White Paper Version 0.5
Concept Framework
A
Concept Framework
For
RAPID DECISIVE
OPERATIONS
22 October 1999
USJFCOM J9
Concepts Division (J92)
1
White Paper Version 0.5
Concept Framework
Joint Experimentation
EEExperimentationExp
erimentation
Preface
This publication is Version 0.5 of U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM) Rapid
Decisive Operations (RDO) White Paper. RDO is an “integrating” concept that
provides context and focus for the “functional” concepts described in USJFCOM’s Joint
Experimentation Campaign Plan 2000 (CPLAN 00).
The RDO White Paper responds to the April 1999 Defense Planning Guidance. This
paper continues to expand our understanding of key constructs first described in Joint
Vision 2010 (JV 2010) and amplified in the Concept for Future Joint Operations. RDO
encompasses many of JV 2010’s 21st Century Challenges and incorporates a number of
JV 2010’s Desired Operational Capabilities. This paper also helps fulfill concept
development requirements described in the December 1998 CJCSI 3010.02 (Joint
Vision Implementation Master Plan) and additional guidance from the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The RDO concept focuses on the joint force at the operational level. It will describe how
a joint force commander (JFC) can determine and employ the right balance of air, land,
sea, space, and information-based capabilities in an intense, focused, non-linear
campaign to defeat an adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity.
RDO Version 0.5 expands on CPLAN 00’s RDO concept summary. It provides a
framework of several constructs that will be examined in a series of FY 00 joint
experimentation events. For example, an RDO seminar, follow-on workshop, and March
2000 Wargame will explore different conceptual alternatives to accomplishing RDO
requirements. An associated USJFCOM experiment (Unified Vision 2000) will focus on
the construct “shaping the battlespace” introduced in this version. The results of these
events will lead to publication of a Version 1.0 White Paper by summer 2000.
Points of Contact
Questions or comments related to RDO experimentation should be directed to CDR
Dave Prothero, Integrated Concept Team (ICT) Chairman, J98, (757-836-2846, DSN
836-2846), prothero@acom.mil. Questions or comments related to the content of this
paper should be directed to Mr. Ron Bullard, J92, (757-836-2255, DSN 836-2255;
bullard@acom.mil) or to Mr. Bob Fawcett, J92, (757-836-2252, DSN 836-2252;
fawcett@acom.mil).
/s/
DAVID J. OZOLEK
Colonel, US Army
Director, Joint Battle Lab
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White Paper Version 0.5
Concept Framework
A Concept Framework for
Rapid Decisive Operations
in the 21st Century
1.0. Purpose. Version 0.5 of the RDO White Paper is a product of the “concept
definition” phase of concept development. Its purpose is to establish an initial concept
framework composed of key constructs, such as “shaping the battlespace”, that are
essential to rapid decisive operations. This framework will help focus discussion and
examination of these constructs in a series of FY 00 events that include seminars,
workshops, wargames, and a joint M&S-supported experiment. USJFCOM will work
closely with Services, combatant commands, and DoD agencies to understand and
incorporate near-term enhancements and lessons learned from recent operations into
concept development and experimentation efforts. J-9 will publish Version 1.0 of this
White Paper based on the results of these efforts.
Simultaneity is a key operational
characteristic of the American
way of war. The dynamic
combination of JV 2010’s
dominant maneuver, precision
engagement, focused logistics,
and full-dimensional protection
will enable the joint force
commander to deploy, protect,
and sustain the force and
achieve decisive results more
rapidly than ever before. Striking
the adversary quickly, in all
dimensions at once, will
foreclose or narrow his most
damaging options.
The RDO concept describes how the JFC can undertake operations immediately to strike at
the heart of the enemy’s vulnerabilities and most dangerous capabilities to achieve rapid
strategic success. The concept seeks to rapidly deny, degrade, or destroy strategic and
operational centers of gravity using methods and capabilities that provide viable military
options without having to conduct an extensive buildup of forces and support in the theater
of operations.
The Result: More credible conventional deterrence and quicker conflict resolution.
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This “framework” version first discusses briefly the operational context for RDO. A
concept section then describes RDO’s primary elements, followed by a brief recap of
potential desired operational capabilities (DOC). This paper concludes with thoughts
on an experimentation strategy.
2.0. Operational
Context.
2.1. The April 1999
Defense Planning
Guidance established a
requirement for USJFCOM to
develop new joint warfighting
Rapid Decisive Operations
concepts to address a variety of
Joint or combined military operations
challenging and important future
characterized by rapid, intense, focused attack
operational missions. One of
of an adversary’s strategic and operational
these relates to forcing an
vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and decisive
adversary to undertake certain
points anywhere in the battlespace to force
actions or denying an adversary the
the adversary to do our will without a
protracted campaign.
ability to threaten or attack others. The
Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) joint
integrating concept1 described in this paper intends to investigate how a joint force
commander (JFC) can accomplish this in a rapid, decisive joint operation that forces the
adversary to do our will as quickly as possible. In this arrangement of joint operations,
the JFC quickly employs all available capabilities in the right balance to achieve
operational and strategic objectives.
2.2. This RDO concept is founded in the key constructs of JV 2010 as amplified
by the May 1997 Capstone Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO). It also
incorporates recent work from the draft Joint Contingency Force Operations concept
that began as part of USJFCOM’s Campaign Plan 1999 (CPLAN 99). RDO considers
several of JV 2010’s 21st Century Challenges such as “Battlespace Awareness”, “Rapid
Joint Force Projection”, and “Generating Precision Effects.” These and other
challenges are addressed at appropriate points throughout the paper. This concept
also uses JV 2010 DOCs as a point of departure for developing a wider set of RDO
DOCs. Finally, it provides context for USJFCOM’s current work on the following
functional concepts—Attack Operations against Critical Mobile Targets; Joint
Interactive Planning; Common Relevant Operational Picture; Adaptive Joint Command
and Control; and Focused Logistics: Enabling Early Decisive Operations. The concept
USJFCOM currently develops two types of operational concepts. An “integrating” concept describes how the
JFC integrates supporting “functional” concepts and capabilities in a specific operation. RDO is the only CPLAN
00 integrating concept. A “functional” concept amplifies a specific function (such as joint command and control)
or describes how to employ a system or conduct a task. Functional concepts rely on integrating concepts for
operational context.
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will also influence early work related to strategic deployment, information operations,
and forcible entry operations.
2.3. Recent campaigns, including those against Iraq (December 1998) and
Serbia (March-June 1999) have demonstrated that accomplishing our strategic
objectives in the early 21st century may require quicker, more concentrated employment
of a wider range of capabilities in a time-constrained environment. The convergence of
potent new concepts and capabilities envisioned by JV 2010 will allow the JFC to
rapidly apply force in a discriminate manner to achieve decisive effects across a broad
range of 21st century missions.
2.4. In a generic sense, “rapid” and “decisive” are desirable characteristics for
any mission across the range of military operations. While future operational
environments may be relatively focused and routine, others will be complex, differ from
mission to mission, and often will combine both combat and noncombat operations.
The JFC will seek decisive operations rapidly in any of these specific missions. This
paper will focus RDO on applying joint combat power, principally at the operational
level, to achieve objectives in a regional contingency environment such as recent
operations in Serbia. Future applications of the RDO integrating concept will address
large-scale combat operations typically associated with major theater warfare. Finally,
RDO will be examined at the lower end of the range of military operations in an
MOOTW environment. Although many principles described in this paper also apply to
larger-scale operations, the RDO concept is not intended as a preliminary phase of a
protracted campaign.
2.5. Power projection and forward presence will likely remain the fundamental
national strategic concepts for military operations well into the early 21st century. Power
projection will enable the timely response critical to our deterrent and warfighting
capabilities. Forward presence facilitates power projection and sends a clear signal of
US commitment and resolve. RDO builds on these concepts by calling for an agile,
lean, and lethal joint force that can deploy and respond rapidly worldwide, achieve
decisive results, and redeploy for subsequent operations. RDO will also look at
leveraging leading-edge technology enhancements to increase our capabilities.
Further, it will investigate concept options that could require new joint doctrine,
organizations, training and education, materiel, leadership, and people (DOTMLP). In
an attempt to “think outside the box”, the concept is not constrained by current budget,
strategy, or policy.
3.0. The Concept.
3.1. When diplomacy and other options fail, our military capabilities currently
provide several ways to compel an adversary to do our will. For example, precision
engagement by aerial and naval fires can destroy a wide range of capabilities, including
critical infrastructure, military projection platforms, and economic targets. Air, sea, and
land exclusion zones can deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by
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force and can also adversely affect their economy. Even the credible threat of military
operations through the quick deployment of military forces to the region can potentially
deter an adversary. In other cases, a full-scale deployment and attack by coalition
forces might be required to forcibly eject an enemy from the territory of a neighboring
state. Possible strategic objectives could be to preclude or halt an adversary’s military
operations against a neighbor, to cause him to cease development of weapons of mass
effects, or to protect basic human rights. Whatever the goal, the basic precepts typically
will be quick decisive operations, minimal loss of life, and limited collateral damage.
3.2. As applied in this paper, the RDO concept focuses on how a highly
deployable, lethal, agile, survivable, and supportable joint force can rapidly defeat an
adversary’s operational and strategic centers of gravity in order to force the adversary to
do our will. The essence of the concept emphasizes situational understanding,
immediate response capability, speed, and massing of effects rather than forces.
3.3. A limited, focused example of such operations might be a single precision
strike from a great distance that accomplishes the strategic objective, such as Operation
EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986 in response to the terrorist
bombing of US Service members in Berlin. The RDO concept, however, will consider a
broader scope of operations, one that enables a JFC to determine and employ the right
balance of air, land, sea, space, and information-based capabilities in an intense,
focused, brief campaign to defeat or neutralize an adversary’s strategic and operational
21st Century Environment
• Through 2010 and beyond, well-balanced
military forces that can dominate opponents
across the full range of military operations will
be critical. We will be expected to achieve rapid,
decisive victory predominantly by concentrated
precision engagement, with minimal US
casualties and collateral damage.
Hypothesis
IF a highly deployable, lethal, agile, survivable,
and supportable force can conduct a deep
operational strike against an adversary’s
operational and strategic centers of gravity,
THEN we can compel the adversary to
concede without having to conduct a
protracted campaign.
JV 2010’s 21st Century Challenges
• Rapid Joint Force Projection; Decisive
Combat Operations; Integrating Precision
Effects
Desired Capabilities
• Highly lethal, maneuverable, survivable and
agile combat forces
Objectives
• Rapid world-wide joint force projection
• Integrated, non-kinetic options
• Rapid penetration of opponents’ sanctuaries
to attack centers of gravity and decisive points
• Common relevant operational picture
• Smaller friendly footprint
• Networked sensor packages
• Multi-dimensional positional advantage
• Advanced planning and decision support tools
• Rapid Decisive Operations
• Support synchronized to battle rhythm
• Flexible options for staging and insertion of
forces
• Adaptive joint force headquarters
Enabling
• Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement
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centers of gravity. Distinguished from traditional operations, this approach usually will
not focus on seizing and occupying territory in the battlespace except for a limited
purpose, such as to generate an otherwise unobtainable opportunity for precision
engagement, to secure a key decisive point, or to protect the civilian populace. Forces
inserted for these purposes would have the capability to be quickly withdrawn and
employed elsewhere. An RDO campaign typically will be characterized by immediate,
continuous, and overwhelming operations to shock and paralyze the adversary, destroy
their ability to coordinate offensive and defensive operations, fragment their capabilities,
and foreclose their most dangerous options.
3.4. The “quad” chart above summarizes key elements of the concept. The
hypothesis quadrant reflects the primary goal—to compel the adversary to concede
without a protracted campaign. The “desired capabilities” quadrant lists examples of the
many potential DOCs that enable RDO. The following sections discuss some of the key
components that comprise the RDO concept. These include precision engagement,
battlespace awareness, rapid joint force projection, the construct of shaping the
battlespace, and joint command and control.
Precision Engagement
3.5. Combat operations in the 2010 timeframe will typically consist of the
application of JV 2010’s dominant maneuver and precision engagement capabilities,
enabled by focused logistics and full-dimensional protection. Successful RDO, as this
white paper describes, relies heavily on precision engagement (PE).
3.5.1. Although its roots are embedded in its predecessor precision strike, PE
encompasses more than just attacking targets with advanced weapons systems
and high-tech munitions; it also uses a wider range of capabilities. Inherently, it
includes actions to detect, identify and track operational targets, determine the
desired effect, select and combine the right forces, engage the operational
objective, assess results, and reengage as required. PE focuses primarily on
operational effects, not on the means by which effects are achieved. The JFC,
for example, could employ forces, an array of weapons and munitions (including
non-kinetic means), a range of information operations, or a combination of those
means at decisive points and times to accomplish RDO objectives.
3.5.2. Precision engagement contains a variety of means that are also used in
many ways to accomplish objectives associated with dominant maneuver (DM)
and full dimensional protection (FDP). Ground-based indirect fire systems
(including surface-to-surface missiles) are PE systems organic to maneuver
units. Likewise, both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft provide platforms for
precision weapons that typically support DM objectives. A variety of air-, land-,
and sea-based PE systems can interdict adversary capabilities before they can
engage friendly forces. Similarly, aircraft carrying precision weapons conduct
offensive counterair operations while a variety of platforms and weapons round
out the air and missile defense component of FDP.
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3.5.3. The improving range, accuracy, and reliability of a broad range of
precision weapons, platforms, and other systems increase the probability that
some missions can be accomplished primarily by employing PE capabilities. If
RDO requires destruction of enemy forces and facilities, our first choice in 2010
could be to do so from well outside of direct-fire range if possible. PE, however,
is broader than just improved ways and means for target destruction. At the core
of PE is the focus on achieving effects that range well beyond killing people and
destroying things, supplementing attrition-based, hard-kill techniques with a
broader range of effects that will help break an adversary’s will. Precision
engagements can be conducted to achieve very specific limited objectives and
can leverage non-kinetic options (such as information operations to disrupt, deny,
or exploit enemy systems) that limit collateral damage and preserve population
and infrastructure.
3.5.4. The Precision
21st CENTURY CHALLENGES
Engagement Joint Warfare
Generating and Integrating Precision Effects
Coordinating Authority2 fielded
st
two 21 Century challenges to
Throughout the range of military operations, the
focus JV 2010 capability
JFC should be able to rapidly select the best
development efforts. The first
mix of forces, weapons, and platforms to
overwhelm the enemy through the precise and
of these, Integrating
unrelenting application of required effects while
Precision Effects, is
minimizing collateral damage.
concerned with the
information superiority aspect of precision engagementthe need to develop a
fused C4ISR system that enables the optimum application of precision effects.
Generating Precision Effects, is concerned with the JFC having the tools to
precisely apply a full range of effects (kinetic to non-kinetic) against adversaries.
3.5.5. Information
21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
operations (IO) provide a
Information Operations
variety of non-kinetic precision
engagement options to the
The JFC should be able to mitigate the effects
JFC. Defensive IOto protect
of adversary information operations (IO) and
friendly systems and
protect our networks from unauthorized
infiltration while influencing, disrupting,
capabilities essential to
denying, exploiting, or destroying the
information superioritywill
adversary’s information capabilities.
begin early in any operation
and continue throughout. Likewise, the JFC can use offensive IO very early in
the operationeven before the joint force deploysto influence, disrupt, deny,
exploit, destroy, or otherwise affect an adversary’s information environment,
In late 1997, the Director, Joint Staff designated several Joint Staff Directorates as “Coordinating Authorities”,
responsible for the oversight of JV 2010’s key constructs. They are as follows: J-7, Full Spectrum Dominance; J-8,
Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, and Full-dimensional Protection; J-4, Focused Logistics; J-6,
Information Superiority (with the J-2 focused on Relevant Information and the J-3 on Information Operations); J-3,
Joint Command and Control.
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thereby increasing the
information differential in the
21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Battlespace Awareness
JFC’s favor. As the JFC and
his staff weigh potential
The JFC should be able to use a common
courses of action, they could
relevant operational picture to achieve
determine that a full range of
battlespace awareness of friendly, enemy, and
integrated offensive IO,
neutral forces, improve the art of decision
making, and provide for more efficient decisive
supplemented by selective
operations.
precision engagement with
kinetic means, might accomplish operational and strategic objectives with
minimal commitment of conventional forces. Information operations can be a
significant combat multiplier, essential to the success of any campaign.
Battlespace Awareness
3.6. Information processing capabilities ensure that key joint and component
command and control systems such as Global Command and Control System (GCCS),
Maneuver Control System (MCS), Contingency Theater Automated Planning System
(CTAPS), and Advanced Tomahawk Weapons Control System (ATWCS) are fully
interoperable. In other words, they all share and promote battlespace awarenessa
real-time, common, relevant picture of the battlespace. Battlespace awareness will not
eliminate the fog of war, but will yield a much-improved visualization of the battlespace
in space, time, and effect, regardless of terrain, weather, or time of day. The total
picture results from a combination of strategic and operational actions and capabilities
and an unimpeded flow of relevant information among all levels. The USJFCOM
CPLAN 00 functional concept, Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP)3,
contains a detailed discussion of the ways and means to address this JV 2010
challenge.
Rapid Joint Force Projection
3.7. The NCA’s ability to
respond to a requirement for rapid
21st CENTURYCHALLENGE
Rapid Joint Force Projection
decisive operations will be greatly
st
facilitated by the realization of 21
The JFC should be able to execute rapid
Century challenges associated with
deployment worldwide, quickly occupy and
rapid joint force projection. The
influence the battle space, and reduce time to
challenge described in the
build combat power in order to seize momentum
and gain multi-dimensional positional advantage.
accompanying text box focuses on
moving forces rapidly to positions of
strategic and operational advantage. This will be enabled by enhanced global
situational awareness resulting from a common relevant operational picture (see the
CROP concept, mentioned earlier). There is a related focused logistics challenge (Joint
Deployment and Rapid Distribution) that concentrates on peacetime initiatives
associated with enhancing transportation infrastructure to facilitate rapid deployment
3
The USJFCOM J-9 approved the CROP concept White Paper, Version 1.0, on 3 Sep 99.
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prior to and throughout a crisis.
Forward presence forces,
21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Decisive Combat Operations
prepositioned assets, and innovative
basing options should greatly
With increased battlespace awareness, rapid
increase force projection agility and
joint force projection, and multi-dimensional
responsiveness. The organic lift
superiority, the JFC should be able to
capability of forces, such as that
simultaneously employ tailored force packages
in high-tempo, intense joint operations to
afforded the Marines by the V-22
achieve decisive results.
Osprey, will allow the JFC to set the
timing and tempo of operations, with
precision engagement where and when the JFC chooses. The mobility and agility thus
afforded joint forces should enable the JFC to extend his operational reach and allow
him to strike simultaneously with multiple systems throughout the battlespace.
Shaping the Battlespace
3.8. Even the necessity for quick, decisive action will not allow the JFC to
disregard the preconditions for mission success. A broad range of preliminary actions
must occur to establish conditions for decisive operations. These include: developing a
complete and accurate picture of the battlespace; achieving dimensional superiority (air,
land, sea, space, and electromagnetic spectrum); isolating the adversary and denying
him freedom of action; building and positioning combat power; and coordinating the
efforts of other organizations to achieve unified action. The objectives of this stage—
however brief it may be—are to seize and exploit the initiative, posture the force, and
set the conditions for decisive operations.
In the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict, Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991
when allied air and naval forces began the destruction of key Iraqi strategic,
operational, and tactical targets. By the end of the second day, the coalition
air component had achieved air superiority and by 21 January the Iraqi air
force was incapable of air operations. Activities that built sufficient combat
power, achieved air superiority, suppressed Iraqi air defense, and degraded
command and control capabilities established the important conditions that
enabled subsequent decisive operations.
3.8.1. In combat, the friendly
21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
force should have achieved
Battlespace Control
information superiority over
the enemy before beginning
If the JFC can control the battlespace by
decisive operations. The
achieving dimensional superiority protecting
friendly force must also be in a
his force, and maintaining friendly access, then
he will to set the conditions for rapid decisive
position to bring sufficient
operations
combat power to bear against
the enemy force at the right time and place to accomplish the mission efficiently
and effectively. This will typically require deployment of forces to attain
operational reach combined with maneuver to achieve positional advantage.
Full-dimensional protection of friendly forces is essential. The additional
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complexity of operations with our allies requires C2 arrangements that must be
established before decisive operations can occur in a coalition environment.
3.8.2. Since the actual period in which decisive operations occur may be very
short, the conditions that enable them may not be required to exist continuously
throughout the campaign. For example, it will not be necessary to maintain
positional advantage throughout an entire operation as long as the force can
achieve positional advantage for the specific period required for decisive
operations. Nor is it necessary to maintain air superiority over the entire
battlespace as long as air superiority can be achieved relative to decisive
operations and full-dimensional protection requirements.
Table 1 – Essential Conditions for Decisive Operations
 Achieve Dimensional Superiority
 Protect the Force
 Maintain Friendly Access
 Isolate the Enemy
 Attain Operational Reach
Shape the Battlespace a core construct
3.8.3. Table 1 lists several of the conditions that enable decisive operations and
can be grouped within a construct called “shaping the battlespace.”4 The ability
of the joint force to achieve dimensional superiority is the central component of
this construct. These conditions are closely linked, with changes in one
potentially affecting the others. This construct helps the JFC and joint force staff
as they consider the interaction of a variety of operations that will create an
environment conducive to freedom of action for friendly forces.

Achieve Dimensional Superiority. This is the central component of
shaping the battlespace. Control of the air and sea has historically been
essential to successful combat operations on land. Air and sea superiority
contribute greatly to the JFC’s ability to maintain friendly access and deny
enemy access to the battlespace and to move our forces within operational
reach of enemy centers of gravity. This concept applies not only to the CINC
and subordinate JFCs, but to commands at lower levels as well. For
example, ground force commanders typically will require local air and indirect
fire superiority in addition to favorable maneuver unit combat-power ratios. In
2010, superiority in space and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum will
be essential as well, particularly for the purpose of achieving information
superiority. Moreover, information operations should contribute significantly
as a combat power multiplier. Dimensional superiorityeven if localized in
time and spaceis required in order to maintain friendly access to the
battlespace.
4
The construct of shaping the battlespace will provide the focus for the USJFCOM-sponsored FY 00 joint
experiment J0019, “Unified Vision 00”.
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5

Maintain Friendly Access. Access to the battlespace in all dimensions by
US and allied forces contributes to the JFC’s freedom of action. This does
not necessarily mean the battlespace is accessible from all directions, but that
sufficient air and sea lines of communication for movement of forces and
sustainment packages exist and can be protected successfully from
interdiction. Access from space and through the electromagnetic spectrum is
equally essential.

Protect the Force. Fulldimensional protection
21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
Countering Air and Missile Threats
(FDP) is one of the
essential conditions for
With an integrated family of interoperable
decisive operations.
systems and a common relevant operational
Protection requirements
picture, the JFC should be able to gain control of
are at the heart of
the battlespace and provide multi-level, in-depth
defense against missile and other air threats
operations to achieve
dimensional superiority,
attain operational reach, and maintain friendly access to the battlespace.
FDP actions exemplify the close interaction among the components that
enable the JFC to control the battlespace. FDP includes both offensive and
defensive elements (such as offensive counterair and antisubmarine warfare
respectively). Countering air and missile threats, a JV 2010 21 st Century
Challenge, will be an essential aspect of establishing full-dimensional
protection.

Isolate the Enemy. It is important to deny the enemy outside sources of
support and access to friendly decisive points and centers of gravity. It can
be particularly difficult to limit outside support if rules of engagement preclude
the JFC from conventional attack against countries or factions that support
the enemy with forces, supplies, or sanctuary. Information operations offer
great potential to inhibit outside sources of support by ways and means that
exhibit no apparent destructive effects. Denying the enemy access to our key
capabilities can be accomplished by offensive and defensive protective
measures, including locating these capabilities outside the enemy’s
operational reach.

Attain Operational Reach. Operational reach is, “. . . the distance over
which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. 5” The
2010 JFC’s operational reach will increase due to many factors, such as
longer-range weapons and systems, more efficient logistics, and smaller but
more lethal combat units. Innovative basing options that allow “split-basing”
of functions and capabilities such as logistics, intelligence support, and C2 will
also decrease our footprint and increase operational reach. Enhanced
Joint Pub 3-0, p. III-16.
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protection capabilities as well as the CROP will help the JFC achieve
positional advantage more quickly.
Joint Command and Control
3.9. The CROP and advanced
21st CENTURY CHALLENGE
information systems will provide the
Joint Command and Control
capability to conduct military planning
in an entirely new way. The JFC and
The JFC should be able to combine increased
his staff will be able to centralize their
battlespace awareness, advanced planning
planning efforts while becoming less
capabilities, and assured communications to
apply the proper balance of JV 2010’s new
centralized in location. The ability to
operational concepts to achieve decisive
rapidly exchange information around
operations.
the globe and throughout the
battlespace will force the sequential,
linear planning of the past to give way to simultaneous, interactive planning which will
greatly affect the tempo of execution.
Likewise, in the execution of future joint operations, our advanced systems will allow
leaders at all levels to leverage more fully the capabilities of the force and achieve a
tempo of operations that will overwhelm any opponent. An unprecedented level of
battlespace awareness will permit leaders to operate more effectively within the
commander’s intent without requiring direct control. However, the same capabilities will
enable commanders to monitor and directly control the actions of their forces at lower
echelons, thus allowing a greater degree of centralized control when required. The JFC
should be able to vary the degree of control based on the situation. In spite of the
potential to centralize control, appropriate decentralization and self-synchronization will
more fully exploit the capabilities of agile organizations and the initiative of leaders at
every level.
4.0. Desired Operational Capabilities
4.1. Joint operations in the 2010 timeframe will depend on fielding a wide range
of capabilities to enable dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and other JV 2010
constructs. The established list of DOCs developed by the JV 2010 Coordinating
Authorities provide a foundation for developing a comprehensive set of desired
operational capabilities tailored to RDO requirements.
4.2. Version 1.0 of the RDO White Paper will discuss DOCs in more detail. The
following DOCs (or DOC categories) are among the most important to the rapid
response and time-constrained requirements of rapid decisive operations:

Provide Real-time Battlespace Awareness This provides real-time or
near real-time battlespace awareness to the JFC, subordinate commanders,
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and staffs at all levels. It includes DOCs necessary to achieve the CROP and
those associated with defensive information operations.

Achieve Unity of Effort The JFC will regulate forces and functions to
focus, integrate, and synchronize actions throughout the battlespace. It
includes DOCs related to organizing the joint force headquarters and task
organizing the joint force.

Achieve and Preserve Battlespace Control This is required in order to
ensure freedom of friendly action. Paragraph 3.7.3 discusses specific
requirements of the construct “shaping the battlespace.” It includes DOCs
that relate to achieving air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic superiority.

Generate Overmatching Lethal and Non-lethal Effects This is the
capability to provide a decisive advantage in range, probability of hit and kill,
efficiency of effects, and relative combat power. It includes DOCs associated
with precision engagement, combat identification, and offensive information
operations.

Synchronize Employment of Forces to Achieve Desired Effects The
capability to synchronize joint operations of widely dispersed forces against
multiple centers of gravity (simultaneously if necessary).

Conduct Short-notice Global Maneuver and Attack The capability to
rapidly deploy, maneuver, and attack with forces sufficient to accomplish the
mission. It includes focused logistics DOCs that relate to strategic
deployment as well as inter- and intra-theater mobility.

Protect Forces, Facilities, and Capabilities This is a relatively broad
category that includes specific full-dimensional protection DOCs related to
early detection and engagement of those threats that are most dangerous to
mission accomplishment (such as air and missile threats that are WME
capable). It also includes DOCs related to precision engagement, defensive
information operations, and combat identification.

Affect Adversary Ability to Observe the Battlespace This increases the
information differential in the JFC’s favor, thus contributing to information
superiority and creating confusion for the adversary.

Affect Adversary Ability to Command and Control Forces This disrupts,
destroys, or otherwise affects the adversary’s C2 systems, thus greatly
weakening his planning and execution processes.
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5.0. Experimentation Strategy Overview
5.1. The RDO experimentation strategy begins with a series of investigation
venues (and corresponding concept refinement) and culminates in a USJFCOM major
joint integrating event (MJIE) or package of events in 2004. Initial focus areas and
corresponding groupings of DOCs and Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) task sets have
been identified for investigation. Given that many facets of RDO remain only loosely
defined, the experimentation strategy in 2000 is directed toward alternative identification
and exposure, discovery, and concept refinement. The strategy centers on two
objectives:

USJFCOM will generate a forum by which new and potentially
revolutionary alternatives to achieve RDO can be examined.

USJFCOM will capitalize on investigation and discovery
opportunities presented in the near-term experimentation
processes of the Services and other organizations.
5.2. The first objective will be achieved through a USJFCOM-sponsored RDO
seminar - work shop - war game - experiment sequence. The seminar will provide
the initial forum for exposure of three broad RDO alternatives that will be used as the
preliminary vehicles for investigating RDO throughout spiral one of the iterative
development process. These alternatives include a baseline comprised of programmed
Service forces employed in accordance with current joint doctrine and two concept
options that project new capabilities, organizations, and employment methods. The
RDO Workshop will investigate force structure and deployability implications of each
alternative. The RDO Wargame and follow-on experiment; UNIFIED VISION 00, will
examine the alternatives and variations against a Kosovo-based, 2010-2015 campaign
scenario.
5.3. The second objective will be achieved by leveraging the discovery
opportunities that reside in currently scheduled FY 00 experimentation venues. Two
active experimentation areas that are of particular interest are the DARPA-sponsored
“Command Post of the Future” series of limited objective experiments (LOE) and the
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate-sponsored series of wargames that will
investigate the utility of non-kinetic weapons. USJFCOM will also conduct its own LOE
to examine the implications of non-kinetic weapon availability during the target selection
and approval process. USJFCOM’s routine participation in Service-sponsored
wargames and other venues will also provide opportunities for discovery and
investigation of specific issues.
5.4. During 4th Quarter, FY 00 USJFCOM will participate in a major leveraged
experiment, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 00, that will combine the opportunities
associated with the four independent Service experiments. These are the Army’s Joint
Contingency Force-Advanced Warfighting Experiment (JCF-AWE), the Air Force’s Joint
Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX), the Navy’s Fleet Battle Experiment-Hotel
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(FBE-H), and the Marine Corps’ Urban Warrior MOUT ACTD. By providing the joint
force headquarters, USJFCOM will leverage a significant opportunity to investigate
emerging architectures associated with the Joint Interactive Planning and Common
Relevant Operational Picture concepts.
5.5. Beyond 2000, we will refine experimentation using the results of the findings
and insights gained during the first year. The strategy will again focus on a USJFCOMgenerated investigation series complemented by increased efforts to leverage high payoff experimentation venues in the JE community at large.
5.6. Following are initial experimentation questions for the RDO concept:

What is the size, composition and capability of the joint force? How could
we organize the joint force?

How will the joint force deploy to a theater? What is the deployment
sequence? How long does it take the joint force to arrive in a combat
position?

What is the best way to protect the deployment of the joint forces?

What is the best organization for the joint force and Service components’
command and control?

What are the information requirements and information generating assets
available to the JFC? How is information for the joint force managed,
coordinated, and distributed?

What are the “new” warfighting capabilities of this force?

How mobile is the force? How does it achieve operational and tactical
mobility?

How much firepower does the joint force need and how does the force
receive timely and effective fires?

How can the JFC leverage non-kinetic capabilities to expand precision
engagement options?

What is the best construct for shaping the battlespace?

How could the adversary counter the capabilities of the joint force at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war?

How does the joint force protect itself?
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
What is the sustainable operational reach of the RDO force?

What are the human implications of RDO? How do humans make
appropriate decisions rapidly enough to take full advantage of advanced
information capabilities? How do they analyze and mitigate the risks
involved in these operations?

What are the effects on leadership, morale, and sustainability of deep
operational force projection?

How do advanced information systems such as CROP and inter-active
combat ID increase operational understanding of the battle space and
allow the joint force to accept risk that previously would have been
unacceptable?
5.7. USJFCOM will modify the RDO concept as appropriate after each
experiment spiral and will use the results of these experiments to build a USJFCOM
major joint integrating experiment in 2004. This large joint field event will stress the
following objective:
Employ the full range of joint capabilities to rapidly control, deny, degrade, or
destroy an adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity without a
large-scale invasion of enemy territory to compel the adversary to undertake
certain actions or to deny the adversary the ability to launch a successful attack.
As the concept matures, USJFCOM will conduct MJIE every two years. USJFCOM will
refocus and refine experimentation objectives and strategy in less-intensive field
experimentation events starting in 2007 and every 12-14 months thereafter.
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