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Russia Aerospace DA UM7wk
***AFF—Disads ........................................................................................................................... 1
2AC Aerospace Link Turns ..................................................................................................................................... 2
2AC Aerospace Competitiveness Uniqueness ........................................................................................................ 4
2AC AT Competitiveness ........................................................................................................................................ 6
2AC Competition Link Turn ................................................................................................................................... 8
2AC Orion Link Turn .............................................................................................................................................. 9
2AC Not Unique .....................................................................................................................................................10
2AC Not Key to National Pride .............................................................................................................................. 11
2AC National Pride Link Turn ............................................................................................................................... 12
2AC/1AR AT India Scenario .................................................................................................................................. 13
2AC Russian Aerospace Collapse Inevitable.......................................................................................................... 15
2AC/1AR AT Brain Drain....................................................................................................................................... 17
2AC/1AR AT Tech Transfer ................................................................................................................................... 19
2AC/1AR Tech Transfer Bad—Prolif .................................................................................................................... 20
2AC AT Russia Collapse ......................................................................................................................................... 21
2AC AT Russian Democracy ................................................................................................................................. 22
2AC/1AR AT Russian public likes space ............................................................................................................... 23
2AC/1AR AT Public influences government ......................................................................................................... 24
2AC/1AR Alt Causality to Nationalism ................................................................................................................. 25
2AC/1AR Nationalism Good ................................................................................................................................. 26
***AFF—Disads
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2AC Aerospace Link Turns
Turn—plan causes investment in Russian Aerospace
Bernstein ’99 (David, member of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University,
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=American+Aerospace+hiring+of+Russian+engineers&hl=en&btnG=Search&as_sdt=1%2C23&as_sdtp=on, AM)
Access to Technology In selected fields where the Russians possess superior technologies or the background
technology to do cutting-edge R&D, U.S. companies have sought access to this technology to improve their own
products’ performance and/or cost. In most of these cases the program evolves into R&D that produces still more advanced technology.
The potential for the Russian partner to form a sustainable business can range from virtually zero to quite high .
A sustained research relationship and a sustainable business do not always coincide, however. The long-term business depends on both the sharing of
rights in the research and the involvement of the Russian partner in aspects of commercialization beyond the research work itself. Cost-effective
R&D This overlaps the previous category in that some key background capability is necessary to perform costeffective R&D; however, there need not be unique or superior technology resident in the Russian organization. In addition to the wage
differential, the Russian organization may have a testing facility, for example, that would be costly to replicate
and/or that can be operated at significantly lower cost than existing similar facilities in other countries , including
the United States. Here too the potential for the Russian partner to form a sustainable business varies widely. Access
to Qualified Personnel This overlaps the previous two categories. There are fields in which there is a shortage of qualified
personnel in the United States. The primary example in the cases studied herein is software engineers and
programmers. Groups of these personnel in Russia often have skills not found in their American counterparts
and/or have the advantage of having worked together in teams for several years. The potential to develop a
sustainable business is again variable, but can be high if the Russian partner becomes increasingly indispensable
and/or of proven value to other possible U.S. partners. The population of potential U.S. partners may be very large in this case.
Utilization of Proven Systems There is one sector in this study, rocket propulsion, in which the Russians have
highly developed and proven systems that can have a major impact on the competitiveness of U.S. spacebased
telecommunications systems. In this field the dollar volume of both sales and projects as well as the potential for building a sustainable
business are high. In these ventures the U.S. partner sought to commercialize existing technology which was already
embodied in working systems, even though it has also supported additional R&D. Nonproliferation and
Demilitarization Private U.S. companies do not have a business motivation to inhibit proliferation and military
production. The U.S. government, however, does work toward this end, and endeavors to involve private U.S.
companies by providing financial and other incentives. U.S. companies interested in investing for other reasons often view U.S.
government programs as a means to reduce costs and risks. Other U.S. government-sponsored programs are operated by
enterprise funds and international financial institutions. The government’s objective may be economic
development as opposed to or in addition to nonproliferation and demilitarization, but the concept of shared
cost and risk is essentially the same. This study does not deal specifically with cases of such shared risk, although some of the cases do
involve such projects. The concept is extremely important, however, and whether the U.S. government should use such mechanisms to pursue its policy
objectives, and, if it should, how best to make these programs effective is a subject of considerable controversy.
Boeing proves
Bernstein ’99 (David, member of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University,
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=American+Aerospace+hiring+of+Russian+engineers&hl=en&btnG=Search&as_sdt=1%2C23&as_sdtp=on, AM)
Both Boeing’s Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG) and the Boeing Information, Space and Defense Group
(BISDG) have many projects in Russia.1 In 1993–1997 Boeing funded over $1 billion worth of contracts with the
Russian aerospace industry. Though it is not easy to estimate the labor effect of these programs, there is reason to believe that it is
measured in tens of thousands of jobs, not counting the multiplication effect. Many of these are well-paid jobs for technical
personnel. The share of Russian programs in Boeing’s outsourcing network is still relatively low, however, and does not create any dependency on either
side. Boeing’s operating approach to date has been to work by contract with the Russian enterprises . In general
Boeing has not taken the approach of hiring individual scientists or engineers directly and has not encouraged
any of them to leave their institutes to seek employment with Boeing. Neither has Boeing encouraged any of them to start their
own companies. In addition, Boeing has not hired Russian engineers to bring them to the United States. Boeing
believes that its approach is the best way to help Russia maintain its core capabilities and to ensure Boeing’s
access to the best technology and cooperation available without contributing to the brain drain of top Russian
scientists and engineers. At every step of the way Boeing has kept the Russian government
informed of its activities and plans in Russia. This, and a clear demonstration of long-term
commitment, has resulted in good cooperation from the government as well as the institutes on
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the research projects. Fundamental differences in the activities of BCAG and BISDG lead to very different operational practices in their
respective cooperative ventures. The cooperative ventures of BCAG are primarily R&D or material-certification activities that are not initially on critical
paths for the design or production of Boeing aircraft, although they may achieve that status in the future. In addition, most of these activities are
relatively small and do not require complex integration of the work of the two partners. BISDG’s cooperative ventures are generally large systemdevelopment projects, with critical dependence on the work of both partners. As a result, a systems-integration management approach is used. This has a
profound impact on the working relationship between the partners. This situation is complicated further by the fact that some programs are commercial,
and others are funded by the U.S. government and therefore have a host of different contractual requirements which Boeing (as prime contractor) must
impose on its Russian partners (as subcontractors).
More evidence—we solve Russian aerospace industry
Bernstein ’99 (David, member of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University,
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=American+Aerospace+hiring+of+Russian+engineers&hl=en&btnG=Search&as_sdt=1%2C23&as_sdtp=on, AM)
This can be illustrated by comparing subsectors of aerospace. Cooperative
technology commercialization in aviation and space
are very different. In the latter, American partners are utilizing major systems, such as Proton
boosters, designed and manufactured in Russia . In aviation, there are two types of ventures. In the first, American
companies (e.g., Boeing) are contracting for diverse elements of research, engineering, and testing, which they
then incorporate into aircraft manufactured outside of Russia. In these cases, the technology transfer is
largely, but not completely, from Russia to the United States. There are also projects, such as the IL96, in which U.S.
companies (e.g., Pratt &Whitney, Collins) have entered into a joint venture for the production of Russian airliners utilizing U.S.-developed engines and
avionics. The ultimate plan is that many of these components will be manufactured in Russia. In this case, the main technology transfer is from the
The international space
ventures have been a major factor in the revitalization of the Russian space industry whereas
the civil aviation industry is still in a precarious financial condition with very few sales of
aircraft.
United States to Russia. The financial viability of the IL96 is not yet assured as sales have been very low.
Turn—current NASA cuts have destroyed the impetus for Russian aerospace innovation—only
the plan revitalizes competition to keep the industry afloat.
De Carbonnel 4/10 (Alissa, contributing writer for the Moscow Times, “Analysis: Stagnation Fears Haunt Russian Space Program”,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-russia-space-gagarin-idUSTRE73910C20110410, AM)
In the 1960s, Gagarin's
flight seemed to leap off the pages of fantasy novels, inspiring dreams of Martian colonies and imminent
of that initial rapture has now faded, leaving nostalgia among many in Russia for the
days when the struggle between the two nuclear-armed superpowers fueled and financed the pursuit of new
horizons in science. U.S. astronauts and Russian cosmonauts "were never enemies in space, but when we began
cooperating on the ground they cut the funding," said veteran cosmonaut Georgy Grechko, 79. "Even the Americans would
call us and say 'launch something new, so they'll give us money.'" With competition eclipsed by cooperation,
Russia's space agency has survived over the past two decades by hiring out the third seat aboard the Soyuz to
foreigners. "Cooperation is good, but as the example of the international space station shows, it also leads to
stagnation," Russian space policy analyst Yuri Karash said, according to state-run news agency RIA. Gubarev said Russia had fallen so
far behind it could achieve little better than a supporting role today in the most cutting-edge projects. "In the
meantime, America will take its time out and build an entirely new spacecraft, so that five or six years down the line
our Soyuz will be entirely redundant," he said. "No serious money is spent on breakthrough projects."
deep-space travel. But much
Experts say China could soon challenge both Russia and the United States in space. "The most important role will be played by our Russian Soyuz craft
now. But we cannot discount the Chinese, who are following their own path and doing all this independently," Shamsutdinov told Reuters. NASA
officials have voiced worries that the current budget financing will not be enough to fund a new rocket and
capsule system for deep space travel. NASA's proposed budget for fiscal 2011 is $18.7 billion, some five times
higher than Russia's. Russian industry insiders say President Barack Obama's decision to halt work on NASA's nextgeneration Orion capsule threatens to take the wind out of a parallel Russian effort to design a replacement for
the Soyuz that can fly beyond the International Space Station's low 354-km (220 mile) orbit. "A little residual competition is a good thing," Sergei
Krikalev, 52, who heads Russia's cosmonaut training center after chalking up a record 803 days in space, told Reuters.
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2AC Aerospace Competitiveness Uniqueness
America already falling behind Russia in the international aerospace market—Recent India
deals prove
IW 6/23 (Indian Weekender, “Mother of All Deals,” http://www.indianweekender.co.nz/Pages/ArticleDetails/10/2430/India/Mother-of-all-deals,
AM)
Billed as one of the largest defence deals ever globally, India’s planned purchase of 126 medium multi-role
combat aircraft (MMRCA) has entered the final phase of its selection procedure. The process had begun in
2005, with the Indian Air Force (IAF) issuing a request for information (RFI) for new jetfighters to replace the vintage Soviet-era MiG-21s that had
been its mainstay since their induction in the early ‘80s. The present estimate of $10.4 billion is likely to escalate as the full
scope of the warplane and its attendant services becomes clearer. The IAF is already hamstrung by a depleting fleet, having just
31 squadrons of serviceable aircraft that fall far short of its targeted 39. Bordering both Pakistan and China, India requires to build up its defences
accordingly, to thwart a two-front assault if need be in the worst case scenario. Having embarked upon a military modernisation programme, this
country of 1.2 billion is expected to spend more than $35 billion over the next five years on defence acquisitions. India’s blossoming ties with
the United States – formalised with the March 2006 signing of the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement - brought in American
firms Lockheed Martin, with its F-16IN Super Viper, and Boeing Integrated Defence Systems, with its F/A-18 E/F
Super Hornet, in response to the request for proposal (RFP) floated by the IAF in August 2007. The other four contenders were France’s
Dassault Aviation, with its offering of Rafale, Swedish aerospace company Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, European
consortium Eurofighter GmbH’s Typhoon and the Russian Mikoyan-Gurevich Corporation’s MiG-35. Recently,
India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD), however, shortlisted – or “down selected” - the 24.5-tonne Rafale and the
23.5-tonne Typhoon as finalists for the MMRCA sweepstakes. One of them will ultimately be awarded the contract by September.
Analysts were perplexed by the Defence ministry’s move, as they widely anticipated that the final decision
would be a political one rather than one premised on military and security considerations. After all, New Delhi’s
earnestness to repay Washington for its nuclear benevolence has already made the US India’s third largest
defence supplier, after Russia and Israel. US firms have already won almost $8 billion in defence sales within the last four years,
starting with the $50 million transfer to the Indian Navy in June 2007 of the amphibious transport ship, INS Jalashwa, commissioned into the US Navy
in 1971 as USS Trenton. Clouding the situation was American ambassador to India, Timothy Roemer’s, abrupt
resignation the very next day after Lockheed and Boeing were eliminated from the competition. He had made an
American choice a priority, especially in light of a letter US President Barack Obama had written to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that
indicated that favouring Lockheed or Boeing would cement the Indo-US strategic partnership and be mutually beneficial in creating thousands of jobs in
both the countries. Pentagon spokesperson, Col. Dave Lapan, affirmed, “We are deeply disappointed by this news,
but we look forward to continuing to grow and develop our defence partnership with India .” He was not off the mark.
The Indian Parliament’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), at a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister last week, cleared a $4.1 billion deal with
Boeing for 10 C-17 Globemaster-III giant strategic airlift aircraft for the IAF. The ultimate deal could be for 16 of them and would top $5.8 billion. The
US itself - with the world’s largest defence budget, of $895 billion, compared to India’s $33 billion - finds these aircraft
exorbitant ($200 million each, without spares and training) and has stopped its purchase. The deal with India will, however, save 23,000
American jobs, an aspect noted by Ambassador Roemer himself. Boeing will also be supplying eight P-8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft for the
Indian Navy in a $2.1 billion deal signed in January 2009.
No room for transition—status quo powers dominate the market
Bloomberg 6/22 (Financial News Service, “Airbus, Boeing still rule at show; smaller rivals make little dent
,” http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2015398755_airshowduopoly23.html , AM)
The Airbus-Boeing airliner duopoly survived the Paris Air Show intact as challengers from Canada,
China, Brazil and Russia offered little evidence they'll break the pair's stranglehold on singleaisle jets. Bombardier's CSeries won 30 orders from Korean Air Lines and an unnamed carrier before the program took a blow: Qatar Airways
shelved a deal and Republic Airways Holding of the U.S. bought Airbus's rival A320neo, casting doubt on a contract for 40 of the Montreal-based
company's jets. Russia's SuperJet won a single 12-plane deal, while Brazilian regional jet maker Embraer said it
will
wait for Boeing's next move in the narrowbody market before deciding whether to go ahead with a 150-seater.
Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China's C919 may be most likely to mount a challenge after enlisting Ryanair Holdings as a development partner, though
the Irish discount carrier is also in talks with Boeing, and analysts said a deal for the Chinese model is unlikely. "Going up against Boeing
and Airbus in head-to-head competition is really tough, not only because of their size, but
because of their existing product line and industrial capacity," Embraer Chief Executive Frederico Curado said in
an interview in Paris. "They can have a very quick response and literally flood the market." All four contenders
are seeking a slice of the biggest part of a global airliner market estimated at $4 trillion over the next 20 years. Airbus' neo, already the European
company's fastest-selling plane, won more than 300 orders during the first three days of the Paris show, bringing commitments since the jet's December
launch to more than 600. Boeing, which says it will take the rest of the year to decide between re-engining and an all-
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new model, still clawed in 75 orders for the 737. Louis Gallois, CEO of Airbus parent European Aeronautic, Defence & Space, said at a
briefing in Paris that he expects some of the new models in the 100-seat-plus sector to fail. "Can the market accept six single-aisle plane
makers? I'm sure the smallest will have to buckle," he said.
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2AC AT Competitiveness
Structural barriers to Russian space competitiveness.
Oberg 11 – (2011, James, American space journalist and historian, regarded as an expert on the Russian space program, worked for NASA at the
Johnson Space Center on the Space Shuttle program and in the Mission Control Center for several Space Shuttle missions from STS-1 on, specialising in
orbital rendezvous techniques, worked in NASA studies of the Soviet space program, has testified before Congress multiple times on the Russian Space
Program, NBC News Space Consultant, “Chapter 22: International Perspectives: Russia,” published in Toward a Theory of Spacepower, ed. by Charles
Lutes and Peter Hays, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf DH)
At the same time, Russia
shows no signs of developing a capability for major innovation in spacecraft engineering or
of demonstrating more than lip-service interest in quantum advances in space operations capabilities.
Incremental progress has been the watchword for decades, usually not by choice but out of necessity because all previous
attempts at breakout projects (human lunar flight, advanced robotic Mars probes, the Buran shuttle, the Polyus-Skif family of orbital battle
stations) ended in humiliating frustration. Providing commercial launch services for foreign customers has provided multidimensional
benefits to Russia. Beyond the significant cash flow, such activities fund booster upgrades and, in the case of converted military missiles, fund validation
of lifetime extension efforts for still-deployed missile weapons. Military applications of space systems remain uninspired, with
critical constellations (such as the missile early warning net) still significantly degraded and likely to remain so for many
years. Russian officials have evidently decided that, despite any public posturings over U.S. military threats, there is
essentially no prospect of actual hostilities in the foreseeable future and hence little pressure to reconstitute military
space assets to a Soviet-era level. Russia retains a nuclear-armed operational antimissile system around Moscow that, if upgraded to hit-to-kill
guidance, could provide significant antisatellite capability; it is also developing small robotic rendezvous spacecraft similar to U.S. projects that have
potential antisatellite capabilities at any altitude into which they can be launched. Attempts at domestic commercialization of space-
related services, including communications, navigation, and mapping, remain seriously—perhaps irremediably—
hamstrung by the recent resurgence of a traditional Russian top-down structure of authority. Bureaucrats are
being ordered to implement wider use of space infrastructure, and after many years of rosy reports of progress, Moscow may
realize that it is almost all, as usual, a sham. There is still little indication of successful exploitation of space
discoveries and spacedeveloped technologies (what NASA and the Europeans call spin-offs) as a means of improving the
technological skills of Russian industry. The space industry, as a component of the national defense industry, remains strictly
compartmentalized from Russia's civil economy, and the resurgence of broad espionage laws (and several recent
highly publicized convictions) will keep this ghettoization in force. This in turn may require other government measures, from patent
purchase to industrial espionage, to acquire technologies that some Russian industries may already possess but are in
practice forbidden to share internally.
Demographics and Russian attitude towards knowledge diffusion must change first.
Oberg 11 – (2011, James, American space journalist and historian, regarded as an expert on the Russian space program, worked for NASA at the
Johnson Space Center on the Space Shuttle program and in the Mission Control Center for several Space Shuttle missions from STS-1 on, specialising in
orbital rendezvous techniques, worked in NASA studies of the Soviet space program, has testified before Congress multiple times on the Russian Space
Program, NBC News Space Consultant, “Chapter 22: International Perspectives: Russia,” published in Toward a Theory of Spacepower, ed. by Charles
Lutes and Peter Hays, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf DH)
However, none
of these intentions has much chance of success unless the Russians find a way out of the looming
demographic crisis that mass mortality is confronting them with. In a society and an industry where
monopolization of knowledge was power and sharing it often led to legal prosecution, behavior must change,
and fast. This must be done so that space workers a decade from now, without the in-the-flesh guidance and advice of the oldtimers, will be able to draw on their team knowledge that survived the passing of its original owners and was preserved
in an accessible, durable form. The alternative is a return to the learning curve of more frequent oversights, mistakes,
and inadequate problem solving of the dawn of the space age—with its daunting costs in time, treasure,
prestige, and even human lives.
Russia is not competitive in the aerospace industry and the space industry has almost no
internal link to the economy
Crane and Usanov ‘10 (Keith, director of the RAND Corporation’s Environment, Energy and Economic Development Program, and Artur,
completing his doctorate in Policy Analysis at the Pardee RAND School, “Role of High-Technology Industries,” Peterson Institute for International
Economics, AM)
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Space is not a dynamic industry in the global economy. Commercial satellite launches have been fewer than expected as fiber
optic cables have satisfied most of the increased demand for communications capacity despite
the extraordinary growth of the internet. Most launches are still purchased by governments. The space
program in the United States appears to be in a period of retrenchment, and in Europe it also faces budgetary
pressures. Although China and India have expanding programs, they tend to favor their own manufacturers. Russia's good
track record and budgetary pressures in the United States provide room for continued sales of launches and rockets as
demand for observation satellites remains, but the industry does not show signs of dynamic growth . New rocket designs appear to be
keeping Russia competitive. Civilian aviation presents a different story Within Russia, there is a debate about whether the Russian industry will be able
to maintain stand-alone capacity to assemble civilian aircraft or would be better off collaborating with Western manufacturers. ‘ Western
companies have complimented Russian capabilities in design, precision engineering, especially turbine blades, and sophisticated
materials but have difficulty in acquisitions or greenfield investments, in part because of security concerns and
high levels of corruption. In our view, despite the concerns of Russia's military establishment, the answer is clear: Russian
companies have done well collaborating with the international industry but have failed when
they have attempted to go it alone. Russia’s successes with joint ventures and the failure of former Soviet products on international
markets show the future of the industry.
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2AC Competition Link Turn
U.S.-Russian competition is key to the Russian space program
REUTERS 4-10-2011 (“Analysis: Stagnation fears haunt Russian space program,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-russia-space-gagarinidUSTRE73910C20110410)
But much of that initial rapture has now faded, leaving nostalgia among many in Russia for the days when the
struggle between the two nuclear-armed superpowers fueled and financed the pursuit of new horizons in
science. U.S. astronauts and Russian cosmonauts "were never enemies in space, but when we began cooperating on the ground they cut the
funding," said veteran cosmonaut Georgy Grechko, 79. "Even the Americans would call us and say 'launch something new, so
they'll give us money.'" With competition eclipsed by cooperation, Russia's space agency has survived over the past two decades by hiring out the third seat aboard
the Soyuz to foreigners. "Cooperation is good, but as the example of the international space station shows, it also leads to stagnation," Russian space policy
analyst Yuri Karash said, according to state-run news agency RIA. Gubarev said Russia had fallen so far behind it could achieve little better than a supporting role today in the
most cutting-edge projects. "In the meantime, America will take its time out and build an entirely new spacecraft, so that five or six years down the line our Soyuz will be
entirely redundant," he said. "No
serious money is spent on breakthrough projects."
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2AC Orion Link Turn
Project Orion is key to Russian space development
REUTERS 4-10-2011 (“Analysis: Stagnation fears haunt Russian space program,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-russia-space-gagarinidUSTRE73910C20110410)
But much of that initial rapture has now faded, leaving nostalgia among many in Russia for the days when the
struggle between the two nuclear-armed superpowers fueled and financed the pursuit of new horizons in
science. U.S. astronauts and Russian cosmonauts "were never enemies in space, but when we began cooperating on the ground they cut the
funding," said veteran cosmonaut Georgy Grechko, 79. "Even the Americans would call us and say 'launch something new, so
they'll give us money.'" With competition eclipsed by cooperation, Russia's space agency has survived over the past two decades by hiring out the third seat aboard
the Soyuz to foreigners. "Cooperation is good, but as the example of the international space station shows, it also leads to stagnation," Russian space policy
analyst Yuri Karash said, according to state-run news agency RIA. Gubarev said Russia had fallen so far behind it could achieve little better than a supporting role today in the
most cutting-edge projects. "In the meantime, America will take its time out and build an entirely new spacecraft, so that five or six years down the line our Soyuz will be
entirely redundant," he said. "No serious money is spent on breakthrough projects." Experts say China could soon challenge both Russia and the
United States in space. "The most important role will be played by our Russian Soyuz craft now. But we cannot discount the Chinese, who are following their own path and
doing all this independently," Shamsutdinov told Reuters. NASA
officials have voiced worries that the current budget financing will
not be enough to fund a new rocket and capsule system for deep space travel. NASA's proposed budget for fiscal 2011 is $18.7
billion, some five times higher than Russia's. Russian industry insiders say President Barack Obama's decision to halt work on NASA's nextgeneration Orion capsule threatens to take the wind out of a parallel Russian effort to design a replacement for
the Soyuz that can fly beyond the International Space Station's low 354-km (220 mile) orbit. "A little residual competition is a good thing,"
Sergei Krikalev, 52, who heads Russia's cosmonaut training center after chalking up a record 803 days in space, told Reuters.
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2AC Not Unique
Russian space industry is stagnant now
REUTERS 4-10-2011 (“Analysis: Stagnation fears haunt Russian space program,”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-russia-space-gagarin-idUSTRE73910C20110410)
But half a century after Gagarin's 108-minute voyage put the Soviet Union ahead in the Cold War space race, critics charge that reliance on Soviet designs as
cash cows has stunted innovation, and that Russia has irretrievably lost its edge. "While we bask in the glory of
having the only operating spacecraft, we are only making money off old rockets," said Vladimir Gubarev, the Soviet spokesman
for the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz program, which achieved the first docking of U.S. and Russian spacecraft.
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2AC Not Key to National Pride
Space program isn’t key to Russian national pride
YAHOO NEWS 2011 (“Does the Russian Space Program Have a Future 50 Years After Gagarin?” April 7,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110407/sc_ac/8234823_does_the_russian_space_program_have_a_future_50_years_after_gagarin_1)
A recent article in Novesti suggests that modern Russians, unlike at the time of Gagarin, do not think that their
country's space program has any relevance. Unlike the American space program, the Russian effort has not
contributed very much to the national economy, particularly in consumer goods. Russians by and large think
that their current space program is a drain and not an asset.
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2AC National Pride Link Turn
The Russian public hates the space program—it’s not key to Russian national pride
RIA NOVOSTI 2011 (“A Fallen Giant: The Soviet Space Industry,” April 4,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/A_Fallen_Giant_The_Soviet_Space_Industry_999.html)
Ordinary Russians see little connection between space exploration and economics. If anything, they see
expensive space programs as a permanent drain on the nation's resources. Some are inclined to take it
personally, as if the dark vacuum of space somehow sucked the money right out of their pockets.
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2AC/1AR AT India Scenario
US encroachment inevitable
AI 6/16 (Avionics Intelligence, “Evenly Spread,” http://www.militaryaerospace.com/index/display/avi-wire-newsdisplay/1438706592.html, AM)
The US too in just a few years of opening up its arms market to India has been a major beneficiary of the Indian
defence orders. Starting with the BBJs, other IAF orders include the C-130J Super Hercules and the C-17 Globemaster
III. The Navy on its part not only acquired the USS Trenton (now INS Jalashwa) and helicopters but also placed an order for
eight P-8I Poseidon with options for more running into billions of dollars. The US companies may be lamenting having
lost the MMRCA deal, but they would do well to remember that many more are coming their way. For example, the IAF is
seriously thinking in terms of placing orders on Lockheed Martin for additional C-130J aircraft. Similarly, the order for
the acquisition of C-17 aircraft from Boeing is being revised upwards to the extent that in dollar terms, even by itself, it would come close to the MMRCA
project. In view of the above, is there a reason for the US to still feel unhappy towards 'ungrateful' India? More
importantly, would it cause a setback to Indo-US relations, as believed in some political/diplomatic quarters?
Perhaps, the best person to answer the question was the US Ambassador Roemer himself when he stated that the US-India relationship continues on a
"positive historic trajectory" and that, "the horizons of our relationship truly have no limits". That sums it up. The IAF's choice is based on
technical evaluation. It is quite straightforward and there is nothing political about it. It is just a process; the other
programmes (US and Russian) were falling short in the technical standards needed by the IAF. It is good that there is progress in the MMRCA
competition. The commercial negotiations will start now. -former Air Chief Marshal (Retd) S. Krishnaswamy The IAF has diligently completed the
evaluation and selection process keeping in mind the capabilities required in the medium multi-role combat aircraft. Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault
Rafale were found compliant with the IAF requirements. Many factors are taken into consideration during the technical evaluation and flying tests
including life cycle maintenance, other facilities, etc. It was a pure selection process, political and commercial negotiations
will start now. -Former Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal (Retd) F.H. Major I still consider the US made Boeing F/A-18 and Lockheed Martin
F-16IN the best. And if I were asked to select between Eurofighter and Dassault Rafale, I would go for Rafale. -A Former Chief of the Air Staff on the
condition of anonymity.
Alt causalities sustain Russian defense exports to India
Bakshi ‘6 (Jyotsna, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 2, Apr-Jun 2006, “India-Russia Defence Co-operation,”
http://idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_jbakshi_0606.pdf, AM)
The two countries have signed several new agreements that will sustain cooperation through the coming years.
Admiral Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya) Deal The $1.5 billion deal for the purchase of the 45,000 tonne aircraft
carrier Admiral Gorshkov was signed on January 20, 2004 after over a decade of negotiations. Admiral Gorshkov is an
old Soviet ship and about 70 per cent of the carrier will be retrofitted. It is expected to arrive in India by the end
of 2008. The wisdom of buying an ‘old Soviet hull’ has been disputed by several experts. However, the Indian Navy greatly needed the
aircraft carrier. Nuclear Submarine Issue The Gorshkov deal was reportedly a part of the package that included the
lease of two 971 Shchuka-B or Akula class nuclear submarines and several strategic Tu-22 (NATO
designation‘Backf ire’) bombers . 3 9 Subsequently, Russia was reported to have backed out of the nuclear submarine deal so as not to
displease the Americans. 40 The issue is in the news again. Citing Russian sources, Vladimir Radyuhin wrote in The Hindu (December 7, 2005) that the
lease of nuclear-propelled submarines to India is in the pipeline. Under a $1.8-billion contract for a ten-year lease, the Russian
side has resumed the construction of the subs, which was frozen in the 1990s. In October 2005, 200 Indian
naval officers have started training at a submarine training centre at Sosnovij Bor near St. Petersburg. 41
Earlier, the Soviet Union had leased a nuclear-propelled submarine nicknamed Chakra to India from 1988 to
1991. The Navy is hopeful that the nuclear submarine will finally arrive.
Russian exports to India inevitable—dependence and legacy
Bakshi ‘6 (Jyotsna, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 2, Apr-Jun 2006, “India-Russia Defence Co-operation,”
http://idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_jbakshi_0606.pdf, AM)
Owing to past legacy and long-term dependence, Russia is likely to remain a major defence partner. In a keynote
address to the General Staff Academy of the Russian Armed Forces, the Indian Defence Minister said that Russia “has
been, and remains the largest source of our arms, weapon systems and technology imports .”
He emphasised that the recent strengthening of defence ties with many countries “is not at the
expense of our traditional friendly relations with Russia which remain unique, timetested and
steadfast.” 56 Even if no new weapons are purchased, India will continue to need spare parts for the weaponry of
Soviet/Russian origin and also depend on Russia for their upgrades and modernisation. The licence production of 140
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diversifying arms acquisitions, India would not like to
risk the derailment of the current system that may pose potential security hazards in the near term. India
would like to maintain its strategic autonomy and decide each issue on the basis of merit and from the
standpoint of India’s national interests. Steps have been taken of late to streamline defence acquisition procedure and make it more
transparent , speedy and accountable. 57
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2AC Russian Aerospace Collapse Inevitable
Russian failure inevitable—structural factors
Blank ‘7 (Stephen, has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the postSoviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was
Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, and taught at the
University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in
Asia, coeditor of The Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has
also written many articles and conference papers on Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank’s
current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. His two most recent books are RussoChinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command, London: Global Markets Briefing, 2006; and Natural Allies?: Regional Security in Asia and Prospects
for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. Dr. Blank holds a B.A. in
History from the University of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago, “ROSOBORONEKSPORT: ARMS SALES
AND THE STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA462020&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, AM)
Defense modernization still entails excessive economic and political costs and means, essentially preserving or
transforming Soviet structural militarization to meet current challenges but without clear strategic guidance as
to what the priority threat or threats are. 128 In fact, to read authoritative documents like Putin’s May 10, 2006, speech to the Federal
Assembly, it would appear that the main threat is not terrorism, but the United States and NATO, so naturally
spending will go to those contingencies. 129 It is unlikely that this Soviet-like restoration, which resembles the endless
Soviet and tsarist reorganizations to “perfect” the state apparatus, can fulfill Russia’s weapons plans for 2010 or 2015,
modernize the defense economy, or overcome the legacy of structural militarization. For example, the
defense industry reportedly recovered far enough by 2003 to produce at 42 percent of its 1990 levels, when it produced twice as many weapons as did
American defense industry. Thus Russia produces almost as many weapons as does America. Yet its gross national
product (GNP) still has not recovered to 1990 levels and is 15 percent of America’s. 130 As of 2004, according to
Moskovskiy, it met only 10-15 percent of the armed forces’ needs. 131 The defense industry’s condition satisfies nobody.
Ivanov complained that industry wants bailouts from the state rather than to compete and sell
on the basis of a market, and conceded that Russia still lives off the Soviet heritage. 132 The
systematic obfuscation of economic statistics also makes it virtually impossible to obtain a clear idea of the
extent of the economy’s militarization or an accurate understanding of defense spending. Thus estimates of that
militarization vary significantly. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London observes that Russian defense
spending through 2002, using the regime’s formal budgetary statistics, amounts to only about 2.5-3 percent of
annual gross domestic product (GDP). 133 However, this conclusion does not consider the widespread reliance on
falsified statistics, extra-budgetary allocations, budget add-ons like that decreed at the end of 2004, funds under the
control of the General Staff for nonmilitary purposes, regional and local spending on the military, and noncash transactions. 134 As a result, estimates of
the true amount of defense spending, and of the burden of defense spending on the economy, vary, but they all do so in ways that significantly revise
upward the proportion of defense outlays relative to Russia’s GDP and budget. Indeed, defense spending is the largest component of the budget. Irina
Isakova argues, with regard to the 2004 budget, that national defense budget headings amounted to 2.56 percent of GDP, a
figure that excludes pensions and paramilitary forces that were funded elsewhere. Using the IISS assessments and adding
these data, defense spending came to 680 billion rubles, or 4.05 percent of Russia’s GDP. 135 She also found that in 2005 the presentation of the budget
was changed so that all defense-related expenditures were brought under a special section on national defense, including a special chapter itemizing the
breakdown of the state defense order on funds for R&D, maintenance of existing equipment, and procurement of new equipment for both the regular
and paramilitary forces. The 2006 budget removed the itemization but specified the classified amount of funds transferred to the MoD (183.1 billion
rubles out of 297.7 billion rubles allocated to it). All defense spending officially amounted to 666 billion rubles, again around 2.8 percent of GDP. 136 Yet
this figure is not consistent with the aforementioned procurement figures because, if it captures total defense spending, then hardly anything is left for
spending on personnel or other needs, a result we know is patently absurd. Alternatively, Christopher Hill of the British Ministry of Defence (MoD)
presented figures for 2001 and 2004 concerning the continuing excessive burden of defense spending upon the Russian economy. Hill estimated that
actual spending in 2000 was 143 billion rubles in terms of 2000 prices, having risen significantly from 1999, with the official 2000 defense budget
reflecting little more than half of true defense spending. 137 In 2001, he found that defense spending rose to $50 billion in constant 2000 prices. IISS
came in with a somewhat higher estimate of $57 billion in constant 2000 prices. 138 In 2001 the government announced its intention to reapportion
arms spending to an even 50-50 ratio between conventional and nuclear weapons by 2011. 139 Although defense spending has risen
greatly since 2001, there is no reason to assume either less opacity or a reduced defense burden compared to
that year. Hill also assumed that the military accounts for one-third to one-half of all spending on science, but official statements suggest his estimate
was unduly conservative. 140 Thus, as of 2001, defense spending probably accounted for 5 percent of GNP, a high proportion by NATO, if not past
Soviet, standards. 141 Hill, together with Peter Sutcliffe, argued in 2004 that Russian defense spending remained in the 4.5-5 percentof-GDP range, that
much defense spending continues to remain off the budget or “extra-budgetary,” and that actual spending on defense by NATO standards of
measurement in 2004 was 480 billion rubles. 142 They also found that Russia could probably reach official conscription and weapon procurement
targets by 2010. 143 Ivanov’s latest reforms, described below, confirm that prediction. Although Isakova’s and Hill’s figures do differ somewhat, they are
close. Taken together, they show the need for not taking official Russian declarations at face value. Russia’s actual defense spending is considerably more
than that announced in the official budget, a fact making the poor return on its investment even more striking. Mikhailov insisted upon priority for
systems related to terrestrial and sea reconnaissance; information support of troops; automated weaponry combat control; precision strike from land,
sea, and air; modern global and theater navigation; optical and radio detection, ranging, and information processing; and new munitions “possessing
significantly greater energy capacity, means for their delivery, and others.” 160 He outlined several key areas in which, using exclusively domestic
production, Russia must compete, given the rising American threat: space and missile engineering to build Topol-Ms, missile defenses, new generation
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of space apparatuses “for various targeting procedures,” aeronautical engineering for new fighter planes, antiair or air defense engineering, 4th- and 5thgeneration submarine missile cruisers, heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, precision-guided missiles, tanks, C2 systems for ground forces, and highly
integrated microprocessors, supercomputers, and neuroprocessors. 161 Richard Staar reported that future defense spending would feature major
increases in aerospace systems; microelectronics; electro-optical systems; new strategic, tactical, and miniature nuclear weapons; the first Boreyclass
nuclear submarines armed with the new SS-NX28 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) (Bulava); the navy; and command, control, communications,
and intelligence (C3I) technologies for both information warfare and nuclear C3I. 162 The program for naval spending on new ships,
originally expected to double by 2008, has gone awry. The Navy, at least according to its proponents in 2005,
risked collapsing even though new, smaller ships are apparently coming on line. 163 According to Staar, Russia has spent
significant amounts researching directed-energy weapons: lasers; microwave radiation emitters; particle-beam generators using subatomic particles to
destroy targets at the speed of light; a new mass plasma weapon that could by ionizing the atmosphere destroy incoming enemy missiles and aircraft;
anti-stealth radar; stealthy air-launched cruise missiles; newly tested antiaircraft and anti-missile systems (i.e., the S-400 with a range of 250 miles); and
a plasma coating to make 5th-generation Russian aircraft invisible. 164 Until these weapons are ready—Staar’s list omitted weapons based on discovery
of new physical principles, information weapons, C3I systems, nuclear weapons, etc.—Russia must continue upgrading existing systems. 165 These
programs reflect emerging Russian views of future war. 166 As a 2002 Swedish study observed, According to the Russian military doctrine, future
conflicts will be characterized by, among other things, a wide use of stand-off weapons, electronic warfare, increased information confrontation, efforts
to disorganize state and military command and control systems, highly efficient high-precision weapons, massive air operations, and the use of airborne
forces. Technologies to support the development of such future forces and capabilities are thus of highest importance. 167 Russian defense
industry may remain competitive in traditionally strong sectors like nuclear, laser, and space satellite
technology. But its excessive dependence upon the state and structural militarization makes it
inherently dysfunctional. Russia still may be falling behind in cutting-edge innovative technologies
relevant to future wars even without considering issues of manpower; professionalizing the armed forces;
underinvestment in education and science; organizing the forces to maximize the potential of new systems and
technologies; and the catastrophic state of its infrastructure. 168 Consequently, the defense industry remains in
crisis despite Putin’s efforts to overcome it by reasserting state control, a policy which, at best, will have dubious results. 169
Undoubtedly this crisis will provoke further reforms. Already the regime appears to be seeking to channel funds from a reformed customs program
whereby the Federal Border Service has been resubordinated to direct governmental control by the President, not the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade. 170 Arms sales, creation of more vertically integrated holdings in the economy, and establishment of ruble-denominated
commodity exchanges for gas, oil, gold, and possibly other commodities will also serve as a source of defense funding.
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2AC/1AR AT Brain Drain
Massive Russian brain drain now
BBC 5/10 – BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political (5/10/2011, “Results of Russian president's three years in office summed up”, Lexis)
MGM
Russia is in dire need of new brands! The country has no brands that are popular in the world. In fact, Russia has
almost no brands left that are popular in Russia.... It is true that today's scientific research will not produce a return
for years, but Skolkovo will produce a psychological, PR return. This is more important now -in two respects. In the minds of the younger
generation, Russia is rarely associated with science and technology. This is one of the reasons for our country's
"brain drain": Those "brains" have no faith in the possibility of successful scientific work in their homeland.
This trend will be very difficult to stop, but unless it is stopped, the possibility of anything but a raw-material
economy must be excluded.
Alt causes cause brain drain
Gold 5/9 – writer (5/9/2011, Donald, “Long-Term Problems Mar Russia's Outlook; Legal System, Brain Drain; Vast stores of commodity wealth
aren't translating to new industries, markets”, Investor’s Business Daily, Lexis) MGM
Another long-term problem facing Russia is an ongoing brain drain. The flow of the country's best and brightest is not as severe
as was seen in the 1990 s, Vardanian says, but it's still bad enough to worry about. What do other countries offer these mostly
young, highly skilled and talented people? Vardanian says it's not so much about the salary one can command, but
more about the things one needs for a family-oriented lifestyle, including health care, education and security.
Structural issues make brain drain inevitable
Wendle ‘9 (John, Russian Correspondent for Time Magazine, “Can a Space Museum Help Russia Get Its Glory Back?,”
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1898856,00.html, AM)
But while young Russians seem to like what they see in the museum, translating a day of fun into a lifelong
interest in science and technology remains a challenge. Some blame the school system. "My daughter is in second grade,
and they're not taught anything," says Olga Fyodorova, visiting from St. Petersburg with her daughter Asya. "The biggest problem is that our
children are not being taught history, math, chemistry and physics." Others believe the problem lies in the
upbringing of children born after the fall of the Soviet Union. "Students today are more interested in money
and dancing," says Yuri Bogomolov, 79, a former scientist at a Soviet-era aerospace lab. "We have a lot of patriotism, but the U.S.
has a lot of money [to put into its space program]," he adds as he watches a clip from White Sun of the Desert, a Soviet action-adventure film that
cosmonauts traditionally — and superstitiously — watch before blasting off, ever since Gagarin watched it and returned alive from his first space flight.
But Bogomolov has confidence that Russia can regain its standing as a space superpower. "[Prime Minister Vladimir] Putin is a strong leader. Now we
know our path and we have a goal," he says, referring to the planned new moon rocket and cosmodrome. (See pictures of Putin.) Wandering past model
rockets, orange cosmonaut suits emblazoned with red U.S.S.R. emblems and a diorama of happy cosmonaut mannequins sitting around a campfire next
to a crashed space capsule waiting for pickup, Lynn Nordstrom of Albuquerque, N.M., and her two sons — in Moscow for the Eurovision song contest —
say they are enjoying their visit. But "after looking at this, I'm afraid of the Egypt syndrome, where all you do is talk about
how great you used to be," Nordstrom says. "The museum is terrific, but you need to look to the future. My whole youth was spent hearing
about the U.S.S.R. making advances in science and us always feeling like we were behind." (See the top 10 Eurovision controversies.)
No internal link—can’t get security clearances
AP ‘8 (Associated Press, “Likely brain drain puts aerospace recruitment into high gear,”
http://www.seattlepi.com/default/article/Likely-brain-drain-puts-aerospace-recruitment-1266734.php, AM)
At the same time, defense executives acknowledge, the sector does not exert the same patriot pull as it once did
since young people today have never known a time when the U.S. was not a leader in space exploration or the
world's sole superpower. The industry confronts another challenge, too. Unlike technology companies,
defense companies generally have to hire American citizens because they need employees who
can obtain security clearance. This eliminates foreign graduates of American universities and foreign
employees in the U.S. on H-1B visas. "The talent is going to have to be homegrown," said Blakey of the
aerospace association. Similarly, defense contractors cannot outsource to countries with more technical workers, such
as India or China. Against this backdrop, defense companies are reaching out to American students in the earliest grades. Lockheed Martin is
sending employees into elementary schools to tutor students in math and science and is recruiting high school
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students to shadow Lockheed workers on the job. The company's engineers coach robotics teams, conduct rocket propulsion
experiments for students and participate in mentoring programs. Northrop Grumman has established a program called Weightless Flights of Discovery,
which allows middle school teachers to experience temporary weightlessness on "zero-gravity" airplane flights that mimic how astronauts train for space
travel. Defense contractors are also trying to market themselves to job candidates with flexible schedules, tuition
reimbursement programs and plenty of opportunities for advancement. Above all, noted Linda Olin-Weiss, director of staffing
services at Lockheed Martin, the defense industry offers "challenging work on programs of national importance."
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2AC/1AR AT Tech Transfer
Tech transfer is unsustainable
Andersson et. al. 10 – (2010, Thomas, PhD, economics, president of Jönköping University, Sweden, president of the board for the
International Organisation for Knowledge Economy and Enterprise Development, vice president of the International Network for Small and MediumSized Enterprises, and serves on the International Advisory Committee of the Competitiveness Institute and on the International Advisory Board of the
World Knowledge Forum, full professor in International Economics and Industrial Organisation at Jönköping International Business School, associate
professor at the Stockholm School of Economics, visiting fellow at Harvard University, Bank of Japan, Hitotsubashi University and the University of Sao
Paulo, chairman of the Innovation Policy Expert group appointed by the Swedish government, “Knowledge-Driven Entrepreneurship: Introduction” p.
xvii, http://www.springer.com/economics/policy/book/978-1-4419-1187-2 DH)
The flow of knowledge, not technology per se, is the hallmark of technology transfer. To be effective, technology
transfer therefore needs trustful and outwardlooking knowledge brokers. The fact is that the knowledge revolution,
caught up in its own enormous success, has in effect contributed to the rise of an economy which, in its present format, has proven
unsustainable. Major problems exist in terms of reliability and accountability in business, while governments
and multilateral institutions are failing to provide satisfactory cross-border policy frameworks in a range of
areas. Finally, it is important that market transactions and innovations are not merely pushed by technocrats and
experts, but that they are pulled by the real needs of people, and of society, to produce better responses to real
issues.
Tech transfer is insufficient to solve warming.
Mowery 10 – (2010, David, PhD, economics, professor at the Haas School of Business, U.C. Berkeley and NBER, Berkeley, “Technology policy and
global warming: Why new policy models are needed (or why putting new wine in old bottles won’t work),” Research Policy 39 (2010) 1011–1023,
http://web65.rollins.edu/~tlairson/pek/glbwarmdisinnov.pdf DH)
Finally, an
element of program design on which the historical discussion of previous public R&D programs
provides limited guidance is the need for any national energy R&D program seeking solutions to global
warming to accommodate the global scope of the problem and the necessary responses to it. Combating global warming, as we noted
earlier, requires that technological solutions be deployed on a global scale as soon as possible. Moreover, the global
nature of technological solutions means that the institutional, economic, and/or industrial settings within
which these solutions are deployed will be enormously diverse, requiring a great deal of “localized” adaptation
of these solutions to the regional context. Although U.S. investments in technological solutions to global warming ultimately are likely to
exceed the scale of investments by other governments, it is critically important to work out an appropriate
division of labor among national governments and to create effective mechanisms for cooperation and coordination. Much more than
“technology transfer” will be required, although support for the global dissemination of information
and, potentially, subsidies for other nations to stimulate the adoption of technological solutions may be
important parts of the international scope of such a program
Spinoffs shouldn’t justify space programs.
Cohendet 97 – (Patrick, Professor of Economics at the University of Strasbourg, France, “Evaluating the Industrial Indirect Effects of Technology
Programmes: the Case of the European Space Agency (ESA) Programmes,” Proceedings of the OECD Conference “Policy Evaluation in Innovation and
Technology”, Available on-line http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/37/1822844.pdf DH)
Such a change in the
research perspective could contribute to overcoming two types of criticism to which studies on
spinoffs are very often exposed. The first is the tendency to justify space activities by their spinoffs , whereas the
growing importance of space activities as an autonomous economic sector leads us increasingly to find justification for these activities in what we have
defined as their direct effects. On the other hand, studies on spinoffs often give the impression that the space sector is seen
as the only innovator of new technologies which are later used in the rest of the economy. In fact, experience
shows that the space industry is where technologies developed elsewhere are assembled and improved. This is why
we should perhaps consider space-sector spinoffs in terms of their complementarity and interactivity with other
sectors rather than in terms of impacts justifying space programmes.
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2AC/1AR Tech Transfer Bad—Prolif
Russian tech sector causes missile proliferation.
Novotny 04 – (Eric J. Novotny, PhD, Vice President, Lockheed Martin Corporation and Adjunct Professor of International Relations, School of
International Service, The American University, “Co-Optation, Political Objectives, and the Business Environment: The Case of U.S.–Russian Space
Technology Ventures,” A Case Study Presented to: The Fourth Annual Conference on Management Strategy and the Business Environment, http://wwwmanagement.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/msbe/2004_stuff/Novotny.pdf DH)
Another major concern of the U.S. was the problem of the proliferation of missile technology made possible by
Russian companies entering international markets unregulated and uncontrolled. The U.S. mounted aggressive
programs to prevent nuclear weapons technology transfers from Russia to other countries. The U.S. actively
sought cooperation from the Russian government and funded efforts to keep resources and scientists in Russia
from selling weapons technologies to the highest bidder. Once rocket systems were being sold, however, there was almost no way of
knowing whether the technologies were being diverted to military purposes.
A number of countries were eager to contemplate launching Russian rockets from facilities in their own countries. At one time, the U.S. even
contemplated compelling the Russian government to establish new launch facilities outside of Russian
territory, suc h as Cape York in Australia. American policymakers were troubled by the transport of commercial
satellites to Russian launch sites where their sensitive technologies would be vulnerable to industrial
espionage.
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2AC AT Russia Collapse
Russia won’t become a failed state
Tarlton 8 – Lt Col, USAF (2/7/2008, Michael, “A RESURGENT RUSSIA IN 2030? A STUDY OF THE PAST, PRESENT, AND POSSIBLE FUTURE
POLITICAL SITUATION WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.”, AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY, Research Report Submitted to the Faculty,
https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153&mode=user&action=researchproject&objectid=74bdbda7-1439-4054-bc3b-0ae57a386cc3) MGM
The least likely scenario is a failed state. Russia has vast economic resources in her oil, gas, and precious
metals. Thus, even faced with rampant corruption and large demographic issues, save the improbable collapse of
oil prices, it is highly unlikely the Russian economy will collapse. Given the current Putin style of power
consolidation and sovereign democracy, there is very little chance his power base will allow Russia to spiral
into a failed state. There is too much money at stake and the available domestic resources are prevalent enough
to prevent such a catastrophic event. However, it is interesting to note that Putin himself used the threat of a Russian Federation collapse in
order to justify his current political power consolidation.87
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2AC AT Russian Democracy
No Russian democracy
Tarlton 8 – Lt Col, USAF (2/7/2008, Michael, “A RESURGENT RUSSIA IN 2030? A STUDY OF THE PAST, PRESENT, AND POSSIBLE FUTURE
POLITICAL SITUATION WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.”, AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY, Research Report Submitted to the Faculty,
https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153&mode=user&action=researchproject&objectid=74bdbda7-1439-4054-bc3b-0ae57a386cc3) MGM
The least likely scenario is a failed state. Russia has vast economic resources in her oil, gas, and precious metals. Thus, even faced with
rampant corruption and large demographic issues, save the improbable collapse of oil prices, it is highly unlikely the Russian economy will collapse.
Given the current Putin style of power consolidation and sovereign democracy, there is very little chance his power base will allow Russia to spiral into a
failed state. There is too much money at stake and the available domestic resources are prevalent enough to prevent such a catastrophic event. However,
it is interesting to note that Putin himself used the threat of a Russian Federation collapse in order to justify his current political power consolidation.87
The likelihood of a fully democratic state is only slightly more probable. In order for Russia to transition into a
democracy, much within the Russian Federation must change. Democracies require effective governance
through free and fair election of representatives within a legal framework that guarantees representation
without corruption. Democracies must allow freedom of speech and freedom of the press, as well as be governed by
the rule of law with the attendant civil society. Further, a democracy must have a judicial system that guarantees the
protection of private property, promotes free and fair global business practices, and most importantly, protects and
promotes the rights of individual citizens. For Russia to become a democracy, it must forego 1,500 years of history
and undergo radical reforms in the public sector and in the business community.
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2AC/1AR AT Russian public likes space
The Russian public opposes the high cost of space exploration
Bogdanov 4/4 – anthropologist and philologist whose areas of investigation covers Russian culture, including folklore, rhetoric, and the history
of science and humanities (4/4/2011, Konstantin, “A Fallen Giant: The Soviet Space Industry”, RIA Novosti,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/A_Fallen_Giant_The_Soviet_Space_Industry_999.html) MGM
Ordinary Russians see little connection between space exploration and economics. If anything, they see expensive
space programs as a permanent drain on the nation's resources. Some are inclined to take it personally, as if the
dark vacuum of space somehow sucked the money right out of their pockets. Space is beyond the realm of the
rational and, therefore, beyond the realm of economics. But Russia's space program was built, in part, by ordinary Russians using
ordinary steel. Space exploration was considered a national priority in the Soviet Union, with the funding to match.
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2AC/1AR AT Public influences government
Public pressure doesn’t affect Russian government policies
Mindell et. al 9 – Frances and David Dibner Professor of the History of Engineering and Manufacturing Professor of Engineering Systems
Margaret MacVicar Faculty Fellow Director, Program in Science, Technology and Society (Scott Uebelhart, postdoctoral associate in the MIT Program in
Science, Technology, and Society, Asif A. Siddiqi, Bangladeshi American space historian and assistant professor of history, Slava Gerovitch,
Dibner/Sloan Postdoctoral Researcher at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology at MIT, “The Future of Human Spaceflight:
Objectives and Policy Implications in a Global Context”, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES,
http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/spaceFuture.pdf) MGM
In the current Russian political climate, however, public opinion is often manipulated by the government, and
it plays a much lesser role, if any, in influencing government policies than in the United States. The lobbying
efforts of the leadership of the Russian space industry to a large extent shape the Russian space policy, resisting
public pressure.80 By engaging top Russian industry executives, joint projects with Russia have created a power
base for continued political support for U.S.-Russian cooperation in space and potentially in other areas.
Russia Disads
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Michigan Debate 2011
7 Week Seniors
2AC/1AR Alt Causality to Nationalism
Multiple factors sustain nationalism – space not key
Tarlton 8 – Lt Col, USAF (2/7/2008, Michael, “A RESURGENT RUSSIA IN 2030? A STUDY OF THE PAST,
PRESENT, AND POSSIBLE FUTURE POLITICAL SITUATION WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.”, AIR
WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY, Research Report Submitted to the Faculty,
https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153&mode=user&action=researchproject&objectid=74bdbda7-1439-4054-bc3b-0ae57a386cc3)
MGM
For many in Russia, Putin is trusted because of his oft-stated nationalism. Russians are a proud people who
have survived many invasions over the course of history. Of those alive today, many remember two German
invasions that shaped their nationalist views and world opinions. If fact, for many Russians, the defeat of Hitler
and the Nazi regime was the defining moment in World War II. Victory Day is celebrated annually in Russia
and commemorates this monumental achievement in Russian history which many commentators argue was
the last time the Russian population experienced national pride.84 President Putin is acutely aware of the link
between nationalism and his ability to manage democracy in Russia. In Russia, an oppressed population will
still support a corrupt government as long as they feel a sense of strong leadership and nationalist pride.85
Thus, while Putin continues to consolidate power within the Kremlin among the siloviki, he also restores a
sense of nationalism and pride within the Russian Federation. Since 2000, Russia has claimed the North Pole
as sovereign territory, taken great strides in its space program, and started flying the Bear Bomber to
demonstrate Russia’s return to the world scene. Further, Putin has secured multiple international economic
victories such as entrance into the G8, the IMF, and all but guaranteed accession into the WTO. All these steps
have led to a large increase in nationalism and pride especially among the younger generations. In the final
analysis, Putin has done an incredible job of increasing Russian pride and nationalism. Further, based on the
deep-rooted ideology of a Russian people being subservient to the government in whatever form, Putin has
increased his powerbase and simultaneously appeased his citizenry.86 Most Russian citizens believe life is
better and continually improving under Putin. Thus, in a country where ideology and nationalism dictate
civilian subservience to the government, the general populace is likely to perceive corruption and basic human
rights violations by their leaders as minor inconveniences. As long as Russia remains strong, the Russian
people are likely to turn a blind eye and let Putin’s siloviki “manage” Russian democracy well beyond 2030.
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Michigan Debate 2011
7 Week Seniors
2AC/1AR Nationalism Good
Nationalism is key to legitimize Putin and his agenda—critical to stability and the economy
Tuminez 2k – Vice Dean (Research) PhD (Political Science), Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
Master (Soviet Studies), Harvard University (April 2000, Astrid, “Russian Nationalism and Vladimir Putin's
Russia”, PONARS Policy Memo 151 American International Group, Inc. and Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0151.pdf) MGM
Should Putin's nationalism be feared? It is too early to conclude. What seems evident is that this nationalism
currently serves some necessary purposes. First, it helps to legitimize Putin as a leader. By putting on the
nationalist mantle and claiming to speak on behalf of the nation and its core interests, Putin--previously a
relatively unknown political entity--is able to legitimize his political position and his exercise of power. Second,
in a destroyed empire, nationalism helps offset feelings of humiliation, resentment, and helplessness, and
creates some space for generating collective optimism and self-esteem. Nationalism creates a new basis for
collective beliefs and consensus, without which it would be extremely difficult for Putin to implement the
economic and political measures that he believes necessary to improve Russia's internal welfare and external
status.