MURALI RAMACHANDRAN:
Curriculum Vitae
Physical Address:
Department of Philosophy, WITS
CB4, Central Block, Ground Floor
2 Jan Smuts Ave., Braamfontein, 2001
January 2013
1
Postal Address: Private Bag 3, Wits, 2050
Telephone: 011 7174324
E-mail: Murali.Ramachandran@wits.ac.za
Date of Birth: September 4, 1959
Nationality: British
Degrees
B.Sc. Joint Honours in Mathematics and Philosophy (University of Nottingham 1981)
MA in Philosophy (University of Oklahoma 1985)
Postgraduate Certificate of Education: Secondary Mathematics (Institute of Education, London 1984).
Employment
2013-present
1994-2012
1990-94
1989-90
1986-89
1984-86
University of the Witwatersrand Associate Professor in Philosophy
University of Sussex
Reader in Philosophy
University of Manchester
Lecturer in Philosophy
Trinity College Dublin
Lecturer in Philosophy (temporary)
Islington Individual Tuition Centre
Tutor of students with special needs.
Christ's College (Secondary School)
Part-time teacher (Maths and English)
Finchley, London
Areas of specialization/interest
Philosophical Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Research awards
Mind Fellowship (2010).
DPhil supervisees
 Manuel de Pinedo Garcia (completed 2000): From Representations to Practice: A Critique of
Naturalized Reason.
 Simon Langford (completed 2005): Occasional Identity and Contingent Identity.
 Andrew Rebera (completed 2010): Russell On Denoting.
Professional affiliations: Member of the British Philosophical Association.
External examiner for the University of Glasgow (2005-2008)
Published articles:
[1]
An Alternative Translation Scheme for Counterpart Theory, Analysis 49 (1989) pp. 131-41.
[2]
Sense and Schmidentity, Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1989) pp. 463-71.
[3]
Contingent Identity in Counterpart Theory, Analysis 50 (1990) pp. 163-66.
[4]
Unsuccessful Revisions of CCT, Analysis 50 (1990) pp. 173-77.
[5]
On Restricting Rigidity, Mind 101 (1992) pp. 141-44.
[6]
The Rigidity of Proper Names, Philosophical Studies XXXIII (The National University of
Ireland, 1992) pp. 189-200.
[7]
Conditionals and Transitivity: Response to Lowe, Analysis 52 (1992) pp. 68-77.
[8]
Restricted Rigidity: the Deeper Problem, Mind 102 (1993) pp. 157-58.
[9]
A Strawsonian Objection to Russell's Theory of Descriptions, Analysis 53 (1993) pp. 209-12.
[10]
Frege's Objection to the Metalinguistic View, European Review of Philosophy Vol. I (Stanford:
CSLI Publications, 1994) pp. 133-41.
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Curriculum Vitae
January 2013
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Methodological Reflections on Two Kripkean Strategies, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society XCV (1995) pp. 67-81.
Bach on Behalf of Russell, Analysis 54 (1995) pp. 283-87.
McDermott on Causation: A Counterexample, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996)
pp. 328-29.
Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation (co-authors: Jonardon Ganeri and Paul Noordhof),
Analysis 55 (1996) pp. 219-25.
The Ambiguity Thesis vs. Kripke's Defence of Russell, Mind & Language 11 (1996) pp. 37187.
Redundant Causation, Composite Events and M-sets, Acta Analytica 16/17 (1997) pp. 149-58.
A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation, Mind 106 (1997) pp. 263-77.
For a (Revised) PCA-Analysis (co-authors: Jonardon Ganeri and Paul Noordhof), Analysis 58
(1998) pp. 45-47.
The M-set Analysis of Causation: Objections and Responses, Mind 107 (1998) pp. 465-71.
Sortal Modal Logic and Counterpart Theory, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998) pp.
553-565.
Noordhof on Probabilistic Causation, Mind 109 (2000) pp. 309-13.
Rigidity, Occasional Identity, and Leibniz’s Law (co-authored with Simon Langford), The
Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000) pp. 518-26.
The Ambiguity Thesis vs. Kripke's Defence of Russell: Further Developments (co-author:
Nadja Rosental) Philosophical Writings 14 (2000) pp. 49-57.
Contingent Identity and Kripkean Counterpart Theory, in T. Childers and Ondrej Majer (eds.)
The Logica Yearbook 2002 (Prague: Filosofia, 2003) pp. 207-19.
Indeterministic Causation and Varieties of Chance-Raising, in P. Dowe and P. Noordhof
(eds.), Cause and Chance (Routledge, 2003) pp. 152-62.
A Counterfactual Analysis of Indeterministic Causation, in J. Collins, N. Hall, L. A. Paul
(eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals (MIT Press, 2004) pp. 387-402.
How Believing Can Fail to be Knowing, Theoria 56 (2006), pp. 185-94.
Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle, in J. Skilters et al. (eds.), Paradox:
Logical Cognitive and Communicative Aspects (Riga: University of Latvia Press, 2006) pp.
157-64.
Descriptions and Presuppositions: Strawson vs. Russell, South African Journal of Philosophy
27 (2008, special issue on the philosophy of P.F. Strawson) pp. 64-79.
Kripkean Counterpart Theory, Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2008) pp. 89-106.
Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87
(2009) pp. 659-73.
Descriptions with an Attitude Problem, Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2009) pp. 721-23
The Impossibility of Inverted Reasoners, Acta Analytica 25 (2010) pp. 499-502
Occasional Identity: A Tale of Two Approaches, Analytic Philosophy 52 (2011) pp. 175-87.
The KK-Principle, Margins for Error, and Safety, Erkenntnis 76 (2012) pp. 121-36.
The Products of Fission, Fusion, and Teletransportation -- an Occasional Identity Theorist’s
Perspective, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2013) pp. 105-117.
In preparation
[37]
Contingent Identity and Counterpart Theory. (Book)
[38]
How and Why I Arrived at a Topsy Turvy Account of Even-Ifs
[39]
A Puzzle About Conditionals
[40]
Disjunctive Knowledge that Depends on One’s Ignorance: A Solution to Two Epistemic
Paradoxes.
[41]
A Re-Assessment of Chandler’s Argument Against Kripke’s Rigid Designation Thesis
[42]
The Paradoxes of Confirmation – No Cause For Concern.