Jeffrey Womack
Buzzanco – “Empire, War, and Revolution”
Week 9: Economics/Materialism/Hegemony
Fordham, Benjamin. Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National
Security
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997
Building the Cold War Consensus presents Benjamin Fordham's argument against
traditional foreign policy histories. Fordham argues that the traditional foreign policy
narrative, which he refers to as a "realist" or "stateist" approach, presents an unrealistic
picture of foreign policy because it obscures the internal conflicts that influence policy-makers
and puts excessive emphasis on dramatic events and external factors. Fordham suggests that
scholars should instead contemplate foreign policy decisions in terms of a "domestic political
economy" model where political actors bargain in favor of their priorities and protect or
sacrifice particular outcomes based on the constituencies attached to those outcomes. As a
case study, Fordham examines the actions of the Truman administration, and he argues
specifically that the administration accepted an undesirable (in its estimation) outcome for Fair
Deal policies at home in return for achieving a positive outcome in terms of foreign policy, with
increased defense spending and monetary aid for foreign nations.
Fordham's book opens with a discussion of foreign policy and its treatment in history.
The author separates government action into two distinct categories: decisions and policies.
Decisions occur on short notice, often in response to unexpected events that affect the
decision-makers. Decisions, according to Fordham, generally happen in response to a crisis.
Fordham describes the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis as examples of decisionmaking. Fordham contrasts decisions with policies. Decisions are made quickly; policies
result from much longer study--often weeks or months. Decisions often fall to the authority of
one individual with executive authority; policy is generally formulated by a group of people,
some of whom represent different parties with an interest in the policy. Decisions tend to
reflect immediate needs and circumstances; policies often anticipate long-term needs or stress
accepting short-term costs in return for distant outcomes. Fordham argues that historians of
foreign policy often present a narrative that is exclusively (and improperly) decision-based, with
heads of state acting reactively to events in the world as they unfold rather than formulating
and following long-term policies. As a case study of this issue the author turns to the case of
NSC 68 and the Truman administration's involvement in the Korean War at the expense of its
Fair Deal initiatives.
Fordham begins his argument for a new view of the Truman administration’s foreign
policy by describing the most popular existing narratives and pointing out problems with them.
The author suggests that existing foreign policy narratives cannot adequately account for the
timing of various Truman administration actions with respect to military budgets. He then
argues, based on the discrepancies and the available evidence, that the administration must
have decided on major changes in its foreign policies based on internal factors, not in response
to external events. In essence, Fordham argues that NSC 68 and a policy of increased
government spending did not represent a response by the administration to events in China or
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, according to Fordham, intervention in the Korean War
represented an opportunity for the Truman administration to implement a policy that it had
already decided on, not a “conversion experience” that caused officials in Washington D.C. to
reject old and adopt new policies.
Much of Fordham’s book explores the relationships between political actors and
constituencies at work during the Truman administration. Fordham argues that politicians
tend to represent the interests and desires of economically powerful forces in their home states,
districts, or regions, and he suggests that political actors can only maintain their position by
building large coalitions of diverse interests. In the process of formulating policies, politicians
seek to satisfy these coalitions, but because members of a coalition may have different, and
even mutually exclusive, interests, a politician must prioritize the desires of coalition members,
giving up the demands of some members in order to achieve positive ends for other members.
Fordham argues that this process of negotiation and prioritization is at the heart of policy
formulations, and he takes as his case study the Truman administration’s domestic policy.
Fordham specifically claims that Truman surrendered his Fair Deal initiatives in a complex
process of political negotiation, accepting in return the support of members of Congress for his
foreign policy program and the increased spending that went with it. According to Fordham,
the administration’s decision to enter the Korean War partially resulted from this process of
negotiation because intervention gave the Truman administration an opportunity to strengthen
its bargaining position against its opponents in Congress.
Building the Cold War Consensus presents a useful warning to historians about the
dangers of trying to examine foreign policy without properly considering the domestic tensions
that drive decision-makers. Fordham does a good job of demonstrating how complex
bargaining processes affect the development of policies, and he presents a useful case study
with the Truman administration that exposes the weakness of several popular explanations of
the administration’s actions. Besides the interesting historical conclusions, this book offers
two very useful correctives to a historian: 1) fit theories to evidence, or you will be tempted to
ignore evidence in favor of the theory, and 2) states, far from being unitary entities with a
definable set of core values and “national interests,” are diverse amalgamations of individuals
and groups with contradictory interests and values, and policy, both foreign and domestic,
arises from the negotiations between those groups.