IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER
Appellant:
XXXXX
Respondent:
The Learning Trust
Case No. HS/1736/2012
DECISION OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ROWLAND
ON APPEAL FROM:
Tribunal:
Tribunal Case No:
Tribunal Venue:
Hearing date:
First-Tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber)
SE204/12/00012
Paper
10 May 2012
SC v The Learning Trust (SEN) [2012] UKUT xxx (AAC)
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER
Case No. HS/1736/2012
Before Upper Tribunal Judge Rowland
Decision:
I refuse both parties’ requests for an oral hearing before the Upper
Tribunal.
The appeal is allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 10
May 2012, whereby it struck out the appeal before it, is set aside and I
substitute a decision that that appeal not be struck out. Accordingly, it
remains to be heard by the First-tier Tribunal.
Subject to any further direction by the First-tier Tribunal, I direct that –
(a) the Appellant make, by 29 June 2012, a written submission to
the First-tier Tribunal in reply to the Respondent’s response; and
(b) an oral hearing before the First-tier Tribunal be fixed as soon as
possible.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1.
Mossbourne Community Academy (“Mossbourne”) is a well-respected, and
therefore oversubscribed, secondary school in Hackney. The Appellant is the
mother of a Year 6 boy who has had a statement of special educational needs since
March 2005. She expressed a preference for her son to be admitted to Mossbourne
in September 2012 for Year 7. However, on 10 February 2012, the Respondent,
which runs education services on behalf of the London Borough of Hackney,
amended the Appellant’s son’s statement so as to name another school from
September 2012. The Appellant and her son’s father appealed against Parts 2, 3
and 4 of the Statement but the grounds of appeal were primarily, if not entirely,
aimed at Part 4. They wished Mossbourne to be the named school.
2.
It is not clear, on the material before me, to what extent, if at all, the possibility
of the Appellant’s son attending Mossbourne was discussed with Mossbourne before
the statement was amended. In any event, by a letter addressed to the Respondent
dated 16 March 2012, Mossbourne wrote “in response to the proposal to name
Mossbourne Academy on the statement of special educational needs” to state that it
was “unable to agree to the proposal to be named” on the ground that the
Appellant’s son’s admission “would be incompatible with the efficient education of
other pupils at the Academy” and, additionally, “due to the severe overcrowding and
heavy pupil demand on existing resources, it is extremely unlikely that Mossbourne
would be able to fully meet his needs”.
3.
In its response to the appeal, the Respondent applied for the appeal to be
struck out on the ground that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal would not be binding
on Mossbourne, due to the terms of its funding agreement with the Secretary of
State. It also opposed the appeal on the ground that the Appellant’s son’s
attendance at Mossbourne would be incompatible with the efficient education of
other children in the school and that his special educational needs would be
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adequately met at the school it had named in the statement. The parents, who did
not have legal representation at the time, resisted the application for the striking out
of the appeal on broad grounds that did not directly answer the Respondent’s points.
4.
The most relevant provisions of the funding agreement are paragraphs 23 to
26 of Annex 3, concerned with the admission of pupils with special educational
needs. With the deletion of the obvious error noted by the First-tier Tribunal, they
read –
23.
The Governing Body of the Mossbourne Community Academy shall
ensure that pupils with SEN are admitted on an equal basis with others in
accordance with its admissions policy.
24.
Where a local education authority proposes to name Mossbourne
Community Academy in a statement of SEN made in accordance with section
324 of the Education Act 1996, the Academy shall consent to being named,
except where admitting the child would be incompatibly with the provision of
efficient education for other children, and where no reasonable steps may be
made to secure compatibility.
25.
In deciding whether a child’s inclusion would be incompatible with the
efficient education of other children, the Academy shall have regard to the
relevant guidance issued by the Secretary of State to maintained schools.
26.
In the event of any disagreement between the … Academy and the
local education authority over the proposed naming of the Mossbourne
Community Academy in a statement, the Academy may ask the Secretary of
State to determine whether the Mossbourne Community Academy should be
named. The Secretary of State’s determination shall be final.”
5.
On 10 May 2012, the First-tier Tribunal struck out the parents’ appeal on the
ground that it had no reasonable prospects of success (see rule 8(4)(c) of the
Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber)
Rules 2008 (SI 2008/2699)). In its reasoning, it broadly adopted the Respondent’s
arguments. The judge said –
“5.
I conclude that the position under the current legislation is as follows:
Part IV of the Education Act 1996 (“the Act”) sets out the obligations in relation
to children with special educational needs. Section 321 imposes a general
duty upon a local authority towards children with special educational needs;
section 323 the obligation to make an assessment of the child’s educational
needs and section 324, the duty to make and maintain a statement of special
educational needs where necessary.
6.
Section 324(5)(b) states that the governing body of a maintained
school, the name of which is specified in a statement, shall admit the child to
the school.
7.
Schedule 27 of the Act has effect in relation to the making and
maintenance of statement and paragraph 3 of the Schedule sets out the
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process for enabling parents to express a preference as to the maintained
school at which they wish education to be provided for the child.
8.
Section 312(5) provides the definition of a “maintained school” for the
purposes of Part IV. The definition does not include an academy. Hence,
section 324(5)(b) and [paragraph 3 of Schedule 27] do not apply to
academies.
9.
The Funding Agreement of Mossbourne Community Academy dated 6
April 2004 and made between the Academy Trust and the Secretary of State
for Education and Skills, identifies at paragraph 7 the Academy Trust’s
undertaking to establish and maintain an independent school and the
agreement sets out the characteristics, conditions and requirements imposed
upon the Academy and the Academy Trust.
10.
The Tribunal, on appeal, can name an independent school in Part 4 of
a statement. In the absence of the statutory obligation imposed by section
324(5)(b) of the Act to admit a child following a successful appeal, the
Tribunal has imposed a requirement that independent schools, in respect of
which a party is appealing, provide written confirmation of the availability and
offer of a place for the child. The written confirmation must be produced in the
course of the appeal, thus ensuring that the decision of the Tribunal is
enforceable in the event that the appeal is successful.
11.
Mossbourne Community Academy has refused to provide the parents
in the present appeal with such a confirmation of place and has provided a
letter explaining why it is not prepared to make an offer of place for [their son].
12.
The arrangements for admission of pupils with special educational
needs are contained in Annex 3 of the Funding Agreement and contains no
reference at all to the Secretary of State’s expectations of Mossbourne
Academy in the event of a Tribunal decision naming it in Part 4 of the
statement. Paragraph 24 states that where a local authority proposes to name
the Mossbourne Community Academy in a statement, the Academy shall
consent to being named except where admitting the child would be
incompatible with the provision of efficient education for other children and
where no reasonable steps may be made to secure compatibility.
13.
Paragraph 26 provides that “In the event of any disagreement between
the City Academy and the local education authority over the proposed naming
of the Mossbourne Community Academy in the statement, the Academy may
ask the Secretary of State to determine whether the Mossbourne Community
Academy should be named. The Secretary of State’s determination shall be
final”.
14.
The Annex does not include any agreement to implement decisions of
the Tribunal and whilst I assume that the reference to “City Academy” in
paragraph 26 is a typing error, the paragraph makes provision for resolution of
any dispute regarding the suitability of Mossbourne Community Academy by
the Secretary of State, whose determination shall be final.
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15.
The Funding Agreement, which is an agreement between the Academy
Trust and the Secretary of State setting out the terms and conditions for the
running of the “independent school”, makes no provision for recognition or
implementation of a decision of the Tribunal and does not import into the
agreement any obligation on the Academy Trust to implement any decision of
the Tribunal.
16.
Therefore, even if the Tribunal were to decide that Mossbourne
Community Academy should be named in Part 4 of [the child’s] statement at
the conclusion of the appeal, the Academy has not consented to admit him
and will not admit him as a pupil, and the order of the Tribunal would not be
enforceable in law as would a decision naming a maintained school.
17.
I conclude that in practical and legal terms, the appeal has no
reasonable prospect of success and should be struck out pursuant to Rule
8(4)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008.
6.
With the permission of the First-tier Tribunal, granted on 18 May 2012, the
Appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal. The appeal was lodged on 30 May
2012. The First-tier Tribunal had alerted the Upper Tribunal to the likelihood of an
appeal and had suggested that it be expedited. Consequently, I had had an
opportunity to consider the issues and was able to issue observations and case
management directions on 31 May 2012. Since the funding agreement was made
between the Secretary of State for Education and Mossbourne, I gave them an
opportunity to apply to be joined as respondents or simply to make written
submissions as to the funding agreement’s meaning and the way it should work in
practice.
7.
Notwithstanding the Jubilee and half-term holidays, the parties and potential
parties have been able to stick to a tight timetable. I am grateful to all of them and
their representatives. Neither the Secretary of State nor Mossbourne applied to be
joined as a party to the proceedings. However, the Secretary of State made a
helpful written submission that, for reasons that will appear, is supportive of the
appeal even though written in general terms and Mossbourne submitted a copy of a
letter it had written to the Secretary of State requesting advice about the admission
of pupils with statements of special educational needs. The Respondent opposed
the appeal and has maintained that stance when given an opportunity to comment
on the Secretary of State’s submission. The Appellant has submitted a detailed
reply, addressing the points raised in my observations and the points raised by the
Respondent and the Secretary of State. I have refused an application by
Independent Parental Special Education Advice to be joined as a party to the
proceedings. I considered that its assistance was not required because the points
that it had raised had either been addressed in the parties’ submissions and that of
the Secretary of State or did not need to be decided.
8.
Both the Respondent and the Appellant have asked for an oral hearing of this
appeal. I refuse those requests. It is important to avoid delay (particularly in this sort
of case) and unnecessary expense but, more importantly, I doubt that I would be
significantly better informed or wiser after a hearing. This is an appeal on a point of
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law. The issues have been argued on paper in great detail. It is not necessary to
deal with all the alternative arguments raised by the parties and, for reasons that I
will explain, I regard the Respondent’s position on the key issues to be untenable. In
all the circumstances, I am satisfied that I can properly determine this appeal without
a hearing.
9.
Although, as the First-tier Tribunal pointed out, academies are independent
schools rather than maintained schools for the purposes of Part IV of the Education
Act 1996 (concerned with special educational needs), they are still part of the state
education system and it would be surprising if, on important matters, they did not
owe duties to parents and children broadly similar to those owed by maintained
schools. A difference, of course, is that maintained schools are, by statute, largely
controlled by local authorities whereas academies have a contractual relationship
with the Secretary of State. The consequence is that duties may be enforceable in
different ways and be expressed in different ways. However, once the structural
differences are penetrated, the similarities become more apparent. Ultimately,
though, this case turns on the construction of the particular funding agreement for
Mossbourne, for which the broad scheme of education law and practice provides no
more than a backdrop.
10.
The first ground of appeal, advanced by Mr Raj Desai of counsel (instructed
by Mrs Elaine Maxwell of Maxwell Gillot Solicitors, Lancaster), joined in the reply by
Mr David Woolf QC, is that the First-tier Tribunal erred in having regard to the
potential enforceability of a decision in favour of the parents when considering
whether or not to strike out the appeal. I reject this ground of appeal. The appeal
was not struck out under rule 8(3) of the 2008 Rules for lack of jurisdiction but under
rule 8(4)(c) for lack of any reasonable prospect of success. A school ought not to be
named in a statement of special educational needs if it is under no obligation to
consider admitting a child who is named in a statement and has made it clear that it
will not do so. The question whether a decision will be enforceable is obviously
relevant to the question whether, in practical terms, an appeal has any prospect of
success. The Appellant’s representatives are right that enforceability may not be
determinative, since a favourable decision may confer a practical advantage on a
party without actually being enforceable, but it is plainly relevant. Indeed, an
appellant may be able to point to a potential practical advantage such that
proceedings should not be struck out, even though his or her appeal is ultimately
bound to be dismissed (see Welsh Ministers v Care Standards Tribunal [2008]
EWHC 49 (Admin); [2008] 1 W.L.R. 2097). The question whether there might have
been any practical advantage in the appeal proceeding in this case even if the
decision was not enforceable is raised by the second ground of appeal and the
question whether the First-tier Tribunal was right in its view as to enforceability is
raised by the third ground. As an independent ground, this first ground fails.
11.
The second ground of appeal is that the First-tier Tribunal erred in concluding
that Mossbourne would not admit the Appellant’s son if the parents’ appeal were
successful. The Respondent, through Ms Sarah Hannett of counsel, instructed by
Ms Breda Maynard, submits that the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to conclude that
Mossbourne would not change its position. However, the real burden of the ground
of appeal seems to be that the First-tier Tribunal merely assumed that Mossbourne
would not change its position, without actually addressing its mind to the issue (see
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paragraph 16 of its decision). What is also said is that, at the very least,
Mossbourne would have been under a public law duty to reconsider its position in the
light of the First-tier tribunal’s decision. This is a point that is best considered
together with the third ground of appeal.
12.
I turn then to the third ground of appeal, which raises the key issue in this
case. It is submitted that the First-tier Tribunal erred in finding that a decision in
favour of the parents would be unenforceable. Three alternative methods of
enforcement are proposed, but it is sufficient that I merely consider the role of the
Secretary of State under paragraph 26 of Annex 3 to the funding agreement.
13.
It is worth setting out in full the Secretary of State’s submission, put in by Ms
Rachel Landau of the Legal Advisor’s Office of the Department for Education.
The Secretary of State does not wish to make an application to be
joined as a respondent in these proceedings at this stage but welcomes the
opportunity to make a written response to clarify his views on the matters
raised by the Upper Tribunal in its Observations dated 31 May 2012 (the
Observations) in relation to this appeal This submission does not seek to
comment on the details of this particular case, but rather intends to address
the wider issues that appear to be relevant in light of the Observations.
1.
The Secretary of State wishes to make it clear at the outset that the
Department's policy is that parents who wish an Academy to be named in a
child's statement of Special Educational Needs (SEN) should have the same
rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (the Tribunal) in relation to the
statement as parents who wish for a maintained school to be named.
2.
All funding agreements between the Secretary of State and Academies
require that where a local authority proposes to name an Academy in a
statement of SEN made in accordance with section 324 of the Education Act
1996, the Academy must consent to being named, except where admitting the
child would be incompatible with the provision of efficient education for other
children, and where no reasonable steps may be made to secure
compatibility. In determining whether a child's inclusion would be
incompatible with the efficient education of other children, the Academy is
required to have regard to any relevant guidance issued by the Secretary of
State to maintained schools. Where there is any disagreement between the
Academy and the local authority over the proposed naming of the Academy
in a statement of SEN, the funding agreements make provision for the
Academy to request the Secretary of State to make a determination.
3.
The vast majority of funding agreements, namely those that were
entered into from 2010 onwards, also place a contractual obligation on
Academies to admit a child where they are named by a local authority in a
statement, or where the Tribunal has determined that an Academy should be
named following a parental appeal. This includes cases where the Secretary
of State may have previously determined that an Academy was not under an
obligation to admit and so a local authority had named a different school but
the Tribunal had determined on appeal that the Academy should be named.
4.
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However, the Secretary of State is aware that there are a very small
number of Academies with funding agreements that were entered into prior to
2010 that, whilst specifying that the Secretary of State's determination in the
event of a disagreement between the Academy and the local authority is final,
do not specify this to be subject to any right of appeal to the Tribunal, nor that
any decision of the Tribunal is to be binding.
5.
The Secretary of State considers that the absence of any reference to
an appeal to the Tribunal by a parent in the provisions of these pre-2010
funding agreements does not mean that no such right exists, nor that the
Tribunal has no role to play. However, he agrees with the views of the Upper
Tribunal expressed in paragraph 6 of the Observations that, in such cases, in
the event of an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal by a parent, the Tribunal would
stand in the shoes of the local authority and, were the Academy to disagree
with an order for it to be named on the child's statement of SEN, the Secretary
of State would then have the final say as to whether the Academy should be
named. Were the Secretary of State to subsequently determine that the
Academy should be named then the Academy would be obliged under the
terms of the funding agreement to comply with this. Should an Academy
refuse to comply, the Secretary of State could seek to enforce compliance by
way of an application to the courts for specific performance of the funding
agreement.
6.
In practice, in cases relating to pre-2010 funding agreements, the
Department would always expect an Academy to act reasonably and not fetter
a parent's right to appeal to the Tribunal in relation to the naming of the
Academy in their child's statement of SEN. Furthermore, were the Tribunal to
order a local authority to name an Academy with a pre-2010 funding
agreement the Secretary of State finds it very difficult to envisage
circumstances in which he would disagree with the Tribunal should an
Academy refer the matter to him for determination.”
7.
14.
Presumably, if the Secretary of State considered that the First-tier Tribunal
had misapplied the law, he would suggest to the local authority that it appeal.
15.
By clause 5 of the funding agreement, questions arsing on its interpretation
“shall be resolved by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Academy”.
However, I need not consider precisely what effect that has because, firstly, as the
Respondent observes, the Secretary of State has not explicitly commented on the
construction of this particular agreement and, secondly, I do not disagree with
anything the Secretary of State has submitted.
16.
The Respondent submits that the Secretary of State’s analysis fails to
consider three important points.
17.
First, it is submitted by the Respondent that the funding agreement contains
no requirement, either express or implied, that Mossbourne admit a child whose
statement of special educational needs names it as a result of an order of the Firsttier Tribunal and, secondly, it is submitted that the dispute mechanism in paragraph
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26 does not apply where a child is named in a statement following an order of the
First-tier Tribunal.
18.
It is true that there is no equivalent of section 324(5)(b) of the 1996 Act in the
funding agreement (unless, perhaps, it can be considered part of “admissions law”
for the purposes of clause 9(c)). However, it is the clear – and I think undisputed –
implication of paragraph 24 of the funding agreement that, where a child is named in
a statement following a proposal of a local authority, Mossbourne must admit the
child. Why else would there be a need to impose a duty to consent to being named?
19.
The question is then whether the word “proposes” in paragraph 24 and the
phrase “proposed naming” in paragraph 26 have the effect that paragraphs 24 and
26 would not apply if the First-tier Tribunal orders the local authority to name
Mossbourne in the statement. The Respondent submits that there is no “proposed
naming” in those circumstances. I disagree, for two reasons. First, the language is
no less apt where the First-tier Tribunal has ordered the naming than it is in other
cases because, in the context of this particular funding agreement, any such order is
necessarily subject to the consent of Mossbourne or the Secretary of State.
Secondly, I can see no proper reason why the parties to the funding agreement
should have wished to draw a distinction between a case where a proposal comes
on the initiative of a local authority and a case where the local authority is required to
make it by the First-tier Tribunal. In particular, why should Mossbourne be the sole
arbiter of what is compatible with the provision of efficient education of other children
in the latter case, when subject to the Secretary of State’s ultimate decision in the
former case?
20.
The third point argued by the Respondent is that paragraph 26 of Annex 3 of
the funding agreement says that Mossbourne “may ask the Secretary of State to
determine whether the Mossbourne Community Academy should be named”, which,
it submits, confers an unfettered discretion and also makes no provision for the local
authority to require the Secretary of State to determine the issue. I do not accept
that there is an unfettered discretion as to when to exercise the power. The word
“may” is presumably used because a disagreement may be resolved. However, if it
is clear that a disagreement will not be resolved, it seems to me that there is a clear
public law duty on Mossbourne to refer the matter to the Secretary of State.
Otherwise, the purpose of the provision would be frustrated. If Mossbourne failed to
refer it, the local authority could no doubt itself draw the Secretary of State’s attention
to the case.
21.
In my judgment it follows that the funding agreement is perfectly workable in a
way that is consistent with a parent’s statutory right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
under section 326 of the 1996 Act, without any straining of language. A local
authority or, on appeal, the First-tier Tribunal ought not to name Mossbourne unless
it is satisfied that the admission of the child would be compatible with the provision of
efficient education to other pupils there and that therefore its view is that
Mossbourne should admit the child. If an appeal is successful and the local authority
is ordered to name Mossbourne, that order would be subject to the consent of
Mossbourne or the Secretary of State. However, it would be made in the expectation
that Mossbourne would – or, at least, in their view should – give their consent. The
local authority must therefore propose to Mossbourne that the statement be
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amended in the light of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. Mossbourne would at least
be bound to have regard to the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning and it would no doubt
also have regard to the likelihood of the Secretary of State agreeing with the First-tier
Tribunal if the case were referred to him. If it still refused its consent, the case would
be referred to the Secretary of State. If he decided that Mossbourne should not be
named, the local authority would refer the case back to the First-tier Tribunal, which
would be able to review its decision under section 9 of the Tribunals’ Courts and
Enforcement Act 2007 and rule 48 of the 2008 Rules. (The Respondent submits that
there would have been no “change of circumstances” but I disagree because the
decision of the First-tier Tribunal would have been made on the basis that the
necessary consent would, or might, be forthcoming and the decision of the Secretary
of State that Mossbourne should not be named would clearly alter that position.) If
either Mossbourne or the Secretary of State accepted that Mossbourne should be
named, the First-tier Tribunal’s order would be fully effective, albeit possibly not
always within the prescribed time limit.
22.
It will be seen that I accept the Appellant’s submission, made in relation to the
second ground of appeal, that Mossbourne is under a public law duty to reconsider
its position in the light of a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. It is, I think, implicit in
Mossbourne’s letter to the Secretary of State that it does in fact do so. It would be
irresponsible and irrational not to look at a decision by an expert and experienced
tribunal on the very issue on which Mossbourne has to express a view. It is
unnecessary on this appeal for me to consider in what circumstances, if any,
Mossbourne could properly not accept the First-tier Tribunal’s view. It is sufficient to
note that the Secretary of State, who would be required to settle any dispute, gives
the highest possible respect to decisions of the First-tier Tribunal.
23.
The position of Mossbourne – and, I suspect, any other academy – is
therefore totally different from that of a private independent school, which does not
have any obligation to admit a child otherwise than on its own terms. On the contrary
and as one might expect, an academy’s position is not greatly different from that of a
maintained school. The First-tier Tribunal is not entitled to strike out a case merely
because the academy’s current view is that it will not admit the child in question,
although it could in theory strike an appeal out on the basis that the appellant had no
prospect of persuading the First-tier Tribunal to take a different view from that of the
academy. I also observe that more recent funding agreements explicitly make
decisions of the First-tier Tribunal determinative and also impose an express duty to
admit a child who has a statement of special educational needs naming the academy
in question.
24.
It is unnecessary for me to consider the fourth ground of appeal, which raises
points under the European Convention on Human Rights.
25.
For the reasons I have given, the First-tier Tribunal, which did not have before
it the detailed submissions that have assisted me, clearly erred in law in finding that
the appeal before it had no reasonable prospect of success merely because of the
terms of Mossbourne’s funding agreement and Mossbourne’s refusal to offer a place
to the Appellant’s son before the parents’ case had been heard by the First-tier
Tribunal. It therefore erred in law in striking out the appeal. I must allow this appeal
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and substitute a decision refusing to strike out the appeal, which consequently
remains to be determined by the First-tier Tribunal.
26.
This decision should not be taken to imply any view on my part as to the
merits of the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal. Indeed, it is not clear to me what
the parents’ case is on the specific points raised by the Respondent that, firstly, the
named school could adequately meet their son’s needs and, secondly, Mossbourne
is overcrowded. Accordingly I direct the Appellant to make a submission to the Firsttier Tribunal by the end of next week.
27.
It may be that, behind the substantive appeal before the First-tier Tribunal,
there lies a general question about the co-ordination of the naming of schools in
statements of special educational needs and the normal admission arrangements of
oversubscribed schools and the consequences of that not being satisfactorily
achieved. In relation to Mossbourne and the facts of the present case, I draw
attention to what may be an unintended lacuna in Annex 2 to the funding agreement,
dealing with initial admission arrangements, although it is possible that there has
already been an amendment. Under paragraph 9(a), children with statements of
special educational needs where Mossbourne is named in the statement have
priority in the admissions process. Note 2 to paragraph 12 and note 3 to paragraph
13 make it plain that children with special educational needs but without statements
will receive equal consideration with other applicants in the allocation of places under
paragraph 9(c). However, no mention is made of children who have statements in
which either no secondary school is named or in which another school has been
named but there is an ongoing dispute as to whether Mossbourne should be named.
Should the notes to paragraphs 12 and 13 cover those children too?
Mark Rowland
21 June 2012
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