File Name
1
Ian Miller
Only impact is conventional wars- prolif doesn’t reduce risk of conventional war- it increases it
A- Empirics proveRussell, 2003
[Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and
Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March,
InformaWorld]
Nuclear-armed adversaries might calculate that honor, fear and interest necessitate war and that its conduct could be limited and not result in nuclear weapons exchanges. For
instance, a nation-state might calculate that it could initiate conventional military operations for limited objectives - such as territory - that
would not threaten vital interests such as the regime survivability of the opponent, reducing the risk of nuclear retaliation. The historical record shows that
non-nuclear states are willing to attack or go to war against nuclear powers. As Sagan points out, 'History suggests that while many states facing nuclear
adversaries may well be cautious, some states have nevertheless launched attacks in the face of such ~ncertainty."~ Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in 1973 and Argentina
invaded the United Kingdom's Falkland Islands in 1982. Israel's reputed nuclear weapons capability did not deter the Iraqis
from firing Scud missiles at Tel Aviv in the 1991 Gulf War. More recently, many Indians see the 1999 Kargil crisis with Pakistan as evidence
that the Pakistanis believed their nuclear deterrent would allow them to take the contested territory in Kashmir without risking Indian
retaliation." If these states were willing to fight against nuclear powers without a nuclear retaliatory capacity, it is reasonable to assume that they would do the same with a nuclear weapons inventory at the ready. Barry
Posen has speculated that the United States, had it been faced with a nuclear-armed Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf War,
might not have been deterred from retaking Kuwait.
B- Studies prove
Kapur, 2007
[S. Paul, Associate Prof. Strategic Research Department – Naval War College, “Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia”, p. 171]
My study's findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of nuclear proliferation's effects on international security. As noted, proliferation optimists argue that
by threatening to raise the cost of war astronomically, nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of conflict. My findings, however,
indicate that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the study shows that the danger of nuclear weapons can in certain circumstances have the
opposite effect. By potentially raising the costs of violence, nuclear weapons can make conflict more likely,
encouraging a weak, revisionist state both to take territory while insulated from all-out conventional retaliation and to
attempt to force third-party diplomatic intervention in ensuing crises. The high cost of nuclear war is precisely what
promises to make such a strategy successful; nuclear danger deters adversaries and also attracts outside attention. If nuclear weapons were not so destructive, a weak, revisionist
state would get neither of these benefits and would be less likely to engage in aggressive behavior. Thus, the high cost of nuclear war may not lead to lower level
stability and can actually increase the likelihood of conflict.
Nuclear war causes extinction- new studies
Starr ‘9 (Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict, October 2009, by Steven Starr Steven Starr is a Senior Scientist with Physicians for Social
Responsibility, and the Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists and the STAR (Strategic Arms Reduction) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.
Despite a two-thirds reduction in global nuclear arsenals since 1986, new
scientific research makes it clear that the environmental
consequences of nuclear war can still end human history. A series of peer-reviewed studies, performed at several U.S.
universities, predict the detonation of even a tiny fraction of the global nuclear arsenal within large urban centers will
cause catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of the protective stratospheric ozone
layer.
Small arsenals don’t deter—perceived as weak
James 00
[Carolyn C., prof at Department of Political Science at Iowa State University, “Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with
Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, ebsco]
Mini-arsenal presents more specifically a minimal nuclear capability and its relation to crisis behaviour. This is
perhaps the most complex, and therefore difficult, level to describe. First, a mini-arsenal state is capable of acquiring,
at best, two or three, crude Hiroshima or Nagasaki-style warheads. Fat Man, the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, was
1
File Name
2
Ian Miller
about 20 kilotons, the more powerful of the two used by the United States in 1945. This pales in comparison to
thermonuclear weapons, that are measured in megatons. India, Israel and Pakistan, which can project significant
nuclear threats, are beyond this category since the arsenals they are believed to possess contain qualitatively and
quantitatively much more destructive power. Second, the most critical distinction of the mini-arsenal is that, while
potential damage may be extreme, destruction of stute or society is not assured. A strike from a mini-arsenal state may
be survivable-militarily, politically and socially. This perception, which may be held both by the mini-arsenal state
leadership and its potential enemies, is expected to result in preferences and behaviour that do not match actions of
states with more deadly arsenals. Leadership that is more willing to risk domestic populations may consciously choose
to escalate wars to nuclear levels if the state and its government may survive. Of the four levels of nuclear capability,
mini-arsenal dyads promise to be the most unstable during crises as the deadliest of cost-benefit analyses are expected
to take place.
New actors wont be stable- the past cant be applied to the future
Yusuf, 2009
[Moeed, Fellow, Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future Boston University, Brookings
Institute Policy Paper No. 11, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons.” Google
Scholar] CMR
Recent efforts to predict the future of nuclear weapons and proliferation agree overwhelmingly that Asian proliferation
would eventually undermine the post-Cold War nuclear equilibrium. The kind of stability that existed in the
superpower nuclear relationship during the Cold War was not expected to take root in regions like the Middle East,
which none the less remains central to the domino effect thesis.180 Indeed, there seems to be a continuing implicit
assumption that developing countries would act less maturely with nuclear weapons under their belt, thus inevitably
leading to regional, and in turn global, instability. Post-Cold War arguments were largely deterministic on this count and the pessimism was much more accentuated than was
the case during the Cold War.
Nukes outweigh bioweapons
Eitzen, 1997
[EDWARD M. EITZEN, M.D., M.P.H., FACEP, FAA, Colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army; Chief, Operational Medicine
Division, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, USE OF BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS, 1997,www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/medaspec/Ch-20electrv699.pdf]
Biological weapons, when compared with nuclear weapons, are less likely to cause widespread physical devastation. Likely
scenarios of use include large-scale attacks against fixed rear areas and forces, such as supply points, ammunition dumps, airbases, command and control assets, and fixed medical facilities; or application on a
It is less likely that
an enemy would attempt to use biological warfare weapons against tactical maneuver units, owing to those units’ high
mobility and the fact that effects on such units may not occur quickly enough to be decisive in the enemy’s favor. A
proper defense against biological weapons thus requires (a) an understanding of the enemy and his likely objectives
for a biological attack, and (b) the adoption of effective personal protective measures to minimize their impact. Biological
morelimited scale to cause disruption rather than annihilation. As a force is demoralized and reduced by disease and strange illnesses, attrition may become a more significant factor.
defenses and future detection efforts should be emphasized in areas of the battlefield where an enemy attack is most likely. However, since an adversary may attempt to use biological weapons when and where such an attack is least expected, all efforts should be
made to prepare our forces in depth for the possibility of a biological attack. This preparation should include the continued development of better vaccines and prophylactic drugs to protect U.S. military forces deployed to areas where intelligence indicates that
Biological warfare agents, by themselves, are not ideal tactical weapons, owing to their
unpredictability and delayed effects (long incubation times). They are also viewed as inhumane by many, and their “first use”
would generate significant world criticism. Their tactical importance may in crease, however, as more is learned about the predictability of damage from specific biological agents.
But the U.S. military must be prepared to defend against biological attack at all levels of conflict . Biological warfare agents in combination with
an attack with biological agents is likely.
other weapons systems must also be anticipated. With the development of new missile delivery systems, even intercontinental delivery of biological agents is possible, and the use of low-flying, longrange cruise missiles or remotely piloted drones may be the best
way to generate a dense cloud of biological warfare agents close to the ground. It has been estimated that under suitable conditions, a cruise missile could deliver anthrax spores over an area of the same magnitude as the lethal fallout from a ground-burst nuclear
warhead.3 However, much more subtle delivery vehicles (such as an agricultural sprayer mounted on a truck, boat, or other, more conventional platform) could be used to deliver biological agents anywhere in the world. Simply to maintain a defensive posture
The U.S. military must be able to sustain an offensive campaign in a biologically contaminated
environment. To do otherwise is to invite use of such weapons by the enemy. The impact of infectious diseases on
military units has been well documented in past wars, but the potential fielding of highly lethal agents by adversaries
for use as biological warfare weapons makes personal protective measures and commanddriven discipline even more
important for today’s army. While the more accurate conventional weapons systems that are currently fielded by some military forces produce less collateral damage, an aggressor using biological or chemical
weapons may use multiple weapons or dissemination devices to cover a large area. Biological weapons could be effective if the enemy’s goal was to preserve
logistical materiel; this presupposes the enemy use of captured friendly weapons and infrastructure, as opposed to mass physical destruction, thereby
making biological weapons more attractive to an enemy than nuclear weapons to accomplish this purpose.12,13
against attack is not adequate, however.
Democracies cause more wars- their studies are flawed
2
File Name
3
Ian Miller
- Henderson ‘2 (Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002,
Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?)
The replication and extension of Oneal and Russet (1997), which is one of the most important studies on the DPP,
showed that democracies are not significantly less likely to fight each other. The results demonstrate that Oneal and
Russet (1997) findings in support of the DPP are not robust and that join democracy does not reduce the
probability of international conflict .
Environment
Empirically No extinction and past the point of no return
AFP, Agence France Presse, September 15, 1999, “Outlook Grim For World’s Environment Says UN,”
http://www.rense.com/earthchanges/grimoutlook_e.htm
The United Nations warned Wednesday that the world’s environment was facing catastrophic damage as the new millennium
nears, ranging from irreversible destruction to tropical rainforests to choking air pollution and a threat to the polar ice caps.
In a lengthy report, the UN Environment Programme painted a grim tableau for the planet’s citizens in the next millennium, saying time was fast running out
to devise a policy of sustainable human development. And for some fragile eco-systems and vulnerable species, it is already too late,
“Tropical forest destruction has gone too far to prevent irreversible damage. It would
take many generations to replace the lost forests, and the cultures that have been lost with them can never be replaced,” it warns. “Many of
the planet’s species have already been lost or condemned to extinction because of the slow response times of both the environment and
policy-makers; it is too late to preserve all the bio-diversity the planet had.” Sounding the alarm, the UNEP said the planet now faced “full-scale
emergencies” on several fronts, including these: -- it is probably too late to prevent global warming, a phenomenon whereby exhaust gases and
warns the report, called GEO-2000.
other emissions will raise the temperature of the planet and wreak climate change. Indeed, many of the targets to reduce or stabilise emissions will not be met,
the report says. -- urban air pollution problems are reaching “crisis dimensions” in the developing world’s mega-cities, inflicting damage to
the health of their inhabitants. --
the seas are being “grossly over-exploited” and even with strenuous efforts will take a long time to recover.
Bio
Bioweapons won’t spread and cause epidemics – even if they do, not many would die
Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!”
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic_set=
3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995
medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped
from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade
anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic.
Poverty is declining
Bjorn Lomborg, adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, associate professor of statistics in the
political science department at the University of Aarhus, PhD in Political Science, Director of Denmark’s national
Environmental Assessment Institute, July 1, 2005, Foreign Policy, No. 149, “The State of Nature,” p. Lexis
You say 60 percent of Earth’s ecosystems are in decline, without talking much about people and forgetting the crucial linkage between poverty and pollution.
The bottom line is--as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment stresses--that humanity’s lot has improved dramatically in
both the rich world and in the developing world. In the poorest countries, life expectancy has more than doubled over
the past 100 years.
3