No. 01-1447
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Barbara Grutter,
Plaint iff-iAppellee,
V.
Defendants-Appellants,
Lee Bollinger, et al.,
and
Kimberly James, et al., Intervening Defendants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN (FRIEDMAN, J.)
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE
THOMAS J. HENDERSON
LESLIE M. GROSS
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE
FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
1401 New York Avenue, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 662-8600
JOHN S.
SKILTON JANE
E. STELCK
MARVTN H.
LETT
MTREYA A.R. LLAURADO
HELLER EHRMAN WHITE
&
MCAULIFFE
LLP
1666 K Street, N.W., Suite
300 Washington, D.C.
20006
(202)912-2000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
ng Defendants-Appellants University of Michigan Law School Supporting Reversal of District Court Decision
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY & INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1
ARGUMENT
3
BAKKE, BUTTRESSED BY OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS,
PROVIDES CONTROLLING PRECEDENT THAT RACIAL DIVERSITY IS A
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
3
A. Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Bakke Clearly Embrace the Importance of
Racial Diversity in Higher Education
3
B. Bakke 's Diversity Justification is a Logical Extension of the Court's Prior Decisions That
Emphasize the Critical Role of Diversity in Education. 5
C. Post-B akke Opinions Have Reaffirmed That the Goal of Diversity is a
Compelling State Interest
10
D. The Lower Court Exceeded Its Authority by Speculating on the Current State of the Law
Concerning the Compelling Nature of Racial Diversity
in Higher Education
12
CONCLUSION
15
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta,
2001 U.S. LEXIS 2857 (Apr. 13, 2001)
13
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995)
13
Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)
13
Brown v. Bd. of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954)
3,4,6
City of Richmond v. LA. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989)
13
Hopwood v. Texas,
78F.3d932(SthCir. 1996)
14
Hopwood v. Texas,
236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1996)
14
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950)
4, 5,6
Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896)
3
Regents of the University of Cal~fornia v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978)
1,2,3,5,6,7,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15
Smith v. University of Washington Law School,
233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9thCir. 2000)
11, 12
Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)
4, 5, 6
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
5, 6
2
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U.S. 267 (1986)
10, 11
OTHER
Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Education, et al. In Support of Appellees and In Support of
Affirmance, Katuria E. Smith, et al. v. The University of Washington Law School,
26 J.C. & U.L. 467, 482-83 (2000)
9
Dean ofAdmissions Fred L. Glimp Final Report to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 65 Official Register of
Harvard University No. 25, 93, 104-05 (1968)
6, 7
Diversity as a Compelling State Interest in Higher Education: Does Bakke Survive Affirmative Action
Jurisprudence?, 79 Or. L. Rev. 493, 522 (2000) (citations omitted), Ryan J. Hagemann
6, 8
Expert Report [-] Reports Submitted on B ehalf of the University of Michigan : The Compelling Need for
Diversity in Higher Education, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 243, 249-50 (1999)
8
3
IDENTITY & INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law was founded in 1963 by the leaders of
the American bar, at the request of President Kennedy, in order to help defend the civil rights of
minorities and the poor. Its Board of Trustees presently includes past Presidents of the American Bar
Association, past Attorneys General of the United States, numerous law school deans, and many of
the nation's leading lawyers. It has local affiliates in Boston, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. Through the Lawyers' Committee
and its affiliates, hundreds of attorneys have represented thousands of clients in civil rights cases
across the country. The Lawyers' Committee is a tax-exempt, nonprofit civil rights organization.
Among its essential interests is the proper construction and implementation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as well as of the regulations that give life to the statutory promise of
nondiscrimination in Federally-assisted programs.
The Lawyers' Committee submits this amicus curiae brief in support of the position of
Defendant-Appellant University of Michigan Law School. The Lawyers' Committee has secured
consent from the parties to submit this brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The decision of the Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), set forth in Justice Powell's decisive opinion,
establishes that the state has a compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body. Justice Powell
concluded that race is "a single though important element" of the diversity that furthers a compelling state
interest. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. The holding of Bakke that a race-conscious admissions program could be
--
consistent with the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment remains the law of the land. This
--
decision flows fairly from the Court's time-honored emphasis on the importance of race-conscious diversity in
education. The University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy, which considers race among many
other factors in order to attain a diverse student body, follows the prescription of the narrowest ruling
in Bakke, found in Justice Powell's opinion. The Law School's admissions policy, designed to
accomplish racial diversity, is a compelling state interest that survives strict scrutiny analysis under
the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Discussion of the second prong of strict scrutiny analysis, the narrowly tailored requirement,
is found in the Proof Brief of Defendants-Appellants, at 33-55 (May 24, 2001) ("Appellants' Proof
Brief').
2
ARGUMENT
BAKKE, BUTTRESSED BY OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, PROVIDES
CONTROLLING PRECEDENT THAT RACIAL DIVERSITY IS A COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST.
A. Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Bakke Clearly Embrace the Importance of Racial
Diversity in Higher Education.
The Supreme Court has long placed special value on the achievement of diversity in higher
education. Bakke recognized that "the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served
by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. The holding in Bakke is fully consistent with what the Supreme Court
has long recognized that, in a classroom, "the contribution of diversity is substantial." Id. at 313.
—
Indeed, the ill-conceived "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) which controlled for over fifty years succumbed in the context of a public education case.
--
--
Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954) (holding state segregation laws violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). In rejecting "separate but equal," the Court in
Brown wrote that the analysis does not depend on tangible factors, e.g., whether white and segregated
schools had equal facilities; instead the Court felt compelled to "look instead to the effect of
segregation itself on public education." Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added). The Court intoned:
3
"[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.... It is the
very foundation of good citizenship." Id. at 493. The Court continued:
It [an education] is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 493.
Brown's thesis on public education extends to the university and graduate levels. In fact, in
ruling as it did, Brown borrowed heavily from prior decisions involving higher education. See Brown,
347 U.S. at 493 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)). In Sweatt, for example, the Court explained:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and
no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from
the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.
4
339 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added). In McLaurin, the Court noted that a black student must receive the
same intangible benefits as whites, i.e. equality in "ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." McLaurin, 339 U.S. at
641 (emphasis added).2
Taken together, these rulings demonstrate the Court's resounding confirmation that diversity in
higher education is not only desirable, but a necessary and constitutionally permissible goal.
B. Bakke's Diversity Justification is a Logical Extension of the Court's Prior Decisions That
Emphasize the Critical Role of Diversity in Education.
Justice Powell's pivotal opinion makes clear that "the attainment of a diverse student body..,
clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education." Bakke, 438 U.S. at
311-12 (J. Powell concurring). As Justice Powell emphasized, "the 'nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation
The Supreme Court has recognized that an essential element of academic freedom is the right
of the university to select its own students. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957),
Justice Frankfurter discusses "the 'four essential freedoms of a university--to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study." (emphasis added). Additionally, in Bakke, Justice Powell noted that academic
freedom "long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment." 438 U.S. at 312.
2
5
of many peoples." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (citation omitted). As in Brown, Bakke recognized the
uniqueness of the education setting:
Bakke builds squarely on the rock of Brown. Brown held that education was generis and that
even if racial segregation could be tolerated in other spheres, the school was different. Bakke
says that even if affirmative action is unconstitutional in other spheres, schools are different
...
and may be able to take race into account to bring races together.
Ryan J. Hagemann, Diversity as a Compelling State Interest in Higher Education:
Does Bakke Survive Affirmative Action Jurisprudence?, 79 Or. L. Rev. 493, 522
(2000) (citations omitted). Also, as with Brown, Sweezy, McLaurin and Sweatt, the
Supreme Court's decision in Bakke recognizes the benefits of a diverse student
body.
Bakke acknowledges that diversity adds a critical element to the educational process and has
long been an integral part of many college admission programs. Justice Powell's opinion cites
approvingly the Harvard College admissions policy, which actively seeks diversity in determining its
admission selections. "The effectiveness of our students' educational experience has seemed to the
Committee to be affected as importantly by a wide variety of interests, talents, backgrounds and
career goals as it is by a fine faculty and our libraries, laboratories and housing arrangements." Bakke,
438 U.S. at 322 (quoting Dean of Admissions Fred L.
6
Glimp Final Report to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 65 Official Register of Harvard University
No. 25, 93, 104-05 (1968)).
While Justice Powell found that the particular admissions program at issue in Bakke was
unconstitutional, the core of his opinion (Part V-C), joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun, expresses an unequivocal commitment to the continuation of programs which take some
account of race at institutions of higher learning:
In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, however, the courts
below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be
served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court's judgment as enjoins
petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must be reversed.
Bakke 438 U.S. at 320. This central holding of Bakke has never been disavowed or overturned by the
Supreme Court.
The compelling need for diversity in higher education, envisioned in Bakke, has not been
diminished by the passage of time. Justice Marshall's words in his separate opinion in Bakke continue
to ring true: "The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of
centuries of unequal treatment. Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful
equality remains a distant dream for the Negro." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395.
7
Undeniably, race remains an important and defining factor of life in our heterogeneous,
multicultural society. An emphasis on racial diversity in the education sphere, by bringing together
people of diverse cultures and races, can and does challenge ideas and stereotypes and helps to break
down those societal barriers created by racism. Harvard president Neil Rudenstine has stated:
"'Diversity in education has been valued and vital for more than a century. [It] was recognized as a
necessary component of the education of citizens in a heterogeneous democracy as early as the midnineteenth century."' Hagemann, 79 Or. L. Rev, at 522.
Studies and testimony presented in this case provide proof that a i"acially diverse student body
has profound benefits for students, both minority and non-minority. Learning in an ethnically diverse
setting motivates students to think and act in new ways at a time when their development and growth
potential are at a critical stage. Moreover, students educated in a diverse environment have a greater
ability to appreciate the views of others, whether different or similar from their own, and are better
prepared for constructive and sensitive participation in our multicultural society. See Expert Report [-]
Reports Submitted on B ehaif of the University ofMichigan: The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher
Education, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 243, 249-50 (1999).
8
The compelling need for diversity in the context of higher education raises the question of the
university or graduate school's discretion in designing goals for such a program. One principle to
glean from Justice Powell's decision in Bakke is that numbers do matter. The number of individuals
from a racial or ethnic group must be large enough to represent the diversity within the particular
group. The Harvard admissions program, attached as an appendix to Justice Powell's decision states:
[Ten] or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the
variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States....
Consequently, when making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions is aware that there is
some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse
student body....
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323.~ Thus, ensuring an enrollment of a "critical mass" of students from racially
underrepresented backgrounds is critical.
~
See also Brief ofAmici Curiae American Council on Education, et al. In Support of Appellees
and In Support of Affirmance, Katuria E. Smith, et al. v. The University of Washington Law School, 26 J.C. &
U.L. 467, 482-83 (2000) (also stating: "Tokenism is the enemy of diversity.... Enrolling a critical mass
of students from traditionally underrepresented backgrounds provides students with meaningful
access to the curriculum and promotes robust exchange of ideas among students of different
backgrounds, thereby providing all students with the educational benefits of a diverse student
body.").
9
C. Post -Bakke Opinions Have Reaffirmed That the Goal of Diversity is a Compelling State
Interest.
Since the Court's decision in Bakke, it has considered cases dealing with affirmative action but
none specifically addressing the issue of consideration of race as one factor in higher education
admissions. Opinions from these cases, as well as decisions from lower courts, have viewed the
Bakke ruling with approval.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a
school board's policy of retaining minority teachers over non-minority teachers in a layoff decision
was not sufficiently related to past societal discrimination to deem it constitutionally permissible.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the decision, but wrote separately to distinguish the minority teacher
"role model" theory from the goal of achieving diversity among teachers. Id. at 288 n.* (J. O'Connor
concurring) ("The goal of providing 'role models' discussed by the courts below should not be
confused with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity..."). In this context, Justice
O'Connor's opinion reiterates the central holding of Bakke: "[A] state interest in the promotion of
racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to
support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest." Id. at 286.
10
Justice Stevens dissented in Wygant, arguing that instead of focusing on a remedial test, the
Court should ask "whether the Board's actions advances the public interest in educating children for
the future." Id. at 313 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens passionately defended the merits of racial
diversity in education:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably
conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body that
could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty. For one of the most
important lessons that the American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural,
and national backgrounds that have been brought together in our famous 'melting pot' do not
identify essential differences among the human beings that inhabit our land. It is one thing for
a white child to be taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only 'skin-deep'; it is far
more convincing to experience that truth on a day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing
learning process.
Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
The Ninth Circuit, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Bakke, has recognized that the
university setting constitutes a "unique niche of our society." Smith v. University of Washington Law
School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000). Smith addressed the same issue pending here: the goal of
student body diversity as a compelling state interest. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court's postBakke decisions look with some disfavor on race-based categorization, Smith recognized that the
Court "has not indicated that Justice Powell's approach has lost its vitality... Id. Smith noted the
."
pressing importance of a diverse student
composition and concluded that universities could use race as one factor in their
11
"admission alchemy" in order to achieve this goal. Id. Given the rationale of the Smith decision, it is
important to note that the Supreme Court recently denied the writ of certiorari in Smith v. University of
Washington Law School, 2001 WL 214037 (May 29, 2001).
D. The Lower Court Exceeded Its Authority by Speculating on the Current State of the
Law Concerning the Compelling Nature of Racial Diversity in Higher Education.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of race in university admissions since
Bakke, the district court declined to follow this controlling precedent. Instead, the court "conclude[d]
that the Supreme Court in Bakke did not recognize the achievement of racial diversity in university
admissions as a compelling state interest." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 46 (E.D.
Mich. March 27, 2001) (hereinafter "Opinion"). As fully discussed in the Appellants' Proof Brief, at
29, the district court's opinion fails to follow controlling precedent. In short, the district court refused
to accept Justice Powell's opinion for what it is the essential grounds for the Court's decision in
--
Bakke, i.e., the goal of diversity is a compelling interest such that a state university may consider race
as a factor in admissions in order to achieve this objective.
12
In relying on Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (l995)~, City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and other recent decisions addressing the use of race to remedy past
discrimination, the district court's opinion misses the mark. Opinion, at 45-46. While the Supreme
Court clearly subjected racial classifications in these cases to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection clause, these cases do not affect Bakke; they do not overrule, directly or implicitly, the
holding that the goal of racial diversity in higher education is a compelling state interest.
Nevertheless, the district court relies on these cases to suggest that the current Supreme Court would
look with disfavor on the Law School's use of race in its admissions policy. However, the Supreme
Court has clearly warned against the very speculation conducted by the district court. See Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (stating that "other courts [should not] conclude [that] our more
recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent"). Furthermore, the district court's
reliance on Adarand and the other cited cases indicates that it failed to recognize the special emphasis
consistently
~
The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari, on limited grounds, in this
case. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2857 (Apr. 13, 2001) ("The petition
for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to... [w]hether the court of appeals misapplied the strict
scrutiny standard in determining if Congress had a compelling interest to enact legislation designed
to remedy the effects of racial discrimination.").
13
placed on diversity in the realm of education, particularly the university setting, by Supreme Court
precedent.
The trial court's analysis is akin to the Fifth Circuit opinion in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996) ("Hopwood IT'), reh 'g en banc denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1033 (1997), which held that a state university (the University of Texas) could not use race in
order to foster diversity in its law school admissions. 78 F.3d at 948. The Hopwood Ilruling suffers
from many of the same defects of the district court's opinion here. And it is notable that, in reviewing
Hopwood II on appeal after remand, although the Fifth Circuit was unwilling to hold that "the [prior]
panel's decision [wa]s 'dead wrong"', it did comment that the prior decision "venture[d] into uncharted
waters" and amounted to "aggressive legal reasoning." Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir.
1996) ("Hopwood lIP'). The court's explicit agreement with the state's contention "that 'in holding that
diversity may never be a compelling interest.., the Hopwood II panel attempted to create a new rule of
constitutional law despite the Supreme Court's continued hesitation to do so,"' is even more telling. Id.
at 274. In short, Hopwood III suggests that the Fifth Circuit itself is not convinced that Hopwood II was
correctly decided.
14
In sum, the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program, designed to accomplish
racial diversity, survives "strict scrutiny" analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
In pursuing diversity in its admissions policy, the Law School advances a compelling interest
supported by Bakke and an appropriate understanding of the emphasis placed on education by a long
line of Supreme Court decisions. For the reasons expressed in this amicus curiae brief, the injunction
issued by the district court should be reversed.
15
Respectfully submitted,
J. Hend~rson
Leslie Gross
~'
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law
1401 New York Avenue, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 662-8600
Of Counsel:
John S. Skilton
Jane E. Stelck
Marvin H. Lett
Mireya A.R. Llaurado
Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe
1666 K Street, N.W.
Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 912-2000
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
16
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to FRAP 32(a)(7) and 6th Cir. 32(a), the undersigned
certifies that this brief complies with the type-volume limitations of FRAP
32(a)(7)(C).
1. Exclusive of the portions of the brief exempted by 6th Cir.(a)(7)(B)(iii), the brief contains 3,087 words.
2. The brief has been prepared in proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word Version 2000 in
Times New Roman 14 point font.
3. If the Court so requests, the undersigned will provide an electronic version of the brief and br a copy of
the work or line printout.
4. The undersigned understands that a material misrepresentation in completing this certificate, or
circumvention of the type-volume limits in 6th Cir. 32(a)(7) may result in the Court's striking the brief
and imposing sanctions against the person signing the brief.
DATED: May 30, 2001
Respectfully submitted,
HELLER EHRMAN WHITE & McAULIFFE LLP
By:
John kilton
.
Counsel r Amicus Curiae
05/25/2001 12:35 FAX 808 683 7499 HELLER EURMAN
[~]003
05/22/01 1O;47 FAX 8126728397
IdASLON LAW FIRM ~1 002 O5/21~2OD1 17408 PAZ
HELLER ~m[~ !~1002
HellerEhrman
p
r~
A
May 18,2001
~a Facsimile
~"z~ ~
~.
(601) 441 .5110
Main (202) 912-2U00
David F. Herr~ Esq.
Kirk 0.. ~n1bo, Esq.
9~420OOI
Masloxz, Eda2znnxi~ Boz~ian & Brand
300 Noii~est C~ter
90 South Seventh Sire~t
Mi~meapoliB~ M~ 5540Z
1~2 qFMtt~1' Vs ~ el ~*L, No~ 01-1447 (~th C~1r-)
Dear Mes~. ~zr and KDlbo:
Th~ Lawyers' Conunitt~ for Civil lUgb.ts Under Law seeks to file an amic~ curiae
brk~fln the case referenced above. The brief will ~ippQr? the posiliou of the U1ivez~ity of
Micl3igIn L~w Scb~ol.
Under Federal ~4.uk of Appellate ?rooed~*re 29(a), we request your
~ena~rit to paraicip~te in tbia case as an amicw~ ouriae. If you coi~ent, p1ea~e
c~oun~ei'-sigu azid return 12i~:
consent kiter to iIM by fhx. as soon a~ possibie.
14Cc
~OAGPEED:
Y¶viASLON,,~~MAN~ BORMAN & BRAND
By:
Dare:
NhflwFhnnan Whlw & ?4CAuP1~ UP '16w 1< ~ImD?. lWJ~ Si*m.WO V&ZtdrIUUm, 0.0. 20008-12.20 wwwJiewjn.~m
N'~wYa,I~ W~aJVnglcn D.C. M~nWamW13~ ~ MD Sari Fr~n~ SiNrw Va flay Lo~ rwuau Sun D&uga ~auWu Pat Uand Az~m~i liaiig
Koilg fi1nSa~awu Afflh1pAadcW~ pranId~j~ MI~ pajlm Rams
05/22/2001 TUE 12:47 CTX/RX NO 65201
~10D2
flR/9~/9flfl1 FRT 13:31
~TX/RX NO 8247~ ~10O3
05/25/2001 12:35 FAX 808 663
7499
HELLER EURMAN
~j005
n~i424( ~KHMAN
~O02/002
HellerEhnnan
May iS, 2001
S.
7 T 0 I~ N ~ Y B
Iohn S. Skih~rn
jFkilt~n~iwwm.coi~
(608) 442-5i~O
Via Facsimile
Piax (202) ~112.202a
John 1'ayton, Esq.
Robin A. Leriiiardt, Bsq.
9542.0001
Wiliner; Cutler & Pickering
2445 M Street, N.W.
Washington. O.C. 20037
Re:
Gn4ter v.. Bollinger, et al~, No. 01-1447 (6th CIr~)
- Dear Mr. ?ayton an&M~ Lenh~Tiiit:
The Lawyers' Conaiziittee for Civil Rights Under Law seeks to file a.n amicus
curiae brief in the ease referenced above. The brief will support the position of
the University of Michigan Law School.
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)~ we request your consent to participate in
thie case as an amicus euriae. If' you consent, please coPnter..sig~1 and reruxn tho
consent letter to us by fax as soon as possible.
Sincerely
kilton
SO AGREED:
WILMER, CUTLER & PICI~ERING
New Yoik Wa~hlrigton D.C. MCi~tOommr~,' Cb,, MO San deco Silicon Valley Loa Angalea San Diego Seattle Portland
Anelioraga
hong Kong Sinaa~oru
Afsiffated 0177c'es: Pianlcfuit Milan Paris Rome
I
Hailer ~lvu,'mn WhiCe I McAuIlfte LLP ¶5~8 K Street, NW Suite 300 Wathii1gl~r,, D.C. 20006-iZ~ www.hewm .com
flt~/~)I~/9flA1 FDT
iq.~1 r'rTiPY NO R9A71 IThA~
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on this 31st day of May, 2001, pursuant to FRAP 25 and 6 Cir. R. 31, I caused a
copy of the foregoing Brief for Amicus Curiae to be filed by Federal Express, with:
Mr. Bryant Crutcher, Office of the Clerk
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Potter Stewart arid U.S. Courthouse
100 E. Fifth Street
Cincinnati, OH 45202-3988
I further certify that, on the same day and pursuant to the same provisions, I caused a copy of the
above brief to be served by Federal Express, on:
David F. Herr, Esq.
Kirk 0. Kolbo, Esq.
Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand
300 Norwest Center
90 South Seventh Street
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Michael E. Rosman, Esq.
Hans F. Bader, Esq.
Center for Individual Rights
1233 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Kerry L. Morgan, Esq.
Pentiuk, Couvreur & Kobiljak
Suite 230, Superior Place
20300 Superior Street
Taylor, MI 48180
George B. Washington, Esq.
Eileen R. Scheff, Esq.
Miranda K.S. Massie, Esq.
One Kennedy Square, Suite 2137
Detroit, MI 48226
John Payton
Robin A. Lenhardt
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
2445 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Philip J. Kessler
Leonard M. Niehoff
Butzel Long
350 South Main Street, Suite 300
/
An Arb ~,MI48l04
reya R. laurado
HELLER EHRMAN WHITE & MCAULIFFE
LLP
1666 K Street, N.W., Suite 300
.
Washington, DC 20006