ARE FUNDAMENTAL DISCURSIVE NORMS
OBJECTIVE?
Sebastian Laukötter, Bernd Prien, Till Schepelmann, Christian Thein
Abstract: Robert Brandom’s book “Making It Explicit” (MIE) can be read as a theory of social norms.
Since our rationality consists in our being engaged in norm-governed discursive practices, social
norms play a very central role for us. In our paper, we are going to draw two distinctions in the domain of social norms: First one can distinguish between objective and non-objective norms, and second one can distinguish between those norms in the game of giving and asking for reasons that correspond to inferences and those norms in that game that do not. Brandom himself stresses the importance of the first distinction, but he does not even mention the second. Having drawn these distinctions, we want to defend the thesis that the norms that do not correspond to inferences (i) are
fundamental for our discursive practices and (ii) that Brandom has to treat them as non-objective. We
will argue that (iii) this view is objectionable.
Keywords: social norm, objectivity, game of giving and asking for reasons, rationality
TWO KINDS OF NORMS
We want to start by introducing the distinction between objective and nonobjective norms. What we mean by objectivity of a norm is more adequately
put by saying that the norm gives rise to attitude-transcendent correctness. A
norm gives rise to correctness insofar as it declares certain actions as correct
and others as incorrect. The attitudes that are said to be transcended are the
deontic attitudes of the members of the community, i.e., whether they take an
action to be correct or not. Now, the correctness a norm gives rise to is attitude-transcendent if and only if it is possible that all of the members of the
community take an action to be correct while in fact it violates the norm. So,
the correctness of an action according to a norm can transcend the deontic
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Laukötter, Prien, Schepelmann, Thein
attitudes of the community members in the sense that the correctness is independent of those attitudes.
Brandom claims that both attitude transcendent and non-attitudetranscendent norms exist. Examples of the latter kind are conventional
norms. “Whatever the Kwakiutl treat as an appropriate greeting gesture for
their tribe […] is one; it makes no sense to suppose that they could collectively be wrong about this sort of thing.” (MIE 53) In cases like this one, what
the large majority of the community-members takes to be correct is correct.
Therefore, it makes no sense to assume that everyone could be wrong about
the appropriateness of a gesture. Or, to take another example: When everybody takes it that male bank employees should wear ties and not pearlnecklaces it makes no sense to assume that they are mistaken.
While Brandom concedes that there are norms of this sort, he insists that
conceptual norms are not of this sort (cf. MIE 53). Brandom claims that the
norms that underwrite the inferences that make up the conceptual contents of
assertions give rise to attitude-transcendent correctness. Even if all of the
members that ever did or ever will belong to the community would take a certain inference to be good, it could still be that the inference is not good.1 For
instance, it is possible that everybody who is, was, or will be a member of our
linguistic community takes the inference from “There is lightning” to “There
will be thunder” to be materially good, while in fact this inference is not good.
HOW CAN COMMUNAL PRACTICES INSTITUTE TRANSCENDENT
CORRECTNESS?
A full discussion of how social practices can institute attitude transcendent
correctness would be beyond the scope of this paper. However, as this will be
important for our discussion of fundamental discursive norms later on, we
now want to describe what we take to be a central feature of Brandom’s account. This is the idea that our discursive practices are solid, corporeal, even
1
Brandom takes it to be one of the prime tasks of MIE to show how norms of this
sort can be implicit in our practices. How can norms be instituted by the actual
normative attitudes in a community and, at the same time, transcend these attitudes?
Are Fundamental Discursive Norms Objective?
3
lumpy, and thick, as Brandom calls it at different places in his writings. 2 This
means that our practices do not merely consist in the manipulation of symbols, but rather include the objects they are about. When describing the discursive practices we also have to mention the objects we talk about because
our practices include language-entry- and -exit-transitions. As Brandom says
in lecture six of BSD, discursive practices are nothing that would “fall on the
‘word’ side of a word/world gulf.” (BSD 6.1, p. 3)
Because of this, “[t]he way the world is, constrains proprieties of inferential, doxastic, and practical commitments in a straightforward way from within
those practices.” (MIE 332) Brandom then goes on to illustrate this constraint
with his acid example:3
So if I perceive a liquid as tasting sour, infer that it is an acid, infer further that it will therefore turn litmus paper red, and, intending to match a
red pigment sample, accordingly dip litmus paper in the liquid, I may
nonetheless subsequently acquire perceptually a commitment to the result being a blue, rather than a red, piece of paper […]. In this way I can
find myself with incompatible commitments (which need to be sorted
out if I am to remain entitled to any of my commitments in the vicinity).
(MIE 332)4
This constraint by the world on our inferential practices provides an essential
part of an explanation of how our actual attitudes can institute correctnesses
that transcend these attitudes. The world can tell me, as it were, that some of
the inferences I endorse are not really good. I may take it that one can infer
from ‘sour tasting liquid’ to ‘acid’, but it may in fact be that one can only infer
from ‘sour tasting clear liquid’ to ‘acid’.
2
3
4
MIE 332, 632, BSD 6.1, p. 5.
The fact that this example keeps reappearing in Brandom’s writings testifies to the
importance of the process described here.
It is interesting that in later writings (for example, the Hegel-papers) Brandom
speaks of an obligation to remove such incompatibilities, instead of a commitment.
This is surprising because in MIE, Brandom explains that he prefers the term
‘commitment’ to ‘obligation’ because of the connotations of commands or edicts
from a superior involved in the latter term (MIE 160).
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This constraint by the world on the inferential proprieties opens up the
possibility of attitude transcendent correctness of inferences: Even if everyone in the community would infer from ‘acid’ to ‘turns litmus paper red’, it
could still be that this inference is not good because, as a matter of fact, there
are sour tasting liquids that do not turn litmus paper red. In that case it would
not be correct to draw the above inference, even if it is universally endorsed.
FUNDAMENTAL DISCURSIVE NORMS
Having dealt with the distinction concerning the objectivity of norms we now
turn to the distinction between inferential norms and fundamental discursive
norms. This is a distinction in the domain of the norms that define the game
of giving and asking for reasons, and it is one that Brandom, as far as we can
see, never mentions.
The game of giving and asking for reason contains norms that correspond to inferences, for example the commitment preserving inference from
“There is lightning” to “There will be thunder soon”. To this semantic relation, there corresponds, on the pragmatic level, a norm according to which
one is ceteris paribus committed to utter the words “There will be thunder” if
one has uttered the words “There is lightning”. Similarly, there are norms corresponding to entitlement-preserving inferences and relations of incompatibility. Since these conceptual norms correspond to inferences, we will refer to
them as inferential norms.
Now, even if Brandom does not say so explicitly, we think it is clear that
the game of giving and asking for reasons also contains norms that do not
correspond to an inference or an incompatibility relation. Here are three examples:
1) The obligation to justify one’s claims:5 When a speaker acknowledges a
commitment, she incurs an obligation to demonstrate her entitlement if
appropriately challenged. Like being committed to further claims, this
5
Interestingly, Brandom uses the term “obligation” in this context: “implicit obligation to vindicate the commitment undertaken by demonstrating one’s entitlement to
it.” (MIE 4.III.6, p. 227)
Are Fundamental Discursive Norms Objective?
5
obligation belongs to the normative consequences of undertaking a
commitment, but one would not say that there is an inference corresponding to this consequence.
2) The obligation to remove incompatibilities: As the example of the concept acid discussed above shows it can happen that we run into incompatible commitments. When something like this happens, we are obliged
to modify at least one of our inferential commitments. The norm giving
rise to this obligation does not correspond to an inference either.
One might try to argue that this obligation is already implicit in the incompatibility of two claims because part of what it is to be incompatible
is that this obligation obtains. This may be so, but one still has to distinguish between the norms that correspond to the incompatibility of two
claims and the norm according to which one is obliged to do something
in this case.
3) The entitlement to ascribe beliefs in the de re mode: If a speaker claims
that an object t is F and I am committed to the claim that s and t are
identical, than I can draw a substitutional inference to the claim that s is
F. Thus far, my discursive actions are legitimized by norms corresponding to inferences. However, for the practice of de re belief ascription, the
next step is crucial: Even if the speaker would explicitly deny that s and t
are identical, I am entitled to say that she believes of s that it is F and
criticize her for saying that. The entitlement to do so must be due to a
norm that is not already implicit in the inferential norms.6
We will call norms like these Fundamental Discursive Norms because they
have to be present in every practice that is to count as the game of giving and
asking for reasons. Moreover, the content of these norms – what they require
us to do under what conditions – is not determined empirically as in the case
of inferential norms. We have seen in the previous section that the content of
inferential norms is constrained by the way the world is and that we are
obliged to modify our inferential commitments if we find out that they do not
conform to the way the world is. The content of the fundamental discursive
norms, on the other hand, is not determined empirically, and we would not
6
The norm about de re belief ascription is crucial for Brandom’s argument for a representational dimension of conceptual content.
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modify them in the face of recalcitrant experience. If we did that we would
stop playing the game of giving and asking for reasons.
ARE FUNDAMENTAL DISCURSIVE NORMS OBJECTIVE?
Brandom stresses that inferential norms are objective and that this distinguishes them from conventional norms which are not. We now want to argue
that Brandom is committed to the view that the fundamental discursive
norms are not objective either and that they therefore seem to be mere conventions. At least his theory in MIE lacks the resources to establish a difference between fundamental discursive norms and conventional norms. The
following two considerations lead us to this conclusion:
1) Brandom cannot argue for the objectivity of the fundamental discursive norms in the same way that he has argued for the objectivity of material
inferential norms. As we have seen above, this objectivity is in the last analysis
due to the fact that there is a worldly constraint on what we can take these
norms to be. That the world can constrain our inferential norms depends on
the following three conditions: i) We can become entitled to claims because
of observation, ii) some claims are incompatible with one another, so that we
can become entitled to incompatible claims, iii) there is a norm according to
which we are obliged to modify our inferential commitments in this case. It is
clear that the worldly constraint on our norms does not apply to the fundamental discursive norms because in their case condition iii) is not satisfied.
We would not modify the fundamental discursive norms in cases of incompatibilities.7
2) There is a line of argument in MIE that we think can be interpreted as
an attempt to establish a difference between fundamental discursive norms
and conventional norms. Brandom says that rationality is what distinguishes
us from the non-us around us. And since playing the game of giving and ask7
In the case of the norm to remove incompatibilities, there is the further difficulty
that this norm is required for for the account of the objectivity of the inferential
norms. The attempt to account for the objectivity of this norm in the above way
would therefore be circular.
Are Fundamental Discursive Norms Objective?
7
ing for reasons constitutes our rationality, one can say, as Brandom does in a
slightly different context: „Conversation is the great good for discursive creatures.“ (MIE 644) However, the assumption that rationality defines us seems
unfounded. Couldn’t one just as well assume that what defines us is faith in
God and that worshiping Him is the great good for us? In that case one could
argue that the norms that are indispensable for our worshiping practices have
a special status while the norms that are indispensable for the discursive practices would sink to the status of mere conventions. So, the appeal to rationality in the end does not suffice to distinguish the fundamental discursive norms
from mere conventions. For all Brandom says in MIE, it could be a mere
convention that we should be rational.
Since no other way of arguing for the objectivity of the fundamental discursive norms suggests itself, it seems that in MIE Brandom has to accept the
consequence that it is up to the community to decide whether there is an obligation to remove incompatibilities, whether one can ascribe beliefs in the de
re mode, or whether speakers have to justify their claims if challenged.
We think that this consequence is objectionable because at least two of the
fundamental discursive norms mentioned here seem to correspond to features of the world. Unlike inferential norms, however, they seem to correspond to what one might call formal features of the world, whereas inferential
norms correspond to material features of the world.
Let us first explain this for the obligation to remove incompatibilities: As
Brandom would probably agree, it is a formal feature of the world that it contains properties that are incompatible with one another because it is in this
that the determinateness of properties consists.8 That two properties are incompatible in turn means that one and the same object cannot exhibit both of
them. There is a correspondence between this formal feature of the world
and the obligation of speakers to modify their inferential commitments if they
become entitled to attribute incompatible properties to an object.
Similarly, one can argue that the entitlement to ascribe beliefs in the de re
mode is due to a formal feature of the world, namely that all speakers talk
about one and the same world. When S claims that an object t is F, I can use
8
Cf. Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s Phenomenology, TMD p. 179f
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Laukötter, Prien, Schepelmann, Thein
‘t is identical with s ’ as a collateral premise to infer ‘s is F ’, even though S
would not accept this identity claim. What is more, I can assess S’s claim that
t is F by assessing ‘s is F ’. This practice corresponds to the formal fact that S
and I both talk about one and the same world, i.e., that S’s claim ‘t is F ’ and
my claim ‘t is identical with s ’ are supposed to be true of one and the same
world.
So, there seems to be an objective reason why we are obliged to remove
incompatibilities and why we are entitled to ascribe beliefs in the de re mode.
Still, at least in MIE, Brandom ultimately says nothing that could satisfactorily
account for this objectivity and distinguish the fundamental discursive norms
from conventional norms.
We think that this issue is ultimately left unresolved in MIE. However, the
question of the significance of one of the fundamental discursive norms – the
obligation to remove incompatibilities – is taken up again in “Holism and
Idealism in Hegel’s Phenomenology” and especially in the sixth Locke Lecture. There Brandom distinguishes between two senses of incompatibility. On
the one hand, two properties are incompatible in the objective sense if one
object cannot exhibit both of them. On the other hand, two claims can be incompatible in the subjective sense if speakers are not permitted to endorse
both of them.
Brandom then mentions two ways in which one might try to account for
the objectivity of the obligation to remove incompatibilities. The first strategy
(called objective pragmatism) assumes that there are objectively incompatible
properties (i.e., properties that cannot both be exhibited by one object) and
argues that because of this, there is an obligation to remove subjective incompatibilities. The second strategy (called subjective pragmatism) argues, in
a way reminiscent of Kant’s transcendental idealism, that because our discursive practice requires that there are commitments that cannot both be undertaken by one and the same speaker, there must be possible properties of objects that a single object cannot both exhibit. In other words, the second
strategy assumes that there are incompatibilities in the subjective sense and
argues that this somehow constitutes the formal feature of the world that
there are incompatibilities in the objective sense (cf. BSD 6.4, p. 27). We
think that the chances of getting either strategy to work are very dim. But if
Are Fundamental Discursive Norms Objective?
9
they could be made to work, they would indeed account for the objectivity of
the obligation to remove incompatibilities.
In any case, Brandom thinks that one can adopt neither of these explanatory strategies because they presuppose either that one can understand incompatibility in the objective sense apart from incompatibility in the subjective sense or vice versa. Against this, Brandom argues that both senses of incompatibility are reciprocally sense dependent, that one can understand each
only if one also understands the other. This may be so, but we think that this
still leaves the question of the objectivity of the obligation to remove incompatibilities unresolved. Brandom’s thesis about the reciprocal sense dependence is a thesis about our grasp of certain concepts. And as such it offers as
yet no explanation of why speakers should avoid subjective incompatibilities.