Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,” World
Politics, April 2001, V. 53, No. 3, pp. 362-98.
Summary: Varshney found that both organized and quotidian interethnic civic networks promote
peace during ethnic riots, while a lack of these civic networks or the existence of only intraethnic
networks is correlated with higher levels of violence. He bases his conclusions on an analysis of 3
pairs of cities in India with varied responses to ethnic tension, and extrapolates his findings for other
regions around the world.
Background
The puzzle for many political scientists is why some places with ethnic diversity remain peaceful while
others experience violence. Varsney argues “that there is an integral link between the structure of civic
life in a multiethnic society… and the presence or absence of ethnic violence”. He differentiates
between civic structures that involve everyday forms of engagement (children playing together,
community fairs) and associational forms of engagement (reading clubs, business associations, sports
clubs, trade unions). While everyday forms of engagement seem to provide stability in ethnically
diverse regions in rural areas, associational forms of engagement are more robust for large scale urban
settings; “we need more links to connect people than the increase in populations”.
Varshney’s working definitions
Ethnic conflict - based on ascriptive group identities: race, language, religion, tribe, caste
- cultural, not economic issues at the core
- ethnic tensions that lead to violent riots, not just ethnic protest through institutions
such as parliament, nonviolent demonstrations, etc.
- ethnic peace as absence of violence, non conflict
Civil Society - space between family and state
- makes interconnections between individuals and families possible
- independent from state
Case Study: Aligarh and Calicut
The pre-existing civic networks help to explain why Calicut reacted peacefully to the Hindu
destruction of a mosque in Ayodhya (1989-1992), while Aligargh erupted in violent ethnic riots. (both
cities have roughly 36-38% Muslim population, with the remaining majority Hindu)
Calucut Response
 The well-established peace committees, politicians, and the press worked to deflect
inflammatory, false rumors and maintain order.
 Interethnic peace committees became forum for information sharing and voicing concerns from
both sides.
Aligarh Response
 Weak, intrareligious peace committees that served primarily to protect homogenous
community interests
 Local media perpetuated inflammatory, false rumors; Hindu and Muslim papers did not report
on violence from both sides


Rumors were believed and resulted in violent backlash from both sides; 70 deaths and many
more injuries
Criminals were not brought to justice (protected by politicians)
Underlying causes
Civic, interethnic networks pervaded Calicut society while they were almost nonexistent in Aligarh.

Everyday Forms of Engagement Calicut Aligarh
% visit each other regularly
% eat together
% children play together



84
90
83
60
42
54
“Calicut is a place of ‘joiners”. Associational forms of engagement - business, labor,
professional, social, and educational groups - were much more prevalent in Calicut; economy
was based on merchandise trade which spurred interethnic trade associations. (even head
loaders/porters in marketplaces were unionized!) Hindus and Muslims in Aligarh, on the other
hand, were not as economically integrated and had a single trade association that split into a
secular and non-secular trade association.
Peace committees in Calicut were extensions of these pre-existing everyday and associational
networks.
While Hindu and Muslim politicians in both cities stood to gain by using the Ayodhya incident
to polarize the community, politicians in Calicut feared disapproval from city residents for
disturbing the peace. Civic networks provide a check on politicians who seek to gain support
by pitting one ethnic group against the other.
Other Observations
 The establishment of associational networks in India was inspired by the national movement.
 In places where politics were focused around other societal cleavages – the caste system for
example – it was easier to bridge the Hindu-Muslim divide.
 John Darby found similar links in a study of 3 cities in Northern Ireland where all communities
had segregated churches, schools, and political parties, but the one community with mixed
social and sporting clubs experienced very little violence.
 There has also been some weaker analysis by Lieberson and Silverman showing that racial riots
in the U.S. tended to be less prevalent in cities where African American participation in local
government institutions was strong. There is less evidence of racially integrated civic
networks.
Other side notes:
 Varshney gives a caveat that his argument is more applicable to riots than to pograms or civil
wars were country-wide breakdown of ethnic relations takes place. Civic networks are more
explanatory for local and regional variations in ethnic conflict.
 Varshney goes through a pretty detailed explanation of how he set up the study to control for
potential “lurking” variables e.g. choosing cities with roughly the same ratio of Hindus and
Muslims within both populations, looked at reaction to a single triggering event, etc..
 There was also a nice tidbit on pg. 967 in the reader on specific role of tea/reading clubs in
Calicut.
 95% of Hindus and Muslins report reading newspapers in Calicut! In Aligarh, information
travels mostly by word of mouth in Muslim community.