooperative efforts with Russia, Ukraine,
and other NIS states to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the materials to make them. It was in that sense a sub-set of CTR. The EU has also
developed a separate bilateral assistance program with Russia. The strategy devised
for its implementation reinforces the importance of CTR-type programs.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
4.37 Apart from these largely bilateral arrangements, much of the day-to-day
multilateral implementation of non-proliferation norms falls to a body called the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). (The role of the IAEA will considered in a later
section.) The NSG is an informal arrangement of nuclear supplier states that seek to
prevent, through the coordination of national export controls, the transfer of
Brubaker, R. Douglas and Spector, Leonard S. “Liability Issues in Cooperative Nonproliferation
Programs in Russia”, The Stimson Center Issue Brief, Spring 2003.
http://www.stimson.org/cnp/?SN=CT200706011307
93
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equipment, materials and technology that could contribute to nuclear weapons
programs in states other than those recognized as nuclear-weapon states in the
framework of the NPT. It was founded in 1974 in response to the Indian nuclear test
earlier that year. That test demonstrated that certain non-weapons specific nuclear
technology could be readily turned to weapons development. Nations already party to
the NPT realised there was a need to further limit the export of nuclear equipment,
materials or technology. The NSG rules forbid nuclear trade with a country which is
not party to the NPT, apart from the recently-agreed ‘India exception’. The NSG
currently has 45 members.
4.38 The list of materials which govern the exports of NSG members was devised
by another informal group known as the Zangger Committee. That Committee was
formed in 1971, and had as its objective the reaching of a common understanding on:
(a) the definition of “equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material”; and (b) the conditions
and procedures that would govern exports of such equipment or material in order to
meet the obligations of Article III.2 of the NPT on the basis of fair commercial
competition. That Article requires that IAEA safeguards must be applied to nuclear
exports.
4.39 There have been numerous studies over the years of the NSG, and as usual, the
Group has its critics and supporters.94 One criticism made by some writers, as well as
states, is that the NSG is in effect a cartel which restricts legitimate trade to states
which are in full compliance with the NPT. Similar criticisms are made of other
export control groups such as the Australia Group in the chemical and biological
weapons context. Indeed, such criticism has led to calls for the existing export control
regimes to consider amalgamation and strengthening.95 Others have suggested that
export controls should be cast in a more positive light by the export control regimes.
They should be shown to be “trade enhancers”—where nations are viewed as reliable
trade partners not engaged in dangerous behaviour—rather than “trade inhibitors”. If
this happened then more countries may be open to adopting export control systems
that advance their economic interests.96
4.40 Another criticism relates to the fact that the NSG depends on the voluntary
application of the export controls of its members. Its decisions, moreover, are made
by consensus. Both these factors are seen by some as limiting agreement on both the
countries which should be denied exports, and measures to enforce compliance by
94
Anthony, Ian, Ahlström, Christer, and Fedchenko, Vitaly. The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, SIPRI Research Report 22, (Oxford University Press, 2007.)
http://books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR22.pdf
95
Beck, Michael, and Gahlaut, Seema. “Creating a New Multilateral Export Control Regime”, Arms
Control Today, April 2003. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/beckgahlaut_apr03
96
Ferguson, Joseph, and Tarleton, Gael. “Nuclear Asia”, Colloquium Brief, Strategic Studies Institute
of the US Army War College, 11 May 2004.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub694.pdf See also Jones, Dr. Scott A.
“Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Regional Response”,
Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 1 October 2004.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB584.pdf
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NSG members. Diplomatic pressure and efforts to enhance transparency in trade deals
is about as much as the NSG can do in this regard.
4.41 The possible need to enforce compliance arises from another concern, namely
the commercial incentives for many NSG members to engage in the nuclear trade
with countries that do not apply “full-scope” IAEA safeguards to their nuclear
activities or which are not party to the NPT. Some writers argue further that since
these countries have already developed military nuclear programs, then it could be
safer to bring these countries into the NSG to reduce any risk of further proliferation.
Other authors enumerate the difficulties with such a policy of engagement, including
the tensions it would introduce among NPT parties.
US–India Nuclear Deal
4.42 In the past three years, this issue was brought to a head when the United States
entered a civilian nuclear trade deal with India in 2005. The deal has many critics in
both India and the US, as well as in a wide variety of other states and organisations,
all of whom claim that the deal undermines not only the NSG but the NPT itself.97
The US nevertheless mounted a concerted lobbying effort among NSG members for
the group to approve the deal by granting a special exemption for India from its
normal rules. A number of NSG member countries, including Austria, Switzerland,
Norway, Ireland, and New Zealand, expressed reservations about the lack of
conditions in the proposed exemption. However, in a meeting on 6 September 2008,
the NSG members agreed to grant India a “clean waiver”. The approval was based on
a formal pledge by India stating that it would not share sensitive nuclear technology
or material with others and would uphold its voluntary moratorium on testing nuclear
weapons.
4.43 Interestingly enough, however, calls have been made in the literature for India
and Pakistan to be asked to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in an effort to
tighten the guidelines for nuclear transfers and make them legally binding. At the
same time, however, it is suggested that new NSG restraints should also be imposed
on transfers between the NWS which might go some way in making ‘us’ closer to
‘them’.98
The Proliferation Security Initiative
4.44 One other initiative is worth mentioning in the present context, and that is the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched by President Bush in May 2003. The
purpose of the PSI is to interdict ships, aircraft and vehicles suspected of carrying
Yasmin, Ghazala. “Evolution of IAEA Safeguards System: Implications For Non-Proliferation
Regime”, Strategic Studies, (Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI)), XXVII, Winter, No. 4,
2007. http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2007_files/no_4/article/a5.htm
98
Lodgaard, Sverre. “Making the Non-Proliferation Regime Universal”, Paper prepared for the WMD
Commission, 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No7-Lodgaard%20Final.pdf See also
Mazari, Dr. Shireen M. “South Asia & Nuclear Arms Control”, Strategic Studies, (Institute for
Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI)), XXV, Summer, No. 2, 2005.
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2005_files/no_2/comment/c1.html
97
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nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and related
technologies to or from ‘countries of proliferation concern’.99 Under it, participating
states claim a right to detain and search suspect shipments as soon as they enter into
their territory, territorial waters or airspace. Initial membership was only eleven.100
4.45 Since that time, 80 countries have participated in various meetings and
interdictions. But it remains unclear just how far some of them support the initiative
in general terms apart from specific interdictions which interest them.101 Support is
particularly weak in Asia. Interdictions are moreover cloaked in secrecy, so there is
no objective way to measure success or failure. Indeed, it is not always clear that there
is a basis in individual cases for interdiction since the US is usually unwilling to share
relevant intelligence.
4.46 It has been suggested by some writers that bringing PSI into the UN system
and providing a budget for it would rectify many of these shortcomings and in the
long run improve its effectiveness.102 The PSI’s reach and effectiveness could also be
improved by eliminating double standards, increasing transparency, and establishing a
neutral organization to assess intelligence, coordinate and fund activities, and make
recommendations or decisions regarding specific or generic interdictions—perhaps
built on the 1540 Committee, set up to oversee implementation of UNSCR 1540 in
2004103 (see Terrorism section below).
4.47 Not only writers, but quite a few states, question the legal validity of the PSI,
and particularly cases where the goods being transported are dual use items which
have peaceful civilian, as well as possible WMD, uses.104 Countries like China, and a
number of writers, suggest that the PSI is in direct contravention of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea which guarantees the free transit or “innocent
passage” of ships on the high seas. Since trading in WMD is not prohibited by
international law, moreover, it is not possible to equate ships carrying such goods
with pirate vessels or slave ships which can be stopped and boarded under
international law. US officials for their part assert baldly, without adducing much
evidence, that current national and international laws provide a sufficient basis for the
initiative. They prefer to focus on the need for all countries to enact, and strictly
enforce, export control laws which would make the PSI unnecessary. These
conflicting views have caused some writers to suggest that the states concerned
Davis, Ian, Isenberg, David, and Miller, Katherine. “Present at the Creation: U.S. Perspectives on the
Origins and Future Direction of the Proliferation Security Initiative”, BASIC Papers, Occasional Papers
on International Security Policy, February 2007, No. 54.
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP54.htm
100
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom and the US.
101
Valencia, Mark J. “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half Full”, Arms Control Today,
June 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Valencia
102
Boese, Wade. “Interdiction Initiative Results Obscure”, Arms Control Today, September 2006.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/Interdiction
103
Valencia, op. cit.
104
Persbo, Andreas, and Davis, Ian. “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security
Initiative and the Law of the Sea”, BASIC Research Report 2004.2, June 2004.
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/04PSI.htm
99
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should seek UN Security authority for each interdiction pursuant to PSI. Others
suggest a more permanent UN Security Council resolution expressly permitting the
interception of WMD shipments in international waters or airspace.105
4.48 One interesting historical footnote relates to the first interdiction which the US
attributes to PSI. That was the 2003 boarding on the high seas of a German-owned
ship transporting nuclear centrifuges to Libya. However, it has since been established
that this interdiction was the result of an operation which preceded PSI, and so could
not be claimed as a PSI success.106
The Private Sector
4.49 For the sake of completeness, some writers have suggested that the private
sector also needs to be involved more actively in efforts to enhance awareness of
proliferation risks and encourage voluntary adoption of appropriate safeguards and
regulatory mechanisms e.g. through codes of conduct. This will also require better
information-sharing between government and private sector. Cooperation with the
banking sector has been identified as a potentially fruitful area for the enhancement of
current efforts to identify and track suspicious deals.107 It has also been suggested that
the international insurance industry be encouraged to support development of an
effective private market for mitigating and insuring against the risk of WMD
attacks.108
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
4.50 One important instrument in the international non-proliferation and
disarmament regime which has yet to realise its full potential, is the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)109 which has not yet entered into force. Though
opened for signature in 1996, its complex entry into force provisions mean that the
required number of specified states have yet to ratify it. These include the United
States, and this is the reason that the ‘Four Horseman’ called for urgent and concerted
action to reverse this.110
Joseph, Jofi. “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?”, Arms
Control Today, June 2004.
106
Boese, Wade. “Key U.S. Interdiction Initiative Claim Misrepresented”, Arms Control Today,
July/August 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_07-08/Interdiction_Misrepresented
107
Forden, Geoffrey. “Avoiding Enrichment: Using Financial Tools To Prevent Another Khan
Network”, Arms Control Today, June 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Forden
108
Bernstein, Paul I. “International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”, NDU
Center for the Study of WMD Occasional Paper 6, May 2008.
http://www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/docUploaded/2008-CSWMD-OP6.pdf
109
Its predecessors were the 1963 the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), prohibiting nuclear explosions
in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; and the 1974 Threshold Test Ban (TTBT), banning
any underground nuclear weapon explosion test having a yield greater than 150 kilotons (kt).
110
See also McGrath, Keegan, “Entry Into Force of the CTBT: All Roads Lead to Washington”, NTI
Issue Brief, April 2008 http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_entry_into_force_ctbt.html and TrenkovWermuth, Calin. “US Nuclear Security Strategy After the 2008 Presidential Elections’, ISS Analysis,
(EU Institute for Security Studies), August 2008.
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/US_nuclear_security_strategy.pdf
105
P a g e | 32
4.51 Prohibiting as it does ‘any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion’ or participation in or causing and encouraging such tests,111 the CTBT is
an important tool not only for non-proliferation, but also for eventual total nuclear
disarmament. It is regarded by many countries as a litmus test of the willingness of
the nuclear-weapon states to fulfil their perceived obligation under Article VI of the
NPT to do away with their nuclear arsenals.
4.52 The CTBT establishes a comprehensive verification regime consisting of an
International Monitoring System (IMS), on-site inspections, confidence building
measures and mechanisms for consultation and clarification of treaty compliance
issues. The IMS in particular is required to be ready when the treaty enters into force,
and considerable progress has been achieved in setting it up. Of the designated 321
monitoring stations and 16 laboratories to be established around the world, to date 192
stations and 9 laboratories are already in operation.112 The monitoring stations are
divided among four different technologies—seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and
radionuclide—which between them are considered capable of detecting any nuclear
test. Only one nuclear test—that of North Korea in 2007—has been detected since
1998.
4.53 Despite some positive developments to date, the CTBTO, the organisation
charged with the day-to-day running of the treaty, is currently facing a severe
budgetary crisis which could limit chances for further progress.113
Entry into force
4.54 As already noted, the CTBT’s entry into force provisions are complex, and
they remain controversial. A number of the states participating in the negotiations
thought the treaty would only have a chance of promoting non-proliferation if it
attracted ratification by the states judged to have the greatest capacity to develop and
test a nuclear weapon. As a result, a list of 44 states is included in Annex 2 of the
treaty which must ratify it before it can come into force. The problem is, of course,
that a number of those states have to date been unwilling to ratify it, and in certain
cases, even to sign it.
4.55 By September 2008, 145 states have ratified the CTBT. A further 35 states
have signed but not yet ratified, including 6 of the 44 states whose ratification is
required for the treaty to enter into force (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the
United States). Seventeen states, including three states among the 44—India, North
111
The CTBT does not prohibit so-called sub-critical tests, in experiments, in which the configuration
and quantities of explosives and nuclear materials used do not produce a critical mass (i.e., a selfsustaining nuclear fission chain reaction). Critics complain that such tests contravene the spirit of the
accord by enabling states to maintain existing nuclear warheads forever or to carry out modernisation
programs based on new warhead designs.
112
CTBTO Press Release “Number of Certified IMS Facilities Passes 200 Mark”, 29 March 2007.
http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2007/number-of-certified-ims-facilities-passes-200mark/
113
McGrath, Keegan, Bobiak, Stephanie, and du Preez, Jean. “The Future of the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”, CNS Feature Story, 7 March 2008.
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/080307.htm
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Korea and Pakistan—have not yet signed. Russia ratified in 2000, and France and the
UK did so in 1998. The USA signed the treaty in 1996 but later voted not to ratify it.
4.56 There are mixed views about the prospects for the CTBT’s entry into force in
the foreseeable future, though generally the assessments tend to be negative. The main
concern in the US relates to the potentially negative long-term impact of a permanent
halt to nuclear testing on the safety and reliability of the US nuclear arsenal, although
a lesser concern is also expressed about the efficacy of the verification provisions,
particularly in detecting low-yield nuclear explosive tests conducted in deep
underground caverns where the seismic signals generated by the blast become
attenuated.
4.57 India sees the CTBT as placing an unacceptable constraint on the country’s
options for developing and modernizing its nuclear deterrence posture. China may be
awaiting movement from the US, but may also, like India, be keeping its options open
as it is thought to be either undertaking or at least planning to updates its nuclear
forces.114 It may also want to reserve the chance for more tests if US plans for the
weaponisation of space proceed.115 Pakistan is unlikely to move until India does.
North Korea has stated that it will not consider signing the treaty before the USA first
drops its ‘hostile policy’ toward the country. Israel neither confirms nor denies it has
nuclear weapons. Iran’s failure to ratify is further cause for suspicion about its nuclear
program. The exact reasons for Indonesia and Egypt’s failure to ratify are not known,
though Egypt may be holding its options open until Israel ratifies or the treaty
otherwise is near the brink of entering into force.
4.58 Suggestions have been made in the literature that before the CTBT enters into
force, and to encourage it, the NPT NWS plus India and Pakistan should as an interim
measure all be encouraged to adopt a joint political commitment that they will not be
the first country to resume nuclear testing.116
Fissile Material Control
4.59 Efforts to halt or limit the production of fissile material117 for nuclear weapons
started in the 1950s though were soon placed on the back burner. The idea was
resurrected in 1995 when the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva adopted a
mandate to ‘negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable’
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). But there the matter has largely rested.
Norris, Robert S., and Kristensen, Hans M. “Chinese Nuclear Forces 2008”, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 42–45 (July 2008).
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/25094v7235832574/fulltext.pdf
115
Zhang, Hui. “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China”, Arms Control Today,
December 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-CVR
116
Einhorn, Robert. “Controlling Fissile Materials and Ending Nuclear Testing”, Paper presented at the
International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, 26 – 27 February 2008.
http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/Paper_Einhorn.pdf
117
For an assessment of current situation relating to fissile materials, see Feiveson, H., Glaser, A.,
Mian, Z., and von Hippel, F. “Fissile Materials: Global Stocks, Production and Elimination”, SIPRI
Yearbook, 2007, Appendix 12C http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/files/YB0712C.pdf See also IPFM.
Toward A Global Cleanout of Nuclear Weapon Materials: Report From The International Panel On
Fissile Materials, Discussion held on 19 October 2007 in the UN. http://disarm.igc.org/ScriptOct19.pdf
114
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4.60 One of the main stumbling blocks to opening negotiations on a FMCT was,
and remains, the question of whether the treaty should, as advocated by Egypt,
Pakistan118 and other states, not only prohibit production of new fissile material, but
that it should also include placing existing stockpiles of fissile material under
international safeguards. They argue that doing so is the only way in which such an
FMCT could be considered a meaningful non-proliferation and disarmament measure.
Given Israel’s ambiguous nuclear stance, Egypt and other Arab states are particularly
insistent that current stockpiles are not only declared but open to internationally
controlled and supervised inventory and inspection.
4.61 There is a wide consensus in the literature that existing stockpiles should be
included in an FMCT.119 Indeed, some have even suggested that the ban should also
cover fissile-level material used in civilian and naval reactors, and that research on
substitute technologies should be conducted as a matter of priority.120
4.62 The thought of including existing stockpiles, however, is strenuously opposed
by the NPT NWS, which have large inventories of fissile material for military
purposes, and India whose existing stockpiles are small though still very much larger
than Pakistan’s. These states have, in other words, a vested interest in retaining their
current holdings. China in fact may not be willing to go along with an FMCT at all
because of the perceived need to increase its nuclear deterrence—and consequent
production of new fissile material—in the face of US plans to weaponise space.121
4.63 This particular stumbling block to negotiations emerged in the late 1990s, and
stems from differences, primarily between the United States and China, over whether
the CD should draft a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space
(PAROS). China had for a number of years linked beginning any FMCT negotiations
in the CD to the initiation of parallel negotiations on a space treaty.122 This was flatly
rejected by the United States, despite some compelling arguments advanced by China
and others.123 Some writers even suggest that the US does not need to establish its
military dominance in space, since it could win any war without it.124 And one
Khawaja, Inam ul Haque. “Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty”, Islamabad Paper, Institute for
Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), 2006. http://www.issi.org.pk/islamabad_paper/2006/no_23.htm
119
Du Preez, Jean. “The Future of a Treaty Banning Fissile Material for Weapons Purposes: Is It Still
Relevant?”, Paper commissioned by the WMD Commission, 2004.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No9.pdf
120
Einhorn, Robert. “Controlling Fissile Materials and Ending Nuclear Testing”, Paper presented at the
International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, 26 – 27 February 2008.
http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/Paper_Einhorn.pdf
121
Zhang, Hui, “FMCT and PAROS: A Chinese Perspective”, INESAP Bulletin 20, August 2002.
http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art06.htm
122
Graham, Thomas Jr. “Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War”, Arms Control
Today, December 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons
123
Axworthy, Lloyd, with Datan, Merav. “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”, INESAP
Bulletin 20, August 2002. http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art01.htm
124
Krepon, Michael, and Heller, Michael. “A Model Code of Conduct for Space Assurance”,
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 77, May/June 2004. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77mkmh.htm
118
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organisation has even prepared a “Model Code of Conduct for Responsible SpaceFaring Nations”.125
4.64 The prospects for opening FMCT negotiations brightened in the summer of
2003, when China dropped its insistence on this linkage. There were also indications
in early 2004 that the Bush Administration was seriously interested in concluding an
FMCT. It even tabled a draft text of such a treaty in the CD in 2006—though it
notably failed to include verification measures.126 The IAEA127 and others, however,
believe that a verification regime for the treaty is both necessary and possible.128
Given that the CD operates by consensus, it has become so mired in controversy over
these issues that it has become largely moribund to the present day.
4.65 As a result, suggestions have been made by both states and writers that an
FMCT should be negotiated in a forum other than the CD, such as the IAEA or an
open-ended committee,129 or that, alternatively, the CD’s consensus rule be scrapped.
Hans Blix, the chair of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, has recently
suggested that the UN General Assembly should convene a ‘world summit’ on nonproliferation, disarmament, and terrorist threats from WMD,130 though others have
stressed the importance of such a meeting avoiding any suggestion of being linked to
the NPT.131 The suggestion has also been made that such a treaty could be drafted by
the eight states with nuclear weapons, drawing perhaps on the existing Trilateral
Initiative supported by the G-8 Global Partnership. However any such “prenegotiations” must be done in consultation with other NNWS.132 Expressions of hope
have also been widely made as to a change in US policy on FMCT under the next US
President, as they have on other aspects of the nuclear debate.
Stimson Center. “Model Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations”, Background
paper released by the Stimson Centre, 24 October 2007. http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=575
126
Ford, Dr Christopher A. “The United States and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty”, Speech to the
Conference on “Preparing for 2010: Getting the Process Right”, Annecy, France, 17 March 2007.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/81950.htm But see International Panel on Fissile Materials. A
Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification, Geneva, 2 May 2008.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmbriefing080502.pdf
127
Rauf, Tariq. A Cut-Off of Production of Weapon-Usable Fissionable Material: Considerations,
Requirements and IAEA Capabilities, statement by the Head, IAEA Verification & Security Policy
Coordination, at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 24 August 2006.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rau06.pdf
128
Carlson, John “Defining the safeguards mission”, IAEA Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, 16-20
October 2006; “Safeguards in a Changing Environment”, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
Annual Meeting, Nashville, 13-17 July 2008.
129
Meyer, Ambassador Paul. “Is There Any Fizz Left in the Fissban? Prospects for a Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty”, Arms Control Today, December 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Meyer
130
Blix, Hans. “Weapons of Terror: The Report of the WMD Commission One Year On”,
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 85, Summer 2007. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd85/85blix.htm See
also Lodgaard, Sverre. “From Alamogordo to Reliable Replacement Warheads”, NUPI Working Paper
726, 20 December 2007.
http://english.nupi.no/publikasjoner/notater/2007/from_alamogordo_to_reliable_replacement_warhead
s
131
Dean, Jonathan. “Reviving the Non-Proliferation Regime”, Paper commissioned by the WMD
Commission, 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No4.pdf
132
Du Preez, supra.
125
P a g e | 36
Enhancing transparency in nuclear warhead and fissile material
inventories
4.66 Failing early negotiation of an FMCT, some studies have nonetheless been
done examining various possible technical approaches to building a comprehensive
regime which would include a full accounting of warheads, verification of their
dismantling and non-diversion, and the monitoring of the facilities in which they were
produced. This regime would need to ensure that no new warheads are produced. It
would also need to ensure the irreversible disposal of fissile material from the
dismantled warheads. It soon becomes apparent from reading such studies that the
development of such a regime faces enormous technical and political challenges.
4.67 These challenges had already appeared in US–Russian efforts to establish the
initial basis for a nuclear warhead transparency regime: namely, the exchange of
classified declarations of warhead numbers, locations and dispositions. Though the
Russian and US presidents agreed in 1994 to develop a process for sharing classified
stockpile data at regular intervals, negotiations to implement the agreement were
abruptly abandoned the following year and never resumed. In the view of many
analysts, the current prospects for negotiating a similar measure are remote, as US and
Russian nuclear warhead production complexes have become increasingly opaque,
especially in light of recent concerns about their becoming the target of terrorist
activity.
4.68 By contrast, there has been some progress made in increasing the transparency
of fissile material holdings in the US and Russia. This has come through the
implementation of several agreements related to the storage and disposition of excess
fissile material, including: the 1993 US–Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
Agreement,133 the 1996 US–Russian–IAEA Trilateral Initiative, and the 2000
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.134 Progress has also been
achieved in increasing transparency in the US and Russian nuclear weapon production
complexes through various Materials Protection, Control and Accountancy programs
undertaken as part of co-operative threat reduction activities.
Bukharin, O. “U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU”,
Science & Global Security, Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University, September 2002.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/sgs10bukharin.pdf See also Center for
Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Why Highly Enriched
Uranium is a Threat, http://nti.org/db/heu/index.html For more information on HEU and the creation
of an improvised nuclear device, see "HEU as weapons material a technical background," prepared by
the organizers of the June 2006 Oslo Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear
Sector. http://nti.org/e_research/official_docs/norway/HEU_as_Weapons_Material.pdf; and Chuen,
Cristina, Developing HEU Guidelines, Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, presented 2007, posted May 2008.
http://nti.org/db/heu/RERtr07_Hansell_Developing_HEU_Guidelines.pdf
134
Evseev, Vladimir V. “The Influence of the International Trade of Nuclear Materials and
Technologies on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime”, Paper commissioned for WMD Commission,
December 2005. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No39.pdf
133
P a g e | 37
4.69 Understandably, concern in recent years about the possibility of fissile
material falling into the hands of terrorist groups has led to renewed interest in the
idea of developing a comprehensive approach for achieving transparency in military
and civilian stocks of fissile materials. While prospects for an FMCT remain distant,
some technical work has been done on a verification regime for such a treaty. Most of
this work has focused on monitoring activities at fuel cycle facilities and other
sensitive sites, as well as on the storage and disposition of existing fissile materials.
There has been relatively little work published on assessing the potential for countries
to maintain undeclared holdings of fissile material, the clandestine production of new
inventories, or covert transfer of these materials from other countries.
Regional approaches
4.70 Given what are widely perceived to be serious flaws in the global nonproliferation regime, some writers have suggested that there could be merit in
devolving at least some of the aspects of the regime to the regional level. Given that
many of the concerns that drive nuclear proliferation are regionally focused, some
writers suggest that regional states might thus be the most zealous in overseeing the
implementation of non-proliferation norms.
4.71 Although both the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and NATO have undertaken reviews of their roles in strengthening nonproliferation norms, there has been little by way of analysis of these reviews or their
implementation. The OSCE, however, has attracted praise for its active role in
supporting UNSCR 1540 on nuclear terrorism.135 NATO for its part appears to have
done little to change existing nuclear policy and doctrine. NATO policy, like that of
the US, UK, France and Russia, allows for the possible first use of nuclear weapons.
In the 1980s NATO Military Command maintained detailed plans for the use of
nuclear weapons in specific scenarios. However, in recent years it has developed
‘adaptive targeting capability’ designed to allow NATO commanders to develop
target plans and nuclear weapons employment plans on short notice. Maintenance of
this policy has attract calls by not a few writers for NATO to review the question
again before its 60th anniversary celebrations in April 2009.136
4.72 In Asia, the official ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on regional security has
held a number of seminars on the non-proliferation of WMD. The second track
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in 2004 established
two study groups: one on countering the proliferation of WMD in the region;137 and
the other on enhancing the effectiveness of the campaign against international
terrorism with specific reference to the Asia Pacific region. The first study group has
undertaken work on export controls, and is also producing a detailed handbook and
135
See statement by the Chair of the 1540 Committee at an OSCE 1540 Workship, Vienna, 8
November 2006.
http://www.un.org/sc/1540/docs/chairstatements/Chairman%20Statement%20OSCE%20Vienna.pdf
136
Simpson, Erika, New Opportunities to Question US Reliance upon Nuclear Weapons, INESAP
Bulletin 28, April 2008. http://www.inesap.org/bulletin28/inesap.php?page=4
137
Glosserman, Brad. “An Action Plan to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in
the Asia Pacific”, Pacific Forum CSIS Issues & Insights, Vol. 6, No. 5, March 2006.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v06n05.pdf
P a g e | 38
action plan to assist regional countries in the non-proliferation effort. A number of
Asian states have also participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative, although, as
noted above, others in the region question the Initiative’s consonance with other
aspects of international law.
4.73 In other regions, there has been virtually nothing written which evaluates the
non-proliferation related aspects of the first Special Conference on Security convened
by the Organization of American States held in May 2003. There also appears not to
have been much by way of follow-up to that meeting.
4.74 More attention has, however, been paid in the literature to the question of
whether regional arrangements might help to bring India, Israel and Pakistan into
some form of association with the NPT regime.138 Indeed, it has been suggested that
regional and sub-regional arrangements, particularly in the economic sphere, could
help bring India and Pakistan together.139
Nuclear-weapon-free zones
4.75 Closely related to the regional arrangements concept has been renewed interest
in nuclear-weapon-free (or even WMD-free) zones (NWFZs), and their possible
strengthening and extension to areas of the world not currently covered by existing
zones.140 This idea has had extensive coverage in recent literature, particularly given
the role of such zones in adding a sharp sense of devaluation to the weapons
themselves.141 Existing zones have also caused at least some of the NPT NWS to
change their operational deployments of nuclear weapons, and perhaps also the
planning philosophy which precedes such deployments, to meet the exigencies of the
various zones.
4.76 In essence, existing NWFZs follow a similar pattern. While abjuring all
aspects of nuclear weapons themselves, parties to NWFZ treaties undertake not to
allow other states to station, test or use such weapons on their territory. The treaties
also normally contain protocols incorporating negative security assurances, under
Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham, ‘An NPT for non-members’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
vol. 60 No. 3, May-June 2004, pp. 40–44.
139
Parthasarathy, G. “India-Pakistan Bilateral Relations and the Nuclear Equations in a Volatile
Regional Environment”, Paper Presented at a Seminar in Wilton Park on "Nuclear Stability in Asia" on
July 22 and thereafter at the IISS in London on July 24, 2008.
http://www.cprindia.org/papersupload/1217317742India%20Pakistan%20Relations%20in%20a%20Volatile%20Regional%20Environment%20.pdf See
also Raghavan, V.R. ‘Regional Conflicts & Their Impact on Reducing Nuclear Dangers”, Paper
presented at The International Conference on "Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear
Weapons", Oslo, 26-27February, 2008.
http://www.delhipolicygroup.com/gen_paper_for_oslo_conf.pdf
140
Parrish, Scott, and du Preez, Jean. “Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Still a Useful Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation Tool?”, Paper prepared for the WMD Commission, 2004.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No6-ParrishduPreez%20Final.pdf
141
Fuhrmann, Matthew and Xiaojun Li. "Legalizing Nuclear Abandonment: The Determinants of
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Ratification", Managing the Atom Project Working Paper Series,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 14 March 2008.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Legalizing%20Nuclear%20Abandonment.pdf
138
P a g e | 39
which the nuclear weapon states undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against any state party to the treaty. Some of the existing treaties also
contain undertakings by the parties to enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA
if they don’t already exist.
4.77 The first NWFZ was established in1967 under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and
covers Latin America and the Caribbean. It was followed by the Treaty of Raratonga
in 1985 which applies to the South Pacific. The Treaty of Bangkok which applies in
South-East Asia was only opened for signature in 1995, though it had been preceded
by the 1971 ASEAN Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) which endorsed the goal of a NWFZ. In Africa the 1996 Treaty of
Pelindaba was opened for signature but has yet to enter into force as it has not
received the required number of ratifications. Similarly, in 2006 the most recent
NWFZ was created in Central Asia though it too still lacks the necessary number of
ratifications to enter into force. In addition, some of the NWS, and principally the
United States,142 have expressed difficulties with some aspects of the treaty.
4.78 In all, some 109 states are party to the NWFZ treaties. Given that three, and
when it enters into force, four of these NWFZs in effect cover the southern
hemisphere, there have been calls for a formal declaration of the whole of that
hemisphere as an NWFZ.
4.79 In addition to the NWFZs listed above, it might also be noted that Antarctica,
outer space, the moon and other “celestial bodies”; and the seabed, the ocean floor
and its subsoil have nuclear weapon-free status143—though US plans to station certain
weapons platforms in space place the denuclearisation of one of these areas in some
doubt.
4.80 Understandably, there have also been loud calls, but little action, for the
establishment of NWFZs in the Middle East144 and North-East Asia.145 While such
calls have been examined in recent literature, there are few practical suggestions for
overcoming the entrenched animosities in both of those regions.146
4.81 One interesting lateral view is that NATO’s expansion is causing the creation
of an NWFZ-in-reverse in Europe, given that the number of countries committed to
supporting and planning the use by NATO of nuclear weapons is actually increasing.
See Also Ahrari, Dr. M. Ehsan. “Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the New Great Game”,
Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 1 August 2001.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB112.pdf
143
Graham, Thomas Jr., and LaVerna, Damien J. "Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control Treaties in
the Nuclear Era," May 2003, Comissioned by NTI.
http://nti.org/c_press/c6_cornerstonesofsecurity.html
144
Fahmy, Nabil. “Prospects for Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East”, The
Nonproliferation Review, July 2001, Volume 8, No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/82fahmy.pdf
145
Liping, Xia. “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Lessons for Nonproliferation in Northeast Asia”, The
Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1999, Volume 6, No. 4. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/xia64.pdf
146
Vignard, K. “Arms Control in the Middle East”, UNIDIR Disarmament Forum, No. 2, 2008.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?v21=121925&lng=en&ord61=alphaNavi&ord60=Publicati
onDate&id=57139
142
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The apparent paradox of this occurring on the one hand, while encouraging more
NATO members to engage in counter-proliferation initiatives such as PSI, is also
noted.147
5. DISARMAMENT
5.1
Disarmament is usually seen, and certainly portrayed in the literature, as being
one of the central pillars of the NPT, and some writers are prepared to lay the blame
for nuclear proliferation since 1998 at the door of the NPT NWS for not living up to
their side of the bargain.148 At the very least, it has been suggested that the
requirement of Article VI of the NPT that the NWS pursue disarmament negotiations
‘in good faith’ means the de-emphasis of nuclear weapons in the strategic posture of
the NWS and the adoption of policies that will create the conditions under which
further steps toward disarmament are seen as prudent and security enhancing. In this
view, the current policies by the United States and the other nuclear armed states are
not taking the world in that direction.149
5.2
However, not all writers subscribe to this view. Some argue that the NPT is, as
its name suggests, primarily about non-proliferation. The argument continues that
states have been supporting the NPT for the past 30 years because they have
perceived it to be in their interest to contain proliferation. Although high on their
agenda, the elimination of nuclear weapons was not the primary objective for the
great majority of them: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states
was the priority.150 The fact that Article VI is addressed to all states, and not just the
NWS, is a further indication that a central theme of the treaty is non-proliferation, and
not just disarmament. Moreover, conventional disarmament is included, and not just
nuclear disarmament, since Article VI talks in terms of a treaty on “general
disarmament”.
5.3
Whatever the case, proposals for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons
have existed for virtually as long as the weapons themselves. The end of the Cold War
in particular was seen as heralding a real possibility that this might be achieved, and
various governments, organisations and individuals worked to make it concrete. To
this end, the Australian Government in 1995 convened the Canberra Commission
Koster, Karel. “NATO Nuclear Doctrine and the NPT”, BASIC Briefings, 29 June 2004.
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/20040629NATO-nuclear-Koster.htm
148
Harrison, Selig S., “The Forgotten Bargain: Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament”, World
Policy Journal, Vol. XXIII No. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 1–13.
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj.2006.23.3.1
149
Weiss, Leonard. “Nuclear-Weapons States and the Grand Bargain”, Arms Control Today, December
2003. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Weiss
150
Dokos, Thanos P. “The Future of the Global Consensus on Nuclear Non-proliferation: Can the NPT
be Kept Together Without the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons?”, Chapter 10 in Nuclear Weapons Into
the 21st Century, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Volume 8, Peter Lang, Bern,
2001. http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=CC2268E6F31C-197D-30E7-AA911C467D99&lng=en
147
P a g e | 41
whose 1996 Report made detailed proposals in this regard.151 Further ideas were
developed by the Tokyo Forum in 1999,152 and the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission as recently as 2006.153
5.4
Despite this, it remains clear from the foregoing that there is still a mindset
among decision-makers in a small number of states that nuclear weapons are an
essential element in the architecture of global security. Even more recently, however,
another fork in the road has been reached with the proposals of the four elder US
statesmen’ and other former statesmen from around the world.154 Coming as they do
from the hard school of Realpolitik, these proposals have given a real boost to the
opposing mindset, not only among states and their leaders, but among observers and
public alike, including in the nuclear-armed states, that not only can more initial
progress be made on disarmament, but that there is in fact a viable road to zero.
5.5
In the literature, there seems to be a widespread acceptance that there such a
road indeed exists, with numerous proposals for moving along that road and reducing
existing arsenals to very low numbers. But getting from that point to zero, and
keeping it there, is recognised as the most difficult part of all. Even the ‘Four Elder
Statesmen’ proposals only describe steps along the road, and contain no suggestions
as to reaching zero. Apart from proposals for a nuclear disarmament treaty (see
below), there are few practical suggestions offered in the literature for the final steps
to zero.155 Once it is achieved, however, there are a small number of detailed
proposals as to how total nuclear disarmament might be verified.156
5.6
There are nonetheless some who argue that the ‘Four Elder Statesmen’ and
those that endorse their views, may have misread the situation.157 While the global
disarmament agenda might appear to be gaining momentum, a closer look at the
rationale behind the trend—at both unofficial and official levels—reveals that it is
more in the spirit of “arms control” than classic “disarmament”, in that it is focused
on threats and relationships, not weapons as such. This creates a complex, perhaps
151
Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 1996,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/index.html
152
Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century, Report of the Tokyo Forum for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 25 July 1999.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/forum/tokyo9907/index.html
153
Weapons of Terror, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report, 2006.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf
154
Hurd, Douglas, Owen, David, Rifkind, Malcolm, and Robertson, George, “Start worrying and learn
to ditch the bomb”, The TimesOnLine, 30 June 2008.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece
155
But see Blair, Bunn, Einhorn et al, Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward A World Free Of Nuclear
Weapons, Preliminary Report from the Hoover Institution’s “Reykjavik Revisited” Conference,
October 2007. http://www.hoover.org/publications/books/online/15766737.html
156
Findlay, Trevor, Verification of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, Verification Research, Training and
Information Centre (VERTIC), May 2003.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=309E79FF-701288D7-5AC8-0FE7E87C0CEF&lng=en
157
Schmitt, Gary J., and Sokolski, Henry. “Advice for the Nuclear Abolitionists”, American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research Short Publications, 5 May 2008.
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27934/pub_detail.asp
P a g e | 42
unsolvable equation: the nuclear weapons states reassure the potential proliferators
that they too are disarming, but in the same breath they underscore their need to
maintain a credible deterrent against those very proliferators.158 And even one of the
‘Four Elder Statesmen’ has acknowledged that we have not yet even reached the top
of the mountain from which we can look out towards zero. Moreover, if anything we
seem to be slipping backwards, rather climbing up further towards the peak.159
5.7
Whatever the case, there is a recognition that the road to zero will be very hard
to navigate in its final stages. But equally, the argument is made that even if nuclear
weapons cannot be uninvented, it should be possible in the end to outlaw them.160
Consonant with this view is the promotion of greater understanding of the close interrelationships between non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and acceptance that progress is required across all three pillars of the NPT,
with movement in each part likely to encourage progress in the others. Most recently,
this movement brought together a significant number of former leaders and observers
at a conference in Norway in February 2008.161
5.8
It should be noted that there are some writers who argue that a world with zero
nuclear weapons is impossible to achieve, and that furthermore, it was “unfortunate”
that the Canberra Commission even suggested that it was possible.162 In this, they are
not necessarily siding with the nuclear armed states, but proceeding from what they
see as a realistic analysis of the geopolitical circumstances involved.163 For such
writers, the main reason countries like North Korea and Iran sought nuclear weapons
included an element of counter-balancing United States conventional forces. Even
Russia, it is suggested, will want to retain its nuclear arsenal in the face of the
deterioration of its conventional forces, and to maintain its standing as a great power.
164
Thus, the US diminishing its nuclear arsenal would not have prevented this
proliferation—although, according to the same writers, such a reduction would at
Landau, Emily B., and Ophir, Noam. “Unraveling the New Nuclear Disarmament Agenda: Between
Vision and Reality”, INSS Assessment,(Institute for National Security Studies, Israel) Vol. 11, No. 1,
June 2008. http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=1952
159
Nunn, Senator Sam, “The Mountaintop: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Speech to the
International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, Norway, February 27, 2008.
http://nti.org/c_press/speech_Nunn_Oslo022708.pdf
160
See discussion of the WMD Commission Report below.
161
A Global Effort to Achieve a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Chairman’s Summary, International
Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, 26–27 February 2008. http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wpcontent/uploads/2008/05/chairs_written_summary.pdf
162
Krause, Joachim. “The Crisis in Nuclear Arms Control”, Chapter 1 in Nuclear Weapons Into the 21st
Century, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Volume 8, Peter Lang, Bern, 2001.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=1901D54A-928A871D-8517-D73EA18B0154&lng=en
163
Stocker, Jeremy, The United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 386, 2007. (Must be
bought.) http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/2007-adelphi-papers/the-uk-and-nucleardeterre/
164
Dokos, Thanos P. “The Future of the Global Consensus on Nuclear Non-proliferation: Can the NPT
be Kept Together Without the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons?”, Chapter 10 in Nuclear Weapons Into
the 21st Century, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Volume 8, Peter Lang, Bern,
2001. http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=CC2268E6F31C-197D-30E7-AA911C467D99&lng=en
158
P a g e | 43
least be an indication of good faith to others.165 Others also see this gradual
diminution of existing nuclear arsenals as contributing to the devaluation of the
weapons per se.166
5.9
As in the debate about non-proliferation issues more generally, there is
recognition that Russia and the United States will need to lead the way,167 with
considerable hope placed in the next US President in this regard.168 As already noted,
there has been little detailed analysis of the potential roadblock of Russian President
Medvedev’s late September 2008 decision to renew and update Russia’s nuclear
deterrence. However, there were earlier prognostications that while considerable
progress had been made in nuclear arms reduction, much of it was reversible.169 But
that aside, there has been a view in the literature that the US and Russia would of
necessity lead on nuclear disarmament, to be followed closely by the other nucleararmed states.170 The leaders of the two countries might also draw some lessons from a
September 2007 public opinion poll which showed a very high proportion of people
in both support the total elimination of nuclear weapons.171
5.10 Even though none of the nuclear-armed states has given any commitment to a
firm timetable for eventual nuclear disarmament, or even any indication that they may
be thinking seriously about one, this has not prevented writers from suggesting that
those states should not be at least factoring disarmament into their longer term
planning.172 At the very least, they should be considering, first individually, then
jointly, the circumstances in which they might be prepared to move to zero.173 More
generally, they should also review the relevance of nuclear deterrence in the changed
Brown, Harold. “New Nuclear Realities”, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007–08.
http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter_brown.pdf
166
Dokos, op. cit.
167
Arbatov, Alexei. “Reducing the role of nuclear weapons”, Paper presented at the International
Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, 26–27 February 2008. http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wpcontent/uploads/2008/02/Paper_Arbatov.pdf
168
Kimball, Daryl G., Transforming U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Arms Control Today,
January/February 2008. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_01-02/focus See also Kristensen, Hans
M., and Oelrich, Ivan. “Presidential Candidates Need to See Beyond Warhead Numbers”, FAS
Strategic Security Blog, 30 July 2008. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/07/obama.php
169
Moltz, James Clay. “Where are the P-5 Headed?”, The Nonproliferation Review, July 2007, Volume
14, No.2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/142toc.htm
170
Gottemoeller, Rose, Sergei Ivanov’s Strategic Breakthrough, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 February
2008.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19913&prog=zgp&proj=znp
p
171
Gallagher, Nancy. “US and Russian Public Opinion on Arms Control and Space Security”,
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 87, Spring 2008. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd87/87ng.htm See
also Steinbruner, John, and Gallagher, Nancy. “If You Lead, They Will Follow: Public Opinion and
Repairing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship”, Arms Control Today, January/February 2008.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_01-02/steinbruner
172
Ingram, Paul. “Taking Responsibility: what can NPT states realistically do to build on today's
momentum behind nuclear disarmament?”, BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 1, 15 July 2008.
http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz01.htm
173
Perkovich, George, and Acton, James M. “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons”, Adelphi paper No. 396,
September 2008.
165
P a g e | 44
international circumstances of the post-Cold War world.174Some writers argue
cogently that except as a weapon of last resort, nuclear weapons have no legitimate or
compelling military role to play in any conceivable US national security challenge.
Since at least 1991, US security has depended almost exclusively on increasingly
capable conventional weapons, as effective as nuclear weapons for attacking the most
difficult targets.175 Only a smaller proportion of such writers, however, point out that
it is precisely this overwhelming American conventional superiority that spurs some
potential target countries to acquire nuclear weapons as their own deterrent.176
5.11 Suggestions have also been made that the nuclear armed states should also be
preparing now for the technical issues that will confront them as they move closer to
zero.177 Approving reference is made in this regard to the work of the United
Kingdom with Norway on verification, and their offer to host a technical conference
of P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next
NPT Review Conference in 2010.178 More generally, there have been calls for the
major nuclear armed states to support convening a world summit of heads of state on
disarmament, non-proliferation and WMD terrorism, or at least an UNGA Special
Summit on Disarmament.179
5.12 One interesting issue that has received little attention has been the possible
role of gender in the mindset surrounding nuclear weapons.180 Proceeding from the
historical fact that women’s groups have been at the forefront of international
campaigns to eliminate nuclear weapons, the argument is made that WMD and those
that devise the policies incorporating their acquisition and potential use are portrayed
as ‘masculine’, while those that oppose them are seen as ‘feminine’ or weak. It is
suggested that such perceptions distort the professional and political discussions on
WMD, and that, as a result, there is a need to redefine terms such as ‘strength’ and
‘security’ so that they more properly reflect all aspects of society, not just the
masculine.
Ibid. See also Arbatov, Alexei, and Dvorkin, Vladimir. “Revising Nuclear Deterrence”, Center for
International and Security Studies at Maryland, November 2005.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=F65BBF30-C9A2644A-3045-A954E69FCEBB&lng=en
175
Gormley, Dennis M., Securing Nuclear Obsolescence, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2006.
http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-summaries/2006---volume-48/year-2006---issue-3/
176
Perkovich and Acton. Supra.
177
Perkovich, George. “Taking Nuclear Disarmament Seriously”, Paper presented at the International
Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, 26–27 February 2008. http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wpcontent/uploads/2008/02/Paper_Perkovich.pdf
178
See also Gottemoeller, Rose. “Beyond Arms Control: How to Deal with Nuclear Weapons”, CEIP
Policy Brief No. 23, February 2003. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief23.pdf —
“There is no arms control or reduction task to which the U.S. and Russian scientific and technical
communities could not immediately contribute as a team.” **Contains useful comparative table of
US/Russian nuclear forces in 2002.”
179
Spies, Michael, and Burroughs, John (eds.) Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security? U.S
Weapons of Terror, the Global Proliferation Crisis, and Paths to Peace, Lawyers Committee of
Nuclear Policy, May 2007. Links to chapters at http://wmdreport.org/ndcs/online/
180
Chon, Carol, with Hill, Felicity, and Ruddick, Sara. “The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating
Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Paper commissioned for WMD Commission, December 2005.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No38.pdf
174
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5.13 Given the success of the Canadian-inspired Landmines Convention initiative
of 1997, and the Cluster Munitions Convention adopted in May 2008, it should come
as no surprise that there is a very large number of civil society movements involved in
the nuclear disarmament campaign.181 Some writers have also called for another
massive civil society campaign, starting both within, and aimed at the US, to compel
governments to devise a ‘roadmap’ on how they would achieve nuclear disarmament.
Some of these contain considerable detail on how this might be achieved, including
proposals to lobby the US Congress, and later, other parliaments, to get the
requirement to move rapidly to full nuclear disarmament enacted as law. Such a
movement might also be bolstered by a body such as a global truth commission to
investigate the harm that nuclear weapons production and testing have done and
continue to do to people all over the world.182
Outlawing Nuclear Weapons
5.14 The Blix Commission, like the Canberra Commission and Tokyo Forum
before it, reached some stark conclusions about nuclear disarmament. Like many
other documents, it contains many suggestions as to what needs to be done along the
road to zero. But with specific reference to final disarmament, it makes a number of
recommendations. One is for the full implementation of existing regional nuclearweapon-free zones and their extension to other regions, particularly and most urgently
in the Middle East. It also argues strongly that there should be an absolute prohibition
on the stationing or use of weapons in outer space—a point particularly relevant given
US policies on space weapons and the shooting down of a satellite by China’s in
2007. However, the central argument of the Blix Commission is that all states should
accept the principle that although nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, they should
be outlawed, just as biological and chemical weapons are. Compliance, verification
and enforcement rules can, with the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with
that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world’s
reach.183 It is also suggested that any act of nuclear proliferation should similarly be
made an international crime.184 This would include Illicit trafficking in highly
enriched uranium and plutonium, and all international commerce in technology and
equipment related to manufacture of nuclear weapons that is not subject to IAEA
safeguards.185
Krieger, David. “Civil Society Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament”, INESAP Bulletin 24,
December 2004. http://www.inesap.org/bulletin24/art14.htm
182
Makhijani, Arjun. “A Readiness to Harm: The Health Effects of Nuclear Weapons Complexes”,
Arms Control Today, July/August 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_07-08/Makhijani
183
Evans, Gareth. “The Blix Commission’s Wake-up Call: Meeting the Nuclear Challenge”,
Presentation to International Conference on A Comprehensive Approach toward Nuclear Disarmament,
European Parliament, Brussels, 19 April 2007.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4784&l=1
184
Perkovich, George. “Democratic Bomb”: Failed Strategy, CEIP Policy Brief No. 49, November
2006. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB49_final1.pdf
185
Potter, William C. “The New Proliferation Game”, Paper commissioned by the WMD Commission,
2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No12.pdf
181
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5.15 In point of fact, efforts have been made for many years to make nuclear
weapons illegal.186 As long ago as 1961, the UN General Assembly declared their use
to be a crime against humanity, though with a significant number of abstentions and
the then nuclear powers voting against.187 More recently, such calls have been made
with renewed vigour, many in the past two years endorsing the Blix
recommendations. One writer has, however, suggested that if the total outlawing of
nuclear weapons is too bitter a pill for the nuclear armed states to swallow at once, a
start could be made by at least outlawing their use, though not possession.188 Others
with far more determined views already believe that even possession of nuclear
weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and is a crime
against humanity just as the General Assembly earlier declared. These writers see the
willingness of such states to possess and show willingness to use a weapon of terror
as making them no different from the terrorists whom they are now seeking to protect
against. Moreover, the same has to be said for those states sheltering under nuclear
umbrellas. And as if that were not enough, testing such a weapon should also, in the
eyes of these writers, be considered a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against
humanity.189
5.16 In this regard, a significant number of writers place heavy reliance on the
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which was of the view that the
use of nuclear weapons would in general terms be against international law.190
However, less attention is paid to the fact that the Court was unable to reach a firm
view on whether there might be some extreme cases in which the use of such weapons
might be justifiable.191
A Nuclear Disarmament Treaty?
5.17 Various proposals have been made over the years for a treaty. One was for a
‘no use’ (not just ‘no first use’) treaty, the violation of which would be a crime subject
to jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Under this proposal, the doctrine of
deterrence would also be declared invalid.192
Goldblatt, Jozef. “Prospects for a Ban on the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Arms Control and
Disarmament, No. 51, Center for Security Studies, Zurich, 1999.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=9E854A8F-7D05B418-482B-D249B34EDCEF&lng=en
187
UNGA Res. 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 (55–20–26).
188
Johnson, Rebecca. “Time to Outlaw the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Editorial Disarmament
Diplomacy, Issue No. 87, Spring 2008. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd87/87rej.htm
189
Mian, Zia, Challenges and Opportunities for Nuclear Disarmament, Statement delivered on behalf
of the NGO community to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, 19 October
2006. INESAP Bulletin 27, December 2006. http://www.inesap.org/bulletin27/art18.htm
190
See for example the views of former ICJ Judge Christopher Weeramantry in Pomper, Miles A. “Is
There a Role for Nuclear Weapons Today?”, Arms Control Today, July/August 2005.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_07-08/views
191
Ware, Alyn. “Letter to the Editor: The 1996 ICJ Opinion and the Legality of Nuclear Weapons”,
Arms Control Today, June/July 1998. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_06-07/letjj98
192
Goldblatt, supra.
186
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5.18 In 1997, a group of NGOs published a draft Nuclear Weapons Convention,
which was presented that same year by Costa Rica to the UN as an official document.
It was revised and updated in 2007, and has been presented, again by Costa Rica, for
consideration at the 2010 NPT RevCon.193
5.19 The draft Convention is intended to be a model, just to show that the complex
process involved in achieving total nuclear disarmament, can indeed be reduced to a
single international instrument. Although clearly the work of ‘righteous abolitionists’,
the draft takes a balanced approach, and does not propose a sudden move to total
disarmament. If negotiation of the treaty started in the near future, it would, for
example, do away with the necessity of negotiating an FMCT since fissile material
stocks are included in the draft. By criminalising the possession, use or threat of
nuclear weapons, and imposing criminal sanctions on individuals, the draft treaty also
takes the Canberra Commission and the ICJ Advisory Opinion to their logical
conclusion: the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons.
5.20 As far as a time frame is concerned, the draft provides a staged schedule for
reduction in size of the nuclear arsenals of the NWS, with each of the five being
allowed varying periods for this, and with each being allowed to retain a small
number of nuclear weapons for a time. Moreover, the two with the largest arsenals—
the US and Russia—are the most favoured and get the longest time to completely rid
themselves of their weapons: 15 years. While they themselves will undoubtedly argue
about the feasibility (and cost) of doing so in so short a period, most observers agree
that a target date needs to be set, and there is nothing to suggest that at least in that
time those states could not at the very least separate the warheads from their bombs
and missiles, and take other action to ensure the weapons cannot easily be rebuilt.
5.21 However, the draft does contain one major point of contention that could mark
the difference between its success or failure. It continues to treat the original five NPT
NWS in a class different from the more recent nuclear-armed states, India, Pakistan
and North Korea, and for that matter Israel. These are expected to disarm themselves
totally within five years of the treaty entering into force. This is highly unlikely to
happen. Rather, accusations of the draft being only another example of an unequal
treaty in the mould of the NPT are bound to fly. Those states can hardly be
realistically expected even to begin negotiations on such terms. One other major bone
of contention for the United States in particular is likely to be the jurisdiction given to
the International Court of Justice to try cases relating to violations of the treaty.
5.22 And another potential weakness from a general point of view may be the
somewhat unfortunate choice of the CTBT model of requiring not only ratification by
all nuclear-armed states but a specific number of other states before the treaty can
enter into force. If the ultimate goal of this treaty, apart from actually getting rid of
nuclear weapons, is to delegitimize them totally in international law, then it could be
argued that it would be much better to have a treaty which has entered into force even
193
Datan, Merav, Hill, Felicity, Scheffran, Jürgen, and Ware, Alyn. Securing Our Survival: The Case
for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, INESAP, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007.
http://www.inesap.org/books/securing_our_survival.htm The new draft trext is contained in Section 2
submitted by Costa Rica for the 2010 RevCon: http://www.inesap.org/pdf/sos/SoS_section2.pdf
P a g e | 48
without all NWS or non-NPT NWS being party. That way a norm would at least be
laid down against which the performance of the nuclear-armed states could be
measured.
5.23 Some writers endorse the view, in general terms, that such a treaty can be
verified if disarmament proceeds in a transparent way and trust is thus built.194 Others
analyse the manifold tasks involved in such verification, but nonetheless conclude that
it is practicable.195
5.24 At the end of the day, with so many competing views on whether total nuclear
disarmament is possible or not, and how it might proceed, it comes almost as a relief
to hear from one thoughtful writer who suggests that considerably more serious
analytical work needs to be done in order to try the reconcile the views of the
‘righteous abolitionists’ on the one hand, and the ‘dismissive realists’, on the other.
And even then, he suggests, the aim would be not to establish or advocate a program
of action, but simply to lay a better foundation of understanding upon which debate
about prospects and options might be advanced.196
6. CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR
The Article IV Dilemma
6.1
Having now examined two of the three main pillars of the NPT—nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament—the third pillar—civilian nuclear power—will now be
considered. As already noted, Article IV of the Treaty, which refers to civil nuclear
energy programs, and Article VI, relating to nuclear disarmament, are together
regarded as the ‘grand bargain’ of the treaty. The problem is that while Article VI
uses fairly weak language amounting to only ‘good faith’ efforts to negotiate on
disarmament, Article IV uses much stronger and, on the face of it, very clear
language. It speaks of “the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination”. Furthermore, it provides that “All the Parties to the Treaty undertake
to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.” As with most legal documents, the devil is in the detail, and
this ‘inalienable right’ must be exercised “in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty.”
6.2
As has also already been mentioned, most NNWS regard the NPT as being
fundamentally discriminatory in relation to nuclear weapons. Some states became
194
Scheffran, Jürgen, The Nuclear Weapons Convention: The Transformation to a Nuclear-WeaponFree World, INESAP Bulletin 28, April 2008. http://www.inesap.org/bulletin28/inesap.php?page=11
195
Findlay, Trevor, Verification of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, supra.
196
Quinlan, Michael, Abolishing Nuclear Armouries: Policy or Pipedream?, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 4,
Winter 2007-08. http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-summaries/2007---volume49/2007---issue-4/
P a g e | 49
party to the treaty because, apart from a concern to stop proliferation of nuclear
weapons, they were compensated, should they so wish, with this ‘inalienable right’ to
develop the full nuclear fuel cycle197 for civilian power generation, either through
their own resources or with the assistance of other nations if they were in a position to
do so. Others at the time expected that the NWS would provide fuel cycle services to
the NNWS when the need arose. However, since the 1990s, quite a few of these have
joined the ‘inalienable right’ camp, regardless of whether they have an interest in
acquiring nuclear energy themselves.
6.3
The problem is, as the world—and many writers—have noticed with alarm,
that the North Korean and Iranian198 nuclear programs suggest that there is a gaping
hole in Article IV which allows countries to put into place all of the fuel cycle
facilities needed for producing weapon-usable fissile material—either highly enriched
uranium (HEU) or plutonium—while remaining in compliance with the NPT. North
Korea further compounded the problem by withdrawing from the NPT in 2003,
seemingly with impunity, and went on to develop and test a basic nuclear weapon.
Iran remains a party to the NPT and maintains strenuously that its nuclear program is
for peaceful purposes, while it continues activities which at the very least suggest it
could move to develop nuclear weapons in a relatively short time frame.
6.4
While the international concern generated by the North Korean and Iranian
programs, the abandoned Libyan WMD program, and the destruction of an alleged
Syrian nuclear facility, gave birth to, and then generated considerable support for, the
proposals of the ‘Four Elder Statesmen’ and many others, it also coincided with two
other major international problems: climate change and food and energy shortages. It
is thus not surprising that the international nuclear energy industry—and some
independent writers—have tended to describe in fairly rapturous terms the
“renaissance” that nuclear energy can bring to world energy supplies. For many
countries, both developing and developed alike, the lure of civilian nuclear energy is
growing, and NPT Article IV is seen as the key to achieving it.
6.5
A small number of states—and a large number of writers—wish to see the
potential proliferation loophole in Article IV closed.199 A growing number of
proposals from governments, NGOs and writers alike, have been made in recent years
to do just that, and one or two initiatives launched. Many of the proposals contain
similar elements and could be mutually reinforcing. However, there has been little
success to date in blending them all into an acceptable end result.
6.6
The thrust of most of the proposals would result in limiting the processing of
weapon-usable material in civil nuclear programs, as well as the production of new
197
The nuclear fuel cycle is the set of chemical and physical operations needed to prepare nuclear
material for use in reactors and to dispose of or recycle the material after its removal from the reactor.
Existing fuel cycles begin with uranium as the natural resource and create plutonium as a by-product.
198
Albright, D. and Hinderstein, C., ‘Iran: player or rogue?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 59,
no. 5, (Sep./ Oct. 2003), 52–58.
199
Braun, Chaim and May, Michael, International Regime of Fresh Fuel Supply and Spent Fuel
Disposal, The Nonproliferation Review, March 2006, Volume 13, Number 1,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/131toc.htm
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material through reprocessing and enrichment, exclusively to facilities under
multinational control.200 Several variations on this proposal have been put forward,
but they all envision the creation of fully transparent international facilities providing
nuclear fuel services under close IAEA supervision. These facilities could be
supplemented by the creation of new multinational programs for managing and
disposing of spent fuel and radioactive waste.201
6.7
At the other end of the spectrum, some leading US experts have advocated a
‘no nascent nukes’ policy that would involve the imposition by the international
community of a complete ban on the production of fissile material by suspected
nuclear proliferators,202 to be enforced by the threat of coercive sanctions or, as a final
resort, the use of force.203
6.8
Proposals have also been made for the development of strategies for the
accelerated development of alternative technologies to allow the gradual phasing out
of highly enriched uranium in peaceful civilian nuclear programs.204 Some writers
with technical expertise have also made innovative proposals, such as that for a
“nuclear battery”—small reactors that might be produced in a factory, shipped to a
deployment site with their fuel already included, generate electricity there for 10–20
years, and then be shipped back to the factory with their spent fuel for disposal. This
sort of proposal is seen as making it possible to have widespread use of nuclear
energy with little spread of sensitive materials and expertise and few proliferation
risks.205 Proposals have also been made to expand the existing "Megatons to
Megawatts" program which converts Russia's highly enriched uranium (HEU) from
nuclear weapons into low-enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel for US nuclear power
reactors, to other countries as well.206 However, it seems the future of this scheme
itself is not assured.207
ElBaradei, M., ‘Towards a safer world’, The Economist, 18 Oct. 2003, pp. 43–44. See also
ElBaradei, Mohamed, 20/20 Vision for the Future, Background Report by the Director-General for the
Commission of Eminent Persons, February 2008. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/PDF/2020vision_220208.pdf
201
Von Hippel, Frank. “A Comprehensive Approach to Elimination of Highly-Enriched-Uranium From
All Nuclear-Reactor Fuel Cycles”, 23 February 2004.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/sgs12vonhippel.pdf
202
Sokolski, Henry D. (Editor). Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats, Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center (NPEC) in cooperation with the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies
Institute(SSI), July 2006. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB707.pdf
203
Allison, G., ‘How to stop nuclear terror’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 1 (Jan/ Feb 2004).
204
Braun and May, op. cit.
205
Bunn, Matthew. "Risks of GNEP’s Focus on Near-Term Reprocessing." Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Full Committee Hearing on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP). Testimony., November 14, 2007. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-GNEPtestimony-07.pdf
206
Bunn, Matthew, “Expanded and Accelerated HEU Downblending: Designing Options to Serve the
Interests of All Parties”, Conference Paper for the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 49 th
Annual Meeting, Nashville Tennessee, 13–17 July 2008.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/inmm-expanded-blend-down-incentives.pdf
207
Podvig, Pavel, “The Fallacy of the Megatons to Megawatts Program”, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Web Edition, 23 July 2008 http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavelpodvig/the-fallacy-of-the-megatons-to-megawatts-program
200
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6.9
One of the principal initiatives in this regard is the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP) launched by the US in February 2006. Its stated aim is to form an
international partnership to promote the use of nuclear power and close the nuclear
fuel cycle in a way that reduces nuclear waste and the risk of nuclear proliferation. In
effect, this proposal divides the world into “fuel supplier nations”, which supply
enriched uranium fuel and take back spent fuel, and “user nations”, which operate
nuclear power plants. Currently, 21 countries participate in GNEP, with around 20
additional observer countries, though the number of full members was expected to
grow with more countries joining at the latest GNEP Ministerial meeting in Paris on 1
October 2008.
6.10 GNEP has proven controversial in the United States and internationally. One
of the main criticisms is that GNEP places a heavy focus on building a commercialscale reprocessing plant for spent fuel in the near term in the United States, and critics
argue that, if accepted, this would increase proliferation risks rather than decreasing
them.208 However, this is sometimes confused with the broader GNEP objective of
establishing new spent fuel treatment technologies like pyro-processing, which will
avoid plutonium separation, and thus serve laudable non-proliferation goals. The US
Congress has also provided far less funding for GNEP than President Bush
requested—though funds have been given to the Advanced Fuel Cycle initiative,
rather than to GNEP itself. US arms control organizations have criticized the proposal
to resume reprocessing as costly and increasing proliferation risks,209 noting that
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel would likely cost considerably more than disposal in a
long-term repository.210
6.11 Russia’s President Putin publicly expressed support on 23 January 2007 for
the establishment of international nuclear fuel enrichment centres under the control of
international organizations, principally the IAEA.211 A number of other governments
have made similar proposals in recent years, and Germany and The Netherlands are
current working on a joint project in this regard.
6.12 Attention might also be drawn here to the offer made in September 2006 by
the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) to donate US$50 million to the IAEA as seed
funding for the creation and management of a stockpile of non-weapons grade nuclear
material. This would guarantee states a source of fuel under strict non-proliferation
controls should they choose to adopt a peaceful nuclear energy program. NTI made its
offer contingent on at least one other state contributing a further $100 million to the
stockpile. To date, $65 million of that target amount has been contributed—$50
million from the US, $10 million from the UAE and $5 million from Norway.212
208
Ibid.
Kidd, Steve. “Evolving international pacts for tomorrow”, Nuclear Engineering International, 14
September 2007, http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectioncode=147&storyCode=2047064
210
Weitz, Richard,” Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”, WMD
Insights, March 2008 http://www.wmdinsights.com/I23/I23_G2_GlobalNuclearEnergy.htm
211
‘Russia favors international nuclear centers under IAEA control’, Novosti Press Agency report, 23
January 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070123/59544393.html
212
“UAE Commitment Gives NTI/IAEA Fuel Bank Critical Momentum”, NTI Press Release, 7 August
2008. http://nti.org/c_press/release_UAE%20fuel%20bank%2080708.pdf
209
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Growing NNWS Resistance
6.13 Many of these proposals are viewed positively by many governments and
some observers as not only eradicating the possibility of developing nuclear weapons,
but also as going a considerable way in reducing the stockpile of nuclear materials
which might inadvertently fall into the hands of terrorists for use in a dirty bomb. It
would also eradicate another source of envy by those states not having the technology
to highly enrich uranium for those that do.213
6.14 The problem with most of these proposals, however, is not technical, but
political.214 Many NNWS, including some developed states—and many analysts—
have criticised the GNEP and other proposals as creating another discriminatory
regime under the NPT, this time between “haves” and “have-nots” with regard to the
nuclear fuel cycle. Some are genuine in their indignation at yet another perceived
inequality. Others are also genuine in their desire to see a proper implementation of
NPT Article IV. However, there is also a small group of states from the developing
world who have seized on the issue for basically political motives. Since the NWS
have not upheld their end of the NPT ‘grand bargain’, these states argue, they will
insist on full and unfettered implementation of the ‘inalienable right’ in Article IV,
regardless of whether or not the country concerned has any immediate interest in
pursuing its own nuclear energy program.
6.15 The resulting clash between the two main groups of countries and views have,
in essence, been at the heart of largely deadlocked debate in NPT Review circles for
the last seven or eight years. It will also be one of the issues that will need to be
unlocked in some way if the 2010 NPT Review Conference is to have any chance of
success.
6.16 It is pertinent to note here that some analysts have expressed scepticism as to
whether any incentives exist which could be offered to countries like Iran that would
ever induce them to abandon their indigenous nuclear programs. In practice, these
states see such proposals as an effort to supplant Article IV with, in effect, a
suppliers’ cartel in nuclear fuel services. Others argue that, in any case, the only hope
of dealing with Iran will be with Russian cooperation, and215—leaving aside recent
tensions over Georgia—that can really only be expected once a bilateral civil nuclear
agreement exists between the US and Russia.216
6.17 It is also pointed out that in order to be effective, an internationalized fuel
cycle regime will have to include important nuclear technology holders (notably
India, Israel and Pakistan), which are outside the existing NPT regime. Indeed, there
213
Berry, supra.
Totty, Michael, “The Case For and Against Nuclear Power”, The Wall Street Journal, 30 June 2008.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121432182593500119.html?mod=2_1586_topbox
215
Einhorn, Robert, Gottemoeller, Rose, McGoldrick, Fred, Poneman, Daniel, and Wolfsthal, Jon, The
U.S.–Russia Civil Nuclear Agreement: A Framework for Cooperation, CSIS Report, 28 May 2008.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080522-einhorn-u.s.-russia-web.pdf
216
Khlopkov, Anton. “What Will A Nuclear Agreement with the United States Bring Russia?”, PIR
Center Moscow Security Index No. 2 (82), Volume 13, 2007.
http://pircenter.org/data/ib/sieng2/khlopkov_eng.pdf
214
P a g e | 53
have already been many complaints in India itself217 that its controversial deal with
the United States, and subsequent NSG waiver, simply put the country at the mercy of
expensive foreign cartels as the source of their nuclear equipment and material.218
Others take a more positive view of that deal.219
Prospects for a Nuclear Renaissance
6.18 This brings us to an assessment of how accurate claims about a nuclear energy
renaissance are, and whether such a renaissance can in practice be maintained.
Needless to say, there are widely differing views in the literature. The nuclear energy
industry, in their publications,220 continue to paint the rosy picture they began nearly
60 years ago, when the industry was still in its infancy, of electricity so plentiful and
cheap that it would not even be worth the bother to meter it. These days, a heavy
element of green has joined the rose. At the other end of the spectrum are those who
might be termed ‘eco-authors’ who would prefer to see nuclear energy phased out
altogether and replaced with what they regard as far more environmentally-friendly
technologies. In this regard, proposals have been made to revive an NGO proposal
made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference for the IAEA to be stripped
of its oversight of nuclear energy, and be replaced by a new ‘International Sustainable
Energy Agency’.221
6.19 In the middle are more balanced assessments.222 Some of these tip towards the
nuclear industry’s position.223 Others closely examine the evidence, and reach a
negative conclusion. According to these writers, the percentage of nuclear-generated
electricity in the overall global energy mix is found to be in fact decreasing. In
Western Europe, as nuclear power's contribution declines in Europe's overall energy
mix, efforts to build new plants are being met with legislative and technical delays. In
Chellaney, Brahma. “Mortgaging nuclear crown jewels”, The Hindu (on-line edition), 17 September
2008. http://www.hindu.com/2008/09/17/stories/2008091755961000.htm
217
Raghavan, V.R. “India and the Global Power Shift”, Paper present at the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute’s global Forces 2008 Conference, Canberra, 2 July 2008.
http://www.delhipolicygroup.com/india_and_the_global_power_shift.pdf
220
See, for example, the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) http://www.wano.org.uk/
and the World Nuclear Association (WNA) http://www.world-nuclear.org/
221
Bloomfield, Janet. “The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, ORG Briefing Papers,
January 2007.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=7320568D-84ACF8C6-59E9-AE8168ACB8EC&lng=en
222
Elliott, E. Donald (Moderator – Yale Law School), “Is nuclear power essential to addressing
climage change and energy independence?”, Ongoing Web Discussion, 2008, New Talk,
http://newtalk.org/2008/07/is-nuclear-power-essential-to.php See also Johnson, Toni Challenges for
Nuclear Power Expansion, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 11 August 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16886/challenges_for_nuclear_power_expansion.html
223
Totty, Michael, “The Case For and Against Nuclear Power”, The Wall Street Journal, 30 June 2008.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121432182593500119.html?mod=2_1586_topbox
219
P a g e | 54
Asia, which is viewed by many as the region poised to jump-start the global nuclear
revival, substantial roadblocks to nuclear growth exist.224
6.20 In Asia, the most pressing problem is the availability of nuclear fuel,225 which
is at the heart, for instance, of India’s drive to see a successful outcome on its nuclear
deal with the United States. But the same consideration bedevils other existing or
nascent nuclear energy programs elsewhere in the region, as few states there have
extensive uranium deposits. This is seen as posing particular problems for countries
such as Australia, which has good non-proliferation credentials, but at the same time
has a lot of money to make in the future from its uranium deposits which are the
largest in the world.226It might be noted in this regard, however, that Australia and
Canada have been major uranium suppliers for many years, and at the same time
maintained good non-proliferation credentials, without any clash between the two
positions.
6.21 Another bottleneck is likely to be the ability to build sufficient nuclear
equipment to meet an increased need for reactors and associated equipment around
the world if indeed the nuclear renaissance blooms. This problem will be compounded
as existing facilities age.227 Closely allied to this is likely to be an insufficiency of
trained personnel to work in nuclear energy facilities.228 In this regard, there may be
some irony in the fact that there are initiatives in place to actively discourage young
professionals and students from careers in military nuclear programs.229 These
initiatives may thus be producing unexpected results more generally in other areas.
6.22 Other writers point to institutional bottlenecks where it is argued that the focus
on IAEA's nonproliferation enforcement work is proving detrimental to what could be
an even more important job: its role as a safe disseminator of ‘green’ civilian energy
technologies. It is further argued that the IAEA's nonproliferation role is not divorced
from its “promotional” function; in fact, the two are intertwined. Technical assistance
for peaceful uses is after all a part of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty's grand
bargain. The suggestion is made that many developing countries are concerned that
the IAEA has not yet struck the balance envisaged between its nuclear watchdog and
its civilian-technology roles. Unfortunately, the agency is currently hobbled in its
efforts to promote these technologies, both due to inadequate funding for these efforts
224
Schneider, Mycle. 2008 world industry status report: Global nuclear power, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists Report, 16 September 2008. http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/reports/2008-worldnuclear-industry-status-report/2008-world-nuclear-industry-status-rep
225
Gadekar, Surendra, India’s Nuclear Fuel Shortage, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6 August 2008
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/indias-nuclear-fuel-shortage
226
Clarke, Michael, Refashioning Australia’s Nuclear Bargain? The Challenges of Changing Strategic,
Regime, and Market Environments, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 15 Number 2 July 2008.
227
Schneider, op. cit.
228
Ibid.
229
Riisager, Thomas, and Sokolski, Henry D. (Eds.) Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of
Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College,
April 2002. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB131.pdf
P a g e | 55
and because of political differences among the agency's most prominent memberstates.230
Engaging the Nuclear Industry
6.23 From the foregoing, there appears to be a clear need to involve the
international nuclear industry more closely in various aspects of the nuclear debate.231
This would not just be for the purpose of assessing what the possibilities and
challenges facing the nuclear energy sector truly are. In increasing the interchange of
ideas and information between governments and industry about issues such as the
primordial need to secure nuclear materials and wider concerns about proliferation
and nuclear terrorism, a more positive international environment is likely to result.
And if proposals along the lines of those being considered by GNEP eventually come
to fruition, the close cooperation of the nuclear industry will be essential.
6.24 It has to be said that there is little in the literature on industry involvement in
the nuclear debate apart from the context of discussion in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. One suggestion has been for a government/industry conference in the lead-up
to the 2010 NPT RevCon.232 There have also been suggestions for an industry code of
conduct, ranging from responsible uranium supply to support for the development of
proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies. Such calls have resulted in the launch
of a project on a code by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which had
its first meeting in early October 2008. The Canadian Centre for International
Governance Innovation (CIGI) also has a project on nuclear energy and global
governance which is due to report in August 2009.233
7. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE
7.1
Central to the discussion of almost any aspect of the nuclear debate are the
allied questions of verification and compliance:234 verification of the implementation
of the non-proliferation norms contained in the NPT; verification of international
arms control agreements; verification of compliance with safeguards agreements
Sreenivasan, T.P., “The IAEA’s Other Job”, The Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2008.
http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB121425487026497891.html
231
Bernstein, Paul I. “International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”, NDU
Center for the Study of WMD Occasional Paper 6, May 2008.
http://www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/docUploaded/2008-CSWMD-OP6.pdf
232
Letts, Martine. “Commission should promote a second nuclear age’, The Australian, 24 September
2008.
233
See ‘Nuclear Energy Futures: Implications and Options for Global Governance”,
http://www.cigionline.org/community.igloo?r0=community&r0_script=/scripts/folder/view.script&r0_
pathinfo=/{7caf3d23-023d-494b-865b-84d143de9968}/Research/nuclear&r0_output=xml
234
Lewis, Patricia, and Findlay, Trevor (Editors). Coming to Terms with Security: A Handbook on
Verification and Compliance, UNIDIR/VERTIC, June 2003.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=17F102FE-94486CA3-8C56-49695F6430F1&lng=en See also Doyle, James E., ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and
Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy (Burlington, MA: ButterworthHeinemann, 2008). See also Avenhaus, Rudolf et al (Editors), Verifing Treaty Compliance (Springer,
2006).
230
P a g e | 56
made pursuant to NPT norms; and, potentially, verification of compliance with any
future agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, including an FMCT. And the
literature is replete with detailed analyses of just about every aspect of verification
and compliance, including separate proposals for verification of the non-acquisition of
radiological weapons.235
7.2
Central to the verification debate is the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) which was established in 1957. It was a child of the Cold War and this is
reflected in its Statute, agreed in 1956. It nevertheless went on to overcome any initial
tensions between Cold War opponents to become one of the most respected of
international organisations. It plays an indispensible role in verifying compliance with
the NPT which was agreed in 1968, quite some time after the IAEA’s inception. Its
role in setting global standards for nuclear safety and security and in providing
multilateral technical assistance to developing states in the nuclear field is generally
regarded as excellent. Its international profile has skyrocketed with its involvement in
the cases of Iraq, North Korea and Iran. It played a significant role in helping divest
Iraq of its nuclear weapon potential after the 1990 Gulf War. Particularly since the
events of 9/11, the IAEA is also seen as playing a special role in preventing nuclear
terrorism. And, as just discussed, concerns about global warming and energy security
have heralded, at least in the view of some, a nuclear energy revival that are likely to
propel the fortunes of the IAEA, as both promoter and regulator of civilian nuclear
energy, even further.
7.3
The IAEA’s membership, is somewhat less than the near-universal adherence
to the NPT, and currently stands at 144. The agency’s safeguards activities have
undergone sweeping expansion and strengthening, notably by adoption of the
Additional Protocol (see below), now in force for 86 states. During the IAEA’s first
three years, safeguards were applied solely to three tons of natural uranium supplied
by Canada to Japan in 1959. By 2007 the IAEA had 237 safeguards agreements in
force in 163 states, applicable to 949 facilities and it conducted 2,122 on-site
inspections. It is also regarded as one of the most efficient and well-managed UN
agencies. In 2006 the US Office of Management and Budget gave it a virtually
unprecedented rating of 100% in terms of value-for-money of US financial
contributions.236
7.4
There is, however, a sort of institutional schizophrenia about the IAEA which
reflects the dichotomy of goals contained in the NPT. The Agency’s objective is to
‘seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world’. 237 However, ‘It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used
in such a way as to further any military purpose’. To this end the Agency was
235
Van der Meer, Klaas, The Radiological Threat: Verification at the Source, Verification Research,
Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), Verification Yearbook 2003.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?fecvnodeid=121925&fecvid=21&v21=121925&lng=en&or
d61=alphaNavi&ord60=PublicationDate&id=13448
236
Contributions to the IAEA, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10004639.2006.html.
237
Statute of the IAEA, Article II.
P a g e | 57
authorized to ‘establish and administer safeguards’,238 including for ‘special
fissionable and other materials’, notably plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, both
of which could be used to make nuclear weapons. Safeguards would involve not just
nuclear accounting but on-site inspections by international officials. The Statute
makes no mention of an agency role in nuclear disarmament, but it does permit the
Agency to ‘apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or
multilateral arrangements, or at the request of a State party, to any of that State’s
activities in the field of atomic energy’.239
7.5
This schizophrenia also appears in the administration of the IAEA Budget,
which is identified by writers as a major impediment to stronger IAEA verification. In
recent years, a growing number of developing states have only been willing to
approve increases in the budget if there are corresponding increases in the technical
assistance budget. Given the unwillingness of some of the major nuclear powers to do
this, the IAEA safeguards budget remains relatively low. Some writers propose a
more equitable system.240
IAEA initiatives to secure nuclear materials and facilities
7.6
As a result of growing international concern about the dangers of nuclear
material falling into the hands of terrorists, steps have been taken under IAEA
auspices to promote consistent standards for enhancing the safe transport and physical
protection of nuclear materials. As long ago as 1979, the IAEA developed the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)241 which
obliges the parties to make specific arrangements for the protection of nuclear
material. The convention was amended in 2005 to extend some of its provisions
which originally applied only to international transport of nuclear materials to cover
domestic transport as well. To date, the amendment has only been ratified by 16 of the
136 parties to the Convention.
7.7
In addition, the IAEA Board in 2002 approved an Action Plan for Protection
Against Nuclear Terrorism242 aimed at upgrading global protection against acts of
terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The plan was also
designed to supplements national efforts to upgrade physical protection of states’
nuclear material and nuclear facilities, detect illicit nuclear trafficking across borders
and improve control of radioactive sources.
7.8
The IAEA also entered into an arrangement with Russia and the US (known as
the Tripartite Initiative) aimed at reducing, and if possible eliminating, the use and
storage of highly enriched uranium in civil nuclear activities. The objective is to
facilitate the return of both fresh and spent fuel from Russian-supplied HEU research
238
Statute of the IAEA, Article III.5.
IAEA Statute, article III.A.5.
240
Ferguson, Charles D., Nuclear safeguards for a new nuclear age, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
19 December 2007. http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/nuclear-safeguards-a-new-nuclearage
241
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml
242
http://iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49-17.pdf
239
P a g e | 58
reactor fuel for long-term management and disposition. There are currently about 80
research reactors around the world that still use HEU.
Adequacy of safeguards arrangements
7.9
In recent years, a significant amount has been written about the perceived need
to strengthen the comprehensive or ‘fullscope’ safeguards agreements which nonnuclear-weapon states party to the NPT are required to conclude with the IAEA.
There was a consensus which to an extent remains, that these fullscope safeguards
agreements were not sufficiently strong. In particular, they were unlikely to be able to
detect the clandestine acquisition or weaponization of nuclear material.243 In the
1990s, following revelations about Iraq’s and South Africa’s clandestine nuclear
weapons programs, the IAEA developed a Strengthened Safeguards System contained
in an Additional Protocol.244 Agreements under the Additional Protocol, which are
negotiated on a state-by-state basis, seek to give IAEA inspectors access to nuclearrelated facilities and technologies at which nuclear materials may not necessarily be
present.245 In order to assess the completeness as well as the accuracy of a state
party’s declaration to the agency, the Additional Protocol also gives the IAEA
authority to conduct environmental sampling both in a specific location and in a wider
area to verify the absence of activities that fall outside the scope of a state party’s
expanded declaration.
7.10 There are differing assessments of the likely effectiveness of the Additional
Protocol in detecting undeclared or proscribed nuclear activities, such as those alleged
to have been carried out by Iran. Some analysts argue that the enhanced access
granted to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol will be enough to deter would-be
cheaters or to at least significantly complicate and delay any clandestine weapon
program. Others emphasize that even under the Additional Protocol the IAEA’s
ability to detect undeclared activities, especially taking place at undeclared sites, will
remain limited if the agency does not have prior information as to the specific
locations of the undeclared activities. Some even suggest that the UN Security
Council should agree in advance on a standard set of responses to possible future acts
of proliferation by governments, and adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the
Charter making it mandatory for all states parties to the NPT to accept the Additional
Protocol.246
Cochran, Thomas B. “Adequacy of IAEA’s Safeguards for Achieving Timely Detection”, Falling
Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War
College, February 2008.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=F75824A5-2403103B-B6E9-2E55FB41E7A5&lng=en
244
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf See also “The 1997
IAEA Additional Protocol At a Glance”, Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, January 2008.
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtoco
245
The Model Additional Protocol upon which the individual protocol agreements between the IAEA
and individual states is based was first published as INFCIRC/540. Hence, these arrangements are
243
known as INFCIRC/540 agreements.
Dean, Jonathan. “Reviving the Non-Proliferation Regime”, Paper commissioned by the WMD
Commission, 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No4.pdf
246
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7.11 Despite its good record, and despite the recognised budgetary limitations,
there are loud and repeated calls from governments, the UN, NGOs, think tanks and
individual writers, for further strengthening of the IAEA nuclear verification
regime.247 Some, for instance, call for creation, at some stage, of a standing United
Nations verification body with a mandate wider than just nuclear weapons, and
including all classes of WMD.248 Others have proposed that the UN Security Council
could authorize the IAEA to carry out monitoring and inspection measures beyond
those provided for in existing safeguards agreements.249It also needs to be borne in
mind that the IAEA itself proposes many of the changes which would strengthen its
verification capacities.250
7.12 Some of the proposals are overtly discriminatory, and are based on a
presumption that some parties to multilateral arms control agreements may be more
likely to cheat than others. Some US analysts in particular regard such a possibility as
being, above all, a function of the nature of a particular state’s regime.251 Such an
approach is also justified by their proponents as focusing the agency’s energies and
limited resources away from states that are assessed as having little or no proliferation
risk.252 An IAEA state evaluation report in their view would take into account factors
such as state parties’ nuclear histories, the scope and size of their infrastructures, and
the relative degree of transparency of these infrastructures. These considerations
would in turn affect decisions about the resources to be devoted to verifying a
particular party’s declaration to the agency’s safeguards division.253
247
Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences,
Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and
Capabilities, Washington DC, 2005. http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11265#toc
248
Findlay, Trevor. “A Standing United Nations Verification Body: Necessary and Feasible”, Paper
commissioned for WMD Commission, December 2005.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No40.pdf
249
Belobrov, Yury, Greenstock, Sir Jeremy, Chang-he, Li, Pickering, Thomas R., and
Schlumberger, Guillaume, The P-5 and Nuclear Nonproliferation, CSIS Working Group
Report,
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071210-einhorn-the_p-5-web.pdf
250
ElBaradei, Mohamed, 20/20 Vision for the Future, Background Report by the Director-General for
the Commission of Eminent Persons, February 2008. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/PDF/2020vision_220208.pdf See also Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons Group on the Future of
the Agency, GOV/2008/22-GC(52)/INF/4, 23 May 2008.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/gov2008-22gc52inf-4.pdf ;
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/PDF/2020report0508.pdf
251
Perle, R., ‘Good guys, bad guys and arms control’, in Anthony, I. and Rotfeld, A. D. (eds), A Future
Arms Control Agenda (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001) ch. 18; Berriman, Annette, Leslie,
Russell and Carlson, John, “Assessing Motivation as a Means of Determining the Risk of
Proliferation”, Annual Meeting of Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Orlando, 18-22 July
2004.
252
Lodding, Jan, and Ribeiro, Bernardo. “Strengthening safeguards in states with limited nuclear
activities”, Trust & Verify Issue No. 123, VERTIC, March 2006–March 2007.
http://www.vertic.org/assets/TV123.pdf
253
Carlson, John “Defining the safeguards mission”, IAEA Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, 16-20
October 2006; “Safeguards in a Changing Environment”, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
Annual Meeting, Nashville, 13-17 July 2008.
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7.13 Critics counter, however, that this shift would fatally undermine the
universality norm upon which the NPT is based. It would also reinforce the emerging
negative tendency discussed earlier in this paper to divide the international
community into ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’.
7.14 Some innovative suggestions have been made for future verification measures
as the world approaches zero and attempted break-outs are detected. These include
legal immunity for weapons scientists, or even members of the public, who act as
whistle-blowers.254 There have also been some calls for greater recognition and
resources for nuclear forensics as a distinct body of science.255
7.15 A number of writers have commented on the requirements for verification of
an FMCT,256 and a few on the requirements for verification of full nuclear
disarmament.257 The UK and Norway are undertaking joint work on the latter as well.
Compliance and Enforcement
7.16 The cases of North Korea and Iran have highlighted some shortcomings in
current verification systems. However, they have underscored a very large hole in the
flip-side of verification, namely enforcement of compliance with non-proliferation
norms. This in fact flows not so much from any inherent weakness in the nonproliferation regime itself, but from the whole system of international law in general
where until relatively recently, enforcement has more often than not been honoured
more in the breach than in the observance. In the past decade or so, in the field of
human rights, considerable strides have been made in not only devising, but actually
applying tough penalties for breaches of international human rights instruments, and a
number of them also make it clear that they apply universally, thus derogating from
the hitherto rigid rules of sovereign immunity as they related to leaders of states.
7.17 In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, however, breaches of nonproliferation norms, or of safeguards agreements, and even the possession of nuclear
weapons themselves, do not yet have the status of an international crime. The 1996
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on nuclear weapons was not
particularly clear on this point, and was in any case no more than an opinion which
has been interpreted by all sides of the debate as supporting their point of view. So
See Perkovich, George, and Acton, James M. “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons”, Adelphi paper No.
396, September 2008. See also Levi, Michael A., “Weapons Scientists As Whistle Blowers”, World
Policy Journal, Volume XX, No 4, Winter 2003/04
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj.2006.23.3.1
255
Niemeyer, Sidney, and Smith, David K. “Following the Clues: The Role of Forensics in Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism”, Arms Control Today, July/August 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_0708/Clues See also Royal Society, Detecting nuclear and radiological materials, RS policy document
07/08, March 2008. http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=29187 and Chivers, Daniel H.;
Lyles Goldblum, Bethany F.; Isselhardt, Brett H.; and Snider, Jonathan S. “Before the Day After:
Using Pre-Detonation Nuclear Forensics to Improve Fissile Material Security”, Arms Control Today,
July/August 2008. http://armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/NuclearForensics
256
Carlson, John. “Can a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Be Effectively Verified?”, Arms Control
Today, January/February 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/Carlson
257
Persbo, Andreas, and Bjørningstad, Marius. “Verifying Nuclear Disarmament: The Inspector’s
Agenda”, Arms Control Today, May 2008. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_05/PersboShea
254
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what is left are sanctions applied by an international body such as the IAEA or in
extreme cases, the UN Security Council; or else sanctions by individual countries or
groups of like-minded countries which simply cut-off the offending country from any
possibility of receiving nuclear materials or technology from those states. Such action
is sometimes necessary in light of the fact that an IAEA or Security Council decision
is usually subject to political considerations and debate, which can—as has been
shown in both the North Korean and Iranian cases—result in very lengthy delays in
taking any action at all. Furthermore, in recent years, such decisions have become
increasingly entangled with politicised debate on the non-compliance of the NPT
NWS with their perceived disarmament obligations.
7.18 The long delays in moving to limited verification following the revelations of
North Korea’s and Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities, while largely attributable to
political factors beyond the IAEA’s control, have also attracted a raft of proposals by
writers. Some are highly technical.258 Others suggest processes that the international
community should follow to strengthen the capacity of the IAEA to resolve in a
timely manner cases of non-compliance.259 One of these even includes the text of a
generic UN Security Council Resolution for dealing preventively with cases of noncompliance, a Model Temporary Complementary Protocol for the application of
IAEA safeguards in a non-compliant state, a detailed proposal for the NSG to adopt
criteria-based export conditions applicable to all non-NPT states, and a list of
objective conditions under which supplier states could provide long-term generic
export licenses for fuel reloads of electrical nuclear power plants.260
7.19 As has already been noted, some writers call for the establishment of a
governing body for the NPT, since it only has a review process which is not
particularly consonant with effecting enforcement of the treaty’s provisions. Speed is
recognised by most writers as being of the essence, and where a body cannot reach a
swift decision, the matter should be referred to an appropriate higher authority, which
in the case of the NPT would normally, faute de mieux, be the Security Council.261
Some writers laud the increased activism of the Security Council in recent years, and
even suggest that future decisions on membership of the Council itself should depend
258
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP). Bulletin Online,
Issue No. 27, December 2006. http://www.inesap.org/bulletin27/index.htm
259
Carlson, John. “NPT Safeguards Agreements – Defining Non-Compliance”, Australian Safeguards
and Non-Proliferation Office, 31 August 2008.
http://www.asno.dfat.gov.au/publications/npt_safeguards.html
260
Goldschmidt, Pierre, “IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance”, study
commissioned jointly by the Harvard Belfer Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 12 July 2008.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20308&prog=zgp&proj=znp
p See also by the same author, Saving the NPT and the Nonproliferation Regime in an Era of Nuclear
Renaissance, Testimony before the US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, 24 July 2008
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20321
261
Ifft, Edward. “Witness for the Prosecution: International Organizations and Arms Control
Verification”, Arms Control Today, November 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOVIfft
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in part on a state’s non-proliferation record.262 Others, however, warn that the Council
itself needs to exercise some caution on how far it goes so as to avoid alienating states
and undermining the Council’s authority more generally.263 At the very least, it is
suggested that the international community will also need a more coherent and
transparently non-discriminatory system of enforcement in advance of suspected
infringements if the legitimacy behind Security Council decisions is to be sufficiently
strong to elicit adherence.264 At the other end of the spectrum, there have been a very
limited number of calls for a dedicated international military force to be created to
deal with any nuclear misdeeds.265
7.20 Practical suggestions for improving enforcement in specific cases are
relatively sparse in the literature. However, there is a recognition by some writers that,
ultimately, enforcement should not be seen only as a separate field in its own right,
but part of the overall process leading to the gradual devaluation of both the political
and military value of nuclear weapons, and their eventual abolition.266
8. NUCLEAR TERRORISM
8.1
With the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and the subsequent
declaration of the misleadingly titled ‘war on terror’, international terrorism had
entered the thinking of the highest echelons particularly of Western governments and
their publics alike.267 With the massive scale of those attacks, it was not long before
the thought of weapons of mass destruction falling into terrorist hands started to
exercise the minds of policy makers and those that seek to influence them. A
substantial body of literature on the subject of WMD, and more specifically nuclear
and radiological, terrorism has since emerged. Much of it focuses on the actions taken
by governments, multilaterally, bilaterally and unilaterally, to prevent terrorists from
acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear or radiological materials.268 Moreover, the bulk
Cirincione, Joseph; and Vaynman, Jane. “Lock in Nuclear Successes”, CEIP Proliferation Brief,
Volume 8, Number 2, 30 March 2005.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16721&prog=zgp&proj=znp
p
263
Müller, Harald. “WMD Crisis: Law Instead of Lawless Self-Help”, Paper commissioned for WMD
Commission, August 2005. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No37.pdf
264
Ingram, Paul. “Taking Responsibility: what can NPT states realistically do to build on today's
momentum behind nuclear disarmament?”, BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 1, 15 July 2008.
http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz01.htm
265
Ramberg, Bennett, “A world free of nuclear weapons: The wrong and right way to do it”, Op-Ed in
Middle East Times, 23 January 2008. http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2008/01/23/oped_bennett_ramberg/5982/
262
266
Perkovich, George; Matthews, Jessica; Cirincione, Joseph; Gottemoeller, Rose; and
Wolfsthal, Jon. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment
Report, March 2005.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16593
267
“ElBaradei warns about extremist nuclear threat”, Los Angeles Times, 10 February 2008, p. A-4.
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/10/world/fg-iran10
268
Charles D Ferguson and William C Potter "Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism",
Paper commissioned by the WMD Commission, 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No2.pdf
P a g e | 63
of the material is critical of identified failures in this regard, and replete with
proposals for strengthening government measures.269 There is also considerable
literature, some of it highly technical in nature,270 for improving security at civilian
nuclear facilities271 and in the field of nuclear forensics.272 The basis of many of the
conclusions reached in this regard are similar to the reasoning advanced by the ‘Four
Elder Statesmen’, namely that the less nuclear and radiological material there is, the
less danger it poses.273
8.2
The radiological aspect of the debate is relatively new and still fairly
undeveloped. While there has been dilatory discussion in past decades of the need for
some sort of radiological weapons convention, this discussion has remained largely
inchoate. The case of the poisoning with Plutonium 210 of Russian dissident
Alexander Litvinenko in London in late 2006, however, served as a powerful
reminder that nuclear and radiological materials of the sort that terrorists might use,
can pass national borders easily.274 There has consequently been a minor flurry of
writings speculating on possible terrorist motivations and plans in relation to
acquisition and possible use of such materials.275
8.3
There appears to be a wide consensus among observers that if terrorists have
an interest in nuclear or radiological materials, it is unlikely to be for a sophisticated
nuclear weapon.276 While it is always possible that a “rogue state” or a state like
Pakistan if a militant Islamist government were to take power,277 might give a
Bunn, George. “Enforcing International Standards: Protecting Nuclear Materials From Terrorists
Post-9/11”, Arms Control Today, January/February 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_0102/Bunn
269
270
Hansell, Cristina, Nuclear Medicine's Double Hazard: Imperiled Treatment and the Risk of
Terrorism, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2008.
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol15/152_hansell_nuclear_medicine.pdf
271
Managing the Atom (MTA) Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Securing the Bomb, Report Commissioned by
the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 26 September 2007.
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp
272
Niemeyer, Sidney, and Smith, David K. “Following the Clues: The Role of Forensics in Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism”, Arms Control Today, July/August 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_0708/Clues See also Royal Society, Detecting nuclear and radiological materials, RS policy document
07/08, March 2008. http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=29187
273
CISAC (Stanford), and Program on Science and Global Security (Princeton). “Preventing Nuclear
Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism”, CISAC Reports, March 2005,
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=13361605-8A697CDF-2F69-672D39C6E93C&lng=en
274
Berry, Ken. “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Moscow-Washington Alliance”, EastWest Institute
Policy Paper 2, 7 February 2007. http://www.ewi.info/pdf/TerrorNukesFeb7.pdf.
275
Acton, James M., Rogers, M. Brooke, and Zimmerman, Peter D., Beyond the Dirty Bomb: Rethinking Radiological Terror, Survival, vol. 49 no. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 151–168
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/02/78/41/49-310Zimmerman.pdf
276
Frost, Robin M., Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper 378, 2005.
http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/2005-adelphi-papers/ap-378-nuclear-terrorism-after911/
277
Mannan, Abdul. “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a
Commericial Irradiation Source in Transport”, Stimson Center Report, April 2007.
http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/VFMannan.pdf See also Berry, Ken. “The Security of
Pakistan’s Nuclear Facilities”, EastWest Institute Policy Paper 2/2008.
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complete nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, fear of nuclear retaliation by the United
States or another nuclear armed state would lessen this risk. It is nonetheless possible
that a well financed terrorist group could build a basic atomic weapon if it had
sufficient fissile material, since the technology is freely available on the internet and
the equipment required need only be of 1945 standard.
8.4
More likely, though, is the prospect that terrorists might prefer, for both
practical and political reasons, to build a so-called ‘dirty bomb’278 (known also more
technically as a Radiological Dispersal Device) which would use large quantities of
conventional explosives to disperse nuclear or radiological material.279 Another
logical step in this regard would be to destroy an insecure civilian nuclear power plant
with consequent extensive radioactive fallout. One detailed report concludes gloomily
that nearly all such plants are vulnerable, particularly from air attacks in the mould of
9/11,280while another concludes that such an attack is highly unlikely.281 Indeed, the
terror effect of spreading radiological material without the use of explosives at all, e.g.
in a city water supply, would equally achieve the goal of widespread panic,
dislocation in government, and a lengthy and expensive clean-up campaign if indeed
such a campaign were even possible.282
8.5
One interesting gloss on this discussion is the suggestion that in fact, even if
they managed to acquire a viable nuclear weapon, a group such as Al Qaeda might
still assess that not using it might serve their purposes better than a single detonation
ever could. Mere possession of such a weapon, and the never-ending threat to use it,
could provoke possibly more terror, and in effect hold a wider variety of governments
hostage in perpetuity.283
http://www.ewi.info/pdf/SecurityPakistan.pdf See also Bunn, Matthew and Wier, Anthony, “Blocking
the Terrorist Pathway to the Bomb: Steps on the Pathway”, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard
University, updated 1 November 2007. http://nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/path.asp
278
Isenberg, David. “‘Dirty Nukes’: The Threat and the Response”, BASIC Notes, 14 March 2003.
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/DirtyNukes.htm
279
Barnaby, Frank. “Dirty Bombs and Primitive Nuclear Weapons”, Oxford Research Group (ORG)
In-Depth Report, June 2005. See also Khripunov, Igor. “The Social and Psychological Impact of
Radiological Terrorism”, The Nonproliferation Review, July 2006, Volume 13, No. 2.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/132toc.htm
280
Large, John H. “The Implications of 11 September for the Nuclear Industry”, chapter in Nuclear
Terrorism, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2003.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=8399D1E0-2F025837-5FAD-B9BA056C5D51&lng=en
281
Mazari, Dr. Shireen M. “The threat of nuclear proliferation amongst non-state actors in Asia”,
Strategic Studies, (Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI)), XXVIII, Spring, No. 1, 2008
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2008_files/no_1/comment/c1.htm
282
Bulkely, Jennifer C. “Decontamination and Remediation after a Dirty Bomb Attack: Technical and
Political Challenges”, The Nonproliferation Review, March 2007, Volume 14, No. 1.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/141toc.htm
283
Dunn, Lewis A. “Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?”, NDU Center for the
Study of WMD Occasional Paper 3, July 2005. http://www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/docUploaded/206186_CSWMD_OCP3WEB.pdf See also Salama, Sammy, and Hansell, Lydia. “Does Intent Equal
Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, The Nonproliferation Review, November
2005, Volume 12, No. 3. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/123salama.pdf and Schelling, Thomas C. “The
Nuclear Taboo”, Wall Street Journal, 24 October 2005.
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/shelling_article_wall_street2005.pdf
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8.6
In view of all the speculation of this kind, it is therefore understandable that a
considerable amount of the existing literature on the subject tries to identify likely
sources of nuclear and radiological material. The ‘usual suspect’ is Russia and the
other states of the former Soviet Union.284 There is considerable evidence, moreover,
in the public domain of around 200 cases of international smuggling over the past ten
years or so, and these were only the cases that were detected.285 While the quantities
of materials were relatively small, the potential for more serious smuggling is
nonetheless there. The 2004 revelations about the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling
network in Pakistan have only heightened concerns in this regard,286 as have the result
of recent audits of nuclear materials held in British establishments which were made
public.287 These reveal that it has proven impossible to accurately account for quite
considerable amounts of both plutonium and highly enriched uranium—amounts
sufficient for potentially dozens of nuclear weapons. However, there are also a
number of writers who have pointed out that relatively insecure nuclear research
facilities and literally hundreds of nuclear medicine departments in hospitals around
the world could also just as well be the source of radiological materials.288
8.7
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, there was widespread concern in the
West, and particularly in the United States, about the security of the enormous Soviet
arsenal of WMD, and especially its nuclear weapons, missiles and associated
facilities. The US took a number of steps under the broad umbrella of the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, providing American technical expertise and
over US$10 billion for cooperative projects to safeguard and destroy Russian WMD
and related materials, technology, and infrastructure, and to prevent the proliferation
of WMD expertise. This experience has no doubt conditioned US legislators and
others to consider Russia a weak partner in the nuclear security debate. Similar US
programs have also been carried out in a number of other former Eastern bloc
countries.289
8.8
There is considerable evidence to suggest that in recent years, Russia has
significantly tightened security over its nuclear arsenal, facilities, material and
personnel. The state security apparatus, the FSB, has been much more vigilant in this
284
Zaitseva, Lyudmila and Steinhausler, Friedrich, Illicit Trafficking of Weapons-Usable Nuclear
Material: Facts and Uncertainties, Physics and Society, Vol. 33 no. 1, January 2004.
http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2004/january/jan04.pdf
285
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia. “An Unrealized Nexus? WMD-related Trafficking, Terrorism, and
Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union”, Arms Control Today, July/August 2007.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/CoverStory
286
Russell, James A. “Peering into the Abyss: Non-State Actors and the 2016 Proliferation
Environment”, The Nonproliferation Review, November 2006, Volume 13, No. 3.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/133toc.htm
287
UK Ministry of Defence. “Historical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium”,
London, March 2006. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/mod06.pdf
288
Bunn, Matthew and Tom Bielefeld. "Reducing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats."
Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 48th Annual Meeting, Tucson, Arizona, 8-12 July 2007.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Bunn_Bielefeld_INMM2007.pdf
289
Bleek, Philipp C., "Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat,"
paper published by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University and
NTI, September 2004. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3139/global_cleanout.html
P a g e | 66
regard, and the risk of Russian nuclear weapons, material or expertise falling into
terrorist hands without state approval has been correspondingly reduced. But there are
others who argue that these measures have not been sufficient.290 And indeed, while
the Russian economy has strengthened in recent years, the newfound wealth of some
in Russia does not necessarily provide any inducement to lower-paid Russian nuclear
personnel wanting to make a quick rouble by selling nuclear material or technology.
8.9
Recent police interceptions of weapons-grade uranium in Georgia have shown
that there are still weaknesses in the Russian system.291 And this is the basis for
ongoing programs to provide financial incentives to continuing and retiring nuclear
personnel to avoid such temptations. In the light of the diminution of activities and
funding under the CTR scheme for programs in Russia, there is some agreement
among writers on the subject that these schemes are worth continuing and with
increased resources.292 Suggestions have been made for the creation of international
databases to share information about nuclear and radioactive materials.293 There are
also studies of the possible extension of Cooperative Threat Reduction principles of
the world to other areas of the world, such as South Asia.294
8.10 The Litvinenko case, alongside the anthrax attacks in the USA in 2001 and the
Aum Shinrikyo attacks in the Tokyo subway in 1995, also show that preparation for
acts of terrorism with such weapons or devices may be very hard and at times
impossible to detect. Thus, states will need to arrive quickly at procedures for
detecting the presence of nuclear materials in significant transportation hubs. There
are many other aspects of policing and customs control that bear on the threat of
nuclear terrorism. These need to be coordinated against a clear risk management
strategy: there are simply not enough police and intelligence resources to detect all
potentially threatening activity. At the same time, much more needs to be done than
simply tightening national legislation or strengthening national police capabilities.295
8.11 The United States and Russia have been identified by most writers on this
subject as having the biggest responsibility for countering nuclear terrorism because
Pluta, Anna M., and Zimmerman, Peter D., “Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent”,
Survival, Vol. 48 No. 2, Summer 2006 pp. 55–70. See also National Academy of Sciences,
"Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia", July
2005. http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11377
291
In January 2006, Georgian police arrested a Russian trying to sell a small amount of weapons-grade
uranium. He had indicated to possible buyers that he had much of the material in his home. A similar
operation occurred in 2003. According to an IAEA database, there have been 16 previous confirmed
cases in which either highly enriched uranium or plutonium have been recovered by authorities since
1993. See ‘Georgian Sting Seizes Bomb Grade Uranium’, Washington Post, 25 January 2007.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/25/AR2007012500 169_pf.html.
292
Gleeson, John. “Managing the Dirty Bomb Threat”, BASIC Papers, Occasional Papers on
International Security Policy, February 2005, No. 47. http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP47.htm
293
Kahn, Michael, “Experts say shared databases could deter nuclear threat”, Reuters UK, 6 March
2008. http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKL0516060520080306
294
Gottemoeller, Rose; and Longsworth, Rebecca. Enhancing Nuclear Security in the CounterTerrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan, Carnegie Paper No. 29, July 2002.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp29.pdf
295
Berry, Ken. “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Moscow-Washington Alliance”, EastWest Institute
Policy Paper 2, 7 February 2007. http://www.ewi.info/pdf/TerrorNukesFeb7.pdf.
290
P a g e | 67
together they account for the overwhelming share of global nuclear materials,
expertise and weapons.296 The two countries also have between them the most
substantial capacities in counter-terrorism intelligence and response. There is little to
separate the two in their policies against nuclear terrorism. Where there are
differences in approach on some aspects of nuclear proliferation, the two countries
have accepted an obligation as the pre-eminent nuclear powers to try to narrow their
differences. The international community cannot defeat nuclear terrorism or limit it
without an active and vigorous alliance between Washington and Moscow.297
8.12 And it was indeed such cooperation between these two powers which was the
catalyst for the adoption without a vote of the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism by the UN General Assembly in 2005.298
The treaty provides for broad areas of cooperation among states for the purpose of
detecting, preventing, suppressing, and investigating acts of nuclear terrorism. This
treaty was a more specific application of principles already enunciated in the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9
December 1999.
UNSCR 1540
8.13 In another measure, largely as a result of American and Russian urging, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004.299 This resolution was
aimed at preventing WMD from entering black market networks and, above all,
keeping WMD and related material from falling into the hands of terrorists. An earlier
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 of 28 September 2001—adopted in the
immediate wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and
Washington—related to the sharing of information pertaining to the suppression of
acts of terrorism generally.
8.14 UNSCR 1540 is covered extensively in the literature.300 It was groundbreaking
as it imposes various obligations on all states pursuant to the Security Council’s
power under Article 42 of the UN Charter to make binding decisions on matters
relating to international peace and security. Some writers have seen considerable
potential in this quasi-legislative role of the Security Council as a means of avoiding
lengthy treaty negotiations to arrive at binding new rules of international law in the
security field.301 However, other commentators argue that the Security Council acted
296
Bunn, Matthew and Wier, Anthony, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, Project on
Managing the Atom, Harvard University May 2004, commissioned by NTI.
http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf
297
Ferguson, Charles D. “Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism”, Council on Foreign Relations
Special Report CSR No.11, March 2006.
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=9BC33681-A13D0FFD-BD4D-05E9A7F6A222&lng=en
298
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/English_18_15.pdf
299
http://www.vertic.org/assets/nim_docs/Treaty/resolutions/S_RES_1540_text_English.pdf
300
Crail, Peter. “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach”, The
Nonproliferation Review, July 2006, Volume 13, No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/132crail.pdf
301
Dupré, Bruno, Reinventing Nunn-Lugar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Proliferation
Analysis, May 22, 2008.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20145&prog=zgp&proj=znp
P a g e | 68
ultra vires its powers in enacting UNSCR 1540, and warn that states that do not agree
with the principle may in future be more inclined to ignore Security Council decisions
when it suits them. In this regard, they point to the fact that only about half of the UN
membership have regularly provided the annual reports that UNSCR 1540 mandates.
However, others note that this may not necessarily have anything to do with those
states’ judgments about the legality of the Resolution, but more to do with the
inability of states, principally in Africa and Latin America, to meet the sheer reporting
burden imposed in the Resolution. Recommendations are made for assistance to be
given to those states.302 There has also been some discussion of the role that regional
and sub-regional organisations and groupings might play in the implementation of the
Resolution.303
8.15 To increase the pace, and to inject new energy into their bilateral efforts, the
Presidents of the United States and Russia on 15 July 2006 launched a new Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.304 Interested countries have subsequently met
several times to consider a practical work plan and ways of expanding participation.
Seventy-five states now participate in the initiative, including India, Israel and
Pakistan, though there is only a smattering of smaller African states, and only one
Latin American state (Panama). The work plan has a heavy focus on terrorist safe
havens and financing, as well as on detection and nuclear forensics.305
8.16 Various papers have identified key points for further action to counter the
threat of nuclear terrorism, and particularly the measures that the United States and
Russia must take together if their goal of suppressing nuclear terrorism is to be
fulfilled.306 How these cooperative efforts may be affected by the confrontation
between Russia and Western nations over the 2008 military actions in Georgia is only
just beginning to be addressed by the literature,307 and it is almost certain to be only a
matter of time before a flood of other articles on the subject emerge. One very recent
proposal is for the establishment of a commission of past presidents of both the US
p See also Heupel, Monika. Implementing UN Security council Resolution 1540: A Division of Labor
Strategy, Carnegie Paper, June 2007. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp87_heupel_final.pdf
and also Weiner, Allen S. et al., “Enhancing Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1540,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, September 2007. http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/22070/1540_Final_Report_w_cvr.pdf
302
Arnold, Aaron. “UN Security Council Resolution 1540 — PART I: Resolution 1810: Progress Since
1540”, WMD Insights, August 2008. http://www.wmdinsights.com/I26/I26_G4_UNSCR1540_1.htm
See also Monblatt, Steven. “Nuclear Terrorism: A U.S. Perspective”, BASIC Notes, Occasional Papers
on International Security Policy, 25 April 2007. http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN070425.htm
303
Bergenas, Johan. “The role of regional and sub-regional organizations in implementing UN Security
Council Resolution 1540: a preliminary assessment of the African Continent”, CNS Feature Story, 8
May 2007. http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/070508.pdf
304
Boese, Wade. “Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Initiative Launched”, Arms Control Today, September 2006.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/AntiTerror
305
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm
306
Berry, supra. See also U.S.–Russia Strategic Framework Declaration, Joint Pledge signed at the
Sochi Summit, 5 April 2008 by Presidents Bush and Putin.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080406-4.html
307
Malin, Martin B. “U.S., Russia must unite to lessen nuclear danger”, The Washington Times, 23
September 2008. http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/23/us-russia-must-unite-to-lessennuclear-dangers/
P a g e | 69
and Russia, including former President Putin, to examine how to get relations back
between the United States and Russia back on track; and second, to provide high-level
advice on important issues such as the extension of START I beyond its current endpoint of December 2009, or what to do about the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty (CFE), which was dealt a severe blow by the Russian incursion into
Georgia.308
8.17 In view of the Presidential elections in the United States in late 2008, a
number of writers have also made concrete suggestions as to what the next President
might do, both domestically and internationally, with regard to terrorism.309
8.18 Prognostications of changed terrorist scenarios have also been made. It has
been suggested, for instance, that in the next 10 to 15 years, terrorism inspired by Al
Qaeda could have given way to violence inspired by other causes. The emergence of
eco-terrorism, in response to rising panic about global warming and food security,
may be one such cause. As a consequence, it is suggested that the scientific and
technical community, the source of the advice needed by nuclear terrorists, has to be
more directly involved in denying them the technologies.310 This is at the very least
important since the Litvinenko case, and other WMD cases referred to above, also
demonstrate that there are technical and/or scientific staff in the richer developed
countries who have no scruples about using devices, substances or weapons with mass
death potential.311
9. MISSILES
9.1
At first glance, missiles might appear to be a subject quite distinct from that of
nuclear weapons and programs. However, missiles are of course an integral part of the
nuclear debate since they are a principal delivery platform for nuclear weapons.
Historically, this has been confined to the category of ballistic missiles—short-,
medium and long-range or intercontinental (ICBMs), and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Of the NPT NWS, only the United States, Russia and
China retain ICBMs, and Britain relies solely on SLBMS, with its Trident armed
submarine fleet. Understandably, the great bulk of existing literature focuses on the
ballistic missile holdings and programs of these states.
9.2
More recently, the very active and apparently successful ballistic missile
programs of states which have recently acquired nuclear weapons (India, North Korea
and Pakistan), and those suspected of harbouring such ambitions, including Iran, have
Gottemoeller, Rose. “A task of monumental importance for Putin”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Op. Ed.,
2 October 2008. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22194
309
Bunn, Matthew, The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism — And Next Steps To Reduce The Danger,
Testimony to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 2
April 2008. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-nuclear-terror-risk-test-08.pdf
310
Berry, supra. See also Finlay, Brian D., and Turpen, Elizabeth. “25 Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror:
A Guide for Policymakers”, Stimson Center Report, January 2007.
http://www.stimson.org/cnp/pdf/25_Steps_complete.pdf
311
Berry, supra.
308
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come under increased scrutiny in the literature.312 India, Iran and North Korea are
developing longer range, though not as yet intercontinental, ballistic missiles. Missile
proliferation in the Middle East has attracted only limited coverage in the literature.313
Ballistic Missile Defence
9.3
The Iranian program in particular is cited by the United States as justification
for the installation of its planned Ballistic Missile Defence (BDM) system in Eastern
Europe. Similarly, North Korea’s developed ballistic missile industry is given as the
reason for installation of BMD systems in North East Asia.314 Indeed, fears that North
Korea may in fact be developing an intercontinental ballistic missile was the original
driver of the US National Missile Defense (NMD) program. Debate over the
NMD/BMD program has generated a large volume of literature, virtually making it a
category in its own right. Dissection of the real or imagined motives of the United
States, and the actual or potential reactions of Russia, China and other states that
believe they may be the real targets of BDM, have been exhaustively examined in the
literature.315
9.4
It is suggested that Russian military analysts might assess the capabilities of
the proposed U.S. system and conclude quite logically that it is aimed, or will be, at
Russia. “The 40 percent faster speed of the defense interceptors relative to the ICBMs
and the early-tracking information provided by the EMR in the Czech Republic would
allow the defense system to engage essentially all Russian ICBMs launched against
the continental United States from Russian sites west of the Urals. It is difficult to see
why any well-informed Russian analyst would not find such a potential situation
alarming.”316 Repeated American rejections of alternative proposals from former
Russian President Putin that from a technical point of view would have also enhanced
the US’s stated goal of protecting Europe, only further fuelled Russian suspicions.
Salik, Naeem Ahmad. “Missile Issues in South Asia”, The Nonproliferation Review, July 2002,
Volume 9, No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92salik.pdf See also Swaine, Michael D., with Runyon,
Loren H. “Ballistic Missile Development”, Strategic Asia 2002-200?, pp.299 et seq.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/sa01_8missiles.pdf and Executive Summary at
http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/sa01xs_8missiles.pdf See also “Ballistic Missiles
and Missile Defense in Asia”, NBR Analysis, Volume 13, No. 3, June 2002. National Bureau of Asian
Research (NBR). http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol13no3.pdf
313
Said, Mohamed Kadry. “Layered Defense, Layered Attack: The Missile Race in the Middle East”,
The Nonproliferation Review, July 2002, Volume 9, No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92said.pdf
314
Jimbo, Ken. “A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defense and Strategic Coordination”, The
Nonproliferation Review, July 2002, Volume 9, No.2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92jimbo.pdf See
also Kaneda, Hideaki, Kobayashi, Kazumasa, Tajima, Hiroshi, and Tosakim Hirofumi. Japan’s Missile
Defense: Diplomatic and Security Policies In a Changing Strategic Environment, The Japan Institute
of International Affairs (JIIA) Policy Report, March 2007.
http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/polcy_report/pr200703-jmd.pdf
315
Kristensen, Hans M., McKinzie, Matthew G., and Norris, Robert S. "The Protection Paradox,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2004.
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/c520186p76821x57/fulltext.pdf
316
Lewis, George N., and Postol, Theordore A. “European Missile Defense: The Technological Basis
of Russian Concerns”, Arms Control Today, October 2007.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_10/LewisPostol
312
P a g e | 71
9.5
The Chinese are portrayed in the literature as likely to have similar fears to
those of the Russians. It is suggested that Chinese strategists will perceive any
ballistic missile defences as undermining its ability to use short-range ballistic
missiles to deter Taiwanese independence. Given its nuclear and conventional force
inferiority to the United States, China is unlikely to be willing to surrender its current
nuclear option, and indeed this may be the cause for reported efforts by China to
modernise its nuclear arsenal. In the longer run, a missile defense system could also
cause a doctrinal change, prompting China to abandon its purely retaliatory posture
and replace it with counterforce targeting similar to that of the United States and
Russia.317
9.6
One twist on this debate argues—in contrast to conventional wisdom—that a
larger missile defence system constructed outside the confines of the ABM Treaty
may impinge on Chinese strategic interests less than the limited system the United
States originally favoured. As mentioned above, the Chinese perceive that any
ballistic missile defences will undermine its ability to use short-range ballistic
missiles to deter Taiwanese independence. Since pursuing the one-China policy is
central to the legitimacy of the ruling regime, a small-scale theatre missile defence
system is as threatening to China as a large-scale layered one. But a more complex
system would present China with possible advantages, since it will consume more
U.S. resources, generate greater international controversy, and be more likely to drive
Russia to seek strategic cooperation with China.318
9.7
NMD/BMD nevertheless has its defenders in the literature, with one writer
even suggesting that a weakness of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR—see below) is its failure to include limits on the export of countermeasures,
which are devices intended to defeat missile defences.319 For most writers outside the
orbit of the US defence establishment, however, NMD is generally seen as an overly
expensive means of achieving a dubious end. For others, the US should be
concentrating instead on theatre missile defences (TMD) since nuclear-armed
adversaries on the battlefield, when faced with superior US conventional forces, could
conclude that actually using nuclear weapons—on theatre-range missiles—to be in
their interest.320 This is quite apart from the fact that current US defence doctrine
specifically envisages use of tactical nuclear weapons on certain battlefields.
317
Kristensen, Hans M., McKinzie, Matthew G., and Norris, Robert S. "The Protection Paradox,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2004.
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/c520186p76821x57/fulltext.pdf
318
Huntley, Wade L. “Missile Defense: More May Be Better – For China”, The Nonproliferation
Review, July 2002, Volume 9, No.2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92hunt.pdf
319
Speier, Richard. “Missile Nonproliferation and Missile Defense: Fitting Them Together”, Arms
Control Today, November 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11/Speier
320
Ochmanek, David, and Schwartz, Lowell H. “The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional
Adversaries”, RAND Project Air Force Report, 2008.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG671.pdf
P a g e | 72
Space Launch Capacity
9.8
Even civilian space launch programs in countries with developed civilian
nuclear sectors (Japan, Brazil), have not escaped analysis by some writers321 in terms
of the potential for the swift transformation of the civilian programs into military ones
in changed future geopolitical conditions, given that their space launch vehicles
(SLVs) have characteristics similar to long-range ballistic missiles. A number of
countries which are already nuclear-armed (China, India, Israel, Russia and the United
States) have also developed SLVs with similar characteristics, as have some European
consortiums. More generally, the existence of such commercial ventures (not to
mention military programs to launch surveillance and other satellites) is regarded by
some observers as increasing the availability of dual use research, technology and
capacity which can be easily adapted to long-range ballistic missile programs. One
contrary view is that excess ballistic missiles could be adapted to become SLVs—
though an obvious downside is that many of the larger missiles use propellants which
are harmful to the environment.322
The Situation Today
9.9
The current situation relating to missile development is very much more
complex than the rather static balance between the major ballistic missile powers
during the Cold War. The development of a wide range of small, and even shoulderlaunched missiles has changed the face of conflict forever. And the cruise missile in
particular has come a very long way since its origins in the ‘Doodlebug’ V1 rocket of
Nazi Germany. Only the US, Russia and France have nuclear cruise missiles, though
China and Pakistan are developing them. Israel has denied doing so. Many were
eliminated under the INF treaty, and other classes have since been retired. However,
the US in particular is beefing up its responses to possible cruise missile attack
generally, particularly as adversaries obtain the capability to strike with increased
precision, lethality and long-range systems.323 Perhaps the most dangerous new
development is the surprising number of countries that have linked their new cruise
missile programs to pre-emptive strike doctrines. This is almost undoubtedly linked to
the inclusion of pre-emption as part of US doctrine in 2002.324
9.10 Many countries now have extensive arsenals of smaller land-, sea- and airlaunched missiles—all, it must be said, armed with conventional warheads.
Nevertheless, it has been estimated that at least 46 states now have missile systems at
least capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Work is also known to have
Jing, Zhong. “Missile Issues in East Asia”, The Nonproliferation Review, July 2002, Volume 9,
No.2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92jing.pdf
322
Iofina, Galina. “Conversion of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles”, INESAP Bulletin 26, June 2006.
http://www.inesap.org/bulletin26/art13.htm
323
Natural Resources Defense Council. “Nuclear Cruise Missiles”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Nuclear Notebook, November/December 2007.
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/t673m130k0614h55/fulltext.pdf
324
Gormley, Dennis M. “Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to
International Security”, Praeger Security International, 30 May 2008.
http://cns.miis.edu/activities/pdfs/pr080805_missile_contagion.pdf See also, by same author: “The
Neglected Dimension: Controlling Cruise Missile Proliferation”, The Nonproliferation Review, July
2002, Volume 9, No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92gorm.pdf
321
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been done in some states—notably the United States—to adapt smaller cruise missiles
to receive tactical nuclear warheads.
9.11 A number of reasons have been advanced in the literature to explain the
motivations that drive states to acquire missile capabilities. While some states may
only be interested in being seen to have state-of-the-art arsenals, others may only be
interested in a small missile capability for tactical use in limited intra-state and
localised inter-state conflicts. However, it also appears that some states regard the
acquisition of larger missile capabilities as serving a more strategic purpose linked to
deterrence: for example, either deterring a regional rival or, in the case of some states,
deterring intervention by a large state like the United States. However, in the latter
case, there is some agreement that the states in question are more likely to regard the
overwhelming conventional superiority of US forces as a reason to acquire a nuclear
deterrence of their own which would act as a better deterrence in their view.
9.12 Quite a number of non-state actors, including groups classed by some states as
terrorists, have a basic missile capability. While these are in the main shoulderlaunched missiles, some of the larger and better funded groups may also have small
ground-launched missiles. The thought of terrorist groups acquiring the sort of cruise
missile with a tactical nuclear warhead has not received wide coverage in the
literature, though it has been suggested that the technical difficulties of developing
both a long range cruise missile and a sufficiently small nuclear warhead to fit in it,
make it unlikely that such a missile will ever be used by terrorists.325 However, the
increasing availability of unmanned air vehicles of different kinds—including dualuse equipment which could convert a small plane into an unmanned vehicle—could
easily lead to their acquisition by terrorist groups for use in lieu of a cruise missile.
While this might very remotely seen as a means of delivering a small tactical nuclear
weapon, a more likely scenario would be to use such a vehicle for aerial dispersion of
radiological material or conventional explosives.
Limiting Missile Proliferation
9.13 Although nuclear weapons have a number of multilateral and bilateral
agreements relating to them, a major lacuna in international law is the total lack of
any multilateral treaty to govern the production, trade or use of missiles. Previous
missile eradication treaties were bilateral, between the US and the former USSR.
They included the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, now abrogated by the US in 2002,
and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987, which saw the eradication
of a whole category of medium range ballistic missiles. In 2002, the US and Russia
negotiated the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) covering the
eradication of some strategic nuclear missiles, though President Bush has
subsequently removed the need for verified destruction required in the Treaty. It
might also be noted that in early 2008, Russia tabled a draft treaty in the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva which would multilateralise the INF treaty326—at the
Natural Resources Defense Council. “Nuclear Cruise Missiles”, supra.
Huisken, Ron. “Globalising the INF Treaty: The Best Way to Inhibit the Proliferation of LongRange Missiles”, SDSC Working Paper 409, May 2008.
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp_sdsc_409.pdf See also Gottemoeller, Rose. “The INF
325
326
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same time putting to rest fears that it would go through with earlier threats to
unilaterally abrogate the treaty.327 Other proposals for treaties have also been made in
the literature.328 There have also been suggestions that anti-missile norms might best
be built on a regional basis. However, apart from South East Asia, there is no real
regional forum where missile proliferation can even be discussed.329
The Missile Technology Control Regime
9.14 Internationally, the major effective control of missile proliferation lies in the
hands of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which was set up in 1987
with the specific aim of curbing the spread of unmanned delivery systems for nuclear
weapons, specifically delivery systems that could carry a minimum payload of 500 kg
a minimum of 300 km. In 1992 the guidelines were expanded include nonproliferation
of UAV’s capable of carrying any weapon of mass destruction, making the
payload/range threshold much less rigid than the original 500kg/300km. The MTCR
now has 34 members, mostly Western nations, though Russia joined in 1995 and
China has applied to join.330 The Group meets annually, the next meeting being
scheduled for Canberra in November 2008.
9.15 The MTCR works by the application of national customs and other legislation,
and members attempt to coordinate their activities and legislation through regular
exchanges of information. There is wide agreement in the literature that the MTCR
has largely achieved its original objective of limiting the number of long range
ballistic missile proliferators in 1987 to a single country currently (North Korea), 331
and has managed to apply the brakes on the missile ambitions of other countries,
some of which are now MTCR members. However, its direct role in future missile
proliferation is regarded as being limited by the fact of its small membership and the
fact that its guidelines are applied on a purely voluntary basis. It does not include
countries of missile and other proliferation concern such as Iran and North Korea, or
for that matter India, Pakistan and others. Nor has it prevented such countries from
actively pursuing successful missile programs, including short, medium and longrange ballistic missiles capable of delivering significant payloads.332 Above all, a
Conundrum”, Proliferation Analysis, 6 March 2007.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19053
327
Boese, Wade. “Russia Pushes Pacts as U.S. Kills Satellite”, Arms Control Today, March 2008.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/RussiaPact
328
Rydell, Randy. “Model for Missile Disarmament: In Search of a Political Foundation”, INESAP
Bulletin 19, March 2002. http://www.inesap.org/bulletin19/bul19art23.htm
329
Smith, Mark. “Missing Piece and Gordian Knot: Missile Non-Proliferation”, Paper commissioned
by the WMD Commission, 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No27.pdf
330
China indicated as early as 1992 that it was prepared to bind itself to respect FMCT’s original
guidelines of 1987 but not subsequent revisions of them.
331
In 1987 Argentina, Brazil, China, the Soviet Union and the United States were all active suppliers
of long-range ballistic missile systems.
332
Karp, Anton. “Going Ballistic? Reversing Missile Proliferation”, Arms Control Today, June 2005.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Karp
P a g e | 75
significant and growing weakness seen by some writers is that it does not cover cruise
missiles.333
9.16 The fact also remains that there are a considerable number of states nowadays
outside the MTCR which produce and trade in smaller missiles, and they are happy to
exchange the relevant technology with others. The possible adaptation of UAVs for
delivery of radiological material, or other WMD, has already been mentioned. In this
regard, it appears that the MTCR has never followed up on their resolve in the
immediate wake of 9/11 to examine inclusion in their guidelines of modern flight
control systems which could convert manned planes into UAVs which could deliver
WMD,334 although the Wassenaar Arrangement, which covers conventional weapons,
has now done so. And there are gaps in the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex
which could be exploited by certain states and non-state actors. Moreover, and again
as already mentioned, there is concern that some space launch vehicles, which are not
covered by the MTCR, could be easily adapted for use as missiles, or their technology
diverted for use in offensive missile programs. Conversely, it has been suggested that
the MTCR members need to deal with the concern of some states that MTCR is
designed to deny them access to legitimate civilian space technologies.335 In answer to
this it has been suggested that offering assistance in space launches to these countries
may lessen their concern or desire to obtain their own launch capacity.336
9.17 Various suggestions have been made in the literature to resolve these
problems, often focusing on a more extensive application of end-use or “catch-all”
controls by MTCR participating states (a step that the regime agreed to take in
2003),337 and adaption of national export controls to accommodate this. Such controls
would require exporters to submit any export transaction to national authorities for
assessment prior to export if there is reason to suspect that the item is or could be used
in an WMD program, regardless of whether or not the item concerned is in the MTCR
guidelines or national export legislation. This would ensure that member states would
not only watch the activities of their exporters more closely, but also provide greater
opportunities to educate exporters about the proliferation risks associated with certain
countries or customers.
The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
9.18 One wider-reaching product of the MTCR was its development of the Hague
Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) which was adopted
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh. “Looking Back: The Missile Technology Control Regime”, Arms
Control Today, April 2007. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/LOOKINGBACK
334
Gormley, Dennis M. “On Not Confusing the Unfamiliar with the Improbable: Low-Technology
Means of Delivering Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Paper commissioned by the WMD Commission,
October 2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No25.pdf
335
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh supra.
336
Dean, Jonathan. “Controlling Missiles”, Paper commissioned by the WMD Commission, December
2004. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No24.pdf
337
End-use or “catch-all” controls require exporters to submit any export transaction to national
authorities for assessment prior to export, whether or not the item concerned is on an export control list,
if there is reason to know that the item is or could be used in an NBC weapon program.
333
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by an international conference in The Hague in November 2002.338 The HCOC
creates norms and specifies transparency measures to promote the non-proliferation of
ballistic missiles and to increase confidence in the peaceful nature of satellite launch
vehicle programs. With regard to ballistic missiles, the HCOC provides that
subscribing states should make annual declarations providing an outline of their
ballistic missile policies, including relevant information on ballistic missile systems
and land test-launch sites. To date, 128 countries have subscribed to the Code.
9.19 While praising some of its positive aspects, the literature tends to concentrate
on the Code’s perceived weaknesses, notably its failure to cover cruise missiles.339
Others are critical of the fact that it is not a binding instrument, with the annual
declarations being purely voluntary and with it not being sufficiently clear about
exactly what information participating states are required to submit. Yet other authors
note—including some states that helped extend the HCOC beyond the MTCR—that
these states decided against subscribing to the Code because they believed the
information sought was too intrusive.
Other missile control proposals
9.20 Two other processes intended to support missile-related arms control might be
mentioned briefly here. In 1999 the Russian government proposed a Global Control
System (GCS) for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology. This
mechanism would have been based on voluntary cooperation among the participating
states and would involve no military enforcement measures or sanctions. It would
include a missile launch transparency regime; positive incentives for states that agree
to give up existing missile delivery systems and programs; and importantly, a security
guarantee to be provided to states that agree to give up existing missile delivery
systems. The Russians held a series of meetings to discuss the idea further, and later
argued that the GCS would be compatible with and supportive of the HCOC. Initial
reactions in the literature were principally from the Russian side and unsurprisingly
concluded that the GCS and HCOC could form the basis for a more effective missile
nonproliferation regime.340 However, no specific draft of the GCS was ever prepared
and it appears to have died a natural death.
9.21 The second initiative is—or was—a fairly rudimentary UN Panel of
Government Experts on Missiles, whose aim was to develop norms from a more
diverse range of countries than the MTCR. The group produced a report in July 2002
but has since become moribund. This report was heavily criticized for its lack of
actionable proposals.341
Kerr, Paul. “Code of Conduct Aims to Stop Ballistic Missile Proliferation”, Arms Control Today,
January/February 2003. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/icoc_janfeb03
339
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh supra.
340
Fedorov, Yuri. “The Global Control System and the International Code of Conduct: Competition or
Cooperation?”, The Nonproliferation Review, July 2002, Volume 9, No.2.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92fed.pdf
341
Karp, Anton. “Going Ballistic? Reversing Missile Proliferation”, Arms Control Today, June 2005.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Karp
338