Multi-level Governance in South East Europe (ESRC grant no. RES-062-23-0183
Project Paper CP/2 - Cohesion Policy and Multi-level Governance in Greece,
Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia: The Story So Fari
Ian Bache
Centre for International Policy Research
Department of Politics
University of Sheffield
January 2007
Cohesion Policy and Multi-level Governance in Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and
Macedonia: The Story So Farii
Introduction
As a starting point for understanding the domestic governance effects of cohesion
policy in member and accession states, the framework of simple and compound
polities developed by Schmidt (2006) is highlighted as a heuristic device…. In this
framework, a distinction is drawn between EU effects in ‘compound’ and ‘simple’
polities. In the former, ‘power, influence and voice are diffused through multiple
levels and modes of governance’ (e.g., Germany, Italy, Spain), while in the latter,
‘power, influence and voice are more concentrated in a single level and mode of
governance’ (e.g., Britain, France, Greece) (Schmidt, 2003: 2).
Table 1. Key characteristics of compound and simple polities
Structures
Power
Authorities
_________________________________________________________________
Simple polities
Unitary
Concentrated
Single
(Fr, UK)
Compound polities
Regionalized Partially diffuse
Somewhat multiple
Federal
Multiple
(Sp, It)
Compound polities
(Ger, US)
Diffuse
Highly compound
Quasi-federal Highly diffuse
Highly multiple
(EU)
__________________________________________________________________
Source: Adapted from Schmidt 2006, 51
Schmidt’s schema links well with research on multi-level governance. In
particular, it brings into focus the distinction between the vertical and horizontal
dimensions of multi-level governance. Specifically, it highlights both structures of the
state (and policy processes) and places these alongside analysis of the nature of
politics. Changes in the former relate to changes in vertical relations as new state
structures emerge or are strengthened at levels above and below the nation state, while
changes to the latter relate to the sideways movement of power and influence to nonstate actors that may demand different types of political interactions and interactions
reflect horizontal rather than hierarchical relations.
The most obvious alternative candidate for organising the empirical material
would be Lijphart’s (1984; 1999) continuum, which places majoritarianism on one
extreme point of the axis and consensualism on the other. Here the two key
dimensions are federal-unitary and executive-parties. This approach also has merit
comparative analysis, but Schmidt’s (2006) approach has a number of advantages in
studying multi-level governance. First, Schmidt includes a third category of (nation)
state structures to the two identified by Lijphart, which is regionalized. A number of
EU states now fit into this category (Spain and Italy being the most obvious), while
others may follow. Second, she replaces the executive-parties dimension with two
more nuanced categories of representative politics and policymaking processes.
Third, Lijphart’s two-fold categorisation of policymaking processes as pluralist and
corporatist is made three-fold to include statist processes (Schmidt 2006, 228) (Figure
1.1)
Figure 1 Member-states along a continuum from statist to corporatist processes
2
Fr Gr
UK
It
Statist
Ger Sw NL
Corporatist
Source: Schmidt 2006, 108.
In relation to politics, which for Lijphart is the overarching dichotomy between
consensual and majoritarian systems, Schmidt includes this within the larger
dichotomy between compound and simple polities. The politics dimension is
separated from the systems dimension, because, as Schmidt (2006, 229) argues
‘Lijphart’s distinction implies that majoritarian democracies will always have
confrontation and consensus ones the opposite. But in real life this is not the case’..
In short, the term compound polity refers to a state with a combination of a
proportional representation system, corporatist policymaking processes and
regionalized or federalized structures. The term simple polity refers to a state with a
combination of a majoritarian system of representation, statist policymaking processes
and a unitary state structure (Schmidt 2006, 227). Using these categories, the EU is
defined as a highly compound regional polity, which places it at the extreme end of
the continuum that includes its member states (Figure 1.2), and one which tends to
pull all member states – irrespective of their place on the continuum - in this direction.
Figure 2 EU and member-states on a continuum between simple and compound polity
EU
UK Fr Ire
Sw NL
It
Simple polity
Ger Sp B
Compound polity
3
(Source: Schmidt 2006, 229).
However, and consistent with the ‘goodness of fit’ argument emanating from the
literature on Europeanization (ref), the impact on states furthest away from the EU on
this continuum is likely to be comparatively greater. This leads us on to the case
studies here, which by any standards would all be categorised as ‘simple polities’ and,
as such, should be subject to strong adaptational pressures from engaging with the
compound polity of the EU. As was discussed in an earlier paperiii, the requirements
for EU cohesion policy resonate strongly with the image and conception of the EU as
a compound polity.
What soon becomes evident from the summary below, as might be expected,
is that while a substantial amount of research has been undertaken on the Greek case,
there is relatively little to date on Slovenia that address the questions of concern here
and none to speak of in relation to Macedonia and Croatia. We address each of these
in turn.
Greece
Traditionally, government and politics Greece is seen to have a high degree of misfit
with EU governance in general terms and in relation to the specific requirements of
EU cohesion policy (specifically, regionalisation and partnership requirements). The
political and administrative structure is hierarchical and centralized, civil society is
weak, and there is an absence of a consensus-building approach amongst political
elites. The country as a whole received Objective 1 structural fundingiv from 1989
and, before that, faced similar governance requirements from the Integrated
Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs). The scale of funding has remained high
throughout the Greek period of membershipv. In this context, significant adaptational
pressures have been generated by structural fund requirements:
‘The introduction of the “subsidiarity” and “partnership” principles and the
promotion of the integrated approach to planning totally misfit with the Greek
centralized and interventionist administrative tradition, the predominance of
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the state and the limited participation of social and private actors’ (Getemis
and Demetropoulou 2004, 358).
Not surprisingly therefore, the early period of membership witnessed some resistance
to EU cohesion policy requirements. However, EU structural policy soon began to
have effects on domestic governance.
On the vertical dimension, the most important effect of cohesion policy was
the creation of a regional level of government, which followed the introduction of the
IMPs into Greece in 1985. The IMPs pioneered the multi-annual, multi-sectoral
approach (Hooghe and Keating 1994), which include requirements for regional
partnerships to be created. In response to these requirements, Greece was initially
divided into six regions, although the division was purely administrative and limited
in institutional terms to the monitoring committees required to oversee the IMPs.
Subsequent legislation in 1986 divided the country into 13 NUTS 2 regions, which
were to provide the basis for Community Support Frameworks (CSFs). These regions
had a centrally-appointed regional secretary supported by a small cohort of civil
servants drawn from central government. In addition, regional councils were
established that were made up of appointees from central and local government and
chaired by the regional secretary (Andreou 2006, 244-5).
After this initial burst of activity, decentralization halted and in some areas
regressed (Verney and Papageorgiou 1993). More specifically in relation to the
structural funds, Kelleher, Batterbury and Stern (1999, 64) noted an ‘absence of
decentralisation’ in the Greek Objective 1 programme and only a marginal role
afforded to regional bodies. Generally, regional-level networks were slow to emerge
and were ‘mostly fragmented and controlled by the state, despite impressions of
relevant autonomy’ (Getemis and Demetropoulou 2004, 374). Beyond the creation of
regional structures in 1986, the main features of decentralisation and territorial
relations that have developed in Greece during the period of EU membership have
been attributed primarily to domestic factors (Leontitsis 2006, 17-18). Andreou (2006,
246) concluded that ‘EU cohesion policy acted as a catalyst for the creation of new
institutions at the regional level. However, the structure, functions and evolution of
these new entities were shaped by domestic factors’.
In relation to the horizontal dimension, the legacy of authoritarian statism in
Greece was a weak civil society and an abundance of political mistrust. Despite this,
5
structural policy did stimulate horizontal partnerships by promoting the role of a
number of non-state organisations (NGOs, social groups) at the regional level, even
though the state retained a pivotal role (Kelleher, Batterbury and Stern 1996, 64). On
the post-2000 period, Getemis and Demetropoulou (2004 374) said ‘It could be
argued that the partnership trends of the 1990s are being re-placed by a pseudocorporatism of state control… current trends do not leave much room for optimism
about a more rapid adaptation at the regional level’. However, Andreou (2006, 250)
suggested that the relative failure of meaningful partnerships to develop in Greece
was partly a consequence of subnational and non-state actors lacking the necessary
capacity to engage effectively. In this context, centralized programming and
management of the funds was probably a ‘necessary evil’ in the short term at least: an
argument that has resonance with developments in the accession states of central and
eastern Europe (below).
Overall, the picture of cohesion policy effects in Greece is one of some
decentralisation occurring, but with a subsequent clawing back of control by the
centre, leaving the regional level remaining weak within the Greek system. Similarly,
horizontal partnerships were established in the regions, but central government
retained a key role in decision-making. Clearly, the central state had to adjust to the
new realities of multi-level governance generated by the structural funds, but did so in
a strategic way. To the extent that there was learning, it was generally ‘thin’. Getemis
and Demetropoulou (2004, 371) concluded that ‘‘the structure and the administrative
tradition of the Greek state, the peculiarities of Greek centre–periphery relations and
the traditional weakness of Greek civil society have considerably limited the capacity
of the regional institutional infrastructure for learning and adaptation’. As such, the
Greek case most closely approximates to the category of accommodation set out in
the literature on Europeanization (Andreou 2006, 253) and it has not moved very far
towards the compound end of the continuum as a result of Europeanization.
Slovenia
There is much less academic reflection on developments in Slovenia than on Greece,
but there is some good material on the background to cohesion policy in both official
(mainly EU) documents and in a small number of academic papers. Two academic
papers on the pre-accession period are particularly useful (Faro 2004vi and Lajh
2003).
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Slovenia’s first funding from the EU came in 1992 for a period running to
1995. The funding in this initial period came from the Phare programme, which plays
a similar role to the Objective 1 programmes of the structural funds (see Paper CP1).
In this first phase, funding was directed towards privatisation, public services and
banking business (20%), infrastructure (20%), the TEMPUS programme and
education (20%) and science and technology, the environment, energy and tourism
(20%) (Lajh 2003, 7). Subsequently, the funding was re-directed to focus specifically
on advancing the pre-accession strategy. In the second period of the Phare programme
(1995-99), particular attention was given to: strengthening the public administration
for the efficient co-ordination of EU affairs; informing the public about EU matters
and Slovenia’s accession to the EU; and supporting the National Assembly in its preaccession activities (Lajh 2003, 7). In the third phase of this funding (2000-06), which
spanned the early accession period, these priorities continued alongside Phare funding
for cross-border programmes (with Italy, Austria and Hungary) along with other
initiatives (mainly funded by ISPA and SAPARD). In this period, the Phare
programme was alongside the two other pre-accession instruments (ISPA and
SAPARD) in an overall framework of multi-annual programming for the preaccession funds that set the funding priorities (Figure 1 below).
7
Figure 3: Pre-accession assistance programming framework
Source: {http://www.gov.si/svez/}, April 2003 reproduced in Lajh 2003, 4.
In response to EU requirements for effective an implementation process, the structure
established to implement pre-accession funds in Slovenia was one that would
anticipate that required under the circumstances of accession and receipt of the
structural funds (Figure 2 below).
8
Figure 4: Implementation of pre-accession assistance in Slovenia
Source: {http://www.gov.si/svez/}, April 2003, reproduced by Lajh 2003, 10.
The effects of the pre-accession aid requirements on the promotion of multi-level
governance in Slovenia have not been substantial. The structures outlined above were
established and new responsibilities allocated within central government ministries
for coordination of aid, with, in 2003, the creation of a new Government Office for
Structural Policy and Regional Development. However, short of mapping the
structures, research is not evident on any significant change in horizontal interactions
(between public, private and voluntary actors). On the vertical level, where more
change might be expected, there is a story to tell – but it is one of support for
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regionalisation for cohesion policy purposes within Slovenia being stymied by the
Commission’s desire to complete the preparations for accession. RDAs were created,
but during the final months of accession negotiations over the regional policy chapter
of the acquis, the Commission decided that it would be most efficient for Slovenia to
be treated as a single region and for the centre to lead the process (Faro 2004, 4).
Croatia
The main policy framework guiding EU-Croatia relations (along with other countries
of the Western Balkans) is the Stability and Accession Process (SAP). In the period
2001-2004, Croatia received £262 million under the CARDS programme, designed
primarily to support SAP, which covered the following priorities:
-
Return of refugees, sustainable development in return areas, reconstruction
and civil society development (28.5% of total)
-
Trade, investment climate, social cohesion including TEMPUS (26.3%)
-
Reform of the judiciary and police, migration and asylum, integrated border
management, the fight against organised crime (24%)
-
Public administration reform, regional and local development, public finance
(15.6%)
-
Environmental approximation, institution strengthening, monitoring and
planning, investment preparation (4.8%).
Source (European Commission 2007:
In 2005, pre-accession funding to Croatia was 105m euros (Phare 8m; ISPA 25m) and
this increased to 140m euros in 2006 (Phare 80m, ISPA 35m, SAPARD 25m). From
2007, Croatia would be eligible for funding under the new pre-accession instrument
(IPA) that combined the previous programmes (see paper CP1).
To date, there is no academic research on the impact of these funds on the
development of multi-level governance or related issues. However, interviews in the
Commission (author 2006) suggested that the priority was to develop effective
national-level structures and developing effective technocratic capacity for
implementing the programmes. There was a newly created central department for
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coordinating the funds and a secretary of state given specific responsibility for
development strategy and EU funds.
The Republic of Macedonia
As with Croatia, relations with the EU for the Republic of Macedonia take place
within the framework of SAP. It benefits from assistance under the CARDS
programme, which in this case focuses in particular on democratic stabilisation. This
includes support for improving inter-ethnic relations and for supporting civil society.
There is also assistance for public administration reform – specifically to support
national ministries and other public bodies to develop sound administrative practices,
enhance local government capacities and promote education. Before the CARDS
programme began, financial assistance from the EU to Macedonia focused on a
similar set of priorities, so CARDS has built on the work of previous programmes. An
illustrative breakdown of the coverage of the CARDS programme is shown below.
Table 2: Republic of Macedonia CARDS Annual Programme 2004 (million EUR)
Subject and Amount
Democracy and rule of law 3.0
- Inter-ethnic relations & civil society 3.0
Economic and social development 22.5
- Private and financial sector development 4.5
- Trade 4.0
- Local infrastructure development 8.5
- Social cohesion 2.5
- Tempus (Commission managed) 3.0
Justice and home affairs 15.5
- Reform of the judiciary 1.5
- Integrated border management 10.0
- Fight against crime 4.0
Environment and natural resources 2.0
- Environment 2.0
Other 3.0
- General technical assistance facility & programme reserve 3.0
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Total 46.0
Source: http://www.ear.eu.int/macedonia/macedonia.htm
Again, there is no academic literature on the topics that concern our study in this case.
The concern of the main internal study focuses on ‘EU Development Funds and the
Republic Macedonia’ is the capacity of the country to effectively absorb funding.
Conclusions
On Greece, there is a significant amount of literature on cohesion policy and issues
relating to multi-level governance. The consensus of this material is that changes in
horizontal relations through cohesion policy in Greece have been slow to emerge, but
are perceptible, suggesting some EU influence on the promotion of multi-level
governance on this dimension. There has also been a degree of regionalisation in
Greece over the period in which the EU has played a role, but the main drivers of
change have been domestic. Overall, Greece has only moved slightly along towards
the compound end of the continuum identified by Schmidt: it remains a highly
centralised and statist polity.
In Slovenia, cohesion policy has had a similarly limited impact to date
although there is evidence that there was potential for cohesion policy to have a
stronger impact on regionalisation, but this was constrained by the Commission in the
run-up to accession. In both Croatia and the Republic of Macedonia, the research to
date has been limited and no clear picture has emerged.
References
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Europeanization. South European Society and Politics 11 (2): 241–60.
Bache I (forthcoming 2008) Europeanization and Multi-level Governance: Cohesion
Policy in the European Union and Britain, Rowman and Littlefield.
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www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW7/GSW%206/Jeremy%20Faro%20Paper.pdf
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i
This paper draws on material from Bache I. (forthcoming 2008) Europeanization and Multilevel Governance, Cohesion Policy in the European Union and Britain, Rowman and
Littlefield.
ii
This paper draws on material from Bache I. (forthcoming 2008) Europeanization and Multilevel Governance, Cohesion Policy in the European Union and Britain, Rowman and
Littlefield.
iii
See Project paper CP1 – add link.
iv
See Project paper CP1 for an overview of the cohesion policy, the structural funds and
related instruments.
v
Over the period 1994-2006, structural and cohesion fund transfers to Greece were 41 billion
euros. Between 2000-06 they represented almost 3 per cent of GDP and almost 8 per cent of
the total investment budget. In terms of aid intensity, Greece was the largest beneficiary of
structural and cohesion funding in this period (European Commission 2005c, 25).
14