GÖTEBORGS UNIVERSITET
Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen
Energy and the concept of security
– Has energy become a securitized issue for the European Union in relation to Russia?
Kandidatuppsats i
Statsvetenskap
VT 2010
Marcus Ehn
Handledare: Urban Strandberg
Antal ord: 9997
1
Table of Contents
1.
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 3
2.
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3
3.
Disposition ....................................................................................................................................... 4
4.
Background...................................................................................................................................... 5
4.1
The European Union as a foreign policy actor ........................................................................ 5
4.1.1
4.2
5.
The EU foreign policy against Russia ....................................................................................... 6
The theoretical instrument of the analysis ..................................................................................... 7
5.1
Security and the theory of securitization ................................................................................ 8
5.1.1
6.
7.
8.
The five sectors of security analysis ................................................................................ 9
Methodology, primary sources and limitations ............................................................................ 11
6.1
Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 11
6.2
Primary sources ..................................................................................................................... 12
6.3
Limitations ............................................................................................................................. 14
Analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 14
7.1
The EU – Russia energy relationship ..................................................................................... 14
7.2
The EU’s external foreign policy on energy ........................................................................... 15
7.2.1
The Green paper on energy........................................................................................... 15
7.2.2
A secure Europe in a better world................................................................................. 16
7.2.3
A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy ........................ 17
7.2.4
External energy relations – from principles to action ................................................... 19
7.2.5
An external policy to serve Europe’s energy interests .................................................. 20
7.2.6
Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security And Solidarity Action Plan . 21
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 22
8.1
9.
European Union foreign policy in action ......................................................................... 6
The Securitization of Energy .................................................................................................. 22
References: .................................................................................................................................... 25
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Energy and the concept of security
– Has energy become a securitized issue for the European Union in relation to Russia?
1. Abstract
The relationship regarding energy between the European Union and Russia is marked by both actor’s
different identities as well as the EU’s internal institutional structure. The EU is driven by a postnational mindset and strives for the attrition of national states and a market driven economy. Russia
in turn is still locked in the cold war mindset of realism through zero-sum games combined with
spheres of influences, and strives to return to its position as a great power through power politics
and a dominant state. These two different positions clash regarding the energy relationship and its
asymmetry. The EU wants their need to import energy to be controlled by the market where as
Russia sees state control over the energy industry as a vital part of modernisation. This has led to the
securitization of energy where the issue is now discussed in a discourse of threat and risks. Through
the theory of securitization the essay analyzes official EU documents by determining the presence of
a speech act, in which the securitizing actor (the European Commission) tries towards portray the
existential threat (inflation, price shocks) that the risk of an unstable energy supply poses to the
referent object (the EU). Because Russia uses energy as a means to project power by striking bilateral
agreements with individual EU countries, the EU views Russia as a threat and a risk against its energy
supply and subsequently the stability of the Union, thereby securitizing the issue of energy through
the formation of a speech act in its official documents regarding external energy policy.
2. Introduction
The 2005-2006 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis effectively demonstrated a new type of landscape regarding
energy foreign policies, and the potential risks for the EU if it fails to prepare and to take these new
developments into account. One of the traditional goals of the EU has been the expansion of the
liberal market, and the EU subsequently views that energy resources should therefore not be
connected to the foreign and security policy strategy of other countries. The conflict between Russia
and Ukraine manifested a new type of resource nationalism through which Russia uses power politics
to further its own foreign policy interests (Umbach, 2010, p1230).
But why is the issue of energy important to the EU and how can you analyze what steps the EU is
taking to adhere to this new political landscape? In a new world of globalization and increased
competition between regions it’s vital for countries to secure a stable energy supply for its
corporations (Strandberg, 2010, p1228). The consequences of a disruption of the energy supply could
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be dire, in the form of increased energy prices which leads to inflation and subsequently job losses
(Hedenus, 2010, p1241). This economic and social unrest could affect the EU negatively in a number
of ways, including large-scale migration and the potential of state failure. The recently new members
of the EU are not as economically developed as the original ones and therefore have an increased
potential of being affected negatively by a shortage of energy supply (Umbach, 2010, p1234). The
consequences of this development have lead to the integration of energy into the security foreign
policy interests of the European Union.
This new political landscape shows the need for the EU to act as a coherent foreign policy actor,
specifically against Russia which currently is its most important gas energy supplier. The failure to act
coordinately and with a clear purpose regarding its external policies could subsequently threaten the
EU: s own internal security, community and prosperity. How then can you analyze if the EU is
coordinating its energy policy and what type of theory can be used to explain this development? In
this essay I will argue that the process of development regarding a coordinated EU energy foreign
policy can be understood through the theory of securitization, in which the issue of energy has
moved from the strictly economic domain into a new discourse of threat and risks. In the process of
securitization an issue is presented as an existential threat and therefore requiring emergency
measures to legitimize actions outside the normal political process. Because security is a selfreferential practice it is not necessary for a real threat to exist, but the point is that the issue is
presented as an existential threat (Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole & De Wilde, Jaap, 1998, p24).
Securitization is therefore studied through analyzing discourse, specifically regarding the presence of
a speech cat, which is the rhetorical argument promoting the threat as a matter of survival and
encouraging emergency action to be taken to combat the perceived threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p2628). An analysis of this potential development within the EU will therefore be done through analyzing
official EU documents regarding the external energy policy of the Union to determine the possible
presence of a speech act.
3. Disposition
The purpose of this essay is to analyze how energy has become a securitized issue for the EU,
specifically by analyzing official EU documents in order to be able to understand what steps the EU is
taking to secure and therefore securitize its supply of energy. To be able to do this however, we must
first understand how the EU acts as a foreign policy actor, and what fundamental principles its
foreign policy is built upon, as well as to understand what are the internal goals of its principle gas
energy supplier Russia are and what type of policies Russia uses to achieve these goals. My position is
that to be able to analyze the EU-Russia energy relationship it’s vital to first understand how the EU
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and Russia view themselves in context with each other and how the internal institutional structures
of the EU affects its ability to act as a foreign policy actor.
After this context has been set I will proceed with constructing the theoretical instruments for
analyzing the official EU documents and directives, specifically the theory of securitization and how it
can be used to understand the actions of the EU. The essay will then continue with a section in which
I lay out exactly how I will use the theory of securitization in order to analyze the position of the EU,
which type of sources I will use and what the subsequent consequences this has on the prospect to
generalize the results. The following part of the essay will consist of the applying of the theoretical
framework on the actual official EU documents in order to understand how the EU actually is
securitizing its energy policy. In the last part of the essay I will summarise my principle findings and
conclude by regarding potential future research.
4. Background
4.1 The European Union as a foreign policy actor
In order to examine European foreign policy in action we must however begin by answering the
question if the European Union in fact even has a foreign policy? The realist school of international
relations would dismiss the EU as subordinate to the wishes of its member states and therefore
cannot have its own foreign policy (Cameron, 2007, p19). The problem with this frame of logic is that
it focuses too much on processes instead of actually analyzing the outcomes of what the EU does and
how it is perceived in international relations. The point is that even though the European Union does
not have legal sovereignty over its member states, the decisions made by the European Council
(which represents the Union) are then implemented by the European community (Smith, 2002, p2). A
precondition for this however is that the internal structures of the organisation create shared aims
through a process of deliberation. If the EU does not act with consistency, the realism analysis gains
ground and consequently a state which deals with the EU through the glasses of realism could be
able to exploit the EU’s lack of uniformity.
This point is important to bear in mind when analyzing the EU-Russia energy trade relationship, as
one of the central problems with the EU foreign policy is its lack of coherence. The problematic
internal bureaucratic structure of the EU leads to constant turf wars between the Council and the
Commission regarding the aim and scope of the EU’s foreign policy, which in combination with the
different visions each member states has for its own foreign policy makes it difficult for the EU to act
consistently and coherently in international relations (Cameron, 2007, p35). The problem is further
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exaggerated by the ongoing development of new foreign policy areas, where traditional foreign
policy of security and defence has been expanded to include issues such as external trade and
interregional cooperation (Smith, 2002, p17).
4.1.1 European Union foreign policy in action
There are a range of instruments which can be used in foreign policy, ranging from the threat of
military action (hard power) to economic and diplomatic means of persuasion (soft power). Upon
examining the actions of the EU we can determine that it traditionally tends not to use hard power
but instead wants to focus on soft power (E Smith, 1998, s67) in its foreign policy. The EU uses
diplomatic instruments in the form of political dialogue in combination with economic instruments to
further its foreign policy agenda. But what are the motives behind the EU’s foreign policy? In order to
understand this we must examine the articles in the document which makes up the CFSP (Common
Foreign and Security Policy). In it we find that the goal of the European foreign policy is described as
“safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union” and “[to]
develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms” (Internet 1). This document sets a strong normative agenda for the European
foreign policy. Its purpose is to promote external security in its neighbourhood by exporting the
values intrinsic of the EU identity (democracy, rule of law, human rights) and thereby also achieving
internal security for the union. The EU is securing itself by promoting its own values in its foreign
policy with other actors.
4.2 The EU foreign policy against Russia
The European foreign policy with Russia has in its history been marked by mistakes and
misunderstanding, often depending on the fact that the two objects have different identities,
structures and frame of logic. This leads to miscommunication which in turn leads to distrust and
resentment. The goal of the EU's foreign policy of promoting internal security and stability by seeking
closer ties with its Eastern European neighbours can be traced back to the original document of the
CFSP mentioned earlier, in which the EU sought to maintain internal stability by “safeguarding the
common values… of the Union” (Internet 2). The goal of the European Union’s foreign policy is clearly
stated in official documents as “[to create] a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values
and objectives… to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration. This will bring
enormous gains… in terms of stability” (Internet 3). The aim was therefore is to use the instrument of
conditionality (use of economic instruments to promote democratic reform) to promote reform
through its foreign policy.
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To understand why this policy struggles against Russia we must first consider the identity of both
partners as well as their strategic interests in each other. The EU seeks to further stabilize its union
by promoting economic reform and democracy through the use of a coherent foreign policy based on
conditionality (Barysch, 2004, p7). Russia in turn sees itself as a great regional power and is still
locked in the cold war mindset of realism through zero-sum games and spheres of influences
(Barysch, 2004, p9). In contrast the EU views itself as having reached a higher level of enlightenment,
and the goal of its post-national mindset is the attrition of national states and the removal of
territorial boundaries through the expansion of a liberal market driven economy as well as
democratic institutions. Russia’s goal of increasing the power of the state therefore fundamentally
goes against the post-national ideas of the EU (Barysch, 2004, p11) and is at the core of the problems
and misunderstandings that characterizes the relationship.
Russia proclaims that it wants to be treated as a great Eurasian power and therefore becomes
insulted when the EU bases its foreign policy on conditionality. Russia does not want to be seen as an
object, effectively summed up in the quote “[Russia] must be considered an equal partner and not
the object of civilising influence…” by Russia’s deputy foreign minister Vladimir Chizhov (Averre,
2005, p178). The country does not want to be grouped together with the former satellite Soviet
Union states which it used to control through proxy communist parties and the threat of military
force. Russia views the Eastern Europe states as its own exclusive sphere of influence (Barysch, 2004,
p41), and therefore it wants to continue its Soviet Union legacy by exerting influence through the use
of controlled instability. Here the EU foreign policy of exporting western values clashes with the
power politics approach of Russian foreign policy. The internal institutional turf wars within the EU
combined with the member states reluctance to completely surrender their sovereignty and control
over foreign policy is in Russia’s mind seen as a weakness and is therefore exploited through “divide
and rule” tactics (Barysch, 2004, p53) to its own benefit (Haukkala, 2008, s327).
5. The theoretical instrument of the analysis
In order to analyze the specific relationship of energy regarding the EU and Russia through the
interpretation of official EU documents and statements, it is first necessary to construct a framework
of analysis, that is to say determine what theory I am going to use to draw my conclusions. In this
essay my aim is to analyze how the energy relationship has become a security priority through what
is called the theory of “securitization”, by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998).
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5.1 Security and the theory of securitization
The goal of the theory of securitization is to provide an encompassing framework of analysis
regarding security studies through the use of multisectoral analysis (Buzan et al., 1998, p1). Instead
of traditionally focusing on the state focused military view of security, this theory’s aim is to provide
a wider range of analysis regarding security.
The definition of security in international relations has its basis in what is called the traditional
military-political understanding of security, namely that security is about survival. Security comes
into play when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object.
The urgency of this threat justifies the use of extraordinary actions to deal with it. What can pose as
an existential threat depends however on the relation it has against a particular referent object. It is
therefore necessary to conduct a multisectoral analysis which can be divided into five sectors (each
with its specific processes), namely the military sector, political sector, economic sector, societal
sector and environmental sector (Buzan et al., 1998, p21-22).
Securitization is the process of security moving from the political sphere into something above or
more radical. Securitization as such is therefore a more extreme version of politicization (Buzan et al.,
1998, p23) in which an issue is presented as an existential threat and therefore requiring emergency
measures to legitimize actions outside the normal political process. The issue becomes a security
issue when it takes absolute priority over other issues. It is important here to understand that
security is a self-referential practice because it is not necessary for a real threat to exist, but the point
is that the issue is presented as an existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p24). Securitization is
therefore studied through analyzing discourse. However just to present something as an existential
threat is not securitization, merely a securitization move. Instead the issue becomes completely
securitized when the audience accepts it to the degree to authorize the emergency measures needed
to combat the threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p25).
The prominent feature of securitization is therefore to construct a rhetorical argument promoting
the threat as a matter of survival and that the issue must be given priority before it is too late (Buzan
et al., 1998, p26). This process is call the speech act where emergency action must be taken to
combat the existential threat against a shared value, which for instance can take place through the
careful repetition of a security argument until it is taken for granted, and therefore has become
institutionalized (Buzan et al., 1998, p28). The argument in a speech act contains two parts, what will
happen if we do not take action and what will happen if we do. Circumstances which facilitate the
impact of the speech act are called “facilitating conditions”, which can be divided into the internal
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grammatical structures of the act and the external contextual positions from which the act is made.
The grammatical structures of the act is successful when there is an existential threat, a point of no
return but with a possibly way out. Depending on which type of sector we are analyzing we can
expect to find different arguments, for instance sustainability in the environmental sector (Buzan et
al., 1998, p33). With regards to the external positions from which the act is made prominence is
given to actors whom maintain positions of authority.
We can now conclude that in securitization through the formation of the speech act there are three
actors involved, namely a referent object (which is seen as existentially threatened and has the right
to survive), a securitizing actor (whom securitize the issue and the threat) and functional actors
(which can influence the decisions made in the name of security) (Buzan et al., 1998, p36).
5.1.1 The five sectors of security analysis
In order to understand this multisectoral approach to security studies it is first important to
understand what the different sectors entail in terms of actors, units and threats.
The military sector is the traditional realm of security studies in which the state is seen as the most
important referent object and the securitizing actors often are the influential ruling elite. Existential
threats are often constructed as threats to the state’s sovereignty and the military sector is
proclaimed to be the answer through the construction of the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998, p49).
The securitizing actors are here usually state representatives with the authority to speak on behalf of
the state (Buzan et al., 1998, p55), and functional actors which can influence the process are for
instance the arms industry. When the securitization has worked threats will be perceived in terms of
military capacities and capabilities.
The environmental sector is a relative new contribution to the theory of security but no less
important. In regards to this sector an integral part of the speech act is to proclaim that the urgency
of the environmental problem is a political issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p71-73), which is done through a
combination of scientific and political actors. The securitizing actors often refer to resource scarcity
and sustainability in order to convince its audience. The environmental sector includes a number of
different issues, such as “energy problems” which refer to transportation, scarcities and uneven
distribution of energy (Buzan et al., 1998, p74). In the securitization procedure the referent object is
often not the environment as such but instead the risk of losing achieved levels of civilization when
being able to affect the outcome(Buzan et al., 1998, p75). An example of the threat posed to a
referent object regarding an environmental issue is threats from human activity to the natural
system which poses an existential threat to the object, for instance the greenhouse gas emissions
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(Buzan et al., 1998, p80). What is important to understand here however is that it is in the realm of
human possibility to prevent the threat from becoming reality, and for the securitization to manifest
itself it must also be a threat of urgent matter.
The economic sector of security is based upon on the relationship between “the political structure of
anarchy and the economic structure of the market” (Buzan et al., 1998, p95). Mercantilists put the
politics on the forefront where as liberals put economics first. The liberal ideal is the attrition of
national economies with their possible restrictions on the movement of goods and services (Buzan et
al., 1998, p96). The discourse of economic security therefore focuses on threats towards the liberal
agenda of free trade and the emergence of doubt regarding the stability of the market which could
disrupt the flow of goods. Specifically concerning if the dependencies made apparent through the
process of globalization could be exploited for political ends and if this can manifest itself through
concern regarding security of supply when referent objects abandon the idea of self-reliance (Buzan
et al., 1998, p97-98). The liberal idea behind for instance the EU was that through the process of
interdependence no one nation would be able to independently mobilize or use trade as a political
weapon. Concerning the speech act the most apparent way of using securitization in regards to the
economic sector is to point to the possible collapse of welfare for the referent object which in turn
can lead to social unrest and eventually a breakdown of society (Buzan et al., 1998, p102). In the
economic sector states are actors with the greatest possibility of securitizing an issue by pointing
towards a threat against what can be seen as its basic needs. If the state is not self-reliant upon all of
its resources needed to maintain its societal structure, and the supply of one of these resources is
threatened, then the state can clearly and legitimately securitize an issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p105).
For instance the EU can be threatened existentially by something which threatens its process of
interdependence through its construction of the single market. The key issue in the economic sector
is the stable supply of goods which means the fluctuations in supply and demand are kept within
certain limits and thereby preventing price shocks such as the oil crisis. Protectionism can thereby for
instance be seen as an existential threat towards the stability of the market. Ways of combating this
can be increasing institutional checks and balances which manage fluctuations in the demand and
supply of goods (Buzan et al., 1998, p107).
The societal sector of security aim differs from the traditional state view as a referent object and
instead focuses on the dynamics of the nation. Whereas political security focuses on the role of the
state, societal security takes into account the fact that throughout history there have rarely been
homogenous national states (although this also applies to heterogeneous states). In the security
analysis regarding the societal sector the key question concerns identity. In this case the
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securitization takes place when an incident potentially could threaten the community and its identity
(Buzan et al., 1998, p119). Usually the collective identity of the community creates a sense of us
versus them in regards to the threat. When the nation is closely connected to the state, this speech
act is often executed by high ranking officials of the government (Buzan et al., 1998, p123). The
identity in question could for instance feel threatened by what they perceive is the cultural
imperialism of the west on its intrinsic values (Buzan et al., 1998, p137).
The primary focus regarding the political sector of security concerns nonmilitary threats to state
sovereignty. This sector can be combined with any of the other sectors, since all threats are defined
politically, however the main focus of securitization is defining an existential threat to the state’s
stability (Buzan et al., 1998, p141). The speech act which appeals to the survival of this referent
object is almost always the authoritarian leaders of the state. Regarding the EU the existential threat
can be the fragmentation and subsequent breakup of the supranational organization. The priority
must therefore according to the securitization be further and deeper integration because the
alternative is unacceptable (Buzan et al., 1998, p148).
With all these different sectors in mind the advantages of the multisectoral analysis makes it possible
to analyze security issues from a wider perspective than the traditional military – state centered
perception, in what can be called the security complex.
6. Methodology, primary sources and limitations
6.1 Methodology
In this essay I will use Buzan’s model of multisectoral security analysis to analyze if the issue of
energy has become securitized for the European Union in relation to Russia. According to the theory
of securitization because security is a self-referential practice it is not necessary for a real threat to
exist, but the point is that the issue is presented as an existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p24). The
essay will therefore analyze official documents through the method of discourse analysis, which
regards language as part of the discourse which shapes our interpretation of reality. The method has
been chosen because it bases its analysis on finding the specific words and phrases in a document
through which an actor seeks to infer meaning and discourse (Esaiasson Peter, Gilljam, Mikael,
Oscarsson, Henrik, Wängnerud Lena, 2007, p239-240). This applies to the theory of securitization as
the securitizing actor seeks to use the speech act as the rhetorical argument declaring an existential
threat towards a referent object. The method will therefore consist of using discourse analysis to
analyze official EU documents and statements regarding energy, through posing specific questions
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which are used to determine the potential underlying speech acts in these documents (Esaiasson et
al., 2007, p243). The answers to these specific questions will be analyzed through the five
predetermined sectors of security analysis presented in the theory of securitization.
In a discourse analysis it is important to determine which type of actor’s texts will be used in the
ensuing analysis (Esaiasson et al., 2007, p247). Through the theory of securitization we can here
conclude that since the argument of security is an influential instrument it is in its nature to be
included in texts central to the EU stance on energy policy (Buzan et al., 1998, p177). The analysis will
therefore focus on six official documents which if a securitization has taken place should be of
sufficient importance to be included in the formation of an eventual speech act. The analysis of these
documents will be done through the use of quotes to determine the potential presence of a speech
act, by analyzing if the EU is presented as an existentially threatened referent object through an
authoritative securitizing actor, as well as determining what type of actions is required by the EU to
meet these perceived threats. The aim of the essay is also to include a discussion regarding if this
potential securitizing act has been successful as well as analyzing how the different identities of the
EU and Russia affect their relationship regarding the supply and consumption of energy.
The questions I seek to answer are:
Has a speech act been formulated by the EU regarding the securitization of energy in relation to
Russia?
According to the speech act, what are the existential threats posed against the EU and what type of
action is required to combat these perceived threats?
How does the identity of the EU convey itself in the speech act?
6.2 Primary sources
The primary sources which I analyze regarding the presence of a speech act are all texts central to EU
energy policy and should therefore by of adequate importance to be included in a potential speech
act, according to the theory of securitization. In adherence to the theory of source criticism the essay
uses primary sources instead of secondary sources in order to ensure the reliability of the analysis
(Esaiasson, 2007, p319). In order to guarantee their authenticity the documents have also been
collected from official European Union websites instead of secondary sources. Five of the six
documents originate from the European Commission, which can be seen the main force of European
integration through its right of initiative regarding future legislation and its responsibility in
implementing common policies (Internet 7).
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The text “Green Paper – Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply” is a 111 page
document adopted by the European Commission on the 29th of November 2000. Traditionally the
goal of Green Papers published by the European Commission is to stimulate discussion regarding a
given subject, and to encourage a debate regarding its proposals, which ultimately can result in
legislation presented in White Papers (Internet 8). The aim of this Green Paper was to discuss the
implications of the European Union’s increased external dependency regarding energy, and the
potential security concerns this development presents.
The paper “A secure Europe in a better world” is a 15 page document that was proposed by Javier
Solana, the then current EUHR (EU High Representative) for the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security
Policy), and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels on
the twelfth of December 2003 (Internet 6). The purpose of the document was to outline the
European Union’s future role in the world by identifying its security threats and challenges, as well as
how to handle them. The role of the EUHR is to provide coherence regarding the EU’s foreign policy
by coordinating the many positions of the individual member states (Internet 9), and this document
should be seen as an effort to make sure that the EU acts with a common voice regarding its foreign
policy objectives.
The text “Green Paper – A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” is a 20
page document presented by the European Commission on the 8th of March 2006, which can be seen
as a continuation of the previous Green Paper from 2000. In this document the Commission
continues to call for the need to develop a “common, coherent European Energy Policy” (Internet 10).
The aim of the document, as with previous green papers, was to stimulate discussion regarding the
Commission’s proposals for creating a more coherent foreign policy concerning energy.
The text “External energy relations – from principles to action” is a 6 page communication from the
Commission to the European Council originating from the 12th of October 2006. The document seeks
to discuss how the EU should act to realize the principles and goals undertaken in the Commission’s
Green Paper presented earlier that year (and subsequently endorsed by the European Council of
March 2006). The document outlines that the energy policy for Europe, in line with the Lisbon
strategy for growth and jobs, should be long-term sustainability, security of energy supply and
economic competitiveness (External energy relations, 2006, p2).
The paper “An external policy to serve Europe’s energy interests” from June 2006 is a 5 page
document from the Commission / the Secretariat General (SG) and the High Representative (HR) for
the European Council with the purpose of presenting what guiding principles the EU should take in
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facing its external energy risks, and calls for the creation of a Strategic Energy Review to coordinate
the proposed integration of external energy relations into an integral part of the foreign policy of the
Union (Internet 11).
The last primary source analyzed in this essay is the 21 page document “Second Strategic Energy
Review – An EU Energy Security And Solidarity Action Plan”, a communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the
committee of the regions, presented on the 13th of November 2008. This communication from the
Commission is the result of the European Commission’s proposal in “A European Strategy for
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” from 2006 to formulate a Strategic Energy Review, in
order to achieve its core energy objectives of “sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply”
(Internet 12). The document outlines that energy security is an issue of common EU concern, and
that solidarity among member states is needed to act coherently regarding its external energy
relations.
6.3 Limitations
In an essay it is however also important to discuss the limitations of my analysis as well as to consider
which other types of methodology could be used in analyzing the EU – Russia energy relationship.
The analysis of the relationship could in addition to the use of official EU documents also have been
done through analyzing quotes or debate articles from prominent EU officials or by determining
where the EU is building its energy supply infrastructure as well as analyzing the actual EU import
statistics concerning energy. The decision to specifically analyze a limited number of official EU
documents was made because these primary sources are central to the formation of a speech act
and should therefore be adequate to determine the presence of one, according to the theory of
securitization. Furthermore because the aim of the essay was to determine the presence of a speech
act, the decision was made only to include an overview of the available import statistics instead of an
in depth statistical account of the relationship.
7. Analysis
7.1 The EU – Russia energy relationship
Through the theory of securitization we now have the tools to analyze a specific relationship
between the EU and Russia, namely the energy trade relationship and its impact on foreign policy.
The energy trade relationship is particularly interesting to analyze because it sums up the entire
range of problematic issues concerning the EU – Russia foreign policy relationship.
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The first thing to notice about the energy relationship is its asymmetry (Barysch, 2004, p15).
Currently, the European Union imports 50 percent of the energy it consumes and is therefore
dependent on foreign energy providers, of which Russia has a prominent position. Russia exports
almost 85 percent of its total gas exports to Europe and that accounts for approximately 26 percent
of the European consumption (Gomart, 2008, p10-11). This interdependence creates interesting
foreign policy dynamics with regard to the EU and Russia’s identities. The problem is that the energy
trade relationship has different connotations for each partner. EU with its post-national mindset
wants to liberalize the European energy market and proclaims that the energy sector should be
discussed in terms of market rationales (Gomart, 2008, p10). Russia with its tumultuous experience
from democracy and market economy during Jeltsin's reign instead sees its modernisation through
the trade of energy as a development which will largely be dependent of the strengthening of its
sovereignty and the role of the state through power politics (Averre, 2005, p190). Russia has
therefore monopolized its supply of gas through is energy company Gazprom (Barysch, 2004, p32)
and refuses to release its control over the vital gas pipelines running through Europe. It realises its
power politics by using the “divide and rule” tactics to strike bilateral agreements that undermine a
coherent EU energy policy.
7.2 The EU’s external foreign policy on energy
The documents analyzed for the presence of a speech act originate from what can be understand are
one of the most authoritative structures of the EU, namely the European Commission, as well as a
document presented by the CFSP. The time period of documents analyzed range from the year 2000
and ultimately concluding in the year 2008.
7.2.1 The Green paper on energy
The Green paper on energy from the year 2000 was presented by the European Commission as a
European strategy for the security of energy supply. The conclusion presented was that the EU’s
external dependence on energy was constantly increasing and that the dramatic effects of the recent
rise in energy prices had revealed a structural weakness in the EU’s energy supply (Green Paper,
2000, p1). It is therefore argued in the document that the constant fluctuations in the supply and
price of energy can have profound economic consequences in terms of outflow of capital. The paper
lays out that it is imperative that the EU's strategy for “energy security must be geared to ensuring…
the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, at a [affordable]price while
[respecting the environment]” (Green Paper, 2000, p1). The aim of the “security of supply… [is] to
reduce the risks linked to [energy] dependence”. The referent object in this context is therefore the
EU and the European Commission acts as a securitizing actor painting the risks of energy dependence
15
as a threat towards the stable supple of energy at affordable prices and respecting the environment.
The objective of the actions presented to deal with this threat is “to ensure that in 30 years time the
Union will not depend on external supplies for 70% of its energy” by “limit[ing] demand” (Green
Paper, 2000, part 3). The existential threat being painted by the EU in the economic sector has the
greatest chances of being adapted by the audience when referring to what the theory of
securitization calls “a threat against what can be seen as its basic needs” (Buzan et al., 1998, p105).
The securitizing actor can legitimately securitize an issue if the supply of one of its basic resources
needed to maintain social order is threatened. This speech act can clearly be seen as the European
Commission outlines the economic risks of energy dependence as the rise in energy prices “create
monetary and trade imbalances which are harmful to the EU’s economic health” through “net
transfer[s]of capital” as well as increased “inflation” (Green Paper, 2000, part 3). Inflation is
particularly dangerous in the economic sector of security as it undermines the value of the domestic
currency and therefore can lead to a downward spiral of the growth rate with subsequent job losses
(Hedenus, 2010, p1241). The economy can enter into a state of economic and social unrest with
ultimately the existential threat of state failure. To understand what monumental impact extreme
inflation can have one need look no further than the Germany hyperinflation after World War I which
lead to the rise of extremist parties and the subsequent road to a new World War. It is important
here to remember that that goal of the EU foreign policy is to promote internal stability and security
through “safeguarding the… independence of the Union” (Internet 1) and its goal to “develop and
consolidate democracy” (Internet 1) can be threatened through the consequences of an unstable
energy supply.
7.2.2 A secure Europe in a better world
The document “A secure Europe in a better world” was proposed by the Javier Solana, EUHR (EU
High Representative) for the CFSP, and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the
European Council in Brussels on the twelfth of December 2003 (Internet 6). The paper outlines that
“Europe still faces security threats and challenges” and that “Europe should be ready to share in the
responsibility for global security and building a better world” through the “spread of the rule of law
and democracy” (A Secure Europe, 2003, p2). The document proclaims that “security is a
precondition of development” and that insecurity “deters investment and makes normal economic
activity impossible” (A Secure Europe, 2003, p2). This stance can be connected to the Green paper on
energy because it also views the economic sector of security as vital. The goal of the EU is to promote
free trade and a single European market and to do this people must be willing to invest. To
understand why this is important we can turn to the “institutional theory of economics” which says
16
that the engine of growth is human innovation, and that a society in order to succeed must have
stable institutions and a social infrastructure which promotes stability. It’s is very important in order
for people to be willing to invest that the rules of the game will not change dramatically (Fregert &
Jonung, 2008, p145-146), such as the company’s principle supply of energy suddenly getting turned
off because of geopolitical tension. Because of globalization the EU has “increased… [its] dependence
– and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in… energy [and other fields]” (A Secure
Europe, 2003, p3). The document outlines that “energy dependence is a special concern for Europe,
[as Europe] is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Import accounts for about 50% of energy
consumption today [and] this will rise to 70% in 2030”. The dependence of energy is clearly seen as a
security issue. The presented goal of the EU is to create an international order based on effective
multilateralism through the use of markets & institutions and it is proclaimed that this enlargement
should be extended to “our neighbors in the East” (A Secure Europe, 2003, p9) regarding the “respect
for common values” (A Secure Europe, 2003, p15). The EU here wants to continue to use its weapon
of conditionality in order to spread good governance and the rule of law. Furthermore the document
proclaims that the EU must act more coherently in its foreign policy because “in a crisis there is no
substitute for the unity of command” (A Secure Europe, 2003, p14).
7.2.3 A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure
Energy
This document published by the European Commission in 2006 continues to outline the need for the
EU to secure its energy supply together with a sustainable development and competitiveness (Green
Paper, 2006, p3). The document again points to the fact that the EU’s import dependency is rising
and that some of the regions which supply the energy are “threatened by insecurity” (Green Paper,
2006, p3). This does not concur well with the EU’s goal of increasing both its internal and external
stability. Instead the document promotes the liberal idea of an internal energy market to encourage
competitiveness and thereby reducing costs. In analyzing the situation through the economic sector
of security we can find that the EU perceives its energy dependence as a threat towards the liberal
market of free trade. The EU does not view its ring of suppliers (such as Russia) as adhering to the
liberal principles. Remember that the goal of the EU’s foreign policy is “[to create] a ring of countries,
sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives… [and] to involve a significant measure of
economic and political integration” (Internet 3). The goal of creating an internal market which can
balance the temporary shifts in supply and demand its threatened by a supplier not adhering to the
rules of the market and not sharing the EU’s fundamental values. The EU is threatened by Russia’s
use of power politics to further its own interests which creates immense uncertainty for the EU in its
quest for free trade and liberalization. The document also proclaims that it is vital that the EU acts
17
together with a common voice and that “Europe must act urgently… to bring innovation… in the
energy sector” (Green Paper, 2006, p4) to promote conditions for “growth, jobs, greater security and
a better environment”. Here we can find links to the document from the CFSP regarding that a
precondition for growth, through the process of innovation, is stable markets and institutions, as well
as that the threat posed by energy dependence must be dealt with urgently, which is a prerequisite
in the speech act of securitization. In this document we can also find a call for the EU “to speak with a
common voice [to] promote diversity of supply, especially for gas” (Green Paper, 2006, p5), resulting
in the Commission’s proposition of creating “a Strategic EU Energy Review [which will] be presented
to the Council and Parliament on a regular basis” which will constitute “a stocktaking and action
plan… on all aspects of energy policy” (Green Paper, 2006, p5). We can therefore find that the issue
of energy according to the EU must be dealt with urgently and that the issue should be given priority
through the creation of a specific strategic review. The priority goal of creating a unified European
grid for the gas market would also be further achieved by creating a “European energy regulator”
and a “European Centre for energy networks”. Here we can see further examples of the EU’s wish to
create stable institutions internally and deepen integration which can be linked to the political sector
of security (which sees fragmentation as a risk against the referent object). Regarding energy we can
also see examples of the extraordinary measures the EU must take to secure its energy supply, such
as investing in generation capacity because “the necessary reserve must exist in order to prevent
disruptions at times of high demand” (Green Paper, 2006, p7). The EU therefore must take
extraordinary measures to secure its energy supply because it views its suppliers as unstable, and the
consequences of this could be dire as “secure availability of energy at affordable prices is crucial” and
“[a] minimum of disruptions are essential” (Green Paper, 2006, p7) concerning the growth of the
European industry. The view of the EU is that the creation of the internal energy market will give the
potential investors the transparency and predictability needed “as well as security against political
risks including interruption of supply” (Green Paper, 2006, p8). Here we can again see that the EU’s
solution is to create market-based instruments and the use of price signals such as the “EU emissions
trading scheme” regarding its environmental security. Concerning the need for extraordinary
measures to combat the threat of energy supply and sustainability the document also calls for the EU
to “finance a more strategic approach to energy research”, instead of individual countries
overlapping their individual research. This shows the need for the EU to act coherently even in the
case of technology development to secure its energy supply.
18
7.2.4 External energy relations – from principles to action
This document is a communication from the Commission to the European Council from 2006 and
discusses how the EU should act to realize the principles and goals undertaken in the Commission
Green Paper presented earlier that year. The central principle in achieving the objectives set by the
EU regarding “security of supply… [and] sustainability” is “coherence between the internal and
external aspects of energy policy” (External energy relations, 2006, p2). The document confirms that
the “realisation of its internal market” is crucial for the EU to ensure competitiveness, diversity and
security of supply. This can be linked to the economic sector of security which key issue is to uphold
the stable supply of goods to the consumer. The goals set are met through major investments in
diversification routes and energy efficiency. As well as in the earlier documents the EU wants to use
the market as the answer regarding its energy needs, effectively summed up in the quote “the Union
should use all its weight in current and future bilateral negotiations and agreements, offering…
market-based solutions… with its traditional suppliers” and that “member states and the Commission
should coordinate their positions in order to speak with an effective, common voice” (External energy
relations, 2006, p3). The EU in the document singles out the EU-Russia energy relationship as
especially important and recognizing the need to base its energy cooperation in “a balanced and
mutually binding manner”. The EU emphasizes that it wants its new agreement with Russia to be
based upon “market economy principles” (External energy relations, 2006, p3). The EU further
highlights the need for “framework conditions regulating and fostering energy trade and cross
investments between EU and Russia” because the EU wants to secure the energy supply from Russia
through the idea of interdependence and also by improving the efficiency of the Russian economy so
that it is able both to meet its internal and external energy demand in the future. The EU recognizes
the interdependence through the fact the “Russia seeks ways to secure energy demand” and “the EU
needs Russian resources for its energy security” (External energy relations, 2006, p4). The document
outlines that that EU wants “non-discriminatory and fair treatment from Russia in their energy
relationship, in terms of supply from Russia and in terms of access to Russian market for EU investors”
(External energy relations, 2006, p4) and thereby recognizing that the energy relationship should be
based on market conditions. This discourse can be linked to the economic sector of security where
the focus lies on eliminating the threats towards the liberal agenda of free trade and the concerns
that the dependencies apparent through the process of globalization are not exploited for political
purposes (Buzan et al., 1998, p97-98). Regarding the troubled past relationship with Russia and its
need to be considered an equal partner it is however still interesting to note that the EU talks about
“the high standards of EU regulations” (External energy relations, 2006, p4) and thereby implicitly
devalues Russia’s institutions and position in the world. As in all the previous documents the EU also
19
continues to emphasize that “it is essential that Member states have a common understanding on
the proposed approach” and that “the union should use all opportunities to convince Russia of the
mutual interest in such an exercise” (External energy relations, 2006, p4). The EU however also
recognizes that attention also should be given to other countries supplying it with energy in regards
to the use of EU’s financial instruments to promote the restructuring and development of the partner
countries’ energy sectors. To ensure that the EU acts coherently the paper also proposes that a
“network of energy correspondents” (External energy relations, 2006, p6) be established in order to
prepare grounds for action and decisions if an energy security crisis ensues.
7.2.5 An external policy to serve Europe’s energy interests
This paper from the Commission to the European Council (An external policy, 2006) continues to deal
with what type of guiding principles the EU should take in facing its external energy risks through the
CFSP and recognizes the link between “energy security, sustainability and competitiveness” (An
external policy, 2006, p1). The document outlines that the increased dependence on energy imports
from unstable regions is a serious risk with regards to the fact that “producers… have been using
energy as a political lever” as well as the effects on the EU’s internal market when external suppliers
not adhearing to market rules enter into competition. This is a clear reference to Russia’s use of
energy as a means of power and its usage of Gazprom in entering the EU’s internal energy market,
which is seen as a threat and risk towards the stability of energy supply and therefore contributes to
the speech act. The building blocks of the EU energy security should according to the paper be based
upon functioning markets and diversification. In order for the markets to function clear legal
infrastructure must be established together with transparency. This argument can be linked to the
economic sector of security where the liberal EU seeks the attrition of national economies and an
agenda of free trade, where as Russia instead focuses on the political structure of anarchy (Buzan et
al., 1998, p95), which leads to Russia being seen as a threat towards the flow of goods to the EU
market. The paper lays out that the EU must convince its neighboring supplier that bilateral deals
only leads to continued instability, a clear reference to Russia whom uses “divide-and-rule” politics
because of its anarchical view of the relationship. This view now becomes a threat regarding the
political sector of security for the EU as Russia’s power politics becomes an existential threat towards
the EU’s stability, with the potential consequence of a breakup of the organization (Buzan et al.,
1998, p141). As can be seen according to the theory of securitization the EU responds with an
attempt to further deepen the integration of the organization (Buzan et al., 1998, p148) through the
argument that the policy adopted by the EU must be “coherent… strategic… focused… [and]
consistent” (An external policy, 2006, p3).
20
7.2.6 Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security And
Solidarity Action Plan
This communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council from 2008 is
the result of the European Commission’s proposal in “A European Strategy for Sustainable,
Competitive and Secure Energy” from 2006 to formulate a Strategic Energy Review, and is presented
as an “EU energy security and solidarity action plan” (2:d Strategic Energy Review, 2008, p1). It
outlines that to reach the EU energy objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and security of
supply the EU has “committed to the “20-20-20” initiative” (originally proposed in the paper “An
energy policy for Europe” presented in 2007) which is set to reduce emissions, consumption and
improve energy efficiency by 20%, all by 2020 (2:d Strategic Energy Review, 2008, p2). This in
reference to a speech act can be seen as referring to environmental security, by also presenting that
is in the realm of human possibility to prevent the threat from becoming reality and by presenting
the threat as an urgent matter (Buzan et al., 1998, p80). The paper recognizes the problem that a
number of EU member states are “dependent on one single supplier” (2:d Strategic Energy Review,
2008, p3) and that this makes the EU’s energy supply vulnerable to political incidents. The goal of the
internal market is to “share and spread risk” (2:d Strategic Review, 2008, p3) and this will be realized
by the EU’s speaking with one voice, acting coherently and therefore “developing an effective
external energy policy” (2:d Strategic Energy Review, 2008, p3) through the “EU energy security and
solidarity action plan”, which wants to reduce the individual countries risk by diversifying their gas
supply. This discourse of threats and risks is often used in the speech act of securitization to justify
the extraordinary actions needed to combat the threat. Accordingly the document (also in line with
the theory of securitization) outlines that that energy “must be given the political priority it merits in
EU’s international relations” through the “liberalization of trade and investment in the energy sector”
(2:d Strategic Energy Review, 2008, p7). This energy interdependence based upon law will be
achieved through upstream FDI (foreign direct investment) in supply countries such as Russia and will
“facilitate the reform and liberalization of [its] energy market” (2:d Strategic Energy Review, 2008,
p8), and thereby also help clarify under what conditions Russia can invest downstream in the EU.
Concerning the environmental sector of security the document recognizes that the change to green
energy will “require a massive switch” (2:d Strategic Energy Review, 2008, p15) but that it’s
something that is necessary for the EU in order to transform it into a “sustainable and secure… low
C02 market” and thereby “creating wealth” (2:d Strategic Energy Review, 2008, p17) and stability.
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8. Conclusion
8.1 The Securitization of Energy
The documents presented and analyzed portray an overview of the attempt to securitize the EU –
Russia energy relationship. The speech act can be found throughout the various documents as the
securitizing actor (the Commission) tries towards portray the existential threat (inflation, price
shocks) that the risk of an unstable energy supply poses to the referent object (the EU). In the
documents the Commission establishes a clear link between what they call “energy security,
sustainability and competitiveness” which can by analyzed through the theory of securitization’s
model of multisectoral analysis. Through the economic sector of security we can understand that the
EU regards energy security as “the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the
market, at a [affordable]price while [respecting the environment]” (Green Paper, 2000, p1). The EU
therefore regards the unstableness of Russia as an energy supplier as “a threat against what can be
seen as its basic needs”, which according to the theory of securitization enables the actor to
legitimately securitize the issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p105). In the documents the securitizing actor
talks about the “risks” to the EU’s economic health that this trade imbalance can create, such as
inflation (Green Paper, 2000, part 3). These risks are presented as an existential threat towards the
referent object (the EU) as inflation can cause a downward spiral of the growth rate (Hedenus, 2010,
p1241) and lead to social unrest and potential state failure. In the Green Paper from 2006 we can
find an additional requirement for the speech act, namely the urgency of the threat, as the
document proclaims that “Europe must act urgently… in the energy sector” (Green Paper, 2006, p4).
In the actions proposed by the EU it is interesting to note that they are based upon the development
of markets & institutions, which can be seen by the use of the word “competitiveness” in the link
towards energy security. The EU believes that the security of its energy supply is based upon
interdependence through the creation of the internal market, joint generation capacity at times of
high demand (to ensure “[a] minimum of disruptions”) and thereby enabling the growth of the
European industry. The idea of liberalization is at the core of the EU identity and in its quest for a
stable energy supply clashes with the power politics of Russia which thereby leads to the
securitization of the relationship. For instance the EU wants to base its relationship with Russia on
market-based conditions and seeks “access to Russian market for EU investors” (External energy
relations, 2006, p4). The EU wants to invest upstream in its supply countries in order to stop energy
from being used as “a political lever”, and instead base the predictability of the relationship on the
rule of law. Russia however seeks to hinder the involvement of international oil companies (IOC) in
its gas production and supply and instead uses national oil companies (NOC) (Umbach, 2010, p1232)
22
such as Gazprom to effectively control the supply of gas to Europe through the use of a button.
Because Russia uses energy as means to project power through “divide-and-rule” tactics by striking
bilateral agreements with individual EU countries, the EU views Russia as a threat and a risk against is
energy supply and the stability of the Union, thereby securitizing the issue concerning the political
sector of security. This presentation of an existential threat posed by Russia through the use of a
speech act can be found throughout the documents as the EU urges its member states to act with “a
common voice” (Green Paper, 2006, p5), “coordinate their positions” (External energy relations,
2006, p3) and have “a common understanding“ (External energy relations, 2006, p4) that the energy
policy adopted by the EU must be “coherent… strategic… [and] focused” (An external policy, 2006,
p3). In the documents the Commission consistently talks about Russia and the stability of the energy
supply in a discourse of threats and risks, which effectively can be seen in quotes such as that the
regions which supply energy are “threatened by insecurity” (Green Paper, 2006, p3). This goes
against the fundamental goal of the EU’s foreign policy in “[to create] a ring of countries, sharing the
EU’s fundamental values and objectives… [and] to involve a significant measure of economic and
political integration” (Internet 3). The Commission’s reference to “sustainability” is connected to a
speech act concerning the environmental sector of security. According to the theory of securitization
it is important that the speech act conveys the urgency of the problem, the risks towards the
prosperity of the society and the ability to affect the outcome (Buzan et al., 1998, p73-75). This
rhetoric can be found in the documents from the Commission regarding that that “Europe must act
urgently… to bring innovation… in the energy sector” to promote conditions for “growth, jobs,
greater security and a better environment” (Green Paper, 2006, p4), and therefore continue to meet
our high standards of living. The ability the affect the outcome is reflected in the “20-20-20” initiative
which will “require a massive switch” (2:d Strategic Review, 2008, p15) but is something that is
humanly possible.
In this analysis however it is also important to remember that in order for the issue to be completely
securitized, the audience (meaning the Council and the individual member states of the EU), must
accept and adhere to the propositions needed to combat the threat, otherwise it is merely a
securitization move (Buzan et al., 1998, p25). For instance the Commission calls for the EU member
states to act with “a common voice” (Green Paper, 2006, p5) and that the foreign energy policy of
the EU must be “coherent… strategic… [and] focused” (An external policy, 2006, p3). According to
Umbach (2010) however these words have not rang true in the political reality. The lack of unity
between the individual member states has played in Russia’s favor as it uses “divide-and-rule” tactics
to strike bilateral agreements (Umbach, 2010, p1237). The action of countries such as Germany,
23
whom have struck bilateral energy agreements with Russia, leads to continued mistrust between the
EU member states which therefore could hinder a complete act of securitization. However, it is
possible that Russia’s use of energy as a political power tool could undermine its long-term strategic
interests as the EU tries to diversify its energy supply and improve its energy efficiency (Umbach,
2010, p1237). Although the EU member states traditionally may have not hold true the rhetoric of
the Commission, the recent experience of the 2005-2006 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis together with the
Russian-Georgian war in 2008 effectively demonstrated the need for EU to act coherently, and
together with the integration of the internal energy market this could potentially lead to a more
coherent EU energy foreign policy in the future (Umbach, 2010, p1238), and thereby completing the
act of securitization. The integration of the European gas grid would make the EU one single market
for Russia, and would effectively reduce the need for bilateral agreements (Noël, 2008, p9) between
individual EU member states and Russia. Analyzing the progress of this development could become
an interesting future essay into the subject.
24
9. References:
Primary sources:
European Commission, 2000. Green Paper. Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy
Supply, Luxembourg, 29 November 2000.
European Commission, 2006. An external policy to serve Europe’s energy interests. Paper from
Commission/SG/HR for the European Council.
European Commission, 2006. External Energy Relations – From Principles to Action, Brussels, 12
October 2006.
European Commission, 2006. Green Paper. A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and
Secure Energy. Brussels, 3 August 2006.
European Commission, 2007a. An Energy Policy for Europe. Communication from the Commission to
the European Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 10 January 2007.
European Commission, 2008a. An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan. Second Strategic
Energy Review. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions, Brussels, November 2008.
European Council, 2003, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy, Brussels,
12 December 2003.
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