1.
Discussion Questions: A Theory of Justice, sections 15-19
15. Primary Social Goods as the Basis of Expectations
(1) what are the difficulties with the judgments of welfare on which utilitarianism relies?
(2) how does the difference principle meet utilitarianism’s problem with interpersonal
comparisons?
(3) how are primary goods defined? is it true that everyone would want them, whatever else he
wants? why would monks who take vows of poverty want income and wealth?
(4) why should we assess the justice of the basic structure by the primary goods those in various
positions can expect, rather than by the happiness they enjoy when they use them?
(5) what difference does it make that there cannot be “agreement on how to estimate happiness”
or “on the intrinsic value of life plans”? why is agreement relevant here?
(6) Rawls says that the use of primary goods is simplifying device. he adds that simplifying
devices generally must identify essential elements that explain what we want to understand.
does the use of primary goods do this, or does it beg important philosophical questions about the
bases of social justice?
16. Relevant Social Positions
(1) why does Rawls need to specify what he calls “relevant social positions”?
(2) what social positions does Rawls single out as relevant? should he single out more? if so, for
what purposes?
(3) what problems are properly addressed from assessing society from the standpoint of the
equal citizen?
(4) what is unsatisfactory about attempts to specify social positions by income and wealth?
(5) on what grounds does Rawls argue that the specification of more relevant social positions -by caste or sex -- is unnecessary?
(6) why does assessment from the social positions deemed relevant have priority to the
assessment from social positions defined by the known interests of individuals in them?
17. The Tendency to Equality
(1) what is the principle of redress and how does the difference principle give some weight to
considerations singled out by it?
(2) instead of trying to show that these considerations are given some weight by the difference
principle, why not simply define relevant social positions to include the handicaps and
disadvantages the principle, in effect, redresses?
(3) does the difference principle give appropriate weight to the considerations singled out by the
principle of redress? even if it does, are the grounds on which it does so persuasive? (consider,
in this connection, Rawls’s clever argument on pp. 86-7. there he attempts to accommodate our
2.
intuitions about who should be given how much education and why and to do so on a very
slender basis. he argues that the level of education we intuitively think just is in fact required by
a just distribution of the primary good of self-respect. see also pp. 91-2 in this connection.)
(4) explain how the difference principle represents an agreement to treat the distribution of
talents as a common asset.
(5) what does it mean to say that the difference principle expresses a conception of reciprocity?
(6) is Rawls’s argument that the difference principle could be justified to the better off
compelling? why or why not? the crucial claim in that argument is “we can ask for the willing
cooperation of everyone only if the terms of the scheme are reasonable.” what does “reasonable”
mean here?
Argument sees to depend upon a claim about rewarding the talented twice over. Seems like an odd
claim. Rawls takes it from Mill; see Principles of Political Economy, p. 210.
(7) is Rawls’s argument against relying on the notion of desert compelling (pp. 88-9)? why or
why not?
(8) does the difference principle correspond to an idea of fraternity? why has fraternity been
neglected indemocratic theory?
(9) do we live in a meritocratic society, as Rawls understands it? would the difference principle
address the problem such a society poses? would any other -- say, liberal equality with a
guaranteed social minimum?
18. Principles for Individuals: The Principle of Fairness
(1) why are all principles for individuals adopted after those for the basic structure?
(2) what is the principle of fairness?
(3) what distinguishes obligations from other moral requirements? are the duties incumbent on
one in virtue of taking an oath obligations in Rawls’s sense? why or why not?
(4) is the principle of fairness sufficient to cover or, better, explain the grounds of, obligations?
19. Principles for Individuals: The Natural Duties
(1) what distinguishes natural duties from obligations?
(2) is it a problem that the grounds of the natural duties cannot be explained by a single principle
or small family of principles? why or why not?
(3) is Rawls correct that there is a natural duty, but not an obligation, not to murder?
(4) are the duties of justice that Rawls cites natural duties? or is the category of a natural duty of
justice ad hoc, added so that Rawls can ground political obligation after all?
(5) why might someone think it surprising that a contractarian view allows for unconditional
obligations? what objection is Rawls imagining and replying to here?
3.
(6) what does Rawls mean by saying that the principle of fairness binds “those who, being better
situated, have advanced their aims within the system”? if the system is a scheme for mutual
benefit, hasn’t everyone advanced her aims?