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I value morality. The standard is consequentialism. Policy-making must be
consequentialist since inviolable constraints make it impossible to weigh the tradeoffs inherent to
decisions involving opportunity costs, as some constraint will always be violated. Thus, even if
there are some problems with utility, still prefer it to deontology since states could not act under
inviolable side constraints. And, even respect for the rationality of persons mandates
consequentialism. Cummiskey1:
If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the
unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and
incomparable
worth” that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality
that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The
concept of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one
focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration
dictates that one may sacrifice some to save many.
Next, the neg must weigh their impacts against AC harms regardless of any specific sanctions
they advocate. Letting the neg delink my harms forces me to preempt every kind of sanction in
the AC which a) makes affirming impossible as there are an infinite number of scenarios in
which sanctions could be imposed and I can’t possibly predict and engage all of them in just six
minutes, while allowing the neg to win by proving that one specific sanction would be beneficial
and b) allows the neg to moot the whole AC with whichever hyper-specific sanction I don’t
preempt, forcing me to start the whole debate over in the 1AR, nullifying six minutes of speech
time. Reciprocally, the aff must be allowed to advocate a competitive alternative defended by a
solvency advocate to solve a foreign policy objective in politically relevant scenarios as long as I
answer neg disadvantages. My interpretation divides ground equally since I must engage neg
disads and he must engage the aff plan. This is most fair because it forces the aff to defend a
stable advocacy as opposed to inaction. My interp is also most educational because it frames real
world discussions. Not allowing the aff to defend some policy action makes no sense; current
senders lifting their sanctions would not give all targets a free pass as real world elimination of a
policy always includes imbedded new alternatives. Also, policy-making always compares the
benefits and harms of mutually exclusive options; it would be unrealistic to claim that economic
sanctions are successful or unsuccessful in a vacuum since success is relative. Policy framed
discussion should always be preferred over abstracted ivory tower analysis because it actually
1
Cummiskey, David. Kantian Consequentialism. Published by Oxford University Press. 1996. (p.142).
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has real world bearing. My interp is key to accessing policy topic lit and hence garnering all
ground. Thus, the plan text: The five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT should
facilitate a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia, with agreements to provide negative
security measures for all who participate. Crail and Kimball2 explain:
A nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is a specified region in which countries commit
themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Five such zones exist
today, with four of them spanning the entire Southern Hemisphere. The regions currently covered under NWFZ agreements include: Lat in America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco),
the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok) Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of
Semipalatinsk). Article VII of
the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, affirms the right of
countries to establish specified [such] zones free of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly reaffirmed that right in 1975 and outlined
the criteria for such zones.
Within these nuclear-weapon-free zones, countries may use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. Each treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone includes a protocol for
the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT-China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States-to sign and ratify. These protocols, which are legally
binding, call upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the zones and not to use or threaten
to use
nuclear weapons against treaty states-parties. Such declarations of non-use of nuclear weapons
are referred to as negative security assurances. However, the five nuclear-armed countries have at times signed and ratified a NWFZ protocol
and declared conditions reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in certain scenarios against parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. For instance, the United States signed the
protocol for the African nuclear-weapon-free zone in April 1996 with a declaration that it would reserve the right to respond with all options, implying possible use of nuclear
weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons attack by a member of the zone. None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed the relevant protocol for the treaty creating a zone in
Southeast Asia because of concerns that it conflicts with the right of their ships and aircraft to have freedom of movement in international waters and airspace. The other three
zones do not explicitly rule out the transit of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states through the zones, and the general practice of nuclear-weapon states is not to declare
whether nuclear weapons are aboard their vessels.
I reserve the right to clarify. An NWFZ is competitive with economic sanctions: A negative
security assurance requires the elimination of economic sanctions on North Korea. Hayes3 04:
The third approach is to re-offer
the basic negative security assurance provided to all non-nuclear states that are in compliance with their
NPT obligations and IAEA safeguards agreements, which
China and/or Russia)
guarantees that the United States (or any other nuclear weapons state in the region, that is,
will not use [nukes] nuclear weapons against [North Korea] the DPRK unless it were engaged in aggression
and in alliance with a nuclear-armed state or was itself attacking the United States or its allies.
The United States followed this formula with
each of the three Eastern European states that inherited nuclear weapons from the former Soviet
Union, including the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In the case of Kazakhstan, the US commitment included
that no economic sanctions would be applied to it – an important issue for [North
2
Crail, Peter and Daryl G. Kimball. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) at a Glance. Arms Control Association.
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2567
3
Hayes, Peter. Enemy to Friend: Providing Security Assurances to North Korea. Nautilus Institute, February 11,
2004. http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKbriefingbook/multilateralTalks/PHEnemytoFriend.html
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Korea] the DPRK (see below). The NPT negative security assurance is the same negative security assurance that was provided the DPRK in the October 1994 US-DPRK
Agreed Framework. As such, it is not likely to garner much interest in Pyongyang although it is politically and diplomatically a well-worn path-of-least-resistance for Washington.
For such an assurance to come into effect, the DPRK would have to give up all its nuclear threat, resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA, and overcome the division of Korea
to ensure that a collision with US military forces is not conceivable. In short, such an assurance is next to meaningless to Pyongyang. Each of thee generic models offers a way
forward, but considered alone, none is likely to be a feasible path for a "security assurance" between the parties to the pending talks and the DPRK. An expanded nuclear-free zone
would tread too heavily on US force mobility, first-use prerogatives, preemptive war inclinations, alliance commitments, and security ideology. A common security process would
take too long and offer too little to the DPRK to be workable. The standard "NPT negative security assurance" is a non-starter for Pyongyang. Therefore, we should return to the
basic question and ask what the DPRK seeks in demanding a security assurance from the United States, and why? There are two answers to these questions. First, the DPRK has
been staring down the barrel of American nuclear weapons for decades. Whether or not they are irrationally paranoid about American intentions to attack them with nuclear
weapons, there is no doubt about their recurring fear of being targeted continuously. Indeed, it is a large part of the explanation of why they have built a subterranean society. They
are strongly compelled to reduce the level of external threat to their existence.
The second answer is that the DPRK
[North Korea] regime's
primary problem is the economics of stability and survival, given the parlous state of their economy. They know
that without changes in US policy toward the DPRK, they cannot recover economically as investors and financial institutions will shy away. Thus, rather than legalistic security
assurances or face-saving fig leaves, the DPRK seeks irreversible changes in substantive US policies toward the DPRK. Specifically, they want the United States to build a
security relationship that is based on mutual respect between the leaderships and ends with US forces staying in Korea on a non-partisan basis to keep the other great powers at
arms length from the Peninsula. This means a presidential-level emissary from Bush to Kim; establishing diplomatic relations; and ending the Korean War. Second,
they
want the United States to stop obstructing their economy. This means removing them from the US list of terrorist states and
allowing others (Japan, South Korea, the EU, and the World Bank) to do the heavy lifting.
supported by a lifeline from China but unable to climb out and rebuild their country.
Until that happens, they know that they will remain at the bottom of their hole
Due to the stakes, it is urgent that United States
move beyond formalism to substantive security negotiations with [North Korea] the
.
DPRK
It also competes through net benefits. Since the neg defends economic sanctions, if an alternative
response is net beneficial while avoiding the disadvantages of sanctions, then it should be
preferred.
Contention 1: Net Harms. First, sanctions on North Korea force it to increase proliferation.
ICG4 on March 15:
Estimating revenue from North Korean arms exports is even more problematic.
Both buyers and sellers have an incentive to
hide the transactions, especially since all North Korean arms exports are now banned. In the
past it was much easier to fabricate shipping documents to avoid detection, but now all North Korean cargo draws scrutiny. In the underworld of illicit arms trafficking, it is very
difficult to track and confirm the true identity of suppliers and end users, as well as the true value of the transactions. However,
as traditional
government buyers might be deterred from conducting weapons transactions with
it, Pyongyang has a greater incentive to seek alternative buyers, such as terrorist
groups or international crime organisations. As the multilateral sanctions regime took effect, DPRK arms shipments were seized. In July 2009, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) detained the ANL-Australia, which reportedly was headed for Iran with conventional arms. Iran and the DPRK have a long-term military relationship that includes
cooperation to develop ballistic missiles, but the final destination for this cargo might have been elsewhere, since Iran can produce the weapons that were confiscated. Iran has
been on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1984 and was described recently as the most significant state sponsor.40 It is possible that Tehran, with
its long-term ties to and support for some terrorist groups, could be cooperating with the DPRK to trans-ship small arms to non-state actors. Hizbollah (Lebanon) and the Tamil
Tigers (Sri Lanka) reportedly acquired North Korean arms in the past, and there are rumours that Mexican drug cartels have also obtained them. In August, the Indian coast guard
stopped and searched the DPRK ship Musan on the high seas after it tried to flee, but no illicit cargo was found. And on 22 September, South Korean authorities searched four
shipping containers that originated in North Korea and entered Pusan aboard a Panamanian-flagged vessel. The containers had been trans-shipped through China, but they held no
The International Crisis Group 2010, “North Korea Under Tightening Sanctions,” Asia Briefing Nº101, March 15,
2010.
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contraband. These cases demonstrate the increased costs of legitimate DPRK trade, which could deter any business enterprise contemplating transactions with Pyongyang. In late
February 2010, the press reported that in November 2009 South Africa seized a shipment of DPRK-made tank parts that were destined for the Republic of the Congo. The parts
were for 1940s and 1950s vintage Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks that have subsequently been produced elsewhere. The parts were trans-shipped though China and transferred in
Malaysia to a ship operated by the French shipping company CMA CGM. The shipping documents listed the components as “bulldozer parts”, but the French firm reported the
suspicious cargo to South African authorities, who seized the cargo and notified the sanctions committee. With controls tightening around arms shipments on the high seas, North
Korea may have turned to air shipments as an alternative. DPRK transport aircraft have the range to reach Burma or Pakistan if they pass over China, or Iran if transiting through
China and Pakistan. Pyongyang decided against using its own aircraft for an arms shipment in December 2009, probably as an added measure for concealment. However, a
chartered Il-76 aircraft was seized in Bangkok on 12 December and found to be loaded with about 35 tons of North Korean weapons, including surface-to-air missiles and rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs). The aircraft was registered with a Georgian firm, Air West Ltd. The five-man crew – citizens of Kazakhstan and Belarus – claimed to believe the cargo
consisted of oil drilling equipment. The crew subsequently was released from detention by Thai authorities. The shipment was arranged by SP Trading, a shell company
established in New Zealand in July 2009. Union Top Management, Ltd., a shell company registered in Hong Kong, leased the aircraft for the shipment on 4 December. The
managers of these two shell firms have vanished. A Japanese official described the operation as similar to organised crime activities in Japan, where the Yakuza have become very
adept at establishing shell companies and holding firms. While the interdictions reflect an increasingly robust sanctions regime, many officials and analysts are concerned about
possible unintended consequences. Kim Jong-il and the senior DPRK
[North Korean] leadership need[s] foreign
exchange to maintain political control. They might be tempted to sell WMD-related
intangibles such as
technology, production know-how, or data from weapons testing – if they have not done so already. Both
South Korean and Japanese officials have expressed concerns that
North Korea could now be desperate and willing to
take greater risks to sell anything for hard currency. Even if Kim Jong-il and his
inner circle are risk averse and unwilling to sell WMD or WMD-related materials and technology,
unauthorised sales could occur at lower levels of authority. In sum, the international community, as it enforces
sanctions, must not only make clear to the North that any crossing of its red lines on WMD will have serious consequences, but also be prepared for potentially more dangerous
smuggling attempts.
Even conservative estimates of the impacts of a nuclear terrorist attack are devastating. Allison5
07:
Let’s run a little with Michael Levi’s numbers.
Imagine that he is correct, and terrorists have “a 90 percent chance of failure” if they attempt a
nuclear 9/11. On the flip side, that would mean
a 10 percent chance of success [if they attempt a nuclear
9/11]. What should a 10 percent possibility of success mean in terms of U.S. policy? Remember, risk equals probability times
consequences. On a normal workday, half a million people crowd the area within a halfmile radius of New York City’s Times Square. If, in the heart of midtown Manhattan, terrorists detonated a ten-kiloton
nuclear bomb (the yield of the bomb an intelligence source codenamed “Dragonfire” claimed was in New York one month after 9/11), the blast would
kill them all instantly. Hundreds of thousands of others would die from collapsing
buildings, fire, and fallout in the hours and days thereafter. Multiply the consequence of such an attack
(five-hundred thousand souls) [multiplied] by a 10 percent probability, and one would
conclude that
[be] the U.S. government should mobilize an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism equivalent to saving fifty thousand Americans
lives. Furthermore, the effect of a nuclear terrorist attack would reverberate beyond U.S. shores. After a nuclear detonation, [since] the
immediate reaction would be to block all entry points to prevent another bomb from
reaching its target.
Vital markets for international products would disappear, and closely linked financial
Graham Allison 2007 [Director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs], “How Likely is a
Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?” Council on Foreign Relations Online Debate, April 17, 2007.
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markets would crash. Researchers at RAND, a U.S. government-funded think tank, estimated that a nuclear explosion at the Port of
Los Angeles
would
would cause immediate costs worldwide of more than $1 trillion and that shutting down U.S. ports
cut world trade by 7.5 percent.
Second, only lifting sanctions brings North Korea back to six-party talks. BBC News6 on January
18:
North Korea has said it will not return to stalled international talks on its nuclear
disarmament until sanctions against it are lifted. North Korea's foreign ministry also repeated its call for a peace treaty to
formally end the 1950-53 Korean War. The US and South Korea have previously said the North must first show progress in ending its nuclear programme. Sanctions against the
North were tightened last year after nuclear and missile tests. Pyongyang pulled out of six-nation talks on ending its nuclear programme last April following widespread
condemnation of a long-range missile launch. International pressure grew following a nuclear test in May - which drew UN sanctions and further missile tests. Confidencebuilding:
If North Korea "goes out for the six-party talks, remaining subjected to the
sanctions, such talks will not prove to be equal," the North's foreign ministry said in a
statement published by the official Korean Central News Agency
. "The dignity of the DPRK [North Korea] will never allow
this to happen." The six-party talks group the two Koreas, plus the US, China, Japan and Russia. Talks on a treaty to put a formal end to the Korean War would
help build "confidence", the foreign ministry added. The war ended in a ceasefire but not a peace treaty. Conditions: The six-party talks began in 2003, seeking to convince
Pyongyang to give up its nuclear programme in return for aid and security guarantees. North Korea is believed to have enough plutonium to build about six atomic weapons and
has recently announced it is enriching uranium - a second route to building nuclear weapons. Late last year, North Korea said it may be willing to return to the talks but has now
,
set down conditions. While discussions on the nuclear front have stalled Seoul and Pyongyang have agreed to hold talks this week on developing the joint factory complex at
Kaesong in the North.
If North Korea’s weapons programs continue to advance, all of South Asia could go nuclear.
Allison7 2:
Already, North Korea's nuclear advances have triggered reflections in Seoul, Tokyo,
and other regional capitals about options that were previously considered taboo.
Although Japan's political culture is unambiguously against nuclear weapons,
in 2002 then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
demonstrated how quickly that could change when he observed publicly, "It is
significant that although we could have them, we don't." And because Japan has a
ready stockpile of nearly 2, 000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and a welldeveloped missile program (for launching satellites), if Tokyo were to conclude that it required a
credible nuclear deterrent of its own, it could adopt a serious nuclear weapons
posture virtually overnight.
A regional arms race causes nuclear war. Perkovich8 writes:
6
BBC News. January 18, 2010. North Korea: Sanctions must end before nuclear talks.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8465341.stm
7
Ibid.
8
Perkovich, George. Nuclear Proliferation. Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 12-23
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the very lack of such elaborate systems that is cause for worry in regional arms
races, whether in East Asia, the Middle East, or South Asia. These countries may not have the satellites
needed to monitor deployment of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, or the sophisticated
early warning systems to detect launches in real time or to determine whether
aircraft entering air space are carrying nuclear weapons. Proximity is also an issue.
For instance,
given the three-to-ten minute missile and aircraft flight times in South Asia
and the six-to-thirty-five minute flight times in the Middle East, there is little
opportunity to gather real-time information about potential preparations to launch
nuclear warheads.
Nuclear war is devastating. Hayes9 2 in 09:
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the
Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident,
leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities.
On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range
missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11
million, and Tokyo over 20 million.
Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of
unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited
nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modeling the effects of even a limited
nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100
to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the
soot from the fires
produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8
years. In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but
the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during
the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also
follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much
greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will
continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make
matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone. These, of course, are not the only
consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use.
Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts
on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present
global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and
in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes.
There
could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical
, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of
turbulence
9
Hayes, Peter and Michael Hamel-Green. [Peter Hayes is Professor of International Relations, RMIT University,
Melbourne. Michael Hamel-Green is Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human
Development, Victoria University, Melbourne.] The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The
Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia. The Asia Pacific Journal. December 14, 2009. http://japanfocus.org/Michael-Hamel_Green/3267
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nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential
proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international
community.
Contention 2: Solvency. A nuclear weapon free zone would provide the security necessary for
North Korea to disarm. Hayes10 3 in 09:
John Endicott’s proposal, initially stimulated by the 1991 US decision to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Korea, has been under discussion in regular Track 2 discussions
between academics and officials from both the region and other relevant countries. It focuses on the possibility of establishing
a circular or elliptical limited nuclear weapon
free zone taking in the two Koreas, Japan, and surrounding land territories of China and Russia, and sea areas within the zone. This would be an
important reassurance and confidence building measure for all the countries within
the zone, and demonstrate the commitment and good faith of the relevant nuclear weapon states whose support is needed for Korean denuclearization. As one aspect of a
newly negotiated Korean NWFZ, an additional protocol could embody the main benefits of the LNWFZ by requiring the nuclear weapon states not to deploy tactical nuclear
weapons on either sea or land within a specified circular or elliptical zone, even within their own land territories falling within the zone. Besides the critical need for major powers
like the US, China and Russia to facilitate negotiations for a Korean Nuclear Free Zone, there is also the question of what role Japan might play as a key country within the region;
and, within the wider Asia Pacific region, what role Australia and the ASEAN group might play. As already noted, the recent election of the Hatoyama Democratic Party of Japan
Government offers some promise of a new approach to Northeast Asia denuclearization. The new Japanese leadership has expressed interest in the establishment of regional
organizations that might address security issues, has shown strong commitment to progress on disarmament, and may be willing to pursue a more independent approach in the
context of the bilateral Japanese-US security alliance. Further, the Asahi Shimbun, has recently advocated, in an August 2009 editorial, that Japan move to establish a Northeast
Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: “One worthwhile idea would be a nuclear-free zone treaty for Northeast Asia. Japan and South Korea could take the initiative by signing such a
treaty first and putting it into force.
If the United States, China and Russia all ratify a protocol that bans them
from launching nuclear attacks against Japan and South Korea, a non-nuclear
umbrella would be raised for the region. North Korea should be able to join the
treaty for protection under the non-nuclear umbrella after it abandons its nuclear program and returns to
the NPT. This prospect would give North Korea a strong incentive to abandon its
nuclear ambitions. While there would be conservative opposition within Japan to replacing the US nuclear umbrella with a non-nuclear umbrella, there
continues to be strong domestic support for Japan’s non-nuclear principles and for Japan playing a constructive role in realizing nuclear disarmament. Japan is currently cochairing with Australia the new Australia-Japan International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament that is due to report before the 2010 NPT Review
Conference, and this may provide further basis for the new Japanese leadership to support Korean and Northeast Asia denuclearization initiatives. Australia, for its part, while not
within the region, has significant economic involvement on the Korean Peninsula, both as a longstanding grain supplier to North Korea and in particular, its supply of minerals to
South Korea by companies such as BHP Billiton and the major investments in South Korea by banks such as MacQuarie. It has a long-term interest in ensuring a resolution of
Korean issues, and a potentially major role to play in the economic and sustainable development aspects of a Korean Nuclear Free Zone agreement. Australia, as a member, and
principal negotiator of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also has considerable experience to offer in the technical and legal aspects of drafting such arrangements. The
Rudd Labor Government that came to office at the end of 2007 shares with the new Japanese leadership a strong commitment to making progress on nuclear disarmament, and
interest in the establishment of new Asian regional structures to address security issues. It was the initiator of the Australia-Japan International Commission, and can be expected to
be similarly likely to consider support for Korean and Northeast Asian denuclearization initiatives that might emerge from Commission recommendations. In a perceptive study of
Australia’s potential role in relation to North Korea, White and Wainwright have argued that Australia should pursue a “creat ive diplomacy” approach, particularly in the
development of collective security guarantees for North Korea, and the promotion and encouragement of diplomatic and economic cooperation. 64
North Korea,
in a June 2009 Nodong Sinmun official newspaper commentary, continued to attack both the South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and the US, blaming
them for the breakdown in the Six-Party Talks and
expressing fears that the United States will re-introduce nuclear
weapons into South Korea. The commentary demonstrates the sense of fear and nuclear
encirclement that is
10
driving North Korean nuclear weapon acquisition, and underlines the
Ibid.
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importance of any denuclearization agreement containing legally binding negative security and non-aggression
guarantees on the part of the United States.
North Korea’s foreign ministry has stated that is supports a nuclear free-world; the only reason it
seeks an atomic arsenal is to deter U.S. aggression. AFP11 on April 21:
North Korea says it will not produce nuclear weapons to excess or engage in an arms race and is
ready to join an international non-proliferation campaign as a nuclear armed state. "It will
manufacture nukes as much as it deems necessary but will neither participate in nuclear arms race nor produce them more than it feels necessary," the North Korean foreign
ministry said in a memorandum published by state media. The North will join international nuclear disarmament efforts "with an equal stand with other nuclear weapons states," it
said. The memorandum comes nearly two weeks after the North vowed to strengthen its own atomic arsenal, complaining that a new US policy was eroding the hard-won
atmosphere for the resumption of stalled six-nation disarmament talks. The talks, grouping the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, were last held in December
2008. The North announced in April 2009 it was quitting the forum and staged its second nuclear test a month later. As conditions for returning, it wants a US commitment to hold
talks about a formal peace treaty and the lifting of UN sanctions.
The North says it developed its atomic arsenal to
deter a US nuclear threat and cannot give it up until the threat is lifted. The
memorandum declared the North's willingness to join international efforts "for
nuclear non-proliferation and on nuclear material security on an equal footing with other nuclear weapons states". The North will
"as ever make consistent efforts for the denuclearisation of the world including the
Korean Peninsula" regardless of whether the six-party forum is resumed or not, it said. The country has "invariably" maintained its policy not to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear states, it added.
Thus, even if sanctions temporarily solves North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, they are
only a band-aid solution because they do not solve North Korea’s incentive structure for
pursuing nuclear weapons, which is to deter U.S. aggression. Only a nuclear-weapon-free-zone
lifts the U.S. nuclear threat against North Korea and prevents possible rearmament. The political
will exists in Japan, South Korea, and NATO countries for a free zone to be successful. Ware12
on February 18:
It was therefore highly significant when
incoming Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada in December 2009 sent a letter to
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, decrying the pro-nuclear advocacy of officials from the previous Japanese government, and supporting President Obama's vision for a
nuclear-weapons-free world. It called specifically on the U.S. to consider adopting a "sole purpose" policy, which would effectively rule out the first-use of nuclear weapons
including the threat or use against chemical, biological or conventional forces. Okada
has also proposed a North-East Asian Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone, which would reduce even further the role of nuclear weapons in the region. Okada's proposals are receiving
encouraging (and unusual) cross-party support in Japan and South Korea. Today, 204 Japanese
parliamentarians sent a letter to President Obama supporting the call for the U.S. to adopt a 'sole purpose' policy, and asserting that Japan will not seek the possession of nuclear
weapons if the U.S. adopts such a policy. Endorsers of the letter included parliamentarians from all political parties. High-level endorsers from the opposition included former
Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and Former Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee Taro Kono.
11
The idea of a regional nuclear-weapon-free
AFP. N Korea promises limited nuclear bomb production. ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation).
April 21, 2010. http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/04/21/2879392.htm?section=justin
12
Ware, Alyn. Japan and NATO Are Ready for the U.S. to Reduce Nuclear Weapons. The Huffington Post.
February 18, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alyn-ware/japan-and-nato-are-ready_b_467736.html
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zone has inspired a newly established cross-party group of Japanese and South
Korean parliamentarians to meet for the first time next week to discuss its
feasibility. The plan would involve North Korea agreeing to abandon its nuclear weapons program in return for which they would receive guarantees that nuclear
weapons would not be deployed in South Korea or Japan. All three countries would also receive assurances from China, Russia and the U.S. that nuclear weapons could not be
threatened or used against them. Okada's proposals are by no means guaranteed to succeed. A similar initiative to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine, proposed
in 1998 by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, failed due to opposition by the US and lack of support from other NATO countries. But this time,
there seems
to be new potential for change in NATO, consistent with the disarmament visions of
both Okada and Obama. Germany and Norway have renewed calls for a reduction
in the role of nuclear weapons in NATO, with German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle calling for removal of remaining US
nuclear forces deployed in Europe. There has also been a flurry of parliamentary letters and resolutions from key NATO states calling for these proposals to be agreed in the
current review of the NATO Strategic Concept, and supporting the U.S.-Russia negotiations on stockpile reductions.
Finally, the conditions for forming a NWFZ are optimal. Hayes13 3 concludes:
The consistent blind spot in US approaches to Korea has long been a product of American ambivalence and even resistance to the establishment of additional nuclear weapon free
zones anywhere in the world. This is partly a Cold War military legacy of US military concern to maintain its ability to transit and deploy nuclear weapons without restraint.
Certainly, such zones do prevent land-based stationing and deployment of nuclear weapons, but with the exception of the Antarctic Zone, most zones have not prevented sea-based
transit (except at the discretion of individual states in their own territorial waters).
During the 2000-2008 Bush Administration there
was not only an ideological opposition to such zones, but a more generalized opposition to new multilateral arms control
measures that might constrain US freedom of military action. In this context, the United States has continued
to refuse to enter a binding agreement to offer non-use or threat of use guarantees to NPT non-nuclear states, and to resist offering such guarantees to several of the established
NWFZs, including the Central Asian NWFZ and the Southeast Asian NWFZ.
Nonetheless, now that the United States has
withdrawn its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and no longer deploys tactical nuclear weapons on surface warships and
planes, and has declared that it has no nuclear weapons based in South Korea,
there is less reason than ever for even the United
States to be concerned about establishment of a new NWFZ in Korea and Northeast Asia. Despite
the current impasse,
there is a new window of opportunity for Korean denuclearization
negotiations following the advent of the Obama Administration in Washington and the
Hatoyama Government in Tokyo, and China’s increasing concern over North
Korea’s nuclear stance. Even Lee Myung-bak’s government in the South would have to reconsider its positions against negotiating with a nuclear-armed
north if a practical proposal for a zone emerged in US-DPRK or multilateral talks.
13
Ibid.
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Indian Springs
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone AC
Additional Cards
New NPR is consistent with Japan’s demands for a U.S. sole purpose policy. The Japan Times14
on April 16:
Some critics complain that
the new U.S. policy does not go far enough; that rather than merely reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons, the U.S. should adopt a "no
first use" policy that would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons unless the U.S. had been attacked with them first. The
NPR says the
administration aims to make deterrence "the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear
weapons." The U.S. pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
states that are signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and are in compliance with
all obligations under that treaty. That pledge, however, still allows the U.S. to maintain pressure against states, such as North Korea and Iran,
that have a cavalier impression of NPT commitments. Hopefully, they will realize that such an attitude can bring dangerous consequences.
14
The Japan Times. Understanding U.S. nuclear policy. April 16, 2010. http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/ed20100416a1.html
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