KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTION
Week 2: What is Knowledge? I
A.J. Ayer. 1956. ‘The Right to Be Sure’, from The Problem
of Knowledge (Penguin,
Harmondsworth), reprinted in L.M. Alcoff (ed.),
Epistemology: The Big
Questions (Blackwell, Oxford, 1998).
E. Gettier. 1963. ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’,
Analysis 23, 121-3, reprinted
in S. Bernecker and F. Dretske (eds.) Knowledge:
Readings in Contemporary
Epistemology
(Oxford
University
Press,
Oxford,
2000).
A. Goldman. 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal
of Philosophy 64, 357-72.
Week 3: What is Knowledge? II
T. Williamson. 2000. ‘Unanalysable Knowledge’, from
Knowledge and its Limits
(Oxford University Press, Oxford). Focus on §2, pp.
2-5.
B. Weatherson. 2003. ‘What Good are Counterexamples?’,
Philosophical Studies
115, 1-31.
Week 4: The Structure of Knowledge
L. Bonjour. 1978. ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a
Foundation?’,
American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 1-13.
A. Goldman. 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal
of Philosophy 64, 357-72.
(See Week 1.)
Week 5: The Argument from Illusion and Sense-Data
B. Russell. 1912. ‘Appearance and Reality’, from The
Problems of Philosophy (Oxford
University Press, Oxford).
J.L. Austin. 1962. Lectures 111 and v, from Sense and
Sensibilia (Oxford University
Press, Oxford).
Week 6: Intentionalism
D.M. Armstrong. 1968. ‘Perception and Belief’, from
Materialist Theory of the
Mind (London, Routledge).
Week 7: Disjunctivism
A
J.
McDowell.
1982.
‘Criteria,
Defeasibility,
and
Knowledge’, reprinted in J. Dancy
(ed.) Perceptual Knowledge (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1988).
T. Williamson. 2000. ‘Factive Mental States’, from
Knowledge and its Limits
(Oxford University Press, Oxford), §3, pp. 5-8. (See
Week 3.)
J.L. Austin. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia, especially §5,
pp. 79-83. (See Week 5.)
Week 8: A Priori Knowledge I
I. Kant. 1781. From The Critique of Pure Reason,
reprinted in M. Huemer (ed.),
Epistemology:
Contemporary
Readings
(London,
Routledge, 2002).
Week 9: A Priori Knowledge II
A.J. Ayer. 1936. ‘The A Priori’, from Language, Truth and
Logic (Penguin,
Harmondsworth), pp. 45-8 and 96-115.
P. Kitcher. 1980. ‘A Priori Knowledge’, The Philosophical
Review 89, 2-23; focus on
§§1-4 (pp.3-14) and §7 (pp. 21-3).
MODULE OUTLINE
Aim
To introduce students to some key issues in epistemology.
Content
This
module
covers
some
of
the
key
debates
in
epistemology on a topic by topic, rather than an
historical, basis. The emphasis is therefore on the
issues, rather than who thought what. The module has
three main parts:

First, we consider the nature of knowledge. We begin by
considering whether knowledge can be analysed, and in
particular whether knowledge can be analysed in terms
of justified true belief. We then go onto to consider
the structure of knowledge, paying particular attention
to
the
question
of
whether
there
are
any
epistemologically basic beliefs.

This leads into the second part of the module, which is
concerned with one of the most basic methods of
acquiring knowledge: perception. We will consider three
theories of perception that provide different ways of
responding to the argument from illusion: the sensedatum theory, intentionalism (the specific form of this
theory we will consider is sometimes called a ‘belief
theory of perception’), and disjunctivism.

The third and final part of the module is concerned
with a priori knowledge: knowledge that is, in some
sense,
independent
of
experience.
Kant’s
famous
discussion of a priori knowledge will be compared and
contrasted with two more contemporary accounts.
The topics and readings are all inter-related. Students
are expected to think about the relations between
material covered in different parts of the course. With
this in mind, some of the readings are used more than
once.
Objectives
By the end of the module, students should
 Describe and critically assess some
nature of knowledge
 Describe and critically assess some
structure of knowledge
 Describe
and
critically
assess
acquiring knowledge
be able to:
accounts of the
accounts of the
some
ways
of
Students will also develop some core philosophical
skills, including the ability to:
 define key terminology;
 accurately describe the content of major works of
philosophy;
 distinguish different solutions to philosophical
problems;
 appraise the persuasiveness of arguments.
Teaching
There will be 2 one-hour lectures and 1 one-hour seminar
per week, Weeks 2-9.
Lectures: Tuesday, 3.15-4.15
12.15-1.15 in D/056.
in
D/056
and
Wednesday,
Details of seminar groups and times will be distributed
in week 1. Students should come to seminars having read
the relevant material, and having answered the study
questions contained within this pack. These questions are
designed to help you to read the text closely and think
about the issues involved. Seminars are your opportunity
to discuss the material that we will consider in this
course. To get the most out of the seminars, you must be
well prepared.
Formal Requirements
Students are formally required to:
 Attend lectures and seminars. If, for any reason, you
are unable to attend a seminar, you must let your tutor
know in advance.
 Read the set texts each week and answer the study
questions contained within this Reading Pack.
 Submit two assessed essays, as described below.
Assessment
Assessment for this module will be by two submitted
essays. Essay questions will be distributed during
lectures later in term; they will also be posted on my
webpage (http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~ka519).
 The first essay must be submitted by Friday 3 p.m.,
Week 5.
 The second essay must be submitted by Wednesday 3
p.m., Week 10.
The word limits for both essays is 2000 words. Essays
that are found to exceed the word limit will be
penalised. For the Department’s policies on word limits,
see:
http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/phil/currentugrads/Word%20Lim
its.pdf.
Essays should be typed, double spaced and in a 12 point
type-face that is appropriate for a piece of academic
work (so: not Comic Sans!). You should state your name,
college, tutor and word count; you should also include a
bibliography.
The usual rules about plagiarism apply. For more
information
on
plagiarism,
see:
http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/phil/current/researchskillsse
ssionjan07.htm.
General guidelines on essay technique are available from
the
Department
webpage
(http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/phil/current)
and
my
personal webpage. Students are also advised to consult
the
Department’s
document.
Assessment
Policies
and
Practices
Reading
All the required reading for this module is contained
within
this
Reading
Pack.
Students
are,
however,
encouraged to read more widely.
Useful resources include:
Alcoff, L. (ed.) 1998. Epistemology: The Big Questions
(Blackwell).
*Bernecker, S. and Dretske, F. (eds.) 2000. Knowledge:
Readings in Contemporary
Epistemology (Oxford University Press).
*Dancy,
J.
1985.
Introduction
to
Contemporary
Epistemology (Blackwell).
*Dancy, J. (ed.) 1988. Perceptual Knowledge (Oxford).
Dancy, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.). 1992. A Companion to
Epistemology (Blackwell).
Greco, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.). 1999. The Blackwell Guide
to Epistemology (Blackwell).
Lehrer, K. 1990. Theory of Knowledge (Westview).
*Sosa, E. and Kim, J. (eds.). 1999. Epistemology: An
Anthology (Blackwell).
Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.). 2005. Contemporary Debates
in Epistemology
(Blackwell).
Sturgeon,
S.,
Martin,
M.G.F.,
Grayling,
A.
1998.
‘Epistemology’, in Philosophy 1: A
Guide Through the Subject (ed.) A.C. Grayling
(Oxford).
‘*’ indicates that a copy is held in Key Texts.