On Cognitive and Social Values: A Reply to My Critics
HUGH LACEY
Department of Philosophy, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT: This article is a response to six critics of my article, “Scientific Understanding and the Control of
Nature,” published as the lead article in this issue: Douglas Allchin, Roger C. Cross, William Herfel, Seng Piew Loo,
Peter Machamer & Heather Douglas, and Ernan McMullin. It clarifies themes in the earlier article, responds to
criticisms, and reaffirms the significance of distinguishing between cognitive and social values for the sake of gaining
a better grasp of scientific understanding.
__________
In “Scientific Understanding and the Control of Nature”, I argued in that there is an elective affinity
between adopting what I called the “materialist constraint/selection strategy” and the “modern value
scheme of control”. Thence, I concluded, much of modern science is not value neutral. Nevertheless, I
went on to argue that this is compatible with scientific judgments made under the materialist strategy
being impartial, since there remains a distinction between cognitive and social values, and these two
kinds of values influence scientific judgments at different logical moments. My commentators offer some
thoughtful criticisms. McMullin queries my use of the term “materialist”. He also addresses my view of the
“affinity”. Loo and Allchin seem to take issue with this view, though Allchin is more concerned with who
bears responsibility for projects informed by scientific knowledge. Machamer & Douglas argue directly
against the separation of roles of the cognitive and social values. Herfel challenges the distinction
between different forms of understanding to which my argument appeals, and suggests an alternative
account both of materialist understanding and of control. Finally, Cross reflects critically upon the
implications for science education that I sketched. I welcome the opportunity to respond to these
criticisms and to clarify my arguments.
MATERIALIST UNDERSTANDING AND THE CONTROL OF NATURE
The following set of theses summarize my view that there is an elective affinity between adopting the
materialist strategy and the modern value scheme of control.
1) Theories established under the materialist strategy provide knowledge that serves to inform practices
of control, and they represent objects, insofar as they can enter into human practices, as they must be
represented in order to enhance our capability systematically to exercise control over them.
2) There is a dialectic of technological and (materialist) theoretical developments.
3) Materialist understandingi is gained from the perspective of practices of control, including experimental
ones.
4) The world has become so shaped by projects expressing the modern value scheme of control (and
thus, especially in recent decades, projects themselves informed by materialist knowledge) that central
objects of our practical life and lived experience (e.g., technological objects) are explicable in their
workings, and their material possibilities charted, only by materialist understanding.
5) Success in extending vastly the realm of control, the widespread adoption of the modern value scheme
of control, and the consequent common expectation that all social problems have in principle a solution
involving our control over objects -- reinforced by the appeal of materialist metaphysics -- have dimmed
our sensibilities to other modes of understanding, including those that might provide the categories for
legitimating subordinating control to other social values.ii
I appealed to these five theses, to explain the virtual (though not complete) monopoly of
materialist research in contemporary science. (1)-(3) by themselvesiii are not sufficient to this end.
(McMullin is right to insist on this!) Moreover, they are compatible with (4) and (5) being false; and thus
both with materialist understanding being one among a variety of forms of valued understanding, and with
control being subordinated to other social values. There is no logically necessary connection between all
of the five theses. The way in which materialist understanding and control are drawn to each other, as
expressed in the theses, is socially embodied; it reflects historical conditions and the dominance of social
institutions that, along with such other values as (especially today) those of multinational capital and free
markets, manifest the modern value scheme of control. iv Thus, under different historical and social
conditions, the link of (1)-(3) with (4) and (5) would be broken, so that engaging in materialist research as
such does not imply commitment to the modern value scheme of control, and it may (I believe, will) find
an appropriate place within other value perspectives -- not in an unqualified way, but tied to where it can
be significant for their projects.
The affinity between materialist understanding and control of nature is summed up in the five
theses. McMullin’s remarks, in his section “Control of Nature”, largely provide helpful clarifications and
elaborations of my view. His attempts to identify an affinity are all contained in my theses. His “strategies
... as a necessary condition” for informing technological projects is built into (1), and to some extent (4).
(5) is usefully elaborated by: “... the absence of all considerations bearing on human well-being from the
strategies that enable structural [materialist] explanations to be developed affords a precedent of sorts for
the subordination of human values to technological advance.” And his first remark about Galileo provides
rich content for (3), and his second one endorses (2).
McMullin criticizes my use of “materialist” in “materialist strategies”. Yet I can detect little
substantive disagreement.v I agree fundamentally with his account of “structural explanation”; it indeed
elaborates well the kind of explanation (explaining phenomena causally in terms of underlying structure,
process and law) that I speak of as being gained under the materialist strategy. I agree, furthermore, that
structural explanation does not entail “reductionism”, that all phenomena can be explained structurally;
and that structural explanations can coexist with and complement other forms of explanation that are not
reducible to structural ones -- e.g., in the case of human beings, intentional ones. Why then did I use the
word “materialist”? McMullin is right that I intended to connote a link with materialist metaphysics, but that
is not a link I created. Modern scientific practice has often been interpreted as having essential links with
materialist metaphysics, and this is partly why the human sciences often adopt materialist strategies
exclusively. I intended the connotation in order to affirm provocatively that the materialist strategies can
(and should) be dissociated from materialist metaphysics, and from any hint that they have exclusive
privilege that might come with the association with this metaphysics. I did not foresee, however, the
“negative rhetorical overtone” that McMullin picks up from my terminology. vi
DISTINGUISHING COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL VALUES
Machamer & Douglas (M&D) maintain “that one cannot usefully or coherently distinguish the cognitive
from the social”.vii They defend this on the ground that cognitive and social values always manifest
themselves in interplay in concrete practices, objects and phenomena. That is not a sufficient ground.
Whether the distinction is useful or not depends upon the explanatory and normative analyses that it
does, or does not, enable.
M&D mislocate my use of the distinction, when they place it within a tradition that uses what they
take to be comparable distinctions (fact/value, scientific/non-scientific and the like)viii, which are made in
order “to provide a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate influences on scientific judgment”, which
in turn enables the promotion of “pure” knowledge, uncontaminated by social influence, and the
performance of “completely rational decision making”. Now, I am interested in what are legitimate
influences on scientific judgments, but not in the promotion of knowledge whose intelligibility (which
combines both cognitive grounding and moral or social significance -- cf., Anderson, 1995) can be
grasped separately from social context.
There are several different (though often overlapping) kinds of scientific judgments, i.e. judgments
made in scientific practice about a theory . They include judgments about provisionally entertaining it,
about making a commitment to its development, about its empirical warrant compared with available
competitors (of a specified domain of phenomena), about whether it (of a domain) is to be included in the
stock of knowledge or consolidated beliefs (Lacey, 1997a), and about its significance or the propriety and
value of using it to inform practical activity. Depending on the kind of scientific judgment it will be
influenced in different ways, and with different salience, by various combinations of cognitive and social
(and also personal and moral) values. The last two kinds, about consolidated beliefs and about
significance, are of special interest.
Judgments about the consolidated belief in a theory (of a domain of phenomena) are soundly
made, according to the thesis I called impartialityix, only if the theory manifests the cognitive values to a
high degree according to the most rigorous standards of assessing the degree of manifestation of the
cognitive values -- regardless of whether (among other things) the theory may be legitimately and usefully
applied in the service of specified social values.x Impartiality, however, does not imply neutralityxi; a
theory’s being part of the stock of knowledge or an item of consolidated belief does not imply that it may
legitimately be applied in any social context or that it is generally significant. The possibilities of a domain
encapsulated in a theory may simply be irrelevant (or counter-productive) to the practical projects
rendered desirable by certain social values.
We might expect that a theory would be especially amenable to application in projects framed by
the social values with affinities to the constraint/selection strategies under which it was developed and
consolidated. Then we might even speak of these social values also being manifested in the theory.
Impartiality does not preclude this; it just denies that it should have anything to do with the grounds
supporting a judgment of consolidated belief. Holding a consolidated belief in a theory (of a domain) is
compatible with holding it to be devoid of significancexii, and judgments of significance (which can be
rationally evaluated) cannot be settled by appeal to the cognitive values alone.
Since judgments of consolidated belief are arrived at in the course of research processes, earlier
moments of which involved making judgments to provisionally entertain the theory and to make
commitments to pursue its development, and these judgments unobjectionably rest in part on adopting
certain social, moral and personal values, there will be items of scientific knowledge that would not have
been obtained outside of contexts where certain social values (e.g., the modern value scheme of control)
have been adopted. Social values can thus be among the factors that causally explain why we have
come to hold certain consolidated beliefs. On the other hand, I want to put into proper balance that social
values are not properly among the grounds for affirming consolidated belief in a theory (of a domain); and
that the goals of one’s activity (shaped by one’s social values) are not rationally determined by (and
means to them may not be able to be informed by) available scientific knowledge. Thus I want to balance
a defense of integrity, with the claim that being held in accord with integrity does not generally imply
significance. “Balance” is the key. I am not advocating acting out of ignorance or voluntarism.
I also want to point to ambiguities in the term “scientific knowledge”: that recognized as
knowledge, and validated as such, within the tradition of modern science; or theories consolidated of
certain domains by research under the materialist constraint/selection strategy; or systematic empiricallybased knowledge, which includes much of traditional agricultural and medical knowledge, as well as
“alternative visions” (Herfel) -- e.g., ecological -- that do exist within what is called “modern science”. The
last usage is not identical with the first two. Calling something “scientific” is, up to a point, honorific,
though how one uses the term is not devoid of (e.g.) educational and legal implications (Lacey, 1997b). In
this paper, I use the term in the sense of “systematic, empirically-based knowledge”. Then, referring to the
“balance” that I want to achieve, not only may items of knowledge gained under the materialist strategy
not be significant given one’s social values, but also the quest for knowledge to inform one’s projects
(especially if they are not deeply implicated in the modern value scheme of control) need not be limited to
developments under the materialist strategy.
The seed
I agree with much of what M&D say about the “seed” example. Of course there are multiple goals in any
project of applied science; in part, that is why impartiality does not imply neutrality. According to my
analysis, research conducted under the materialist strategy has links with the modern value scheme of
control, which in turn reinforce and are reinforced by other social values such as those of the market,
whose interests may well be (sometimes uniquely) furthered by particular materialist research projects.
My point is that these social values account for the interest in the possibilities discovered in the materialist
research project (and thus the significance of the theory that encapsulates them), but what the concrete
possibilities turn out to be is settled by evaluation of theories in the light of the cognitive values. The social
and cognitive values are playing their roles at different (logical) moments.
M&D affirm (their
Endnote 2): “... what [Lacey] cannot do is accept the social/cognitive separation, and at the same time,
accept that scientific judgments (as pure as they could be) actually could be made in a real world
context”. Now, I deploy two distinctions: social value/cognitive value; and materialist/ related to the world
of lived experience (which has social aspects). They are different distinctions. “In a real world context”
scientific judgments (e.g., about the causes of “real world” effects) will undoubtedly involve reference to
social as well as material causal factors, for rarely is there a straightforward extrapolation from the
laboratory or experimental field station to “the real world” (Lacey, 1997b), and it may be very difficult
(even in principle) to separate these factors. Even so, such judgments should (and can) be assessed in
the light of the cognitive values. So too should judgments made within the second strategy of research on
the seed that I describe. It is irrelevant to the cognitive assessment of such judgments that, if established,
they would be significant for the projects nurtured by specific social values. Furthermore, I do not claim
that knowledge gained under the materialist strategy is all insignificant under the strategies of the second
approach. Much of it will be significant, consistent with my view that control plays some role in all cultures,
as M&D’s (and Herfel’s) examples make clear. It is true that impartiality does not imply neutrality, but that
leaves open that numerous items of materialist knowledge will have the requisite neutrality -- so too may
items of traditional agricultural knowledge.
The epidemiology of dioxin
M&D’s introduction of the case of “dioxin” provides a useful context to further the discussion. I will
focus on the one new point that it raises. They say: “... statistical reasoning is both social and cognitive at
a deep level. ... Statistical significance levels are really the level of false positive error that will be
tolerated in the particular study. What level of error should be tolerated seems obviously to depend upon
what the importance of the findings are, or ... what hangs on whether one makes a mistake or not.
Presumably this is a value judgment about the importance of the claim advanced in the study. But such
evaluations of importance are both social and cognitive.” Yes, they are both social and cognitive; but the
two seem to be separable. The social, as well as the cognitive, is relevant to the judgment of what level of
error should be tolerated, but not to the estimation of what the level of error is.
The studies on dioxin exposure causing cancer (as reported by M&D) support this separation.
Collins et al., company scientists perhaps motivated by the social value “protection of employer and
profit”, did not argue that Fingerhut et al. were tolerating too lax a level of error motivated by social values
connected with public health standards. Rather Collins attempted to cast doubt on Fingerhut’s estimate of
the level of error; if successful, the issue of ranking of the claims of the competing social values would not
have to be entered into. On the account offered, Collins misused statistical methods. We may explain his
behavior in doing so in terms of his putting social values alongside or ahead of the cognitive values
embodied in the statistical methods. According to my analysis, this is illegitimate; though if -- from stating
explicitly his commitment to certain social values -- he had demanded higher standards of evidence from
Fingerhut, that would be legitimate (in principle), but then the dispute would be squarely in the realm of
social values. More generally, I think that social values can properly influence the standards against
which we “measure” the degree of manifestation of the cognitive values in a theory (of a domain). xiii
In all of these cases, the distinction between social values and cognitive values is vindicated in
view of its explanatory and normative uses.
THE SEED AGAIN
Herfel
At the outset of the lead article, I point to various forms of understanding. I do not think that they are all on
a par, or that they do not interact. In particular, the materialist form is incomplete, and understanding of
things gained within it typically represents things in abstraction from their full (often human and social;
also environmental) contexts. That underlies the central point of the article, the link between the
predominance of the materialist form of understanding and the modern value scheme of control. Of
course, hybrid seeds are a human artifact. My point is that they are not represented as such under the
materialist form of understanding. And, of course, we cannot understand that seeds become commodities
without considering the material possibilities and impossibilities of hybrid seeds, as well as the forms of
organizing of social and economic institutions. Herfel complains that my account “leaves out the fact that
human beings, and their societies, are material entities”, and that I am committed to “dualism”. In fact, my
argument presupposes no such metaphysics. Human beings and their societies are indeed part of nature,
but (like most objects in the realm of lived experience) their possibilities are not exhausted by their
material possibilities. One needs a plurality of nonreducible vocabularies to capture the full range of their
possibilities.xiv
I agree with much of what Herfel writes about “control”. We cannot control the whole of nature; we
can only exercise control over particular natural objects or systems. I presented “gaining enhanced
capability to control nature [natural -- material? -- objects]” and “activities realizing this enhanced
capability” as values, not subordinated systematically to other social values in predominant modern
institutions, though interacting in a reinforcing way (but not uniquely) with the values of the market and of
private enterprize. The green revolution gains much of its rationale, and initial credibility, from being an
implementation of the modern value scheme of control, and relatedly from being informed by knowledge
gained under the materialist strategy. The centerpiece of Shiva’s criticism is that such a project was
bound to have disastrous consequences.xv From her perspective, it is important to subordinate the
control of natural objects to other social values such as local empowerment and sustainable environment,
and not to separate the investigation of material possibilities of things from the human, social and
environmental contexts in which those possibilities might be realized, and what might happen to them
should the possibilities be realized. It oversimplifies this analysis to put it, as Herfel does, that the
question is “who controls” the activity of farming: local farmers or multinational enterprises. But I do agree
with him that addressing questions like these fruitfully must involve thinking of ourselves as integrally
implicated in complex and interacting networks of material and social relations. Moreover, the way that
these are currently (see Note 4) organized may pose profound obstacles to the development of
alternatives opposed to the forces linked with the modern value scheme of control.
Allchin
Allchin acknowledges the devastation caused by the green revolution that Shiva documents, and he
wishes to assign responsibility. He denies that “scientists or their style of research were responsible” even
for the research agenda. Rather: “Scientific research was merely a tool for furthering the cultural values of
an ill-informed Rockefeller Foundation” and it, in turn, “merely reflected the cultural norms of the time in
adopting a ‘scientific’ strategy for solving the vexing problem of global hunger”. Now, I do not claim that
scientists and their style of research were solely, or primarily, responsible for the green revolution. I am
sure Cross would say that scientists were responsible for their research becoming a “tool” for furthering
these cultural values, and that we are not exempted from responsibility when we sell our skilled services
to a socially respectable bidder. I would agree. But that is not the point I am pressing. My point is that the
research that informed the green revolution could not have been presumed to have significance outside
of contexts shaped by these cultural values, or others closely affiliated with the modern value scheme of
control (see also Note 17, lead article). However well its results may have met the conditions of
impartiality, they do not satisfy neutrality. The presumption of neutrality that underlies withholding
responsibility from the scientists involved derives from the research being conducted under the materialist
strategy, i.e., its being devoted “only” to the identification of a class of material possibilities.
Allchin’s view seems to be that it is the scientist’s job to identify material possibilities, and
society’s to decide which classes of material possibilities are worth investigating and which ones are to be
realized; that the scientist makes judgments about consolidated beliefs about the underlying order and
what the material possibilities are, and society makes judgments of significance. This permits him to
criticize the green revolution, and praise research efforts in Africa that “pursue science within the
frameworks of their local social and technological traditions”. He asks: “Should we say that the science is
fundamentally different merely because the cultural context has changed?” The research is not described
in sufficient detail to give a clear, and appropriately nuanced, answer to this question. If what is
“fundamental” to science is that it produce systematic, empirically-based knowledge, then one would
hope the answer to be “no”. But it is research in a context where control is being subordinated to the
values of “local social and technological traditions”, and thus where the constraint/selection strategies of
the research may not be limited to the materialist strategy.
Shiva (1991) maintains that it is
characteristic of many traditional local knowledge systems to gain understanding of things, not
reductionistically (i.e., in terms of underlying constituents, structures, processes and laws), but in virtue of
their relations with other things and kinds of things, including their relationships to ecological, social and
cosmic order. While it is clear that this kind of local knowledge can be usefully complemented and
supplemented in many ways by knowledge gained under the materialist strategy (see Lacey, 1997b), it
can remain a viable basis of research (often in collaboration with research conducted under the
materialist strategy) and there is no ground to hold that it can be displaced by materialist research. xvi I
recognize that a considerable amount of knowledge gained under the materialist strategy can be
significant in value perspectives in which control is subordinated to other social values. Nevertheless,
research conducted predominantly under the materialist strategy, abstracting from explicit consideration
of issues of significance, gains its intelligibility from its implicitly presumed significance for the modern
value scheme of control (see Note 2) . Thus, while the potential significance of a theory is not among the
proper grounds for consolidated belief in it (of a domain), when the research that grounds a consolidated
belief is guided “only” by the materialist strategy, its significance for the modern value scheme of control is
ceteris paribus assured. And so, I part company with Allchin’s view of separating the responsibilities of
scientists and society, though on many particulars we agree.
Loo
Loo affirms: “Lacey makes reference to the works of Shiva(1991) and Nandy (1988) but overlooks the
important point made by them that science and violence towards nature are inseparably intertwined.” He
wishes to refute this point, apparently in order to defend neutrality (a view which, oddly, he attributes to
me). His refutation, however, just consists of a polemic against some superficial and ill-considered
remarks made by some of the contributors to Nandy’s volume, but he does not address Shiva’s (1988)
interesting argument, which is applied not to “science” but to “reductionist science”, which amounts (in my
terminology) to science produced under the materialist strategy to the exclusion of other strategies.
Although I did not use the word “violence”, my analysis of the seed (largely derived from Shiva)
illustrates most of her claims. Reductionist science results in violence against “the beneficiary of
knowledge”, e.g., farmers in rural India. She agrees with Allchin, of course, that the science is not the
only, or even the principal, causal factor involved; its link with “capitalist logic” is essential to her analysis.
For her, the scientific knowledge that informed the green revolution could only have been significant when
linked with this logic. Secondly, reductionist science results in violence against “the subject of
knowledge”. Granting “monopoly” to knowledge gained under the materialist strategy, devalues the
knowledge of the bearers of other forms of understanding and the activities informed by them, and poses
no barriers to social and economic projects which render these forms insignificant and thus diminish the
agency of their bearers.xvii Thirdly, and relatedly, there can be violence against “knowledge itself”, as
when in the name of sound “scientific knowledge” traditional knowledge is not only devalued but also
suppressed and distorted. Finally, there is violence against “the object of knowledge”, when, e.g., a
project informed by reductionist knowledge “destroys the innate integrity of nature and therefore robs it of
its regenerative capacity”.
I query the detail and generality of Shiva’s analysis of this “fourfold violence” that results from the
monopoly of reductionist knowledge, and I think its connection with “capitalist logic” is mediated by
commitment to the modern value scheme of control. But its thrust is sound. xviii
SCIENCE EDUCATION
Cross correctly points out that my remarks relating to science education are spare and uninformed by the
current literature on science education. They constitute an afterthought added to the main text at the
instigation of the editor of this journal. In agreeing to add the afterthought I hoped that it might provoke
some in the field of science education to useful reflection. Thus, I welcome Cross’ reaction. He identifies a
significant ambiguity in my stated remarks, offers an interesting interpretation of them as “an echo of
Bernal”, and raises the question of how science education programs could be changed so that science
would be taught as integrally a social and cultural phenomenon -- one whose direction is open to
democratic deliberation, at the same time as its immediate participants assume special social
responsibilities.
The ambiguity is in my remark that one of the tasks of science education is “to develop critical
self-consciousness about the character of scientific activity and its applications, and the choices one
faces as a responsible participant in it.” Cross raises whether this is a proposal “to graft onto a traditional
form of schooling in science” a critique of modern science, or whether it proposes a much more profound
transformation of science education. He then points to the flaws of the grafting approach, and difficulties - largely springing from the socialization of science teachers -- confronting attempting a profound
transformation. Cross is correct that I do not reject the “traditional conceptions of scientific literacy”
entirely, for much scientific knowledge gained under the materialist strategy is significant across a wide
range of value perspectives, and some spaces and problems are explored appropriately only under that
strategy. But he is correct in identifying the flaws of grafting a critique onto this. A critique, such as the
one I am offering, cannot leave our approach to science, and therefore to science teaching, unchanged.
How can we go about producing that change, given reigning social values? Some form of the
“grafting” approach probably cannot be avoided in the first instance. Space needs to be gained to develop
the critique and its implications. As a philosopher of science I am free to do this without having to deal
with the day to day issues of teaching any of the content or skills of science; and I can offer it to science
students in my classroom. Similarly, Cross can develop programs in institutes for social responsibility in
science. Where forms of traditional knowledge still remain vital in a society (as in many of the third world
countries) the concrete possibilities for raising a critical interaction, and for bringing different perspectives
to bear on practical issues, are more directly pertinent.
In the long run, however, I think one must aim for a richer integration of science into the whole
curriculum, so that science, the values connected with its pursuit, its historical, economic and social
context and implications, and its interactions with other forms of knowledge would be taught as
interwoven. Then, the lines between the scientist and non-scientist would blur. It would be open to
everyone to gain a strong understanding of science (and the competing versions of it) -- some learning
how to be more actively involved in specialized pursuits, others becoming especially conversant with
judgments of significance -- learning to make judgments about what kinds of knowledge are needed to
inform the immediate tasks of social significance, and the skills needed to make the assessments (and to
argue intelligently) about both cognitive and social values that lead to the definition of what is socially
important.
This then puts me squarely on the side of those who wish science education to promote that form
of citizenship (which Cross favors) in which an informed community can debate not only the direction and
merits of scientific practices under the materialist strategy (Bernal), but also what strategies of research
are desirable to adopt . Although I can offer no concrete curricular or pedagogical proposals, I am
grateful to Cross for having raised this important set of issues, and I look forward to further contributions
from him.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
McMullin concludes his paper as follows: “But it is not so clear that there is an alternative way to conduct
scientific research which employs strategies of a different sort, strategies that no longer exclude issues
that bear on human flourishing.” Certainly, in accord with my account of the affinity between materialist
inquiry and the modern value scheme of control, there is no alternative that is institutionalized in the way
that materialist inquiry is. We might look for alternatives (or perhaps anticipations or residues of them) at
the margins, or among minority approaches in mainstream institutions. That is why I am interested in
efforts in the third world to integrate materialist knowledge and traditional local knowledge (Lacey,
1997b).xix Moreover, certainly there is no alternative that has been developed with the sophistication,
systematicity, general credibility and power of materialist science. I do not look for one alternative,
however, but a diversity of more modest, less encompassing alternatives, complementing each other and
materialist inquiry, reflecting the diversity of social and cultural values which have been adopted in
different places. These are not alternatives in which social values will trump cognitive values, but ones in
which social, cultural and material factors are considered together (in projects of systematic, empiricallybased inquiry, whose products are subject to assessment in view of the cognitive values, Note 17) in
complex, interacting causal networks, and in which the quest for those possibilities that may further
human flourishing is foremost.
Another place where we can look for alternatives is in the human sciences themselves. In
denying, as McMullin and I both do, that human possibilities are exhausted by materialist possibilities, we
thereby refuse to grant a monopoly in the human sciences to the materialist strategy, and to identify the
realm of systematic, empirically-based inquiry with inquiry conducted under that strategy (Lacey, 1990;
Lacey & Schwartz, 1996).
My central point is that there is, embodied strongly under current social conditions, an elective
affinity between the materialist strategy and the modern value scheme of control. My argument for it does
not depend on contrast with well developed alternatives, though in the absence of strong alternative
competitors its social salience may be insignificant. Many, no doubt, will see no need for alternatives.
After all, the modern value scheme of control has widespread appeal today, and for others the claims of
materialist reductionism are virtually a priori. For them, whether the preeminence of the materialist
strategy derives from the presupposition of the neutrality of its results, or from its links with a favored and
hegemonic set of values, perhaps is of no great moment. But for those who are critical of the modern
value scheme of control, my point lends urgency to the quest for alternatives. It also indicates the
difficulties, both cognitive and social, confronting that quest.
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Shiva, V.: 1988, ‘Reductionist Science as Epistemological Violence’, in A. Nandy (ed.), Science,
Hegemony and Violence, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
Shiva, V.: 1991, The Violence of the Green Revolution, Zed Books, London.
NOTES
i
“Materialist knowledge (understanding, research)” is simply an abbreviation for “knowledge (understanding)
gained or research conducted under the materialist strategy”
ii
Thus, they have also dimmed our awareness of the fallacy of inferring: if a (materialist) theory is empirically
well established then ceteris paribus it is significant, i.e., legitimately available to being used to inform practical
projects. In fact, any movement from being well established empirically to significance requires the mediation of the
values expressed in the projects. The implicit assumption that all viable practical projects express the modern value
scheme of control enables this mediation often to be overlooked.
iii
As pointed out the lead article, (1)-(3) are compatible with there being materialist understanding of domains
of objects outside of the realms of our control, and there being domains appropriately investigated only under the
materialist strategy, since there is reason to hold that their possibilities are exhausted by their material possibilities.
So the objectives of specific materialist research projects may have nothing to do with the interest of furthering
control. McMullin’s remark about “curiosity” is especially pertinent here.
iv
It is widely held today in political controversies throughout the world that the only viable possibilities for the
future are those framed by the institutions and policies of neoliberalism. (For criticism of this view, see Lacey, 1997a.)
Then, since the social institutions in which the affinity is embodied are held to be effectively historically necessary, it
becomes easy to slip into the view that the conjunction of the five theses represents some sort of given. Note,
however, that the affinity can also be embodied in non-capitalist structures, e.g., those of Soviet-bloc “socialism”.
v
This does not surprise me, for my thinking on the roles of the cognitive and social values has been very
much influenced by interaction with his work. Both the lead article and Lacey (1997c) are descendants from a
commentary I made to a presentation of McMullin on “Values in Science” at a conference of the Greater Philadelphia
Area Philosophy Consortium in October 1994.
vi
I am not fully happy with my terminology, and I acknowledge that it carries hints of ambiguity (see Note 4,
lead article), which I will not address here. For my views on “intention” and “intentionality”, see Lacey (1996) and
Lacey & Schwartz (1986). See also Note 14.
vii
Frequently, however, they refer to the “cognitive and social aspects” of scientific judgments and to the
“interplay” between them. Their own argument, especially concerning levels of statistical significance in connection
with the epidemiology of dioxin, seems to require some such distinction.
viii
For my account of “values” and of how value judgments may properly be influenced by scientific judgments,
see Lacey & Schwartz (1996) and Lacey (1997a). See also Note 11. I reject emotivist and subjectivist metaethical
views, and the view that values are not open to rational assessment (Lacey & Schwartz, 1996). Contrary to M&D’s
suggestion, on the current theme I do not keep company with Ayer, Stevenson and Hare. M&D have also, more
appropriately, put me into the company of Laudan and Marx. I have discussed the relationship of my views with those
of Laudan (briefly) in Lacey (1997c), and with Marx in Lacey & Schwartz (1986).
ix
Remember that I have diagnosed the view that science is value free as consisting of three theses:
impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. (It is not that social and moral values play no major roles connected with
scientific practices and some scientific judgments. I discuss this in detail in my manuscript in progress, referred to in
Note 5, lead article.) I think that only impartiality can be defended. But I do not think that all theory choices actually
made in scientific practice, or all claims to scientific knowledge authoritatively propounded from scientific institutions,
are impartial. Ideology may be propounded as scientific knowledge (Lewontin, 1993). Impartiality, as I am prepared to
defend it, should be understood as itself a value of scientific practice that we can aspire to have manifested ever
more fully.
x
Cognitive values are the characteristics of a “good” theory, the features desired to be manifested to a high
degree in, and believed to be constitutive (Longino, 1990) of a worthily believed theory, one taken to express
knowledge. Social values are features desired to be manifested in, and believed to be constitutive of worthily adopted
social forms. (For more on social values, see Lacey, 1997a; Lacey & Schwartz, 1996; on cognitive values, see Lacey,
1997c). Impartiality presupposes that cognitive values can be identified and defended as such independently of social
values, even if they are never manifested in the absence of the manifestation of some social values. That is
consistent with practices which express the cognitive values being considered as of high (or low) social value.
xi
I presented neutrality as a conjunction of three (logically separable) theses: (1) theories logically imply no
value statements; (2) theories have no consequences for the fundamental values on holds, and (3) theories may, in
principle, be adopted in practice within any value scheme. Here I will be concerned only with (3). In Lacey (1997a) I
argue that (2) is false in general, and that (1) may be held only in a highly qualified way.
xii
Cf: “Contextual values determine what phenomena are so significant that a theory ought to represent them
when they exist. Evidence indicates when those phenomena are instantiated” (Anderson, 1995, p. 51). Equally,
evidence may indicate that certain phenomena are instantiated, but contextual values determine that they are
insignificant, devoid of significance for one’s moral projects (Anderson, 1995, pp. 37-42).
xiii
I develop this point more fully in Lacey (1997a) in the course of discussing an argument (similar to that of
M&D) proposed by Rudner (1953).
xiv
My position is more aristotelian, than cartesian, or materialist (in the way that tends to be presupposed in
contemporary cognitive science). There are several kinds of causal factors in nature (see Lacey,1986). Herfel,
perhaps following the marxist tradition, seems to want to call all causal factors “material” -- “the material organization
of the economy”. That is not my terminology. (Much of the apparent disagreement between Herfel and me is an
artifact of our different terminologies -- see also Lacey, 1990) On the substantive level, I do not think that there is any
causal action that does not involve the realization of material possibilities of things (as I have defined this term). For
me, a “material thing” is a thing whose possibilities, under certain boundary conditions, are fully exhausted by its
material possibilities, and so human beings are not material things. That does not mean that human beings are
material things plus something else. As Herfel says: “We are constrained by the same laws as any other species”.
But, and this is where he and I differ, “our” possibilities cannot be fully identified from the generative power of those
laws that constrain us and other species, but require reference to our efficacious (but not unconstrained) intentional
agency. We are, of course, intentional agents within nature. But I am wary of “owning up to the fact that human
beings, our products and values, are parts of the material world [my italics].” Despite the brilliant analysis of Dyke,
that he cites, that “aspects of social dynamics can be put in a materialistic framework”, that the possibilities of human
beings are exhausted by their material possibilities remains not a fact to be owned up to but a metaphysical
speculation, which -- when we cut through the rhetoric of “owning up to”, with its connotations of honesty, integrity
and courage -- offers little illumination of human life and value.
xv
Shiva would be unimpressed, as I am (see Lacey, 1997b), by Allchin’s claim that the green revolution
represents a “well intended venture”, “aiming to reduce hunger in nonindustrialized countries”. Five centuries of
colonialism and neocolonialism make one wonder if any project designed to “help” people in nonindustrialized
countries, which does not involve the integral participation and authority of these people themselves, can nonironically be called “well intentioned”. Allchin does couple his claim of good intentions with a critique of “cultural
myopia (if not cultural imperialism)”.
xvi
See Lacey (1997b) for references to research that does not draw upon the materialist strategy. In this
context, it is important to remember that it is traditional local knowledge that informed the activities that produced the
seeds from which the hybrid and (more recently) genetically engineered seeds of contemporary agribusiness have
been manufactured. Whatever its limitations may be, it is empirically grounded and it has been practically successful.
xvii
Neither I nor Shiva wants to replace a “privileging” of knowledge gained under the materialist strategy with
a generalized and uncritical privileging of traditional knowledge forms and claims. Regardless of constraint/selection
strategies deployed, knowledge claims are to be assessed in virtue of how well they manifest the cognitive values,
and not just for their significance for different value commitments. I found it disappointing that Loo did not address
the revival of Islamic values in Malaysia and its impact upon the form of science taught in Malaysian schools in
these terms, instead of limiting himself to its impact on the teaching of evolution.
xviii
All quotes in the previous three paragraphs are from Shiva (1988), pp. 232-235.
xix
This leaves a role for “pure science”, which I consider to be the pursuit of knowledge of the most
encompassing law, process and structure to which we can gain access, and perhaps the use of the knowledge
gained for the sake of exploring phenomena, spaces and processes that happen to engage our curiosity. Some
amount of pure science will typically be presupposed in efforts to identify the material possibilities of spaces
investigated in the laboratory and of objects of control in practical life. The range of value perspectives over which
pure scientific knowledge is neutral is generally greater than that of knowledge of “applied science”. (Outside of the
materialist strategy I do not think that the pure/applied distinction, however vague it may be in concrete scientific
practice, can be drawn.) Prima facie pure science is a value, but it open for discussion how it ranks with other values.
I cannot address these issues here.