JOINT SERVICES
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
DEFENCE RESEARCH PAPER
BY
Maj P P LYNCH MC RM
ADVANCED COMMAND AND
STAFF COURSE
NUMBER 11
SEP 07 - JUL 08
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DEFENCE RESEARCH PAPER (DRP)
SUBMISSION COVER SHEET
Student Name:
Major Paul Lynch RM
DRP Title:
What kind of soldier should I be? Does ethical education
have a place in the UK Armed Forces? If so, what should
be its base and how should it be taught?
Syndicate:
B7
Syndicate DS:
Lt Col Rod Williams
DRP DSD Supervisor:
Dr David Whetham
FE submitted towards psc(j)
and the KCL MA in Defence
Studies
psc(j) and KCL MA in Defence Studies
MOD Sponsored Topic?
Yes
Sponsoring Directorate /
Agency / HQ:
HQ Land Command
Word Count
14,998
I confirm that this Formal Exercise is all my own work.
Signature:
Date: 2 June 2008
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Seen by:
Date:
Comment/Action:
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DEFENCE RESEARCH PAPER
What kind of soldier should I be?
Does ethical education have a place in the UK Armed Forces?
If so, what should be its base and how should it be taught?
Major P P Lynch MC Royal Marines
Word count: 14,998
The views expressed in this paper are those of the Author and do not necessarily represent those of the
UK Ministry of Defence, any other department of Her Britannic Majesty's Government of the United
Kingdom. Further, such views should not be considered as constituting an official endorsement of factual
accuracy, opinion, conclusion or recommendation of the UK Ministry of Defence, any other department of
Her Britannic Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom.
© Crown Copyright 2008.
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ABSTRACT
Against the backdrop of an increased focus upon ethical behaviour in conflict, this paper
discusses the current state of ethics education in the UK Armed Forces, asserting that it lacks a
substantive theoretical framework. After reviewing the UK Armed Forces’ current approach to
ethics, the normative ethics theories that could be applied to the actions of the military are
comparatively analysed. This paper recommends that ethics education in the UK Armed Forces
needs to be revitalised to articulate a demonstrably apparent ethical personality and that this
process must be formalised, joint, open and accountable. This paper concludes that virtue ethics
should be utilised as the vehicle for a joint Code of Ethics, suggests such a Code for all ranks in
the UK Armed Forces, and proposes a methodology of education, involving military experts and
academics, which would educate its personnel in a manner that facilitates moral autonomy and
reduces the likelihood of ethical failure.
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‘… to deal with the morality of war convincingly and competently, you need to know something
about ethics. But every bit as important, you also need to know something about war – and not
just war on paper or in the abstract but war as it actually is.’1
- Barry Watt
‘A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide
variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear
than those upon the fighting man. … What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier, or
airman.’2
- General Sir John Hackett
On 20 March 2003, as a member of the Manoeuvre Support Group of 40 Commando Royal
Marines, securing an oil manifold and metering station on the Al Faw peninsula, Iraq, I could have
legitimately killed an Iraqi soldier as he emerged from his fighting trench to stand not twenty metres
away armed with an AK-47. It was dark, I had night vision, and he did not. From his bearing and
gait, I reckoned that the will to fight had most probably deserted him, his defensive position having
been subjected to intense bombardment not long before our assault commenced. This may not
have been the perception of others, or indeed myself at another time, who may have thought, that
in the absence of obvious wounds, he was capable of fighting. I consciously did not fire and the
Iraqi soldier climbed back in his trench a few moments later. Rather than assaulting the trench or
throwing a grenade to kill him, despite his combatant status, we encouraged him by loudspeaker
and an interpreter to surrender, which he did not. A decision was taken to wait a few hours until
sunlight and reinforcements arrived to sweep the position. They were directed to the trench and
the soldier was taken prisoner and removed to a distant holding area.
Having killed eight combatants and taken over twenty-five prisoners that night and the
following morning from our immediate objective, no information was ever likely to be received to
confirm whether or not he was still capable of fighting that night. The consequences of shooting
him dead would have meant one less fighter; the ends would have justified the means. As a
soldier, to shoot an enemy combatant, who has not surrendered, is armed and poses a threat,
would have been judged as the right thing to do; the character of the act would have been
blameless. To kill him could have easily been justified as legal under the Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) but in my heart, it would have been improper. It just seemed the wrong thing to do.
The complexity and moral ambiguity that exists in war, as events unfold with little clarity and
much confusion, can certainly lead to actions being taken that with hindsight may not have been.
Soldiers justify these actions in a variety of ways but all justifications will resort to answers based in
Watt, Barry, ‘The military art and national values’, in Hietala, Janis (ed.), Moral obligation and the military,
(Washington: NDU, 1988), pp.52-53.
2 Hackett, John, ‘The military in the service of the state’, in Wakin, Malham, War, Morality and the Military
Profession, (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p.119.
1
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morality for questions based on right or wrong.3 Not the more obvious illegal actions, which are
rightly shunned, but those actions that one might not wish one’s friends to be aware of but those
that a band of fellow warrior professionals might empathise. Those actions where there is no right
answer, just a variety of less wrong ones. War has never been morally simple. In order to study
war, one must realise that morality matters and has always been important to the military
throughout the ages. Not just to protect the soldier in dark days from the mental consequences of
his actions but, contemporarily, a political and military imperative to avoid military failure. Ethics
are not only significant for the military but traditionally vital for doctors and lawyers, and
increasingly across all spheres of human interaction, as they provide some guidance for the moral
principles that should be upheld within that interaction.
Morality is a ‘language of justification’,4 transient in character and context. Morality is
determined by ethics, turned into action by ethics education and judged by standards of ethical
behaviour. This paper addresses why ethics matter to the military, which ethics theory should be
taught to the UK Armed Forces and how that ethics theory should be best taught and applied. It
will show that military ethics are increasingly more important, but a set of moral principles have
always mattered to the military. It will define the key terms in order to provide a commonly
understood evaluative language before analysing jus in bello as part of the just war tradition. The
linkage between morality and the law will be expanded upon before relating this specifically to the
military. This analysis will flow into a discussion on the current state of ethics education in the UK
Armed Forces, where it will be demonstrated that it lacks a substantive theoretical framework. A
comparative analysis of the main normative ethics theories will reveal that virtue ethics theory is
the most appropriate for the ethics education of the UK Armed Forces. Building upon the current
single Service core values, a joint Code of Ethics will be proposed for further discussion and,
leading on from this, the general, broad methodology for educating soldiers will be stated. This
methodology will focus upon a joint, through-life educational syllabus, which is aimed at all ranks,
taught by a mixture of academics and military professionals, with the academic focus provided by a
currently missing but necessary Centre of Excellence for Military Ethics. This paper will conclude
strongly that greater ethics education would lead to less likelihood of ethical, and therefore possible
operational, failure.
Using Cook’s distinction, this paper is not a discussion on the ethics of military service, but
on ethics in military service.5 Ethics matter to the modern military because of its high profile ability
to use lethal force, to kill, on an increasingly regular basis, post-Cold War, in difficult and
ambiguous circumstances in support of government and military strategy, which in itself is
pragmatically inconsistent. It is generally accepted that the military realm is different to the civilian
realm in terms of what each sphere requires of its members, with only a ‘tenuous moral cord’
3
With the greatest respect and for simplicity, this paper will refer to all members of the UK Armed Forces as
soldiers.
4 Walzer, op. cit., p.13.
5 Cook, Martin, ‘Moral foundations of military service’, Parameters, Vol 30, No 1, Spring 2000, pp.117.
10
connecting them.6 Analysing this linkage further is outside the scope of this paper. Ethics matter
because ‘only when the military articulates and lives up to its highest values can it retain the
nobility of the profession of arms’.7 Ethics education matters as it highlights to society that soldiers
restrain themselves according to a higher than normal standard of behaviour, and therefore are not
mere killers,8 and because it intellectually allows soldiers to conceive that they are soldiers,
warriors, and not sheer murderers when killing for their country.9 The integration of these ‘sword
and shield’ approaches to military ethics is superbly extolled by Christopher Toner to form a
‘practice-centred’ approach to military ethics.10
The perception that the UK is conducting wars of choice in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than
these wars being seen as wars of national survival, or existential wars, has brought the concept of
ethical behaviour and morality into sharp focus. Being ‘a force for good’11 has translated to an
increasing emphasis on ethics in military service. As foreign policy-led intervention operations
have become the norm, a stronger moral justification is now required for actions outside defence of
the realm. With a moral responsibility to prevent, mediate and mitigate conflict, the military’s role
must uphold the highest moral standards on operations to reinforce legitimacy and retain public
support.12
Richard Norman wrote that, ‘war is … one of the most deeply divisive of moral
problems’.13 This is reflected in the fact that significant debate on the issue of the morality in a
conflict is often polarised immediately by prejudgement, where people have already decided
whether a conflict is right or wrong. The war in Iraq is a classic example of this prejudice. Walzer
characterised this as the moral reality of war, not determined by the actions of soldiers in war but
by the opinions of mankind.14
Obedience to a set of moral principles has determined some of the most courageous
actions in war. Field Marshall Eric von Manstein displayed considerable moral courage to refuse to
obey the ‘Commissar Order’, the Kommissarbefehl, in June 1941, recognising that not only was the
order illegal but also unethical. He believed that it would have been ‘utterly unsoldierly’ to obey an
order to arbitrarily execute all political commissars once captured, stating that ‘to have carried it out
would have threatened not only the honour of [his] fighting troops but also their morale’.15 A
Japanese colonel in the Second World War, insisted upon written reiteration of oral orders from his
superiors that he was to kill all prisoners and those offering to surrender. Whilst he was waiting for
the predictably untimely reply, he ordered his men to release their prisoners, allowing them to
Mosely, Alexander, ‘The ethical warrior: a classical liberal approach’, in Robinson, Paul, de Lee, Nigel, and
Carrick, Don, (eds.), Ethics education in the Military, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p.178.
7 Cook, M., (2000), op, cit. p.128.
8 May, Larry, War crimes and just war, (New York: Cambridge University, 2007), p.2.
9 French, Shannon, ‘The warrior’s code’, US Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, 24 January
2002, http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE02/French02.html accessed 24 March 2008.
10 Toner, Christopher, ‘Military service as a practice: integrating the sword and shield approaches to military
ethics’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol 5, No 3, 2006, pp.183-200.
11 MOD, Strategic Defence Review, 1998, (Crown Copyright), Introduction, para.19.
12 Ibid., p.14.
13 Norman, Richard, Ethics, killing and war, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995), p.1.
14 Walzer, Michael, Just and unjust wars, (USA: Basic Books, 2000), p.15.
15 Manstein, Eric von, Lost Victories, translated by Powell, Anthony, (London: n.p., 1958), p.362.
6
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escape into the jungle.16 In 1968, Hugh Thompson, Glenn Andreotta and Lawrence Colburn
demonstrated exemplary moral courage at My Lai defending Vietnamese villagers from their
helicopter and on the ground against the murderous intentions of American soldiers.17 Their
individual moral principles would not allow them to participate in what they were being asked to.
The soldiers mentioned previously all determined that their actions would be ethically
correct, not merely as history would judge them but as they would judge themselves. Why their
acts were considered to be ‘the right thing to do’ appears self-evident but their true value can only
be determined when judged using the language of morality. There is no overall consensus on the
meaning of the terms ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’. Some consider them to be synonymous,18 others
consider them to be related, but what is clear is that there is no global consensus of what is
considered right and wrong. In order to mitigate this disagreement, discussions about right and
wrong should take place within ‘a shared framework of evaluative language’19, allowing different
value systems to reject or reinforce specific attributes of morality. To ensure subsequent
discussions use the same language, a number of definitions are required for the purposes of this
paper.
Morality can be defined concurrently as the principles concerning the distinction between
right and wrong or good and bad behaviour, a system of values and moral principles, and the
extent to which an action is right or wrong.20 It involves making judgements of what is right and
wrong by determining which behaviour is in accord with commonly accepted moral standards.
Morals relate to principles of right and wrong and focus on standards of behaviour. In this
definition, a moral person would be one whom society judges to have acted in a decent and
acceptable manner in a particular situation.
Ethics is the branch of knowledge concerned with these moral principles.21 It is derived
from the Greek word ήθος (ethos), but has a distinct purpose and meaning. Ethics refer to the
study of moral principles, encompassing the breadth and depth of moral philosophy, without
ascribing universal value to each branch. Ethos is defined as the characteristic spirit of a culture,
era, or community as manifested in its attitudes and aspirations and is therefore limited in its scope
and veracity of challenge to its statement. The words ‘ethic’, described as a set of moral principles,
and ‘ethos’ are not interchangeable and can be misleading if this is considered. Attitudes and
aspirations are not the same as a set of moral principles. Many nations choose to use the term
‘ethos’ to describe how their members uphold their version of right and wrong. By describing what
the spirit of the UK Armed Forces is, in terms of the individual Services, one may miss describing
16
Karsten, Peter, Law, Soldiers and Combat, (1978), p.114, in Osiel, Mark, Obeying orders, (USA:
Transaction, 1999), p.312.
17 Toner, James, Morals under the gun, (Kentucky: Kentucky University, 2000), pp.122-124.
18 Norman, op. cit., pp.2-3.
19 Ibid., pp.18-19.
20 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Ed., (GB: Clays Ltd, 2006).
21 Ibid.
12
its military ethic. The ethos and the ethic of a group are linked but one does not necessarily
explain the other.
Ethics education is concerned with determining moral principles within an intellectual
framework and how they are conveyed. It requires a firm base in moral philosophy, not least for
the educators. Moral philosophy is defined as the branch of philosophy concerned with ethics,22
and can be subdivided into three areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics.
Metaethics focuses upon the nature and actuality of morality, including studying the evaluative
language used in moral discussions. There is little need for metaethics in the ethics education of
the military and therefore it will not be discussed further. Normative ethics provides traditional
options for a moral framework to determine right and wrong. Addressing and evaluating these in a
later section will determine the most appropriate theory for use by the UK Armed Forces. Applied
ethics form the practical end of moral philosophy by applying normative ethics theories to specific
situations to determine the rightness or wrongness of an action. Military ethics is a specific branch
of applied ethics and ‘applies its tasks, methods, and distinctions to practical and professional
situations’.23 The chosen normative ethics theory will need to be applied in this manner to assist in
the overall ethics education and an examination of how this can be achieved will be addressed
later.
A military set of moral principles needs to be a feasible guide that shines a principled light
on difficult decisions in war and peace and attempts to show what a right answer might look like.24
Militaries have been keen to define their own standards of conduct and core values as
professionals, that is to say that the military constitute a profession in the same way as doctors and
lawyers. To determine what constituents a profession, Greenwood stated five elemental
characteristics which must be fulfilled: systematic theory, authority, community sanction, ethical
codes and a culture.25 Following Hartle’s analysis of the US military as a profession, the UK
Armed Forces can be analysed against Greenwood’s criteria in a similar fashion.26 As a large
proportion of professional military experience has been codified, doctrine across the full spectrum
of operations, from high intensity war fighting to military aid to the civil authorities, is taught in a
systematic manner to the military. Through the expertise in the chain of command, authority is
created and legitimised by society through the elected government, producing the necessary
community sanction. A distinct culture is undeniably identifiable within the UK Armed Forces with
its rituals, customs, values and comparative uniformity. Ethical codes exist for all the UK Services,
albeit expressed in ethos, values, and standards as opposed to a formalised code of ethics, but
22
Ibid.
Myers, Charles, ‘Military Ethicists – what are they good for?’, International Society for Military Ethics, 24
January 2008, http://www.usafa.edu/isme/ISME08/Myers08.html#_Shouldn’t_the_military accessed 24
March 2008, section 5, para 1.
24 Hartle, Anthony, Moral issues in military decision making, (USA: Kansas University, 2004), p.1.
25 Greenwood, Ernest, ‘Attributes of a profession’, in Nosow, Sigmund and Form, William (eds.), Man, Work,
and Society, (New York: Basic Books, 1962), pp.206-207, quoted in Hartle, op. cit., p.19.
26 Hartle, op. cit., pp.19-20.
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there is no unified Code of Ethics for the UK Armed Forces. This grave omission will be examined
in a later section.
The Just War tradition, the law and morality
The ethics of warfare are those judgements of right and wrong, not only codified in the
framework of national and international law but within society and the military’s own values and
standards. Politicians must justify to their public primarily that their cause is ‘just’, that sending
their armed forces, their sons and daughters, into harms way is necessary. Prime Minister Blair
stated in 1999 that the criteria for UK intervention were: just cause, credible means, reasonable
chance of success, determination to see through to the end and a broad concept of national
interest.27 In stating the reasons why war is necessary, politicians use the language of morality,
the values that they wish to defend, the rightness of their cause and actions, contemporarily
utilising the language of the dominant intellectual model related to the morality of war, the just war
tradition.
Contemporary just war doctrine stems from a particular Western tradition (justum bellum)
which provides a summarised framework of theories that relate to the just use of force by states.
The tradition developed from early religious scholars, above all Augustine and Aquinas, to
sixteenth and seventeenth century Scholastics and Jurists, in particular de Vitoria, Suarez, Grotius,
Pufendorf and Wolff, to twentieth century moralists and legalists, most notably brought into a
modern intellectual hub by Michael Walzer in his seminal work, Just and Unjust Wars. The just
war tradition ‘refers to a group of like-minded thinkers who employed similar concepts and values
to construct a moral code regarding wartime behaviour.’28 In order to justify the use of force, states
appeal to the criteria within this framework, divided into two ostensibly independent categories: jus
ad bellum, relating to justice of war and jus in bello, relating to fair and just conduct in war. In
determining whether the military lever of national power ought to be used to pursue a political end,
all the traditional categories of jus ad bellum must be met, although they are open to considerable
interpretation.29
Of primary concern to any discussion of soldierly ethics are the principles of jus in bello,
enshrined in the positive laws of war, known collectively as international humanitarian law (IHL) or
the LOAC.
The principles of jus in bello are: discrimination between combatant and non-
combatant, proportionate force to achieve military ends, avoidance of acts’ that shock the moral
conscience of mankind’30 and adherence to the positive laws of war, supported by natural law. 31
Rt. Hon. Anthony Blair, MP, ‘Doctrine of the international community’, Economic Club Chicago, 24 April
1999, http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp accessed 23 April 2008.
28 Orend, Brian, Michael Walzer on war and justice, (Llandybϊe: Dinefwr, 2000), p.86.
29 The categories for jus ad bellum are: just cause, right intention, proper authority and public declaration,
last resort, probability of success and macro-proportionality. For further amplification, see Orend, op. cit.,
p.86.
30 Walzer, op. cit., p.107.
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The discrimination requirement has been refined to recognise that civilians have always been killed
in war.32 The important aspect for soldiers today is that there are differing limits of acceptable risk
for soldiers and civilians in war. How this relates to morality needs to be explained in terms of how
the law is interpreted in the UK.
From the evolution of natural law, the positive laws of war have attempted to provide a
regulatory function on the battlefield. The purpose of IHL is one of huge importance, in that it
attempts to provide a measure of practical justice for the interaction between states in conflict.
As
a modern secular state, the UK relies on a legal positivist approach within an interpretive
framework to determine legal actions.33 Legal positivism relegates discussion on theoretical
concepts of justice and ethics to moral philosophy and relies only on binding statutes and legal
customs to provide positive law, thereby rejecting natural law.34 May states that, ’law and morality
merge at the point where law is first founded’. A pure legal positivist standpoint would not rest on a
particularly solid platform in the UK as many positive laws are empirically based on principles
derived from natural law. Therefore, if the law was founded on a divine basis (e.g. the UK’s
Anglican Thomistic heritage), subsequently rejected by a multi-faith society, but supported by
common law, it does not invalidate the tradition of the law in a secular Parliamentary system. It
just means that a different normative standard will need to be found to justify the law. This has
produced the UK’s legal positivist approach, with morality as the determinant of the meaning of
legislation.35 What does this mean for the military?
For a soldier in battle, this means that interpretation of legislation relies on a moral
interpretation of action related to the law by society, both national and international. If variably
interpreted legislation exists, or the law is unclear without context, this reinforces the necessity for
high soldierly moral standards as they will be judged according to a standard related to the law, not
by the law in isolation. Learning a précis of the LOAC by rote does not guarantee legality of action,
particularly in ‘wars amongst the people.’36 The appearance of ‘grey areas’ in the law becomes
muted to a greater extent when high standards of morality are applied; a greater chance of the
occurrence of these high standards is manifest after significant ethics education. A joint Code of
Ethics would allow a more uniform approach to be adopted for ethics education, utilising an
element of scales of economy in education and pooling of scarce resources, academic and
military.
31
Bellamy, Alex, Just wars: from Cicero to Iraq, (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p.124.
The ‘double-effect’ principle reconciled the legal killing of non-combatants when conducting legitimate acts
of war. See May, op. cit., pp.38-39, pp.54-55, pp.75-76, pp.124-125. Nagel specifically rejects this principle
in Nagel, Thomas, ‘War and massacre’, in Cohen, Marshall, Nagel, Thomas and Scanlon, Thomas, (eds.),
War and moral responsibility, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1974), pp.10-11.
33 Irvine, Lord, ‘Sovereignty in comparative perspective’, in Human rights, constitutional law and the
development of the English Legal System, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), p.247.
34 Hensel, Howard, (ed.), The legitimate use of military force: the Just War tradition and the Customary Law
of Armed Conflict, (Padstow: Ashgate, 2008), pp.80-85.
35 Irvine, op. cit., p.247.
36 Smith, Rupert, The utility of force, (London: Penguin, 2006), p.3.
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The UK has ratified IHL, concerning violations of the rules and customs of war, as legally
equal to national legislation.37 Modern treaty and customary laws of war (jus gentium) have
developed primarily from The Hague Convention, the St Petersburg Declaration and the Geneva
Conventions.38 In the UK, this treaty and customary law is reiterated in the UK’s Joint Services
Manual of the LOAC which explicitly covers jus in bello.39 The Manual states that, ‘the LOAC is
consistent with the economic and efficient use of force. It is intended to minimize the suffering
caused by armed conflict rather than impede military efficiency.’40 It aims at establishing a basic
level of ethical behaviour which is prescriptive, but open to interpretation, mixing deontological and
teleological ethics approaches. These approaches will be analysed in due course. The Manual
does not prescribe a set of moral principles but does have four principles of its own: military
necessity, humanity, distinction (discrimination), and proportionality. The linkages to justice in war,
as part of the just war tradition, and soldierly ethics are stark, but obedience to IHL in an
interpretive legal framework ensures that there are potential openings for ostensibly legal yet
immoral actions. Adherence to a Code of Ethics would better ensure legal and moral actions in
war.
Within this framework of the just war tradition and positive law, ethics that might be seen to
guide the actions of the military begin to form. If an act is illegal in IHL, it is illegal in UK domestic
law. The interpretation of law will determine whether an act is illegal or not. As numerous
examples have shown, including the experience of the Nazi officers at the Nuremberg trials, the
excuse of obeying orders is no excuse for acting unethically, immorally or illegally; it may just be a
mitigating factor. In the asymmetric wars of today, Rodin has stated that the militaries, on the side
of the strong, should be held accountable to a higher set of norms, more demanding still, than
IHL.41 The exceptionally rigorous legal steps to avoid collateral damage, particularly the death of
civilians, which arguably are in place, highlight the need to not only to act within the law but to act
ethically. Ignatieff sums this up as: ’…for force to be legitimate, it must be constrained.’42 This
view is reinforced by Osiel, recommending a reinterpretation of military law to ensure that it
enforces a more discriminating - ‘more ethical and conceptually refined’ - version of the LOAC.43
The constraint of force and reinterpretation of military law can be made more effective by
developing increasingly honourable soldiers, developed utilising comprehensive ethics education
founded on a joint Code of Ethics.
International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Constitutional structure and position of IHL in domestic law’,
National implementation of international humanitarian law, http://www.icrc.org/ihlnat.nsf/f80f8f25c8ba70cd41256486004ad095/e259f85e9400552cc1256ba700532b80!OpenDocument
accessed 25 April 2008.
38 For a detailed account, see Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, ‘The development of international humanitarian law
and the continued relevance of custom’, in Hensel, op. cit., pp.117-133.
39 Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Joint Service Publication 383: Joint Service Manual of the Law of
Armed Conflict, 2004, (Crown Copyright).
40 Ibid., p.22.
41 Rodin, David ‘The ethics of asymmetric war’, in Sorabji, Richard and Rodin, David (eds.), The ethics of
war, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp.161-162.
42 Ignatieff, op. cit., p.25.
43 Osiel, op. cit., pp.166-167.
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The basis for military obedience is both an ethical and legal one as ‘self-discipline is the
mark of moral maturity’.44 Many militaries have an adherence to discipline as a core part of their
ethos but the backbone of this virtue is primarily legal. However, the setting of laws or standards
does not guarantee obedience or achievement of them; additionally sanctions are only applied
retrospectively. A legal framework, set against the moral standards of a country, only sets an
ethical minimum, achievement of which will only lead to avoidance of punishment. Laws can be
broken without punishment if no-one is there to witness and report the transgression, or witnesses
it but fears retribution or suffers peer pressure not to report. The bar should be set higher for the
military, those who are expected to uphold the highest ethical standards in difficult circumstances.
This is where ethics education comes in to provide the soldier with the ability to determine what
actions are ethical and legal. In other words, how to determine right from wrong – to be a ‘fully
morally conscious’ soldier when the ‘moment of truth’ arrives.45 But what is the foundation for the
ethical education of the UK military?
Current ethics education in the UK Armed Forces
The UK Armed Forces have developed their own language to justify and moderate
behaviour in war along single Service lines expressed as ethos, as opposed to a central Defence
or Service ethic. An examination of what this means in terms of ethics currently taught to the
military is necessary to determine whether it is sufficient or requires revision. The UK Armed
Forces have enjoyed a well-deserved reputation for military professionalism, incorporating ethical
behaviour, for a considerable period of time. This has been developed recently into a limited focus
on the moral education of their soldiers as part of the moral component of fighting power.
The UK Armed Forces’ higher guidance on the ethical aspects of the moral component is
not compelling. The doctrine states that: ‘The moral component of fighting power is about
persuading our people to fight. It depends on good morale and the conviction that our purpose is
morally and ethically sound; these promote an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the
aim.’46 According to the doctrine, in order to persuade people to fight, motivation, leadership and
management must be applied in good measure. However, within this highly pragmatic approach,
the only mention of a military ethic is: ‘In many people there is an instinctive desire to do what is
right and good.’ There is mention of comradeship, espirit de corps, and pride in belonging but no
mention of a set of moral principles that should guide Servicemen and women in peace and war. It
is not intellectually rigorous enough for the leaders of the Armed Forces to state that there is ‘an
instinctive desire’ for ethical behaviour, and expect ethical behaviour to follow. There appears to
be too much emphasis placed upon single Services to create their own military ethic, as part of
General Sir Rupert Smith, quoted in Mileham, Patrick, ‘Building the moral component’, in Mileham, (2001),
op. cit., p.64.
45 Ibid., p.65.
46 MOD, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01 - British Defence Doctrine, 2nd Ed., October 2001 (Crown Copyright),
p.4-3.
44
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ethos, which has the potential to dilute the effect and change its meaning in increasingly joint
operations.
The intellectual development of the moral component has been in the recent form of
educating soldiers in their Services’ ethos as opposed to a military ethic. The development of
defining formally what ethos actually consisted of has been predominantly spearheaded by the
British Army since the end of the Cold War. Their first attempt47 in 1993 was analysed by Mileham
as confusingly merging meta-ethical statements with orders regarding personal moral behaviour.
Accordingly, he saw this mish-mash as defining the limited intellectual boundaries of the debate on
the development of military ethics in the UK Armed Forces.48 This confusion has continued in the
recent development of subsequent single Service efforts to codify the values that each
represents.49 There is no substantive theoretical framework underpinning the chosen values of
each Service, just heuristics.
The single Services are not monolithic organisations in the contemporary operating
environment. Each may have a culture and distinct way of thinking about the way war should be
conducted, not only by their branch, but by the other branches and Services with which it would
have to interact in war.50 However, in addition to this multicultural mix, increasingly joint
organisations and operations have emerged and have led to a cross-pollination of values,
described in Table 1 overleaf.
47
MOD (Army), The discipline and standards paper. The military ethos. (The maintenance of standards),
D/AG/415/1, October 1993.
48 Mileham, Patrick, ‘Teaching military ethics in the British Armed Forces’, in Robinson, Paul, de Lee, Nigel,
and Carrick, Don, (eds.), Ethics education in the Military, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p.48.
49 Current versions are: MOD (Army), Values and Standards of the British Army (MOD: 2008), MOD (Navy),
Naval Service Core Values and Standards (MOD: 2007), MOD (Navy), Royal Marines Ethos (MOD: 2004),
and Air Publication 1 (2nd Edition) Ethos, Core Values and Standards (High Wycombe: Media Services HQ
Air Command, 2008).
50 Rosen, Stephen, Winning the next war, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1995), p.19.
18
Table 1: The core values of the UK Armed Forces.
Royal Navy
Courage
Royal Marines
Personal courage
Discipline
Integrity
Army
Courage
Discipline
Integrity
Professional standards
Loyalty
Respect for others
Unity
Humility
Loyalty
Respect for others
Commitment
Commando humour
Cheerfulness
Unselfishness
Selfless commitment
Personal determination
Adaptability
Fortitude
Commando spirit in bold,
others are group values
Royal Air Force
Physical and moral
courage
Discipline
Integrity – moral
courage, honesty,
responsibility, justice
Excellence – personal
excellence, discipline,
pride
Loyalty
Respect – mutual and
self
Service – physical
courage, loyalty,
commitment, teamwork
Italicised words
incorporated in main
values in bold
This cross-pollination is evident in the core values of each Service and may assist in developing
more of a monolithic military culture amongst the strategic thinkers, making individual Service
culture less hostile to the concept of a joint Code of Ethics. The trend is for more joint ventures,
and this should support the development and implementation of a joint programme of ethics
education, based on a joint Code.
The UK Armed Forces currently have no joint methodology or common approach to military
ethics outside of the UK’s Defence Academy but instead rely primarily on common sense and best
practice derived from collective memory, with officers receiving significantly more ethics education,
delivered on a single Service basis. There is a considerable focus on leadership to set an example
for soldiers to follow. There appears to be a lack of a substantive theoretical framework to support
the current Service ethoi, although there is ongoing work at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
to rectify this for the British Army.51 As Mileham identifies, there appears to be ‘intellectual doubt
about how to articulate and codify what actually is intuitively well understood’.52 This doubt is
possibly more about the fear of getting it wrong, changing the ethos of the Armed Forces for the
worse by tinkering, considered to be an unacceptable risk. As Toner and Toner state ‘however
important such intuitions may be, military ethics cannot be based solely upon flashes of ethical
HQ LAND, ‘Review of the Values and Standards Action Plan’, 12 February 2008,
http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2008/DEP2008-0476.doc accessed 24 March 2008.
52 Mileham, (2008), op. cit., p.44.
51
19
insight’.53 Stating a list of core values without comprehensive education, both theoretical and
practical, is akin to learning how to determine a solution to mathematical problems using a faulty
calculator with no understanding of how to work out an answer in one’s head.
In ethical terms,
we need to educate soldiers to be able to arrive at an answer in their head without resort to a
checklist or manual. Clear education in ethics, not learning by rote but real education, will assist in
developing this type of practical wisdom.
The system of imbuing ethos currently lacks intellectual rigour, cannot be easily explained
and appears impenetrable to ordinary civilians but has traditionally been seen to work. However,
in the development of Service ethoi, there is little actual mention of ethics theory relating to the
selection of core values.54 It would appear that the military have been unable to define what they
understood to be ‘best practice’ in the face of significant intellectual challenge for justification.
Field Marshall Sir Peter Inge, Chief of the Defence Staff, summed this feeling up in 1995:
‘I believe that to the Armed Forces, ethos is very important. It is, I find, a very difficult subject to talk
about. It is a mixture of emotional, intellectual and moral qualities. …it is something that is
fundamentally important for Armed Forces to believe in. It is about tradition, the type based on
high standards, on comradeship, on helping others and, when the going gets rough, about
something to provide a useful handrail to guide you out of difficulties.’55
Field Marshall Inge was not a moral philosopher but his words appeal to intuitionist theories of
ethics, despite its obvious Aristotelian undertones. The danger comes when, as MacIntyre states,
that ‘one of the things that we ought to have learned from the history of moral philosophy is that the
introduction of the word ‘intuition’ by a moral philosopher is always a signal that something has
gone badly wrong with an argument.’56
Is it the case that one can appeal to more than intuition to explain why ethos and tradition
are important? Can one appeal to utilitarian calculations to establish how the military should act?
Can one have principles guiding action that cannot be broken? More importantly, can a normative
ethics theory provide the answer to how the UK Armed Forces should act? With intellectual
horsepower and will, there must be a method of stating, in holistic terms, what the military ethic
consists of, as part of Service ethos and justification of why it is vital and why more education in its
basis is needed. The application of normative ethical theories to military activity is a field of applied
ethics that has been comprehensively studied with some consensus.57 Therefore, a normative
Toner, James, and Toner, Christopher, ‘Universalism and Military Ethics’, US Joint Services Conference
on Professional Ethics, 28 January 2000, http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE00/Toners00.html accessed 24
March 2008, Section 2.
54 Mileham, (2008), op. cit., p.47.
55 Inge, Sir Peter, Field Marshall, ‘The roles and challenges of the British Armed Forces’, RUSI, February
1996, p.4.
56 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After virtue, 2nd Ed., (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1984), p.69.
57 Robinson, Paul, ‘Ethics education in the military’, in Robinson, Lee, and Carrick, op. cit., pp.5-6.
53
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ethics theory should be applied with greater intellectual rigour, utilised to support and justify what is
taught.
The UK approach, one of ‘received wisdom’, is being challenged in light of two influential
aspects relating to the ethics of the military.58 First, the perception of the war in Iraq as an illegal
war and subsequent questions about how the UK’s Armed Forces can act justly within an unjust
war. Second, the well-publicised ‘military ethical failures’ allegedly perpetrated by British forces in
Iraq in 2003- 2004. Early in 2008, Brigadier Aitken released his much-publicised report into
prisoner mistreatment in Iraq by British forces. The Report rightly identified that, since the invasion
of Iraq in 2003, over 120,000 members of the UK’s Armed Forces have served in the region but
there have been only 229 allegations of criminal activity investigated by the Service Police, of
which twenty have been dealt with, either by court martial trial or by summary dealing within the
chain of command. Six of these were the high-profile prisoner abuse cases which involved death
or injury of those arrested or detained by UK troops.59 As Major General Patrick Cordingly
optimistically put it in 2005: ‘This is not the tip of the iceberg – this is the iceberg, the bad news is
out.’60 It might be for the mature theatre of Iraq but have the underlying issues been resolved?
Brigadier Aitken’s words add significant weight to formalising the ethics education of the UK Armed
Forces: ‘We now have to encapsulate in our people a better understanding of what is right and
wrong, and not by learning the core values parrot-fashion but really understanding what they
mean.’61 This will undoubtedly mean a greater emphasis on ethics education, possibly forcing a
more intellectual approach.
The Aitken report also identified the actions that had been taken since 2003 to prevent a
repetition of these types of ethical failures, which were primarily additional training in the LOAC, a
re-write of the Values and Standards of the British Army and their corresponding annual training
package. Despite being the frontrunners in developing core values, the Army annual training
package appears to be fairly flimsy (40 minutes long) and certainly insufficient to inculcate the
values that are espoused.62 The values provide a guideline but certainly do not meaningfully
engage soldiers’ will. In an increasingly joint operating environment, it is not only the army that
engages with the civilian population, although understandably they form the bulk of the interactive
force. If there is a serious effort to address ethics education in the Armed Forces, it must be
conducted on a joint basis with adaptation made in the syllabus for environmental factors.
Although difficult and requiring significant resource in military and academic terms, articulation of
what the UK Armed Forces ethics should be possible. The ethics theory and accompanying
58
Mileham, (2008), op. cit., p.44.
For a summary, see Ministry of Defence, The Aitken Report, 25 January 2008, (Crown Copyright), p.3.
60 BBC News, 'Vital investigation welcomed’, 20 July 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4699773.stm
accessed 25 April 2008.
61 Ministry of Defence, ‘MOD releases report into abuse of Iraqi civilians’, 25 January 2008,
http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/defencenews/defencepolicyandbusiness/modreleasesreportintoabuseofir
aqicivilians.htm accessed 25 April 2008.
62 HQ LAND, MATT 6 Values and Standards Policy Statement, Issue 1, Amendment 1, October 2006.
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guidance can be justified and can be unified in joint terms to present a common intellectual
framework to assist soldiers in conducting their tasks in war and peace. The ethics theory, code of
ethics and methodology utilised to inculcate of this code will be addressed in the following sections.
Comparison of normative ethics theories
Legislation provides retrospective sanctions for previous transgressions and guidelines for
behaviour based on the lowest ethical baseline; ‘do not break the law’ being the only legislative
guideline. There may be divergence between the morality in war and the laws of war, in that
something that is permitted in law may be morally unacceptable in war. National rules of
engagement provide further amplification of international law and guidelines for action in a
particular operation or war. What may be legal in war does not have to be forcefully conducted,
even if its conduct might lead to the achievement of a mission. Ethical education not only teaches
what is legal and illegal, as part of the virtue of discipline, but persuades soldiers that it should not
be the fear of getting caught, the sanction, that should prevent them from conducting an illegal act.
If not for fear of getting caught, on what are the criteria for moral judgements dependent upon? It
depends on the normative ethics theory that is utilised for the education. For the soldier, ethical
education links the laws of war with the morality in war, but it is vital to recognise, as Charles
Myers puts it, that: ‘No theory has the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about
morality, least of all the morality of war.’63 This paper aims to demonstrate that virtue ethics theory
has more of this ‘truth’ than the alternative theories.
Francis Snare argued that there were four questions to be answered regarding moral
judgements, the first two of which are relevant.64 First, what are the principles of morality and
second, how can one justify a moral judgement?65 The first question was considered by most
influential strands of twentieth century thought as a question of normative ethics which might
produce answers to the second question in a given circumstance. Snare considered normative
ethics to be concerned with taking a moral stand in deciding what kind of acts are right and what
features of then make them right. The study of applied ethics therefore examines the application of
normative ethics theories within the practical world. The very act of thinking about how these
theories might apply to real situations assists in developing ethical thought. Applying normative
ethics theories to real life does not mean that a list of what is right and wrong will appear; merely
that the theories may demonstrate their utility to a greater or lesser extent in particular areas. The
balance between the ethics theory and the practical application of the theory can be reached by
trial and error; the problem that within the field of military force, there is currently little appetite for
63
Myers, op. cit., section 8, para 4.
Snare, op. cit., pp.2-8.
65 The third and fourth questions were what is a moral judgement and what is the place of moral ‘values’ in
the world of scientific ‘facts’?
64
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error. In order to reach Rawls’ ‘reflective equilibrium’66 between theory and practice, little risk will
have to be taken in the first step to formalise what is taught. The consequences of failure to
convey an ethic that assists in preventing ethical failures will be ethical failure and the
disproportionate effects that result. These ethical considerations can be regarded in a separate
manner to the codified military and national legislation but come together in a practical application
of the theory and practice.
This paper is not the place for a complete history of the development of normative ethics
but a study of those primary theories relevant to the discussion will be outlined prior to analysis.
Modern normative ethics theories, prior to Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’
paper,67 were focussed primarily on two traditions: Kantianism and utilitarianism. Kantian, or
deontological, ethics derive the rightness or wrongness of an act from the character of the act itself
rather than the outcomes of the action. It is concerned with establishing principles to govern what
we decide and do. Kantianism derives its associated morality from Kant’s Categorical Imperative,
a rational and impartial moral law derived from the notion of duty, which is to be obeyed at all times
and in all circumstances. Duty is deemed to be the guiding moral principle for soldiers in war in
this tradition as, ‘action in accordance with one’s inclinations has no intrinsic value.’68 The guiding
force behind Kantianism is that one should act as if the principles that lead to an act could be willed
as a universal law. If it cannot, the act is not virtuous. Obedience to IHL could be said to be a
modern form of Kantian duty. An appeal to duty may seem a particularly soldierly ethics theory but
it is not as apt as it first seems.
The main criticism of Kantianism is that it is a form of absolutism which only allows pass or
fail answers to ethical questions and does not allow for the choice between two wrongs. The moral
dilemmas created by conflicting duties are irreconcilable in Kantianism. If it were only possible to
distribute food aid to one of two villages when both need food to survive, then both villages would
starve using Kantian logic. One could not allow a village to starve by not feeding them when it was
possible to do so therefore this act cannot be universalised. The concept of ‘acts and omissions’ –
i.e. killing is wrong but letting people die is not – is an attempt to revive Kant’s ethics, but it is
flawed as it depends upon an element of intention, unintended and intended consequences.69 The
argument by Susan Martinelli-Fenandez that Kantian analysis can be utilised to determine moral
action after the event is compelling but of little practical use. The argument is that by examining
the action with hindsight, one can establish ‘the moral worth of the outcome and, derivatively, the
character of the agent.’70 The main criticism of her attempt to revive Kantianism in educating
soldiers is that one could say this about any theory that views events with hindsight, but it does not
66
Rawls, John, A theory of justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p.20 and pp.48-51.
Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘Modern moral philosophy’, Philosophy, Vol 33, No 124, 1958.
68 Osiel, op. cit., p.33.
69 Norman, op, cit., pp.77-82.
70 Martinelli-Fenandez, Susan, ‘Educating honourable warriors’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol 5, No 1, 2006,
p.58.
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necessarily contribute to developing virtues themselves. Examining events that have not
happened and therefore have had no outcome would be no more useful.
Developing Kant’s duty-based theory, Lawrence Kohlberg designed a highly influential
model of moral development which proposed six stages (or three levels) of moral development.71
These stages ‘represent a certain manner of thought about moral problems’.72 At the first level (the
pre-moral level), people predominantly act to avoid punishment and receive rewards. The second
level (the conventional level), people conform to avoid disapproval and censure by authorities. The
third and final level (the post-conventional level), people act according to social duty and ultimately
according to principles of conscience to avoid self-condemnation. Kohlberg’s theory may provide a
measure for ethical reasoning and therefore has some use, but it does not reveal much about how
to educate soldiers in military ethics. Additionally, Kohlberg’s model was considered to be
exclusively male-orientated and influentially criticised.73 It is also difficult to find evidence in
Kohlberg’s writing for determining which level is considered to be the most desirable, although
intuitively it seems to be scaled from least to most desirable. Actions speak louder than words, the
old aphorism goes, and this applies to Kohlberg’s measurement model. It does not determine the
rationale behind which principles should be upheld, nor allows for great discussion – it just asks
people to choose between X, Y and Z in hypothetical situations. It cannot be used as a basis for
ethics education.
The main alternative to Kantianism are teleological ethics, which derive moral obligation
from what is good or desirable as an end to be achieved - the ends justify the means. One form of
teleological ethics is consequentialism, which posits that the consequences of a particular action
form the basis for any valid moral judgment about that action. Utilitarianism is one particular way in
which consequentialism can be given ‘a more specific moral content.’74 The theories of its main
exponents, Bentham and Mills, judge a moral action as one that creates the greatest amount of
happiness for the greatest number of people. The decision to bomb Japanese cities at the end of
World War II is said to have been taken on a utilitarian basis. To continue the invasion of Japan
would have caused more deaths than those caused by the bombs. This theory appears to have
some appeal for soldiers but again it can be analysed as another false dawn.
There are significant arguments against the adoption of utilitarianism as a guide for ethics
in the Armed Forces. Nagel, in his classic War and Massacre, writes simply:
‘Once the door is open to calculations of utility and national interest, the usual speculations about
the future of freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to bear to ease the
consciences of those responsible for a certain number of charred babies.’75
71
Kohlberg, Lawrence, Essays on moral development, Volume I: The philosophy of moral development,
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981).
72 Toner, op. cit., p.56.
73 Gilligan, Carol, In a different voice, Cambridge, (MA: Harvard University, 1982).
74 Norman, op. cit., p.102.
75 Nagel, op. cit., p.9.
24
Rodin gives a scathing criticism of the consequentialist position in War and self-defense.76 His
powerful argument against using consequentialism as a guide for determining whether it can, if
ever, be right to wage war equally applies to jus in bello. The difficulty of applying a utilitarian
approach to ethics arises when attempting to calculate how individual acts in war, which can have
disproportionate effects, are cumulatively related to the war’s outcome. Even retrospectively
applied consequentialism is unreliable and unjustifiable, relying heavily on counterfactual historical
analysis.77 Norman’s three criticisms of consequentialism indicate that ‘the extent of one’s
responsibilities for the consequences of what one does depends on prior moral considerations, not
just on causal considerations.’78 Fleming supports this viewpoint, adding that both Kantian and
utilitarian approaches to ethical decision making are ‘simply impractical in most military contexts’.79
Actions in war taken quickly and under pressure by individual soldiers cannot hope to
consider all the factors that the utilitarian would demand. In the era of the ‘strategic corporal’, a
firmer basis for decision making must be established that has a greater level of moral robustness.
This robustness can be achieved by placing emphasis on developing and habitualising particular
qualities in the military character in order to face the demands of contemporary soldiering. The
habits must have been ingrained, ‘etched in their minds’,80 prior to the action in war where they are
required. Aristotle wrote that for ‘many acts of courage … there is no time for deliberative
preparation. Instead the act flows, spontaneously, from character (and vision).’81 Logically, these
qualities must be inculcated by adopting virtue ethics as the basis for military ethics education.
‘It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing
temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of
becoming good.’82
The modern revival of virtue ethics, derived from Aristotle, was developed from Elizabeth
Anscombe’s criticism of the modern take on normative ethics theories, particularly Kantianism and
utilitarianism.83 Her work was expanded primarily by Phillipa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre. Virtue
ethics focus on the character of the agent rather than on the nature or consequences of the action
itself. The aspirational end of virtue ethics is that people can become what they believe they ought
to be. This reconciliation between the nature of man and the purpose of man can occur by the
developing Aristotelian-style virtues.
76
Rodin, David, War and self-defense, (New York: Oxford University, 2002), pp.10-13.
Rodin, (2006), op. cit., p.157.
78 Norman, Richard, op. cit., p.104.
79 Fleming, op. cit., p.10.
80 Martins, Mark, ‘Rules of engagement for Land Forces: a matter of training, not lawyering’, Military Law
Review, Vol 3, No 5, 1994, p.143, quoted in Osiel, op. cit., p.255.
81 Aristotle’s observation, noted by Nancy Sherman, quoted in Osiel, op, cit., p.255.
82 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, (London: Penguin Classics, 2004), p.38.
83 Anscombe, op. cit.
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Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics provides the bedrock for the development of virtue ethics,
focussing on intellectual virtue, which must be taught, and moral virtue, which must be
habitualised.84 These virtues were to be pursued until excellence of character was reached, hence
virtue ethics is an aspirational theory. Virtues, for Aristotle, are formed by constant repetition85
which in turn allow us to control our feelings in order to ‘have these feelings at the right times on
the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way ... (this is) … to
feel them to an intermediate, that is, to the best degree; and this is the mark of virtue.’86 In the
Ethics, Aristotle identified twelve moral virtues which all sat between the vices of excess and
deficiency, and nine intellectual virtues.87 The so-called ‘Golden Mean’ is the pinnacle of moral
virtue, the ability to achieve, relative to oneself, the balance between excess and deficiency in the
moral virtues. For example, the Aristotelian ‘mean’ between risk and caution is courage. To a
certain extent, the intellectual virtues provide the knowledge to assist in determining the mean for
the moral virtues. Accordingly, all people have the potential to achieve all the virtues as the virtues
are in people by nature, but it was unlikely that all people would achieve the mean as it required
significant habit and practice. By basing the joint Code of Ethics and its subsequent education on
a form of virtue ethics theory should promote ethical behaviour underpinned by academic
foundations.
Aristotle is not without his critics: Bertrand Russell judged Aristotle’s Ethics, ‘in spite of its
fame’ to be ‘lacking in intrinsic importance’.88 His main criticism was that virtue ethics were
patronising and culturally bound. Aristotle was sexist, racist, elitist, and ageist, but those who are
not should be able to apply the theory without political incorrectness. Foot and MacIntyre
developed the theory further for a more modern constituency and their work is vital for justifying the
adoption of virtue ethics as the basis for a joint Code of Ethics.
Philippa Foot characterised virtues in the following way: first, virtues must be in some way
beneficial to man and his kind; second, virtues must connect with human will, separating them from
arts and skills; and finally, virtues should be seen as corrective, an enforced habit.89 The notion of
practical intelligence, Aristotle’s phronēsis, or to give the term its military colloquialism, ‘common
dog’, is a great example of a soldierly virtue. Practical wisdom benefits the soldier as it enables
him to make good decisions, decisions good for himself and for his society. The soldier who
discreetly detains a suspected war criminal who is fleeing in a volatile crowd conducts an act that is
morally wise for him and benefits society by removing the suspect, thereby preventing a potential
84
Russell, Bertrand, A history of Western philosophy, (Woking: Unwin Brothers,1947), p.195-196
Hughes Cox, L., ‘Aristotle's Ordinary versus Kant's Revisionist Definition of Virtue as Habit’, Paideia
Project, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/MPsy/MPsyCox.htm accessed 24 April 2008.
86 Aristotle, op. cit., p.101.
87 Moral virtues: courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, proper ambition, patience,
truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, righteous indignation. Intellectual virtues: technical skill,
scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, intelligence, wisdom, resourcefulness, understanding, judgement,
cleverness.
88 Russell, op. cit., p.206.
89 Foot, Philippa, ‘Virtues and vices and other essays’, Moral philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2002),
pp.2-9.
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reoccurrence of the alleged crime. The ability to realise that discretion was necessary is available
to all soldiers, this knowledge is not beyond their reach or ability; it is the engagement of his will
that determined if he had this knowledge. To allow the suspect to freely depart with the crowd
would have been an easy option. To detain him was corrective; it required the temptation to let
him go to be resisted. The virtue of courage (both moral and physical) overlaps with practical
wisdom in this case. The benefits of basing ethics education of virtue ethics become clearer after
reading Foot’s work.
MacIntyre’s theory of ‘practices‘ relating to communities with strong social traditions has
great resonance with the concept of a joint Code of Ethics based on virtue ethics for the UK Armed
Forces.90 By practice, he meant:
‘any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through
which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity,
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended’.91
Within such a ‘practice’ as the military, the benefits derived from virtue may be internal to the
soldier, but the exercise and development of virtue will be part of the soldier’s interaction within the
military.92 This is reinforced by Toner’s ‘practice-centred’ approach, reconciling the concept that a
Code of Ethics protects a soldier mentally from the strains of war and provides him with the
intellectual and social tools to carry out his military actions.93 This theory could be utilised to
support the proposal to adopt a joint Code of Ethics for the UK Armed Forces.
In virtue ethics, the act of shooting the Iraqi soldier in March 2003 mentioned at the
beginning would have been wrong in the effect that it would have had on my character; killing him
would have made me a worse moral agent, a bad person. It would not have been virtuous to kill
him; not only would my reputation have suffered, my character, or conscience, would have been
affected as a result. This is but one example which would support its adoption as the basis for
military ethics education. A soldier, educated in virtue ethics, does not have to formally evaluate
multiple factors, guessing the consequences of his actions based against a myriad of outcomes,
and does not have to resolve a moral dilemma, reconciling two wrongs against an abstract
absolute rule. He acts on what he thinks is right, framed, not on moral certainty, but on
considered reflection, thought and habit. Unless virtue ethics education seriously allows the soldier
to develop his character morally, in an aspirational sense, the military will only have a reputation for
ethical behaviour, not an engrained character for it. Lincoln summed up the difference between
90
MacIntyre, op. cit., ch.1-6, 9-14.
MacIntyre, op. cit., p.187.
92 O’Kane, Stephen, Politics and morality under conflict, (Durham: Pentland, 1994), p.22.
93 Toner, (2006), op. cit., pp.183-200.
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the character and reputation: ‘Character is like a tree and reputation like its shadow. The shadow is
what we think of it; the tree is the real thing.’94 ‘The real thing’ is what a soldier stands for and
should be developed, in part by the military, by habitualising virtues, using ethical education based
on virtue ethics.
A rule-utilitarian challenge to virtue ethics is that soldiers should obey IHL in order to
maximise the benefits for all soldiers and civilians, not for a vague notion of respect for others or
human dignity. The rules should be obeyed because less people should die in horrific ways and
only those capable of harming should be killed – the rules provide the basis for maximising
humane treatment for the most people. The main challenge is that the specificity of these rules
provides clear guidance to soldiers in war whereas virtue ethics do not. To reconcile this view with
the promotion of virtue ethics for soldierly conduct, one must recognise that the virtue of discipline,
which in part means adherence to IHL, provides as much guidance as the challenging theory does.
The situationist challenge to virtue ethics is that virtues cannot be ascribed to a collective
such as the military. Sandin disputes this position and argues forcefully that collective virtue can
be ascribed the military.95 He states that some traditional, individual virtues will naturally form
collective virtues of the military. This ‘bottom-up’ approach to virtue ethics is not inconsistent with
ascribing virtues to the military as a whole. The formation of a virtue ethics education cannot be
conducted in isolation from history and previous practice. A baseline has already been established
in the UK Armed Forces. Indeed, the current predominantly heuristic approach to ethics education
in the UK can be incrementally changed to a more intellectual approach across all three Services
with intellectual adaptation, accompanied by military and political will and resource. Internally
generated change, a pro-active approach, will ensure greater control over the process and greater
certainty of the result, less disruption and the ability to set timelines to achieve the change. The
converse may be fought tooth and nail, but unless a more formal, open and understandable
system is developed, the momentum to force an externally generated change may be an ‘ethical
failure’ away.
This section has shown, as in all philosophical discussions, that each theory can be
balanced, argued against or built upon to form new versions.96 Albeit true in academic terms, this
is not really practical enough for discussions of behaviour in war. The UK Armed Forces must
decide upon the normative ethics theory that they wish to underpin their ethic as the ‘philosophical
development of moral theory has not converged into a single, commonly accepted moral
conception’.97 MacIntyre states that, ‘Aristotlean moral theory is the best theory so far …
Lincoln, Abraham, in Gross, Anthony, (ed.), Lincoln’s Own Stories, (New York: Harper & Bros., I912),
p.109.
95 Sandin, Per, ‘Collective military virtues’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol 6, No 4, 2007, pp.303-314.
96 Posner, Richard. The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1999),
p.41.
97 Kasher, Asa, ‘Problems in military ethics of fighting terrorism’, 7 th Canadian Conference on Ethical
Leadership, 28-29 November 2006, p.5, http://www.cdaacd.forces.gc.ca/CCEL_Conference_CCDEL/engraph/doc/ProfessorAsaKasher_Paper.pdf accessed 28
April 2008.
94
28
adherents are rationally entitled to a high measure of confidence in its epistemological and moral
resources’.98 Once chosen and justified, one can substantiate what actions are right for a soldier
to conduct, and enable, empower, the soldiers with the ability to judge for themselves, to justify the
action for themselves. Moral autonomy is essential when reconciled with the virtue of selfdiscipline. The concept of the strategic corporal (or soldier) is equally as aptly defined as ‘strategic
in the ethical sense’ as he is in the military sense.99 In the absence of a general belief in divine
authority to provide the justness of a cause, virtue ethics can at least provide a semblance of
justness of action for individuals and a profession such as the military. Reflection and
development of specific virtues, situated in a Code of Ethics and imbued by ethics education,
should better prepare the soldier to make these ethically strategic decisions.
The Armed Forces, as an educational system, should aim to create ethically strategic
soldiers, possessing an element of moral autonomy, who, when circumstances present
themselves, act in a manner that is less likely to lead to ethical failure. Military ethics are not
developed in isolation to prevent ethical failure. Coherent operating procedures, robust rules of
engagement, cultural awareness and empathetic leadership all assist in producing morally
justifiable action on the battlefield.100 Shannon French argues convincingly for the requirement for
militaries to have demanding codes of behaviour, linked to their society’s beliefs, which require
higher ethical standards than that expected from an ordinary citizen. Her reasons for this include
the need to protect the military from psychological damage, to shield the soldier by providing a
justification for killing in the name of the state, to provide a measure for society to judge the soldier
as ‘proud defenders’ and ‘heroes’, and to provide an element of nobility into conflict.101 Soldiers
act on behalf of the state and it would seem proper for the state to ensure that soldiers have some
protection from the ‘worst effects’ of being a soldier and carrying out their will. 102 A developing
principle of Western war is to protect the force103 and this does not only apply whilst deployed on
operations. The rules of war, the regulation of behaviour in war, and force protection, physical
protection, count towards this aim but, at least equal to the body, the mind needs to be protected.
A way of reducing post-traumatic stress disorder is to ‘shield the mind’, to provide an intellectual
framework to justify action that is more than simply acting for the greater good.
If this is the case, are the UK Armed Forces educating their personnel sufficiently in such a
code? Are soldiers educated in the core values of their Service in an inspiring enough manner to
promote adherence without the threat of punishment or in sufficient depth to be meaningful? Is it a
case of ‘follow these rules and you will ‘become’ a better soldier’? Osiel believed that ‘there is a
great deal more potential left in the virtue-oriented approach to the prevention of atrocity than most
98
MacIntyre, op. cit., p.277.
Ignatieff, op. cit., p.28.
100 Wortel, E. M. and Schoenmakers, J. P. M., ‘Teaching military ethics’, US Joint Services Conference on
Professional Ethics, 26 January 2006, http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE06/Wortel-Schoenmakers06.html
accessed 24 March 2008, conclusion.
101 French, op. cit.
102 May, op. cit., p.37.
103 Smith, op. cit., p.19.
99
29
civilians assume, or imagine possible.’104 MacIntyre saw the virtuous self as 'an unfolding narrative
of moral continuity. ... Narratives are constructed (or, better yet, lived) which establish a thread of
continuity between one's past actions or beliefs and the future self one is intent on becoming'.105
Are core values as described and taught sufficient for this end? If not, the core values taught are
not sufficient for their purpose and the UK Armed Forces should aspire to provide soldiers with
greater education to develop their virtuosity.
A proposed joint Code of Ethics
‘I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances,
rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.
This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity.’106
There is a significant baseline for ethics education in the UK Armed Forces in the form of
the core values of the single Services. The words from McIntyre above can be firmly ascribed to
the UK Armed Forces – the current ‘ethos’ which has core values can be adapted to form the
relevant constituent parts of a form of virtue ethics education. An analysis of the single Service
core values reveals that there are significant overlaps and commonalities between them. This
paper proposes that a joint Code of Ethics be designed and promulgated by the Ministry of
Defence. In order to assist in the agreement of the Code and to allay fears of the erosion of single
Service ethos, it should be made possible to supplement the Code with single Service variations
upon agreement with a central Defence organisation dedicated to military ethics. What would a
joint Code of Ethics for the UK Armed Forces consist of? The Code must support the UK’s core
values in the National Security Strategy: human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable
government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all.107 There are significant debates
on what character traits should be considered as virtues and therefore this paper proposes the
following Code for further discussion, not as a definitive list for adoption: courage, self-discipline,
integrity, honour, professional excellence, loyalty, respect for human dignity, cheerfulness and
humility.
The primary martial virtue should be courage, both moral and physical, as the mean
between rashness and cowardice in Aristotelian ethics. Physical courage for the military is seen as
a great virtue, rewarded with honours and awards but moral courage is of equal, if not greater,
importance. It has developed to signify ‘the capacity to overcome the fear of shame and
humiliation in order to admit one’s mistakes, to confess a wrong, to reject evil conformity, to
104
Osiel, op. cit., p.38.
MacIntyre, op. cit., p.124.
106 MacIntyre, op. cit., p.220.
107 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, (UK: The Stationery Office Limited,
2008), p.6.
105
30
denounce injustice, and to defy immoral or imprudent orders.’108 The soldier who defies his peers
to report an injustice upon another deserves praise; he has displayed moral courage at the
possible expense of his standing in his group. Reflective ethics education would allow the group to
realise why the soldier broke rank even if they still shun him. At least the common evaluative
language shared by the group would allow the soldier to explain his actions, to persuade them of
his action’s necessity. Without this, the military are only reinforcing the notion that the group is
paramount and that moral courage is not a true virtue, just another set of words to be memorised
for an annual test.109
Self-discipline should be a virtue from which obedience to lawful orders will follow. Osiel
suggests that rules that state ‘obey all legal orders’ should state ‘disobey all [perceived] illegal
orders unless reasonably convinced of their [actual] legality’.110 Regard for the rule of law, IHL,
customs of war, and rules of engagement will be strengthened by the adoption and promotion of
self-discipline. This will not occur for Kantian principles, but for discipline of character because
obedience will make the soldier a more ethical person. The end is the soldier acting ethically, not
as a result of his actions but the result of his character. Integrity, both to others and self, would be
intertwined with the self-discipline virtue but would form a separate virtue in itself. Acting at all
times in line with what he honestly believes is the mark of a soldier with integrity. Mileham
describes integrity as ‘that faculty of our character whereby what we say is what we do; what we
promise, we deliver; … Furthermore, what we say we will not do, for good reason, we do not do.’111
Self-discipline and integrity are vital and self-reinforcing for the character of a soldier.
Linked firmly to integrity, honour should form a military virtue in this Code. Robinson
reconciles integrity and honour based on the premise that to act as one believes regardless of
what others think creates ‘internal honour’. This view is honourable as long as what one believes
is virtuous112 which would be developed by ethics education and immersion in Service ethos.
Based on Bentham’s writings, May states that, ‘honour seems to be an enhancement of the
ordinary efficacy of moral prohibitions.’113 In other words, an honourable soldier holds himself to a
higher moral standard than civilians, or less scrupulous soldiers, because he needs to shield
himself from the act of killing that is his profession. He needs to be honourable to combine
‘enhanced respect for normal moral rules’ with respect for ‘special rules that require conscientious
reflection and socialised motivation crucial for humanitarian law’s requirement that soldiers act with
restraint even when their lives are jeopardised on the battlefield’.114 This is reinforced by
Robinson’s conclusion that the extremes of honour which may turn it into a vice can be countered
108
Miller, I., The mystery of courage, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2000), p.254.
For further analysis of different types of courage, see Olsthoorn, Peter, ‘Courage in the military: physical
and moral’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol 6, No 4, 2007, pp.270-279.
110 Osiel, op. cit., p.325.
111 Mileham, (2001), op. cit., p.65.
112 Robinson, Paul, ‘Magnanimity and integrity as military virtues’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol 6, Issue 4,
2007, pp.261-262.
113 May, op. cit., p.31.
114 Ibid., p.32
109
31
by placing ‘respect for human dignity’ on an equal footing as moral courage and loyalty. 115 Within
this moral construct, it would be honourable not to kill Walzer’s ‘naked soldier’,116 even though it
may be justifiable within the rule of law, due to a respect for human dignity. Osiel believes that
‘martial honour may be more effective in motivating compliance with ethical norms than the threat
of legal sanctions.’117
The pursuit of professional excellence should be a military virtue. This means to aspire for
the most amount of practical and intellectual knowledge concerning a soldier’s function within the
military and the most amount of additional knowledge that might contribute indirectly to that
function. Combined with determination and fortitude, this would lead to greater low level
leadership, initiative and adaptability amongst soldiers. Loyalty to the Armed Forces and the state
should be a virtue. Loyalty will need to be developed, not assumed, to include loyalty upwards,
downwards and across the chain of command. Service, teamwork, trust, unselfishness and unity
would be built into the loyalty virtue.
‘A positive account of the matter must begin with the observation that war, conflict, and aggression
are relations between persons.’118
Nagel’s wise words remind us that respect for human dignity must be a military virtue,
incorporating respect for others outside the military and mutual respect within the military. In
operational terms, this virtue would be linked squarely with the notion of humanity as forbidding
‘the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of
legitimate military purposes.’119 But more than this restraint, it would encourage sympathy and
magnanimity amongst soldiers for prisoners of war and for the general civilian population. The
truism that ‘effective soldiers never deny the humanity of their adversary’120 would be reinforced by
encouraging empathy and compassion amongst soldiers.
Cheerfulness in the form of wittiness or humour that maintain or enhances morale should
be encouraged as a virtue. Professional excellence will ensure that this wittiness is not
inappropriate but well intentioned and timely. Without appropriate cheerfulness, it is difficult to see
how war is survivable without significant mental stress. Humility is the final virtue of a soldier that
is vital to ensure that they do not believe that they are better than others. This will reinforce the
virtues of respect for human dignity, loyalty and honour. Humility needs to be a virtue to maintain
the sense of the soldier as a servant of the state and to prevent the demonising of the enemy that
has produced atrocities in the past.
115
Robinson, (2007), op. cit., p.268.
Walzer, op. cit., p.143.
117 Osiel, op. cit., p.32.
118 Nagel, (1974), op. cit., p.13.
119 JDCC, (2004), op. cit., p.23.
120 Osiel, op. cit., p.170.
116
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Methodology of ethics education
‘There exists a strong chance that an individual will uphold moral values if those values are not
perceived as a varnish which has no deep root in his personal convictions, but when those values
have become, as a result of moral (self)education, a part of his sense of personal identity.’121
If virtue ethics are accepted as the basis for ethics education in the UK Armed Forces, how
should soldiers be educated in the chosen virtues? How can the military avoid learning virtues
parrot-fashion, but understand what they really mean and use them as a guide for action? This
section will present the case for a Joint syllabus of ethics education, with a through-career focus for
officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, focussing on a formal class-based grounding in
ethics theory, taught by military and academic instructors, and reinforced by appropriate military
case studies, exposure to role models (the leaders) and a weather eye on examining the ethical
implications of actions throughout military training.122 Lord Moran aptly and succinctly described
why virtue ethics matter to the military:
‘Character as Aristotle taught is a habit, the daily choice of right instead of wrong; it is a moral
quality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed on the outbreak of war.
For war … has no power to transform, it merely exaggerates the good and evil that are in us, till it
is plain for all to read; it cannot change, it exposes. Man’s fate in battle is worked out before war
begins. For his acts in war are dictated not by courage, nor by fear, but by conscience, of which
war is the final test. The man whose quick conscience is the secret of his success in battle has the
same clear cut feelings about right and wrong before war makes them obvious to all. If you know a
man in peace, you know him in war.’123
Contrast these admirable words with current doctrine: ‘Being highly motivated in peace-time is one
thing; to retain that motivation in the face of battle requires a profoundly deep commitment to one’s
comrades, one’s unit, one’s country and to the cause for which one is fighting.’124 Contrast the use
of the words ‘conscience’ and ‘motivation’ – it is the emphasis on conscience that a military ethic
would focus upon in order to produce motivation and commitment. If the military are serious about
developing ethical thought leading to ethical action, the education package must fire the will as well
as the mind.125 To develop the complete person is a difficult task, more than the effort of a few
Baarda, Ted, ‘Military ethics in peacekeeping and in war: Maintaining moral integrity in a world of contrast
and confusion’, speech at the University of Amsterdam, 2 October 2003, http://www.jha.ac/articles/a129.htm
accessed 4 April 2008, conclusion.
122 Robinson, (2008), op. cit., pp.9-10.
123 Lord Moran, Anatomy of courage, (Gateshead: Northumberland, 1966), p.160.
124 MOD, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01 - British Defence Doctrine, 2nd Ed., October 2001 (Crown
Copyright), p.4-4.
125 Likona, Thomas, ’What does moral psychology have to say to the teachers of ethics?’, in Callahan, Daniel
and Bok, Sissela, (eds.), Ethics teaching in higher education, (New York: Plenum, 1980), p.132.
121
33
standard lectures. It may be its scale is too daunting in an era of scarce resources but that is the
challenge, the gauntlet that has been thrown down. Although concerns about efficient use of
resources are valid, they should not overwrite the vital nature of the proposed educational
system.126 Success in ethics education will decrease the chances of operational failure in the
contemporary operating environment.
The idea that soldiers do not just follow orders but are required to make independent
decisions within an intellectual and situational framework has developed according to social and
technological changes.127 This means that members of the military must develop four crucial
attributes within a more (modern) democratic model. First, skill in the use of weapons and physical
stamina. Second, discipline and the ability to communicate with others when working in groups.
Third, sufficient initiative to enable them to work independently of the group when circumstances
require them to do so. Fourth, and finally, a sense of moral responsibility for the actions of their
group as well as for their individual actions.128 The first requires the typical repetitive, automatic
training that is the experience of soldiers throughout the ages. The second requires the application
of standard procedures, technical competence and skill, combined with social bonding. The third
requires experience and ability to recognise how to apply different aspects of training and
education to specific circumstances, with the understanding that the chain of command would
sanction the behaviour. This assumes trust but this must be developed by example and
experience, proving that the chain is willing to support risk and allow initiative to flourish in the
training environment. The fourth aspect requires significant investment in ethics education, more
than annual revision of a list of values but a structured syllabus of study, essentially Joint but with
Service specificities, based on Socratian dialogue rather than learning rules and regulations.
Therefore, within this framework of attributes, different methods of training and education are
necessary within the military that currently are not in evidence.
Socratian dialogue, described by Joseph Miller, involves examining what one believes to be
right or wrong in a given situation, questioning the justifications given to support those beliefs and
subsequently testing those justifications against other theories until some general principles are
established that one thinks are acceptable. This requires all those involved in educating to develop
a habit of posing questions until the underlying values of the situation are revealed to the students.
As Socrates said to Protagoras: ‘Cut up your answers into shorter pieces, the better for me to
follow you.’ It does not always lead to a homogenous set of answers, but does challenge beliefs
and facilitates moral autonomy – it develops mental and moral agility and allows the soldier to
think. There does appear to be reluctance to educate the military formally in ethics theory and use
that as the basis for ethics education. As Miller hypothesises, this may stem from the military
pedagogy that focuses upon imparting knowledge via a military expert to students, which does not
tally with a methodology with encourages dialogue that may challenge the ‘expert’. The danger of
Ficarrotta, J. Carl, ‘Military Ethics’, Air and Space Power Journal, Winter 2006, p.92.
Fleming, op. cit., pp.7-8.
128 Fotion, Nicholas and Elfstrom, Gerard, Military ethics, (n.p.: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p.62.
126
127
34
allowing military professionals, who may or may not have a grounding in ethics theory, to lead in
this type of instruction is that cadets and recruits do not benefit from a rounded, considered
understanding of the issues; they are exposed to merely an opinion, an interpretation of events, of
an instructor.129 To ensure that this does not happen, an educational methodology is required that
is built upon a joint syllabus with a through-life focus on developing ethics educators within the
military, reliant primarily on academics for their education.
An overarching focus for ethics education in the UK Armed Forces is missing. To rectify
this, a Centre for Excellence for Military Ethics must be created as a priority, with single Services
providing suitable staff as they find them in the first instance. The Centre would be able to
determine the structure of ethics education that should be implemented across Defence, from initial
recruit and officer training to higher education courses. Other comparable countries have
developed military ethics to be taught to the whole force. A Defence Ethics Programme owned by
a Directorate (Canada) and a Military Ethics Programme owned by the national Defence College
(Australia and the Netherlands) have been created. It would seem prudent to establish the UK’s
Centre of Excellence at the Defence Academy, Shrivenham, as military ethics are currently taught
to officers on various courses by academics from King’s College, London. This combination of
academics and military professionals should produce a balanced programme, aimed at each level
of education, coherent in structure and content with a through-life focus. The Code of Ethics
Programme could then be cascaded through the Defence training establishments with an initial
information campaign for those currently serving. It will take some years before the programme is
fully bedded in but should lead to command courses having a progressive teaching package
attached to allow those promoted, officers and NCOs, to educate others.
The most forward leaning organisation in this field, the British Army, believes that a
'through-life' approach to the instruction and education in Values and Standards is already being
delivered, and does not see the imperative for any additional training in Values and Standards
outside of a re-vamped initial and annual training requirement.130 There is a school of thought that
the perceived lack of educational ability amongst the UK Armed Forces prevents any more
rigorous ethics education than being currently provided. However, they are expected to make the
right decisions so they must have the requisite ability to do so. This requires new ways of learning
for the military. ‘Situational deliberation’ and Socratian dialogue, not rote rule-learning, ‘produces
more effective and ethical decisions in many of the predicaments faced by professional soldiers
which require hard choices and quick judgment calls in the field.’131 Currently soldiers to pass their
annual values and standards test must state the role of ethics in values and standards, list the
values of the British Army and apply them to a few situations in a non-operational setting. As
Ficarrotta states, ‘military ethics cannot be taught via posters, pamphlets or short motivational
Miller, J. Joseph, ‘Squaring the circle’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol 3, No 3, 2004, p.205.
HQ LAND, ‘Review of the Values and Standards Action Plan’, 12 February 2008,
http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2008/DEP2008-0476.doc accessed 24 March 2008.
131 Osiel, op. cit., p.327.
129
130
35
speeches’.132 Greater intellectual rigour must be applied across all ranks on educating soldiers,
NCOs and officers in ethics theory and practice.
The current methodology relies heavily on training rather than education. In order to imbue
ethics in the military, to convey conscience, a soldier must be educated and have the time to reflect
on the reasons why an action should be taken or not; not rely on a simple multiple choices test
where there is one right answer. This merely encourages the idea that in ethics there will be a
simple answer to a situation, whereas in reality the choices will be more complex. The education
must have a theoretical element to it in order to allow the soldier to understand why values, virtues,
matter so much in the military, not only operationally but institutionally. This will need to be classbased, led by appropriate educators, who themselves have been educated in the most appropriate
form of pedagogy. As people of action, soldiers are concerned with morality in a very practical
sense. Any educational package that failed to realise this would quickly be labelled a gimmick by
soldiers and studiously ignored. Most ethics education focuses on officers, but the NCOs and
soldiers suffer from a lack of formal military education in the subject. The officers must provide a
shining example of moral behaviour, to exemplify the notion of ‘do as I do and do what I say.’
However, by focussing effort on the officers and not the vast majority of the Armed Forces, the
military are forcing moral problems onto the other ranks without providing them the tools to fully
justify their actions to themselves. Hence, there is a greater risk currently that the ‘strategic soldier’
may not act virtuously when faced with an ethical decision since he may not be grounded in ethical
reasoning. The cascade of education flowing from the Centre for Excellence would mitigate this to
a certain extent but greater involvement of academics is required.
Conclusion
As a result of the frequent morally ambiguous circumstances that military personnel can
find themselves in conflict, high ethical standards are more consistently demanded by the national
and international public. These circumstances make it increasingly important for the UK Armed
Forces to ‘build up moral defences against barbarism’.133 However, even with the application of
ethics education, there are no flawless moral actions. The UK Armed Forces have an undeniably
high reputation for fairness and discipline with little formalised ethics education outside of officer
education. In a similar manner to US military officers after Vietnam, will UK officers believe that
they lack authoritative guidance to solve the moral dilemmas faced in Iraq and Afghanistan? If this
becomes the case, will the introduction of and education in a joint military ethic address their
concerns? 134 The consequences of living by a code of ethics based on the virtues to be proposed
should be a more virtuous Armed Force, which should assist in preventing ethical failures. This is
not intuition but probability based upon the fact that most people are not criminals, the majority of
132
Ficarrotta, op. cit., p.92.
Glover, Jonathan, Humanity, (London: Pimlico, 2001), p.409.
134 Myers, op. cit., section 2, para 4.
133
36
soldiers do not commit atrocity and most doctors do not murder their patients.135 Immersing the
soldier in ethical language and education should lead to more ethical behaviour.
Paraphrasing Toner and Toner, ethics education is part of the support for a bridge.136 On
one side is our beliefs and on the other, our actions. To live a just life, we must connect the two
with a bridge. The bridge that connects the two is supported by our beliefs, friends, occupation,
education and other factors, which must be constantly refreshed in order to maintain their support.
There are certain bridgekeepers which prevent unjust traffic crossing; for the military, these
bridgekeepers are wise educators, colleagues and superiors. They assist the soldier in
determining the just path. Ethics education would provide firmer supports for that bridge and lead
to less likelihood of ethical, and therefore possible operational, failure.
This paper has demonstrated that it may be possible to more formally educate members of
the UK Armed Forces to conduct their actions in a morally ‘balanced, courageous and, where
possible, magnanimous’137 manner. This requires an ethics education programme that is tangible,
accountable and open, based on current values, formalised across the three Services to reflect a
joint Code of Ethics. It will be difficult to produce in a final version and implement; but this Code
should act as a shield for soldiers and their actions in conflict and allow them to conduct their
employment as the final defenders of the national interest. This paper is a sincere proposal for the
UK Armed Forces to design and articulate ‘a clear moral self-understanding’138 by stating a joint
Code of Ethics and educating its personnel in a manner that facilitates moral autonomy. Many
questions remain however. When ethical failures occur under the new system, will the jury
condemn the system or celebrate that the fault can be found in an individual, not the system? Will
the ability to kill and seize ground be lost if soldiers think too much? The balance will need to be
struck, on an unyielding basis, between training soldiers to obey legal orders to kill in war and
educating them to disobey illegal orders to murder. Whatever the answers to these questions,
action is required now.
Robinson, Paul, de Lee, Nigel and Carrick, Don, ‘Conclusion’, in Robinson, de Lee and Carrick, op. cit.,
p.199.
136 Toner and Toner, op. cit., Section 5.
137 Mink, F. B., quoted in Baarda, op. cit., conclusion.
138 Watson. Bradley, ‘The Western ethical tradition and the morality of the warrior’, Armed Forces and
society, Vol 26, No 1, Fall 1999, p.55.
135
37
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