Hume’s Argument that Inductive Reasoning in Science Cannot Be Rationally Justified (restated) 1. All inferences from experience to conclusions about the future presuppose the principle that the future will resemble the past. (Principle of the Uniformity of Nature) a. If we suspect that the course of nature may change and that the past is no guide to the future, then all experience becomes useless and does not support any conclusion about the future. 2. Therefore, no argument from experience can support the principle that the future will resemble the past. 3. No deductive argument can establish the principle that the future will resemble the past. 4. Therefore, the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature cannot be rationally justified. 5. If the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature cannot be rationally justified, then inductive reasoning in science cannot be rationally justified. 6. Therefore, inductive reasoning in science cannot be rationally justified. To solve a problem is to answer correctly the question(s) that it poses. To dissolve a problem is to show that it is not really a problem—i.e., does not pose any significant questions. The problem of induction poses the question: How should we respond to Hume’s argument? Possible Responses to Hume’s Argument: 1. Premise 5 is false: inductive reasoning is inherently rational. 2. Hume argument implies that inductive reasoning can be justified only on the basis of deductive reasoning. 3. Premise 3 is false: the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature can be derived from the mathematical theory of probability. 4. The inference from premises 2 and 3 to 4 is invalid: we have a priori knowledge of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature. 5. Since Hume’s argument says nothing specific about inductive reasoning, his conclusion can only depend on the fact that inductive reasoning is not a form of deductive reasoning. 6. Premise 5 is false: inductive reasoning is a form of abduction (inference to the best explanation), which is rationally justified. 7. The inference from premises 2 and 3 to 4 is invalid: we can “observe” necessary causal relationships and, therefore, know of their existence independently of deductive or inductive reasoning. 8. The inference from premise 1 to 2 is invalid: neither of the two basic forms of reasoning—deduction, induction—can be defended in a non-question-begging way. 9. Premise 5 is false: inductive reasoning can be modified so that the conclusions of inductive arguments say only that something is probably true. 10. Accept the conclusion that inductive reasoning in science cannot be rationally justified. However, it does not matter because scientific reasoning is fundamentally deductive rather than inductive. (Popper)