The State and Ethnic identity in Liberian conflict
LisaLaurine Bondo
Student ID# 3615804
10 July 2012
Thesis MA Politics and Society in Historical Perspective
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Introduction
Prior to the April 12, 1980 coup led by Samuel Doe which overthrew the then 130 year rule by
the dominant minority of Americo Liberians, Liberia was an independent and politically stable
country. Western observers (scholars, reports and government officials) in the immediate
aftermath of President William Tolbert’s bloody overthrow in 1980 military coup assumed that
the post colonial conflicts witnessed in many neighbouring West African states Angola and
Nigeria at the time would have been minimal in Liberia. In 1981, Sanford Ungar a reporter with
the American newsmagazine Atlantic Monthly commented on political situation in the aftermath
of the coup, “The country was coup proof, the African dynasty schooled in western ways.”1
(Ungar) Liberia has long been regarded as Africa’s oldest republic by its neighbours and Western
allies. It was a distinction referenced to Liberia’s long standing democratic traditions. Civil
society was commended by Western leaders for avoiding socio-political conflicts within the
country despite successive governments’ marginalization of Liberians outside the capital of
Monrovia for decades. Within the country, the marginalized majority regarded the military coup
as a revolution correcting a long standing injustice. Ungar’s observation formed into a question
that would be repeated throughout the Liberian Civil War: how could a violent conflict occur in a
multicultural country such as Liberia?
The West African region and wider African continent have witnessed a cycle of political coups
since gaining independence in 1960. American and European media occasionally refers to the
instable atmosphere as typical of African states. An observer unfamiliar with African politics
often concludes that political instability is unique to African states ignoring similar events
occurring in Asia and Latin America. West African states are not endemic to coups, nor is it
difficult to understand the origins of instability. Attempts made by Western media to understand
Yugoslavia’s complexity that led its disintegration and the 1990s conflicts can also be applied to
many West African states. Several West African civil wars have become well known to the
world notably the 1990s Sierra Leone and Liberian civil conflicts. Once hailed as a model of a
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successfully stable non colonial state, Liberia’s decade’s long slide into brutal conflict still
baffles many.
In this paper, I will seek to address the 1990s Liberian conflicts’ origins in a socio-political
context of the post colonial and post-cold war era. The analysis will focus on the state and
people’s transformation in the aftermath of the coup throughout the civil war. As in the case of
Yugoslavia and other West African nations, the Liberian state played a crucial role setting the
stage for the conflict. The state exploited the most visible marker among its citizens that has
served as both a unifying power and a divisive force: ethnicity. It was a gradual process that
began within government institutions including the armed forces, than trickled down to civil
society, first through ethnic polarization that later transformed into ethnic divisions. What is
often overlooked when ethnic divisions are invoked is the fact that the country’s previous leaders
had been able to maintain a peaceful, democratic and multiethnic state without emphasizing
ethnic differences to a strong degree. The principle question is: to what extent did ethnic visions
fostered by the Liberian state lead to the 1990s conflict?
There are three components which offer explanations. First, the socioeconomic marginalization
of rural Liberians by the highly centralized Liberian state was one of the major factors
contributing to the tense political environments during the late 1970s under the William Tolbert
Presidency. The tension extended to Samuel Doe’s administrations throughout the 1980s.
Secondly, the countryside or “interior” as Liberians refer to it was and today still confronts the
state’s preference for full urban and limited rural population’s participation in national
development. Rural Liberians forming the majority of citizens and belonging to the mélange of
indigenous ethnic groups have continuously voiced their grievances at being left out of the
national building process. Lastly rebel factions during the 1990s civil conflict exploited the
government’s violence toward certain ethnic groups labelled as enemies to garner support from
their kin or neighbours to eventually overthrow the government. Investigating the political
transformation through these three components seeks to help the reader to realize that Liberia’s
ethnic conflict was not a matter of tribalism but of twenty years of the state’s ethnic polarization.
The conflict’s origins continue to have a significant influence in Liberia for three reasons.
First, the political transformation’s relevance from a relatively peaceful multiethnic democracy
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to highly polarized society divided by ethnicity and government mistrust has the potential to
harm the post war nation’s fragile peace. Second, previous governments’ failures to continue the
progressive political reforms begun under Tolbert’s administration which attempted to integrate
rural Liberians into nation building while reforming the entire Liberian political structure feeds
the frustrations of the people it was meant to help. Lastly, some ethnic groups the Mandingos
continue to face the consequences of division. Although Liberian citizens, Mandingos continue
to be viewed by society as foreigners through rumours that they are more Guinean than Liberian.
As recent history reminds us, labelling fellow citizens as foreigners to only affects their standing
within society but also leads to dangerous levels of discrimination.
For a theoretical approach of these issues, I will be utilizing Roger Brubaker’s article, “Ethnic
and nationalist violence.” In his article, Brubaker proposes various theories to explain the origins
of the ethnic component in wars. Among the theories that illustrate the Liberian conflict’s ethnic
component are the culturalist approach and intergroup dynamics. The intergroup dynamics is a
theoretical model within Game Theory. The intergroup model determines how persecuted groups
react to real and imagined threats. It first manifested itself through the state under Samuel Doe’s
presidency as he originally sought to take political power on behalf of all indigenous Liberians
away from Americo-Liberians. However his aims soon developed into a personal quest to
consolidate power through defining non Krahn Liberians as enemies or threats to the state.
Cultural construction of fear emerges from the culturalist approach theory emphasizing the
strong role fear plays in cultural symbols, rituals or myths. Outside the cultural context, fear was
already being applied by the state long before the war. In Liberia’s case, the state adapted a
construction of fear along political lines to fit its own needs of security. During Samuel Doe’s
Presidency in 1980s, the state turned symbols of national security such as the Armed Forces of
Liberia into symbols to be feared by the general public. Terrorizing citizens with the AFL’s
excessive use of force was justified to maintain social and national order. As the political
environment worsened, fear became a tool for newly formed rebel forces under the leadership of
Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson to garner support from terrorized citizens. A combination of
fear and grievances against the state for past injustices gave new recruits to rebel forces enough
reason to take up arms against the state. The Liberian state’s earlier use of fear led to its eventual
demise in 1990. Rebel forces replaced the state in using fear not only for political aims but in a
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cultural context. Brubaker’s culturalist theory suggests that fear can lead states and political
factions to construct perceived threats or enemies as others. The Liberian war as witnessed by
civilians illustrates many instances where rebel factions regarded their former neighbours or rural
society as a dangerous other that needed to be subdued or weakened. The rebel forces’ use of
cultural symbols familiar to many rural Liberians dominated stories and images related to the
Liberian war. These uprooted cultural symbols included decorative masks representing
indigenous culture often worn by dancers, the myth of the country devil representing evil spirits
or temptation, superstition and legends of indestructible power through the use of shamanic
powers. Whereas these symbols have long been used in peaceful ceremonies to promote
neighbouring villages and peoples’ strong links to their communities, these symbols were meant
to terrify and divide both enemies and victims. The Truth Reconciliation Commission includes
many testimonials by Liberians attesting to numerous incidents of state terror on citizens during
the past thirty years. The TRC is also mentioned to emphasize the role of cultural construction of
fear in the state and rebel forces’ tactics on civilians caught in the violence. The TRC is a post
war trial set up in the immediate aftermath of the Liberian civil war to gather testimonials from
victims and perpetrators of atrocities committed from 1989-2003.
The cultural approach will be applied to the state and rebel forces since the theory serves as a
theoretical context of ethnic division and political marginalization. From this perspective that the
reader may understand that the 1990s conflict did not emerge in vacuum nor was a result of long
standing tribalism. Liberia shares the same socio-political complexities with a few well known
case studies Yugoslavia and Nigeria.
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Chapter 1 How history shaped Liberian identity and national development
History has long been seen by society as a learning experience in understanding the present. In
Liberia, as in many countries around the world, history has served as an object of national
reflection on equality and social progress for all citizens. Occasionally history also exposes
ignored consequences of long standing inequalities within society. A historical overview of
Liberia will be provided to aid the reader in better understanding of indigenous Liberians’ role in
the country’s early socio political history. I chose to begin Liberian history in the 15th century to
include the often overlooked and sometimes ignored history of Liberian society and indigenous
Liberians prior to the 19th century. Most if not all references to Liberian history begins 1822
when the country was formed as a nation state. There has been little attempt even in Liberian
textbooks to include the pre-1822 story of the country’s political and cultural roots before the
Americo Liberians’ arrival. Through Liberian historians such as Teah Wulah, it is now known
that indigenous Liberians played an active role in Liberia’s early history. Liberians participated
in trade and contact with Europeans. It defies some Americo Liberians’ stereotype of African
peoples in this case indigenous Liberians who needed aid from Americo Liberians or Europeans
to learn how to govern their societies. Liberian society was complex and advanced throughout its
early history. Overlooking Liberia’s early history again marginalized indigenous Liberians in a
historical context. Furthermore it regards Americo Liberians’ experiences in Liberia as the
country’s sole defining moments in its history.
If long standing multiculturalism is taken into account, the state’s use of ethnicity during
Samuel K. Doe and later Taylor administrations for political aims represents an unforgiving
paradox. Historically and still today, Liberia is home to a multiethnic society where many of its
citizens speak a multitude of languages and share diverse cultures. There are sixteen indigenous
ethnic groups often listed in the following order of size: Kpelle, Bassa, Mandingo, Kru, Grebo
and the remaining groups. The sixteen groups compose 95% of Liberia’s population. Similar to
the wider West African region, Liberia’s majority ethnic group do not even form 50% of the
population as is the case in some Western European countries’ ethnic makeup. The Kpelle who
are considered to be the majority in the country only form a third of the population or 20%. The
remaining 5% of Liberia’s population consists of Americo Liberians, Congoes and a small
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number of foreigners namely Lebanese. Pade Badru’s article on Ethnic conflict and state
formation in post colonial Africa illustrates Liberia’s political inequality with its ethnic
composition. “The Americo Liberian compromised 2.5 percent of the population with the Congo
People (descendants of Slaves from Brazil and the Caribbean) also forms another 2.5 percent.”
(Badru 155)
The adjective indigenous, often used interchangeably with the term native, is an apolitical
definition used within and outside Liberia to distinguish the majority from the Americo Liberians
and smaller minority of Lebanese the country’s third largest minority, along with Indians and
Chinese. In addition, the Lebanese merchant families form an influential “ethnic trading
minority” (Grossman 162) that runs the majority of businesses in the Liberian capital Monrovia.
However, the Lebanese rarely receive attention in most history books or discussions related to
Liberian society or identity. Despite the fact that Lebanese families have lived in Liberia since
the late 19th century and many are Liberians by birth, they have not been granted citizenship by
the state due to an 1822 clause in the Liberian constitution that only allows “…citizenship and
land ownership to people of Negro descendant.” (Ch 4, art 27, sec 2) At the legislative and
judicial levels the state has maintained its stance on citizenship being granted to anyone with
African ancestry or their descendants but is still hesitant because of economic benefits Lebanese
and other minority groups enjoy. There is still ongoing debate to extend the citizenship to
Lebanese Liberians. The Lebanese will be briefly included into the analysis because of their
prominent economic role. Additionally some Lebanese businessmen benefited from close ties to
both the Doe and Taylor governments often to protect their family businesses. Several
eyewitnesses’ accounts from Truth Reconciliation Commission trial have accused several
Lebanese businessmen of financing Taylor regime during the Liberian conflicts.
The cultural history between Liberian minority and majority ethnic groups is one of
intermingling for centuries. “Intermarriage and internal migration have made it possible for
many Liberians to invoke more than one tribal affiliation” (Moran 4). Liberian historian Teah
Wulah in his book, The Forgotten Liberian, illustrates how geography and trade was crucial to
the country’s early history as a crossroads region similar to Palestine or Yemen for various
ethnic groups from the Sahel and Guinean forest seeking safety or beginning a new life in pre
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contemporary Liberia. “Most of the Liberian tribes migrated (into Liberia) as part of
demographic adjustments caused by the political and economic upheaval of the ancient empires
of Ghana, Mali and Songhai in West Sudan.” There were other peoples such as the Dei, Loma,
Golas, Mendes and Mano who had settled in the country prior to the collapse of the Songhai
Empire who arrived into the region from neighbouring countries in the 12th century and probably
earlier. “Most Liberian tribes have an affinity with kinsmen in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Ivory
Coast.” (Wulah 21). The indigenous society had developed a complex political culture and legal
systems regarding the rights and roles of citizens living across the country. The TRC’s
perspective on rural Liberian society emphasizes that political leadership is tied to extended
family and community connections. These connections would later aid Samuel Doe in his rise to
power in 1980.
“These rural communities are generally the centre of extended family, or kinship groups. Ties to
an extended family network are critically important in Liberian culture and often form the
foundation upon which local and national political governance is built.” (TRC 52)
In addition to communal connections, rural society has a long history in educating Liberians of
all ages and ethnicities in local culture and society. Prior to the introduction of Western
education, rural Liberians turned to secret societies Sande (for girls) and Poro for boys to educate
generations of children in traditional values and disciplines. The importance of these societies
sometimes outweighed the influence of Americo Liberian urban culture in the countryside. Both
Sande and Poro societies referred to as bush schools are part of the culture having existed
centuries before Liberia became a modern nation state. It is unknown if Samuel Doe might have
attended the Poro school. It is not uncommon that some of his government officials might have
been educated in the Bush schools instead of the Western educational system via Christian
mission schools promoted by the state across the countryside.
For practical reasons I shall refer to various the ethnic groups as they exist within Liberia’s
current borders as Liberians. The country’s strategic location on the fringe of both the African
and later French empires in a small corner of West Africa has served as both a blessing and
curse. Liberia was considered too inhospitable and “as unsafe for Europeans.” (Wulah 13) Its
entire coastline is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conarky from its
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northern and north-eastern borders and Ivory Coast shares the Cavalla River in its southeast
region. The dense forest geography and Kru people’s unwillingness to be disadvantaged from sea
trade by European traders in the mid 15th-19th centuries might have saved Liberia from being
colonized prior to its creation as a modern nation state in 1822. Contemporary Liberia
historically was not a long standing state or country in the same manner as Mali or Ghana. It
could be described as a region similar to Sierra Leone where each people that arrived were able
to settle and govern themselves without a centralized authority. The region maintained its non
state form for nearly 500 years until 1822 with the arrival of African American settlers and
former Caribbean slaves attempted to create a new nation state from the old Melaguetta Coast.
It was originally the Portuguese who created names for major towns and rivers along Liberia’s
coast. The names alongside local names are still in use today for instances Cape Monteserrado,
River Cestos, Cape Palmas (aka Harper and Cape Mount). Prior to scramble for Africa, there
were early attempts by European geographers at defining West Africa through sectioning the
region into multiple territories according to Portuguese or English settlements along the West
African coast above Liberia or islands of Sao Tome on Spanish and English maps. The Mano
River region which includes Liberia, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone’s location was first named
Guinea with no relations to the two contemporary countries of the same name. Guinea was later
divided into Lower and Upper Guinea modelled after the same geographic split as Lower and
Upper Egypt. In this case Upper Guinea meant south. Liberia and its neighbours became part of
the region of Upper Guinea under the name Grain Coast.
Portuguese traders sailing along the West African coast were the first Europeans known to
reach Liberia. “Although during the sixth century BC Hanno of Carthage in Tunisia is said to
have sailed down the coast of Africa with more than fifty ships and some three thousands or
more colonialists.” (Wulah 11) So the Europeans may not have been the first foreigners
Liberians had seen. Following in the footsteps of the Portuguese were the English, French and
Dutch. To Europeans the country was known as the Melaguetta (Pepper) Coast and later the
Grain Coast after its local peppers dubbed the “Grains of Paradise” which were in high demand
across Portugal and England at the height of the Spice Trade. From the 16th to 17th centuries
there was tense competition among the major Western European countries to gain a monopoly on
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coastal trade in the region. The Portuguese blockaded British ships sailing along the coast while
the British destroyed Dutch forts inland in hopes of discouraging either party from wanting to do
business with Liberians. The relationship between Europeans and Liberians involved land and
sea faring trade in gold, locally produced cloths, baskets (from where River Cestos received its
name) and gold. The Krus living in coastal villages and major towns are still known as the most
sea faring traders and fishermen among Liberian people. English and later French traders worked
with the Kru for inland explorations and communication between the two peoples. “During the
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Europeans frequently recruited Liberian Kru…to work
as sailors on European ships travelling between Europe and India via Africa.” (Appiah 20) to
Although relations between English and French and Kru were diplomatic, tensions increased and
relations soured as the Kru, Bassa and Grebo among other Liberians resisted attempts by some
European traders seeking to profit from the growing Spanish-English slave trade on the island of
Goree in Senegal, Sierra Leone and Angola. Kru fishermen fought Europeans frequently
throughout the 18th to early 19th centuries by attacking smaller slave ships on the coast. In
addition, slaves from Upper Guinea mostly came from farther inland mostly from Nigeria, Sierra
Leone and Guinea often sold by their enemies or neighbours collaborating with European traders
under a barter system. Africans captured and shipped as human products were meant to replace
the dying Amerindian forced labour in many European plantations producing sugar, tobacco and
other heavy duty crop cultivation in the Americas particularly Brazil and the Caribbean.
According to Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s historical documentary titled Black in Latin
America, “90% of all slaves sent to the Americas ended up in the Caribbean.” (Gates)
The significance of the Atlantic Slave Trade cannot be overemphasized. Slavery’s major
significance was the invisibility and denial of human rights African slaves experienced in 19th
century American society. Americo Liberians (freed and former slaves) were dehumanized in a
cultural and social sense that their histories, individual or collective identities, culture and
traditions not to mention religions that tied them to mainland Africa were denied by European
and American historians until mid 20th century. Few mass migrations of people voluntary or
involuntary have had a lasting effect on the continent as slavery did. “It is estimated that some 12
million men, women and children were turned into human commodities and exported from the
continent.” (Parker) On both sides of the Atlantic, African scholars and their European
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counterparts have concluded that “the slave trade was a human tragedy without parallel” (Emmer
4). The justification often given to downplay the horrors of the Atlantic Slave Trade lasting 400
years from the late 16th-19th centuries is the rationale that the Arab slave trade occurred in
Ethiopia, the Swahili Coast and Somalia that had been part of the economy for centuries or
“Africans sold other Africans.” (Shahadeh) While both did occur before and after the trade it was
not extensively brutal as European slavery towards West Africans. While White American
society constantly reminded itself and its neighbours in the Caribbean that it was a land of free
people enshrining the rights of men in its constitution, ordinary Americans were more or less
content viewing Africa as a place without a history or its own identity not connected directly to
European traders. The perspective emphasized that Africans were not human beings but savages
or cursed souls from the Dark Continent Africa. Thus slavery was not a destructive institution
but necessary to save Africans from themselves.
There were slaves that successfully rebelled forming their own societies as the case of Haiti
becoming the world’s first independent black republic in 1804 on the island of Hispaniola in the
former French colony of St. Domingue renamed Haiti or Ayiti. The Haitian Revolution sent
shockwaves throughout the Western countries and wider Latin America for the first time
confronting the 19th century’s popular cultural stereotype that Africans were cursed by God to be
slaves and could not govern themselves. The immediate fear by American and European
societies was enslaves Africans would imitate Haiti setting in motion an end to slavery.
Furthermore, Haitians revolted against Napoleon’s Army dispatched to the St. Domingue during
the French Revolution that coincided with Haiti’s own revolution. French revolutionaries’
demands for freedom from government oppression and real equality were applied to France’s
most famous motto Egalite, Liberte and Fratenidad. They were ideas that found there way to
Haiti. To paraphrase American author Randall Robinson also the former president of
TransAfrica Forum (an organization established to promoted enlightened US policy towards
Africa), “The Haitian revolutionaries with their magnificent victory had set a foot a new black
women, men and child…The days of involuntary servitude were, at long last
numbered.”(Robinson 14) The Haitian Revolution both inspired and taught Americo Liberians
regardless of their social status within American society that they were human beings fully aware
of their need to assert their basic political and human rights. The less daunting method toward
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achieving such rights for Americo Liberians was the creation of a democratic state styled as a
Black Republic on the continent of Africa instead of the United States. Americo Liberians saw
the Haitian experience as a lesson in reaffirming their rights to self determination and nation
building without fear of a backlash from colonial powers. If the Haitians were successful in
creating their own state than Americo Liberians had little to fear save for future challenges to
constructing their own nation. Haiti was among the first countries to recognize Liberia as an
independent country in 1847.
Through the rapidly changing socio-political situation of the African Diaspora in the Americas
the ancestors of the Americo Liberians emerged contemplating their own path to freedom. The
term Americo Liberian will be applied to the former and freed African Americans who became
the world’s first black settlers. Furthermore, the Americo Liberians were different from Haitians
in a few ways. While the Haitians maintained a deep cultural and religious connection to West
Africa, the Americo Liberians were far removed from their African roots. They were second to
third generation Americans influenced by the cultural norms and society of the Southern United
States. White American slave owners and Southern society believed that Americo Liberians and
other freed slaves would not enjoy the benefits of freedom or the protection of their human rights
expunged in the U.S. Constitution without causing a profound shift in the Southern slave
institutions. To remedy the possibility of one day granting slaves their real rights and
incorporating them into American society, both slave masters and abolitionists met in the states
of Virginia, Maryland and Georgia to find a feasible solution. From 1817 to 1822, the American
colonization Society or ACS was formed to address growing numbers of recently freed African
American slaves. Henry Clay, the Speaker of the House of Representatives summed up the
benevolent proposal to create a separate state for freed American slaves in Africa.
“Unconquerable prejudice resulting from their colour, they never could amalgamate with the free
whites of this country. It was desirable, therefore, as it respected them, and the residue of the
population of the country, to drain them off.” (Lowance 264) The ACS’s proposal was
influenced by early British attempts to create a colony in Sierra Leone for freed and recaptured
Slaves from the Americas. This led Liberian diplomat Edward Blyden one of the early fathers of
Pan Africanism to comment, “Liberia and Sierra Leone as twins whose destiny for good or ill
will remain inextricably linked.” (Laband 195) The parallels between Liberia’s founding and 19th
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century Zionists’ quest for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine to allow European Jews to
live securely and free from European anti-Semitism may not be a mere accident considering both
peoples histories. Both Liberia and Palestine are still coming to terms with the consequences of
“the oppressed becoming the oppressor.” (Freire 42)
It is estimated that 15,000 freed African American and repatriated Caribbean slaves that
became known as Congoes, arrived in Liberia from 1822 to 1847. Liberia declared its
independence from the American Colonization Society in 1847 becoming the second
independent black republic after Haiti and officially Africa’s oldest republic. Although believing
they arrived in a new Promised Land or New Jerusalem in their own state, the Americo Liberians
and Congoes found themselves confronted with forming a new identity. “The Americo Liberians
were a classic marginal people-socially and culturally. As a displaced people with no pride they
never found the self worth they were looking for in Africa.” (Dennis) Liberians were soon to
realize that ethnic regionalism hampers modern nation building.
The Liberian constitution, the capital of Monrovia named after President James Monroe and
Americo Liberian culture and traditions resembled the former Southern United States society
they left behind. The new identity Americo Liberians constructed ignored the indigenous
Liberians living in the countryside and within the city of Monrovia. Both indigenous and
Americo Liberians could have forged a new national identity that respected multiculturalism
while demonstrating Liberia’s strong state institutions fused by indigenous and American
traditions. A possible joint effort to overcome the histories of persecution experienced by both
peoples was overlooked in the creation of the new Liberian state. The transformation of Liberian
national identity continued throughout the 19th century. The first distinction between indigenous
Liberians and the new Americo Liberian identity was couched in colonialist terminology. The
Americo Liberians became the settlers and indigenous Liberians the natives or tribes. The settlers
originally applied the “Mission civilisatrice” or civilizing mission upon their arrival into Liberia.
Instead of European missionaries bringing Christianity and salvation to the so called Dark
Continent and saving indigenous Liberians from a life of suffering it were African American
missionaries taking the place of Europeans. In addition to the traditional religions and Islam that
arrived in Liberia centuries earlier, Christianity left a strong mark on Liberian society. Until
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1986, the constitution mandated Liberia was founded on Christian principles ignoring its
religious minorities’ traditions and contributions to Liberia’s religious diversity. Whereas
Liberia’s neighbours are majority Muslim countries with small Christian minorities, the reverse
occurred in Liberia. Though Liberian Christianity resembles its American counterpart it also
integrated elements of indigenous beliefs in the countryside among villagers and common
people.
In spite of not being colonized by either the French or British carving up territories in
neighbouring Ivory Coast and Guinea or Sierra Leone and Ghana; Liberia mirrored a colonial
state ruled by English speaking, culturally American Mulatto elite who shared similarities with
corrupt colonial officials elsewhere in the region. Language was one of many obstacles to
integrating the Americo Liberian elite into rural life or indigenous society. “They did not always
communicate well with their rural neighbours who spoke numerous vernaculars and viewed the
colonial experience with particularly dismay.” (Birmingham 36)
Similar to their Sierra Leonean or Guinean neighbours, indigenous Liberians who entered
missionary schools were forbidden from speaking their own languages. Often times it was the
only language they and their families knew or could communicate in. However the Americo or
settler English transformed into a unifying Creole language Liberian English or “Colloqua”
which was and continues to be the lingua franca for Liberians across the country. Liberian
English has become a fusion language combining settler English with various words and
proverbs from sixteen Liberian ethnic groups. Alongside Liberian English is Standard or
American styled English used by the elite and upper class. Interestingly, recent census on the
country’s linguistic make up notes that “English is spoken by 20% of population while there are
20 ethnic languages few of which can be written down or used in correspondence.” (CIA 2011)
Both the Bassa and Vai languages have their own locally created scripts. Long consider a
necessary method of communication language would be used by both elites and rebel forces as
both a divisive and unifying tool during the Liberian conflicts.
While language served to break down communication barriers, one area of society that became
relatively flexible in assimilating the indigenous into Americo Liberian elite society and vice
versa was marriage. Intermarriages between indigenous and Americo Liberians continued
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throughout the 19th and into the 20th centuries. “Taboos against intermarriage weren’t rigid.
Americo Liberian men took native mistresses which linked them with their tribe.” (Dennis 38)
Even the non elite Americo Liberians who attempted to disassociate from indigenous peoples
found marriage to be an advantage in not only uniting both peoples but in turn developed into an
tool for assimilation. Succeeding Liberian presidents often intermarried with indigenous
Liberians for political reasons. Indigenous women were often chosen as wives by high ranking
officials as was common throughout colonial societies. As mentioned earlier intermarriage
between indigenous peoples and foreigners was not as revolutionary as it seemed. In a political
context, intermarriage emerged among the elite and wider Americo Liberian society for strategic
reasons either through hopes of promoting westernization in the Liberian countryside or gaining
alliances against anti-government groups.
On a social note it gradually broke down barriers on cultural misunderstandings between both
peoples as the question of what constitute a Liberian other than origins were beginning to
emerge. The former definitions between indigenous and Americo Liberians were now replaced
by a common national identity: Liberian. By the early 20th century, questions of a new identity
focused on a continent wide African identity instead of the 19th century ethno nationalism in
Europe began to emerge in Liberia. This new identity was led by Liberia’s most prominent
author and diplomat Edward Blyden. He shared similar Diaspora roots with the Americo
Liberian leadership and citizens hailing from the former Danish Caribbean island of St. Thomas
(United States Virgin Islands). However unlike some of his countrymen; Blyden attempted to
reconcile the Diaspora and mainland Africans separated by historical geography and slightly
differing cultures into a wider supranational nationality. Pan Africanism was to transform
individual nation states into a self conscious entity knowledgeable of the positive contributions
African peoples have left on African and world history, civilization and culture. Blyden is
regarded in Liberia today as a national hero for proposing the earliest formation of a Pan-African
identity and unity. Liberians took his call to heart until the late 1970s when political unrest
became a concern.
Pan Africanism not only grew into an international movement, it cemented collaboration
between Diaspora and mainland African resistance to European rule across Africa. After Blyden,
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William Edward Dubois and later Marcus Garvey emerged as Blyden’s successor for initiating
African American and Caribbean peoples’ interest in Pan African Unity. “DuBois organizes
occasional conferences in European capitals, which allowed Africans students and others to
discuss common grievances across colonial boundaries within an eclectic ideological
framework.” (Laband 30). Trinidadian student George Padmore was one of the first Pan African
students to suggest that an African nationalist organization similar to the Kuomintang nationalist
party in China be formed: “To foster racial conscious and a spirit of nationalism aiming at the
protection of the sovereignty of Liberia.” (Azikiwe 138) In short Pan Africanists were to
champion Liberia’s national sovereignty as a challenge to colonialism.
A combination of Negritude ideology alongside Marcus Garvey’s “Back To Africa Movement”
(Stein 44) boosted interest in Pan Africanism among colonized Ghanaians, Senegalese and
independent Liberians. In the aftermath of 1960 independence across West Africa many leaders
notably Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah attempted to apply a Pan African perspective to the
country’s economic development and relations with neighbouring countries. Nkrumah’s Pan
African ideals became the basis for the creation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.
The OAU is the predecessor to today’s African Union. Liberia was among the organization’s
first founding members. Throughout the 1970s, the Tolbert government reached out to its
neighbours by hosting several OAU conferences in Monrovia and emphasizing a Pan African
agenda. As a matter of fact, President William Tolbert was finishing his term as the chairman of
the OAU when he was assassinated on April 12 1980. Post coup politics gradually pushed Pan
Africanism into the background. It was only until after the Liberian civil wars that the ideals
would revive among Liberians.
However strong Pan Africanism was among Liberians, pro American sentiment distinguished
Liberia from former colonial states. From the moment of independence, the Liberian state relied
on its “special relationship” with the United States to strength its standing as a nation state.
Within Liberian society, Americo Liberians maintained strong cultural connections and political
ties to the American mainland through family ties and educational exchanges. The Liberian state
organized cultural and educational policies of westernization in rural Liberia continued into 20th
century. For European and American leaders, Liberia served as an example of Democratic
16
African governance and the state for its colonized neighbours in West Africa and across the
continent. Liberian society had adapted Western culture and a local version of political
institutions without the state being pressured by a colonial administration. “The influence of
Westernization gradually altered every aspect of traditional society.” (Dennis 87)
The alterations occurred among the younger generation who saw mission schools, English
language and replacing Americo culture with rural culture as key to social mobility. In coastal
cities of Buchanan and Cape Palmas integrating into the cosmopolitan culture was a necessity.
A lasting example of economic cooperation between the United States and Liberia was the
world’s biggest rubber producer Firestone’s arrival in the country in 1927. Firestone negotiated a
99 year concession with the Liberian government for land in Harbel, Liberia some forty miles
outside of Monrovia. The concession was part of a larger loan granted to the government by
Firestone to provide in return for 1 million acres in land. In his article, An Anatomy of an
Investment, Frank Chalk suggests that the Liberian government’s desperate turn to Firestone was
meant to assuage the country’s bankruptcy due to falling exports in coffee and previous acquired
loans. “The bill passed by the Liberian legislature bound the government to borrow five million
dollars from the Financial Corporation of America.” (Chalk 12)
The Liberian legislature offered Firestone legal methods to establishing its presence where it
remains today. “The Creolized settlers mortgaged their land to an American company that
recruited native labour to work on its rubber plantations. The rising new market for motor tires
helped to finance the privileged wellbeing of the Creole Bourgeoisie in an embryonic city
(Monrovia)” (Birmingham 37) The Firestone deal would be the first in many economic policies
rural Liberians would illustrate as short sight economic deals between the government and a
multinational partner. The economic deals were seen as serving and benefiting the government’s
American and European allies at the people’s expense. The government had been seeking short
term goals without seeking long term economic development for the state and rural Liberians
meant to benefit from the new concession. In 1927, the Liberian government was accused by
Britain and France of ignoring forced labour practices used by Firestone on rural Liberians
working on the company’s rubber plantations. Accusation of slavery transformed into an
international scandal for Liberia. British and French sources even threatened to absorb Liberia
17
into either a French or British protectorate. The Firestone slave labour scandal came to represent
a contradiction of Liberia’s founding principles that it was a nation freed from the repression and
violence which caused the Americo Liberians to flee to the Melegueta Coast in the first place. In
spite of Firestone’s questionable reputation, its operations remained functioning even as new
accusations arose.
Forced labour was not the only limiting counter human capital measures experienced by Rural
Liberians as the country’s economy became the focus of the United States during the interwar
period. The city versus the countryside featured prominently in national development as the
state began to consolidate its power not only in politics but in economics. Throughout 20th
century Liberia beginning in the 1920s, national development would increasingly become
unequal in terms of critical infrastructure between the city and countryside. Two parallel
societies based on urban and rural cultures existed in Monrovia and coastal cities where Americo
Liberians settled and in the countryside where the majority of indigenous rural Liberians lived.
Economic observations carried out by the U.S. State Department in the 1930s to 1940s suggested
that the Monrovia based government was purposely discouraging necessary infrastructure from
being constructed in the countryside that would have greatly benefited Rural Liberians both
small farmers and marketers. “The Liberian Government has done practically nothing to foster or
encourage commerce or open the hinterland to trade.” (Wulah 131) The State Department report
further recounts the government’s subtle abuses shown toward the indigenous Liberians since the
country’s creation. Abuses ranging from misappropriating taxes from rural Liberians to
individual politicians to forced labour for villagers who are unable to pay fines levelled by
magistrates. One method of control that would be employed by the successive governments is
intimidation by the state through rural policemen and civilian military that were tasked with
suppressing protests against such abuses. Regardless of ethnicity, the majority of indigenous
Liberians were treated with abuse by the state in similar fashion. It was only until the Wiilliam
Tubman government from 1944-1971 that the state’s harsh abuses were eased. In the 1950s
Liberian women and indigenous were granted the right to vote in presidential elections and
received parliamentary representation that had previously privileged only Americo Liberians in
the coastal towns and Monrovia. New representation in parliament forced te government in
18
certain instances to pay closer attention to their rural constituents who now demanded equal
wealth distributions and fair share in investment deals.
The Tubman government’s most notable achievement was opening the country to foreign
investment and wider international trade under “the Open Door Policy.” The United States,
Sweden and the United Kingdom operated mining companies to export Liberia’s abundant
mineral wealth particularly iron ore in the country’s northern hills. The now defunct LAMCO
Company and Bong Mines were instrumental in constructing the port of Buchanan and
Monrovia’s main port. Liberia experienced similar post world war growth as the United States
and Asian countries throughout the fifties and sixties. North western university in the United
States commissioned an economic survey of Liberia as a comparative study of past development
and economic policies set in place by the government. The completed survey was republished as
a book in the early 1960s. It references to notable aspects of Liberia’s national development.
First, “the traditional social and political institutions impeded the country’s development.”
(Tuwah) The state’s lack of encouraging its citizens to be innovators and business oriented
instead of relying on foreign help would later haunt the country as a whole. The second aspect
was heavily reflected upon under Tolbert’s government. Liberia’s robust economic growth was
characterized as “Growth without development.” (Walker & Clower 23) The economy flourished
without the majority of Liberians including urban and rural residence receiving the essential
technical and practical skills needed to produce manufacturing and processing industries within
the country. Such technological and critical skills were greatly missing in the country’s
educational policy. The modern architecture and other crucial infrastructure related to health and
education were all built by foreign companies or foreigners. Many unskilled Liberians were not
given an opportunity to apply practical methods to building the nation.
Rural Liberians only saw minimal infrastructure development in their villages and towns
despite millions of dollars invested into agricultural and public works projects by foreign
companies. The road network in the provinces was still lacking. Most remained unpaved as they
had been in early 20th century. Quality education and economic opportunities still remained
confined to Monrovia for most Liberians seeking to improve their education or financial
situations. Similar to migrants in post colonial West Africa, Liberian students and families from
19
the countryside began to construct informal homes and businesses on the outskirts of
metropolitan Monrovia. These migrant homes transformed into permanent settlements and
communities. In many instances, the migrant communities were recognized as its own suburb or
neighbourhood of the capital. Some estimates suggests that there were around 720, 000
residences living in Monrovia when William Tolbert took office in 1971. “The country’s rapid
economic growth had declined sharply by the early 1970s partly a result of declining demand for
rubber and iron on the world market.” (Ejigu 2) Even with a diversified economy, Liberia still
faced similar economic decline alongside its West African neighbours when dollar devaluation
sent the world economy into a slow economic recession.
Politically, several West African states Nigeria and Angola including Liberia were witnessing
post colonial questions of identity and how to build inclusive societies. In a couple of cases
ethnic and national identity questions were answered with declaration of succession by
marginalized ethnic groups seeking to avoid farther neglect by the state. On the other hand,
solving previous colonial divisions by reviving perceived ancestral homelands carried
unintended consequences. The creation of an ethnic homeland Biafra for the Igbo people in
Nigeria in the mid 1960s soon developed into the 1967 Biafra Civil War. Beyond civil wars,
cultural life flourished with local authors and wider society seeking to balance respect for
diversity with constructions of national unity and independence. Throughout the 1970s, anticolonialist revolutions in Guinea-Bissau and Angola against the Portuguese continued to push
national identity to the forefront in many West African countries including Liberia. Media
reports in addition to literature on liberation theology and ideas of Pan Africanism were available
to Liberians allowing them to follow events occurring in neighbouring countries closely. Rural
Liberians and their urban countrymen exchanged ideas on the role of national identity in the
public sphere at university gatherings or neighbourhood teashops. Alongside national identity
discussions on the state’s role in respecting citizens’ human rights became an increasing focus.
Renewed focus in reforming previous constitutional laws which would have recognized the
indigenous majority’s rights to integrate into a democratic society as equal citizens dominated
discussions across society. The national reform movement did not occur in a vacuum. The
Tolbert government initiated several progressive policies allowing for basic forms of Democratic
governance long strangled by Tubman’s one party state reign. Freedom of speech and press
20
flourished after nearly thirty years of suppression by the Tubman administration. However,
Tolbert’s progressive stance toward redressing the inequality and abuses of previous
governments was overshadowed with accusations that the Tolbert presidency resembled the
previous ruling regimes with little change despite radical promises. In addition, opposition
groups such as the Progressive Alliance for Liberia and Movement for Justice in Africa accused
the administration of nepotism. Tolbert had hired most of his family members as cabinet
members and in other government ministries. By the end of his term, Tolbert had developed into
an autocratic more concerned with maintain power in grandioso style than fulfilling promises to
citizens.
Rising costs in food prices, fuel and clothes continued to prove a lasting challenge throughout
his presidency. Two events coincided with the 1980 coup. “The first was the government’s
increase in rice subsidies for a bag of rice from $22 to $26.” The increase may not have had such
a major impact had it not been for the fact that rice was Liberia’s staple food. Second the
transformation of a peaceful protest against the subsidies increase into what became known as
the rice riots. The rice riots were the final act of citizen outrage. It also marked the end of long
standing Americo Liberian rule. The explosion had exposed the visible corruption that only
benefited presidential families functioning as royal families rather than Democratic leaders.
The historical overview offers an in depth analysis of Liberia’s origins as a modern nation and
includes the often overlooked history of the country’s indigenous population. It is possible to
chart the growing disparity between Americo and indigenous Liberians through the country’s
evolution from a non colonized region to a developed country with unequal access to social
mobility. Liberia’s early history has been shaped as much by its citizens as by the government.
During the previous 500 years, Liberians of indigenous and later Americo background have been
part of reoccurring socio-political changes in Liberia. The role of society has been crucial in
shaping national development and identity. Rural Liberians were proactive in monitoring
national development concerning infrastructure and challenging unequal social mobility that
directly affected them long before Samuel Doe or other leaders acted to change the status quo.
Early government policies aimed at disenfranchising rural Liberia united rural society against the
state’s socioeconomic abuses. For instances, successive governments’ consistent attempts to
21
exclude rural Liberians from major public works or questionable economic deals encouraged the
growth of civic participation and citizens rights in relationship to the government. Civic
participation brought national attention to the inequality that lay below the surface of society.
Such action by civil society led to a national movement to reconfiguring the Liberian state’s
policies and institutions to meet the needs of its ignored citizens. Finally, parallel to national
development was the role of identity in nation building. Not only questions of identity in terms
of who are we as a people or a nation but also multiple layers of identity. Liberian national
identity in its early history ranged from local identities tied to rural communities than to the
encompassing Pan African identity which it was envisioned Liberia and West Africa would
represent part of a unified continental African identity transcending individual national or ethnic
identities. At the national level, a Liberian national identity existed for most of the nation’s
history holding the country together despite some citizens’ frustrations toward the body politic.
Throughout their long history Liberians have contemplated belonging to multiple identities that
can coexist with their allegiance to a specific region, culture or society. Furthermore, identity
within Liberian society is not a monolith. Identity adjusts to the period and leadership throughout
history. History has shown that Liberians of all persuasions have been actively involved in
determining the route of national development and identity irrelative of its failures and success.
22
Chapter 2 How has the use of ethnicity by the Liberian state and within the
Armed forces shifted between 1980-2003?
Throughout the 133 year Americo Liberian rule, indigenous Liberians of various ethnic
backgrounds were unified in their understanding of succeeding governments’ abuses and
privileges at all levels of society. The state in kind viewed the country’s ethnic groups along the
indigenous and Americo Liberians lines. Unofficially, the government up to 1980 was defined by
the domination of a single ethnic group. The Liberian state as a political entity could be summed
in the following, “The polity had evolved from a repatriate Democracy to a repatriate oligarchy
to a patronage party state” (Gifford 10). The ruling government’s self imposed barrier for
indigenous Liberians seeking to obtain the presidency or gain political representation at the
national level of society through the electoral process confirmed this fact. Senior researcher on
African conflicts, Lansana Gberie in his essay on Liberia and Sierra Leone in Daily Lives of
Civilians in Wartime Africa described the Americo Liberian government’s antipathy to Liberian
majority’s political participation. “Mildly brutal and clannish, successive True Whig Party
(TWP) governments were deeply resented by the vast majority of Liberians, the indigenes, who
were shut out by accident of birth from the charmed circle.” (Gberie 196). The William Tolbert
Administration was one of the few Americo Liberian governments that sought to include
indigenous Liberians from the countryside into his cabinet. Yet this was seen by some officers of
the Armed Forces of Liberia as a little too late to assuage past grievances of the indigenous
Liberians’ neglect and exclusion from national levels of government and nation building.
The socio-political exclusion accumulated with the rice riots that pushed the William Tolbert
presidency from power. It served as an opportunistic launching pad for Master Sergeant Samuel
K Doe and his fellow soldiers of Armed Forces of Liberia. His emergence as one of the principle
leaders of the coup was not lost among rural Liberians. He was born in a small town Tuzon,
Grand Gedeh County in the country’s far southeast region. Samuel Doe’s birthplace came to
represent rural Liberians’ geographic and economic distance from Monrovia in a literal sense.
Professor on African politics, Pade Badru suggests that Doe’s childhood and ability to
manoeuvre through the military hierarchy symbolized the everyman story. Badru writes on
Doe’s pre military years, “Doe was said to have a fourth grade education along with severe
23
mental and emotional problems.” (Badru 155) Doe’s latter characteristics came to light
throughout his rule. “Doe managed to get into the army where he was promoted to Master
Sergeant in 1979. Doe replaced officers with Americo Liberian roots with poorly qualified
soldiers from his own tribe of the Krahn.” (Badru 155) Incidentally, Krahns are also an ethnic
minority among indigenous Liberians. “The total population (of Krahns) is about 175,000”
(Wulah 75). Of the then 2 million Liberians in 1980, the Krahns were less than 1% of the
population. However Doe’s ethnic minority status was not a main concern to many of his
supporters. His rural and ethnic roots connected him with majority of Liberian society who
regarded him as a fellow indigenous countryman.
“Doe announced that he had not assumed power to repeat the oppression of the past, and
indicated that he would soon return the country to civilian rule.” (Daworko 17) The coup was
greeted with euphoria. It was seen as long overdue justice. One of Doe’s earliest promises was
representing all Liberian citizens under a new government with the title People’s Redemption
Council that sought real social justice. In her recent article “The Promise of April 12,” Liberian
journalist Robtel Pailey relates the April 12 coup to a national reawakening. “April 12 held such
promise for Liberia. It was a day when marginalized Liberians finally realized that the system
could work for them, that ‘you can’t fool all the people all the time.’ It was a day when we all
realized that oppression is man-made, and that another Liberia is possible.” (Pailey) For the first
time an indigenous Liberian or “countryman” not connected to the Americo Liberian elite had
come to power via military support. Given previous colonial administrations’ marginalization
across West Africa, Doe’s arrival signalled the beginning of the end of Liberia’s old guard. The
only citizens that would not receive justice and was eventually excluded from having any input
into the direction of the new government were Americo Liberians. The government’s attack on
middle class and poor Americo Liberian citizens was viewed by indigenous majority originally
as years of bottled up frustration. “It was correcting the injustices of the past.” (Pailey) For the
majority the targeted ethnic minority represented the beneficiaries of a state that had long
excluded the majority to maintain control of economic resources and development. Repressive
military force and rounding up of opposition forces made up of both Americo and indigenous
Liberians was an early example of collective punishment against a single ethnic group. The
assassination of William Tolbert while he slept followed with live footage of the trial and
24
execution of a dozen officials on a Monrovia beach was meant to construct fear in the hearts of
Americo Liberians. The show of force not only terrified the former elite but other ethnic groups
who began to question Doe’s brutal methods.
Roger Brubaker’s article Ethnic and nationalist violence proposes several theories to explain
the origins of ethnic polarization and the prolonged conflicts it produces. Yugoslavia is
represented as a prime case study of the state’s indirect and occasionally direct involvement in
ethnic conflicts. Brubaker references four prominent theories of ethnic violence: international
relations, cultural construction of fear, game and rational action theory. All four emphasize the
importance of security and the need of the state and its leadership to exist as a legitimate power
through exerting control over society. Furthermore, there are two specific theoretical approaches
mentioned by Brubaker that relate to Samuel Doe’s leadership. One aspect is the role of
intragroup dynamics in interethnic relations and communications. The second is the cultural
construction of fear under the culturalist analyst of ethnic violence. Both approaches featured
prominently in the actions taken by the coup makers to establish their rule over society. The
intragroup communication created an atmosphere where members belonging to the marginalized
Krahn viewed ethnic cooperation as key to protecting their own interests, families and leaders as
priority. Ethnic cooperation filled the gap for marginalized Krahns seeking protection from
reprisals in the coup’s aftermath where the state was nonexistent. “Several observers (Western
diplomats) were aware of the reprisals that this would inevitably bring against the Krahn when
Doe was finally deposed.” (Gifford 33)
In the midst of protecting fellow Krahns many members overlooked similar concerns by their
neighbours. The cultural construction of fear was already apparent with the Doe leadership
targeting Americo Liberians regardless of social standing. Americo Liberians were no longer
viewed as fellow citizens but as oppressive tyrants who had committed unforgivable abuses
against Krahns and other indigenous ethnic groups. A UK based Liberian gave her statement
recounting the unpredictable to Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. “There were
frequent radio announcements that the Krahns were coming after Americo Liberians and I didn’t
know what was going to happen from one day to the next…” (TRC)
25
Intragroup dynamics and cultural construction of fear played a significant role in the post coup
environment in Monrovia and the countryside. Throughout his decade long rule, Doe had applied
both approaches to managing dissidents and opposition. The cultural construction of fear first
emerged in human rights abuses aimed at targeted individuals and certain ethnic groups living in
the countryside. The AFL capitalized on violent intimidation and fear to show the state’s strength
towards demonized citizens who represented constructed political other threatening state power.
Brubaker proposes that intragroup dynamics occurs when pressure is execrated on a political
leader or the group as a whole. Despite being a well integrated society, the pressure to deliver on
the immediate needs of society pushed the Doe government to promote Krahns to leadership
positions originally denied to them. The polarization of the state that emerged can be seen
through the perspective of the intragroup dynamics. Resentment was the obvious response by
many Liberians to the unearned privileges granted to Doe’s family and ethnic group.
New African magazine columnist Carina Ray writes in her article How the word tribe
stereotypes Africa, that both the Liberian state and military’s use of ethnicity is equally tied to
social mobility within society for any group seeking higher office. “In short, where ethnicity has
played a role in post-independence violence, it is not because of ancient hatreds, but rather
because of a perceived relationship between ethnicity and access to material resources and
political power, which has its roots in the 20th century.” (Ray)
Not long after the events of April 12, Doe’s earlier promise to represent all Liberians soon
transpired into aiding only his ethnic group at the expense of all citizens. In addition, Doe went
to great lengths to include Krahns into his administration. The civil service was reformed to
include mostly Krahns and members of the Doe family. Many Krahns moved en mass from the
countryside to Monrovia. Ethnicity replaced pluralism at every level of government. Doe’s
government resembled an ethnocracy in every aspect except in official documents. It was not
long before opposition to an ethnicized leadership developed. Other marginalized Liberians soon
realized that the Doe government was only providing privileges and benefits to his own people.
It was little change from previous government. The country was moving away from its past
struggle for equal socio-political representation irrespective of ethnicity to building frustrations
26
with government’s ethnic favouritism. Samuel Doe’s first term was marked by a fundamental
shift from the way ethnicity was defined in Liberia.
Prior to Doe, the state and society regarded ethnic differences through distinctions made
between the Americo and indigenous Liberians. Krahn domination of the government replaced
the long standing Americo-Indigenous juxtaposition with a narrow focus on ethnic differences
among the indigenous majority. The Doe government continued to tout a Liberian national
identity to calm society’s fears that ethnicity was trumping national unity. However, ethnic
identity among indigenous Liberians became highly polarized often overshadowing dialogue on
redefining national identity to fit the country’s new political reality. The Americo Liberians’
disconnection from their fellow countrymen and Africa has been well documented. Indigenous
Liberians’ attitudes towards ethnic identity have been overlooked or assigned to the all
encompassing “tribal identity” used by some Liberian and Western authors to describe ethnicity
among indigenous peoples. Authors Wulah and Pajibo argue that indigenous Liberians’ attitudes
varied greatly on ethnic identity depending on the socio-political and cultural contexts. Tribalism
in Liberia’s case does not necessarily allude to a strict definition of ethnic loyalty nor does it
suggest that a person cannot exist in a multiethnic environment. It was not until the 1980s that
tribalism became associated with power politics and ethnic polarization used by the state and
later rebel forces to garner support from citizens. In Monrovia and the coastal cities it became a
tool not only to define society along rigid ethnic lines but also to construct an atmosphere of fear
against a single group or multiple groups of people. In rural Liberia tribalism replaced a
multiethnic society that balanced group loyalty under the local indigenous political system
without excluding other Liberians from different backgrounds. Lastly, tribalism polarized
interethnic relations and sparked long lasting friction within multiethnic regions. Author Jeremy
Levitt argues that describing Liberian society as tribal overlooks Liberia’s shifting ethnic
boundaries and loyalties. In his book Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia, Levitt affirms
tribalism is not a monolith concerning Liberia or its neighbours.
“Ethnicity in Liberia, sometimes referred to as tribal identity, is a complex and often artificial
notion, just as it is in other parts of Africa and the world” (Levitt, 50)
27
Many Western observers further note that Liberia was one of the few West African countries
where ethnic differences among the indigenous Liberians did not harm interethnic relations. “It
may be noted that until Doe occasioned it, tribalism was not a feature of Liberian society.” (Tarr
44) There are many reasons for lack of Liberian tribalism or ethnic polarization until 1980. The
majority of rural Liberians had shared historical grievances against the state that transcended
specific ethnic groups. The shared identity as an oppressed majority united rural communities
across the country despite the varying experiences. Importantly, ethnic groups in the hinterland
share common histories, multicultural identities and are intermarried. Most rural Liberians were
also well integrated into their communities at the educational or political levels. The state did not
fragment society along the lines of ethnic affiliation nor turned it into a visible aspect of daily
life. Ethnic definitions of Liberians were broad and generic. A person either belonged to the
Americo Liberians or country people. Regionalism ie rural vs. urban citizens shaped Liberians’
local identity than specific ethnicities. Liberian identity was able to maintain a shaky balance
between local and regional identities similar to its distance neighbour Senegal’s national identity.
In the context of wider anti colonial movement occurring across Africa, Liberia of the 1980s
resembled a post colonial state even though it had experienced a century of political stability and
sovereignty. The political system shared similar post colonial problems of inequality left in place
by previous governments and a lack of policies aimed at social progress by including all citizens
as part of the nation building process. The new government took advantage of previous
inequalities between the elite and society to misrepresent the past as an attack on an individual
ethnicity instead of the majority of Liberian citizens. This was the first time ethnic instead of
local (rural/urban towns) identity entered wider debates on the state’s governance. Ethnic
homelands and separatism had not disrupted Liberia’s political system in the same manner as the
Biafra independence movement had in Nigeria. Liberian historians suggest that the country’s
small size and intermingling of ethnic groups may explain why an ethnic separatist movement
did not emerge in the country. A second and often cited plausible reason according to Ezekiel
Pajibo relates lack of ethnic separatism to previous Liberian leaderships’ “lack of a unifying
nationalism.” (Pajibo) Nevertheless a form of patriotism instead of nationalism served as a
unifying force within the Liberian state. Patriotic feelings among urban and rural Liberians cut
across society’s opposition to the government’s ethnic driven politics.
28
Liberian scholar Heneryata Ballah in her article Ethnicity, Politics and Social conflict: Quest
for Peace in Liberia examines the role of ethnicity in the lives of indigenous Liberians beyond
tribal affiliation. “Ethnicity is important to Africans in many ways. First it provides security to
the group as a whole as well as individuals…Secondly ethnicity provides each group with a
common ancestry and history which is an important aspect to African peoples…Third it also
identifies each group by providing its members with a common language.” (Ballah 3) These
three aspects are often perceived as the basis for defining a nation of people or the nation state as
a political entity. Samuel Doe’s decision to surround himself with fellow Krahns can be
illustrated by the political traditions found in the rural countryside. Belonging to an ethnic group
served as a unifying force instead of the Liberian state for rural Liberians living outside
Monrovia and the major coastal cities. The state’s reluctance to distribute equal investment and
resources to counties such as Grand Gedeh or Nimba farther convinced some rural Liberians to
rely more on their own groups (single ethnicity or multiethnic) and communities to provide basic
services. Local political system also functioned on group connections and loyalty. However
strong tribal loyalties were among Doe’s peers or other rural Liberians, group loyalty did cross
ethnic boundaries to become more communal than tribal. Tribalism only became relevant when
providing a social network for Doe and his fellow peers to gain legitimacy as the national
authority among their community in Grand Gedeh which included other ethnic groups beside the
Krahns. It was not use as a divisive tool until political power at the national level was threatened
by competition.
In terms of the nation state, Ballah poses that ethnicity not only provides for local society but
also leads to regionalism. Ethnic regionalism is beneficial to the group i.e. Krahns or other
ethnicities seeking to protect itself from outside influences. It may also help ethnic groups
organize themselves into a local system of government or societies. Ballah’s explanation does
relate to rural Liberia. “These ethnic groups (indigenous majority) were governed by their ethnic
leaders under their indigenous political systems and lived in communities based on their
ethnicity.” (Ballah 56) Ethnic regionalism mobilized and organized rural Liberians into strong
communities where the Liberian state’s involvement was minimal. One aspect of rural Liberia is
most indigenous ethnic groups rely on indigenous laws and communal politics to grant the
legitimacy of new leaders. Legitimacy is not only about ethnic loyalty it can also relate to social
29
mobility or wider support from across the countryside. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that
ethnic regionalism does emerge when ethnic groups or communities conclude they have been
overly marginalized or represented as a non citizen. Samuel Doe brought the concepts of ethnic
regionalism from the countryside to the Liberian capital Monrovia that had moved away from
ethnic regionalism to form one of the country’s oldest multiethnic cities.
Liberian politician Amos Sawyer was an eyewitness to Doe’s rise. Sawyer believed Doe and
his comrades shared more in common with their urban, unemployed countrymen in Monrovia
than they did with their rural community. They had likely grown up in a provincial city that
connected them (however distance) to Monrovia’s urban culture and social life compared to their
parents or peers’ previous less urbanized upbringings.
“Although the coup makers were all from indigenous ethnic backgrounds only a few had lived
and grown up in their communal areas and been socialized in indigenous values.” (Sawyer, 175)
Estrangement from indigenous culture was not an impediment for Doe and his military
comrades. As with many coup leaders before him, suspicion and fear of losing power to an
opposition group or lay at the heart of Doe’s quest to maintain power. Doe’s leadership became
known for its constant violations of human rights and torture. “Two impulses seemed to
dominate the coup makers (now government) behaviour. The first was the impulse to rule in a
brutal and tyrannical manner with the liberal use of the machine gun. The second was to satisfy
personal greed by raids not only on the public treasury but with the use of the gun on people in
society.” (Laband 196) All Liberians were targeted indiscriminately for demanding a return to
civilian democracy or ending rampant corruption.
The 1980 coup was the first instance of a strong military foothold at the political level. “In fact
under the PRC, and at the beckon and instruction of Mr. Samuel Kanyon Doe, the Armed Forces
of Liberia was ethnicized.” (Pajibo, 1) Previous Liberian governments including Tolbert and his
predecessor Tubman had maintained a balance between the national police and the Armed
Forces of Liberia. Both leaders viewed the possibility of even a medium size army posing a real
and greater challenge to their rule. Liberia was one of the few African countries without an
influential standing army embedded within the state’s security apparatus. Another overlooked
30
aspect of the AFL was the majority of enlisted soldiers were illiterate without professional
training.
“The army was largely an amalgamation of mostly unlettered men and women, whose primary
function included being maids, drivers, messengers and bodyguards to Liberian government
officials and their hanger-ons” (Pajibo, 2)
The AFL’s relationship ordinary citizens demonstrated a larger power disparity. “In the years
preceding the Coup d’état of 1980, a major function of the Liberian army was its deployment
into the hinterland as escorts to tax collectors.”(Pajibo) The soldiers often used property
confiscations, beatings and rapes on rural taxpayers unable to meet payments. These early abuses
by the AFL were not easily forgotten by rural Liberians who would witness similar abuses by the
state.
As Doe’s first term came to an end, the military targeted any opposition within society that
demonstrated the slightest challenge or representative an alternative government. The
government had transformed into a military state right before the 1985 elections. Political parties
such as the Progressive Alliance of Liberia and MOJA along with assemblies and demonstrations
organized by the University of Liberia students were banned. In addition, the former free press
was strangled. Lastly, Doe turned to expelling his own cabinet members who he suspected of
harbouring intentions to overthrow his autocratic rule. “He soon began to eliminate his former
associates in the coup plot, so that within three years, all 16 colleagues who plotted the coup with
him has either been killed or fled to neighbouring countries.” (10) Repression was not only
condoned by the government but was also legalized through the passage of Decree 88A among
other military laws to bend the judicial system in the state’s favour. “It was the famous Decree
88A, which allowed for anyone that was suspected of criticizing Doe’s government to be arrest
and sent to jail with no justice.” (57) The 1847 Constitution unchanged since its creation was
effectively banned. The military continuously targeted UL students. They were often the most
resistant citizens to the military rule whereas the majority of society made every effort to stay
clear of military’s heavy handed violence. One particular episode of chaos occurred at the
University of Liberia on August 22, 1984. In essence, it foreshadowed the brutality witnessed by
civilians throughout the 1990s civil wars. A student witness from that day would later testify at
31
Liberia’s Truth Reconciliation Council trial in 2003. I have paraphrased his description of the
chaos to highlight the specific abuses employed by the army.
“Soldiers entered campus between noon and 1pm firing automatic rifles…student leaders
convinced to stay on campus because…it was against international law for the military to come
on campus…Most of the soldiers spoke French...They were Ivorian Krahn soldiers who had been
drafted into the Liberian Army. The soldiers beat professors and stripped them naked…” (TRC,
20) The account includes descriptions of rapes, fear and detainment against students. According
to Brubaker, the cultural construction of fear presents the intellectual community of students and
professors as a dangerous other. In addition, universities as was the case with the Liberian press
became targets of the state as intolerable symbols of freedom. As a result, the university was
pressured to either following Doe government politics or face farther isolation. Bowing to
pressure, the university allowed its new faculty to be reappointed by the president while its
students were prevented from farther protest.
Military actions against university students and wider society led to the deteriorating state of
relations between the state and its citizens by the 1985 elections. To appease citizens’ demands
for an end to military rule, Doe created the illusion of distancing from the AFL. He rebranded
himself as a strong willed incumbent leader with a self appointed political party Interim National
Assembly emerging from the abolished People’s Redemption Council. “The Doe regime
continued to resort to decree 88A anything they considered unfair political comment could lead
to extended detention without charges.” (Gifford 20) Potential candidates within Doe’s cabinet
and even civil society were threatened with possible detention from by the decree. Other
independent minded candidates faced intimidation. The October election was widely regarded as
a fraud by international observers and Liberians. Nevertheless, Doe reiterated he was rightful
leader compared to an unknown incumbent.
On November 12 1985, Thomas Quiwonkpa attempted to launch a coup against the
government. Quiwonkpa had been Doe’s former colleague who aided him in the 1980 coup.
Their relationship officially soured in 1983 stemming from the order to expel Quiwonkpa and his
supporters from the country as part of the earlier campaign to purge perceived disloyal officials
within the government. Quiwonkpa too joined many Liberian civilians and soldiers in
32
denouncing rampant corruption and abuses. For his outspoken criticism he became popular with
many Liberians. However, he was unsuccessful in toppling Doe. A radio announcement
confirming prematurely that Quiwonkpa’s coup was later intercepted by Doe himself. He
ordered immediate reprisals on Quiwonkpa’s supporters and citizens that had supported his
second coup attempt. Quiwonkpa was brutally killed by the military than displayed publically to
serve as a warning for future coup leaders. The state’s retaliation against ordinary citizens went
farther than previous repressions. The retaliation was felt the heaviest in the countryside. “There
were reprisals in Doe's own county of Grand Gedeh, and in Nimba County where support for
Jackson Doe and Quiwonkpa was strongest.” (63) Soon after Quiwonkpa’s death, Liberians
belonging to his ethnic groups Gio and Mano were targeted by the state. “Doe’s revenge against
his opponents increasingly focused on people from Nimba County” (95) Nimba county is home
to both Gio and Krahn ethnic groups who had until 1983 lived in relative peace. Even before the
failed coup accusations of past violence by the Gio against the Krahn had surfaced. As a revenge
for Doe’s attempted expulsion, Quiwonkpa was reported to have attacked Krahn security forces
in Nimba’s important mining town Yekepa near the Guinean-Liberian border. “The 1983 Nimba
Raids were according to historian Stephan Ellis the first open sign that the Krahn-Gio ethnic
rivalry had spilled over into from the barracks into the country itself.” (98) The rivalry began
among local security and national army personnel in response to the Nimba raids. However the
tit for tat strategy developed into low intensity warfare involving civilians that were far removed
from the original violence. Unidentified gunmen were sent to several houses belonging to
members from the national army. The gunmen were launching a counterattack against army
generals and soldiers with non Krahn roots. Among the AFL members targeted for assassination
was Charles Julu, a general in the Liberia’s Armed Forces and a Gio. Violence against civilians
increased as Julu carried out vendettas against members of the general public for the murder of
his son. Liberian documentarian Nancee Bright narrates the fear and anxiety felt by Liberians
towards Doe’s desperation to cling to power without regard to the consequences. In her
documentary, Liberia: America’s Stepchild the AFL action is recounted, “Doe was bent on
staying in power. Since Quiwonkpa’s insurrection Doe had brutally suppressed any dissident in
Nimba County. Time and again he would send soldiers of his tribe (ethnicity) the Krahns on a
campaign of terror against Manos and Gios building into a tribal war.” (Bright)
33
The ethnic violence that engulfed Nimba County throughout the late 1980s was the catalyst
giving rise to the growing opposition movement in the countryside. Survivors of the army’s
pogroms fled into neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire protected by their ethnic kin Ivorian Gios and
indirectly by the then Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. The presidential protection was
symbolic in that Tolbert and Houphouet-Boigny were close friends. A new rebel movement
formed of Manos and Gios emerged in Ivory Coast under the leadership of Charles Taylor, an
Americo Liberian who also harboured grievances against Doe. “The enigmatic Charles Taylor
showed up and worked his way into the leadership, combining the resentment of the dethroned
TWP with the lethal fury of a vengeful Nimba people into a ferocious enemy soon to be
unleashed.” (TRC 117) Taylor was also a former civil servant during the Tolbert era and later
replaced by Doe’s purge of disloyal government workers. “Ivorian President Felix HouphouetBoigny, still smarting from the brutal murder of his friend and colleague, President Tolbert,
greatly facilitated the planning of the insurgency, as did the President of Burkina Faso who
introduced Taylor to the Libyan leader.” (TRC 117) On Libya’s possible connections to Taylor’s
rebel forces, Newsweek reporter Jeffrey Bartholet appears to confirm the TRC’s report that the
Libyan government under Muammar Gaddafi might have indirectly provided weapons and
training to new rebel recruits on Taylor’s behalf.
“Taylor led the initial incursion into remote Nimba County on Christmas Eve last year with a
core group of about 150 men. The original force was reportedly trained in Libya and Burkina
Faso. (Taylor denies the Libya connection, but several of his fighters do not.)” (Bartholet)
In less than a decade, the state’s rampant violence and corruption had managed to unify
Liberians (divided by ethnic persecution) outside the country into an influential opposition
movement. Non violent action against the state’s use of selective ethnic violence manifested into
anti Doe, pro Democracy organizations among exiled Americo and indigenous Liberians living
in the United States and West Africa. US based Liberians, some who had been imprisoned by the
Doe government formed advocacy organizations to encourage the American government to
enough pressure on Samuel Doe to step down as president. “Amongst Doe’s staunchest and most
active political opponents in the Diaspora were Dr. Amos Sawyer and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf,
34
both victims of Doe’s brutality, who, along with other exiles organized the Association For
Constitutional Democracy in Liberia (ACDL)” (TRC Final Report, 117)
The chances of the United States intervening to halt the violence on the advocacy
organization’s behalf were relatively slim. The strong Cold War alliance between Liberia and
America was slowly replaced by the American government’s hands off approach to Liberia’s
internal problems. The Reagan government had distanced itself from the Doe administration by
the end of the 80s. Until the 1985 elections, Reagan and Doe had continued the previous strategic
alliance between the two countries. Liberia had been a strategic country given its geography and
history until the Soviet Union’s collapse. Liberia was somewhat isolated from the world events
following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1990.
The civil war officially began on December 24 1990 launched from Cote d’Ivoire by Charles
Taylor, his Libyan trained and Ivorian financed rebel movement named National Patriotic Front
of Liberia. For the second time in its recent history, Nimba County was caught in the crosshairs
of the NPFL insurgency against the Armed Forces of Liberia. Taylor was following similar path
Doe had taken a decade ago to challenge the Monrovia based government through championing
the rights and exposing the injustices witnessed by rural Liberians. Namibians from both ethnic
groups Mano and Gio joined the NPFL behind Taylor’s counter insurgency. Here the intragroup
dynamic plays a distinctive role in mobilizing ethnicity into a unifying force against a political
regime. As with Doe’s government, NPFL members regarded the state as having failed to create
a society that represents the country’s diversity at the political and societal levels instead of
fragmenting the Liberian people. “Despite their differences, which became evident much later,
they were united in one cause: eliminate Doe and his ethnic Krahn and Mandingo supporters and
seize power, at any cost, which was denied them when Doe hijacked the presidential election…”
(TRC 119) The AFL continued its counterinsurgency against the rebels by attacking the civilian
population who had fled from Yekepa to other towns across Nimba County. “AFL counter
insurgency operation directly targeted Manos and Gios in Nimba County killing citizens en
masse, burning villages and looting. Over 160,000 civilians fled to Guinea and Ivory Coast
between January and May 1990.” (TRC 120) The NPFL found supporters among internally
displaced civilians as the rebels moved from town to village waging deadly street battles with the
35
AFL. Not only did the mass killing and fleeing civilians come to represent the state’s cruelty to
its own citizens it also signalled the end of non violent opposition to Doe government.
By the time of his death, Samuel Doe had lost some 90% of the country to rebel forces
including certain suburbs of Monrovia. He was well aware that the cards were being drawn. “As
the fighting increased, Doe became more forceful and members of the military began arresting
citizens accusing them of being supporters and fans of the rebels.” (TRC 122) The rebel forces’
siege of Monrovia brought the countryside’s five year ethnic battle to the relative calm capital.
Despite decades of being a cosmopolitan and multicultural city, the capital too succumbed to the
ethnic rivalry. An American reporter explained the various rebel forces’ motivation for revenge
against specific ethnic groups across the city as a continuation of the state’s earlier violence
against rural Liberians. “Now rebels are seeking out Krahn and also Mandingo people accused of
backing Doe's troops.” (Bartholet 2)
A third ethnic group Mandingoes would also find themselves targeted by the NPFL in the
name of revenge. Mandingoes are one of the few Liberians that also belong to a religious
minority. They are predominately Muslims who live in Lofa and Nimba counties. Two other
ethnic groups Vai and Gbandi form the remaining half of the country’s Muslim population. The
Liberian Mandingoes have played an economically significant role throughout Lofa. They are
regarded as Lofa’s principle merchant class in the local service industry. Mandingo businessmen
and women often facilitate cross border trade with communities in neighbouring Guinea.
Mandingoes share cultural and religious connections to their Guinean neighbours as well as
fellow Liberians. Their strong ties to Guinea have often led to accusations that Mandingos are
not Liberians but Guineans. Oddly, there have been numerous instances where rural Liberians of
every ethnicity have turned to their ethnic and cultural kin in Guinea or Cote d’Ivoire including
the Krahns for business or military purposes as Doe demonstrated through hiring Ivorian Krahns
to control university students. The question of loyalty to the Liberian state did not arise to the
same extent. Alongside the Manos and Gios, Mandingoes were also targeted for persecution by
the NPFL rebels for originally supporting Samuel Doe. Support for Doe was based on economic
reasons according to Liberian journalist Jimmy Shilue. The government was cash strapped from
acquiring massive debt over the ten years from borrowing IMF loans to economic
36
mismanagement. “Doe’s ability to support existing patron ties diminished thereby necessitating
the search for local wealthy groups, mostly Mandingos, for support in return for full citizenship
recognition.” (Shilue 3) The “patron ties” refers to the state’s use of a patronizing system
whereby the president not only consolidates his power into a select few but maintains patronclient relationship with his own citizens. Shilue defines the Doe government as a neo patrimonial
system where ethnic discrimination and nepotism became the rule not the exception. The
government turned to the Mandingoes to fund the fledging leadership. The alliance was
maintained by previous political reforms carried out in 1985. “President Samuel K. Doe
amended the Constitution of Liberia was a Christian state and expressly permitted the free
exercise of religious practices.” (Shilue 3) The constitutional move was seen by Mandingoes and
other religious minorities i.e. followers of indigenous religions as one of the few positive
contributions by the Doe government to real reform.
A political alliance with the government prior to the war had sheltered the Mandingo
community from serious harassment by the Armed Forces during Doe’s rule. However, it did not
protect the Mandingoes from being labelled as enemies by encroaching NPFL rebels from
Nimba on their long march towards Monrovia. The NPFL rebels associated all Muslims with
Mandingoes to the extent that Vai and Gbandi Muslims were killed due to mistaken ethnic or
cultural affiliations. The rebels believed that the Mandingo community had by default supported
Doe’s troops financially or morally. Formerly persecuted Namibians turned rebels constructed an
image of Liberian Muslims (Mandingo or not) as threatening enemies of the Liberian people. In
response to attacks by NPFL rebels, Mandingoes formed a second ethnically based group
ULIMO-K to protect the community. This was the first of many opposing rebel groups to emerge
that would later challenge Charles Taylor’s influence in the war. Disagreements between Taylor
and his second in command Prince Johnson led to the creation of a third rebel group Independent
National Patriotic Front in Liberia. Taylor and Johnson found themselves dangerously competing
with one another for new recruits and seeking to be the first to gain control of government office.
The AFL disbanded at the height of the 1990 siege of Monrovia caving into mounting pressure
from overwhelming rebel forces’ firepower. Former soldiers formed their own rebel group
seeking to protect the soldiers’ interests and the Krahn community. It would take another decade
37
of war before the country’s professional army was revived. Without a standing army, civilians
were left to defend their families and lives. Whereas some civilians turned to the protection of
rebel forces, others were fortunate to flee the country with aid from the American embassy. The
dismantlement of the armed forces represented the final demise of a hated state and its repressive
security apparatus. Charles Taylor and the NPFL had installed themselves as the new self
appointed government of Liberia. When the first Liberian Civil war ended in 1996, rebel forces
transitioned from various militias into the new state security forces tasked with policing a war
scarred country. In his article Liberia: Why Demilitarization Makes Sense, Ezekiel Pajibo recalls
the rebranding of rebel forces in the aftermath of the 1996 Abuja Accords signing ending the
war. “Mr. Taylor transformed his war machine into the national security apparatus thereby
rendering the national army and other agencies of state security hapless.” (Pajibo) While peace
held for the next three years, security forces continued the defence policies of the past. Weary
civilians throughout the country were targeted by Taylor’s private army Anti Terrorist Unit. The
ATU was a defacto army of thugs. For the third time in Liberia’s recent history a new rebel
movement composed of disgruntled citizens developed in the countryside to remove Charles
Taylor. The new rebel groups LURD and MODEL had been formed from former members of
ULIMO. For the next four years both groups launched a lightening war using intimidation and
fear to gain recruits. The war was largely funded by illegal diamond mining. Taylor avoided
assassination by agreeing to leave Liberia for exile in Nigeria.
The Liberian Civil War ended in 2003 with competing rebel forces agreeing to halt hostilities
under the Accra Peace Accords. There was little priority given to reviving the AFL. The interim
government was concern with reconstructing the state and providing security. Liberian scholar
Ezekiel Pajibo went farther in arguing that society’s past relations with the army represented a
good reason to oppose a standing army. “We have been presented with a historic opportunity to
once and for all get rid of our national standing army. Costa Rica, in Latin America, where wars
and rumours of wars abound has no standing army, why not Liberia.” (Pajibo) Pajibo’s argument
did not find a strong audience among government officials. The AFL was reinstituted as a
national army in late 2003. Its current function has been reduced greatly from its once prominent
role as a government enforce. AFL members belong to a multitude of ethnic groups representing
the Liberian national identity. They are now required to pledging to protecting the Liberian
38
people instead of their specific ethnic groups or government. Liberians hope the new army will
be a large change from its predecessor. The AFL is still being reformed and trained with aid from
the United States to serve as civilian army. The presence of United Nations peacekeepers
providing security for the country farther suggests that the AFL’s future in national security and
territorial defence is still being debated.
This political synopsis has provided the origins of how divisive politics and abusing history
became a principle feature of Liberian state. Ethnic divisions within the Armed Forces and
applied by the Liberian state towards its citizens is a recent circumstance Liberia’s political
history. Contrary to arguments that tribalism features prominently in Liberia or other African
nations, tribal identity was not an omnipresent in Liberian society before the Samuel Doe
Presidency transformed ethnicity into a national issue. Among Rural Liberians ethnic
identification was challenged by intermarriage and shared cultures that kept ethnic divisions
within rural society at a minimal for most of the 20th century. Ethnic division only became
apparent in the Liberian countryside and wider society in response to the need of marginalized
Liberians to secure political and military power. Once political power was seized, history was
misused to emphasize an ethnic component to the state’s previous neglect and corruption
towards all citizens. With the state embracing ethnicity instead of a multicultural national
identity, Doe and later governments missed an important opportunity to build on real social
progress and equality. A dangerous precedent emerged when the state transformed the Armed
Forces into an ethnicized security force to maintain order and collectively punish perceived
enemies of the state. The armed forces would have served as a unifying force against ethnic
discrimination. However, the AFL further ignited ethnic rivalries across the country. In effect
ethnicity was also tied to revenge attacks against the armed forces and former neighbours for
previous offences. From the divisive tactics carried out by the state, its security forces and
citizens we can see the origins of the Liberian civil war exacerbated by ethnicized political
violence. Ethnic violence continues to harm relationships even with the war’s end. It is especially
problematic in the countryside where returning refugees and displaced Liberians feel neglected
by the government’s reconstruction plans. The nation is now peaceful but still tense. An end to
hostilities, disarmament of rebel forces and Charles Taylor’s removal from power has helped the
state maintain stability. Past aggressions experienced by citizens who once found themselves at
39
relative peace with their neighbours and fellow countrymen still carry the potential for reigniting
violence. Overcoming ethnic division will mean the state and armed forces must work to provide
security to effected citizens and deliver justice for the whole nation.
40
Chapter 3 How did the culture of fear affect society through the war years?
The intense fear and violence which characterized the Liberian civil war was an inconceivable
shock for many. Samuel Doe government’s decade of crackdown on Liberians opposed to his
regime had produced an atmosphere of fear that bordered on paranoia. Such fear developed
further during the war. Liberian society had never experienced a situation where many of their
fellow citizens were regarded as dangerous political enemies that needed to be removed by the
state’s security forces by any means. Similar constructions of fear was applied against civilians
by the various rebel forces at the start of the civil war who saw fellow Liberians belonging to
ethnic groups (Krahn, Mandingo, Gio) loyal to the government or opposing rebel factions as the
dehumanized Other.
Brubaker’s theory on the cultural construction of fear places cultural symbols and people into a
subhuman or demonized Other out casted from the rest of society. If Brubaker’s definition is
taken into account, it first emerged under Doe’s rule and continues to develop during the civil
war. The state and rebel forces made use of the cultural construction of fear through
dehumanizing certain Liberians (both urban and rural) into a subhuman Other. The constructed
Other comes to represent an ethnicized scapegoat threatening political stability and national
security the Liberian state transforms opposition by unified citizens (no ethnic affiliations) to the
state’s abuses into collective punishment toward citizens connected to opposition groups or
leaders’ ethnicity. The state’s punishment in the form of massacres by government soldiers
against the dehumanized Other is meant to frighten survivors and members belonging to the
opposition party’s ethnic group. It is also continues to drive the wedge between ethnic groups
who no longer regard one another as fellow citizens. Fear not only heightened civilians’ sense of
danger it warned competing forces of a similar fate if they attempted to fight against a particular
group. The war became characterized by moments of ethnic vengeance among factions. The
cultural construction of fear could be seen in the state collapse, the psychological fear used by
rebel forces against civilians and the dehumanization of children through violent acts.
State Collapse
The Doe government’s dehumanized Other coupled with ricocheting violence as a result of it
paved the way to the Liberian state’s end as a functioning entity. The feared government was
41
already on the brink of collapse due to political instability. Other failures related to the state’s
bankruptcy and unchecked violence was the final push for many civilians. The Armed Forces
were equally stretched beyond capacity in the countryside. Samuel Doe’s capture and execution
by disgruntled rebel forces led by Independent National Patriotic Front leader Prince Johnson’s
added to the final blow. The state’s collapse after Doe’s death left civilians at the whim of
undisciplined insurgents hoping to fill the political vacuum. The dehumanization of citizens
along ethnic lines continued for years as factions went on campaigns of revenge for past
government and militia atrocities against specific ethnicities. Again fighting for all citizens
irreplaceable of ethnicities was overlooked by rebel forces. Competition between additional rebel
groups prolonged the war. As some Liberian observers noted years later the original motivation
for launching the insurgency was achieved with Doe’s demise. However, it did not signal an
expected end to fighting among rebel groups. “The insurgency, unfortunately, soon established
an identity of its own as Liberia degenerated into a “rebellion without a cause.” (TRC 119)
During the latter half of the 1990s, Liberia was branded a failed state. Its political system and
society was seen to be trapped in a cycle of unending war. Some Liberians saw rebel forces as
the only players capable of providing some form of security for civilians who could not flee the
country nor were safe in their original county. There was an early attempt made by neighbouring
West African nations namely The Gambia to avoid the state’s collapse by setting up a
provisional government. In November, 1990, Gambian officials invited the main conflict and
civilian players to set up an “interim government of national unity” under a coalition of all rebel
forces. Amos Sawyer became the main head of the IGNU. However, varying interests and
dissatisfaction with sharing power gave the IGNU limited influence in Monrovia. The majority
of the country remained under the control of rebel forces. Nevertheless the interim government
was able to exist as a defacto government until the 1997 elections. Monrovia’s security slightly
improved with the presence of regional peacekeepers.
Psychological fear through cultural symbols and violence
In addition to rebel forces sustaining the constructed image of rural Liberians or opposition
groups as dehumanized others, psychological fear became a method of warfare. The rebellion
morphed into sporadic acts of violence by rebel forces against civilians. Many members and their
42
supporters still carried recent memories of collective punishment meted out by the AFL under
Doe’s Presidency. Power struggles between rebel forces based in Monrovia and the countryside
farther prolonged the war. When viewed without the historical context that produced it, random
violence could be misunderstood as senseless or bizarre. All sides involved employed
physiological warfare to terrify enemies and their supporters. One popular method applied by the
rebels was the use of culture to represent the personification of fear. The rebel tactic of using fear
returned to the construction of fear in a cultural sense. Rural cultural would becomes the new
dehumanized Other. Rural Liberians’ attachment to indigenous religion’s superstitions came to
be demonized under the pretext of condoning irrational belief systems. There were two cultural
symbols which the rebels distorted for their own purpose. One was the cultural mask and the
other was traditional rituals associated to village life.
The psychological aspect originally began with notorious nom de guerres i.e. “General Butt
Naked” belonging to rebel leaders known for traumatizing civilians with unrelenting weaponized
assaults on civilian infrastructure and lives. U.S. News and World Report writer Eric Ransdell in
his article The New Africa vs. Old referred to the use of nicknames as an effective method to
making the rebel’s presence widely felt. “Fighters for the various Liberian factions wear bizarre
regalia and affect noms de guerre such as ‘Captain Suicide,’ ‘Colonel Mosquito’ and ‘Rebel 99.”
(Ransdell) Cultural art in the form of decorative masks and spiritually was appropriated. Cultural
masks are recognized as part of rural Liberian identity. Masks are used in cultural performances
celebrating farm life and community festivals. Each mask is decorated relating to a specific
region or peoples. Furthermore, handmade masks have also come to represent the indigenous
heritage of the country. A cultural symbol of peace and unity was used as tool to intimidate the
wider community. Masks came to symbolize the war’s destruction in human form. Performers
who often wore masks during cultural dances were said to become the mask. Donning decorative
masks had a significant meaning behind it. “Those (Liberians) who believe the war is
fundamentally a tribal battle says the costumes reflect the combatants' primitive beliefs in the
supernatural. Those who say it is a struggle for political power argues that the masks are simply a
practical way of disguising oneself to prevent reprisals.” (Ransdell) Cultural masks were not the
only cultural symbol that transformed into a fearsome tool. Rural society’s use of shamanic
rituals for healing was also incorporated into rebel forces’ disguises. Herbal medicines and
43
remedies had long been consumed by Rural Liberians for common colds to minor injuries when
western medicine was not widely available in the countryside. Herbal medicines are often used
by a range of health practitioners from midwives to shamans sometimes (mistakenly referred to
witch doctors) in communal rituals for births, rites of passages to wedding ceremonies. Only on
rare occasions are the rituals used by soldiers.
There was a general belief among many rebel forces that it was possible to gain certain healing
powers from homemade amulets and herbal medicines. Weapons confiscated from captured
prisoners of war were turned into good luck charms to ward off evil spirits. Other forces applied
gun powder as a protective shield over their bodies. The gun powder was seen to give its user
courage or at least make them immune to bullet wounds. Drugs were also consumed by many
faction members to build indifference to atrocities. And it could also be viewed as preventing a
rise in moral objections to continual warfare. The combinations led to dangerous situations
where innocent civilians caught in the crosshairs or despised by forces belonging to a different
ethnicity paid with their lives. Stories emerged from the countryside of rebel forces using human
body parts in cannibalistic rituals under the belief that consuming the heart of the enemy made
one stronger. Reports of cannibalism by rebel forces remained controversial and conflicting
aspect of the war. Former rebel leaders continued to deny such actions throughout the war. TRC
findings on the use of rebel rituals reiterated that such actions were not actual traditional rituals
practiced by rural Liberians prior to the war. “These practices were perverted derivations of
Traditional rituals of secretive origin. During the conflict, these traditional ritualistic practices
became openly visible and commonly practiced by military as well as political leaders seeking
supernatural powers in the prosecution of armed conflict.” (TRC 229) Rituals once considered
harmless and integral parts of religious ceremonies or cultural dances came to symbolize
physiological warfare.
Psychological warfare extended to Liberia’s capital Monrovia and the coastal cities of
Buchanan and Robertsport. Liberians in Monrovia did not fare better than their rural
countrymen. The instability caused by unpredictable warfare within the capital manifested from
psychological fear into physical threats on the city residents’ lives. Monrovians faced food
shortages, occasional rebel attacks and limited access to separated family members living in the
44
countryside. The need for security extended to both adults and children seeking to regain
normalcy in their lives. Instability created a massive exodus of Liberians from the countryside
and urban areas to neighbouring countries of Ivory Coast, Ghana and Nigeria. This would be the
first time a mass movement within Liberia occurred. Liberians seeking safety and wanting to
resume a life filled without anxiety received a rude awakening from Ivorian government officials
who limited the number of refugees entering Ivory Coast. The government feared the Liberian
civil war would spill over into their territory or destabilize the government. Canadian Reporter
Naomi Morris in her article, There is Nothing Here but Death, documented the Liberian
refugees’ frustrations and lack of empathy from neighbouring states in search of a safe haven.
“More than 350, 000 people have fled to Ivory Coast and 15, 000 to Ghana in recent years
prompting both countries to impose a closed door policy against further refugees.” (Morris)
The gruesome images now associated with the rebels forces’ physiological warfare emerged
from media reports and eye witness accounts from Liberians. Most of the images were shaped by
atrocities committed against civilians during the first civil war. American news channels to
nightly broadcast downplayed the Liberian state’s history of abuse against its citizens as one of
several factors leading to the war’s origins. Crucial context was reduced to a tribal conflict.
Independent reporter Carina Ray remarked on the shock factor and minimalizing socio-political
aspect to present civil wars within Liberia as solely a confusing ethnic problem. “To characterise
the violence as “tribal war” or “tribal bloodletting” however, neither speaks to the ethnic
dimensions of the violence nor to the other important factors, such as unequal access to political
and economic power, that have coalesced to bring about this unprecedented wave of
destruction.” (Ray) Following the end of second Liberian Civil War the media began to revaluate
its perspective on the causes of the conflict. Reports on Liberia’s hostilities now take into
account the abuses committed by the state and rebel forces under an atmosphere of fear to
purposely perpetuate intense fear and violence in an already divided society. The return to fear
and uncertainty within Liberian society can be seen as a window into why rebel forces and
earlier opposition movements were consistent in their demands to replace the government even if
such action harmed society as a whole.
45
Dehumanization of children by rebel forces
The dehumanization of children by rebel forces added to psychological fear and children’s
desensitization to atrocities. Refugee and internally displaced families faced both separation and
killings as they attempted to protect themselves when travelling through rebel territories to
refugee camps. Children remained the most vulnerable to the war’s chaos regardless of their
urban or rural origins. The most significant aspect of the rebel forces was the involvement of
children. Both boys and girls who were unable to attend school or could not earn a living in the
country’s informal economy recruited by the NPFL, INPFL and ULIMOK. These three rebel
factions became well known for recruiting “small boy units.” In turn, the small boy units carried
out the majority of terrorizing citizens with brute force that exceed the AFL’s treatment. In
several reports by human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
rebel leaders are equally condemned. Charles Taylor received the most condemnation for his
forces’ prominent role throughout the war in major battles with opposing rebel forces and
atrocities. Collected testimonies from civilians attest to the use of children from the war’s
beginning in 1989 to its final end in 2003.
“Charles Taylor…has been strongly criticized by UNICEF for his use of "small boys units,"
groups of child soldiers between the ages of 8 and 14.” (Morris 1)
The child soldiers became synonymous with civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. TRC
findings linked the use of child soldiers by rebel forces and even government troops to the
earliest days of the war. Both the AFL and NPFL were early culprits in child recruitment.
“At the outbreak of the Liberian Civil War in 1989, children were forcibly recruited in droves
by the NPFL as well as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).” (TRC, 62)
The findings included instances where children were also perpetrators of violence against their
parents and neighbours. This was not the first time children had been recruited into an adult
army. There are early reports from the 1960s that reference early example of child soldiers being
used as infantry units in the Angolan Civil War. Liberian children taking up arms against the
state or enemy combatants for the first time in their young lives would’ve been imaginable even
under Doe’s regime. The small boy units were formed by orphans, refugees and captured
46
children from destroyed villages and towns. Many witnessed their parents and siblings executed,
raped and tortured. Many child recruits belonged to rural families. It was also viewed as a matter
of survival to the point of preserving their lives. These experiences were a handful of reasons
other than economics for many to join rebel forces. New York Times columnist Tim Weiner’s
article At 14, A Liberian veteran Dreams of Finding Away Home, delves into the anxiety and
mental exhaustion faced by children both civilians and reluctant soldiers. Weiner interviews
Liberian psychiatrist Dr. Edward Grant who treated former child soldiers who previously abused
drugs while partaking in violence.
''These children are the most dangerous segment of the fighting machine,'' he said. ''They have
been used to commit atrocities under the influence of drugs.'' (Weiner)
Many young Liberians and their counterparts in Sierra Leone considered joining forces not
only for security or stability but also socioeconomic benefits. A Human Rights Watch report on
the war experiences from young rebels in Liberia and Sierra Leone sums up their frustrations
through socioeconomic context rather than a culture of violence. “They described being deeply
affected by poverty and obsessed with the struggle of daily survival, a reality not lost on the
recruiters. Indeed they were born in and fight in some of the world’s poorest countries. Many
described their broken dreams and how, given the dire economic conditions within the region,
going to war was their best option for economic survival.” (HRW, 5) Indeed the various factions
relied on a couple of methods to funding themselves. Both NFPL and Sierra Leonean
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) turned to mining diamonds, gold and timber in Liberia and
Sierra Leone as principle sources of funding. Of the three resources, diamonds became the most
lucrative because of their value on international and black markets. They also earned the
distinction of conflict resources. Captured civilians or prisoners of rebel forces were often
coerced into extracting the minerals under gruelling labour conditions. Both adults and children
participated in diamond mining throughout the war years. It provided security and a meagre
income for some labourers. However, many labourers were not free from the dangers faced by
refugees and IDPs. Human rights and child rights organizations compared the brutal methods of
diamond extraction to a form of slave labour. Exported diamonds earned the nicknamed blood
diamonds.
47
Lack of Political will against Taylor and 2nd Liberian civil war
Replacing the government was not only a matter of political will. It also represented an attempt
to address an overlooked human development of ordinary citizens. Despite the multiple rebel
groups fighting across Liberia their motivation to wage war returned to the state’s long history of
isolating their citizens. Isolation not only involved physical abuses. It included centralizing
economic mobility and human capital development to the domains of the national capital.
Liberians living in Monrovia and other urban areas were equally disregarded by the state. Still,
the rural population always felt the additional weight of disenfranchisement through direct
confrontations with the state. When the opportunity arrived to fight back against the state
through a citizen’s army, many rural Liberians including children saw their voices finally making
an impact in wider society. There was little patience left to comprise with an indifferent
government.
The fact that rebel forces succeeded in sustaining the decade long war also deserve farther
scrutiny. Fear at all levels continued to play a principle role in the political competition among
the patch work of rebel forces spread across the country. It proved a crucial element in securing
power from civilian leaders working for an end to hostilities or challenging embedded ethnic and
social divisions plaguing society. At the same time, fear and anxiety produced a heightened sense
for security among all citizens. When rebel forces failed to provide necessary security for
internally displaced residents of Monrovia and Buchanan, Liberians appealed to neighbouring
countries Ghana and Nigeria. It was seen that intervention by other West African states would
provide temporary security until the Liberian state was revived. Nigeria and Ghana intervened in
the early 1990s in the Liberian civil crisis as it was then called to offer a workable solution. On a
regional level, Liberia’s war became the first instance of a regional African organization in the
form of the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) mobilizing peacekeeping
troops to send to a member state Liberia. The ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) would
fill the void left by a lack of security infrastructure. ECOMOG’s presence only provided
temporary relief. Most of the peacekeepers were not prepared to immediately halt rebel factions’
terror campaigns against civilians or lacked the resources to begin disarming heavily armed
children. Contributing countries to ECOMOG, Ghana and Nigeria complained of lack of funding
and equipment to properly monitor rebel forces’ movements to better secure Monrovia.
48
Meanwhile Liberians across the countryside continued to live in anxiety while hostilities
continued on and off for over a decade. Ironically, civilians and relief workers permitted to enter
the city soon discovered that some ECOMOG soldiers were also turning a blind eye to abuses by
rebel forces against civilians. Other soldiers were accused of participating in looting civilian
properties in Monrovia. Christian Science Monitor reporter Jennifer Ludden recounts the shock
and disappointment Liberians felt towards corrupted ECOMOG soldiers operating outside their
duties to maintain some semblance of security.
“According to relief workers and diplomats, Ecomog's has shared in the widespread looting.
Spoils include iron ore, rubber, tropical wood, and booty from diamond and gold mines.
Witnesses have also described soldiers carting vehicles, refrigerators, and air conditioners onto
freighters bound for their home countries. Locals have even coined their own definition of
Ecomog: "Every Car Or Movable Object Gone." (Ludden)
Beyond the warzone, ECOMOG leaders attempted to bring stability back to Liberia through
several peace accords from 1990 to 1996 to no avail. The only success thus far was setting up
Liberia’s interim government. A ceasefire was called under the 1995 Abuja Accords. In addition
rebel forces were again instructed to join part of a transitional government to replace the INGU.
While the new government did not materialize, the ceasefire held to the surprise of many
Liberians and neighbouring countries. Rebel forces (many child combatants) complied with the
voluntary disarmament programs carried out by the ECOMOG soldiers in Monrovia and
elsewhere across the countryside. ECOMOG was praised by western and fellow West African
nations for halting further conflict despite their earlier record of taking advantage of the chaos
for misconduct. The troops were withdrawn from Liberia in 1999 during the country’s post
conflict period.
A rationale did exist for factions who refused to put down their weapons. In their view, the war
would not be declared over until opposing forces surrendered. Despite disorganization, any rebel
force that was able to gain control of the instability would be able to provide security for the
whole country. The NPFL and INPFL hoped to remove their competition by establishing greater
influence over weaker splinter groups. Only the NPFL was successful in bringing other rebel
forces under their control. Their success was partly due to Taylor’s regional connection to
49
sympathetic politicians and weapon suppliers. To a lesser extent, Taylor was recognized as an
influential rebel leader. International media regarded him as an important figure in the conflict.
An ABC News report on the civil war incorrectly dubbed Taylor as “the leader of Liberia.”
(Sawyer, ABC News Nightline)
Taylor acted on the international recognition he received. He followed the familiar route to
regroom himself as a redeemed politician as Samuel Doe had done a decade earlier. He transition
from dressing in military fatigues to civilian clothes to reassure his supporters he was more of a
statesman than a ruthless leader. Violence began to ebb with West African peacekeepers
ECOMOG maintaining a minimal level of security in Monrovia. Rebel forces were ordered to
comply with peacekeepers’ demands to disarm. The disarmament coincided with the upcoming
1997 presidential Elections. Fear began to subside but did not replace the anxiety felt by some
refugees and IDPs within and outside the country. The first civil war ended in 1996 to joy of
many Liberians within and outside the country. To appease rising fears of a return to war,
presidential elections were called by Taylor. He was viewed by rebel forces as only leader who
could bring order to the country. Still reeling from the violence and uncertain future, Liberians
were initially sceptical of Taylor taking part in the elections. Many voters did not want to make
the same mistake that led to Doe’s “re-election” or give leverage to continual abuse.
Nevertheless, society feared Taylor would use his defeat to an opposition candidate as a prelude
to launch a second war. Out of fear, Liberians coined the world’s most infamous political slogan.
“He killed my ma, he killed my pa, but I’ll vote for him.” (Laband, 204) The slogan captured
both the anticipation and stress civilians were under. While the majority of Liberians objected to
electing a warlord as the new head of government, they did not want to allow the nation to return
to fearful war. Taylor’s government personified Liberians’ fear of abusive leader that treated its
citizens as pawns. Peace lasted from 1996 to 1999. Normalcy returned to Monrovia and the
countryside. The period was marked by public fear of reprisals from rebels turned security
forces. Taylor realized sustaining a fearful environment gave him unconditional authority to
operate with little to no opposition. Observations on Taylor’s presidency mirrored Doe’s later
rule with disastrous consequences. Unlike Doe, Taylor ruled over a country with a destroyed
infrastructure and weak state institutions. Basic services for electricity, schools and roads were
50
barely functional. Laband offers a disturbing observation on Liberia’s apocalyptic state during
Taylor’s five year presidency.
“Taylor did little to improve the conditions of the war torn nation. Illiteracy and unemployment
remained above 75 percent throughout his presidency...He actively refused to rebuild formal
state institutions that had been destroyed during the war he had started. And he destroyed those
still existing.” (Laband, 204) The Liberian economy was devastated in the same manner. UN
sanctions against the government limited exports of diamonds, timber and rubber, Liberia’s
traditional sources of income. To compound matters, the country’s debt had ballooned to $4
billion by 2003. Liberia bore the distinction of being a poverty stricken pariah in West Africa. It
was politically and socially isolated from the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Guinea because of
the various rebel factions’ roles in destabilizing neighbouring governments.
The second Liberian Civil War from 1996-2003 left a lasting scar on the country. It
represented an accumulation of the previous wars and rebel forces’ frustrations with slow
progress of human and infrastructure development. A lesser note, there was anger at the slow
process to unseat the Taylor government. For the rebels the second civil war was a continuation
of the early 1990s conflict. However the second civil war or “World War III” as Liberians
dubbed it differed greatly. Only two major rebel factions participated in overthrowing Taylor and
capturing Monrovia. Both groups participated in clashes with government soldiers and attacks on
civilians. The attacks across the countryside carried the same ferocity as before. Liberians from
the country side fled to Monrovia as their last refuge finding few alternative routes blocked. The
intensity of the violence inflicted against civilians opposed to a new war literally destroyed any
remaining infrastructure left in the country. As a result, civilians living in and outside of
Monrovia faced shortages of medical supplies and food. The most affected were women and
children who hid in the city’s football stadiums or dilapidated buildings for protection.
Medicines Sans Frontieres working in Monrovia since 1996 suggests that the shortages added to
the war’s rising casualties. By the end of the second civil war in 2003 MSF reported “250,000
people died from war wounds, malnutrition or epidemics.” (MSF) The 2003 siege of Monrovia
brought the horrors of the revived decade long war to international attention.
51
Liberians’ earlier fears eventually turned into anger. For the third time, an opposition
movement formed by Liberians from both the countryside and cities seeking to overthrow
Charles Taylor. Just as his predecessors have not learned, Taylor failed to connect marginalized
citizens and government neglect to politics. Fear was no longer keeping the citizens from
confronting the government directly. A new rebel force emerged in Northern Liberia named
LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) composed of former veterans from
the now disbanded ULIMO-K from the previous war years. Despite a unified stated goal,
LURD’s factions were still divided according to groups’ specific ethnic origins. Undoubtly it
was a left over consequence from the First Civil War. As a result, Krahns and Mandingos and
Lorma and Gios marched together but worked in their respective communities to gain support
among civilians. Furthermore Guinea was said to provide financial support and serve as a
launching pad for LURD rebels marching towards Monrovia from the Guinean-Liberian borders.
Additionally, a second rebel force MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia) emerged in
2003 at the height of the second war. MODEL began its long trek to Monrovia from Southern
Liberia with the same aim as LURD. Without considering potential consequences, Ivory Coast
provided support for MODEL rebels. Fighting spread beyond Liberia’s borders into
neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone and Guinea. Sierra Leone had experienced a similar
civil war to Liberia with the exception that it became notorious for rebel forces hacking off the
limbs of civilians and weapons flows sustained by illegal diamond trade. Sierra Leone accused
forces from LURD of aiding Revolution United Front (RUF) rebels in atrocities against civilians
and siphoning diamonds for funding. Both countries’ war continued into the 21st century while
the rest of the West Africa region and wider world focused on the war on terror in the aftermath
of September 11th attacks in the US. It would take three years before Liberia and Sierra Leone
caught the attention of the international media in response to the fear of terrorist groups using
West Africa as a base to search for new recruits.
Since the 1996-1999 period of peace within the country, Liberia alongside West Africa had
been overlooked in international affairs by the international media. The sudden interest in
Liberia’s internal affairs at first came as a surprise to Liberians. The United States followed the
war in Liberia closely than in the past. One reason was the war corresponded with American
engagement in Africa and the Middle East as part of the globalized War on Terror launched by
52
American president George W. Bush in the aftermath of September 11th. Although Liberia did
not have a history of providing support for political terrorists, the post 9/11 environment raised
fears of Liberia possibly serving as a host for Al Qaeda. A Washington Post article on Al
Qaeda’s global reach in Africa went as far as to suggest a connection between Charles Taylor
and the group. Written by Douglas Farah, the article Al Qaeda’s Growing Sanctuary warns that
failed states such as Liberia could potentially pose a national security threat to the United States
while serving as possible haven for terrorist groups.
“The ties of former Liberian president Charles Taylor to al Qaeda have been corroborated by
the FBI and the U.N.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone, which is charged with investigating
crimes against humanity in that nation's brutal civil war. The now-identifiable presence of al
Qaeda in other countries shows that these once-marginal wars and regions matter. We ignore the
warnings at our peril.” (Farah)
While Farah’s scenario might appear slightly exaggerated given the region’s history, it did
feature prominently in the American government’s concern for Liberia’s internal security.
Hesitation continued to be a factor in the US’ decision to intervene. President Bush stated flatly
that Liberia was not of any strategic importance or had any American interest. Fortunately for
Liberians, media outlets devoted considerable airtime to highlighting Liberia’s strong historical
relationship with the US. Additionally, press coverage was given to Liberians’ daily struggles to
survive. Numerous media reports showed the human side of the conflict through civilian
interviews. Some journalists went further in their reports indirectly critiquing the United States
for failing to help one of its staunchest and culturally linked African allies. The reports aided in
congressional debates on the appropriate response to halting the war and avoid losing American
lives. Intervening in Liberia or any African country was judged by previous American
intervention in Somalia which led to the deaths of several American military personnel in 1991.
Even sending a small American military force to halt rebel advances was viewed as a second
Somalia waiting to happen. A new peacekeeping force led by ECOWAS was considered as a
reasonable substitute. However, ECOMOG’s previous behaviour during the first Liberian Civil
War raised questions of discipline. A second alternative emerged: UN Peacekeepers. The
UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) began its mandate in September 2003 based in Monrovia where
53
they remain today. With the arrival of one of the world’s largest UN peacekeeping missions at
15, 000 members, rebel forces gradually halted their siege of Monrovia. Charles Taylor complied
with demands to step down to the amazement of many Liberians and regional leaders. Liberians
in the Diaspora and the country applauded world leaders for finding workable solutions to put an
immediate halt to the war.
Final end of the civil war and Citizens’ Peace movement
What Liberians did not foresee was the country’s period of peace and stability outlasting the
previous war’s three year peace period. An interim government replaced Charles Taylor and
began the slow process of reconstruction. The state and its institutions had to be revived from
scratch for the second time in the country’s tumultuous history. Democracy became a new
byword for national building and reinstating state institutions. Unlike Somalia, Liberia had less
difficulty in setting up a Democratic government or organizing new elections. Despite previous
leaders’ use of fear and intimidation, Liberia had previous experiences involving its citizens
participating in Democratic system no matter how flawed. Liberia’s post war revival was
heralded by the US and international media as a transformation success for other African nations
in similar unstable political situations. It was no longer a failed state but a recovering nation.
The role of the media and influential nations help in reaching a solution for Liberia’s conflict is
not only instances where non combatants collaborated against rebel forces and Taylor. Liberians
within the country have also contributed to bringing an end to hostilities. As rebel assaults
reached a peak in early 2003, Liberian women of all religions, ethnicities and regions formed a
mass peace movement to call for an end to the war. The Women of Liberia Mass Action was
headed by Leymeh Gbowee, a peace activist who had organized Liberian women across
Monrovia to non violently protest until the leaders of the government and various forces agreed
on a new peace accord. The WLMAP went beyond simply demanding rebel forces to turn their
weapons for the children’s sake and the country’s future. The movement protested Taylor
whenever he was out in public in his presidential motorcade or at a speaking event. A sex strike
and curse (turning the rebel’s tactics of rural cultural elements of fear on rebels) were called to
emphasize the gravity of their demands. The WLMAP remained steadfast even as Taylor and
rebel forces refused to meet to the anger of many civilians. Such defiance gave many Liberians
54
confidence to equally join in the national movement and call for rebel forces to agree to an
immediate settlement. The fear experienced by these refugees and IDPs were a thing of the past.
At last, the Ghana Peace Accords came into fruition in August, 2003. Even as the accord was
being debated by rebel leaders and in absentia by Taylor, the WLMAP protested outside the
vicinity of the meeting in Accra, Ghana. The movement’s demands led to a solution with Charles
Taylor’s exit from the country by the end of August. Liberians across the country breathed a
collective sigh of a relief that transformed into national euphoria. The state’s reliance on fear and
abuse was broken by the WLMAP. Since the end of the war, Liberians have continued their non
violent protest to hold the state responsible for its actions in the conflict and its future endeavours
as it rebuilds the country.
Despite significant gains made by ordinary Liberians to encourage greater civic participation
across society, there are still fears that a third war could occur if the government repeats the
mistakes of the past. Many in Liberia are fearful of the consequences if the countryside is
bypassed by current or future development plans. As in the past, civil society is keeping pressure
on the government through peaceful protests and letters to the president to balance national unity
with real political and socioeconomic development that will benefit all citizens instead of a
privileged minority. Liberians at the top level of government are well aware of the pretext that
led to the fourteen year civil war. Citizens are not overcome with fear and have been challenging
the government vocally on national development aimed at decentralization of resources and
infrastructure between rural and urban areas of the country. Civil society is stronger than it has
been in the past. There are new measures and laws that Liberian lawmakers are attempting to put
in place to protect citizens from abuse and violence. While the state is not as abusive or
militarized as it had been over the past twenty years, Liberians are vigilant of the amount of
power the state has in controlling resources or flexing its muscles towards its citizens. Perhaps
the most significant aspect of Liberian politics at the moment is the state is complying with the
needs of all its citizens even if the gestures are minimal such as constructing infrastructure or
reforming the political, economic and social sectors. Liberia’s political future remains stable for
the foreseeable future. Its social fabric is still torn and in need of overdue political reforms in
areas related to land ownership, equal access to natural resource usage by multinationals and
55
government and citizens’ reassurance from the state that Democracy will never again be used as
a precursor to corrupt leaderships or dictatorship.
In this final chapter, a review of Liberia’s fourteen year civil war divided into two parts
illustrates how actions by the state and armed response by citizens exhausted by such abuses
launched the first Liberian Civil War. The country had never experienced excessive violence or
psychological fear to the level it did throughout the 1990s. Despite atrocities there were
successful attempts at containing the violence or at least keeping running battles to a minimum
through regional organizations such as ECOWAS or ECOMOG. The past became a victim of the
violence as all rebel factions involved used the mantra of fighting for the Liberian people to
violently overthrow the Samuel Doe government than competed amongst themselves to become
the new government. The interests of ordinary people for peace and stability were ignored by the
various factions. Fear and anxiety became tools for rebel forces to abuse civilians particularly
children. The Liberian state not only violently suppressed its citizens but acted above the law to
maintain power. The breakdown of state institutions and society only further confirmed that the
country was headed toward an abyss. For Liberians in the countryside and cities this abyss came
to represent a national nightmare no one had experienced even under Samuel Doe. Fear became a
tool that each faction and later the Charles Taylor government used to their own advantages to
protect themselves while leaving the rest of society vulnerable. It was during the war years, that
urban Liberians experienced firsthand violence and abuses rural Liberians had experienced with
the AFL for decades. Political corruption by the state was no longer an issue of rural Liberia
being left on the margins. Now the fear and corruption once reserved solely for the countryside
was also levelled on Monrovia and the major cities. In some instances, rural Liberians belonging
to rebel factions were avenging previous violence carried out by the state and AFL on their own
countrymen who lived in urban areas or other parts of the countryside and viceversa. Security
was left in the hands of rebel forces who became thugs in the eyes of many refugees and IDPs.
One of the larger consequences concerning the war was the dehumanization of rural culture
and societal norms that held it together. Rule by fear and dehumanization extended beyond the
physical battle lines drawn by government and rebel forces. Fear had become so ingrained in
society that traditional rural culture became an element of it. Communities which in the past
56
maintained cordial relations according to the local politics and culture in Rural Liberia found
themselves divided along rigid ethnic lines and mistrust. In coastal cities such as Buchanan and
Harper, ethnic divisions that did not exist rose as rebel forces searched for new recruits on their
march towards Monrovia. The overriding fear also represented the accumulation of the past
thirty years of citizens’ anger to state neglect and abuse. Overcoming the decade of fear was not
a small fate for many Liberian citizens. It was a momentous leap for many who witnessed the
country’s implosion from the start of the war to its finish. While Liberians have recovered from
their fear, the destruction caused by the war is another task they have to brave.
57
Final Conclusion
Few national histories have bewildered so many as Liberia’s history. As a nation state, Liberia
was designed to be Africa’s success story. An African country that was both westernized and
indigenous that had a long history of balancing between both cultures. The country had avoided
the post colonial trap of ethnic divisions or state collapse until 1980. Its civil society played a
significant role in challenging governments’ policies that neglected rural Liberia favouring the
urban cities. Liberians had a history of democratic traditions. Even with self proclaimed
dictators, Liberia remained politically stable until an unexpected coup in 1980 transformed the
country into a former shadow of its earlier self. It would be difficult to speculate if the military
coup or eventual civil war could have been avoided had Liberians not built up a fear of the state.
One can only imagine how developed the nation could be today had political leaders addressed
past abuses and disenfranchisement. Reviewing Liberia’s early political stability up to the war’s
beginning the origins of the war are not as complicated as previously assumed.
Throughout the paper I sought to address the war’s origins through a political history that
examines the country at all levels of society. Liberian history provides a unique perspective on
the power relationship between the state and its citizens. Corruption by the government has often
been cited as one of the many causes that led to the war. However it is not the only cause. In the
earlier two chapters, various authors cite the state’s lack of political will to serve Liberian
citizens. I have found that such apathy by the political leadership did long term harm to the
nation’s human development. From the early fifteen century, rural Liberians played a crucial role
in Liberia’s early socio-political development. However from the nineteenth century onward,
Americo Liberians ignored rural Liberians’ previous expertise in national development. Instead
the Americo Liberian governments regarded rural residents as unable to successfully take charge
of a modern nation state. Rural citizens were neglected in crucial decisions on how the nation
should be developed. Even after the 1980 coup and subsequent first civil war, the state paid little
attention to demands by citizens for a political or societal change that would include the
countryside in equal wealth and development.
At the political level, it appears from my research that previous Liberian governments did not
learn from consequences caused by earlier shortcomings. These consequences related directly to
58
the state’s policies, abuses and violence toward rural citizens that created social and later ethnic
divisions within Liberian society. The first consequence emerges with the lack of political
representation in parliament or no say in economic decisions affecting the countryside. The
state’s early 19th century political foundations gradually cemented disparities between
indigenous and Americo-Liberians. The disparities between the countryside and urban areas
widen throughout the 20th century. Successive governments centralized wealth and infrastructure
development in Monrovia and coastal cities not considering the consequences of neglecting the
countryside until decades later. Rural Liberia’s limited access to political representation in
parliament also created the power struggle among competing rebel forces who considered their
group the only worthy citizens to obtain the presidency. There is also the second consequence of
governments such as Samuel Doe and William Tolbert who first attempted to address the
decades of neglect and equal redistributions of wealth but later stop short of making any real
change. There are numerous examples that have already been illustrated in the previous chapters
that show the state’s weakness in taking concrete measures to fulfil demands by citizens for
equality and human development. The third consequence relates to the state’s use of emphasizing
the rural vs. urban disparities through sharpening ethnic divisions among citizens to distract
citizens from national discussions on political reform or socioeconomic development. This was
illustrated by Doe and Taylor’s Presidencies. The fourth consequence combines ethnic divisions
and previous rural Liberia’s neglect by the state to transform such grievances into construction of
psychological fear carried out by the state and rebel forces. The construction of fear represents
for me the state’s inability to work for the betterment of society and its citizens. Fear is a
powerful tool to not only to maintain power but to keep citizens from challenging the state. It
serves the Doe and Charles Taylor governments until both are directly confronted with armed
citizen militias. Fear eventually divides society along ethnic lines that were already cemented by
the state’s earlier use of ethicized leadership and using excessive violence against specific ethnic
groups. These consequences mentioned above led unintentionally to the Liberian Civil War. Fear
and abuse exercised by from the Doe to Taylor’s presidencies demonstrate how these actions
eventually signalled the state’s own downfall. Despite previous governments’ attempts to
overlook disparities, citizens continuously returned the state’s attention to the divisions created
within society as a key factor to why events transpired. Even in the post war period, rural
59
Liberians are once again accusing the government of providing limited security in the
countryside and ignoring the immediate socioeconomic needs of citizens. Despite the slow
process of development rural Liberians have taken the peaceful means to protest government
apathy. Such protests serve as a warning to future governments that addressing the consequences
of the war involves a national dialogue between citizens and the state.
Liberians have played a crucial role in shaping the country’s fate over the last thirty years. The
image usually associated with the Liberian politics is one where citizens show indifference to the
government’s failed policies to address inequalities within society. I have highlighted various
instances to demonstrate rural Liberians’ interest in the overall social and economic development
of their country. Ordinary citizens held the government accountable to their responsibilities and
failures throughout the country’s political history. Even with the consequences that ignited the
war, Liberians continued to fight to improve their social well being for all citizens using non
violent means. Citizens’ concern helped to develop civil society and bring about wider national
dialogues on social progress. Ordinary Liberians have learned from the state’s past failures and
will maintain the current period of peace despite some setbacks by the government concerning
national development. Overall, without citizens taking the initiative, the country’s stability and
future would have taken longer to bear fruit.
In sum, to examine the origins of the war as it relates to Liberians and the state’s historical
relationship I applied Brubaker’s theories on ethnic and nationalist conflicts. I felt the culturalist
approach or the construction of fear and intergroup dynamics were two theories that fit Liberian
political crisis. I feel that the culturalist approach that suggested fear is based on social
constructions by political elites or citizens had transformed over the years. It was used by
individual governments originally as a method to keep Liberians from challenging political
establishment. This would be the governments of recent decades. When the government felt its
power threatened by opposition opponents in the forms of coups and armed militias, the
construction of fear came to symbolize rural culture instead of a political group.
The rural countryside represented the feared political opposition the government sought to
crush. Rural culture was symbolized as a dehumanized other meant to be despised. Eventually
this symbol came to represent Liberians who did not belong to opposing rebel groups but were
60
regarded as enemies by rebel forces based on their ethnicity. The cultural construction of fear
represents the changing politics of pre wartime and civil war Liberia. The Intergroup dynamics
frame how the government reacted to different opposition groups. It played a role in how the
leadership favoured the specific ethnic groups in the government positions. Thus, leaders such as
Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor reacted to the political opposition as a threat and therefore they
undertook an official campaign to deter Liberians from overthrowing them. The two theories
applied here illustrated the political and historical origins of the conflict in Liberia and the
extension it took. The conclusions presented here may serve as historical account to reduce the
conflict risk in the future.
61
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