Discussion
Hyuk-Sang Sohn
Professor, Kyung Hee University
In his paper, Professor Dunn discusses the core human values of freedom and equality as
they have broadly evolved in the contemporary world. Given the current global situation of
confused values and nihilist attitudes, his presentation provides us a useful orientation on
universal human values that are of pressing need today. From a historical perspective, he
explains the two values of freedom and equality and their relationship, indicating the need for
their amendment for the advancement of society. As I am not a specialist on political theory,
rather than examining the overall meaning and significance of Professor Dunn’s position, I
would like to center our discussion on a few points of interest.
The Meaning of "Beyond"
Our pursuit of something new reflects our frustration over the ways things stand now. We
do not live in Leibnizian "best of the possible world," nor do we accept Fukuyama’s triumphant
"End of History." At the same time, we do not accept the pessimistic and resigned higher
criticism that "there is nothing new under the sun." In these respects, I agree with Professor
Dunn’s following arguments: "The values we affirm today and the ways in which we shape our
lives together today are each in pressing need of considerable amendment,"(p.6) "A renaissance
is a re-birth, but a re-birth not merely by iteration and biological destiny, but by imaginative
recapture and enhancement of something which had already been born before"(p. 15). There is a
Confucian saying of "reviewing the old and learning the new." Perhaps what we need is a new
approach to renaissance, namely neo-renaissance. This point is appropriately addressed by
Professor Zhang in his conference paper today. "Beyond" may be understood to imply
exploring the betterment of society not by self-assertively seeking something entirely detached
from the past but by reflecting on what humanity has accomplished so far.
Beyond Modern Freedom
This concept of beyond can similarly be applied to the question of freedom. From the
recent discourse on freedom, it is worth considering Isaiah Berlin’s comparison between
positive liberty and negative liberty1. Although a full critique of Berlin’s perspectives would go
1
Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959)
beyond the scope of this discussion, the point I would like to make is that his two concepts
appear limited to the self-centered concept of modern freedom. In other words, Berlin’s
discussion can be primarily regarded as a comparison between autonomous self and higher self.
What is missing in Berlin ’ s comparison is Benjamin Constant ’ s ancient liberty which
emphasizes political participation.2 Constant’s ancient liberty implies political participation in
the political community in which citizens dwell. Of course, it is true that the modern revival of
ancient politics is an unfeasible proposition due to the sharp difference between ancient polis
and today’s state. The question is whether there is no way to attach modern relevance to ancient
liberty through revision. Recent attempts to overcome this issue address the discrepancy
between positive liberty and negative liberty. What I have in mind is recent attempts to address
this issue, among which are Quentin Skinner’s neo-roman theory of Liberty3 and Philip Pettit’s
a republican view of Freedom (Freedom as non-domination)4(각주 4). Skinner and Pettit call to
doubt the negative liberty that has hegemonic status in freedom today, the absence of
interference. Instead of the freedom of individuals, Skinner and Pettit present freedom as based
on a free state and a free government respectively. I would like to know Professor Dunn’s
thoughts on his colleague Skinner’s perspective and on Pettit’s notions of freedom. The reason
why I raise this question here is because both Skinner and Petit’s work represent important
efforts to explore a different kind of freedom through the analysis of past heritage. Another
question of interest is what kind of political participation is feasible and appropriate under today
’s political and social structure. As Professor Dunn indicates, given the present degradation of
citizens into denizens, it is necessary to explore somewhat better systems and cultures that
would address the problems of governance only by professional politicians and political
participation limited by elections. Recently in Korea, civil society and regional autonomy have
gained importance while numerous civic groups have sought political participation. Keeping
these trends in mind, I wonder if Professor Dunn has any suggestions.
Liberty and Harm
Professor Dunn provides meaningful insights on the relationship between liberty and
harm. Still, I do not have a clear grasp of what he implies by "freedom to act, both conceptually
and causally, must always imply the opportunity to damage and even damage badly."(p.9) This
may be interpreted in three different ways. The first possibility is that because harm to others is
inherent even under the freedom of non-interference, modern freedom without infringement
upon others is implausible. A second interpretation is that freedom cannot serve as the
2
3
4
Benjamin Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancient Compared with That of the Moderns," in Benjamin Constant:
Political Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998)
Phillip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)
foundation in intimate spheres like the family, and must remain in only specified domains.
Finally, we may understand that given the unrestrained degradation of freedom, some
restrictions on freedom are unavoidable. Which of the three explanations does Professor Dunn
offer, or is he referring to all three interpretations?
Beyond Equality
I would like to talk about equality. Professor Dunn points out that, "the precise meaning
and status of equality remains as murky as it ever was." He also indicates that equality is
confronted by ascertainable obstruction. According to Dunn, claims of equality are either
presented as prerequisites for freedom, or favored out of embarrassment and in the hope that
equal condition if realized could yield clear benefits in relation to our other purposes and
hopes. In other words, equality is not a goal in itself but the means to other values. It seems to
me that Tocquevelli's prediction that equality of conditions is irreversible providence proved
mistaken on this point. If we again recall Montesquieu's argument that the principle of republic
is love of equality, we could observe the current situation as a crisis of republican principle. In
this context, the exploration of equality as possible under capitalism, or as different from that
pursued by socialism, can be seen as a political issue of great significance. However, in
handling such an issue, the prevalent instrumental view of equality appears unsuitable. I wish to
ask Professor Dunn whether the conceptualization and practice of equality as an end rather than
a means can be seen as a wrongful willfulness of humanity or an infeasible task in reality.
Equality and Envy
On equality, Professor Dunn points to the important human emotion of envy. I find this a
very interesting point. As he indicates, envy can be viewed as projective and pathological when
not aroused by objective forms of inferiority. Is envy about objective forms of inferiority
conducive to equality? If so, what is the specific form of inferiority and what examples may be
provided? Or are other passions such as sympathy required to foster equality? Recently, the case
of Korea seems to demonstrate strong demands of equality and expressions of egalitarian envy
in many areas. Could you elaborate on your point over envy in its relation to equality?
Nexus between Economy and Politics
Given Professor Dunn’s long term interests in the relationship between politics and
economics, I would like to raise some broader related questions. Rather than Napoleon’s
proposition that politics is fate, 'economy is fate' seems a more appropriate description for today
’s situation. Politics reflects the constraints of economics. Although fate is an extreme notion
here, what is certain is that there are severe economic limits to contemporary politics. Karl
Polany indicated the risks of the disembedded economy. We previously discussed the
importance of political participation, and Professor Dunn states that the political tasks we are
now facing are tasks "for all citizens."(p.14) The evasion of political participation by many
citizens arises partly from frustration, namely the assumption that participation may not bring
tangible results. This problem, as Professor Dunn discusses in his paper, can be regarded as a
collective action problem. A related point of my interest is the locus of participation. There
seems to be a need for a more approachable venue for participation, one that can supplement
representative democracy. Of course, civic participation will not cure all ills. Civic participation
alone seems insufficient to curb the "veracious demands of a formula of economic
rationalization"(p.14). We must identify the positive role of the state or government in this
context. In spite of the weakened status of the state in the contemporary global age, I still think
that the state has a duty to liberate its citizens from their avoidable dependence on others’
goodwill and to alleviate the unjust inequalities among its citizens. At the same time, I think
that the state has a duty to prevent its governmental agency from behaving arbitrarily when
imposing the rules that govern our common life. Does this not signify that we must reach
beyond the notion of the state as either neutral or a "necessary evil?" I would be grateful if
Professor Dunn could provide some of his thoughts on these big but important issues.