A META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS
Charles R. Crowell
Department of Psychology and Computer Applications Program
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556
Phone: 574-277-4774
Fax: 574-271-2058
Email: ccrowell@nd.edu
and
Robert N. Barger
Computer Applications Program
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556
Phone: 574-289-8939
Fax: 574-289-2039
Email: rbarger@nd.edu
Running Head: META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS
META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS
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A META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS
Abstract
This article describes how a person's view of reality (i.e., one’s metaphysics or worldview or
weltanschauung) influences that person's view of morality (i.e., one’s ethics). This possibility has
broad implications for understanding personal ethics in general and computer ethics in particular.
Four worldviews were revealed in a survey of college students: They were Idealism, Realism,
Pragmatism, and Existentialism. Idealism is the view that reality is ultimately grounded in the
perfect, abstract, ideal world—the world of spirit and ideas. Realism emphasizes the ultimate
importance of the natural world, that is, the physical, material, sensible universe. Pragmatism
suggests that reality is not static in the sense of depending on absolute ideas or matter, but rather
is ultimately "in process" and must be constantly probed and determined by social
experimentation. Existentialism holds that reality is not objective, rather it is subjective and
must be constructed by each individual. The implications of these worldviews for three
examples of ethical dilemmas relating to information technology, those concerning piracy,
privacy, and authority-decption are described and discussed.
Keywords: Metaethics, Information ethics, Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, Existentialism,
piracy, privacy, authority-deception
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INTRODUCTION
"Metaethics" is a term which is subject to potential misunderstanding. Halverson (1981)
regards metaethics as the generic name for inquiries that have as their object the language of
moral appraisal. This definition reflects the viewpoint of a branch of philosophy known as
Linguistic Analysis. It does not, however, reflect a universal understanding of the term.
Consistent with the tenants of systematic philosophy metaethics can be defined more broadly as
the generic name for inquiries about the source of moral judgments (i.e., about their basis) as
well as about how such judgments are to be justified (Barger, 2001a). Taken in this sense,
metaethics is not about isolated individual judgments concerning whether certain actions are
right or wrong. It is about how a particular worldview -- or more precisely, a weltanschauung -is propaedeutic to the formulation of such ethical judgments.
The essential idea here is that before one can make a judgment on whether a particular action
is right or wrong, one must have adopted a basic understanding of what reality is about; morality
then becomes a question of whether or not the action in question is in harmony with this
understanding. In philosophy, one’s understanding of reality is called metaphysics. A person's
preferred metaphysics is basically a statement of belief about fundamental reality. It is a "belief"
because it cannot be proven or verified. Rather, one’s metaphysics is simply a fundamental
assumption one makes about how things are (Barger, 2001a).
Aristotle called metaphysics "first principles" (McKeon, 1968) in deference to the notion that
a foundation of meaning is prerequisite to the interpretation of any particular events or actions
within the larger universe of that meaning. The reason that more than one metaphysics exists is
that different people adopt different personal explanations of reality. Once a personal
metaphysical world view is adopted, that view inevitably influences, if not governs, personal
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decisions about ethical matters (Barger, 2001a). It is in this sense, then, that a person's view of
reality is propaedeutic to one’s stand on value questions.
OBJECTIONS FROM LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
It is here that proponents of Linguistic Analysis (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1961) might take issue
with our more liberal interpretation of metaphysics. Adherents to Linguistic Analysis believe
(and we again use the word “belief” in the sense noted earlier) that statements about reality can
be verified or validated in only one of two ways. Those ways are by application of the rules of
logic, or by application of sense observation. Thus, from this standpoint, anything not open to
logical analysis or to observation by the senses is not “real.”
Linguistic Analysts argue that, by definition, a weltanschauung or worldview is an
interpretation of ultimate reality and is not subject to examination by logic or sense observation
(Barger, 2001a). Adherents to this view therefore argue that ethics, the moral implications of a
metaphysical worldview, also are not themselves subject to verification by logic or sense
observation. Hence, linguistic analysts say that ethical questions simply cannot be talked about in
any reasoned way because they are beyond the bounds of verification. Linguistic analysts would
admit that there are indeed questions of morality, but such questions are purely emotional and
subjective in nature. Thus, for these thinkers, no determination is possible about whether
something is objectively good or bad. As Wittgenstein (1961) himself has said: "The solution of
the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time, (6.4312)" and further, "We feel
that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain
completely untouched" (6.52).
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THE MAJOR METAPHYSICAL POSITIONS AND THEIR RESULTANT ETHICS
However, even if we grant that the basic tenets of any particular metaphysical worldview
cannot themselves be verified objectively, the existence of different metaphysical positions
across people can be documented and catalogued. For example, in some research done on a
random sample of 347 students at a Midwestern regional/comprehensive university, Barger and
Barger (1989) found that that there were a limited number of distinguishable metaphysical
positions among the students despite their diversity of majors and backgrounds. The worldviews
revealed in this research were the traditional systematic philosophies of Idealism, Realism,
Pragmatism, and Existentialism (some could argue that Existentialism cannot be described as
either "traditional" or "systematic," but in the interests of space we will forego a response to that
argument here). Idealism and Realism might be characterized as absolute or objective
philosophies, while Pragmatism and Existentialism could be described as relative or subjective
philosophies.
Idealism
The metaphysical position of Idealism, dating back to the Greek Philosophers Socrates and
Plato, is that reality is more in the spiritual than the physical. The Idealist derives greater
meaning from ideas than things. Ideas do not change, so reality is basically static and absolute.
Perhaps the most famous modern Idealist philosopher, Immanuel Kant, used what he called the
“Categorical Imperative” to assess the ethics of any action. The first form of his Categorical
Imperative states: "Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law" (Kant, 1933). In other words, if you wish to establish (or adhere to) a
particular moral or ethical standard, you must be willing to agree that it would also be right for
anyone else to follow that standard. It seems, then, from an Idealist perspective that the originally
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intended purposes of things (i.e., the ideas upon which they were based) would weigh heavily in
ethical judgments and actions.
Once the metaphysical view that reality is found in the idea is assumed, the ethical position
that goodness is to be found in the ideal (that is, in perfection) automatically follows. Goodness
is found on the immaterial level, that is, in the perfect concept, or notion, or idea, of something.
Thus, perfect goodness is never to be found in the material world. Evil, for the Idealist, consists
of the absence or distortion of the ideal. Since ideals can never change (because they are a priori
and absolute), moral imperatives concerning them do not admit of exceptions. That is, these
imperatives are stated in terms of "always" or "never." For example: "Always tell the truth" or
(put negatively) "Never tell a lie." Since truth is the knowledge of ideal reality and a lie is a
distortion of that reality, truth must always be told and lying can never be justified.
Realism
A Realist believes that reality is basically matter, rather than spirit. For the Realist, things take
precedence over ideas. Whatever exists is therefore primarily material, natural, and physical. As
such, reality is quantitative and measurable. It exists independently of any spirit or idea and is
governed by the laws of nature, primary among which are the laws of cause and effect. The
universe, according to the Realist, is one of natural design and order. Aristotle was an early
representative of this view. B.F. Skinner, the behavioral psychologist, was a more modern
representative.
The resultant ethical position that flows from a Realist metaphysics is one that views the
baseline of value as that which is natural (that is, that which is in conformity with nature). Nature
is good. One need not look beyond nature to some immaterial ideal for a standard of right and
wrong. Rather, goodness will be found by living in harmony with nature. Evil, for the Realist, is
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a departure from this natural norm either in the direction of excess or deficit (i.e., having, or
doing, too much or too little of something which is naturally good).
Pragmatism
For the Pragmatist, metaphysics is not so simple a matter as it is for the Idealist and Realist.
The Pragmatist finds meaning neither in ideas nor things. It would be a mistake to view reality as
either a spiritual or physical "something." Rather, the Pragmatist believes that reality is a
process. It is a dynamic coming-to-be rather than a static fixed being. It is change, happening,
activity, interaction...in short, it is experience. Reality is more like a verb than a noun. It is flux
and flow where the concentration is not so much on the things as on the relationship between the
things. Since everything changes - indeed, the Pragmatist would say that change is everything nothing can have any permanent essence or identity. Heraclitus, an ancient Greek Pragmatist,
used to say in this regard: "You can't step in the same river twice." For the Pragmatist,
everything is essentially relative. The only constant is change. The only absolute is that there are
no absolutes! The Americans Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey are
representatives of this view.
Pragmatism might therefore be regarded as a more expedient approach than, say,
Idealism. Since this philosophical view holds that everything can change, there is no permanent
essence or identity. In terms of ethical behavior, this outlook implies that all moral values must
be tested and proven in practice since nothing is intrinsically good or bad. If certain actions work
to achieve a socially desirable end, then they are ethical and good (Barger, 2001a). This is so
because meaning is inherent in the consequences of actions. In the Pragmatist's view, things are
value-neutral in themselves. There is nothing that is always good, nor is there anything that is
always bad. The value of anything is determined solely in terms of its usefulness in achieving
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some end. In answer to the question, ‘Is that good?’, a Pragmatist would probably reply, "Good
for what?" Thus, the Pragmatist believes that the end justifies the means. That is, if an act is
useful for achieving some laudable end or goal, then it becomes good. In other words, a means
gets its positive value from being an efficient route to the achievement of a laudable end (a
laudable end is one that brings about the greatest good for the greatest number of people).
Accordingly, a means is not valued for its own sake, but only in relation to its usefulness for
achieving some valuable outcome.
Results or consequences are the ultimate measure of goodness for a Pragmatist, since the
usefulness of a means to an end can only be judged after the fact by its effect on the end. Thus,
for the Pragmatist, there can be no assurance that something is good, at least until it is tried. Even
then, it is only held tentatively as good since a thing is good only as long as it continues to work.
There can, however, be a dispute about which means are more effective for achieving an end.
Indeed, there can be a dispute about which ends should, in fact, be pursued. Thus, the Pragmatist
looks for guidance from the group. The reasons for this are metaphysical: reality is experience,
but it is the experience of the whole. For the Pragmatist, the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. This means that the whole is more valuable than any of its parts. In the realm of value
judgments, the group's wisdom is more highly esteemed than the wisdom of any individual
within the group.
Existentialism
The Existentialist joins with the Pragmatist in rejecting the belief that reality is a priori and
fixed. But, unlike the Pragmatist who believes that reality is a process whose meaning is defined
primarily by the controlling group, Existentialist metaphysics holds that reality must be defined
by each autonomous individual. The Existentialist notions of “subjectivity” and
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“phenomenological self” emphasize that the meaning or surdity of an otherwise "absurd"
universe is individually determined. Any meaning attached to the world must be put in it by the
individual, and that meaning or value will hold only for that individual. Thus, each person's
world, as well as each person's own identity, is the product of that person's own choices. In a
sense, each person can be defined as the sum of that person's choices. So, too, reality is different
for each individual. We each live in our own world and we are who we choose to be. Soren
Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Satre are frequently mentioned as representatives of this view.
The Existentialist worldview leads to an ethics in which the individual must create his/her
own value. There is no escape from the necessity of creating values. Just as the world is defined
by the choices an individual makes, so, too, the individual expresses her/his own preferences in
making those choices, which in essence defines a person’s values and underscores their
responsibilities. The individual cannot deflect praise or blame for personal choices onto others. If
personal choices were freely made, then responsibility for them must be accepted. While groups
might influence what choices an individual makes, there is a zone of freedom within each
individual that cannot be conditioned or predetermined. While emphasizing a highly
individualized choice of values, an Existentialist is not necessarily a non-conformist, but if an
Existentialist does conform to the values of a group it will be because that person has freely
chosen to do so -- not because they have been pressured to do so by the group.
THE PROBLEM OF CONSISTENCY
The above summary of metaphysical views might appear to oversimplify the basis for ethical
decision-making that might stem from these positions. No doubt ethical decision-making in real
time is a much more complex process than the above characterizations might imply. For
instance, in their research Barger and Barger (1989) found that while most of the students
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surveyed had primary leanings toward one of the four worldviews described above, students also
had simultaneous secondary leanings toward one or more of the other three positions. In other
words, nobody in their sample was fully and completely an Idealist, Realist, Pragmatist, or
Existentialist.
This means that simply knowing a person's primary metaphysical position will not guarantee
accurate prediction of how he or she might behave in response to a given ethical dilemma. It
should be acknowledged that this predictive inaccuracy happens for at least two reasons: 1) the
one just stated, that strong sympathies with other philosophical positions besides one's primary
view might end up influencing action in any particular case; and 2) the fact that people do not
always conscientiously act in a manner consistent with their beliefs, no matter how primary or
dominant those views may be. That is, for various reasons, they might fail to follow through with
what they believe is the right thing to do in a particular situation.
Parker (1991) provided some guidelines for resolving ethical dilemmas which seem to reflect
the fact that everyone is at least a little Idealistic in their Worldviews. Most of his guidelines
appear to be fashioned from the "Kantian Universality Rule." This Rule states: "If an act or
failure to act is not right for everyone to commit, then it is not right for anyone to commit"
(Parker, 1991, October 14). Of course, this Rule is just an alternate formulation of Kant's
Categorical Imperative noted above. Alongside this Idealistic guideline, Parker proposes what
appears at first glance to be a Pragmatic one ("The Higher Ethic"): "Take the action that achieves
the greater good" (Parker, 1991, October 14). While this maxim may seem to be an instance of
the Pragmatic motto: " Do the greatest good for the greatest number,” it may also have
something of an idealist flavor. Rashdall (1907) attempted to synthesize Idealism and
Pragmatism by holding that the right action is always that which will produce the greatest
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amount of good on the whole." Whatever the exact philosophical analysis of Parker's guidelines
may be, the fact that they may be representative of more than one fundamental metaphysical
viewpoint could enhance their usefulness in the area of practical ethical decision-making.
METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THREE COMPUTING-RELATED ETHICAL
DILEMMAS
The different worldviews noted above seem to offer divergent solutions for many possible
ethical computer-related dilemmas. We select but three here for purposes of illustration. They
have to do with piracy, privacy, and authority-deception. Our argument here is that this
divergence can be traced rather directly to the different ethical standards associated with each
view. In the interest of brevity, we will consider only two alternatives for each dilemma: an
"absolutist" type of solution which is characteristic of the Idealist and Realist views; and a
"relativist" solution which is characteristic of the Pragmatist and Existentialist views. Finer
distinctions could be made within each of these main solution categories to separate the four
distinct worldviews.
Piracy
First consider piracy, a common ethical dilemma in today’s digital world involving wrongful
appropriation of computing resources. As an example, suppose someone uses a personal account
on a university's mainframe computer for something that has no direct relation to University
business. Such use could involve anything from sending a personal e-mail message to a
hometown friend, to conducting a full-blown private business on the computer (billing, payroll,
inventory, etc.). Is there anything unethical about such computer usage? The absolutist position
would likely say that the above-described activities are indeed unethical—whether only the email message is involved, or the larger-scale business activities (although the absolutist would
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recognize a difference between the two in the amount of wrong being done)—provided that such
use is prohibited by the University’s published computer utilization policy. The guiding principle
here would be based on the purposes for which the University (i.e., the computing-resource
owner) intended the computer to be used. Any utilization for purposes other than what was
intended, as specified in the usage policy, would be unethical. A similar argument would apply
to the “misuse” of any other computing resource or digital property for which ownership and an
owner’s wishes for those resources/materials could be established, explicitly or implicitly.
On the other hand, a relativist might say that only the full-scale business activities really
were unethical because they tied up too much memory and slowed down the machine's
operation, thereby depriving other legitimate users of access to, or reasonable performance of,
the computing resource in question. However, the personal e-mail message wasn't unethical
because it represented no significant drag on operations or no deprivation of
services/performance for other legitimate users. The guiding principle here is consequences or
harm: no harm, no foul.
Privacy
Next consider a dilemma having to do with privacy. Suppose a student enters a public
computer lab on campus and encounters a machine still logged into a student’s account who
forgot to log off when she left. The student then decides to get nosey and accesses the personal
files that are available on the system belonging to the account owner. Is this behavior unethical?
An absolutist position would maintain that the behavior was unethical because the only person
who is entitled to access someone’s personal files is the owner of those files, unless the owner
knowingly grants permission to others.
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A relativist position would be based on the consequences. If the nosey student logged the
owner off after snooping around and never revealed to the owner or anyone else any confidential
information he or she may have seen, then no harm would accrue to the account owner. The
intrusion would thus not be considered unethical. But, if the nosey student passed on any
personal or confidential information about the account owner, or failed to log the owner’s
account off after looking at it, then unethical action might be involved since potential harm could
result.
Authority-Deception
Finally, let’s look at a dilemma involving what may arguably be regarded as an abuse of
power by authority, but certainly involves an instance of deception. A student is strongly
suspected by his University of a major “fair-use” computer-policy violation involving a hoax
email allegedly being sent by the student under the name of a prominent administrator. This
email proved to be exceedingly disruptive to student affairs until it was identified as fraudulent.
The student suspect, though not a professional hacker, was adept enough to cover his electronic
tracks well. However, the administration decided to confront the student and falsely inform him
that they had hired an outside expert whose skills were sufficient to uncover electronic evidence
of the student’s involvement in the hoax. The suspect was essentially being lied to in an effort to
coax an admission, which he eventually provided. Did the administration behave unethically in
this instance?
An absolutist position would maintain that lying under any circumstances is wrong. This
follows, of course, from an Idealist emphasis on the universal importance of truth. A relativist
could argue, however, that the “end justified the means” in this case. The “greater good” was
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being served by any means used to identify the perpetrator, dispense a severe penalty, and
hopefully deter future instances of similar computer-use violations.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE TRENDS
The skeletal cases we have just presented are not meant to suggest that ethical solutions to
computing dilemmas can be easily generated. Indeed, just the opposite is true. In the present
world of computing, where ethical dilemmas are becoming ever more complex, the hope of
finding a single normative code which would contain standards with which everyone would
agree seems dim. That does not mean, however, that such an effort is futile. For example, it is
possible for people of different philosophic worldviews to agree upon the same standards–
although for different reasons.
There is little doubt that technology use will continue to escalate. As it does, so will the
potential for ethical dilemmas arising from such use. While there is some controversy about
whether technology-based ethical dilemmas are unique, or merely instances of age-old moral
questions (Barger, 2001b; Barger & Crowell, 2005), it is clear that morality and ethics must be
an ever increasing focus of our educational system at all levels. Moreover, it is important to
continue to explore how Metaethical analysis may be helpful in understanding and promoting
moral education and development.
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