Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Intellectual Property Law (LW566)
Dissertation:
Despite a widespread assumption that the
Copyright system is in place to protect the
artist; the current copyright legislation in
fact undermines the protection and the
development of the modern visual arts.
March 2006
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Word Count: 5,461
(Excluding all Footnotes, Contents page, Headings, Sub-Headings and Bibliography)
1
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
CONTENTS.
Contents……………………………………………………….………..…...2
Abstract……………………………………………………….………….…3
Part 1
Copyright: The Legal perspective…………………………………………………….…...4
1.1 The Berne Convention: The treatment of art and copyright.
1.2 The development of U.K. legislation and understanding of “artistic works.”
1.3 A further premise regarding copyright.
Part 2
The Importance of Paternity, a brief view…………………………………………….….9
2.1 Historical Analysis.
2.2 Philosophical Examination.
Part 3
Modern Arts interplay with copyright………………………………….………………..12
3.1 Modern artistic practices.
3.2 Contemporary artistic practices: The impact of the modernist legal position.
3.3 Moral Rights of the author.
3.4 Expression Vs. Ideas – copyrights ideas or arts ideas?
Part 4
Copyright and Modern Artistic practices………………………………….......................20
4.1 Sherrie Levine: Critical content of her work.
4.2 Jeff Koons: Critical content of his work.
[Insert:] Figure 1. Edward Weston, Nude 1925……………………………………………………25
[Insert:] Figure 2. Sherrie Levine, After Ed Weston 1981………………………………………..25
[Insert:] Figure 3. Art Rogers, Photograph, Puppies 1980; Jeff Koons,
Seven Puppies 1998…………………………………………………………………………….……..26
Part 5
The Modern Artist, can he be protected?…………………………………………………27
5.1 Conclusion.
Part 6
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………….…..31
Cited Articles/Papers.
Cited Articles/Papers from Websites/Electronic Sources.
Other Cited Websites.
Cited Books.
Cited Cases
Cited Legislation
Background Reading/ Research Sources…………………………………………………….35
2
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Abstract:
The Copyright system restricts the development of the modern visual arts. Copyright
constructs a pragmatic relationship between artist and artwork relying stringently on
the logic of property law. The meaning of ‘artistic work’ itself in the Act is limited to
only a few definitions. The current copyright system prevents the modern artists from
copying or using other related works, which already exist in their own right;
excluding some modernist genres such as: the art of the ‘readymade,’ ‘appropriation
art’ and ‘conceptual art’ in general. Modernism is an art form whose formal practices
unsettle copyright’s doctrinal certainties. It seems modern artists are unable to
receive due protection, and use previous artistic works because of the limitations
under the 1988 Act. The growth of digitalisation similarly provides limited protection
to the artist; electronic copies can be effortlessly reproduced and published. This
precise issue is suppressing the development of modern visual arts.
This is further made apparent by the evaluation of genres of the visual arts under
copyright law by using an approach taken by theories of art, particularly
Appropriation Art and the Modern Art movement. This is evident through the analysis
of artists who challenge the modernist construction of the artist. The broader
consequences of this construction are discussed with reference to the work of two
post-modern artists: Sherrie Levine and Jeff Koons. Their works controversialise what
is taken to be “art” and protected by copyright, with a view to publicising the voices
excluded in the modernist vision. This is apparent through a consideration of the
critical content of some of their work to discuss how the modernist legal position
impacts upon contemporary artistic practices.
3
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
PART 1
Copyright: The Legal perspective.
1.1 The Berne Convention: The treatment of art and copyright:
1.1.1 The Berne convention expressly recognises that artistic works are to be given
protection in member states of the Berne Copyright Union. Article 2 of the
Convention states that, “the expression, “literary and artistic works” shall include
every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the
mode or form of its expression.”1 When granting copyright protection most States do
not discriminate between “good” and “bad” artistic works, a work merely has to be an
“artistic work” rather than be above a particular threshold of quality.
1.1.2 Similarly, in the UK “artistic works” are protected regardless of their artistic
quality. The current governing legislation, The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988 (CDPA), refers to such works being protected “irrespective of artistic quality.”2
1.2 The development of UK Legislation and understanding of “artistic work.”
1.2.1 Art works were given protection after the Statute of Anne 1709,3 by a series of
statutes in 1755 for engravings.4 Prints taken by lithography or other mechanical
processes gained protection from the International Copyright Act of 1852. The first
comprehensive step towards a modern statute was the Copyright Act 1911.5 The
1
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; Article 2 (1) The expression
“literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain,
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings;
lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works;
choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words;
cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to
cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography;
photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography;
works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to
geography, typography, architecture or science.
2
CDPA 1988 s4 (1) (a) Further, “Artistic craftsmanship” being the exception to this rule.
3
which was only for literary works.
4
The Engraving Copyright Act 1734: It was the first statute to give legislative protection to the artist.
“This was because the force behind the Act, the celebrated artist and engraver William Hogarth, was in
variably the designer as well as the engraver of his well known works which were widely pirated.” “Art
and Copyright.” Simon Stokes.
5
It took account of technological developments such as sound recordings, and the period of protection
of work was made at least the author’s life plus 50 years. It also took account of the Berne Convention
1886. “Art and Copyright.” Simon Stokes.
4
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Copyright Act 1956 took account of further technological developments.6 After
further legal changes during the 1970’s7 the U.K. adopted the current legislation, the
CDPA.
1.2.2 Awareness of “Intellectual property rights”8 by means of protecting expressions
of artistic characters as cited can be sourced from the CDPA. “No copyright can
subsist in a work produced as a true collective enterprise (rather than by one or more
identifiable or anonymous ‘authors.’)”9 For “artistic works” to be copyrighted they
must satisfy the qualifying factors: firstly, it must be an “original” 10; it must be a
“work”11; it must be “literary”12; it must be capable of being “fixated” 13 and has to be
“qualified”14 in order to satisfy the copyright protection criterion. Copyright can only
subsist in certain classes of works, exhaustively defined in s115 of the CDPA;
1.2.3 The CDPA amalgamates various kinds of “artistic works” together. The
categories of “artistic works” 16 are defined in s4 of the Act. Developing artistic
It added three new forms of entrepreneurial copyright – in cinematograph films, broadcasts, and the
typographical format of published editions. “Art and Copyright.” Simon Stokes.
7
There was a consensus that further legal changes were required to take account of photocopying,
audio and video taping and computing. The use of copyright to protect industrial designs was also
being reassessed.
8
‘By “intellectual property” we mean ideas, inventions, discoveries, symbols, images, expressive
works (verbal, visual, musical, theatrical), or in short any potentially valuable human product (broadly,
“information”) that has an existence separable from a unique physical embodiment, whether or not the
product has actually been “propertized,” that is, brought under a legal regime of property rights. “The
Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law” William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner
9
“The Ethical Reaches of Authorship” (1996) 95 South Atlantic Quarterly; Peter Jaszi and Martha
Woodmansee – Sourced from: “Copyright Law and the Claims of Art”; Intellectual Property Quarterly;
Anne Barron
10
s.1(1)(a) Original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work. Precedent: University of London Press
v. University Tutorial Press[1916] 2 Ch 601 ; Ladbroke(Football) v. William Hill (Football) Ltd.
[1964]1 All ER 465 ; Interlego v. Tyco Industries[
11
Precedence: Ladbroke v. William Hill; G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd [1944] AC
329; Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Insurance Insurance Consultants [1982] R.P.C. 69 (C.A) (de minimis rule)
12
s.3(1) Precedence: University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press
13
ss.3(2), 178 Copyright does not subsist in literary, dramatic or musical works unless it is recorded in
writing or otherwise.
14
ss.1(3), 153
15
s1 Copyright and copyright works: (1) Copyright is a property right which subsists in accordance
with this Part in the following descriptions of work- (a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic
works, (b) sound recordings, films or broadcasts, and (c) the typographical arrangement of published
editions.
16
s4 Artistic works: (1) In this Part “artistic work” means- (a) a graphic work, photograph, a sculpture
or collage, irrespective of artistic quality, (b) a work of architecture being a building or a model for a
building, or (c ) a work of artistic craftsmanship (2) In this Part- “building” includes any fixed
structure, and a part of a building or fixed structure; “graphic work” includes-any painting, drawing,
diagram, map, chart or plan, and (a) any engraving, etching, lithograph, woodcut or similar work;
6
5
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
techniques challenge the CDPA and what is likely to fall within the relevant category
of subjects. This needs detailed consideration, given the way contemporary art
continues to progress. For example, the work must be fixed which excludes, body
art17, land art18, and performance art in general; works which are not original,
excludes the readymade and appropriation art in general; “Copyright does not protect
the ‘basic’ components of cultural productions [and so radically limits the protection
awarded to minimalist and conceptual art.]”19
1.2.4 The common conception of the meaning of ‘original’ is something that is new
which has not been created before.20 The CDPA clearly states that copyright will
subsist legally in “original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.” However,
‘original’ is not defined21 within the Act. It is only through case law that the
appreciation of the legal meaning that the law has attached to this term can be
determined.
1.2.5 University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd.22 Peterson J.
states that: “The word ‘original’ does not in this connection mean that the work must
be the expression of original or inventive thought, and, in the case of ‘literary work’,
with the expression of thought in print or writing. The originality which is required
relates to the expression of thought.”23 It is clearly stated here that the originality
required by the law is not that of revolutionary new ideas but of the way that the
thought is expressed. Peterson J. continues: “[t]he Act does not require that the
expression must be in original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied
“photograph” means a recording of light or other radiation on any medium on which an image is
produced or from which an image may by any means be produced, and which is not part of a film;
“sculpture” includes a cast or model made for purposes of sculpture.
17
Where the body and/ or its products are used as a material art-making
18
Those works completed by natural forces or the built environment
19
“The Ethical Reaches of Authorship” (1996) 95 South Atlantic Quarterly; Peter Jaszi and Martha
Woodmansee – Sourced from: “Copyright Law and the Claims of Art”; Intellectual Property Quarterly;
Anne Barron [See footnote, 52 for definition of Conceptual Art]
20
Originality is a threshold question. Its purpose is to save administrative and other costs by screening
out works that would be created even without copyright protection. “The Arts and Humanity in Public
Life: Copyright Protection and Appropriation Art,” by William M. Landes
21
‘Original’ defined as, “1. Existing from the beginning; first or earliest. 2. Produced first-hand; not a
copy. 3. Inventive or novel...” by the English language. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Tenth
Edition, Revised, Edited by Judy Pearsall
22
[1916] 2 Ch 601
23
ibid
6
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
from another work – that it should originate from the author.”24 In order for a work to
gain copyright protection, it must originate from the author – the recognised legal
meaning of ‘original.’25 The ideas expressed within the work do not themselves have
to be new, but the way in which they are conveyed to the audience does: ‘copyright
law does not require that a work should be unprecedented, that is, new in comparison
with already existing works…A copyright…is good provided a sufficient amount of
work was originated by the author independently, even if some other person had
already produced an identical piece by sheer coincidence.’26
1.2.6 Copyright protects only a work’s expression, not the ideas it contains; ideas may
be freely taken and applied.27 The TRIPS Agreement28 reaffirms this principle of
copyright law: ‘Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not ideas,
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.’29 This illdefined boundary proves in reality to be complex thus providing little reassurance to
the creative genius. The artists ideas may be ‘copied’ despite being represented in a
slightly different manner; this is evidenced in Duchamps, L.H.O.O.Q.30
1.3 A further premise regarding copyright:
1.3.1 The modern artist asserts to reproduce, by himself, the ‘genuine artistic birth
being separate from and elevated above dishonest creations,’31 which includes both
‘father-less commodities and the products of women's labour, by the copyright
regime.’32 Copyright suggests that these products, that lack an ‘assertion of ingenious
activity by a male progenitor, are value-less.’33 It appeals to a rigid separation
between the ‘public’ space of art and the ‘private’ realms of industry and the home.34
It is indeed this rigid separation which remains the underlying problem today
24
ibid
“The word ‘original’ in the statute does not imply inventive originality; it is enough that the work is
the production of something in a new form as a result of the skill, labour and judgement of the
reporter.” From Express Newspapers PLC v. News (UK) Ltd. (1990) 1 WLR 1320, 1324-7
26
Laddie, H. et al, “The Modern Law of Copyrights” 2nd Ed., (1995) Butterworths, page 48.
27
Article: Ideas Vs. Expression
28
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) (TRIPS Agreement)
29
Article 9(2) TRIPS Agreement 1994
30
This is explored further, see footnote 44
31
“Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by post-modern artists” Kathy
Bowrey Lecturer in Law, Macquarie University
32
ibid
33
ibid
34
ibid
25
7
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
between the legal world and the art world. ‘Copyright law in the U.K. has no category
of “art”, and it does not demand of the objects it protects that they elicit as aesthetic
response. Copyright law therefore cannot recognise whole swathes of contemporary
practice in the visual arts as having any claim to legal protection as such.’35 The
conflicting ideas of what actually constitutes artistic or visual representations come to
light with the rapid development of new innovative techniques36 that challenge the
dogmatism of the legal world.
1.3.2 When dealing with particular instances of copyright ‘infringement’ these
distinctions take on a new light. The courts appear to overlook the distinction between
art and business,37 due to a concern to protect economic values of the ‘reproductive
right’ in works. They protect the mass reproduction of the unique with little
appreciation of the apparent double entendre this engages. However, this security
only serves to strengthen the status of the ‘other’ private area: the production and
reproduction of the artwork is protected so that he can provide for the home and those
who ‘naturally’ reside there38. ‘Accordingly women’s reproductive work is what is
ultimately rendered value-less by copyright, not the masculinist reproduction
embodied in the multiple artworks.’39 By the scrutiny of two appropriate modern
artists, that of, the feminist artist Sherrie Levine and the commodity approach adopted
by Jeff Koons, these issues can be clarified.
“Copyright Law and the Claims of Art”; Intellectual Property Quarterly; Anne Barron
Someday this period will be thought of as a Renaissance, one of the times that technology and
imagination have intersected to redefine the way a culture creates and represents knowledge. Entirely
new forms of information are being invented using digital technologies: new art forms are emerging-like animation and computer music--new forms of scientific visualization, and new sorts of cybernetic
social spaces. I am concerned that copyright law will impede the very process of technological and
educational innovation, which is the social purpose of copyright as defined in the Constitution: to
"promote the progress of science and the useful arts." Copyright and Fair Use in the Digital Age, Q&A
with Peter Lyman, By Educom Review Staff.
http://www.educause.edu/pub/er/review/reviewarticles/30132.html
37
Optimal copyright protection strives to balance the incentive benefits against access costs in a way
that promotes economic efficiency or, equivalently, social welfare. Just as too little protection can be
harmful so can too much protection. Many copyright doctrines can be understood as efforts to promote
efficiency by striking the right balance between incentives and access. “The Arts and Humanity in
Public Life, Copyright Protection and Appropriation Art,”by William M. Landes
38
“The Arts and Humanity in Public Life, Copyright Protection and Appropriation Art,” by William M.
Landes
39
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by postmodern artists. Kathy
Bowerey, Lecturer in Law, Macquarie University
35
36
8
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Part 2.
The Importance of Paternity, a brief view.
2.1 Historical analysis.
2.1.1 Paternity and authorship has always been of strong importance with all artistic
constructions; art at times could be perceived with its basis in ritual or as “a reflector
of external objects.”40 Paternity stems from the origins of art; the stylistic diversities
of the Ancient Greek creators through to the Renaissance masters, the ‘personage’ of
the artist was attributed to many factors not simply, for the value of the work of art.
2.1.2 ‘At its core . . . their conception of the public for art was a political one. The
very term vision was used in these aesthetic texts in a way that was directly analogous
to the ‘vision’ exercised by the ideal citizen of the commonwealth. Vision in this
sense meant to see beyond particular, local contingencies and merely individual
interests . . . a gaze that consistently registered what united rather than what divided
the members of the political community was a requirement for participation in public
affairs.’41 Patronage granted a guarantee in the production of good works,
representing the work of its creator and, as an object of representation, the artwork
signified the ‘virtue of its patron’42: the economical value of the work increased due
to the attribution by the patron for his commissioned piece. Social acknowledgements
were allowed to increase due to the sanction of authenticity. The artist's role was
perceived as an agency in the creation of meaning, rather than as a form of personal
commentary upon it.43
2.2 Philosophical examination
2.2.1 Burgin argues: “The romantic author feared the social disintegration and
distancing inborn in the use of a more rational, atomistic outlook of the world where
human nature became articulated in the shape of products manufactured for the
40
M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition,(London:
Oxford University Press, 1971)
41
T. Crow, “The Birth and Death of the Viewer”, in Discussions in Contemporary Culture.
Number One, edited by H. Foster, (Seattle: Bay Press, 1987) at 3.
42
…but, primarily to commemorate themselves, their relations, friends, ancestors, and patrons.” R.
M. Smuts, Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early Stuart England
43
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by post-modern artists. Kathy
Bowrey
9
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
marketplace. This idea was seen as threatening the production of "significant"
works.”44
2.2.2 Paternity and authorship45 thus, has become imperative as the foundation of the
meaning and assessment of artistic works. The classical association of art with history
and tradition was rejected because through contemporary artistic practices it had
become corrupt. Contempt for the affairs of capitalist production meant that art was to
be sternly divorced from "industry" calculations. The appeal of the romantic position
was that in locating the work in the natural self, meaning could be kept safe from
industrial contamination. It is copyright which serves as a ‘gate-keeping’46 function
that shelter the ‘legitimacy of artistic works’47 by isolating these from basic
‘commodity items.’48 Copyright is essential for keeping artistic works from
intermingling with their social inferiors49. However, this is a traditional notion that is
significantly limited to only Fine Art50 and the conception of the romantic author,
excluding the radical modern artist.
2.2.3 Bently argues, the notion of the author in copyright law functions as a point of
attachment and divestment: “While copyright may be built on an image of creative
authorship, copyright uses that image as a point of attachment - a point at which to
ascribe a property right and by which that right can be determined. But the essence of
that ascription is that it is a divestible or alienable right. In law, authorship is a point
of origination of a property right that, thereafter, like other property rights, will
44
By the end of the eighteenth century, under the influence of, most notably Rousseau, the metaphor of
organic growth had replaced more mechanical, rational images of the processes governing art:
ignorant of, or indifferent to, rules and reasons, the artist creates by blind necessity, like Nature itself.
V. Burgin, The End of Art Theory, (London: Macmillan, 1986)
45
With reference to law Roland Barthes noted that - The author is reputed the father and owner of his
work: literary science teaches respect for the manuscript and the author’s declared intentions, while
society asserts the legality of the relation of author to work (the droit d’auteur or copyright). R.
Barthes, “From Work to Text”, in Image, Music, Text, translated by S. Heath, New York: Noonday
Press, 1977
46
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by post-modern artists. Kathy
Bowrey
47
ibid
48
ibid
49
ibid
50
Fine Art: “Art for arts sake,” (www.worldimages.com/art_glossary.php)
Art which is produced for beauty rather than utility, often requiring high skill and technical ability,
associated with Classics and the Academics. The term has been used to refer to a limited number of
visual art forms, including painting, sculpture, and printmaking.
10
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
circulate in the market, ending up in the control of the person who can exploit it most
profitably. Since copyright serves paradoxically to vest authors with property only to
enable them to divest that property, the author is a notion which needs only to be
sustainable for an instant.51”
2.2.4 In modern copyright law, therefore, the concept of authorship is no more and no
less than the essential first step in the process of commodification. This means that
copyright law, at times, recognises authors that would not be accommodated by
romantic theories of authorial creativity because it can assert a property right
allowing it to become dogmatic like the law. Barron also claims that “copyright law is
a branch of property law, and the chief function of property law is to delineate the
entities which may be objects of exclusive private control and identify the persons,
whom those rights of control may be vested.” 52 This reflects the logical approach
adopted by the law, as property law is particularly logical in comparison to the arts.
Copyright law “assumes that “Art” manifests itself only in a determinate array of
species such as painting and sculpture cannot accommodate any artistic gesture that
is not realised in one or other of these forms.” 53 Barron continues asserting that it is
this “blindness towards art that copyright law’s discriminatory and exclusionary
potential resides.” 54 The laws blindness to “Art” is not a result of “deliberate
aesthetic prejudice” but she claims it is merely a “by-product of copyright law’s
pursuit of certainty, objectivity and closure.” 55
“Art and the making of Modern Copyright Law” L.Bently,
“Copyright Law and the Claims of Art”; Intellectual Property Quarterly; Anne Barron
53
Ibid
54
ibid
55
ibid
51
52
11
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Part 3.
Modern Arts’ interplay with copyright.
3.1 Modern artistic practices
3.1.1 20th-century art displays more than stylistic diversity. Modern artists have made
paintings not only with the use of traditional materials such as oil on canvas, but
broadly of any material available to them.56 This innovation has led to developments
that are even more radical: Conceptual Art,57 Performance Art movements,58
Appropriation Art,59 practices that expanded the definition of art60 to include not just
physical objects but ideas and actions as well.
56
The practice can be traced back to the revolutionary, innovative modern practices of the Synthetic
Cubist collages and constructions of Picasso and Georges Braque made from 1912 onwards. These
works challenged the art world and the meaning of artistic works, these artists were the first to use the
artistic technique of appropriating items from a non-art context into their work; real objects such as
newspapers were included to represent themselves. Subsequent compositions such as Guitar,
Newspaper, Glass and Bottle (1913) in which Picasso used newspaper clippings to create forms,
became categorized as Synthetic Cubism. The two artists incorporated aspects of the “real world” into
their canvases, breaking the mould of the previous pragmatic and dogmatic approaches to the visual
arts, the typical two-dimensional artists representation, thereby, questioning the true meaning of art and
creation.
57
Conceptual Art: An art form that developed in the mid-1960’s, in which the concept takes
precedence over the actual object; http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_7615060632/Conceptual
_Art.html
58
Dramatic presentation by visual artists (as distinguished from theatre artists such as actors and
dancers) before an audience, usually apart from a formal theatrical setting.
(www.clevelandartandhistory.org/HTMLPages/Glossary.html)
59
To appropriate something involves taking possession of it. In the visual arts, the term appropriation
often refers to the use of borrowed elements in the creation of new work. The borrowed elements
include images, forms, or styles from art history or from popular culture, or materials and techniques
from non-art contexts. Since the 1980’s the term has also referred more specifically to quoting the
work of another artist to create a new work. The new work may or may not alter the original. Aspects
of appropriation appear in nearly all areas of visual art history if one considers the basic act of making
art as the borrowing of images or concepts from the surrounding world and re-interpreting them into
artwork. Some might classify Leonardo da Vinci as an appropriation artist, because he used
recombinant methods of appropriation, borrowing from sources as diverse as biology, mathematics,
engineering and art, and then synthesising them into inventions and artworks.
60
Appropriation art was developed much further in the ready-mades by the French artist Marcel
Duchamp (Marcel Duchamp (1887- 1968) A prolific artist, his greatest contribution to the history of
art lies in his ability to question, admonish, critique, and playfully ridicule existing norms in order to
transcend the status quo—he effectively sanctioned the role of the artist to do just that.) from 1915.
The French artist exhibited everyday, mass-produced, utilitarian objects—including a bicycle wheel60.
He combined coupled his visual assaults on “art” with verbal puns: Most notorious of these was
Fountain (In 1917, he entered Fountain into the American Society of Independent Artist exhibition.) a
man’s urinal signed, “R.Mutt” (or “armut” German for poverty) titled and presented on a pedestal.
When the Jury at the 1917 Independents exhibition in New York rejected his urinal as not being art, in
his defence it was stated that, “The only works of art America has given are her plumbing and her
bridges.” (Comment by Beatrice Wood, sourced from www.arthistoryclub.com) The urinal appeared
neither original nor rare, Duchamp’s “creativity” as an artist lies in the gesture of selecting the urinal as
an art piece and displaying it in an artistic context. However, recent research has revealed the apparent
urinal as non-standard, and even non-functional: Duchamp allegedly custom designed it along with his
other supposed ready-mades. Duchamp also went so far as to use existing art in his work,
12
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
3.2 Contemporary artistic practices: The impact of the modernist legal position
3.2.1 New artistic developments have revolutionised the innovative minds of the
modern artist.61 They allow the artist to reach areas of new heights in creativity.62
Among the 20th century’s most important contributions to the history of art are:
abstraction,63 the introduction of a wide range of new artistic techniques and
materials, even the redefinition of the boundaries of art itself64. So, can they be
offered the same level of protection as their creative ancestors or past icons? It seems
not. The statutory precedence, the CDPA, does not provide for certain new creative
techniques. This seems bizarre, as its aim surely is to initiate and promote
innovation65, thereby protecting innovation. Furthermore, some contemporary artistic
practices allow the artists to use previous artworks such as Appropriation Art, but
copyright prevents this, impeding the progression of art movements. Deitch claimed
that, “If these copyright laws had been applied from 1905 to 1975, we would not have
modern art as we know it.”66 The CDPA is specific in its sub-classification of the
“artistic work” in its accommodation for contemporary practices. It cannot permit, as
appropriating an apparent copy of the Mona Lisa defaced by a drawn-on moustache, entitled,
L.H.O.O.Q, this is a coarse French pun (When pronounced in French, “elle a chaud au cul” it means
“She’s got a hot ass”.) Despite this the image of Mona Lisa does not exactly reproduce the original,
but instead provides a subtly different copy modelled on Duchamp himself.
61
Later, in the 1930-1940’s the Surrealists and their poetic productions, criticised by Raymond
Queneau as profitable “pseudo-philosophical-scientific-occult-marxist junk,” (Surrealism and the
Visual Arts, Theory and Reception, Kim Grant: And this [Surrealist] manner of exalting the word
“Poetic,” is this not an exemplary instance of the falsification that allows all sorts of merchandise to
be presented under a brilliant term? . . . The great name of “Poetry” has been used to great profit in
order to get rid of a lot of pseudo-philosophical-scientific-occult-marxist junk) also made extensive use
of appropriation in collages and objects such as Salvador Dali’s Lobster Telephone. Meret
Oppenheim’s Object (Luncheon in Fur) (1936) also incorporated “found” objects. These objects took
on new meaning when combined with other unlikely and unsettling objects. Although, it has been
speculated that what they defend, in sum, are the rights of poetry, freedom and fantasy. And, in truth,
this is an old battle. (Maximilian Gauthier, source: Surrealism and the Visual Arts, Theory and
Reception, Kim Grant)
62
In the late 1950’s appropriated images and objects appear extensively in the work of Jasper Johns
with his use of the American dollar bill and in Pop artists, such as Andy Warhol. Controversial artistic
techniques were adopted, these new forms of creating artistic works, and visual representations pushed
forward a new concept in the art world, that of the Modern Artist. Most specifically in relation to
certain American artists in the 1980’s, notably Sherrie Levine and the artists of the Neo-Geo group
particularly Jeff Koons.
63
Art that does not imitate the appearance of things.
64
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia
65
Comparatively, it is often claimed that the institution of copyright is fundamentally oriented towards
the promotion of the arts, and in particular towards the protection of artists from unscrupulous pirates
who--but for the copyright system--would exploit art for commercial gain and leave artists themselves
to "starve in their garrets". Intellectual Property Quarterly, 2002, Article: Copyright and the Claims of
Art, Anne Barron
66
Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art: an Economic Approach” William Landes
sourced from:“Copyright in the Cultural Industries” Edited by Ruth Towse
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Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
stated, installation art,67 video art,68 environmental art, mixed media works or
conceptual art. Neither can the category of “art” in the CDPA permit the products of
these practices. The effect of this taxonomic approach to defining the objects of
copyright is certainly discriminatory, simply because the narrowness of the law’s
classifications causes it to fail to reflect the diversity of contemporary, modern art.69
3.2.2 Sherrie Levine reproduced as her own work other works of art, through
photography, including paintings of the renowned Impressionist Claude Monet. Her
intention was to create a novel situation, and accordingly a new meaning or set of
meanings for a recognizable image. Modern art raises questions of originality,
authenticity and authorship; belonging to the long modernist tradition of art
questioning the nature or definition of art itself. Modern artists’ works
controversialise the theory of “art” and what is to be protected by copyright; they
allow for the rejected voices of the modernist vision to be noticed.
3.2.3 In particular, two Modern artists, Levine and Koons radically confront the
modernist conception of art; Levine from a feminist position, Koons as a critic of the
distinction between art and commodity culture. Their works challenge the distinctions
that underlie artistic copyright providing an appraisal of it. Their artistic practices
interrogate, stretch and reinvent the distinctions between art, industry and home and,
in this context, ‘their works help define or identify wider structural transformations in
our social, economic and political context.’70
3.2.4 The main dominant conception of art utilised by the courts is based upon a
romantic property right 71 whereby an artistic work is perceived as the natural
embodiment of imagination, projecting the personality of its creator. Copyright
protects and maintains the original, intimate connection between a work and an
author. It determines the significance and essence of a work with reference to its birth,
67
Where the art is defined primarily by its spatial location and context rather than by the materials that
constitute it.
68
Where the use of the video, an essentially time-based medium, is apt to suggest refusal of the
instantaneity or simultaneity celebrated by Modernist critics (such as Fried.)
69
“Copyright and the Claims of Art,” Intellectual Property Quarterly. Anne Barron
70
“Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by postmodern artists.” Kathy
Bowerey, Lecturer in Law, Macquarie University
71
“Copyright and the Claims of Art,” Intellectual Property Quarterly. Anne Barron
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Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
rather than with reference to its locality or purpose in society. Copyright protects
against copying but not independent duplication72. Copyright insists that we pay
homage to the forebear of a work before we can interact with it, albeit in the form of a
licence to use the work and payment for that privilege.73 It is clear that there is an
emerging rivalry and distinction with the different views of copyright by both the
art74; for example, with the use of photography, and legal worlds; in particular with
reference to public economics and private issues regarding the re-production of the
copyrighted work. In addition, the developing digital world75 has opened new areas
concerning the re-productions of artistic works and impact of artist’s protection rights
within the ‘art world.’76
3.2.5 In order to analyse in detail the branches of the art world, it has become crucial
for art theorists to take into account the legal dimension, in particular the impact of
copyright law on these art-related practices.77 Legal norms and decisions provide the
binding framework of social institutions in modern society.78 Being the result of
historical experience, ‘they bear the traces of previous conflicts;’79 they lay the tracks
72
The Arts and Humanity in Public Life: Copyright Protection and Appropriation Art, by William M.
Landes
73
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by postmodern artists. Kathy
Bowerey, Lecturer in Law, Macquarie University.
74
Photography is a good example of the limited success of copyright in promoting a multimedia
marketplace. Although photographs are a powerfully expressive medium for the representation of
knowledge, it is very difficult for the average person to gain legal permission to reuse a photographic
image. Copyright and Fair Use in the Digital Age, Q&A with Peter Lyman, By Educom Review Staff.
75
Digital art is the apotheosis of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. The very distinction
between original and copy becomes meaningless in a digital world - there the work exists only as a
copy. And yet, artists, like the rest of us, remain uncertain as to whether the new information universe
is merely an impoverished shadow of some other, more corporeal reality. Daniel. Pinchbeck, "State of
the Art." Wired 2.12 (December 1994): 206-8.
76
This clique, whose very exclusivity defies the expansive name ("the art world") that it bears,
expressed only condescension toward "computer art" up until the end of the 1980s, when awareness
dawned that the growth of digitally-based media may in some way upset the structure of the museum
and gallery system itself. "The art world is scared to death of this stuff," says Laura Trippi, a curator at
the New Museum of Contemporary Art, a SoHo establishment that showcases the cutting-edge in
artists and ideas. "We are seeing a breakdown of the art object which reflects the fact that the field of
fine art is itself breaking down." Daniel. Pinchbeck, "State of the Art." Wired 2.12 (December 1994):
206-8.
6 German Law Journal No. 12 (1 December 2005) – Copyright & Art By Eberhard Ortland and
Reinhold Schmucker
78
See Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1993). Sourced from: 6 German Law Journal No.
12 (1 December 2005) – Copyright & Art By Eberhard Ortland and Reinhold Schmucker
79
For the earlier development of German author's rights law this was shown by Ludwig Gieseke, Vom
Privileg zum Urheberrecht. Die Entwicklung des Urheberrechts in Deutschland bis 1845 (1995)
77
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Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
that most of us follow up most of the time, even in the art world, where the basic rule
of thumb is to try to do something extraordinary.
3.3 Moral rights of the author
3.3.1 Looking at the legal dimension and impact of copyright law it is clear that there
remains a profound difference in the treatment of art within the legal context
compared to intellectual property law.80 Contentious issues involving author’s rights,
insofar as to include their “moral rights” such as the authoritative control over the
integrity of a work of authorship has gained belated recognition81 in the U.K.82 The
CDPA recognises them in line with the Berne Convention. The impact of the different
regulations on the legal status of art and the consequences they bear for the actual
conditions of the production, distribution and appreciation of art has largely been
neglected in critical contestation. Economic factors are a consequence for the author
to insist in maintaining his enforcement of copyright. To be sure, some original
works will still be created even in the absence of copyright protection.83
3.3.2 Interestingly, in the UK, copyright primarily is interested only in protecting the
rights of the ‘owner’84 and not of the ‘creator.’ Barron asserts that it is “the work,
rather than the author, that has constituted the key site of intersection between
copyright, art and art theory, because it is the manner in which copyright law defines
the work rather the manner in which it defines the author that exposes the affinities
between the discourses of copyright law and the aesthetic theory most vividly.”85
Sourced from: 6 German Law Journal No. 12 (1 December 2005) – Copyright & Art By Eberhard
Ortland and Reinhold Schmucker
80
In the course of efforts towards an international harmonization of intellectual property law, profound
differences in the legal treatment of art — in particular between the Anglo-American traditions of
common law and some continental European civil law jurisdictions — have come to the fore. source: 6
German Law Journal No. 12 (1 December 2005) – Copyright & Art By Eberhard Ortland and Reinhold
Schmucker
81
“Copyright and the Claims of Art” Intellectual Property Quarterly, Anne Barron
82
“Moral Rights” are covered by Chapter 4 of the CDPA ss77-87. Further, moral rights do not exist
unless they have been asserted; it is possible to waive moral rights
‘…creators may use contract law or other private enforcement means to discourage copying. But
given the speed, low cost of copying and the difficulty of employing private measures for widely
distributed works, the number of new works created will be significantly reduced in the absence of any
copyright protection.’ The Arts and Humanity in Public Life: Copyright Protection and Appropriation
Art, by William M. Landes
83
84
85
This might be due to purely economic factors.
ibid
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Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Copyright stringently attaches itself to proprietary rights; fundamentally it is
committed to the ‘logic of property.’86
3.3.3 The “Moral rights” provisions do recognise, at a limitation, the ‘creator’ of a
work as having a “continuing interest that the work is treated with respect,’ 87 despite
perhaps their economic interest already having been transferred once copyright is
granted.
3.4 Fair dealing
3.4.1 Lord Denning M.R. stated, “It is impossible to define “fair dealing”. It is a
question of degree. You must first consider the number and extent of quotations and
extracts. Are they altogether too many and too long to be fair? Then you must
consider the use made of them.”88 The fair dealing defence allows89 limited use of the
copyrighted work for the purpose of research, private study,90 criticism, review and
news reporting.91 It is a necessity of modern visual practices to do this kind of
copying in order to create their works. The law does not,92 allow ‘copies’ to be made
of similar works, limiting the development of the modern practices.
3.5 Expression Vs. Ideas – copyrights ideas or arts ideas?
3.5.1 “The distinction between expression and ideas…needs to be handled with care.
What does it mean? It all depends on what you mean by ‘ideas’.”93 Lord Hoffman’s
reiterates the controversial statutory references to the copyright of certain artistic
works. Definitions do vary. There is a subtle margin between an expression and an
idea. Plainly, there can be no copyright in an idea which is merely in the head, which
86
“Copyright and the Claims of Art” Intellectual Property Quarterly, Anne Barron
87
Chapter 4 of the CDPA ss77-87
Hubbard and Another v. Vosper and Another [1971] CA 2 Q.B.
89
s28 CDPA 1988 Sets out the permitted acts.
90
s29 (1) CDPA 1988: Fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purposes
of research for a non-commercial purpose does not infringe the any copyright in the work provided that
it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.
91
s30 (1) CDPA 1988: Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or
another work or of a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that
it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement and provided that the work has been made available
to the public.
92
(because of infringement purposes) If a substantial amount element of the work is used of the
copyrighted work then the work has been infringed according to the requirements in s16 of the CDPA
1988. This can be evidenced in Williamson Music Ltd. v. The Pearson Partnership Ltd. [1987] F.S.R.
97
93
Article: Ideas Vs. Expression
88
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Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
has not been expressed in copyrightable form, as a literary, dramatic, musical or
artistic work94. It is in this that the law attempts to strike down the perplexity by the
exhaustive list specified in s1. ‘Copyright law fragments this object into an elaborate
list of species and types.’95 Clearly ideas, which are ‘in the head’ as it were, cannot
possibly be traced or pragmatically found whereas an expression can be physically
seen and is tangible to the senses.96 It is precisely this issue which reveals the stark
difference between the art and legal worlds. The art world has the ability to fantasise,
be boundless and infinite in its process, whereas the law is strictly pragmatic and
dogmatic in its approach to dealing with issues. Clearly, protecting ideas would
involve substantial administrative costs in defining and staking out the boundaries
between original and old ideas.97 Comparatively, every element in the expression of
an artistic work, essentially, is the expression of an idea of the author or artist. “It
represents her choice to paint stripes rather than polka dots, flowers rather than
tadpoles, use one colour and brush technique rather than another, and so on.”98
Ironically it is the expression of these ideas which are in fact protected.
3.5.2 As a matter of rhetoric, copyright has allied itself with theories of ‘genius,
creativity and culture.’99 The life of the law is not logic, there is no test of talent or
genius so it does not prevent the resonance of those ideas from influencing the
rhetoric which sustains intellectual property doctrine as a whole.100 However,
copyright has often failed these concepts.101 An example of this, at the general level,
94
Article: Ideas Vs. Expression
“Copyright and the Claims of Art” Intellectual Property Quarterly, Anne Barron
96
This concept is explored further in “Man and His Symbols” C.J.Jung (1964) “…part of the
unconscious consists of a multitude of temporarily obscured thoughts, impressions, and images that, in
spite of being lost, continue to influence our conscious minds.”
97
Copyright protects expression but not ideas. Protecting ideas would involve substantial
administrative costs in defining and staking out the boundaries between original and old ideas. Drawing
boundaries and erecting fences is much more costly for intangible than tangible property. In addition,
most original ideas in copyrighted works are trivial and involve small expenditures relative to the cost
of expressing them. Hence, the added incentive benefits from protecting ideas are likely to be swamped
by the resulting access costs. The Arts and Humanity in Public Life: Copyright Protection and
Appropriation Art, by William M. Landes
98
Article: Ideas Vs. Expression; reference: Designers Guild Ltd. V. Russel Williams (Textiles) Ltd
[2000] 1 W.L.R. 2416 (U.K.: House of Lords)
99
Copyrights Commodification of Creativity; Fiona Macmillan
100
Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights & Social Values in Intellectual Property
(1993) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841, 853.
101
Macmillan, Copyright & Culture: A Perspective on Corporate Power (1998) 10 Media & Arts Law
Review 71.
95
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Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
might be the very low threshold of the originality requirement102 in relation to literary,
dramatic, musical, and artistic works.103 Landes comments that, “its purpose is to
save administration costs by screening out works that would be created even without
copyright protection.”104 It is moderately apparent that the content of this condition,
as cited by case law,105 derived from concerns that copyright should confer a
monopoly over the form of, rather than the ideas in a work and, accordingly, the
notion of originality attached itself to differences in form106. Copyright law has been
left in a situation where it grants monopoly protection to works that have little to do
with any accepted notions of creativity.107
3.5.3 ‘The modern artist asserts to reproduce by himself, the genuine artistic creation
being segregated from and elevated above illegitimate creations,’108 by the copyright
regime. Copyright suggests that the products that lack an assertion of inventive
activity are worthless. It appeals to a rigid separation between the “public” space of
art and the “private” realms of industry and the home.109
102
Andy Warhol lampooned the idea of originality itself with his Brillo soap-pad box and Campbell
Soup paintings, substituting an impersonal, mass-produced aesthetic for the artist's individual "style."
Yet the art market co-opted their efforts: ultimately all of their pieces could still be sold as originals or
collectibles to museums or private patrons. Daniel. Pinchbeck, "State of the Art." Wired 2.12
(December 1994): 206-8.
103
Macmillan Patfield, Legal Policy and the Limits of Literary Copyright in Parrinder & Chernaik
(eds), Textual Monopolies: Literary Copyright and the Public Domain (1997), 113, 118-121
104
“Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art: an Economic Approach.” William Landes
sourced: “Copyright in the Cultural Industries,” Edited by Ruth Towse.
105
University of London Press v University Tutorial Press (1916) 2 Ch 601, 608 per Peterson J
106
Chartier, Figures of the Author in Sherman & Strowel (eds), Of Authors & Origins: Essays on
Copyright Law (1994), 15.
107
Norowzian v Arks Ltd (No 2) [2000] FSR 363 (CA)
108
which includes both father-less commodities and the products of women's labour, Copyright, the
paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by post-modern artists. Kathy Bowerey, Lecturer in
Law, Macquarie University
109
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by postmodern artists. Kathy
Bowerey, Lecturer in Law, Macquarie University
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Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Part 4
Examples of Copyright and Modern Artistic practices.
4.1 Sherrie Levine: Critical content of her work
4.1.1 Sherrie Levine110 is a feminist artist who confronts the dogma of modernism by
revealing the historical identity of the concepts of originality and authorship.
Through her use of image appropriation111 she uses famous original artworks, makes
new versions of them through the use of re-photographing112 them and placing them
in different contexts, as ‘original art.’113 Levine mainly uses works by 20th century
eminent male artists.114 Her main medium is photography115 which is particularly
appropriate for the deconstruction of “art”. Photography as ‘art’ operates with a high
degree of imagination, in terms of the real conditions of its production and in terms of
its history116. ‘Mediums that are inherently multiple- like photography- test the notion
110
Levine began exhibiting and performing works in New York in the early 1970's. Her participation in
the 1977 Pictures exhibition at the Artist's Space, New York generated mainstream critical attention
and in that sense signified the "arrival" of post-modern artistic practices.
111
. “Thus, when Sherrie Levine appropriates-literally takes-Walker Evans's photographs of the rural
poor or, perhaps more pertinently, Edward Weston's photographs of his son Neil posed as a classical
Greek torso, is she simply dramatizing the diminished possibilities for creativity in an image-saturated
culture, as is often repeated? Or is her refusal of authorship not in fact a refusal of the role of creator
as "father" of his work, of the paternal rights assigned to the author by law? (This reading of Levine's
strategies is supported by the fact that the images she appropriates are invariably images of the Other:
women, nature, children, the poor, the insane....) Levine's disrespect for paternal authority suggests
that her activity is less one of appropriation: she expropriates the appropriators." From Craig Owens'
"The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism"
112
To the degree that the various sources and authors of “quoted texts” are left intact and fully
identifiable in truly contemporary montage, the viewer encounters a decentralized text that completes
itself through his or her reading and comparison of the original and subsequent layers of meaning that
the text/image has acquired. B. Buchloh, “Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in
Contemporary Art”, in (1982) Artforum, No 1.
113
So persuasively did Levine’s project insist on the inadequacy of traditional formal and
iconographical methods of analysis in deciphering its meaning few people even bothered to look inside
the frames to consider what she was rephotographing. Pleasant though it was to be in the room with
the photographs that comprised After Walker Evans it did seem embarrassing to be caught looking at
them too closely. As initiates had concluded, the meaning of Levine’s curiously covert art had to lie
elsewhere beyond the frames of these pictures, perhaps in the circumstances of their exhibition. D.
Deitcher, “Sherrie Levine: Rules of the Game”, in Sherrie Levine
114
to emphasize the absence of women in the art world at that time.
115
Instead of taking photographs of trees or nudes I take photographs of photographs. I choose
pictures that manifest the desire that nature and culture provide us with a sense of order and
meaning . . . S. Levine as quoted in D. Deitcher, “Sherrie Levine: Rules of the Game”.
116
The photographic image partakes more of the nature of mosaic than of a drawing or painting. It
contains no lines in the painter’s sense, but is entirely made up of tiny particles. The extreme fineness
of these particles gives a special tension to the image, and when that tension is destroyed—by the
intrusion of handwork, by too great enlargement, by printing on rough surface, etc.—the integrity of
the photograph is destroyed. (Weston 1980: 169-78) The Photographical Turn:
www.forart.no/kroksnes_1/kroksnes_1.html
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Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
of authenticity- for to ask for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense- there are only
multiples in the absence of an original.’117
.
4.1.2 Levine generates a freedom for her art by deduction118, by taking away the
artistic subject matter from her work by exhibiting in its place another “original
artist.” “I’m interested in the way that negation implies its own affirmation”119 Her
ability to re-capture the ‘original’ artwork defies the dogma of copyright. ‘It involves
the presentation of an event in such a manner and at such a distance that it is
apprehended as representation- representation not as re-presentation of that which is
prior, but as the unavoidable condition of intelligibility of even that which is
present.’120
4.1.3 Through the use of the ‘original’ work, and using her ability to manipulate it
into her own works,121 Levine essentially is re-asserting the work of the artist,
establishing it in a manner which affirms their uniqueness similarly followed previous
artistic customs. This method openly clashes with copyright. Copyright law promptly
restores the images of the son to its paternal creator.122
4.1.4 In, After Ed Weston123[see Insert: Figure 1 and Insert: Figure 2], according to
copyright law, the images belong to Weston,124 or now to the Weston estate. Crimp
asserts, “I think, to be fair, however, we might just as well give them to Praxiteles, for
if it is the image that can be owned, then surely these belong to classical sculpture,
117
R. Krauss: sourced from : Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by postmodern artists. Kathy Bowrey
118
This may sometimes be referred to as ‘subtraction’.
119
as quoted in “The Anxiety of Influence - Head On. A conversation between Sherrie Levine and
Jeanne Siegal” in Sherrie Levine, ( Zurich: Kunsthalle, 1992)
120
D. Crimp, “The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism”, (1980) 15 October 91 at 99.
121
These images instil an uneasiness in the viewer through the artist's intervention of authorship: "it did
seem embarrassing to be caught looking at these pictures too closely. You felt that the meaning of
Levine's curiously covert art had to lie elsewhere, perhaps in the circumstances of its exhibition rather
than in the images themselves.” Sherrie Levine: Appropriation and Copyright Werner Hammerstingl,
1998. www.olinda.com/VC/lectures/Levine_page_1.htm
122
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by post-modern artists. Kathy
Bowrey
123
After Ed Weston, 1980 For a visual comparison, see [Insert: Figure 1 and Figure 2: page 25]
124
Thus, when Sherrie Levine appropriates-literally takes-Walker Evans's photographs of the rural
poor or, perhaps more pertinently, Edward Weston's photographs of his son Neil posed as a classical
Greek torso, is she simply dramatizing the diminished possibilities for creativity in an image-saturated
culture, as is often repeated? Or is her refusal of authorship not in fact a refusal of the role of creator
as "father" of his work, of the paternal rights assigned to the author by law? Craig Owens' "The
Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism"
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Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
which would put them in the public domain.125” The question thus is raised, where do
artist get their original ideas from?126 They are influenced and inclined to use works
by previous artists, so paternity issues become conflicting. The representation already
existed ‘in the world,’ these artists are merely re-representing them in their own
individual manner,127 so copyright and the ‘original’ become inaccurate and
confusing. ‘The priori Weston had in mind was not really in his mind at all; it was in
the world, and Weston only copied it.’128 Thus, Levine is free to reproduce the ideas
present in such works, but she cannot appropriate the very expression of those ideas.
It is this notion which is protected by the law. It is impossible for her to ‘appropriate’
the way in which Weston had depicted or expressed his work. But she is allowed to
use his ideas as these are not protected by copyright.
4.1.5 It seems that the actual expression is not in fact ‘original’ at all but perhaps an
unconscious myth. A myth which copyright rigorously allies itself with in order to
maintain a command over reality.129
4.2 Jeff Koons: Critical Content of his Work.
4.2.1 Comparatively, Jeff Koons’130 use of appropriation131 is significantly different to
Levines. They equally examine the ideals of art and industry as a notion,
125
from Douglas Crimp, The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism published in October, issue #15
(Winter 1980) sourced: http://www.artnotart.com/sherrielevine/crimpweston.html
126
For further discussion, see, “Man and His Symbols.” C.J.Jung (1964)
127
Levine comments “... artists worry about the power of the past and its representations. ... Finding a
new way to express this old concern is a task fraught with contradiction. We are accused of irony when
the concern is expressed and nostalgia when it is denied.... I feel my pieces are most successful when
they function as membranes permeable from both sides so that there is an easy flow between an
imaginary past and an imaginary future, between my history and yours.” Arts Magazine, February
1986. Not Painting: The New Work Of Sherrie Levine. www.artonart.com
128
from Douglas Crimp, The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism published in October, issue #15
(Winter 1980) sourced: http://www.artnotart.com/sherrielevine/crimpweston.html
129
The concept of style is a product of the way style is conceived as having been generated:
that is, collectively and unconsciously… R. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant Garde and Other
Modernist Myths
130
Koons' installations were exhibited in the early 1980's in New York, and in 1986 art critics develop
the concept of "Neo-Geo" for his genre of post-modern works. In distinction to the "Pictures" artists,
who appropriated imagery questioning their own position as producers of art, the "Neo-Geo" artists
utilised objects or commodity sculpture, complicit in a process of producing seductive, bourgeois
objects.
131
The Pictures artists have been involved in questioning their own position as producers of art in
relation to the mythic baggage of subjectivity and individuality, of which they have become acutely
self-conscious. There has been a shift in the activities of the new group of artist in that there is a
renewed interest in locating one’s desire, by which I mean one’s own taking pleasure in objects and
commodities, which includes what we call works of art. There is a stronger sense of being complicit
with the production of desire, what we traditionally call beautiful seductive objects, then being
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Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
acknowledging the isolation of ‘art’ from the masses. Koons uses an approach to
create his works through ‘Kitsch,’132 attempting to unite art and popular culture,
aiming at appealing to a broader audience.
4.2.2 This method becomes arduous in relation to the role of copyright. It implicates
that despite these works thriving in society and being appreciated by law, they still
involve original art works because they are ‘art.’ They clearly have a specific author.
Koons v Rogers133 or the String of Puppies case [see Insert Figure 3] he created a
sculpture on the basis of a photograph of a couple holding seven puppies; he failed to
escape copyright infringement on the basis of the fair dealing defence134. Koons
argued he was entitled to protection by the doctrine on the understanding that his
work was a parody135 for the purpose of criticising the triteness of popular culture
images. But the ‘fair use’ defence only applies where the infringing work has used a
copyright work for the purpose of criticising that actual copyright work, not where it
has been used for the purpose of criticising society in general. The fair use doctrine
did not entitle Koons to engage in an act of cultural pastiche and parody is of concern
if one thinks that copyright law should be about promotion of cultural activity and
diversity.136 It appears that it is the intellectual commons137 which are failing to be
protected by copyright: being postmodernist products such as pastiche or parody. As a
result these practices can be saved by the use of defences such as fair use or fair
dealing rules. Development and diversification cannot possibly occur if the
intellectual commons138 are not safeguarded. Copyrights failure to secure the
commons may mean that it has not supported creativity and culture at a fundamental
level.139 It seems that copyright is more ready to protect the economic interests of
culture.
positioned somewhere outside of it. In this sense the idea of criticality in art is also changing. H.
Steinbach, as quoted in “Flash Art Panel. From Criticism to Complicity”, in (1986)
132
Kitsch: garish, tasteless, or sentimental art. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Tenth Edition,
Revised. Edited by Judy Pearsall
133
Rogers v Koons, 960 F 2d 301 (2d Cir), cert denied, 113 S Ct 365 (1992) For visual comparison, see
[Insert: Figure 3] page 26
134
See para: 3.4.1 (Statutory reference in footnotes: 62, 63, 64, 65, 66)
135
Parody: Is permitted for the purpose of satire, it has been closely linked to the ‘Fair use’ defence.
136
Copyrights Commodification of Creativity, Fiona Macmillan
137
Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property Law.1996
138
It is the intellectual commons that enabled Newton to say that he stood on the shoulders of giants,
because his work depended on the ideas of the scientists and mathematicians who came before him.
http://www.saint-andre.com/journal/2002-01-03.html
139
Copyrights Commodification of Creativity, Fiona Macmillan
23
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
4.2.3 Koons deliberately and clearly reproduced the original work of Rogers
according to the Law. However, in the art world, Koons is simply expressing his own
impression of Rogers’ work, by essentially recreating it in his personal way. The
motivation for this case is weighted with the appropriation aspect but with greater
bearing on the economical impact of the original artist. In this sense, copyright is
merely serving the function by protecting the economical interests of the original
artist.140 Koons stated: “The way I look at it is that all visual imagery should be
available to the artist . . . When visual imagery gets copyrighted, it is taking away a
vocabulary not only from the artist but the total public.”
4.2.4 Evidently, copyright restricts any kind of physical use of artistic works;
providing a hindrance to developing modernist artistic techniques. Koons’s radical141
copyright stance suggests, ‘the value of the object arises as an innate property of
things, disconnected from any work, in any of its dimensions.’142
140
It prohibits any kind of recreation of that particular work.
Yet he relies on fame to promote his works. It is this method which perhaps makes his practice
immoral; he is expressly relying upon the controversy of his works to guarantee recognition.
142
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by post-modern artists. Kathy
Bowrey
141
24
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
[Insert] Figure 1: Edward Weston, Nude 1925143
[Insert] Figure 2: Sherrie Levine, After Ed Weston, 1981, untitled144
143
www.edward-weston.com
25
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
[Insert] Figure 3: Art Rogers, Photograph, Puppies; Jeff Koons, Seven Puppies 1988
(wood painted sculpture)145
Art Rogers
Photograph:
Puppies
1980
144
145
Jeff Koons
Wood painted sculpture:
String of Puppies
1998
www.forart.no/kroksnes_1/kroksnes_1.html
www.artnet.com
26
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Part 5
The Modern Artist can he and his practices be protected?
5.1 Conclusion.
5.1.1 The current ideas of copyright restrain and defy the expansion and growth of
modern artistic practices. The law is successful in this role as it is complicit in
maintaining a function for art that is of questionable contemporary relevance. This
undermines the need for law to recognize its foundational role in structuring and
interacting with social relations and to acknowledge the need for sensitivity to
changes in how people perceive, interrogate, and use/abuse artistic works.146 That
copyright law cannot accommodate whole swathes of contemporary artistic
production under its protective umbrella is clear.147 The legal system cannot generate
respect for copyright law by simply resisting, redefining or ignoring changes in the
function of art. Copyright law must be responsive to the broader context of these
challenges. Especially given that copyright tends to be justified as an instrument for
encouraging the progress of art.
5.1.2 Levine and Koons are exploring these areas148. The conflict with the issues of
copyright appears to be generating innovative artistic genres. It is exactly these genres
which are breaking down the traditional classification of painting, which the legal
world had been so comfortable with.149 Art is incorporating many of the ‘new media’
146
Sherrie Levine's enchantment with modernism can return us to Kant's text—not to illustrate, because
its complexities lie beyond illustration—but in order that we might read it, might reinstruct ourselves or
reinscribe ourselves within it, perhaps altering our destination. This we can call her deconstruction of
the modernist frame; it is not quite what we would mean if we were to speak of a demystification of the
frame with all that would promise of deliverance from it. Arts Magazine, February 1986. Not Painting:
The New Work Of Sherrie Levine. www.artonart.com
147
“Copyright and the Claims of Art” Intellectual Property Quarterly, Anne Barron
148
They are not isolated examples. For example, the New York “painter” Mark Kostabi
also claims authorship over art which is created by other artists whom he pays.
149
An example of the stark difference, as a modern artist, in Levine motivation: “Certainly the best
thing in life is ordinary sexual love. But we find unsanctioned sexual activity like unsanctioned
violence, frightening as well as exhilarating, because without manners or form, it yields no meaning or
hope.” Here we can see that her aim is to shock so that she reveals the problematic situation with the
modern artistic perceptions and the law. “It has no stake in the future. Reluctant moralists, we make art
that suggests our simultaneous longing for anarchy and order to have nothing and everything. An
uneasy peace is made between the reassuring mythologies society and culture provide and our wish to
see ourselves as free agents. The very best in art makes public our private anguish in the face of this
ineluctable conflict. We want images and stories which present us with ideals but at the same time are
not innocent of the other side of the coin our desire to have no ideals, no fetters whatsoever We aspire
to the best of both worlds.” Sherrie Levine: Appropriation and Copyright Werner Hammerstingl, 1998.
www.olinda.com/VC/lectures/Levine_page_1.htm
27
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
types which rely upon such practices as digital sampling such as “Computer art” and
“sound sculpture”. These new art genres are no longer skill or practice related but
more conceptually defined150 confronting copyright.
5.1.3 Levine and Koons represents two alike, yet dissimilar, post-modern
interventions testing the security of the paternity of artistic works by the system of
copyright. The approaches are similar in that both acknowledge the foundational role
law plays in structuring and interacting with social relations. However they are
radically apart in their response to this.
5.1.4 Levine’s tactic challenges the relationship between art and copyright law
through revealing the traditional151 and theoretical relevance of this front.
She infringes the copyright of others152 liberating the principles of "art" and
"copyright " to scrutiny.153 Her legacy is that she questions, re-positioned issues
around authorship and the original in artistic practice.154 ‘Koons, whilst changing the
function of art, does not lead to a changing function for law, being that his “no law”
stance retains a timeless position for law in its relationship with society. His art
aspires to dominate others, to the extent it can move beyond critical dialogue into
charisma it embodies totalitarianism.’155 Koons is asserting the impenetrability of
copyright law with the multiplicity in artistic practice; else the problem being that
Modernism needs to be condensed in its variety.
5.1.5 The presence of such artists in the mainstream highlights this problem,
reaffirming societal and artistic change. The law needs to change to accommodate
this, or the modern artist has no choice but to accept that copyright is apart of the
150
They are not specifically traditionally art insofar which is recognised by copyright.
Levine's work has been ever more explicitly oriented not to exhaustion but to desire and its
historical situation Arts Magazine, February 1986. Not Painting: The New Work Of Sherrie Levine.
www.artonart.com
152
even though to date she has been able to negotiate around litigation.
153
she moves toward restoring a “public” function for art, in the sense that she makes a space for
philosophical questioning concerning “who we are” possible.
154
This legacy is important to explore as the appropriated image and the pastiche image is so central in
today’s art and commercial practice especially. Sherrie Levine: Appropriation and Copyright Werner
Hammerstingl, 1998. www.olinda.com/VC/lectures/Levine_page_1.htm
151
155
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by post-modern artists.
Kathy Bowrey
28
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
environment in which they work in, so are thus limited in their practice as a result of
its obstinacy.
29
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
Part 6
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cited Articles/Papers:
“A Philosophy of Intellectual Property Law.” Drahos, 1996
“Copyright & Culture: A Perspective on Corporate Power.” Macmillan, (1998) 10
Media & Arts Law Review 71.
“Copyright Law and the Claims of Art.’ Anne Barron, Intellectual Property Quarterly
4 (2002)
“Copyrights Commodification of Creativity” Fiona Macmillan
“Culture Club” The Gazette, Art and the Law, 23rd June2005
“Flash Art Panel. From Criticism to Complicity” H. Steinbach (1986)
“From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights & Social Values in Intellectual
Property.” Waldron (1993) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841, 853.
“From Work to Text” R. Barthes, in “Image, Music, Text,” translated by S. Heath,
New York: Noonday Press, 1977
“Ideas Vs. Expression” From Principles of Copyright, Cases and Materials, World
Intellectual Property Organisation, 2002
“Legal Policy and the Limits of Literary Copyright.” Macmillan Patfield, in Parrinder
& Chernaik (eds), “Textual Monopolies: Literary Copyright and the Public Domain”
(1997), 113, 118-121
“Man and His Symbols” C.J.Jung (1964)
“Of Authors & Origins: Essays on Copyright Law.” (1994) Chartier, Figures of the
Author in Sherman & Strowel (eds)
“Sherrie Levine: Rules of the Game” D. Deitcher,
“State of the Art.“ Daniel. Pinchbeck (December 1994): 206-8
“The Anxiety of Influence - Head On. A conversation between Sherrie Levine and
Jeanne Siegal” in Sherrie Levine, ( Zurich: Kunsthalle, 1992)
“The Artist as an Economic Actor in the Art Market” – Rosenblum, B. in (1985)
Balfe, J. H. & Wyszomiriski, M. J. (eds.) “Art, Ideology and Politics”
“The Arts and Humanity in Public Life: Copyright Protection and Appropriation Art”
William M. Landes
30
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
“The Birth and Death of the Viewer” T. Crow, in Discussions in Contemporary
Culture. Number One, edited by H. Foster, (Seattle: Bay Press, 1987) at 3.
“The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism” Craig Owens
“The End of Art Theory” V. Burgin, (London: Macmillan, 1986)
“The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition” M.H.
Abrams, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971)
“The Originality of the Avant Garde and Other Modernist Myths.” R. Krauss,
Cited Articles/Papers from Websites/ Electronic Sources:
“Art and the making of Modern Copyright Law” L.Bently, in D.Mclean and
K.Schubert, Dear Images: Art, Copyright and Culture, (London:/CA/Ridinghouse,
2002) cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/publications/articles.php
Arts Magazine, February 1986. Not Painting: The New Work Of Sherrie Levine.
www.artonart.com
Arts Magazine, February 1986. Not Painting: The New Work Of Sherrie Levine.
www.artonart.com
B. Buchloh, “Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary
Art”, in (1982) Artforum, No 1. www.forart.no/kroksnes_1/kroksnes_1.html
“Copyright and Art” Eberhard Ortland and Reinhold Schmucker, German Law
Journal no.12 (1st December 2005) www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=676
Copyright and Fair Use in the Digital Age, Q&A with Peter Lyman, By Educom
Review Staff. www.educause.edu/pub/er/ review/reviewarticles/30132.html
Copyright, the paternity of artistic works and the challenge posed by postmodern
artists. Kathy Bowerey, Lecturer in Law, Macquarie University
www.chickenfish.cc/copy/Publications/Paternity.pdf
Douglas Crimp, The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism published in October,
issue #15 (Winter 1980) sourced: www.artnotart.com/sherrielevine/crimpweston.html
“Feminism, Aestheticism and the Limits of Law” Anne Barron, Feminist Legal
Studies 8, no.3 (2000) www.lse.ac.uk/people/a.barron@lse.ac.uk/publications.htm
Sherrie Levine: Appropriation and Copyright Werner Hammerstingl, 1998.
www.olinda.com/VC/lectures/Levine_page_1.htm
Sherrie Levine: Appropriation and Copyright Werner Hammerstingl, 1998.
www.olinda.com/VC/lectures/Levine_page_1.htm
31
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
“The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law” William M Landes and
Richard A Posner. www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/LANECI.html
The Photographical Turn: www.forart.no/kroksnes_1/kroksnes_1.html
Other Cited Websites:
www.artnet.com
www.artnotart.com/sherrielevine/crimpweston.html
www.artnotart.com/sherrielevine/crimpweston.html
www.artonart.com
www.clevelandartandhistory.org/HTMLPages/Glossary.html
www.educause.edu/pub/er/review/reviewarticles/30132.html
www.edward-weston.com
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_7615060632/Conceptual _Art.html
www.forart.no/kroksnes_1/kroksnes_1.html
www.forart.no/kroksnes_1/kroksnes_1.html
www.olinda.com/VC/lectures/Levine_page_1.htm
www.olinda.com/VC/lectures/Levine_page_1.htm
www.saint-andre.com/journal/2002-01-03.html
www.worldimages.com/art_glossary.php
Cited Texts:
“Art and Copyright” Simon Stokes
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Tenth Edition, Revised, Edited by Judy Pearsall
“Copyright in the Cultural Industries” Ruth Towse
“Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early Stuart England.” R.
M. Smuts.
32
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
“Intellectual Property Law Statutes” Blackstones 7th Edition
“Media, Technology and the Copyright” Michael A Einhorn
“Surrealism and the Visual Arts, Theory and Reception.” Kim Grant
“The Modern Law of Copyrights” Laddie, H. et al, 2nd Ed., (1995) Butterworths,
page 48.
Cited Cases:
Designers Guild Ltd. V. Russel Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2416 (U.K.:
House of Lords)
Express Newspapers PLC v. News (UK) Ltd. [1990] 1 WLR 1320, 1324-7
Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Insurance Insurance Consultants [1982] R.P.C. 69 (C.A)
G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd. [1944] AC 329
Hubbard and Another v. Vosper and Another [1971] CA 2 Q.B.
Ladbrokes (Football) Ltd v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 All ER 465
Merchendising Corp. of America v. Harpbond [1983] F.S.R. 32 (C.A)
Norowzian v Arks Ltd. (No 2) [2000] FSR 363 (CA)
Rogers v Koons, 960 F 2d 301 (2d Cir), cert denied, 113 S Ct 365 [1992]
University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch 601
Williamson Music Ltd. v. The Pearson Partnership Ltd. [1987] F.S.R. 97
Cited Legislation:
The Agreement on the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) [1994]
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [1886] (as
revised)
The Copyright Act [1911]
The Copyright Act [1956]
The Copyright Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) [1988]
The Engraving and Copyright Act [1734]
33
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
The International Copyright Act [1852]
The Statue of Anne [1709]
Background Reading/ Research Sources:
Journals/ Articles:
“A £35,000 Tracey Emin quilt- but worthless if school tries to sell it” The Guardian
30th November 2004
“Foul-mouthed jibe at Skegness lands ‘Viz’ in a mess” M. MacDonald The
Independent December 16th 1995
“Ideas Vs Expression.” From Principles of Copyright, Cases and Materials, World
Intellectual Property Organisation, 2002
“The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence
of the ‘Author’” M. Woodmansee, (1984) 17 “Eighteenth Century Studies” 425
Texts:
“Contested Culture. The Image of the voice and the Law” Jane M Gaines
“Intellectual Property Law” Jennifer Davis
“Picasso” by Jean Louis-Ferrier
‘Renaissance’ by Andrew Graham-Dixon
‘Surrealism and the Visual Arts, Theory and Reception,’ Kim Grant
‘The Story of Art’ by E.H.Gombrich 13th Edition, enlarged & revised
Websites:
www.answers.com’topic/appropriation-art
www.artcyclopedia.com/artists/koons_jeff.html
www.ArtMonthly.co.uk
www.artquest.org.uk
www.artsjournal.com
34
Convenor: Alan Story
Intellectual Property Law (LW556)
Emma Lucy Slais-Jones
http://docs.law.guru.edu/facweb/claw/lhooq0.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appropriation_(art)
www.heraldnet.com
www.MarcelDuchamp.org
http://members.riba.org/library/rlinks.htm
www.moma.org/exhibitions/1996/johns/
http://muse.jhu.edu/journal/modernism-modernity/v012.3saint_amour.html
www.negativland.com/changing_copyright.html
www.nytimes.com
www.patent.gov.uk/copy/definition.htm
www.picasso.fr/anglais/
www.tate.org.uk/modern
www.telegraph.co.uk
www.the-artists.org/ArtistView.
www.timesonline.co.uk/art
www.timesonline.co.uk/law
www.warholfoundation.org
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/10/appropriation-art-and-copies.html
35