THE HUNTING OF THE SLORC: POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGIES
This analysis was written in early 1993. The main body of the text is unchanged, though some new
comments are included in the endnotes in square brackets. Updates made in early 1994 and
2001are added at the end.
The distinction between "political" and
"military" is by no means clear in a state so
profoundly militarized as Burma, where
Clausewitz' dictum1 is reversed, and politics is
simply war carried out by other means.
The Chinese sage Sun Tsu says in The Art of
War that "The supreme art of war is to
subdue the enemy without fighting". In its
conduct of the civil war SLORC (State Law
and Order Restoration Council, the martial
law administration ruling Burma), is
currently using Low Intensity Conflict
strategies2, which avoid major military
confrontation, but are designed to force a
"political" (read "politico-military")
settlement on the ethnic opposition and
divide them from the political opposition.
These strategies are closely tied to SLORC's
attempts to acquire constitutional
"legitimacy" by means of a National
Convention, and are aided by the pressure
which Burma's neighbors3 are putting on the
non-burman ethnic groups to sign ceasefires. But no lasting solution to the country's
problems will be achieved until the three
main actors -- the military, the political
opposition and the ethnic opposition -- meet
on a basis of equality and with a strong
political will to achieve national
reconciliation and the restoration of
democracy. The politico-military devices
described in this paper must therefore be
seen as measures by SLORC to retain power,
reverse international criticism, especially at
the UN General Assembly and the
Commission on Human Rights, and attract
foreign investment and development
assistance.
The search for legitimacy4: The legal status of
the military junta ruling Burma, the State Law
and Order Restoration Council, is that of a
martial law administration, which in
international law is permitted to govern only
during a state of emergency5. SLORC is
therefore a completely illegal regime since by its
own admission, the "law and order", dis-turbed
by the 1988 democracy movement, have been
restored. Its only legitimate course would be to
step down and hand over to the victors of the
1990 elections6. But it is set on clinging to
power, and in common with most dictatorships
which rule by brute force, especially those
operating within a hierarchical culture, is
anxious for some form of legitimation beyond
that of the bullet. This ambition was not
significantly furthered by SLORC's suppression
of the monkhood, the body which traditionally
legitimizes Buddhist rulers, nor by the election
results of 1990 when the people overwhelmingly
voted for the opposition. Lacking anything more
substantial, SLORC seeks "recognition" by
association: monks, ethnic nationals in
traditional dress, visiting businessmen and
statesmen, UN officials and even ordinary
tourists, are all liable to be paraded across the
state-run print and broadcast media alongside
SLORC officials in order to "prove" that
SLORC has won acceptance from these various
communities. To judge from The New Light of
Myanmar (the revamped Working People's
Daily), the official -- and only -- newspaper, one
would assume that the SLORC leadership does
little else but make offerings to senior monks,
receive visiting dignitaries, and inspect
construction sites. It claims legitimation from
every contract signed and even from its
membership of the United Nations, though it is
states rather than governments which the UN
recognizes.
But SLORC's main source of "legitimation" is
the civil war, which like the previous
administration7 it has maintained as a
justification for continued military rule -- the
argument is that without the army in control, the
different ethnic nationalities would secede from
the Union and split the nation. SLORC has
therefore avoided a peace settlement with the
ethnic opposition as a whole up to this time,
though it has approached most of the groups
individually, and made deals with some of them.
This may soon change, however, since SLORC
is busy constructing an alternative source of
legitimation in the form of a New Constitution
which would stretch a thin skin of civilian
administration over the real power -- which of
course would remain firmly in the hands of the
military. (One problem is that without the civil
war it might be more difficult to justify the 50%
or so of the national budget thought to go on
military expenditure.) The device by which it is
seeking to bring this off is the so-called
"National Convention", which is charged with
drafting the basic elements of the constitution.
One of the stated objectives of the Convention is
to guarantee the "participation of the Tatmadaw
(the Burmese military) in the leading role of
national politics of the state in future."8 The
members of the National Convention have been
hand-picked by SLORC. Even so, their
activities are rigidly controlled, with strict rules
as to what subjects can be discussed and how,
and severe penalties for infringements. Some
participants are representatives elected in 1990,
but these comprise a small percentage of the
total Convention, which is an unrepresentative
body with no mandate whatsoever from the
people. In spite of their being hand-picked,
however, many members of the Convention, at
no little risk to themselves, have walked out,
largely on account of the requirement, quoted
above, that the military should retain its political
dominance.
built, and the foreign exchange SLORC needs to
prop up the collapsing economy will not be
forthcoming. Over the past couple of years,
therefore, SLORC has been developing some
alternative strategies inspired by Sun Tsu and
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).
In Karen, Kachin, Mon and Karenni areas, there
have been a number of minor skirmishes over
the past year9 between the Tatmadaw and
troops of the ethnic opposition, but most
Tatmadaw activity has concentrated on
terrorizing and controlling the minority civilian
populations. The army comes into villages and
shoots a couple of people if any of its men have
been attacked by Karen, Karenni or Mon
soldiers. It has relocated villages to sites
grouped around military camps and established
free-fire zones in the areas not in the immediate
vicinity of the camps.
This "strategic hamleting"10 serves several
purposes: it provides hostages against military
attack, a pool of "voluntary" labor for the army
in various road-building and other construction
projects, as well as for forced portering11; it
separates the villagers from the ethnic minority
fighters, thereby reducing their flow of
intelligence, recruits and material support; and a
belt of such "hamlets" and the intervening freefire zones may eventually form a cordon
sanitaire to control movement between the nonburman areas and the interior12, thus allowing
the formation of Bantustans. Along with this
demographic engineering, there has been a large
build-up by the Burmese army over the past two
and a half years which has led some observers to
predict a major military offensive.
In my view, however, the increased number of
troops13 is not intended for purely military
purposes. Along with control of the civilian
population, it is part of a LIC strategy to apply
politico-military pressure on the non-burman
ethnic nationalities to come to a cease-fire on
SLORC's terms. When combined with
"persuasion" from the neighbors to sign a ceasefire (China and Thailand can apply a
stranglehold on the Kachin and Karen
respectively since these groups depend on crossborder communications and supplies), such
Changing civil war strategy: In parallel with the
National Convention, SLORC is pursuing a
politico-military civil-war strategy. The civil
war cannot be won by traditional military means
alone. Even if such fixed bases as Manerplaw
were taken, the ethnic minority armies could use
classical guerrilla tactics indefinitely. And so
long as the civil war continues, mineral and
other kinds of extract-ion by US, Thai, Chinese,
Japanese and Korean companies among others,
will be hindered; dams and pipelines cannot be
2
pressure would appear almost irresistible14. Sun
Tsu, quoted above, tells his students15 that if
they can achieve an overwhelming superiority in
position, weaponry and men, and at the same
time offer a way out so that the enemy does not
have to fight, the stronger party may be able to
dictate terms without a battle16.
railroaded through the National Convention, it
would take a few years to consolidate, and if the
82-year old Ne Win dies before this happens,
there is a high probability that the army would
split into two or more warring factions in a
struggle for State power21. Some observers
think that certain regional commanders are
already building up their private armies and
fiefdoms in preparation for a breakdown of
central power in the post-Ne Win era.
SLORC could accompany coercion by inducements, and offer "generous" terms ("an offer
they could not refuse") to the non-burman
nationalities -- retention of arms, continued
control of their territories, access to
international development assistance etc.
SLORC would no doubt prefer to deal with each
group separately or, failing that, with the four
main combattant groups, the Kachin, the Karen,
the Karenni and the Mon17. If the groups hold
out, SLORC might agree to a settlement and a
nation-wide cease-fire with the National
Democratic Front (NDF). The Tatmadaw would
hardly be enthusiastic about negotiating with the
broader Democratic Alliance of Burma
(DAB)18 since this would counter its general
strategy of dividing the alliance between the
ethnic and political opposition.19
Short-term: One scenario is that SLORC might
succeed in concluding a "political" settlement of
the civil war, imposing a constitution, and
persuading its neighbors and the international
community that the process has been legal and
political enough. In this case countries,
agencies and corporations with myopic
optimism or short-term interests might agree to
renew bilateral and multilateral development
assistance. Corporate investment from Japan22
and other industrial countries would no doubt be
renewed, and provide a temporary alleviation of
Burma's economic sickness. (A nationwide
cease-fire with the promise of a "political"
settlement would certainly smooth SLORC's
passage at this year's General Assembly, where
there will be many voices calling for sanctions
and an arms embargo.)
This alliance presents SLORC with its greatest
threat, since it combines political legitimacy
with military force. In fact, as the price of a
settlement the ethnic minorities might have to
expel their allies in the political opposition from
their territories, abandon the long-term struggle
for democracy; surrender control over natural
resources in their territories to companies
holding concessions from SLORC; and perhaps
accept a reduction in the area of their
territories20. Of course, if any of the minorities
do not agree to a cease-fire on SLORC's terms,
an actual military offensive is not excluded.
Without real political and economic change,
resumption of ODA (Official Development
Assistance) and increased foreign investment
would mean that an unrepresentative,
authoritarian and unstable military regime could
remain in power, buy better weapons, continue
to starve and abuse its people, sell off its natural
resources, destroy its economy, bully its
neighbors, and destabilise the region. In
addition, a settlement forced on the ethnic
nationality armies would be unlikely to last
long. Already the Wa and some of the other
groups SLORC made deals with in 1989 are
expressing dissatisfaction about the
arrangements and rattling their weapons.23 And
no ethnic group or alliance believes that SLORC
can be trusted to honor a peace treaty beyond
the period of military, political or economic
expediency. The question of the duration of a
Uncertain: There is no guarantee, of course, that
SLORC will succeed in these undertakings.
Although some of its working groups are still
meeting, the National Convention has been
postponed several times, after very few plenary
meetings, on account of the resistance, even
among the hand-picked participants, to the
requirement that the military remain at the
centre of political life. Even if a constitution is
3
peace settlement is of particular interest to
investors, who require long-term guarantees of
stability -- for instance it would take up to 15
years to construct the proposed dams on the
Moei and Salween rivers24, pipelines are
notoriously exposed to attack, and it would be
politically embarrassing for companies to have
their personnel and equipment protected by the
Burmese army against the local people. Perhaps
SLORC calculates that by the time the "political
settlement" breaks down, enough money will
have been brought into the country by
governments, corporations and multilateral
agencies to justify the exercise.
reconciliation. Instead, they are using their
influence to encourage a settlement of the civil
war on SLORC's terms, in isolation from the
restoration of democracy, thereby supporting
continued military rule. China's motives for this
approach are not difficult to identify: the present
leaders would hardly welcome a democratic
Burma with leaders sympathetic to the Chinese
democracy movement and to the aspirations for
self-determination of the Tibetan and other
peoples within the international borders of the
PRC (Burma shares a border with Tibet). They
might also suspect that a democratic Burma
would turn more to India than to China.
Thailand's motives are more complex, but one
could mention the close links between the Thai
and Burmese military which are manifested on
commercial as well as political levels, as well as
Thailand's desire to counter Chinese influence
in Burma25.
A centralized military state: Burma is a military
state, as it has been for more than 30 years, with
an all-pervasive Military Intelligence. A new
constitution, if SLORC succeeds in imposing it,
will make no essential difference to this reality.
Politics, for the Burmese military, is simply war
carried out by other means, to reverse
Clausewitz' dictum. The development of the
more sophisticated politico-military strategies
described in this paper does not indicate any
lessening of SLORC's commitment to the
growing militarization of what is already the
most militarized state in the region. There is no
reduction in the rate of increase in military
expenditure and recruitment, for instance. The
Burmese army has shown its willingness to
bully its neighbors Thailand and Bangladesh,
with periodic incursions onto their territories
which have resulted in the death of a number of
their nationals. If the Burmese army reaches its
projected target strength of 500,000 men under
arms by the end of the decade, it will be the
largest (apart from its friend China, and India)
and most battle-hardened fighting force in the
region, though not yet the best armed.
As far as the ASEAN policy of Constructive
Engagement is concerned, this description of a
long-term policy by the Burmese military to
retain power tends to undermine the view that
economic assistance and an increase in trade
will alone lead to significant change, and
broadly supports the arguments for additional
forms of international action, for instance UNfacilitated negotiations between the three main
actors, reinforced if necessary by selective
sanctions, perhaps including an arms embargo
on SLORC. ASEAN member Singapore, which
acts as a channel for arms to SLORC, would no
doubt resist an arms embargo. This may also be
the case with other ASEAN members and India,
if they see Singapore's role, though bilateral, as
reducing SLORC's dependence on China.
This analysis suggests that the policy of
Constructive Engagement has not dissuaded
SLORC from retaining centralized military
control over political and economic life in
Burma. In fact the injections of foreign cash into
Burma have enabled SLORC to keep the
economy afloat without the radical
decentralization and demilitarization of the
economy needed for long-term improvement.
The devices of the National Convention and the
forced politico-military settlement of the civil
war are simply means to give a constitutional
China, Thailand and Constructive Engagement:
Ninety-five percent of Burma's trade is with
China and Thailand, and China is SLORC's
main arms supplier. These countries, if they
chose to do so, could pressure SLORC into
entering into negotiations with the real leaders
of the political and ethnic opposition for
restoration of democracy and national
4
and political gloss to continued military
dominance. There is no indication that the
military intends to reduce its control over the
economy, which will thus remain centralized,
oriented towards military expend-iture26, highly
dirigiste and incompetently managed .
economic changes.
If on the other hand they are willing to join a
serious international effort to encourage real
political and economic change in Burma, an
effort which must also contain a dimension of
dialogue with SLORC or its successor regimes,
their experience, contacts and
leverage, especially that of China and Thailand,
will be invaluable.
The basic articles of faith of Constructive Engagement are that quiet and friendly though firm
advice by Burma's neighbors is better than
confrontation, and that economic de-velopment
will lead to political liberalization and greater
respect for human rights. On the former point I
would say that both are needed. On the latter,
there is no evidence that the economic
development of countries like South Africa,
whose racist ideologies and discriminatory
citizenship laws are somewhat similar to
Burma's, has led to political liberalization or an
improvement in the human rights situation. In
fact, as South African Nobel Peace Laureate
Desmond Tutu has frequently said in relation to
Burma, the kind of international sanctions which
have been most effective in forcing political
change in his country might also bring about
change in Burma.
Implications of this analysis for the political and
ethnic opposition: If this analysis is even
partially correct, it would support the opposition tactic of opposing the National Convention
internally and in international forums, and
stressing its unrepresentative and illegal nature.
It would also suggest that a close alliance
between the political and ethnic opposition is
feared by SLORC, and should therefore be
developed and reinforced.
CONCLUSIONS
The choice for ASEAN countries and others,
including India and China, who wish to extend
their influence in Burma through trade and
investment, is one of long- or short-term
interest: Do they want a country in the region
which is politically and economically
centralized and militarized and in addition,
economically incompetent? Burma is a country
of 43 million which is increasing the size of its
army to half a million, has shown a willingness
to bully its neighbors and which after Ne Win's
death might enter a period of classical civil war
compared with which the conflict in Cambodia,
with a population of 7 million, may seem a
minor event in terms of refugees and the
destabilization of the region. Is a short-term
policy worth the risk?
SLORC is an illegal regime using an illegal
process to acquire "legitimacy" through cosmetic constitutional changes. Its aim is to
preserve the political and economic
dominance of the military. It is also seeking
through a barely-disguised policy of military
coercion to force a "political" settlement of
the civil war. If it were to succeed in these
attempts, the resulting arrangements would
be highly volatile and could easily destabilise
the region.
There is also no sign that the ASEAN policy
of "Constructive Engagement" has done
more than encourage SLORC to develop such
strategies. The economy is still under
centralized and incompetent military control;
the Kyat is still overvalued by a factor of
about twenty; consumer prices have risen
sharply since 1988, including that of rice,
which has more than tripled; domestic
production is stagnant; foreign investment is
highly risky; and meanwhile, the people
starve27 and Burma's ethnic and religious
If so, ASEAN and Burma's neighbors should
continue their present course, congratulate
themselves on symbolic and superficial changes,
enjoy the short-term benefits of cheap fish and
teak, and block international efforts to pressure
SLORC into more radical political and
5
minorities are subject to unspeakable,
racially-motivated atrocities.28
coercive and short-term measures, which
isolate the civil war from the restoration of
democracy;
Medium- and long-term stability in Burma
require the establishment of genuine democracy, respect for the ethnic nationalities'
demands for national equality and the right
to self-determination, and the
demilitarization and decentralization of the
economy. One necessary step would be the
negotiation29 of a credible timetable for the
transition of power to the representatives
chosen by the people in 1990. Such
negotiations would involve U Tin U, U Kyi
Maung and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The
process leading towards long-term stability
would also require unforced negotiations
with the alliances of the ethnic nationalities.
4) Recognize that "Constructive
Engagement" alone is making no impact on
the deep structural problems of Burma's
economic and political life, which can only be
solved through genuine democratization,
decentralization and demilitarization of
government and economy. Attempts should
be made to coordinate the strategies of
Constructive Engagement with the sanctions
and other measures which industrialized
countries are contemplating.
At its forthcoming session the General
Assembly should:
The main actors are therefore the Tatmadaw,
the political opposition and the alliances of the
non-burman ethnic nationalities. Three-way
talks between these groups on a basis of
equality are an essential part of any
meaningful process of national reconciliation
and democratization, and would provide a
good medium-term goal for international
diplomacy.
5) Make an explicit condemnation of the National Convention, on the grounds that this is
an illegal body with no mandate from the
people, designed to provide a
"constitutional" fig-leaf for the perpetuation
of naked military rule;
6) Recommend to individual member states
and to the Security Council that they impose
selective sanctions, perhaps including a
prohibition on investment in Burma and a
ban on trade in arms and timber. The lifting
of sanctions should be made conditional on
the initiation of, and progress
in,negotiations between the three main actors
in Burma: the military, the ethnic
nationalities and the political opposition. The
negotiations should be on the basis of
equality between these parties, who should
demonstrate a strong political will to achieve
national reconciliation
and to draw up a credible timetable for a
restoration of democracy and the fulfillment
of the will of the people expressed in the
elections of 1990;
RECOMMENDATIONS
The international community and countries
in the region should:
1) Recognize that the process of imposing a
constitution to "legitimise" continued
military dominance, in opposition to the
people's choice of civilian representatives in
1990, is
illegal, destabilising and a mockery of democracy and popular participation;
2) Recognize that a forced end to the civil
war, whether described as "political" or
military, is unstable in the medium and long
term. SLORC does not have the political or
economic capacity to maintain a forced
settlement other than by military means;
7) Call on the Secretary-General, in collaboration with countries in the region, to use his
good offices to facilitate such negotiations.
3) Cease encouraging SLORC to adopt such
David Arnott, Burma Peace Foundation
6
June 1993
UPDATE TO THE HUNTING OF THE SLORC (March 1994)
The preceding text was written between April and May 1993. Events in Burma since then have led some
people to believe that SLORC has yielded to its public relations advisers and international pressure and is
making genuine moves towards national reconciliation and the restoration of democracy. However,
although a number of small gestures have been made such as more visitors for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
and the release of a number of political prisoners, SLORC logic remains essentially military, with all
policy decisions subordinated to questions of control of people and territory, and survival of the ruling
group. The National Convention has been kept on track, despite frequent suspensions of the plenary for
resisting elements in SLORC's proposed constitution.
As regards the civil war, the Kachin Independence Organisation signed a formal cease-fire with SLORC
on the 24 February. Thai pressure on the Karen and Mon to agree cease-fires with SLORC has been
reinforced by such measures as the Thai authorities' seizing consignments of medical supplies intended
for the Karen (with implications for other supplies including ammunition), the announcement of a
prohibition on NGO cross-border assistance, the closing of part of the Thai-Burmese border, and the
expulsion of the senior Karen diplomat from Thailand.
An element not adequately dealt with in The Hunting of the SLORC is the destabilising role of forced
labour, enforced recruitment and economic oppression in combination with forced relocations and the
general terror tactics of the "People's Army". Forced labour is not only a terror tactic, but also does
severe damage to the economic life of a village by depriving it of agricultural and other workers. One
stage in the Burma army's recruitment drives is the destabilisation of the village economy by forced
labour and eviction from land to make way for military installations and farms. A point comes where
joining the army is the only way of surviving. The families of the recruits receive important economic
and other privileges. The consistent pattern of economic oppression seen in reports on the activities of
the Burma Army -- burning of fields, killing of animals, stealing of foodstuffs and other items,
destruction of houses etc, compounds the damage, which in combination with forced relocations and
terrorization results in the destabilisation and collapse of village communities, abandonment of villages,
increased internal displacement and mass exoduses to neighbouring countries.
The view expressed in The Hunting of the SLORC that SLORC would be prepared to offer autonomy and
retention of arms to the ethnic nationalities has had to be modified. Fragments of information emerging
from the preliminary talks with some of the ethnic groups suggest a much harder line than anticipated,
which would require virtual surrender on the part of the armies of the ethnic groups. It appears that
SLORC is seeking localised cessations of hostilities round the proliferating military "development"
enclaves implanted in the territories of the ethnic groups rather than the nation-wide cease-fires which
the ethnic groups want. SLORC's intention is presumably the progressive occupation and partitioning of
the non-burman areas by means of this counter-insurgency/development strategy. Presumably also, this
will be accompanied by forced relocations, forced labour and economic sabotage unless the Burmese
military has changed its working methods. This will lead to the further abandonment of villages,
increased levels of internal displacement and mass exoduses into Thailand on a scale hitherto unknown
on this particular border30. However, until SLORC has sufficient troops to occupy the whole of the nonburman territories, this process is likely to be gradual, and not necessarily consistent. Several scenarios or
stages come to mind:
7
1) Politics but no arms: the non-burman peoples preserve their identity and still participate in national
politics. Local autonomy and participation in future national elections is the picture presented by
Xuwicha Hiranyapruek, the Thai businessman who as advisor to the Thai National Security Council
(NSC)31 and intimate of SLORC has been shuttling between the various parties peddling cease-fire deals.
However, a SLORC spokesman has said that to take part in national politics the minority organisations
would have to disarm32.
2) Arms but no politics: the non-burman ethnic nationalities preserve their identity and weapons but
refrain from participating in national politics. A policy of separate development. And the tungsten,
copper, nickel etc?
3) Assimilation: the non-burman groups merge their cultural and political identity into a greater
Burmese identity. This scenario is supported by reports of the continuation of the policy of cultural and
genetic burmanisation (minority languages are discouraged and soldiers are encouraged to marry girls
from the ethnic group which predominates in any given non-burman area33).
4) Selective military occupation: important areas (towns, rich agricultural land, development projects of
various kinds, actual or potential mines, hydro-electric and other energy projects, strategic areas for
defence or communications etc) are occupied by the military and their families34 and subjected to further
burmanisation, while the non-burman populations are driven onto marginal land and called on to
provide labour, brides, and recruits for the army. The "Liberated Areas" are penetrated by various kinds
of military enclaves centered around development projects and other locations of strategic, economic or
communications significance, for which localised "cease-fires" are negotiated. Such enclaves, needless
to say, also act as fortresses for military purposes, and when linked up, can act to partition the general
area. In addition to these enclaves, one may expect the implantation of settlers from burman and other
non-local ethnic groups in areas abandoned by the indigenous populations as a result of SLORC's Low
Intensity Conflict strategy. Such settlement has been reported (not confirmed) from Arakan, where land
and houses abandoned by the fleeing (Muslim) Rohingyas are reported to have been occupied by
(Buddhist) Rakhine settlers.
5) Total military occupation: total military occupation of all the minority areas would be a simple
development of scenario 4. (Mao's Go strategy?) SLORC troops might not mass on the Thai border, but
there would be little to prevent them if it suited their purpose35. One would certainly expect a very large
number of refugees to seek asylum in Thailand under these circumstances.
Some of these scenarios could occur simultaneously and/or sequentially. For example, 2 and 3 could
apply respectively to the ethnic heartlands and the mixed areas, and then lead into scenarios 4 and 5.
It is fascinating to speculate on how SLORC sees NGOs and UN Agencies contributing to these
undertakings; -- presumably they will supply the "carrots" while SLORC applies the stick.
FURTHER UPDATE, MARCH 1995
In early December 1994, SLORC mounted a major offensive on several fronts against the Karen, which
led to the fall of Manerplaw in late January 1995, and Kawmoora a month later. Up to 15,000 new Karen
refugees have fled to the Thai side of the border.
It is unclear exactly why SLORC abandoned its LIC strategy and reverted to a purely military approach,
given that the Karen had dropped nearly all their conditions for cease-fire talks. (At the beginning of
1994 the Karen had insisted on talks with the Democratic Alliance of Burma rather than with individual
8
groups, a neutral country as venue, and international observers. Several months before the attack,
however, they had dropped all conditions save a preference to meet in Rangoon, the national capital,
rather than a provincial town.) What is clear is that military considerations have greater priority than
political ones. The current offensives serve to remind any who were in doubt, that SLORC is a military
body, and that military thinking predominates.
Possible explanations are:
1) SLORC took advantage of its successful "religops"36 strategy which had succeeded in dividing the
Karen Christian and Buddhist communities. (About 1500 Karen Buddhist troops had deserted from the
Karen National Liberation Army and formed their own units, which allied themselves with SLORC. It
was they who guided SLORC troops in the attack on Manerplaw)
2) In Rangoon General Khin Nyunt, who had been spearheading the "politico-military" approach may
have lost some influence to the military hardliners who have less concern over international opinion.
3) The "cease-fire" talks were simply time-saving devices within a military game-plan. When the military
position was suitable, SLORC dropped all pretence and attacked.
4) The KNU's willingness to enter cease-fire negotiations with minimal conditions raised the real
possibility that the civil war could be brought to an end, something SLORC (the military hardliners
within SLORC?) would view with great misgiving, since without the civil war, the Tatmadaw would
have little excuse for its current expansion and political power 37. By taking Manerplaw, SLORC is
seeking to move the Karen into a classical guerrilla strategy, which will prolong the war indefinitely.
5) SLORC wanted to take Manerplaw because it was an international window on Burma, a major point of
contact between the political and ethnic opposition and an important communications centre with the
opposition inside Burma. Kawmoora was in a strategic position in relation to the stretch of the Asia
Highway which Thailand and Burma propose to build between Myawaddy and Rangoon. The
international partners of the gas pipeline would find it politically embarrassing to go ahead if there were
an insurgency in the region, thus the pressure to crush the insurgency as quickly as possible.
The international response
The offensive, though successful from a military standpoint, was a diplomatic disaster for SLORC, both
internationally and regionally. The strongest-ever resolution was adopted by the Commission on Human
Rights, and the neighbours, especially Thailand, expressed their criticism in private and public.
The offensive had a direct impact on Thailand in the form of 20,000 new refugees, SLORC shells landing
on Thai soil, and a number of raids across the border into refugee camps by Karen defectors and the
Burma Army. These factors contributed to increased irritation by Thailand against SLORC. Some
observers believe that the release of U Tin Oo and U Kyi Maung was an attempt to recover Thai favour.
The increased coverage accorded by the New Light of Myanmar to General Khin Nyunt in late March and
early April may be another expression of SLORC's disillusionment with a purely military strategy, and
mark a return to the more "political" approach which he had advocated.
LATEST UPDATE, OCTOBER 2001
The Karenni Progressive Party signed a cease-fire with SLORC on 21 March 1995, which broke down
9
after a few month. The Mon agreed a cease-fire in 1995, which has held, though the Mon are not happy
about their situation, and some armed Mon groups are recently reported to have renewed hostilities with
Rangoon. The Karen are still fighting, though they have lost most of their territory and are acting largely
as a guerrilla army
NOTES
1. In his classic study On War Clauswitz states that war is politics carried out by other means.
2. Sometimes known as Total Approach Strategy, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a counter-insurgency
strategy developed during US surrogate wars in many parts of the world including El Salvador and the
Philippines. (Not that the United States is supporting SLORC -- LIC techniques are public knowledge.) LIC
favors political, economic and psychological operations over traditional military warfare. It is anti-insurgency
war which has become a war against whole populations. One of its theorists, Colonel John Waghelstein,
says that "The military is a distant fourth in many cases. It is total war at the grassroots level". LIC avoids
major military confrontation, aiming rather at control of civilian populations by dislocating their traditional
social and economic life, which is then, in many cases, replaced by social and economic patterns designed
by the LIC strategists. Its techniques include "strategic hamleting" and other forms of forced relocation, and
the creation of "free-fire zones", All techniques of demographic engineering in fact -- hamleting, sponsored
migration, ethnic cleansing, evictions from rural or urban centers -- have been used in LIC. LIC includes
economic sabotage, political assassinations, terrorization by torture, disappearances and reprisal killings. It
seeks to infiltrate organizations, spread misinformation, and exploit ethnic and other conflicts in order to
divide the enemy -- members of the DAB take note. An aspect directly relevant to the Burmese situation is
that LIC is essentially a military strategy, the results of which are claimed as political.
3. China and Thailand in particular. They have political, military and commercial relations with SLORC,
and China is putting pressure on the Kachin and Thailand on the Karen and Mon, to come to a settlement
with SLORC.Their motives are mixed, and not necessarily consistent. Most of the neighbors (plus
presumably Japan, the US, South Korea and others) find the civil war an obstacle to trade and commercial
exploitation of Burma's considerable resources (though the illicit teak and heroin trades flourish in a civil
war context, where control is lacking). It is possible, though unlikely, that these countries have not seen
that their support of SLORC's civil war strategy will sustain military rule.
China's motives, are not in doubt, of course. A government led by President Aung San Suu Kyi
would be expected to lean towards India and support the Chinese democracy movement and Tibetan selfdetermination (Burma shares a border with Tibet). Besides, a federal democratic Burma might be more
reluctant than SLORC to sell off the family silver, copper, gold, uranium, tungsten, nickel, zinc, rare earths,
jade, gems, teak, etc etc, most of which lie in the territories of the non-Burma ethnic groups, and which
China, being mineral-poor, hopes to access. China is SLORC's main arms supplier and, along with
Thailand, Burma's main trading partner. Chinese merchants now dominate commercial life in Mandalay
and a number of other cities, and Chinese, including a high proportion of retired military, are buying up
most of the best properties in the North. For strategic and commercial reasons, China covets access to
the Indian Ocean, is involved in large-scale road- and bridge-construction in Burma, and is reported to
have been involved in the construction of a deep-water port south of Rangoon and a radar station in the
Coco Islands.
[These factors are a cause for concern to many countries in the region. Leading Indian strategists,
for instance, are concerned by the commercial and military implications of China's Burma policy not only
for the immediate region, but for the whole of the Asia-Pacific rim over the next 20 or 30 years. Indian
policy towards Burma is motivated in part by these considerations, despite the fact that India and China
are enjoying good relations at present -- early 1995 -- having agreed to shelve their border disputes.
However, pure commercial interest is also a major factor for India, as it is for Thailand and Singapore].
Apart from teak and fish, Thailand is also interested in resources, particularly for energy generation, and
two large fields of gas and oil in Burmese waters are near enough to Thailand to make the construction of
10
pipelines to Thailand feasible. Studies for a number of hydro-electric dams on the rivers which form the
border of Thailand and Burma have also been completed. Funding for these will be raised by a Japanese
agency, which will also coordinate their construction. Japan's overall role, as Burma's main ODA donor, is
as yet unclear.
4. A basic assumption of this paper is that political legitimacy, stability and social justice are dependent on a
high level of popular participation at all levels of decision-making. Conversely, the analysis assumes that in
the long term, authoritarian regimes with low popular participation are illegitimate, and will tend to be unstable
and unjust.
5. See the reports to the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission by the Special Rapporteur on States of
Emergency, Mr Leandro Despuy.
6. On 27 May 1990, elections for a National Assembly were held in Burma. Nearly three-quarters of the
registered voters cast ballots. Despite official conniving and obstacles, 82% of those elected belonged to the
opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), even though its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, had been
under house arrest for ten months. SLORC proceeded to isolate, imprison, and torture many of those
elected, as well as activist students. Three years later, SLORC still refuses to hand over power, asserting
that there must first be a new constitution, which it is trying to impose through the device of the National
Convention. In 1990 the NLD and allied parties mandated a number of elected representatives to form a
provisional government under the leadership of Dr Sein Win. The provisional government was established as
the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) in December 1990 in Manerplaw, the
headquarters of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) near the Thai border.
7. While the front men have changed, most observers hold that General Ne Win still dictates policy from the
background.
8. Martial law Order No. 13/92 of 3 October 1992.
9. i.e. 1992, this text being written in early 1993. The Kachin Independence Organization signed a cease-fire
with SLORC on 24 February 1994, and the Karenni National Progressive Party on 21 March 1995.
10. Developed by the British in Malaya, then used in Vietnam, the Philippines, Guatemala, the Chittagong Hill
Tracts, Ethiopia and many other politico-military theaters, strategic hamleting is one of the most common
techniques of Low Intensity Conflict. In Burma, where it is known as the "Four Cuts Campaign" -- to cut off
recruits, information, food and money from the insurgents by grouping villages round military camps -- this
technique has been used for at least twenty years, but since 1990 has evolved into a longer-term strategy of
military/political control. One observer compares the military camps surrounded by villages to the castles in
feudal Europe from which the barons controlled the surrounding villages. One might add, however, that the
feudal barons depended also on legitimation by the Church and the ideology of hierarchy, whereas the
Tatmadaw rules only by brute force and fear. And the feudal villagers fed the baron and his troops. How does
this work in Burma? Is it a short- or long-term policy? If the village people are separated from their fields,
how can they survive in the long term? (Are they meant to?) How can they supply rice to the army if they do
not plant any? Are they trucked back to their fields by the army in the planting season? How does the policy
affect the economy of the region? Is there any central policy, or is it up to the regional or local commanders?
11. The seizure of men, women, including pregnant women, children and the elderly for coerced portering is
probably the best documented and most widely condemned violation of human rights by the Burmese army.
Porters are made to carry 20-40 kilos of arms, ammunition or rice; they are hardly fed; mortality is very high;
they are frequently sent ahead of the army columns as human minesweepers or human shields in battle.
Avoidance of forced portering is a major motive for internal displacement or mass exoduses to neighboring
countries. See the various reports on Burma by Amnesty International and other human rights monitoring
organizations.
11
12. From maps and reports of the relocation areas, such a belt is easiest to identify running North-South to
the West of Karen State. So far, however, we do not have enough information to be sure, or to say whether
the same strategy is being used to isolate other areas. It is also not clear if the isolation is intended for purely
military or for ethno-political purposes, though some observers think that SLORC's racial policy is aimed at
creating a pure Burman state, and that the isolation of the ethnic "homelands" is a step in the creation of
Bantustans. Another form of demographic engineering, government-sponsored migration (of Chinese into
Tibet, Javanese to the outlying islands of Indonesia, Bengali settlers into the Chittagong Hill Tracts of
Bangladesh Israelis to the West Bank etc) to dilute or displace the local population, has not yet been widely
duplicated in Burma except to a certain degree in Mon State This is perhaps because the civil war is still
being fought, or because SLORC is pursuing the South African technique of creating separate "homelands"
or Bantustans rather than the Israeli approach of implanting settlers (see notes 2, 11, and 20).
13. Reversed for a few months when troops were pulled back to Rangoon to police the National Convention.
14. In early October 1993 there were reports, repeated by Burmese Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw to the UN
General Assembly, that the Kachin had "returned to the legal fold" and had agreed a cease-fire. Further
clarification revealed that as of mid October, there is no formal agreement, but that negotiations are taking
place -- as they have for the past two years -- between SLORC and the Kachin. Further reports that the
Karen are willing to conduct separate negotiations with SLORC have not been confirmed.
15. Who have included Mao Tse Tung and General Ne Win. The Art of War, written 2,500 years ago, has
been translated into Burmese and is a basic textbook in Tatmadaw officer training.
16. Not that SLORC is an entirely peace-loving institution -- SLORC politics are still the politics of
domination, a direct extension of military strategy. But the bilateral and multilateral development assistance
and international investment which SLORC is seeking would come much more easily, and with less political
embarrassment, following a "political" rather than a military solution of the civil war. This is particularly the
case in such projects as the proposed Thai/Burmese dams on the Salween and Moei rivers, which would
flood large areas of Karen and Karenni territory, or the gas pipeline(s) which may be routed across Karen and
Mon territory,
17. A document has been circulated listing 12 points of a ceasefire arrangement between the Tatmadaw and
the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) made in Myitkyina from 6-8 April 1993. From this document
some observers conclude that the Kachin, under pressure from the Chinese and their own rank and file, have
already agreed a separate cease-fire with SLORC. The Kachin say that they have been talking to SLORC,
but deny that they have formalized any agreement, or would do so until a nation-wide ceasefire were
implemented. They say that the document is a working paper from their discussions with SLORC, and has no
official status. My interpretation is that the Kachin have been exploring in some detail the kind of
arrangements that a cease-fire would involve, that this paper is a technical document which would enter into
force only after an official political agreement, and that no such agreement would be made without the
participation of the other combattants -- i.e. at least the Karen, the Karenni and the Mon, and perhaps some
of the Shan groups. Another interpretation, of course, is that the KIO has in fact done a separate deal. [The
KIO signed a cease-fire on 24 February 1994.]
18. The NDF comprises the majority the ethnic minority groups which are still at war with Rangoon (the
Karenni are reported to be in the process of pulling out of the alliance); the DAB contains most of these plus
largely Burman political opposition groups such as the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), the
People's Liberation Front (PLF) and the All Burma Young Monks Union (ABYMU).
19. Including students from the democracy movement of 1988, members of parliament elected in 1990
(NCGUB; NLD, Liberated Area) and a number of other groups.
20. Which may be a reason for the Tatmadaw's digging in over the past year or so, and the progressive
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squeezing of the "liberated areas" by the "Four Cuts" and the hypothetical cordon sanitaire (see notes 2, 9
and 11, above). The parallel with Tibet is worth examining -- the "Tibet Autonomous Region" is much smaller
than ethnic or historical Tibet; the rest has been absorbed into Chinese provinces.
21. The uneasy control and fear which govern Burma are imposed by the Tatmadaw and the all-pervasive
Military Intelligence. The army is held together in large part by an officer corps which has pledged loyalty to
Ne Win personally, and has undertaken not to divide the army during his lifetime; but many observers believe
that it will split into several factions after his death.
22. Even though Japan has stated that she will not renew ODA until Burma is clearly returning to democracy,
and Aung San Suu Kyi is unconditionally released.
23. See Far Eastern Economic Review of 20 May 1993. [In October 1994 the United Wa State Party entered
into a political alliance, the Peace and Democracy Front (PDF) with a number of other "cease-fire" groups
such as the Kokang and Palaung. This grouoping is said to have good informal relations with the NDF as
well as with Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army]
24. Incidentally, SLORC is reported to have offered to supply the work-force to build the dams -- no doubt the
kind of "voluntary" labor the Tatmadaw is so good at recruiting.
25. [In 1993 India entered the ranks of the constructive engagers, with increased trade links and joint
management of narcotics and insurgency on their joint borders. Motives cited are the seriousness of the
border problems and the need to offset growing Chinese influence. However, pure commercial interest
seems the strongest factor]
26. There are varying estimates of the proportion of the national budget spent on arms. 50% is about
average.
27. And this in a country of vast agricultural resources once known as the "rice-bowl of Asia". See the recent
UNICEF figures which indicate a major humanitarian crisis in Burma.
28. Yet despite this, SLORC's emissaries continue to deliver self-congratulatory speeches in international
forums on the subject of economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development! Whose
development, and of what?
29. Which might involve discrete third-party mediation in the early stages.
30. Already, after eighteen months without major combat, the Burmese refugee population in Thailand is at
an all-time high -- 74,449 is the February figure, not counting the student caseload.
31. Which is currently directing Thailand's Burma policy.
32. The Nation 23 January 1994. The SLORC officer in question is Lt Col Kyaw Win, who is Lt Gen Khin
Nyunt's No. 2 in Burmese Military Intelligence. SLORC has already asked the Wa to disarm twice, a request
which the Wa inexplicably rejected.
33. For instance, a Burmese soldier serving in the Pa'O region is given 300 Kyat if he marries a Burman girl,
1000 Kyat if he marries a Shan girl (not of the predominant group in the region, but still from an ethnic
minority), and 3000 Kyat if he marries a Pa'O girl. In the latter case a very senior officer will bless the happy
couple by his presence at their wedding, and the girl's family will be granted the right to buy food at the
(lower) army rate and receive immunity from forced labour.
34. While there is a general ethnic mix in the military, most officers are ethnic Burmans, and the ethos of the
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army is almost entirely burman.
35. Over the past years Thailand has sought to preserve the Karen, Karenni and Mon as a buffer between
Thailand and Burma. Has this policy now been abandoned? The NSC attempts to drive the ethnic opposition
groups into the loving arms of SLORC seem likely to end up with their armies disarmed and the SLORC at
the gate. If the buffer policy is still in place, what is the basis for Mr Hiranyapruek's and the NSC's faith in
SLORC's good intentions?
36. Religious operations, a specialized branch of psychops or psychological operations
37. The removal of the civil war as legitimation for military rule is, incidentally, a major reason for the Kachin
decision to conclude a cease-fire.
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