Draft 4/05/08
Alan Randall
Taking the Precautionary Principle Seriously
–
A.
a proposed monograph
Rationale
The problem context. The precautionary principle (PP) has been proposed as a guide for
public policy in areas where there may be extraordinary risk, uncertainty, and gross
ignorance about future consequences. Of course, we already have theory and methods for
risk assessment and risk management, but the whole PP movement is founded on the claim
that something more, something stronger than ordinary risk management (ORM), is needed.
The PP is fundamentally a claim that, when making multi-dimensional public decisions,
acting to avoid and/or mitigate potential harmful consequences should be accorded high
priority. It has been invoked in contexts such as medical, pharmaceutical, ecological, and
environmental risk; and is a source of controversy in trade and economic development.
There are many definitions of the PP in the literature (Clooney 2004). Definitions fall into
three main categories, on a weaker-stronger scale:
 Uncertainty about harmful consequences does not justify failure to take
precautionary action (Bergen Declaration 1990)
 Plausible but uncertain harm justifies precautionary intervention (UNESCO 2005)
 Uncertain harm requires intervention, and the burden of proof is shifted to the
proponent of the proposed risky action (Wingspread Statement)
Governments and international organizations have adopted various versions of the PP. In
this, the European Commission (2000) and UNESCO (2005) have been leaders, and they
have tended toward the mid-strength definition, and embedded the PP in more fullyarticulated decision processes with safeguards to prevent invoking the PP with, among other
things, insufficient evidence of threat (“crying wolf”), insufficient attention to likely costs of
precautionary actions, and inadequate provision to deal with distributionally-skewed
consequences.
Despite its elemental appeal – be careful not to run off the cliff – the PP has proven a
lightning rod for controversy in scholarly discourse, public discussion, policy circles, and in
regulation and law. To its proponents, PP is just a matter of commonsense: extraordinary
risks call for extraordinary precaution (e.g., Seventh Generation, undated). Yet opponents
argue that the PP would undermine business-as-usual and stifle innovation and growth
(e.g., Bailey 1999, More 2005). Scholarly critique of the PP includes versions of the above
popular arguments, along with an array of others. Nevertheless, governments and
international institutions have moved ahead to embed the PP in their decision structures in
commonsense ways with safeguards of various kinds.
Objectives. This project aims to bring some conceptual clarity to the scholarly discourse,
and ultimately to influence public discussion. Scholarly commentary is anchored at one end
by claims that the PP is foolish, self-defeating, and ultimately meaningless because it would
forbid any and all risky alternatives (Sunstein 2005), and at the other end by surprise that
the PP is so controversial because, after all, it is little more than ORM (e.g., Farrow 2004).
Yet, a PP to be taken seriously can be neither foolish nor redundant (as it would be, if it
were just ordinary risk management). My objectives are to:

Define and defend a PP that can be taken seriously, and is clearly positioned as a
principle, not a rule.
Address clearly the issues of
o the nature of threats that might invoke a precautionary response (and, in so doing,
the related concepts of disproportionate and asymmetric risk, uncertainty, and gross
ignorance),
o scientifically credible evidence in an era of persistent attempts to politicize science,
and
o the distinction between a principle and a rule.
Outline a coherent framework for acting on principles in practical governance.
Review some attempts to implement the PP (e.g., US endangered species legislation,
EU attempts to restrict imports of genetically-modified commodities) and some attempts
to specify a governance framework for implementing the PP (e.g., EU and UNESCO
documents), as a way of “ground-truthing” the framework developed above.



Significance. The PP, while it remains controversial, has been adopted by governments,
multi-national organizations, and various global conventions. It has potential application to
(1) medicine, pharmacy, and public health (especially, cases involving involuntary exposure
and/or exposure without informed consent), and (2) global environmental issues such as
climate change, ecosystem health, and scarcity of essential resources. It has become an
issue in international trade – witness United States objections to European Union
restrictions on importing genetically modified commodities and beef raised with artificial
hormones. In unsubtle application, the PP may invite certain disaster for the very poor as
the “acceptable” cost of avoiding a more speculative risk (see Turvey and Mojduszka, 2005,
on PP-based objections to international food aid in Africa). If this project succeeds in
bringing more conceptual clarity and coherence to the design and justification of the PP, this
will lead eventually to more appropriate, consistent, and beneficial application in a world
fraught with risk, uncertainty and gross ignorance.
B.
1.
(a)
Outline
Introduction and motivation
(approximately 16 printed pages)
PP is controversial. The precautionary principle (PP) is fundamentally a claim that, when
making multi-dimensional public decisions, acting to avoid and/or mitigate disproportionate
risks should be accorded high priority. Despite its elemental appeal – be careful not to run
off the cliff – the PP has proven a lightning rod for controversy. Popular commentary is
anchored by claims that
 PP offers an idea that seems like ordinary commonsense: Extraordinary risks call for
extraordinary precaution.
 PP would undermine business-as-usual and stifle innovation and growth, all in
response to excessive pessimism and possibly-irrational fears.
Scholarly critique of the PP includes versions of the above popular arguments, along with
an array of others. Here, we highlight –
 The PP is self-defeating and essentially meaningless because it would forbid any and
all risky alternatives, yet even the no action alternative involves risk (Sunstein 2005).
 The PP is nothing special – just good science, good risk assessment, and good benefit
cost analysis, i.e., ordinary risk management, ORM (Farrow 2004).
 The PP is susceptible to false alarms whereas ORM assigns authority regarding the
credibility of threats to the scientific mainstream, where it belongs.
2



The PP debate is merely a quarrel about who owns the null hypothesis (“Prove the
proposed action is harmful”. “No, you prove it is harmless”).
There are almost twenty different formulations of the PP in circulation, so how can it be
taken seriously in real-world policy?
The PP conflicts with other important values that good law and policy would surely
respect, and it fails to provide clear instructions for resolving these conflicts.
(b)
Objectives of this project
(~8 pp)
Taking the PP seriously requires that we define and defend a meaningful PP that is neither
foolish nor redundant. Such a PP would be …
 Addressed to public policy issues involving collective threats.
 Clearly distinct from ordinary risk management (and therefore not redundant in that
sense). It would not exclude ORM but, rather, subsume it in a broader framework that
does not balk at stronger remedies when they can be justified.
 Justified for circumstances that would be recognized as extraordinary – a scientifically
credible scenario that generates a disproportionate and asymmetric threat – and
therefore avoids at least two kinds of foolishness: the imperative to avoid all risks, and
susceptibility to false alarms.
 A sharp break from business-as-usual that provides remedies proportionate to the
threat, allows time for research and learning, and is revisited in light of new information.
 Clearly positioned as a principle, not a rule (a principle is capable of commanding broad
agreement and identifies considerations to be taken seriously, but is not a universal
trump that defeats other valid considerations).
… and thus would survive the above challenges.
2. Define a coherent PP
(~50 pp)
Some environmentalists have defined PP as invoked by any and all actions that risk harm to
nature (Raffenberger and Tichner 1999). At the opposite extreme, some economists (e.g.,
Farrow 2004) have defined it as (merely) introducing explicit risk aversion into the standard
expected welfare maximization calculus. Neither extreme makes sense. Sunstein (2005),
among others, has emphasized the foolishness of a PP that is invoked by any and all risks.
On the other hand, a PP that goes no further than ORM is not merely redundant; it fails to
grapple seriously with the well-recognized weaknesses of ORM in dealing with the problem
of unlikely but potentially devastating possibilities.
Getting started
(i) Consider the Hippocratic Oath – above all, do no harm. What can this possibly mean?
 If taken literally, an incision would be impermissible.
 Perhaps it means do no harm in the net – harm from (1) intervention should be less
than from (0) letting things take their course – i.e., a Benefit Cost criterion.
 But there is risk in (1) and risk in (0). Perhaps the expected value of harm(1) must
be less than the expected value of harm(0); or expected utility(1) should be greater
than expected utility(0), an approach that could accommodate risk-aversion within a
thoroughly utilitarian framework. These approaches are consistent with ORM.
 Perhaps it calls for an asymmetric calculus – harm (1) should be disproportionately
less than the harm(0). Why? Because there is a special duty on the intervener to
get things right? 1 Because it is basically unfair if people who trust their government
1
This seems sensible enough, but there are some special problems with the idea of an intervention:
the distinctions between acts and omissions, and doing and allowing, are problematic.
3

get blind-sided by an authorized treatment (or a regulated food supply) that harms
them, even if on average the treatment helps and the food nourishes? Or simply
because novel interventions may raise possibilities of harm asymmetrically greater
than are likely from letting things take their course?
Perhaps it is nothing more than an admonition to, before intervening, pause to
consider the unintended consequences?
This brief look at the implications of the Hippocratic Oath has served several purposes. It
has identified the benefit cost, expected value, and expected utility approaches that
constitute ORM; and it has opened the door to two approaches that are outside of the usual
range of ORM – a stand stronger than ORM that calls for asymmetric treatment of uncertain
but potential asymmetric harm, and a stand weaker than ORM that calls only for sensitivity
regarding possible unintended consequences. The Hippocratic Oath discussion here has
been framed in terms of one of the two situations where PP might be relevant – the case of
a novel and potentially threatening action (a treatment that may turn out to be harmful).
At this point, we have taken the Hippocratic Oath about as far as it can be taken as a
metaphor for the PP, because the PP I have in mind applies more readily to collective
threats. Precautionary strategies for individuals, and the obligations of public institutions
and the professions to protect individuals from unnecessary exposure to threats, are
interesting and important problems; but they are not a primary focus here.
(ii) Consider the Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper (who is removing rivets from the wings of the plane
you will fly in, because scrap metal is selling well and nothing bad has happened to the
plane despite the rivets popped thus far).2 There is a cost to quitting the popping, and
perhaps some ORM involved on that side because the price of scrap metal, and the
economic consequences of stopping, may vary. This is a standard criticism of PP – (1)
there is risk on both sides of the equation, and (2) PP would paralyze innovation and stunt
economic growth, all because we are scaredy-cats. But surely the risk to the plane is at
least a candidate for classification as disproportionate and asymmetric3 relative to the risk to
the economy.
The rivet-popper example advances the PP discussion in several ways. It addresses the
second of two situations where PP might be relevant – the case of a business-as-usual
pattern of exploitation (or pollution) that might overstress natural and/or economic systems,
potentially resulting in a novel and threatening outcome (regime shift). It moves the
discussion in the direction of collective threats (if the wings fail, all aboard the plane face
extreme danger). Let the plane serve as a metaphor for a major ecosystem, or for the
planet Earth itself, and we have imagined a realistic and policy-relevant asymmetric and
disproportionate threat of the collective kind.
2
The rivet-popper example is controversial among ecologists, if interpreted as a metaphor about
redundancy in ecosystems. Its use here is more straight-forward – it is simply a metaphor for
stressing a system cumulatively, when we do not know how much stress it can bear.
3
I need to be clear about language. Here, disproportionate means that the worst case is very much
worse than the expected case is good. However, disproportionate often is used elsewhere in spatial
and distributional contexts, e.g., environmental justice, differential exposure to injury/disease,
differential access to medical care. Here, asymmetric is used in the statistical sense: the distribution
of possibilities is skewed – the good outcomes are fairly predictable and modestly good, but the bad
outcomes include a few that may be rare but are quite awful. However, asymmetric risk is quite
ordinary to experts in finance – cases when standard hedging strategies fail, usually for a brief period
until arbitrage brings the prices back into line – and they develop strategies for dealing with it.
4
An ETR framework
Let us start with what could be called an ETR framework. A PP of the following form …
If there is evidence stronger than E that an activity raises a threat4 more serious than T, we
should invoke a remedy more potent than R
… would focus on the key issues: what sorts of threats might invoke precaution, what sorts
of remedies might be appropriate, and what sorts of evidence might justify a precautionary
interruption to business as usual? For my purposes, it is helpful to start with T and R
because my project is to define and justify a PP that is, or can be, more potent than ORM.
So, I start by asking what kinds of threats would justify remedies stronger than ORM.
T. Threats relevant to a coherent PP are likely to be collective threats (see box, p. 6).
Examples might include threats to the ecology and/or environment which affect us all, and
threats about which we are not informed – in both cases, we have limited opportunity to
choose our level of exposure. [Note that relevant threats concerning health and treatment
may be of either or both kinds.] Relevant threats should be disproportionate and
asymmetric – ordinary risk management is fine for ordinary risks. Contextual features that
increase the likelihood of disproportionate and asymmetric threats include complexity,
novelty, and large spatial and/or temporal scale.
Complexity. The resilience of complex systems – (1) their tendency, following
perturbations, to return toward their prior trajectory; and/or (2) their capacity to tolerate
disturbances while retaining their structure and function – may be undermined by sudden
anthropogenic shocks that precipitate regime shifts, or by sustained anthropogenic
pressure (e.g., harvest, or effluent inflows) that reduces resilience and increases
vulnerability to regime shifts (Holling 2001, Folke et al. 2004). Because regime shifts
change the system in unpredictable ways (Folke et al.), the threats introduced may be
asymmetric.
Novelty. New and untested phenomena (things and events) may introduce
disproportionate and asymmetric threats – we have better knowledge of outcomes
and/or probabilities associated with familiar phenomena, and it is likely that the extremely
harmful possibilities have been eliminated already – which implies that the risks involved
are more likely to be manageable with standard tools. Novelty may pertain to actions
(i.e., we introduce a new technology, or release an alien organism), or to outcomes (a
familiar and sustained intervention – perhaps exploitation or pollution – may increase
vulnerability to regime-shifts with unpredictable consequences).
Large spatial and temporal scale. If the effects of an alternative cannot be contained
readily in space or in time, then the chances are exacerbated that threats will be
disproportionate and asymmetric.
4
Language, again, is an issue. (1) In ordinary language, harm is something bad; threat is an
indication of something bad impending (a signal correlated with a future bad outcome from a given
action); and risk is an etymological mess (a chance or probability, a negative expected value, or a
threat). For most of the discussion that follows, threat is the most serviceable of these concepts. (2)
In the language of statistics and information theory, risk, uncertainty, and gross ignorance represent
decreasing gradations of knowledge about outcomes yet to be revealed: risk – we can enumerate
outcomes and we know their probabilities; uncertainty – we can enumerate outcomes but their
probabilities are unknown; gross ignorance – the outcome set is unbounded.
5
This PP would offer guidance beyond the scope of ORM in cases where the choice set
includes some actions that induce disproportionate and asymmetric threats, and some
actions that do not. PP offers little beyond ORM in cases where all possible actions involve
similar threats.
The nature of collective threats. The threats addressed by my PP are collective threats.
There
are two
of collective
threats
that makebythem
a relevant
focus for
the PP.
The nature
of characteristics
collective threats.
The threats
addressed
my PP
are collective
threats.
First,
is intwo
thecharacteristics
nature of collective
threatsthreats
that exposure
is inthem
considerable
involuntary.
Thereitare
of collective
that make
a relevantdegree
focus for
the PP.
This
bethe
because
threat is to
a larger
system
to which
we are inextricably
or
First,may
it is in
naturethe
of collective
threats
that
exposure
is in considerable
degreebound,
involuntary.
because
not sufficiently
to exercise
Second, bound,
default or
threats
This maywe
be are
because
the threatinformed
is to a larger
systemmeaningful
to which wechoice.
are inextricably
to
individuals
differ,
in
a
very
important
way,
from
the
public
policy
concerns
I
have
in
mind.
because we are not sufficiently informed to exercise meaningful choice. Second, default threats
Individual
defaults
includeway,
possible
outcomes
of veryconcerns
large negative
– if I do
to individuals
differ,may
in aplausibly
very important
from the
public policy
I have value
in mind.
not
undergo
the treatment
I may die
– butpossible
negativeoutcomes
infinity is of
a much
less negative
plausible value
default– value
Individual
defaults
may plausibly
include
very large
if I do
for
policy
to address
threats.
There,
default
much more
likely
to
not public
undergo
the actions
treatment
I may diecollective
– but negative
infinity
is athe
much
lessisplausible
default
value
be:
if we do
not take
theto
proposed
mortality
may
increase
fractionally
or, perhaps,
theto
for public
policy
actions
address action,
collective
threats.
There,
the default
is much
more likely
opportunity
fractional
decrease
in mortality
willmay
be foregone
likely,or,
postponed).
It
be: if we do for
notatake
the proposed
action,
mortality
increase (more
fractionally
perhaps, the
happens
that
one but two
factors in
contribute
this
between
individual
and It
opportunity
fornot
a fractional
decrease
mortality to
will
bedifference
foregone (more
likely,
postponed).
collective
threats:
(i) default
individualstomay
be of greater
relative
magnitude
than
happens that
not one
but twothreats
factorstocontribute
this well
difference
between
individual
and
in
the
collective
case,
and
(ii)
as
decades
of
research
have
shown,
conversion
of
frequencies
collective threats: (i) default threats to individuals may well be of greater relative magnitude than
among
populations
to and
probabilities
for individuals
is less
informative
for individual
choice than
in the collective
case,
(ii) as decades
of research
have
shown, conversion
of frequencies
we
might
hope.
among
populations
to probabilities for individuals is less informative for individual choice than
we might hope.
An example may help. The PP seems not well-adapted to guide decisions re the permissibility
of
trials.
participants
volunteers,
each of whom
Anclinical
example
maySuppose
help. The
PP seemsare
notfully-informed,
well-adapted toself-selected
guide decisions
re the permissibility
has
the condition
for whichparticipants
the experimental
treatment is self-selected
indicated. With
such a group,
thewhom
risks
of clinical
trials. Suppose
are fully-informed,
volunteers,
each of
related
treatment
lessthe
likely
to be asymmetric
to their
individualWith
defaults,
may
has the to
condition
forare
which
experimental
treatment
is indicated.
such awhich
group,
the risks
include
grim
possibilities
if thelikely
ailment
be fatal ortodebilitating.
They
face hard
decisions,
related to
treatment
are less
to becan
asymmetric
their individual
defaults,
which
may but
probably
not possibilities
asymmetric ifrisks.
Suppose
that the
public expects
netface
benefits
the but
include grim
the ailment
canalso
be fatal
or debilitating.
They
hard from
decisions,
knowledge
from clinical
in aggregate,
even
if thisexpects
particular
turns from
out badly.
probably notgained
asymmetric
risks. trials
Suppose
also that the
public
nettrial
benefits
the It
seems
cleargained
that this
situation
call for a PP,
butifitthis
does
call for vigilance
knowledge
from
clinicaldoes
trialsnot
in aggregate,
even
particular
trial turnsthat
out the
badly. It
experimental
treatment
has gone
through
testing
priorcall
to for
experiments
with the
human
seems clear that
this situation
does
not callexhaustive
for a PP, but
it does
vigilance that
subjects,
and treatment
that participation
is limited
fully informed
andprior
consenting
volunteers
among
experimental
has gone
throughtoexhaustive
testing
to testing
with human
those
withand
thethat
indicated
condition.
subjects,
participation
is limited to fully informed and consenting volunteers among
those with the indicated condition.
Peterson (2006, 2007) has argued that the case of clinical trials is informative to the PP debate:
“…
directly
applicable
recent
discussions
of PPofinclinical
medicine,
Peterson
(2006,
2007)tohas
argued
that the case
trialsbiotechnology,
in informative environmental
to the PP debate:
management,
and related
fields”.
I think notof– PP
the in
clinical
trials biotechnology,
case may not be
an ideal
“… directly applicable
to recent
discussions
medicine,
environmental
application
of the
but collective
threats
different
themay
PP not
is much
to
management,
andPP,
related”.
I think not
– theare
clinical
trialsand
case
be anbetter
idealadapted
application
them.
of the PP, but collective threats are different and the PP is much better adapted to them.
R. Remedies may include
 Prohibiting the action or business-as-usual stress that gives rise to the threat
 Precautionary accommodations (e,g., avoidance, mitigation, and/or adaptation)
beyond those that may be recommended by BC or ORM considerations
 Insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection – the standard instruments of ORM may
well have roles in a precautionary policy package (it takes a PP to justify a package that
includes ORM and some additional restraints).
There are two additional components of a comprehensive precautionary policy:
 Monitor, study, and reassess the threat– a process that may be repeated perhaps
many times, with adjustments in remedy as warranted by emerging evidence. If all of
the above R are reversible or adjustable at some tolerable cost, then remedies may be
6

adjusted – prohibitions may become pauses, precautionary accommodations may turn
out to be temporary, and levels of insurance and self-protection may be adjusted – as
more is learned. Assume that the costs of pause-study-reassess are fairly modest,
involving some out-of-pocket expense and some opportunity cost of foregone welfare
from plowing ahead. This process tends to reduce but not eliminate the costs of
precaution, thus reducing the chance that precaution itself will induce asymmetric
threats. Then, the choice set includes actions that induce disproportionate and
asymmetric threats (plowing ahead), and actions that do not (pause-study-reassess).5
Specific policies to reduce or mitigate disproportionate negative impacts of precaution
on particular locations and/or socio-economic groups.
On the possibility of a utilitarian PP. The definition of the remedy I am defending (avoidance
and
mitigation
measures
beyond those
by expected
welfare considerations,
i.e., by
On the
possibility
of a utilitarian
PP. justified
The definition
of the remedy
I am defending (avoidance
ORM)
raises a measures
question: can
we imagine
a utilitarian
PP (the welfare
point being
that utilitarian
ORM
and mitigation
beyond
those justified
by expected
considerations,
i.e.,
by
might
PPs
that
consistently
utilitarian)?
Manybeing
economists
have assumed
ORM) logically
raises a include
question:
can
wewere
imagine
a utilitarian
PP (the point
that utilitarian
ORM
unquestioningly
that a credible
must
be a utilitarian
PP. In Many
a similar
vein, Peterson
(2006)
might logically include
PPs thatPP
were
consistently
utilitarian)?
economists
have assumed
claimed
that
the
PP
is
incoherent,
which
he
“demonstrated”
by
showing
that
a
rational
person
unquestioningly that a credible PP must be a utilitarian PP. In a similar vein, Peterson (2006)
facing
conditions
ideal
for ORM would
choose
ORM rather than
a precautionary
restraint
–
claimed
that the PP
is incoherent,
which
he “demonstrated”
by showing
that a rational
person
reasoning
of impregnable
ORM
is exactly
one
gets when one
derives
facing conditions
ideal for circularity,
ORM wouldsince
choose
ORM
rather what
than a
precautionary
restraint
–
optimal
actions
from rationality
assumptions
and is
ideal
conditions.
reasoning
of impregnable
circularity,
since ORM
exactly
what one gets when one derives
optimal actions from rationality assumptions and ideal conditions.
Early attempts at a utilitarian PP were problematic because extreme risk aversion was imposed
in
oneattempts
guise or at
another,
and often
unconvincingly.
Randall argued
of this (over)reaching
Early
a utilitarian
PP were
problematic because
extremethat
riskallaversion
was imposed
for
a utilitarian
is much
too
strained
– there is noRandall
convincing
argument
thethis
idea that
in one
guise orPP
another,
and
often
unconvincingly.
(2007)
argued against
that all of
the
scope
for
business-as-usual
utilitarian
ethics
might
coherently
be
bounded
by
non-utilitarian
(over)reaching for a utilitarian PP is much too strained – there is no convincing argument
constraints
a non-utilitarian
PP).
against the (including
idea that the
scope for business-as-usual
utilitarian ethics might coherently be
bounded by non-utilitarian constraints (including a non-utilitarian PP).
Margolis and Naevdal have offered yet another, and this time more promising, utilitarian PP.
Perhaps
be (2008)
searching
foroffered
the thresholds,
kinks,
to derive
a utilitarian
Margolis we
andshould
Naevdal
have
yet another,
andetc.
thisneeded
time more
promising,
utilitarian
prohibition,
or we
pause,
in our
expressionfor
of the
the thresholds,
way the world
works
in the
PP. Perhaps
should
be searching
kinks,
etc.(i.e.,
needed
to response
derive a utilitarian
function)
rather
than ininour
utility
function).
Thresholds,
prohibition,
or pause,
ourexpression
expressionofofpreferences
the way the (the
world
works
(i.e., in the
responsekinks,
etc.
in therather
way the
world
works
are in fact
suggested by
theutility
ideasfunction).
of complexity,
regimekinks,
shifts,
function)
than
in our
expression
of preferences
(the
Thresholds,
tipping
points,
etc.
(Folke
et
al.,
Holling),
and
Margolis
and
Naevdal
have
shown
that
etc. in the way the world works are in fact suggested by the ideas of complexity, regime shifts,
precautionary
oral.,
pauses
mayand
be optimal
utilitarian
standpoint
when the
tipping points, prohibitions
etc. (Folke et
Holling),
Margolisfrom
andaNaevdal
have
shown that
response
relationships
exhibit
thresholds.
precautionary
prohibitions
or pauses
may be optimal from a utilitarian standpoint when the
response relationships exhibit thresholds.
In the end, I think, the arguments of Margolis and Naevdal (who have justified a utilitarian PP for
certain
particular
of of
how
the world
and
Randall
argues
that a PP for
In the end,
I think,specifications
the arguments
Margolis
andworks),
Naevdal
(who
have (who
justified
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coherent
precautionary
constraint
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of utilitarian
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haveato be
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specifications
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thedomain
world works),
and Randall
(whonot
argues
utilitarian)
can coexist and
in fact complement
each
other; butethics
Peterson’s
argument
coherent precautionary
constraint
on the domain
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does (2006)
not itself
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cannot
coexist
with either
his case thateach
the PP
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falls when
facedcannot
with
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can coexist
andclaim
in fact– complement
other;
but Peterson’s
argument
systemic
complexity
in a –utilitarian
andis when
faced falls
with when
ethicalfaced
pluralism.
coexist with
either claim
his caseuniverse,
that the PP
incoherent
with systemic
complexity in a utilitarian universe, and when faced with ethical pluralism.
To this point, I have defined a class of threats (disproportionate and asymmetric) that might
justify remedies that are not limited to ORM. This PP does not exclude ORM; rather, it
subsumes it in a broader framework that does not balk at stronger remedies when they can
be justified. To complete the ETR framework, the remaining challenge is to address the
issue of false alarms – what can be said about the kinds of evidence that would justify
invoking a precautionary response?
5
If, on the other hand, there is a non-trivial chance that aliens would destroy us while we research
and dither, the threat is no longer asymmetric – but there are plenty of asymmetric cases, I suspect.
7
E. The evidence that would justify a precautionary interruption of business as usual should
be scientific and credible – one cannot take seriously an approach that can be triggered by
unfounded panic. The challenge is to put some flesh on the idea of plausible and credible
scientific evidence.
 There are commonsense notions of scientific credibility/plausibility.
 US courts have addressed the issue. In Daubert and Kimho Tire, courts affirmed the
admissibility of expert testimony, ruling that there are some hallmarks of what is
plausible/credible in scientific testimony (the evidence and the methodology have been
tested, the results have been peer reviewed and/or published, the potential rate of error
is known, the evidence is generally accepted in the scientific community), and courts
should look for these in judging admissibility.
 Nevertheless, the Cellular Telephone decision endorses regulation despite scientific
uncertainty – to justify regulation, scientific evidence of a threat does not have to be
overwhelming: “not a preponderance but more than a scintilla of evidence”.
 Court decisions suggest strongly that judgments of scientific credibility are the province
of scientists, not ordinary people. [Kahan et al., psychologists, titled their response to
Sunstein “Fear of Democracy”.]
 There is a campaign to politicize science and reduce scientific discourse to an ordinary
cultural quarrel: “muddying the waters” (Michaels and Monforton), “junk science”
(junkscience.com), “manufactured uncertainty”, “false balance”, and “teaching the
controversy”. Most of us are aware of this sort of thing regarding evolution and climate
change, but it appears also in ordinary regulatory disputes.
 But this campaign cannot succeed completely, because sciencehas some strong
defenses against politicization. The whole culture of scientific detachment and the
political independence of science itself, and the self-policing and self-correcting
tendencies built-into the institutions of science sustain a considerable degree of
interpersonal reliability in what counts as scientifically plausible and credible. The
public and the courts willingly concede substantial deference to scientists in matters of
scientific judgment.
 Nevertheless, the public has to be brought along – “Just as consultation breeds trust in
expert risk regulators, the perception that (they) are remote and unaccountable erodes
it” (Kahan et al. 1104).
The Precautionary Principle – a working definition
My tentative working definition of the precautionary principle, in an ETR frame, is:
In response to a scientifically credible threat of disproportionate and asymmetric harm, we
should take avoidance and mitigation measures beyond those justified by expected welfare
considerations.
The call to action is triggered by scientifically credible evidence of a disproportionate and
asymmetric threat, such that the loss from the worst case outcome (even if unlikely) is
disproportionately large relative to the gain from the most likely outcomes, and the remedy
indicated can be justified only by departing from expected welfare maximization (even if very
substantial risk aversion is built-in). This precautionary principle addresses plausible but
uncertain harm, and it may call for approaches that consciously depart from ORM; it is
simply not limited to figuring out how much risk aversion to front-load into a benefit cost
analysis.
8
3. Understanding PP as a principle
(~18 pp)
Discussion of the precautionary principle (PP) seems mostly to proceed in legalistic terms,
and often in the particular legalistic terms of international trade (D. Peterson 2006).6 Such
discussion by its nature seeks enforceable interpretations, and is uncomfortable with
competing definitions, and inconsistencies (either internal or with other widely-honored
values). However, I think this discussion reflects a rather odd view of what can reasonably
be expected of a principle.
What do we mean by principles in the policy context? First, consider principles in moral
reasoning. Principles are general statements of normative moral positions for a class of
concerns (e.g., change that benefits some while harming none is morally desirable; and,
each person’s autonomy is morally valued). They can be formulated from moral intuitions
and are, in that sense, logically prior to complete moral systems.7 Yet, the absence of a
complete and dominant moral theory (Williams 1985) provides good reason for taking moral
principles seriously. As we might expect, some principles are so compelling that they are
recognized by many competing moral systems.8 To call a moral statement a principle does
not grant it lexical priority over other principles – in complicated (that is, interesting)
exercises in applied ethics, important principles will come into conflict and resolution
requires a weighing of the principles involved and the facts of the case. Yet, a principle is
much more than a preference – we feel a serious moral loss when we have to compromise a
principle in a particular case. Finally, agreed principles provide not policies but a frame for
policy resolution that anticipates and accounts for competing and conflicting principles.
Principle has a similar meaning in law. A legal principle is not a complete theory of
normative law, but must be interpreted in ways that anticipate and account for competing
and conflicting principles. To call a statement a legal principle does not grant it lexical
priority over other legal principles. Agreed principles cannot be implemented directly – a
principle provides a powerful argument in a particular direction, but does not determine a
specific outcome (Cooney 2004) – but must be operationalized in laws, rules, guidelines,
etc.
Critiques of the PP as incomplete, inconsistent with other principles and values, and
altogether not a good stand-alone decision rule simply misunderstand the nature and role of
principles in legal as well as moral discourse.
If the precautionary principle is viewed as a principle, then it succeeds if it serves as a
principle that guides law and policy, in the sense that it embodies a considerable moral
intuition to be consulted along with other pertinent principles and values when the issues it
addresses come into play. Such a precautionary principle is capable of justifying the strong
See also M. Peterson’s (2007) claim that the PP cannot guide action and decision unless it is
structured and used as a stand-alone rule that tells us what to do and what not to do for each
possible input of information.
6
7
Often, efforts to work out practical responses to ethical challenges (e.g., environmental ethics) take
legal or political form before they are understood as works of normative ethics.
8
Groups and individuals often disagree about moral theories, but may nonetheless accept a
surprisingly large body of common principles. Thus, they may be able to achieve substantial social
agreement about actions, even though their theories are incompatible. Taylor (1989) emphasizes the
search for principles capturing and generalizing prior moral intuitions that transcend and precede
moral theories – principles that (he argues) routinely go under-valued in standard moral
epistemology, but are forced to the front by value pluralism.
9
sustainability exceptions that back-stop business-as-usual weak sustainability, and of
framing the policy discourse that triggers the exceptions in particular cases.
4. Moral foundations of PP
(~18 pp)
The PP is itself a principle, I have argued, yet it must find its moral support in prior more
general moral intuitions which themselves enjoy widespread acceptance among thoughtful
moral agents. The case for invoking the PP hinges on a scientifically credible threat of
disproportionate and asymmetric harm – ordinary risk management is appropriate for
roughly symmetric risks. In the case of a disproportionate and asymmetric threat, moral
principles that might support a PP include the following variations on the general ideas that
risk-taking9 should not be disproportionate to the expected gain, and that exposure to risks
should be distributed roughly the same way as opportunity to gain:
 Do not sell-out something unique and potentially very valuable for modest gain
 Do not take inordinate risks for modest gain
 Do not impose big risks on the public for modest private gain
 Do not impose big risks on the future for modest immediate gain
5.
(a)
Acting on principles in practical governance
(~15 pp)
Pragmatic, progressive roots of policy processes. Pragmatic policy processes still
predominate in public agencies, and tend to produce fact-based decisions aimed not at
saving the world but making us a little bit better-off one step at a time. By “fact-based”, I
mean only that policy discourse proceeds on a tacit assumption that policy questions can
(and where possible should) be resolved mostly by evaluating fact-claims without explicit
consideration of values (especially, conflicting values). If fact-claims drive policy, no value
matters until it matters – that is, value discourse is submerged and occluded, to the effect
that value questions do not arise until value-driven objections to proposed policy are raised,
which is hardly the ideal context for fruitful value discourse.
Special challenges in dealing with concerns for the future. It follows that pragmatism is
good for day to day social decisions, but disastrous for addressing issues concerning the
distant future, where values are incompletely developed and poorly articulated. How, then,
can policy accommodate principles? Technologies for meeting objectives (that is, the
familiar planning tools) are not useful for defining objectives. We cannot work toward moral
consensus via processes designed to submerge moral issues and discourse in pursuit of
pragmatic progress. When dealing with the future we need to address moral issues directly,
with special attention to issues best posed as questions of principle rather than mere
utilitarian (and therefore fungible) value. This process should identify a set of principles that
command broad-based support, and can be operationalized in laws, rules, and ultimately
management practices. On the ground, resource and environmental managers should be
bound to a set of principles, but encouraged to interpret those principles in practice via a
serious policy dialogue.
(b)
Acting on principles: implementing the PP
(~35 pp)
The fundamental framework proposed and defended here would make business-as-usual
decisions according to familiar welfare criteria, while providing precautionary exceptions for
Here, I am using the term “risk-taking” in its ordinary, colloquial sense. Where risk is in fact the
issue, the PP that goes beyond ORM comes into play when risk is disproportionate and asymmetric.
Where uncertainty is the issue, with unknown probabilities, the credible threat is that a
disproportionately bad outcome may be made more likely. Where gross ignorance is the issue, with
unbounded outcome set, the credible threat concerns a bad outcome novel in kind or scale.
9
10
particular, scientifically credible threats of asymmetric risk and/or uncertainty.10 The
precautionary exceptions are justified by principles that would be honored by many different
moral systems (section 4). The framework would respect both the modern experience of
technical progress and increasing welfare even as change in what we consume and how we
produce it proceeds apace, and the reasonable instinct for caution as we continue to push at
the frontiers of what can be known about our planet’s capacity to support future welfare.
The framework should articulate clear principles and take them seriously in practice
 Commitment to precautionary exceptions in cases that exceed a threshold of concern
 Commitment to transparent and inclusive public decision processes
 Commitment to equitable sharing of burdens – esp. burdens undertaken to benefit
future generations
 Implementation procedures should recognize that:
o Principles must be operationalized in laws and rules that provide for
interpretation via shared discourse – there are plenty of judgment calls to be
made, e.g., scientifically plausible threat of disproportionate harm.
o Scientific detachment provides a degree of interpersonal reliability in what
counts as scientifically plausible/credible.
o But the public has to be brought along – “Just as consultation breeds trust in
expert risk regulators, the perception that (they) are remote and unaccountable
erodes it” (Kahan et al. 1104).
o Every effort should be made to structure decision processes so they avoid
privileging particular worldviews in law and regulation.
 Managers should be bound to principles, but encouraged to interpret them in practice
via a serious policy dialogue with expert and stakeholder involvement. Principles
should guide management decisions. Management procedures should avoid
planning to the fourth decimal place, and abdication to stakeholder conventions.
These points will be illustrated by examining cases from the US (including the experience
with endangered species legislation) and the EU (EEA 2001), and reviewing EU (EC 2000)
and UNESCO (2005) documents attempting to specify a governance framework for
implementing the PP.
6. Conclusions
(~8 pp)
(Total printed pages: ~168 + preface, contents, references, index)
10
In that sense, this discussion will develop further some ideas outlined in Farmer and Randall 1998,
Randall 1999, and Randall 2007.
11
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