ETHNIC POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE UNION OF BURMA
(A Brown Bag Seminar organized by the Council for Southeast Asia
Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA).
By Zo T. Hmung
October 25, 2000
I am honored to speak today about the ethnic political crisis in the Union of
Burma at Yale University, one of the finest universities in the world. I am
thankful to Prof. Michael R. Dove, Chair of the Council on Southeast Asia
Studies, and Prof. James Scott for this kind invitation.
Approximately, Burma has a population of 48 million people. Of those 48
million, 68% are Burman, and the rest, 32 %, belong to the ethnic groups
such as Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan, etc. These are
only estimated statistics as there is no proper documented information
available inside Burma. The ethnic people have their own religions, culture,
and languages. There are different religions such as Buddhism, Muslim,
Christianity, and Hinduism. Burmans belong to the majority religion,
Buddhism while most ethnic Chins and Kachins are Christians.
The ethnic political issue is important to Burma's politics. Because in order
to put an end to civil war, which has spanned over half a century in Burma,
the ethnic political crisis must first be resolved in accordance with the full
consent of the ethnic minority people. Therefore, Burma's political history,
especially how the minority and the majority groups came to live together
under the Union government, needs to be addressed.
The Formation of the Union Government
To be more precise, I will take an example from Chin history, as I am an
ethnic Chin. In 1886, the British annexed Burma and ruled Burma and India
together, from India, known as the British-Burma. At that time, Chin
territory was an independent territory with its own political administration,
culture, religion, and language, without any outside political interference.
Ten years later, in 1896, the British occupied Chin territory and ruled it,
together with Burma and India, from India. Before the British's occupation,
Chinland had lived independently since time immemorial. In 1937, for
administrative convenience, the British divided her administration into two
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parts known as British-Burma and British-India. Chinland was ruled from
British-Burma.
On December 20, 1946, Mr. Clement Richard Attlee, then Prime Minister of
Great Britain, proposed granting independence to Burma at the House of
Commons. As a result, Aung San, who led the Anti-Fascist People's
Freedom League (AFPFL), was invited to London to speak on ways to
transfer to independence. Unfortunately, the Labour Party government in
London had not invited any representatives from the ethnic groups, even
though the ethnic people had voiced concern that Aung San could not
represent their will concerning their future status with the British
government.
The British ignored the complaints of the ethnic groups and asked Aung San
to gain consent of the Frontier Areas (Frontier areas means ethnic peoples).
This unfortunate lack of representation became part of the impetus for the
ethnic political crisis that is so evident today. If ethnic groups were given
self-determination to choose their own destiny by the Labor Party
government in London, today's political histories would be very different
from today's ethnic political crisis in the Union of Burma. The AFPFL had
the right to represent the Burmans only, not the ethnic minority groups.
AFPFL representative Aung San, for the interim government of Burma, and
Clement Richard Attlee, for the British government, signed an agreement on
January 27, 1947, for Burma to become an independent country within a
year. The second step of political strategy for Aung San was to convince the
ethnic groups to join the interim Burmese government during the transitional
period, and to later form the Union government based on equal footing of all
Union members. In order to convince the ethnic minority to join the interim
government of Burma, the AFPFL’s campaign message was to gain
independence from the British first, and then to form a Union government
together. This campaign message of independence became powerful and
convincing as the British had been ruling them for more than half a century.
Everyone wanted to gain independence from British colonial rule.
Within a month of Aung San's return from England to Burma,
representatives of Burma led by Aung San, along with representatives of the
Chin, Kachin and Shan, signed an agreement popularly known as the
Panglong Agreement at the Panglong Conference in Shan State on February
12, 1947. February 12 became Union Day in the Union of Burma and is
2
observed as an official holiday in Burma. This clearly indicates how these
different groups came together to form the Union. The Preamble of the
Panglong Agreement said: "The members of the Conference, believing that
freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins, and the
Chins by their immediate cooperation with the Interim Burmese
government"1 The basic concept of each state administration in a federal
system of government was evident in the Panglong Agreement. Article 5 of
the Agreement said, "full autonomy in internal administration for the
Frontier Areas is accepted"2
A common interest, aimed for mutual benefits, had gathered together the
Burmans and the ethnic people to form a Union government. Based on the
Panglong conference, the Right of Secession was enshrined in the 1947
Union Constitution, Chapter X. This Right of Secession meant if one of the
Union members did not find benefits, or if they lost benefits within the
Union government, that member had the right to depart from the Union In
my opinion, as the proposed Union belonged to different groups with
different territories/countries, the name of the government should not be
Burma. It should have a different name, one that could represent all Union
members.
Therefore, the Union government, according to the Panglong Agreement,
was of the Union government of the Panglong signatories, which was based
on trust, faith, and mutual benefits. Kio Mang, a Chin representative from
Haka town, Chin State, said he signed the Panglong Agreement because he
trusted in Aung San. The spirit of the Union and a trust of each other
mattered to the Union-founding members.
A Lack of Federalism in the 1947 Union Constitution
After the Panglong Agreement, the elections to the Constituent Assembly
followed in April. In this very first election, there were 255 seats; 210 seats
were for Burmans and only 45 seats went to non-Burman ethnic groups.
Like today's National League for Democracy (NLD), the people mandated
the AFPFL, led by Aung San, as it was the party that took lead in the
independence struggle for the Burmans. The above seats meant that the
Burmans could control the government and drive the Union government in
their own way. Chances for the non-Burman ethnic groups at the central
1
2
See Panglong Agreement. The Panglong Agreement was signed at Panglong village in Shan State, Burma
See Panglong Agreement. In this context, Frontier Areas were understood as non-Burman areas.
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government level were almost nil. However, it was the transitional period
and the priority was about independence from British within a year. My
assumption is that the non-Burman ethnic groups did not focus on the
importance of the election.
In June 1947, Aung San led the drafting of the Union constitution for the
future Union government, in accordance with the Panglong Agreement, to
be a federal system of governance. Unfortunately, Aung San and his cabinets
were assassinated on July 19, 1947, only one month after drafting had
begun. U Nu headed the AFPFL continuance of the Union constitution
drafting by appointing Tin Tut, Sir Ba U, E Maung, and Kyaw Myint. All
were Burmans educated in the law school of Cambridge. U Chan Htoon was
appointed as a constitutional adviser. No ethnic group participated in this
constitutional drafting process. This process began the questioning of
federalism in the Union of Burma. U Chan Htoon himself admitted that the
Union Constitution did not represent the spirit of Union, which was
federalism. He said: "Our constitution in theory federal, is in practice
unitary".3
On September 24, 1947, the Union Constitution was adopted, becoming
effective on January 4, 1948, the date that Burma gained independence. The
Union Constitution was not even federal in theory; it was both unitary in
theory and practice. In a unitary system of government, the government is
centralized wherein the federal state's powers are placed under the central
government's direct control.
I would like to take an example from the Chin Special Division to show the
relationship between the federal state and the central Union government. For
Chin Special Division, the President of the Union government appointed a
Minister for Chin Affairs from a member of the Union government, upon
nomination by the Union Prime Minister. The Union Minister member
designated as a Minister for Chin Affairs was the head of the government.
The power of the Minister's administration for Chin Affairs was subject to
the approval by the Union government in all state affairs such as education,
culture, etc. Therefore, the Minister was under the direct control of the
central Union government. There is the Chin Affairs Council comprising of
all members of Parliament elected by the Chin people.
3
Tinker, Hugh. The Union of Burma. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. P. 30
4
The Chin Affairs Council's function was simply to aid and advise the
Minister for Chin Affairs in matters such as recruitment, postings, and
transferring civil services4. Therefore, they too were under direct control of
the central Union government. Moreover, there was no provision for passing
bills or the right to legislation of the Chin Special Division in the 1947
Union Constitution. This is called a system of centralized government
putting every power in the center. As such, the Chin people and Chin
territory were in the hands of the Burmese.
Another example is of the Kachin State. Like Chin Special Division, the
Kachin had a State Council and a State government. The Minister for Kachin
Affairs was the head of the government. Members of the State Council had
partial rights to pass bills of the state. The problem was, the bills should be
presented to the President for approval, and should be subject to the
President’s signature, in order to come into existence. And the State can only
recommend the passing of the law to the Union parliament.5
Therefore, both in Chin Special Division and Kachin State, all powers, both
in State and central government, went to central government. In a federal
system of government, the State Council or the federal state should be given
full authority to function independently, especially in the case of Burma as it
consists of different groups. The federal state should have had the right to
legislation, especially in school, police, press, and other individual state
affairs. In addition, the constitution should provide for the right of passing
bills. Neither the Union government nor the central authorities should
control or impose her authorities to federal state council or the state
government. Even in the local government, there should be self-government,
as there are many different dialects and cultures. The federal government's
role should be in the matters of monetary issues, taxation, foreign affairs,
communication, and federal armed forces. All these were absent in the
Union Constitution of 1947. Therefore, the AFPFL, led by U Nu’s
constitution of 1947, aimed to control all power in local, state, and central
4
See The 1947 Union Constitution, Part V: Sections: 196, 197, 198
5
see the 1947 Union Constitution, Part II- 166-170
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government. The Burman majority enjoyed all authority from top to bottom
and bottom to top.
In summary, the 1947 Union Constitution betrayed Aung San's Union as
well as the Panglong Agreement. This constitutional crisis led to ethnic
groups meeting in Taungyi on February 25, 1961 and submitting a proposal
of federalism to parliament. Unfortunately, General Ne Win took power
from U Nu, the Prime Minister of the Union government, claiming nonintegration of the country on March 2, 1962. The ethnic issues continued to
worsen.
General New Win's Policy of Burmanization and Ethnic Cleansing
Right after his military coup in 1962, General Ne Win began using a policy
of Burmanization, also known as assimilation, that means making all ethnic
groups into Burmans. He abolished the 1947 Constitution and ruled by guns.
It was now forbidden to teach or learn ethnic languages in the universities
and colleges. Burman cultural dress, such as Taihpung and Longkyi, became
the official dress in offices and schools. In Chin State, there is not a single
college or university. As result, many Chin people could not pursue higher
education and became uneducated. Chins who attended the Mandalay
University and Rangoon University were indoctrinated in Burman cultures.
This is a calculated assimilation policy of Ne Win to assimilate all ethnic
groups into Burmans.
As a last resort, more ethnic minority groups took up arms against Ne Win’s
dictatorial rule leaving families, relatives and friends behind in an attempt to
regain their inherent rights and to safeguard their freedom. Ethnic civilians
do not escape the Burmese Army's eye either because the Burmese Army
regards them as supporters of the ethnic armed forces. They are subject to
torture, imprisonment, and arbitrary arrest along with forced relocation. In
order to escape the Burmese Army's persecution, ethnic groups have fled to
other countries for safe haven.
The Revolutionary Council, from 1962 to 1974, and the Burma Socialist
Program Party, the one party system, did not satisfy the majority of Burmans
either. The Military regime not only failed the economic policy of the
country, but also spent approximately 40% of the national income for the
defense budget in order to strengthen the armed forces to fight against the
ethnic armed forces. It had been used for ethnic cleansing activities. Selling
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her rich natural resources, such as hardwood to neighboring countries
including Thailand could not solve the economic crisis. To bail out of the
economic crisis, the only choice left was applying for the Least Developed
Country status. In 1987, Burma became one of the ten poorest countries in
the world.
One of the main reasons for the 1988 uprising was freedom from the
Burmese dictatorial rule, which included economic freedom, cultural
freedom, educational freedom, etc. After the uprising, the regime doubled
armed forces along with the doubling of opium production. Production of
opium became one of the main sources of income for the Burmese Army.
Most of opium production had been taken places in ethnic areas such as in
the Wa area of Shan State. This has not only been a threat to Burmans and
the ethnic groups, but also to the international community. The International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999, released by the Department of State
in March 2000, describes Burma as follows: "Burma has been, and continues
to be, one of the world's largest producers of illicit opium. Burmese opium
production doubled in 1989"6. The Burmese military regime regards the
ethnic minority groups as the enemy. Two months ago, on August 7, 2000,
the Central Executive Committee of the National League for Democracy
(NLD) released a four points statement condemning the burning of Chin
Christian churches, houses, school buildings and live stock. The fourth point
of the statement said: "In Burma today, under the rule of the military
dictators, if you are not a Burman Buddhist you are discriminated against.
The military dictators regard you as an enemy." 7 This statement truthfully
highlights the crux of the political crisis in Burma. For non-Burman groups,
and those who oppose the SPDC, life in Burma is full of fear.
Two weeks ago, I was in Guam interviewing an estimated 280 refugees from
Burma, mostly from Chin State on human rights issues. One thing that
strikes me most concerns Chin girls. I was told that the Burmese Army is
targeting Chin girls for marriage. These girls, and their families, obtain more
6
The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 released by the Department of State in March
2000, P. 5.
7
Central Executive Committee, National League for Democracy, Statement 124 (8/00), 7 August 2000,
Rangoon
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opportunity by marrying members of the Burmese Army, and in the same
way Burmese soldiers who marry Chin girls are promoted in rank.
Chin women who married Burmese soldiers later received military training
at the Football ground in Haka. They are then used to combat the activities
of the Chin National Front. These Chin girls are used for both purposes of
assimilation and attacking the Chin people. A high school teacher at Haka
town, Chin State told me another painful story. One day the Army Captain
came to his high school classroom saying that he needed the most beautiful
girl in the classroom. Shortly thereafter, a Chin girl was taken to his house
where it was later discovered she had been raped. Her family said they were
afraid to report the rape to higher authorities knowing there would be no
action taken and the family would surely be accused of lying. These acts
committed crimes against humanity.
Chin State, my State, is a restricted area. Chin-Americans could not
travel to Chin State to visit their relatives. Foreigners are also not
allowed to visit Chin State. In Chin State, approximately 1% are
Burman, they are the Burmese Army and their families. Not less than
99% of the population is Chin people. One percent of the population
holds power over the will of 99% of the population. The U.N. Human
Rights Commission’s Rapporteur Rajsoomer Lallah's report on Burma,
released on October 16, 2000, said that the worst violence committed by
the Burmese Army was against ethnic minorities8 This is about ethnic
cleansing.
According to the report of the U.S Committee for Refugees 2000 World
Refugee Survey, at least 200,000 refugees from Burma live in Thailand,
Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, and other countries. Approximately, up to one
million people are internally displaced.9 These figures provide a clear picture
of the political crisis in Burma, a crisis which is about ethnic discrimination
because not less than 90% of those who took refuge outside the country, and
those internally displaced, are the ethnic people, not Burmans.
The International Community's Role
The United Nations General Assembly has made resolutions on Burma for
nine consecutive years. Recently, on October 10, 2000, the U.S Congress
8
9
See Rapporteur Rajsoomer Lallah’s Report on Burma
See U.S. Committee for Refugees Website, World Refugee Survey 2000, P 133.
8
passed Resolution H. Con 328 including implementation of the results of
1990 general election. I think the U.N, the U.S, and other governments have
a legitimate and powerful role to play in implementing the results of the
1990 Elections based on the will of the Burmese people. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) article 21: 3 says, "the will of the
people shall be the basis of the authority of government."10 The people of
Burma have expressed their will, voting against the military regime and
voting for democracy. The international community has the right to demand
that the Burmese military regime transfer power to the 1990 election
winners.
In addition to the results of the 1990 election, it would also be helpful to
concentrate more on the refugee situation and problems of the internally
displaced persons inside the country, including ethnic cleansing, genocide,
and war crimes committed by the Burmese Army. From a humanitarian
ground, the international community has a major role to play in today’s
ethnic political problems in Burma. I strongly believe issues such as
refugees in border areas, and internally displaced persons, would provide a
sense of urgency to the international community, hence speeding up political
change in Burma. Issue such as ethnic cleansing could become a spotlight in
the efforts to implement the 1990 election and its legitimacy.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Chief Sadako Ogata's recent visit
to a Karen refugee camp in the Thai-Burma border area on October 17, 2000
was very encouraging to refugees themselves, the ethnic groups, and the
democratic forces, including the international community. Ms. Ogata shared
her insights upon her return from the refugee camp, saying to reporters, "I
am sorry to say I was quite shocked."11
Indeed, the SPDC does care about the international community's voice and
pressure. They respond to the truth of events by disseminating wrong and
untruthful news to the international community. For instance, on October 17,
2000, U Win Aung, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the
delegation of the Union of Myanmar to the Millennium Summit in New
York, spoke at the Summit saying, "We do no harm to anyone. We do not
commit any atrocities".12 Therefore, the involvement and role of the
10
See UN Commission on Human Rights website
See BurmaNet News website, October 17, 2000.
12
See Myanmar Information Committee website, Information Sheet No. B-1525 (I) 9 September, 2000.
11
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international community is crucial to motivating political change in the
Union of Burma.
Lessons from the Past
People should look to the future. However, many lessons are to be learned
from the past. One key area is from a Panglong perspective. From a
Panglong perspective, the Union existed because of the Panglong
signatories. The spirit of Panglong should be restored, respected, and
honored because the Union is not of the Burmans alone; rather it is of all
ethnic groups. The Union Constitution should also be a federalism giving
full functioning power to each state government. Equally important, the
Right of Secession should be enshrined in the new Union Constitution.
These were dreams of the Union’s founding members. When we look back
at the 1990 elections, the NLD won 396 seats out of 485 seats. The SPDC
won only 10 seats and the other 79 seats went to independent and ethnic
groups. In accordance with this election rule, Pyithu Hluttaw (People's
Assembly) was to form the Union government, which was based upon the
size of population. As Burmans are majority in number, it seems that the
Union government will always go to the hands of the Burman majority and
the ethnic groups will have a hard time defending or proposing their agendas
at Union Parliament. Therefore, "drafting the new Union Constitution of
Burma will indeed be a crucial question for the future Union of Burma."13
Conclusion
After the 1988 democratic uprising, both ethnic groups and Burman
democratic forces have joined together in the efforts to restore genuine
democracy in the Union of Burma. There is hope for the future. This hope
should be based on equal footings and equal status of all the Union
members.
The independence hero, Aung San once said to the ethnic people; "If Burma
receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat".14 A Kyat is a Burmese
currency. In other words, if a Chin gets one dollar, a Burmese also will get
an equal amount, which is a dollar. It is about the right to equality. Aung
San’s dream for the Union government was based on equality and self13
14
Hmung, Zo T. “My Vision for Chinland”. Chin National Journal ( 1997): 109.
Smith, Martin. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London, Zed Books Ltd. 1991. p. 78
10
determination. Unfortunately, the AFPFL governments and the Burmese
military regime ignored Aung San's dream. I believe Burma’s prodemocracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, being the daughter of Aung San,
surely knows her father's dream.
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