The Precautionary Principle: reaffirming its scientific, ethical and political importance
Hugh Lacey
Associação Filosófica ‘Scientiae Studia”, São Paulo
15 June, 2012
Our session, ‘Science and technology for social justice and preservation of the earth’, aims to
respond to the question:
How and by whom should scientific research be conducted, scientific knowledge used, and
technologies developed, so as to ensure that the earth is respected, its regenerative powers
not further undermined and restored wherever possible, and the well being and rights of
everyone everywhere enhanced?
I take for granted that reductionist approaches to science are seriously incomplete and
that ‘science‘ properly understood, requires the contributions of indigenous and other forms of
marginalized knowledge; and that ‘technology’ includes ‘social technologies’ developed in
interaction with marginalized communities for the sake of developing effective means for
generating social transformation’.
This question provokes exploring a positive vision of what science might become, responsive to
democratic input and oversight, to inform projects aiming for social transformation that embody
the values of social justice and preservation of the earth. It also provides a point of reference for
critique of current dominant tendencies of science and technology, in which scientific research
has become subordinated to the quest for technoscientific innovations that contribute to
economic growth and other interests of current capitalist arrangements – and so: What steps
should be taken to counter scientific and technological practices that impede social justice,
are destructive of the earth, and threaten massive, irreversible harm to human beings and
the environment?
Adopting the Precautionary Principle is one of these steps. PP was brought to the
attention of a wide public by the Rio Declaration of 1992, and it gained adherents in some policy
and regulation making bodies – but its place is far from secure. Here, at Rio + 20, it is important
to reaffirm PP creatively:
• making clear that its meaning derives from a positive vision
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• to identify and reject misinterpretations and distortions of it
• to define clearly how it should influence, not only public policy about technoscientific
innovation, but also the agendas of scientific research and application
• to challenge the way in which much of the dominant scientific and technological mainstream
incorporates interests and values that are opposed to it.
PP should not be identified with a particular version such as the one used in the Rio
Declaration, for that is a product of compromises reached in negotiations and subject to
renegotiation. The ethics, law and responsibilities of technoscientific innovation (and
formulations of PP itself) are not fixed once for all. They develop in response to new exigencies,
perspectives, ethical and legal deliberations, and responses to our guiding question.
Given the short time available, I will simply state what I take the principal components of PP to
be.
PP is relevant in situations where available scientific knowledge does not permit
definitive conclusions about possible (ethically salient) effects of a technological innovation,
their significance and the likelihood that they would occasion harm. In these situations, if
available scientific knowledge is consistent with the plausibility of the hypothesis that it could
bring about serious (perhaps irreversible) harm to people, social arrangements or the earth, PP
proposes:
(1) Intervention to avoid the possible harm –– taking into account the possible harmful
consequences of the precautionary interventions themselves –– including, when the harm is
sufficiently serious, delaying final decisions about permitting or regulating use of the
innovation.
(2) Such delay is to allow time for appropriate scientific research to be conducted: (i) What is the
likelihood of the possible harm occurring in the context of actual use of the innovation? Can
it be adequately regulated? When dealing with possible long-term ecological and social harm,
what are its socioeconomic mechanisms, as well as its physical/chemical/biological
mechanisms? (ii) What are the possibilities and risks of alternative courses of action?
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(3) Evaluate the seriousness of the possible harm in the light of such values as respect for the full
range of human rights, environmental sustainability, equity within and between generations,
participatory democracy.
(4) Long-term monitoring of the effects of any actually used innovation – so as to enable
decisions to be reviewed and reversed should evidence be found that harm is actually being
caused.
(5) Democratic decision-making, involving all relevant stake-holders, about such matters as the
length of the period of delay before making final decisions, the possible harmful effects (and
the alternative courses of action) that need to be investigated scientifically, and with what
priority.
(6) Normally, the burden of proof for the safety of an innovation, and legal liability for any harm
that is caused, should be assumed by those who introduce its implementation.
PP challenges standard commercial practices of innovation, and it is in tension with regulations
of the World Trade Organization which permit innovations provided that there is no compelling
evidence available of actually causing harm. Consequently, it is often ignored, belittled,
distorted, parodied, subverted, deemed ‘unrealistic’ – and (above all) criticized as a negative
influence that slows down ‘progress’, by impeding business interests and the ‘development’
policies of certain countries, and leading to ‘regressive, burdensome regulations’. It is also said
to dull the potential for using technoscience to solve ‘humanitarian’ problems (e.g., hunger and
malnutrition). Critics also have charged that PP involves the illegitimate intrusion of ethics into
scientific research, interfering with the proper autonomy of science.
All of this does make sense from the viewpoint of commitment to the values and interests
of capital and the market, to the presumption that the subordination of scientific research to these
values does not represent an illegitimate intrusion of social and ethical values that interferes with
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the proper autonomy of science, and to the claim that there are no serious alternatives and
aspirations outside of the trajectory of technoscientific innovation for economic growth.
In fact, however, PP actually serves to counter intrusions of ethical, social and political values,
and special interests that reflect them, that are currently affecting mainstream scientific research
and subordinating it to corporate and government interests; and, far from curtailing scientific
research, the impetus of PP is to highlight research that responds to our guiding question. The
critical role of PP is of great importance: science conducted in response to our guiding question
does aim to inform steps that will minimize harm – but its primary thrust is to identify scientific
practices that will contribute towards enhancing well being in general. Its critique points
positively towards the agenda of social justice and preservation of the earth – it criticizes for the
sake of enabling better alternatives to develop [it criticizes transgenics for the sake of gaining
space for alternatives (like and including agroecology – and programs for ‘food sovereignty’) to
develop.
In order to define the research priorities for this agenda, appropriate forums for
democratic deliberation will need to be created and be responsive to (what I call) the ‘range of
alternatives’ question:
In the light of the proposed benefits of a practice [solution to a problem, technoscientific
innovation], what is the range of alternatives that might offer comparable or ‘better’
benefits, not limited to alternatives that essentially are involved in technoscientific
innovation, but taking into account options that may be informed by methodologies that
are not utilized for the pursuit of technoscientific innovation and that may make use of
developments of traditional and indigenous knowledge? And which of them, all things
considered, is the ‘best’ alternative? The relevant investigation needs to take into account
that ‘best’ may be thought of differently in the context of different locations, cultures and
value perspectives.
E.g., regarding agriculture: What options are available in agriculture –
‘conventional’, transgenic, organic, subsistence, indigenous, agroecological,
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permaculture, etc, and others adapted for use in urban settings –, and in what
combinations and with what locally specific variations, for practices that are
(i) highly productive of nutritive foods, environmentally sustainable, not dependent of the
use of agrotoxics, and protective of biodiversity
(ii)
more aligned with, and strengthening of, rural communities and the diversity of
their aspirations with place and culture
(iii)
capable of having an integral role in producing the food needed to feed the
increasing world population; and
(iv)
particularly suited to ensure that rural populations in impoverished regions are
well fed and nourished?
The range of alternatives question needs to be addressed in as many areas as possible in order to
assess the prospects for fruitful research that can inform the agenda of social justice and
preservation of the earth.
PP needs to be combined with the ‘space of alternatives’ question for its full scientific, ethical
and political significance – and the spuriousness of the criticisms made of it – to be apparent.
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