Networks and Governance in Trade Associations :
AEIC and NELA in the Development of the American
Electricity Industry 1885-1910
Chi-nien Chung
Department of Sociology
Stanford University
cnchung@leland.stanford.edu
January, 1996
Published in the International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 17 (7/8):52-10, 1997
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Introduction
In this paper, I demonstrate an alternative explanation to the development of the
American electricity industry. I propose a social embeddedness approach (Granovetter,
1985, 1992) to interpret why the American electricity industry appears the way it does
today, and start by addressing the following questions: Why is the generating dynamo
located in well-connected central stations rather than in isolated stations? Why doesn't
every manufacturing firm, hospital, school, or even household operate its own generating
equipment? Why do we use incandescent lamps rather than arc lamps or gas lamps for
lighting? At the end of the nineteenth century, the first era of the electricity industry, all
these technical as well as organizational forms were indeed possible alternatives. The
centralized system we see today comprises integrated1, urban, central station firms which
produce and sell electricity to users within a monopolized territory. Yet there were visions
of a more decentralized electricity industry. For instance, a geographically decentralized
system might have dispersed small systems based around an isolated or neighborhood
generating dynamo; or a functionally decentralized system which included firms solely
generating and transmitting the power, and selling the power to locally-owned
distribution firms (McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, forthcoming). Similarly, the
incandescent lamp was not the only illuminating device available at that time. The arc
lamp was more suitable for large-space lighting than incandescent lamps; and the secondgeneration gas lamp--Welsbach mantle lamp--was much cheaper than the incandescent
electric light and nearly as good in quality (Passer, 1953:196-197).
The major question then becomes why the centralized/incandescent lighting (electricity)
system was adopted among these alternative paths. Through what process and by what
mechanisms did this development template become the dominant one in the electricity
industry? Governmental data indicates that as early as 1915, this template had already
become the prevailing structure among electric utility firms in America. Almost every
major electricity firm had similar internal structure and external relationships (United
States Departments of Agriculture, 1916: volumes 8, 9, 10). The first successful
incandescent lamp was devised by Edison in 1879 and the first commercial central
electricity station was launched in 1882 at Pearl Street, New York City. What happened
during the period from 1882 to 1915 that produced the dominant status of the
centralized/incandescent lighting (electricity) system. The usual answer to this question
relies on either market or technical factors, arguing that the most efficient technical and/or
organizational system is able to dominate the market, become the model of the industry,
and finally shape the whole industry (Arthur, 1984, 1989, 1994a and 1994b; Chandler,
1977, Williamson, 1975, 1985). One main disadvantage of such market-centered
explanations is that they neglect the role of non-market factors such as trade associations,
social networks, state, or other institutions. Our evidence2 indicates that trade associations
1
"Integrated" means an electricity system which includes all three major components of an electricity
business--generation, transmission, and distribution--within one firm.
2 The data employed in this paper was initially collected by Patrick McGuire and Mark Granovetter for their
upcoming book (McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, forthcoming).
2
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played a significant role in path selection and expansion in the development of the
American electricity industry. The two trade associations under examination--the
Association of Edison Illuminating Companies (hereafter, AEIC) and the National
Electric Light Association (hereafter, NELA)--were actually the major governance
mechanisms of the industry during 1885-1910. More importantly, there was a set of preexisting social networks that dominated the slate of officers and the executive committee
of these two associations. This set of networks, which I will call the "Edison/Insull
associates", occupied the most influential positions in the associations' power circles and
used this advantage to spread their blueprint of the development of the electric enterprise-the centralized/incandescent lighting (electricity) system. This paper challenges the
market-centered theories by showing the power of non-market factors--social networks
within the trade associations--on technology choice and organizational development
within the American electricity industry.
By showing the network structure within trade associations, this paper also challenges the
current theory of associative governance (e.g., Campbell, Hollingsworth, Lindberg, 1991).
Although this theory provides many insights into the operation of an association and its
role as a distinctive governance structure in modern economies, I argue that it too
understates the significance of social networks in the process of associative governance.
In the second section of this paper, I review the market-centered theories and the
associative governance theory, and show how they fail to deal with the significance of
social structure in explaining industrial development. Following this discussion, I
elaborate the social embeddedness approach. In the third section, I provide a brief
historical review of the electricity industry, including the trade associations , the major
firms, and the central actor of the Edison/Insull network--Samuel Insull.3 The fourth
section focuses on network methods which enable us to identify the influential actors
within the executive committee of AEIC and NELA. The fifth and the sixth sections
report the results of using these network methods to analyze the data derived from the
proceedings of these two associations. Section seven delineates how the Edison/Insull
network was constructed and under what historical contingencies this network was
mobilized to occupy the influential positions in the trade associations.
Theories
Neoclassical minimalism on technology choice and organizational development
One breakthrough in the economists' explanation of technology selection is Arthur's
concept of "lock-in by historical small events" (Arthur, 1984, 1989, 1994b). This concept
brings in historical contingency and hence enables economists to explain why markets
don't always cause the "right" technology to emerge. The basic argument is that, under
increasing returns to scale, if any one of the two or more competing technologies
accidentally pulls ahead in the market by random historical events, this technology may
3
Insull, a young man born in London, who became the personal secretary of Thomas Edison when he was
only twenty-one years old. Later, by serving on different positions within the Edison company system, he
became a focal liaison among the Edison/Insull associates. The history section will provide a detailed
description of his biography.
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accelerate enough for it to corner the market and finally become locked-in because of
economies of scale. This unintentional result is mainly based on what Arthur calls
positive-feedback loop--the more people adopt a technology, the more it improves and the
more attractive it is for further adoption (Arthur, 1994a:10-11). In other words, "the
economy, under increasing returns, can dynamically lock itself in by small historical
events to a technological path that is neither guaranteed to be efficient, nor easily altered,
nor entirely predictable in advance" (Arthur, 1994b:25). A good example of this theory is
the QWERTY typewriter keyboard (David, 1985).
The ideas of positive-feedback and lock-in are fruitful but the concept of historical events
is problematic. Ascribing the initial lead of a specific technology to small "random"
events is to dodge the expected trap of market-centered explanations. When the marketchosen technology is not always the most efficient one, in order to keep their favorite
explanatory mechanism--the market--economists bring in historical contingencies but
treat them as random and "small" factors. This is because if these historical factors are
treated seriously and used to explain technological evolution, economists ironically
undermine their habitual hypothesis--market efficiency. In order to maintain their
conviction and at the same time make the technology-selection model work, they
discovered a catch-all excuse--historical small events. They ascribe all the relevant social
complexities to the scapegoat in order to maintain a clean market-centered model (Hirsch,
Michaels, and Friedman, 1987). In doing so, they neglect certain structural forces which
might be mainly responsible for the selection of specific technologies.
These remarks can also be applied to market-centered theories of organizational
development. For instance, Chandler (1977) argues that managerial hierarchies emerged
when market conditions became competitive and volatile and production process became
bigger and more complex. The dominant organizational form in an industry is thus the
most efficient one. Williamson (1975, 1985) modifies Chandler's theory and takes
economic transaction as his unit of analysis, arguing that the organizational form that
minimizes transaction costs survives. Williamson uses this theory to explain the
emergence of multi-level hierarchical organizations.
Such market-centered theories, consistent with their roots in neo-classical minimalism,
adapt a logic that severs technological and organizational development from social and
historical contexts. Using Granovetter's (1985) concept of social embeddedness, I propose
that these market-centered theories explains the evolution of industries by assuming that
economic actors proceed as if in a social vacuum, and hence both the role of the actor and
the social environment are under-estimated. This paper shows that the "lock-in" of the
centralized/incandescent lighting system in the American electricity industry was not due
to small random historical events or market efficiency but rather to the strength of social
structure. I will demonstrate in the following sections that there was a set of preconnected actors, Edison/Insull associates, who, based on the previous experience of
working together, shared the same template of the development of the electricity industry.
They occupied most of the influential positions within the trade associations and used
AEIC and NELA as vehicles to make their preferred technology/organization paths
dominant.
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"Great man" theory of electricity industry development
In contrast to market-centered theory's under-estimation of human agencies and their
social structure, there is at least one explanation of the electricity industry which
overestimates the role of human agency. Hughes's (1983) account of electric power
systems depends largely on the actions of those inventors, entrepreneurs, engineers,
managers, and financiers involved in the industry. He describes the industry development
as the result of brilliant men's efforts to find solutions to economic and technological
problems (McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, 1993:215). "The model identifies the
particular capabilities and interests of the professionals who presided over system growth
in each of the phase" (Hughes, 1983:14).
Although human agents and their social environment play a significant role in the
development of electric systems, their actions and social connections are not
unconstrained. As stated by McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz (1992): "Human agency
is overestimated in Hughes's book but immensely underestimated in the market-centered
theories". It is true that actors and their collective actions are critical to technology
selection and organizational development, but only within specific historical and
structural constraints. I show in the last section that the Edison/Insull networks were able
to mobilize successfully only under certain historical circumstances.
Associative governance and social networks
Recent studies of trade associations and economic governance (Streeck and Schmitter,
1985; Campbell, Hollingsworth, Lindberg, 1991; Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck,
1994) have increased our understanding of the operation of trade associations and how
they influence industrial development. Unlike those market-centered models which
neglect all other possible types of economic governance in industry4, this theory treats
trade associations and networks as two distinctive governance structures (mechanisms) in
the capitalist economy.
This theory conceptualizes governance structures as those institutions within an industry
that coordinate the transactions within as well as outside the industry and thus keep the
economic activities of this industry going. This conceptualization focuses attention on the
major actors and their relationships5 within an industry. By doing so, this theory enables
researchers to explore the static structure as well as the dynamic evolution of an industry.
Following this conceptualization, I propose that AEIC and NELA were the dominant
governing mechanisms of the electricity industry in the period of 1885-1910. There are
4
Economic governance theory proposes five types of governance mechanism: Market, Hierarchy,
Community, Association, and Networks (Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck, 1994:5-8, Hollingsworth
and Boyer, 1995:Figure 3).
5 The relevant actors in a governance structure, whether in a individual form or a organizational form,
include the focal actor (i.e., the producer), the other actors (e.g., competitors in the same industry,
customers, suppliers, labor, finance institution, etc.) and the state (i.e., government agency). The relevant
transaction relationships include the division of labor among the actors within the industry, their
transactions with their suppliers and customers, and their procurement of capital, labor, and technology
(Traxler and Unger, 1994:186).
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three types of evidence to support. First, the emergence of these two associations resulted
from the collective effort of the lighting companies to resolve their common problems,
such as securing the necessary electrodes for their lighting system, standardizing diverse
illuminating equipment, etc.6 Secondly, during the period of 1902-1914, trade
associations played an even more important role in coordinating the different transaction
relationships within and outside the industry. For instance, NELA dealt with the labor
strike in 1903 by extending membership to leaders of the worker organization and
creating a professional association to oppose striking, agitation, or compulsion. AEIC
dealt with the energy-supply problem by proposing a standardized purchase practice.
Moreover, both AEIC and NELA handled the problem of negotiating with the generating
equipment manufacturers by choosing the type of equipment and standardizing the
methods of repair, construction, operation, and even terminology. Thirdly, in the 1890s,
NELA was extensively involved in the relationship between the industry and the public.
The association cooperated with educational institutions, distributed pamphlets,
established connections with other associations, and even organized women's clubs
(United States Federal Trade Commission, 1928:234-250). All these efforts tried to create
a favorable public attitude toward the industry. In general, it is safe to conclude that the
trade association was the major intermediary in relationships within and outside of the
electricity industry during 1885-1910.
Although I adopt some fundamental concepts from the theory of associative governance
in this paper, this theory's treatment of social networks is questionable. It has not paid
sufficient attention to the social structure in which the associative actions are embedded.
Under certain circumstances, networks could be a distinctive and independent governance
mechanism, as proposed by the economic governance theorists. For most situations,
interpersonal networks are intertwined with the other governance structures to a
significant extent. Although each of these mechanisms7 could be the apparently official,
formal dominant coordinating structure in a specific industry, I believe that since
economic actions and economic institutions are embedded in social relations
(Granovetter, 1985, 1992), there are always unofficial, informal network effects within
the dominant mechanism. For instance, Macaulay's (1963) research shows the extensive
use of non-contractual relations in market transactions which are supposed to have only
strict contracting, arm's-length bargaining and price bidding elements. Similarly, Dalton's
(1959) research demonstrates the significant effect of informal structure on the operation
of a private hierarchical business firm. Although the firm has a formal organizational
chart, it is usually the informal structure that allow "the plant's work to get done"
(Granovetter and Swedberg, editor's note, 1992:315). Besides Dalton's research, a similar
argument with more recent evidence was offered by Krackhardt (1992, 1993). As to the
public hierarchy, there is much evidence showing how interpersonal relations influence
the state as a governance mechanism. A famous instance is the relationship between the
steel industry and the White House.8 Following the discussion above, I am going to
6
I will elaborate more about this in next section.
See note 4.
8 This relationship started from "President Theodore Roosevelt's 'entente' relationship with Judge Elbert
Gary, chairman of U.S. Steel, through William Howard Taft's endorsement of an antitrust suit against U.S.
Steel and Franklin D. Roosevelt's denunciation of the industry as a 'concealed cartel system'..." (O'Brien,
1994:58).
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extend the network argument into the sphere of association governance, an arena that has
not yet been systematically investigated. I argue that while AEIC and NELA were two
apparently dominant formal governance structures in the American electricity industry
during 1885-1910, the interpersonal networks within these associations had critical
effects on governance practices, and hence influenced the development of the whole
industry.
History
Electricity was new and little understood until 1877. Before then, illumination was largely
dominated by gas lighting. By 1875, there were over four hundred gas companies in
America with most of them located in the larger cities (Passer, 1953:12). Electric lighting
started from the development of arc and incandescent lighting and was not commercially
available until 1882, when two small generating stations--the Pearl Street steam station in
New York and the hydroelectric station in Appleton, Wisconsin--were launched (United
States Federal Trade Commission, 1928:159). The year of 1882 hence marks the
inception of the electricity industry. Electricity was used only for lighting at the beginning
and not until the late 1890's did improvement and inventions in various electrical
apparatuses allow the application of electricity for industrial, commercial, and
transportation use.
The new industry grew at an astonishing speed in the following thirty years. The two
small stations in 1882 grew to 3,620 electrical central stations with 1,845,084 kilowatts
generating capacity by 1902. By 1912, after thirty years development, there were 5,221
stations with altogether eleven billion kilowatts capacity (United States Federal Trade
Commission, 1928:262). The growth of the manufacturing sector and the increasing use
of mechanical power in the American economy combined with the concentrated urban
population during 1875-1900 provided an extremely favorable environment for the
development of the electricity industry (Passer, 1953:7).
As mentioned earlier, the electrical central station industry started from two different and
technically incompatible lighting systems--the arc and the incandescent systems. Each had
distinctive dynamos, conductors, and lamps. The arc lighting system used carbons as
electrodes in arc lamps. The leading companies in this system included Brush, ThomsonHouston, Weston, and American Electric and Illuminating. In contrast, the incandescent
lighting system used the Edison incandescent lamp and the Edison chemical meter in the
system. The Edison company (consolidated by GE after 1892) and Westinghouse were
the two major firms in this system. These two systems were competitors for market share,
and the emergence of NELA and AEIC was largely related to the competitive interfirm
relationship within and between these two systems. NELA was formed in 1885 by
lighting companies in the arc system to respond to an attempt by the arc carbon
manufacturers to establish an alliance for price agreements (Passer, 1953:60). We thus
expect that the membership and leadership structure in the early years of NELA largely
reflected its origins in arc lighting firms. According to Nye (1990), there was a small
group of elites from the Electric Club who dominated NELA in the initial era: "Six of the
seven officers of NELA were also in the Electric Club in 1888; apparently that there was
close informal cooperation between the two" (ibid.,: 173). Since the membership data of
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the Electric Club are unavailable, we don't know exactly who these people were. Yet as I
show later that this earlier leadership structure was replaced by the Edison/Insull
associates after 1898 when Samuel Insull was elected as the president. As to AEIC, two
reasons have to be mentioned for its emergence. First, it was a response to the formation
of NELA. Since the Edison incandescent lighting system was in competition with the arc
system, the companies of the Edison-system organized AEIC to cope with the
competition from NELA. Secondly, this association was sponsored by the Edison
manufacturing company to facilitate the "interchange of opinion" (McMahon, 1985:1213) regarding the technical standardization as well as management skills among the
licensee Edison lighting companies. In order to fully comprehend this dynamic interfirm
relationship, it is worth briefly summarizing the history of the Edison system.
Starting from 1876, Edison employed about 200 technicians and inventors to conduct
research on a new lighting device. To support their research, he and his associates formed
the Edison Electric Light Company (hereafter, EELC) in 1878, which was under the
financial auspices of J.P. Morgan and several affiliated financiers such as William
Vanderbilt. In 1879, they invented the first incandescent lamp and in 1880 formed the
Edison Electric Illuminating Company (hereafter, EEIC) to manufacture and market their
centralized/incandescent lighting system. In 1882, Edison installed the first central station
at Pearl Street in New York City. On the basis of the technical and commercial
experience gained in the installation and operation of the Pearl Street station, the Edison
company promoted licensee central stations in most of the large cities of the United
States. By August, 1886, there were 58 stations and 149,900 lamps in use. Most of them
were in the large cities such as New York, Chicago, Boston, Brooklyn, Detroit, and
Philadelphia (Passer, 1953:121). The proliferation of Edison lighting companies was an
important reason for the start of AEIC. However, control over this lighting system laid
not with Edison but with the patent-owner. In order to attract sufficient capital for the
invention, Edison agreed to assign all his inventions and improvements to the EELC. The
EELC hence became a firm whose primary activity was the holding and licensing of the
Edison Electrical patents9.
Under the operation of this system, the EELC actually made the licensee central station its
customers. If the licensee stations were successful and prospered, promotion of additional
central stations would proceed faster, widening the market for the Edison equipment. It
was against this backdrop that the AEIC emerged: "To improve the management of the
central stations and to bring them into closer contact with the Edison manufacturing
companies, the AEIC was formed in 1885" (Passer, 1953:122).
From the brief history reviewed above, it is clear that the membership of AEIC was
relatively small. Membership was limited to the sponsor--EELC, Edison-associated
manufacturing firms, and other Edison lighting companies. Its leadership structure was
also a tightly-knit group. A review of the Association's officers from 1885 to 1895
indicates that they were overwhelmingly from firms in New York and Boston, and owned
9
"The license was exclusive for a specified territory--usually a city or a county--and included the right to
operate an Edison central station, to sell isolated plants, and supply them with renewal lamps and repair
parts. The local licensee company thus possessed the exclusive rights to operate a central station in its
territory, to sell all Edison lighting equipment in its territory, and to sell Edison lamps" (Passer, 1953:118).
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by the same financiers who sponsored the EELC and subsequently GE (McGuire,
Granovetter, and Schwartz, forthcoming). Although these financiers supported Edison's
invention of incandescent lamps, they had different ideas about the development strategy
of the incandescent lighting system. They preferred a decentralized rather than the
centralized, integrated system proposed by Edison. The reason is that selling isolated
generators and lamps would bring in immediate profits without additional investment. To
continue to invest in other facilities needed by the centralized system was risky for them
although Edison believed, and later proven right, that the centralized system would secure
much more profit after the whole system was established (for details, see McGuire,
Granovetter, and Schwartz, 1993). The slate of officers from 1885 to 1895 clearly
indicates that these financiers and their affiliates controlled AEIC during this period. Yet
as I show later, this dominant group changed significantly after 1896--the year Insull was
elected to the presidency. Edison/Insull associates occupied most of the influential
positions and reshaped this association toward the direction of centralized version of
industry development.
Before considering the key figure of Samuel Insull, one must consider why it was
important that Edison/Insull associates dominated these two associations? As mentioned
earlier, these associations were the main governance mechanism of the electricity industry
during 1885-1910. Their influence on the industry was profound and broad-ranging.
Within AEIC, the six leading Edison lighting firms, located in New York, Boston,
Chicago, Detroit, Brooklyn, and Philadelphia, were the main innovators behind technical
and organizational change. Other firms treated their accomplishments as worthy of
emulation (McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, forthcoming). Those industry practices
that were advocated in AEIC would be respected by other utility firms. For NELA, the
potential influence depended on the relatively broad and diverse background of their
participants. This is more obvious after 1902 when Insull and his associates rewrote the
by-laws to create a more hierarchical classification of membership and thus promoted the
identity and influence of the central station within the association.10 More importantly,
this transformation allowed non-Edison and even non-Westinghouse central station firms
into the association. According to a report of the Federal Trade Commission in the 1930s
(United States Federal Trade Commission, 1934:23), NELA was "the largest, most
important utility association.....its membership in 1926 covered something over 90
percent of the total energy generated in the country". A combination of the innovation of
AEIC and the pervasiveness of NELA provided the best platform for Edison/Insull
associates to influence the whole industry.
Because of the potential influence of these two associations, whoever was in their
executive committees was therefore in an important position. Based on the available data,
we know that the executive committee in NELA was the governing body of the
association. It had the power of selecting and constructing the meaningful issues during
the semiannual or annual meeting. According to NELA's constitution in 1887:
10
They created a membership hierarchy which had five categories of membership and different levels of
dues adjusted to the category level and firm size. This reorganization gave disproportionate economic and
political influence to a few large urban centralized firms who became the principal sources of NELA
funding (McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, forthcoming).
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The Executive Committee shall be the governing body of the
association....They shall meet from time to time and shall report upon
application for membership, gather and prepare information upon topics of
interest and arrange for their discussion at the several meetings of the
Association (NELA proceeding, 1887).
We may therefore conclude that occupying an influential position in the executive
committee of AEIC and NELA gave the Edison/Insull associates the opportunity to
influence the American electricity industry.
Having sketched the history of the industry, the trade associations and the firms, it is now
appropriate to turn to the actors. I will demonstrate later that the operation of AEIC and
NELA after 1898 largely hinged upon a set of pre-existing social networks. The key actor
of this network was Samuel Insull. Insull, a former secretary for Edison's technical
representative in Europe (Edward Johnson), became Edison's secretary in 1881 when he
was twenty-one years old. As the private secretary to Edison, Insull was the conduit
through which flowed all correspondence between Edison and his business world.
Through this key structural position, Insull was intimately related to other participants in
the creation of the emerging electrical industry (McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz,
forthcoming). In 1883-1884, Insull served as chief executive of the Edison Construction
Company, a company founded by Edison in 1883 to facilitate the construction of central
stations. During this period, Insull met with many of the local investors and executives
who later became members of the AEIC (Insull, 1924: 39). In 1886, Insull was put in
charge of the Edison Machine Works at Schenectady, NY, where he became acquainted
with several young electrical engineers who later were leaders of the major Edison
lighting firms and important figures in both AEIC and NELA.
Due to Insull's special career positions, most members of the Edison/Insull networks had
worked with him previously. His central position will be identified by the network
methods discussed in the next section, and his strategic influence will be elaborated in the
AEIC and NELA sections.
Methods11
In order to identify the influential groups of persons within AEIC and NELA executive
committees, three network methods are employed in this paper: centrality degree,
automorphic equivalence, and blockmodel. Each of these methods explores a different
level of information regarding the structural relationship of these influential groups. This
section explains the definition and characteristics of each method as well as the potential
information embraced in these methods.
Centrality degree
11
The network notation of the following section is largely derived from the network analysis handbook by
Wasserman and Faust (1994).
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Influential actors are those who are extensively involved in relationships with other
actors. Centrality degree is a measure for each actor's level of involvement. To fully
utilize this measure, three related indices need to be considered12. First, the crude
centrality degree shows how many actors directly contact the focal actor. It ranges from 0
to g-1 (supposing there are g actors in the network). A 0 degree represents an isolated
actor and a g-1 degree means a star actor. The second index is the standardized centrality
degree. It is obvious that the crude centrality degree is dependent on the group size--g
and hence is difficult to compare across different networks. To overcome this drawback, I
standardize the crude degree through dividing by g-1. The standardized centrality degree
thus is the proportion of other actors who are connected to the focal actor. This index is
independent of the group size and can be compared across networks of different sizes
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994:179). The minimum value of this index is also 0 but the
maximum value is 1.
While the first two centrality indices concern individual actors, the third index is about
centralization at the network level. This network-level measure allows us to compare
different networks as a whole. The larger the index is, "the more likely it is that a single
actor is quite central, with the remaining actors considerably less central. Thus, this
group-level quantity is an index of centralization, and measures how variable or
heterogeneous the actor centralities are....It is (roughly) a measure of variability,
dispersion, or spread" (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:176). The range of this index is
between 0 and 1. A 0 means every actor's centrality degree is exactly the same; no one is
more central than the other. On the other hand, it equals 1 if and only if one actor
completely dominates the network (Freeman, 1979:228). UCINET413 calls this index
Network Centralization .
Although centrality degree is simple and straightforward, it is crucial to this paper in the
sense that the other two methods are both based on it. The major reason for its importance
is the coincidence between its conceptual properties and the purpose of this paper.
Serving in the executive committee in the same year allows actors to communicate with
each other. According to the constitution of NELA mentioned earlier, when there were
many policy issues that needed to be discussed in the associations' periodic meetings,
serving together in the executive committee provided an opportunity to communicate
about which issues should be presented to the members of the association. This
"screening" privilege gave the members of the executive committee the power to
influence the direction of the trade association and subsequently the industry. In the
process of communication in the committee, "a person who is in a position that permits
direct contact with many others should begin to see himself and be seen by those others as
a major channel of information" (Freeman, 1979:219-220). In this conceptualization,
influential persons are those actors who have high centrality degree and hence have the
most opportunity to receive as well as to spread relevant information and ideas.
12
For the mathematical presentation and the algorithms of these indexes, see Freeman , 1979.
UCINET4 is a computer software designed for the purpose of network analysis (Borgatti, Everett and
Freeman, 1992). All network analyses of this paper were carried out with this program. There are also other
programs available for the same purpose such as STRUCTURE, SNAPS or GRADAP, consult Wasserman
and Faust, 1994: 735-737 for more information.
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Automorphic equivalence
It is often a group of influential persons rather than a single star that can dominate the
whole association. Since centrality degree only informs us of the level of involvement at
the individual level, we need another method to group people. One major procedure to
detect the subgroups within a network is automorphic equivalence. It not only groups
actors by their centrality degree, but also by structural location in the network.14.The
major idea behind this procedure is the principle of substitutability--equivalent actors
should occupy indistinguishable structural locations in the network (Everett and Borgatti,
1988). In general, to be automorphically equivalent, actors are identical with respect to all
graphic theoretic properties (Borgatti and Everett, 1992). The same centrality degree is
surely one of these but there are also other properties, such as belonging to the same
number and size of cliques. The only thing that can differ between automorphically
equivalent actors is the "names" or "labels" attached to them (Wasserman and Faust,
1994:472).
However, it is difficult to find a group of people that are exactly automorphically
equivalent in practice. I therefore measure the degree of automorphic equivalence
between pairs of actors and cluster the people with similar degrees of equivalence into the
same classes.
Blockmodel
After identifying automorphically equivalent classes of actors, to explore the structural
relationships within and between these equivalent groups is important , since there might
be two or more contending groups existing simultaneously and competing for the
leadership of the associations. The automorphic equivalence procedure only groups the
actors that have a similar level of equivalence and does not consider the structural
relationships among these groups. In order to examine these relationships, the blockmodel
procedure is adopted.
For the specific purpose of this paper, I manipulate the blockmodel procedure in the
following ways. First, permute the rows and columns of the actor mode (actor-by-actor)
matrix so that the actors in the same equivalence classes are arranged side by side, and
then divide the original matrix into several submatrices according to the equivalent
classes. Secondly, calculate the density for each of these submatrices. If the submatrix
density is greater than the grand density of the original matrix, a 1 is assigned to the
block; if not, a 0 is assigned. As a consequence, a smaller image matrix appears. The onecell in the image matrix means the presence of a tie from the row position to the column
position; the zero-cell means absence of this tie. In other words, the blockmodel is a
simplified representation of a network that captures some general features of a network's
structure (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:396, 408). The pattern of ties between and within
these blocks usually present theoretically important structural properties (see White,
Boorman, and Breiger, 1976).
14
For the algorithm of automorphic equivalence, please consult Everett, 1985 and Everett and Borgatti,
1988.
12
13
Data and coding
The relational data for the actors in the executive committee of AEIC and NELA is
derived from the official proceedings of these two trade associations. These proceedings
list every member of the slate of officers and the executive committee for each meeting.
For AEIC, there were two meetings per year during the period of 1885 to 1889. After
1890, the association met annually until 1910. Hence, there were 31 meetings during
1885-1910. Because the executive committee membership is not available for the first
meeting in 1885, we have the membership for 30 meetings rather than 31 meetings for the
26-year period. This data set is coded as a two-mode affiliation matrix of actors by years.
The 1's shown in the matrix means that the person in a specific row served in the AEIC
executive committee in one specific year; if there is a 0 rather than a 1, it means this
person did not serve in the committee in that year. I then transform the two-mode matrix
into a one-mode matrix of actors by actors; the value in the cells of the new matrix
indicates how many times a pair of specific actors served together in the executive
committee within the 30 meetings. After this, I dichotomize this actor-by-actor matrix by
using 1 as the cut-off value (values greater than or equal to 1 are replaced by 1, otherwise
0 ), I then get another matrix in which the 1 means that a pair of actors served together at
least once in the 30 executive committee meetings during 1885-1910.
During the transformation from the actor-by-year matrix to the actor-by-actor matrix, the
information of year is lost. It is no longer possible to identify in which year a specific pair
of actors was connected. We only know how many times they have sat on the committee
together within the 30 meetings. On the other hand, after dichotomizing the actor-by-actor
matrix, the information of frequency disappears. I am now unable to detect the strength of
their connection; only whether or not they were connected during the 26-year period.
However, these two procedures do not decrease the validity of our analysis, because the
main objective of this paper is to identify the influential groups in the two associations
within the 26 year period; the focused target is the group of actors most extensively
connected by other actors. The specific year the influential actors were connected or the
strength of their connection is not critical in this respect.
Yet compressing a data set that consists of 26 years and 30 meetings is still problematic
for the purpose of detecting the leadership structure of the association, because the
structure might change significantly during this time period and hence the research
outcome shown is only a congealed image of a dynamic structure. One way to overcome
this drawback is to separate the data into several subsets15. The history of the associations
suggests a natural cut-point for the data set. In the case of AEIC, since Insull became the
president in 1896, I separate the data into two subsets--1885-1895 and 1896-1910. I then
do the same transformation and dichotomization mentioned above to these two
submatrices. Analyzing and comparing these three sets of data enables us not only to
examine the evolution of the leadership structure but also to test the hypothesis of
whether the structure changed significantly after Insull's presidency.
15
Doreian (1980, 1986) and Wasserman and Iacobucci (1988) propose different ways to overcome this
problem.
13
14
For NELA, there were two meetings per year during the 1885-1891 period. Since the data
of the official crew and executive committee membership are not available for 1887a and
1888a,16 I have a total of 31 meeting records. The coding, transformation, and
dichotomization procedures are identical to those for AEIC data. The only difference is
the cut-point. Since Insull became the president of NELA in 1898, I separate the data into
two subsets--1885-1897 and 1897-1910 .
AEIC: 1885-1910
Centrality degree
[Table 1 is about here]
Table 1 lists the Degree and the StdDegree for each actor. As already mentioned, the
former index means how many other actors have connection to the focal actor and the
latter index is a standardized index which represents what percent of other actors are
connected to the focal actor. Table 1 demonstrates that the actors in the later period have
more extreme degree than the earlier period actors. For instance, in the later period,
Edgar, Insull and Lieb have contacts with every other actor. On the other hand, Smith-A,
who is the most central person in the earlier period, has contacts with only 54% of other
persons. This fact is also reflected in the three group-level indicators: mean, standard
deviation, and network centralization. All of them are higher in the later period. It is
obvious that the later period is an occasion of denser interaction and connection. We thus
expect a more centralized structure in the later period.
16
"a" means the first biannual meeting of that year and b means the second one.
14
15
Automorphically equivalent classes and the blockmodel
[Table 2-1 to 2-3]
Tables 2-1 to 2-3 demonstrate the automorphically equivalent classes and their
blockmodels for the three time periods. Starting with Table 2-1, we can divide the 50
participants into six classes of automorphic equivalence after four splits.17 It first should
be noticed that Edgar alone is a class (G5). Referring to Table 1, we know that it is
because Edgar is too "central" to be ascribed to any class. He has a degree of 36 which is
7 greater than that of the second highest central person's, Insull. For other central actors
identified by the centrality degree measure, most of them are in G4 in Table 2-1. G4
actually has an average StdDegree of 45% which means that on average, 45% of other
actors have a tie to this group of people by way of serving in the executive committee in
the same year. Including Edgar in G4 leads to a new G4 of eight persons with a new
StdDegree of 49%. This inclusion is justified by the reason of the same structural
position18 in the image matrix.
G4 and G5 are both connected to G1, G2 and each other and don't even have one
connection to G3 and G619. A more lucid image matrix appears after combining G4 and
G5. Two notable things are found by examining this new matrix. First of all, G4 is the
most influential group in the matrix; it is connected to two of the four other groups (G1
and G2).20 Secondly, G5 and G3 are two isolated but self-sustained groups. They connect
to less than one other position, yet the actors within these groups are internally completely
(G5) or significantly (G3) connected. The four actors in G5 were indeed the only four
members in the 1885b executive committee and they never show up after that. Our AEIC
records show that three of them were from EEIC. This is the same condition for the nine
actors in G3. Seven of them (except Carrol and Smith-H) appear in the executive
committee records for 1886 and 1887 and never show up again. The other two appear
only in 1890 or 1891 and are missing after that. Among these nine actors, six of them
were from EEIC. These facts reflect the sponsor role played by EEIC during the initial
years of AEIC.
Now turn to Table 2-2. When we compare it to Table 2-1, we can find that except Edgar,
none of the seven actors in the most central group--G2--in the earlier period has ever been
the member of the star group in the total period. If we add in Table 2-3 for comparison,
we can see that these star group actors of the total period are in either G3 or G1, which
are the two most central groups in the later period. Except for Insull and Edgar, the rest of
17
For the ways to partition actors in equivalence analysis, see Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 375-385.
There is one confusing thing need to be elaborated before we reach this conclusion. Since G5 has only
one person, Edgar, there is no way to calculate the submatrix density in the position of G5*G5--we don't
count the diagonal value when calculating the density. The UCINET4 thus shows a 0 rather than 1 in that
position. If we change the zero to one, the structural position of G4 and G5 are exactly the same.
19 This is indicated by the 0 in the intersection of the G4, G5 with G3 and G6 in the density table.
20 Although G1 is also connected to two other groups, its StdDegree is only 34% which is quite smaller than
G4's 49%. The leadership structure shown in the image matrix will be clearer after we split the total period
matrix into two sub-matrices.
18
15
16
the eight star actors actually commenced showing up in the scene after 1896.21 when
Insull was first elected as the president. This evidence shows that there was a significant
transformation in the leadership structure of AEIC around 1896.
Considering Table 2-3 together with Table 2-1 and 2-2 gives us a clearer picture about the
leadership structure. Table 2-3 shows that G3 has a StdDegree of 98% and G1 has a
StdDegree of 70%. Based on the fact that G1's StdDegree is fairly high, G1 should also be
treated as one of the influential groups in the later period. The image matrix provides
more evidence for the central status of G3 and G1. G3 is linked to every other position
and also is completely internally connected.22 No other position has such a central status
as G3. While G1 is connected to G3 and G4, it is not significantly linked to G2. This
image matrix thus authentically reflects the first central status of G3 and the second
standing of G1 in the later period. As mentioned earlier, all the actors in the most central
group, G4, of the total period are either in G3 or G1 of the later period. The substantial
overlap of the actors between the central groups in the later period and that of the total
period suggests that the leadership structure of AEIC during 1885-1910 was actually
rooted in the later period. In other words, the influence of these central actors in the total
period is largely derived from their central position in the later period. This demonstrates
the significant influence of the hub of the Edison/Insull network--Samuel Insull.
Presidency and the core group
[Table 3 is about here]
Combining the information above with the information from Table 3, which lists the
presidency of AEIC from 1885 to 1910, enables us to identify the most influential group
within this association. We can note that the four actors in G3 of the later period--Dow,
Edgar, Insull, and Lieb--are also the members of the most central G4 in the total period.
Furthermore, all of them have been the president of the association. Three actors in the
secondary central G1 of the later period--Ferguson, McCall, and Murray--are also in the
most central G4 of the total period. These three persons also have been the president of
AEIC. I thus propose that these seven actors constituted the leadership core of AEIC
during 1885-1910 while their leadership was largely derived from their positions in the
1896-1910 period.
Two interesting observations about this leadership group are worth mentioning. First,
besides Insull himself and Edgar, all of the other five persons--Dow, Ferguson, Lieb,
McCall and Murray--became active in the executive committee and the slate of officers
after 1896. In other words, their emergence on the platform of AEIC's power circle
followed Insull's initial assumption of the presidency. I demonstrate in the last section that
all these six actors, including Edgar, were previously connected, either directly or
indirectly, to Insull by a working relationship. Insull is the only person that had a previous
connection to all of the six core leaders. Secondly, our AEIC records indicate that while
21
Dow and Lieb, each with the third and the fourth highest centrality degree, began participating in the
executive committee just in 1896.
22 Notice that the density in the intersection of G3*G3 is 1.00 which means the actors within G3 are
completely interconnected.
16
17
these six core actors might not all be members of the central groups in the executive
committee of NELA, they still played a significant role in NELA's operation after 1896-following Insull's appearance on the scene of NELA in 1894. Their extensive
participation in the positions of president, vice-president, and service as members of the
executive committee and other standing committees, shows that this AEIC leadership
core "moved" into NELA after they secured their leading position in AEIC. By contrast,
there is hardly any actor from NELA playing a significant role in the AEIC executive
committee. The six actors who participated first in NELA and then appeared in the AEIC
executive committee--Beal, Davis, Huntly, Lesile, Perry, and Weeks--all belong to G2 of
Table 2-1, which means that they were not influential in the AEIC executive committee. I
show in the next section that most of those executive committee actors of NELA who
first participated in AEIC are in central rather than peripheral positions within NELA.
This evidence substantiates the argument that, after securing the leading role in a smaller
but technically/organizationally pioneering association, Edison/Insull associates moved
into a larger association to spread their influence to the entire industry.
NELA: 1885-1910
Centrality degree
[Table 4 is about here]
Table 4 lists every actor's centrality degree. On average, each actor in the earlier period
contacts 16 other actors by serving in the executive committee in the same year. Actors in
the later period, however, can contact almost 20 other actors. The intensity of comembership is higher in the later period. The network centralization measure, which is
60% in the later period and 45% in the earlier period, reflects the fact that actors in the
period of 1898-1910 have more chances to become the star. The third column of Table 4
shows that Scoville has a StdDegree of 100 which means every other actor in the network
was linked to him during 1898-1910.
Automorphically equivalent classes and the blockmodel
[Table 5-1 is about here]
Tables 5-1 to 5-3 show the automorphically equivalent groups and their blockmodels in
the three periods. The upper half of Table 5-1 divides the 94 actors into six equivalent
classes. The classes are equivalent in the sense that the constituents within each class are
occupying a similar structural position in the network. One important property of this
equivalence is the actors' similar centrality degrees. The second column of Table 5-1 lists
the average StdDegree for each equivalent group. It shows that the groups with the
highest StdDegree are G5 and G4; each has a StdDegree of 77% and 47%. The image
matrix shows that these two groups have the same structural position. They both link to
G1 and to each other but not to G2, G3, and G6. If we combine these two groups into a
new G4, we will get a 51% StdDegree for the new G4. This StdDegree is much higher
than that of the second highest group, G1 (20%). This means that actors in G4 were the
most influential ones in the executive committee of NELA during 1885-1910. Moreover,
17
18
Table 4 indicates that these eight actors are actually the top eight actors in the centrality
degree dimension.
The NELA records indicate that three of the eight actors in the new G4--Davis, Edgar,
and Scoville--are from firms using the Edison system; four other of the eight--DeCamp,
Huntley, Peck, and Young--are from firms using either Brush or Thomson-Houston
systems, which are two major arc lighting systems.23 This shows that both the
incandescent system and the arc lighting system had agents in the most influential
position in the 1885-1910 period. However, the position pattern is more meaningful and
explicable after separating the original network into two networks.
[Table 5-2, 5-3 is about here]
Comparing the network position of the earlier period (1898-1910) and the later period
(1885-1897) with that of the total period (1885-1910) discloses an important
transformation of the leadership structure within the NELA executive committee in 1898.
In the earlier period, the three agents of Edison--Davis, Edgar and Scoville--who are in
the center position in the total period do not exist in the most central position, G5. They
do not even exist in the second highest position, G4. As shown in Table 4, these three
persons began getting onto the executive committee after 1898. On the other hand, the
four members of the most central position in the earlier period are all from either the
Brush or the Thomson-Houston system. As mentioned earlier, the leadership in NELA
before 1898 largely reflected the arc lighting firm origins and was replaced by the Edisonassociated actors after 1898 when Insull was elected as the president. This point can be
demonstrated by looking at Table 5-3. Two of the three most influential actors in the later
period--Scoville and Edgar--are from Edison. In addition, the image matrix after
combining G4 and G5 into G4 has a proximate pattern of center-periphery structure. This
means a core position that is internally cohesive and all other positions have ties to the
core but not to each other (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:419-423). G4 of the later period
has connections to every other group and is itself completely internally connected. Within
this group, two of the three actors are from Edison firms.
This transformation argument is even more strongly supported by examining secondarylevel central groups in separate periods. The necessity to scrutinize these groups is
obvious when we consider their average StdDegree and the image matrix. G4 in the
earlier period with 12 members has an average StdDegree of 42% and G1 in the later
period with 12 persons has a 54% average StdDegree. Their significant influence is
reflected in the fact that almost half of the other actors have connections to them. As
shown in the image matrix, the G4 position in the earlier period and the G1 position in the
later period are connected to the other positions to a substantial extent.
Thus far, we can identify the background of all twelve persons in G4 and eight of the
eleven actors in G1. Of the twelve actors in G4, half (six) of them--Burleigh, Carnes,
Fairbank, Gardener, Gilbert, and Young--are from companies deploying the ThomsonHouston system; four others--Gilbert, Redman, Ridlon, and Robertson--are from
23
The last one--Seely--is from a firm using Heisler which is another arc-lamp lighting system.
18
19
companies using the Brush system. The last two--Markle and Nicholls--are from Edison
system companies. It is obvious that the persons from T-H and Brush have the
overwhelming power in this group. Furthermore, the only two actors from Edison are
representing relatively small firms in the camp of the Edison system24 and hence have a
limited influence within NELA. On the other hand, six of the eight identified actors in G1
of the later period--Copeland, Davis, Ferguson, Insull, Robinson, and Williams--are from
Edison firms; only two, Hunt and Peck, are from Thomson-Houston. Again, this pattern
confirms the argument that the influential groups (at the first as well as the secondary
level) in the NELA executive committee changed dramatically after 1898.
Presidency and the core group
[Table 6 is about here]
The leadership transformation can also be demonstrated by examining the presidency of
NELA. Table 6 shows the thirty one presidencies from 1885 to 1910. In the earlier period
(before 1898), except for E. R. Weeks25 and F. Nicholls, all the other identified presidents
are from Brush, Thomson-Houston, or Fort Wayne system firms. On the other hand, eight
of the ten presidents identified in the later period are from Edison firms.
Considering the level of influence within the executive committee together with the
presidency of NELA, we can locate eight core actors who are most important to the
operation of the association. Scoville, DeCamp, and Edgar are three persons in the first
level central position in the executive committee. Edgar was also the president in 1903
and 1904. Davis, Farrand, Insull, Ferguson, and Williams are in the secondary central
position in the executive committee and all of them were president during the 1898-1910
period. The NELA records show that six of these eight core actors are from Edison firms.
In the following section, I trace these people's pre-existing relationships with Insull and
demonstrate the significant effect of Insull and his social networks in the operation of
NELA. The trade association records also correspond to my argument that the leadership
core of AEIC "moved" into NELA after they established their dominant status in AEIC.
Those participants in the executive committee of NELA who first emerged at AEIC, such
as Copeland, Edgar, Ferguson, Insull, and Scoville, all occupy an influential position
within the NELA executive committee. Scoville and Edgar are the most and the third
central actors in the later period and the other three are all in the secondary central group,
G1.
24
Markle is from EEIC in Hazleton, Pa., which had only a capacity of 2,700 lamps around 1890, and
Nicholls is from Toronto Incandescent Light and Power Co., which had a 6,000 lamps capacity. Both are
very small compared to the major firms in Edison system such as Chicago Edison which had 40,000 lamps
and Boston Edison which had 29,000 lamps.
25 Weeks is a complex figure. According to the NELA proceedings, he represented Thomson-Houston
Electric Light Company in Kansas City, Missouri from 1885 till 1887 and served as the vice president in the
NELA. After 1888, he began representing Edison Electric Light and Power Co. in Kansas. We do not have
enough data to explain this transition but it seems that Weeks was originally involved with ThomsonHouston system.
19
20
Networks within AEIC and NELA
Having identified those Edison-associated core actors in AEIC and NELA, I delineate
their pre-existing relationship with Insull in this section . These relationships were mainly
working relationships which were already established before these actors' emergence in
the associations' power circles. I then address the network mechanisms embedded in this
historical configuration which enabled the pre-existing relationships to be mobilized and
to successfully dominate AEIC and NELA.
[Table 7 is about here]
These pre-existing relationships were not established intentionally by Insull but resulted
from the unpremeditated career overlap between Insull and these core actors. Table 7 lists
the major career developments for some of the core leaders. Comparing these career
developments with that of Insull's provides the following findings. First, Edgar and Lieb
both joined Edison Machine Works around 1882 and 1883 when Insull was the private
secretary of Thomas Edison. Insull then was representing Edison in the establishment of
different Edison manufacturing firms including the Edison Machine Works in 1881. This
was a new firm with newly-graduated employees. Edgar and Lieb had just graduated from
colleges and the positions they held in Edison Machine Works were their first major
career steps. Insull was about the same age as Edgar and Lieb and had just made his chief
career move by becoming Edison's secretary. After their initial career overlap in Edison
Machine Works, Insull and Edgar had more common experience by both serving in EELC
during 1884-1886. After that, Edgar was sent to EEIC-Boston by the EEIC parent
company to help them set up the central station and in 1900 he became the president of
EEIC-Boston. Lieb was sent to Europe by Thomas Edison to help Italian Edison install
central stations. He then came back to America in 1894 and became one of the major
figures in EEIC-New York (later New York Edison ). Their similar age and shared career
experience facilitated the development of their relationship before they showed up in the
associations, and their important positions in the leading Edison firms26 in their later
career were undoubtedly helpful for their collective influence within the associations.
As opposed to the cohort relationship between Edgar, Lieb and Insull, the relationship
between Ferguson and Insull was a patron-client case. Ferguson was younger than Insull
and joined Chicago Edison immediately after he graduated from MIT. When Insull joined
Chicago Edison as the president in 1892, Ferguson was an electrical engineer. Yet after
just one year, Ferguson was promoted to a supervising position in charge of all soliciting
and contracting. In the following year, he began showing up in AEIC standing
committees. In 1897 he became general superintendent of Chicago Edison and
commenced his influence in NELA.
For McCall and Murray, there seems to be no direct career overlap with Insull. Yet they
did closely connect to someone who had direct links to Insull. For McCall, the
intermediary between him and Insull was John Vail. Vail had worked with Insull in the
Edison Machine Works. Although Vail was not a core actor within the associations, he
26
Edgar in EEIC-Boston, Lieb in New York Edison, and Insull in Chicago Edison.
20
21
participated in AEIC from 1886 till 1898 as the secretary and an member in executive
committee and different standing committees. Vail was the chief engineer of
Pennsylvania Electric Co. from 1890 through 1907. During this period, McCall was the
secretary in 1893 and then the president in 1902 of the same company, and began
representing his company in AEIC in 1903. Vail had co-working experience with Insull in
his early career and later worked with McCall for over ten years. I claim that he was the
link between Insull and the core leader of AEIC--McCall. As for Murray, Table 7 shows
that he moved to New York City in 1895 and became second vice-president and general
manager of New York Edison in 1900. It should be noticed that Lieb returned from Italy
to New York Edison in 1894 and served as the third vice-president and general manager.
He certainly had a career overlap with both Murray and Insull; he was the bridge between
these two actors.
In addition, there was another person related to Insull through Lieb: Williams. The
relationship between Williams and Lieb was the same as that between Ferguson and
Insull. Lieb was Williams's patron. Williams joined EEIC-New York in 1885 and was the
general agent when Lieb was the third vice-president and general manager. "Williams and
Lieb were close enough that by 1898, Lieb sent him to Europe to examine turbines as
Lieb's proxy on a trip"27. Lieb seemed to treat Williams as his representative and even
sent Williams to Europe to continue his work. When Williams returned to EEIC-New
York in 1903, we don't know which position he was occupying; what is certain is that he
began showing up on the NELA scene and became the general commercial manager of
New York Edison in 1915.
Until now, I have discussed the relationships between Insull and the core actors listed in
Table 7. Now the focus turns to those core actors that do not have data in any
biographical encyclopedia or dictionary. For AEIC, the only remaining core actor is Dow.
Dow was acquainted with Insull by working with him in Chicago from 1888 to 1893:
"Dow was involved in wiring the South Park district for Chicago Brush. His biography
notes that he met and interacted with Insull from 1888 to 1893"28. There also remain two
actors in NELA that we have not yet discussed--Scoville and Davis. Although there is no
biographical data for Davis29, Scoville was from Cleveland Edison and his connection to
Insull was mediated by Robert Lindsay:
Lindsay was a boy living near Menlo Park and visited Edison and his
associates frequently--meeting people including John Lieb. He afterwards
worked at the Edison Lamp Company, and then went to Brooklyn Edison
as Assistant General Manger in 1889 as it opened. Insull, Lieb, Johnson,
etc. had chosen him and worked closely with him as they created a new
'prototype' plant. He went to Cleveland Edison in 1893.30
27
Excerpts from communication with Patrick McGuire.
ibid.
29 I can't find any biographical data for Davis. He is the only person for whom I can't make an argument
about his relationship with Insull.
30 Excerpts from communication with Patrick McGuire.
28
21
22
Lindsay was the link between Insull and Scoville. After he went to Cleveland Edison in
1893, we see that Scoville came into view in NELA after 1898.
The preceding evidence demonstrates the irreplaceable position of Insull within the
Edison/Insull associated network. This network was based on previous co-working
relationships and was mobilized within the trade associations after the hub of the
network, Insull, occupied the presidency. Yet there were other mechanisms embedded in
this specific historical configuration that made this network function in the trade
associations. First, the actors in this network shared a common technical and
organizational "ideology" concerning the electricity enterprise which constituted the
solidarity foundation for the network. This ideology originated from working together
under the leadership of the charismatic inventor, Thomas Edison. This is especially true
for those actors who had worked in the Edison Machine Works, such as Insull, Edgar, and
Lieb and the two intermediaries--Lindsay and Vail. By way of these actors, this ideology
then was shared by Dow, Ferguson, Murray, Williams, Scoville, and McCall.
Secondly, the core actors within AEIC and NELA not only had a common vision for the
electricity business but also shared common interests. Most of these actors were in highranking managerial positions in the large urban Edison electric companies.31 All these
companies had the largest capacity for generating and lighting in the Edison camp. In
other words, these firms had an enormous investment in the Edison system; and these
Edison/Insull associated actors mentioned above were in charge of running these firms.
This common interest was undoubtedly one of the important mechanisms for the
solidarity and corporate actions of the Edison/Insull network.
Thirdly, the network solidarity and corporate actions were even stronger when there were
competitors. In the emerging period of the electricity industry, there were different
systems competing for dominant status in the market. Each of them had different
generating, transmitting, and distributing apparatus with different types of lighting
devices. As pointed out in the history section, the two broadest categorizations were the
incandescent and arc lamp systems. Yet within these two categories, there were
companies that developed different electric systems such as Brush, Thomson-Houston,
Heisler, Fort Wayne, Western, or Arnoux-Hochhausen for the arc-lamp system and
Edison, Westinghouse, Bernstein, Schuyler, or National for the incandescent lighting
system. Under such a flourishing environment, competition was always an impulse to
mobilize the pre-existing network for corporate action in the trade associations.
Fourthly, the corporate actions of the Edison/Insull network were able to be activated
because this network had a powerful leader--Insull. All the influence of this network
emerged after Insull's assumption of presidency of the trade associations. This is
especially obvious for NELA. Even in a trade association which was largely originated by
arc-lighting firms, Insull's influence was still significant. He brought in other actors of his
network and put them in influential positions. His strength came from his early contacts
with other leaders in NELA. As early as 1890, Insull was already a member in the board
31
Insull and Ferguson in Chicago Edison, Dow in Detroit Edison, Edgar in Boston Edison, Lieb, Murray,
and Williams in New York Edison, Scoville in Cleveland Edison, and McCall in Philadelphia Electric. All
of these firms were using the Edison centralized generating system and incandescent lighting.
22
23
of managers of New York Electric Club32 which is identified by Nye (1990) as a group of
elites who dominated NELA in the initial era.
Conclusion
By using several network methods, this paper identifies a set of influential actors within
AEIC and NELA during 1885-1910, and demonstrates the pre-existing social networks
among these core actors by using relevant biographical data. Furthermore, the separation
of the total period matrix into two sub-matrices shows the significant status of the hub of
this network--Samuel Insull. This empirical evidence strongly supports the idea that there
was a set of pre-connected actors who, under the leadership of Insull, materialized their
domination of the electricity industry through AEIC and NELA. Thus, they were capable
of using these two associations as a vehicle to disseminate their preferred model of
electricity enterprise, the centralized/incandescent electricity system. My emphasis on the
role of human agents and their social relationship on industry development challenges the
market-centered theories which sever human agents from their historical and social
contexts. In contrast to the clean models advocated by these neoclassical theorists, this
paper calls for a more socially embedded approach for the studies of technical choice and
organizational development. Small historical events and market efficiency are convenient
conceptual tools for constructing succinct explanations yet they simultaneously risk
losing social reality in history. Industry development, like the evolution of other economic
institutions, is embedded in social structure (Granovetter, 1992). It is therefore necessary
to use a socially-embedded approach to arrive at a more complete account of that
development.
Secondly, advocating human agents and their social environment does not necessarily
lead to the "great man" type of conclusion. Indeed, the four historical contingencies,
which are indispensable for the Edison/Insull networks to function, proposed in the last
section suggest that we should emphasize the strength of human agency in the context of
their historical/structural condition.
Finally, by showing the social structure within trade associations, this paper also
challenges the increasing prevalent theory of economic governance. Although this theory
provides several useful concepts for studies of governance structure in capitalist
economies, this paper argues that it overlooks the role of networks in the governance
process. The evidence exhibited above suggests the need to reconsider the relationship
among the five governance mechanisms of the theory.
32
American Electrical Directory, 1890:15
23
24
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28
29
Table 1. Freeman's centrality degree for AEIC participants in executive committees 1885-1910, 1885-1895, 1896-1910
1885-1910
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Name
Edgar
Insull
Lieb
Dow
Ferguson
Stetson
Murray
Barstow
McCall
Gilbert
Vail
Field-A
Howell
Smith-A
Johnson
Beggs
Eglin
Huntingt
Leslie
Weeks
Bowker
Brine
Freeman
Merritt
Perry
Chandler
Davis
Huntley
O'Dea
Shaw
Wilcox
Marks
Carroll
Hammer
Lindenbe
McLaugl
Scovil
Beal
Dwelly
Field-C
Gorton
Humbird
Jones
Pryor
Smith-H
Upton
Hastings
Schwenck
Stewart
Wood
Mean
Std Dev
Net Cent
Degree
36
29
26
24
21
21
19
18
18
17
17
14
14
14
13
11
11
11
11
11
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
8
6
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
10.56
7.45
54.08%
1885-1895
NrmDegree
73
59
53
49
43
43
39
37
37
35
35
29
29
29
27
22
22
22
22
22
18
18
18
18
18
16
16
16
16
16
16
12
10
10
10
10
10
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
6
Name
Smith-A
Edgar
Beggs
Weeks
Merritt
Shaw
Vail
Marks
Carroll
Hammer
Lindenbe
McLaugl
Stetson
Beal
Dwelly
Field-C
Gorton
Humbird
Insull
Jones
Pryor
Smith-H
Upton
Hastings
Schwenck
Stewart
Wood
Degree
14
12
11
11
9
8
8
6
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
5.78
3.02
34.15%
29
1896-1910
NrmDegree
54
46
42
42
35
31
31
23
19
19
19
19
19
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
12
12
12
12
Name
Edgar
Insull
Lieb
Dow
Ferguson
Murray
Barstow
McCall
Gilbert
Stetson
Field-A
Howell
Johnson
Eglin
Huntingt
Leslie
Bowker
Brine
Freeman
Perry
Vail
Chandler
Davis
Huntley
O'Dea
Wilcox
Scovil
Degree
26
26
26
24
21
19
18
18
17
17
14
14
13
11
11
11
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
5
13.93
6.29
52.15%
NrmDegree
100
100
100
92
81
73
69
69
65
65
54
54
50
42
42
42
35
35
35
35
35
31
31
31
31
31
19
30
Table 2-1. Automorphically equivalent classes and the blockmodel for AEIC executive committee
1885-1910
Average
NrmDegree
Names
Number
(50)
G1
G2
34%
16%
Barstow, Field-A, Howell, Smith-A, Stetson, Vail
Beal, Beggs, Bowker, Brine, Chandler, Davis, Eglin, Field-C, Freeman, Huntingt, Huntley, Johnson,
Jones, Leslie, Marks, Merritt, O'Dea, Perry, Pryor, Scovil, Upton, Weeks, Wilcox
6
23
G3
G4
G5
G6
10%
45%
73%
6%
Carroll, Dwelly, Gorton, Hammer, Humbird, Lindenbe, McLaugl, Shaw, Smith-H
Dow, Ferguson, Gilbert, Insull, Lieb, McCall, Murray
Edgar
Hastings, Schwenck, Stewart, Wood
9
7
1
4
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
Density Table (grand density=0.22)
1G
G2
G3
G4
G5
0.73
0.21
0.24
0.67
1.00
0.21
0.10
0.02
0.48
1.00
0.24
0.02
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.67
0.48
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
G6
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
1G
1
0
1
1
1
0
Image Matrix
G2
G3
G4
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
G5
1
1
0
1
1
0
Image Matrix (combined G4 and G5 as G4)
1G
G2
G3
G4
G5
G1
1
0
1
1
0
G2
0
0
0
1
0
G3
1
0
1
0
0
G4
1
1
0
1
0
G5
0
0
0
0
1
30
G6
0
0
0
0
0
1
31
Table 2-2. Automorphically equivalent classes and the blockmodel for AEIC executive committee
1885-1895
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
Average
Names
NrmDegree
17%
Beal, Insull, Marks, Pryor, Stetson
40%
Beggs, Edgar, Merritt, Shaw, Smith-A, Vail, Weeks
17%
Carroll, Field-C, Hammer, Jones, Lindenbe, McLaugl, Smith-H, Upton
15%
Dwelly, Gorton, Humbird
12%
Hastings, Schwenck, Stewart, Wood
Density Table (grand density=0.22)
1G
G2
G3
G4
G1
0.43
0.43
0.00
0.00
G2
0.43
0.62
0.46
0.29
G3
0.00
0.46
0.18
0.00
G4
0.00
0.29
0.00
1.00
G5
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Number
(27)
5
7
8
3
4
G5
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
G1
1
1
0
0
0
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
Image Matrix
G2
G3
G4
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
Table 2-3. Automorphically equivalent classes and the blockmodel for AEIC executive committee
1896-1910
Average
NrmDegree
G1
G2
G3
G4
70%
32%
98%
47%
Names
Number
(27)
Barstow, Ferguson, Gilbert, McCall, Murray, Stetson
Bowker, Brine, Chandler, Davis, Freeman, Huntley, O'Dea, Perry, Scovil, Vail, Wilcox
Dow, Edgar, Insull, Lieb
Eglin, Field-A, Howell, Huntingt, Johnson, Leslie
Density Table (grand density=0.54)
1G
G2
G3
G4
G1
1.00
0.44
1.00
0.75
G2
0.44
0.09
0.95
0.14
G3
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
G4
0.75
0.14
1.00
0.47
G1
G2
G3
G4
31
G1
1
0
1
1
Image Matrix
G2
G3
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
6
11
4
6
G4
1
0
1
0
G5
0
0
0
0
1
32
Table 3. Presidency in AEIC 1885~1910
Year
1885a
1885b
1886a
1886b
1887a
1887b
1888a
1888b
1889a
1889b
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
Name
Humbird, James S.
Humbird, James S.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Beggs, John I.
Edgar, C. L.
Edgar, C. L.
Edgar, C. L.
Insull, Samuel
Insull, Samuel
Bowker, R. R.
Lieb, J. W. Jr.
Lieb, J. W. Jr.
Ferguson, L. A.
Ferguson, L. A.
McCall, Joseph B.
McCall, Joseph B.
McCall, Joseph B.
Dow, Alexander
Dow, Alexander
Freeman, W.W.
Murray, Thomas E.
Murray, Thomas E.
Firm
EEIC
EEIC
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
Harrisburg Electric Light Co.
Harrisburg Electric Light Co.
EEIC-Boston
EEIC-Boston
EEIC-Boston
Chicago Edison Co.
Chicago Edison Co.
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
EEIC-New York
Chicago Edison Co.
Chicago Edison Co.
Edison Electric Light Co.
Edison Electric Light Co.
Edison Electric Light Co.
Edison Illuminating Co.
Edison Illuminating Co.
EEIC-Brooklyn
New York Edison Co.
New York Edison Co.
32
Committee(Abb)
cfi
ex
ex
ex
ex, csb
ex, csb
ex
ex(chair)
ex(chair)
ex(chair), cil(chair), cm
ex(chair), cil(chair)
ex(chair), cm, css(chair), csb
ex(chair), csb
ex(chair), cse
ex(chair), cse
ex(chair)
ex(chair)
ex(chair)
cil
ex(chair)
ex(chair)
33
Table 4. Freeman's centrality degree for NELA participants in the executive committees 1885-1910,
1885-1897, 1898-1910
1885-1910
1885-1897
1898-1910
Numbe
1r
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Name
DeCamp
Huntley
Peck
Scovil
Seely
Edgar
Young
Davis
Gilbert
Farrand
Nicholls
Gardener
Redman
Burleigh
Faben
Fergu-LA
Bean
Carnes
Howell
Markle
Robinson
Walbank
Williams
Atkinson
Copeland
Doherty
Fairbank
Hunt
Insull
Ridlon
Robertso
Stevens
Bemiss
Bottomle
Brock
Scott
Wagner
Francisc
Gossler
Hartman
Hewitt
Law
Perkins
Blaxter
Lynch
Moses
Smith-HJ
White
Wilmerdi
Bosley
Harries
Morris-J
Sunny
Dow
Corrivea
Morris-W
Searle
Alexande
Bowen
Corby
Degree
72
53
53
46
43
37
37
34
31
29
29
27
27
26
26
26
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
22
22
21
21
21
21
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
18
18
18
18
17
17
16
16
16
16
15
14
14
14
13
13
13
NrmDegree
77
57
57
49
46
40
40
37
33
31
31
29
29
28
28
28
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
24
24
23
23
23
23
22
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
19
19
19
18
18
17
17
17
17
16
15
15
15
14
14
14
Name
Huntley
DeCamp
Peck
Seely
Young
Nicholls
Burleigh
Faben
Carnes
Markle
Fairbank
Ridlon
Gardener
Redman
Gilbert
Robertso
Francisc
Law
Blaxter
Lynch
Moses
Smith-HJ
Wilmerdi
Bean
Bosley
Morris-J
Stevens
Sunny
Wagner
Walbank
Corrivea
Morris-W
Alexande
Bowen
Corby
Armstron
Rollins
Abell
Davis
Mackie
Mason
Smith-TC
Weeks
Ayer
English
Thurber
Barton
Beebe
Hart
Kreidler
Leonard
Leslie
Rhodes
Fletch-G
Holbrook
Noonan
Donaldso
Fletch-J
Hockhaus
O'Connor
Degree
42
41
40
37
31
29
26
26
25
25
24
24
23
23
22
22
19
19
18
18
18
18
17
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
14
14
13
13
13
12
12
11
11
11
11
11
11
10
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
33
NrmDegree
71
69
68
63
53
49
44
44
42
42
41
41
39
39
37
37
32
32
31
31
31
31
29
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
24
24
22
22
22
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
17
15
15
14
14
14
14
14
12
12
10
10
10
8
8
8
8
Name
Scovil
DeCamp
Edgar
Farrand
Fergu-LA
Howell
Robinson
Williams
Atkinson
Copeland
Davis
Doherty
Hunt
Insull
Peck
Bemiss
Bottomle
Brock
Scott
Bean
Gilbert
Gossler
Hartman
Hewitt
Perkins
Walbank
White
Harries
Seely
Stevens
Young
Dow
Gardener
Redman
Searle
Wagner
Dunham
Frueauff
Huntley
Tait
Byllesby
Campbell
Smith-EL
Stone
Whitaker
Martin-J
Martin-T
Degree
46
42
37
29
26
25
25
25
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
21
21
21
21
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
17
16
16
16
16
15
14
14
14
14
13
12
12
12
11
11
11
11
11
10
8
NrmDegree
100
91
80
63
57
54
54
54
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
46
46
46
46
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
37
35
35
35
35
33
30
30
30
30
28
26
26
26
24
24
24
24
24
22
17
34
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
Dunham
Armstron
Frueauff
Rollins
Tait
Abell
Byllesby
Campbell
Mackie
Mason
Smith-EL
Smith-TC
Stone
Weeks
Whitaker
Ayer
Martin-J
English
Thurber
Barton
Beebe
Hart
Kreidler
Leonard
Martin-T
Leslie
Rhodes
Fletch-G
Holbrook
Noonan
Donaldso
Fletch-J
Hockhaus
O'Connor
Mean
Std Dev
Net Cent
13
12
12
12
12
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
10
10
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
8
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
18.89
11.38
58.35
%
14
13
13
13
13
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
11
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
16.27
9.15
45.12
%
34
19.45
7.83
60.29%
35
Table 5-1. Automorphically equivalent classes and the blockmodel for NELA executive committee
1885-1910
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
Average
Names
NrmDegree
20%
Abell, Armstron, Atkinson, Ayer, Bean, Bemiss, Blaxter, Bosley, Bottomle, Bowen, Brock, Burleigh,
Byllesby, Campbell, Carnes, Copeland, Corby, Corrivea, Doherty, Dow, Dunham, Faben, Fairbank,
Farrand, Fergu-LA, Fletch-G, Francisc, Frueauff, Gardener, Gilbert, Gossler, Harries, Hartman,
Hewitt, Howell, Hunt, Insull, Law, Leslie, Lynch, Mackie, Markle, Martin-J, Martin-T, Mason,
Morris-J, Morris-W, Moses, Nicholls, Perkins, Redman, Ridlon, Robertso, Robinson, Rollins, Scott,
Searle, Smith-EL, Smith-HJ, Smith-TC, Stevens, Stone, Sunny, Tait, Wagner, Walbank, Weeks,
Whitaker, White, Williams, Wilmerdi
10%
Alexande, Barton, English, Kreidler, Rhodes, Thurber
8%
Beebe, Hart, Holbrook, Leonard, Noonan
47%
Davis, Edgar, Huntley, Peck, Scovil, Seely, Young
77%
DeCamp
5%
Donaldso, Fletch-J, Hockhaus, O'Connor
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
Density Table (grand density=0.20)
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
0.18
0.09
0.07
0.50
0.92
0.09
0.20
0.10
0.19
0.00
0.07
0.10
0.40
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.19
0.00
0.90
1.00
0.92
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
G1
G6
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
G1
0
0
0
1
1
0
Image Matrix
G2
G3
G4
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
Number
(94)
71
G5
1
0
0
1
1
0
Image Matrix (combined G4 and G5 as G4)
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G1
0
0
0
1
0
G2
0
1
0
0
0
G3
0
0
1
0
0
G4
1
0
0
1
0
G5
0
0
0
0
1
35
6
5
7
1
4
G6
0
0
0
0
0
1
36
Table 5-2. Automorphically equivalent classes and the blockmodel for NELA executive committee
1885-1897
G5
G6
Average
Names
NrmDegree
24%
Abell, Armstron, Ayer, Bean, Blaxter, Bosley, Corrivea, Davis, English, Francisc, Law, Mackie, Mason,
Morris-W, Rollins, Smith-HJ, Stevens, Thurber, Wagner, Walbank, Weeks, Wilmerdi
21%
Alexande, Barton, Bowen, Corby, Fletch-G, Kreidler, Lynch, Morris-J, Moses, Rhodes, Smith-TC,
Sunny
12%
Beebe, Hart, Holbrook, Leonard, Leslie, Noonan
42%
Burleigh, Carnes, Faben, Fairbank, Gardener, Gilbert, Markle, Nicholls, Redman, Ridlon, Robertso,
Young
68%
DeCamp, Huntley, Peck, Seely
8%
Donaldso, Fletch-J, Hockhaus, O'Connor
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
Density Table (grand density=0.28)
1G
G2
G3
G4
G5
0.22
0.00
0.03
0.46
0.92
0.00
0.67
0.25
0.13
0.40
0.03
0.25
0.27
0.15
0.08
0.46
0.13
0.15
0.76
0.96
0.92
0.40
0.08
0.96
1.00
0.00
0.08
0.00
0.08
0.00
G1
G2
G3
G4
G6
0.00
0.08
0.00
0.08
0.00
1.00
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
1G
0
0
0
1
1
0
Image Matrix
G2
G3
G4
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
Number
(60)
22
12
6
12
4
4
G5
1
1
0
1
1
0
G6
0
0
0
0
0
1
Table 5-3. Automorphically equivalent classes and the blockmodel for NELA executive committee
1898-1910
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
Average
Names
NrmDegree
54%
Atkinson, Copeland, Davis, Doherty, Farrand, Fergu-LA, Howell, Hunt, Insull, Peck, Robinson,
Williams
37%
Bean, Bemiss, Bottomle, Brock, Dow , Gardener, Gilbert, Gossler, Harries, Hartman, Hewitt, Perkins,
Redman, Scott, Searle, Seely, Stevens, Wagner, Walbank, White, Young
24%
Byllesby, Campbell, Dunham , Frueauff, Huntley, Martin-J, Martin-T, Smith-EL, Stone, Tait,
Whitaker
96%
DeCamp, Scovil
80%
Edgar
36
Number
(47)
12
22
11
2
1
37
Table 11. Presidency in NELA 1885~1910 (missing 1887a and 1888a)
Year
1885a
1885b
1886a
1886b
1887b
1888b
1889a
1889b
1890a
1890b
1891a
1891b
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
Name
Morrison, Jm. Fr.
Morrison, Jm. Fr.
Morrison, Jm. Fr.
Morrison, Jm. Fr.
Morrison, Jm. Fr.
Duncan, S.A.
Weeks, E.R.
Weeks, E.R.
Perry, M.J.
Perry, M.J.
Perry, M.J.
Huntley, C.R.
Huntley, C.R.
Ayer, James I.
Armstrong, E.A.
Francisco, M.J.
Wilmerding, C.H.
Nicholls, F.
Insull, Samuel
Young, A.M.
Carnes, Samuel T.
Cahoon, J. B.
Ferguson, L. A.
Edgar, C.L.
Edgar, C.L.
Davis, Earnest H.
Blood, Wm. H.
Williams, Arthur
Farrand, Dudley
Eglin, William C.L.
Frueauff, Frank W.
Firm
Brush Electric Light Co
Brush Electric Light Co
Brush Electric Light Co
Brush Electric Light Co
Brush Electric Light Co
Allegheny Electric Light Co
Edison E L & P Co
Edison E L & P Co
Narragansett Electric Light
Narragansett Electric Light
Narragansett Electric Light
Brush Electric Light Co
Brush Electric Light Co
Municipal Electric Light and Power Co.
?
Rutland Electric Light Co
Chi Arc Light & Power Co
Toronto Incand Light&Power
Edison-Chicago
Poughkeepsie Light, Heat and Power Co.
Memphis Light & Power Co
?
Edison-Chicago
Boston Edison Electric
Boston Edison Electric
EEIC-Williamsport, Pa.
Seatlle Electric Co (NYC)
Edison-New York
Public Service Corp.
Edison-Philadelphia
Denver Gas and Electric Co.
37
Lighting System
Brush
Brush
Brush
Brush
Brush
Bruch Arc
Edison
Edison
Thomson-Houston
Thomson-Houston
Thomson-Houston
Brush
Brush
Forte Wayne, Heisler
?
Thomson-Houston
Thomson-Houston
Edison
Edison
Thomson-Houston
Thomson-Houston
?
Edison
Edison
Edison
Edison
Edison
Edison
?
Edison
?