The Pastoral-Agricultural Conflicts in Zamfara State, Nigeria
Umar, Bello Farouk1
North Central Regional Centre for Rural Development
Iowa State University, Ames
ABSTRACT
The study was conducted to achieve the following specific objectives: (i) to identify factors that
augment conflicts between pastoralists or herders and farmers in the state (ii) to examine existing
centralised and informal channels for managing key rural resources and resolution of conflicts in
the state with a view to exposing their strengths and weaknesses; and (iii) to suggest policy
implications based on the findings of the study. Respondents for the study included farmers,
pastoralists, and officials of selected pastoralists and farmers associations, law enforcement
agents, staff of organisations concerned with management of common property resources and
local leaders. Cluster sampling was used in the selection of the farmers and pastoralists.
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and questionnaire administration were employed in data
collection. Major causes of conflicts between farmers and herders were found to include crop
damage by herders’ livestock, encroachment of cattle corridors and grazing lands, and blockage
of water points by farmers. Devolution of natural resource management to local communities is
strongly recommended for addressing the incessant crisis between farmers and herders.
Introduction
Customary property rights, which are essential for livestock production in Africa, have been
eroded by a long history of conflicts. Attempts to apply uniform, centralist state law have
weakened both the institutional environment and contractual arrangements on which communal
land-tenure is based and has destroyed the management capacity of local institutions (Kirk,
1999). This institutional erosion of management efficiency is not only a consequence of the
states’ incapacity to administer nationalised pastures efficiently but also of its lack of capacity to
manage a complex private-property system and to protect still-existing common property from
unhindered “encroachment” of private interests.
As a consequence, a variety of conflicts on several levels find their origins in attempts to effect
rigid changes in tenure through state policy in pastoral areas: disputes between pastoralists and
the state over land rights, between competing land users over access to resources, or between
pastoral organisations over differing approaches to halt the loss of lands (Cousins 1996). Thus,
all conflicts can be said to be embedded in and aggravated by an increasing competition for land
as a result of population growth, land scarcity, and a new solvency due to income earned outside
agriculture (GTZ 1998 in Kirk 1999, Gefu and Gilles, 1990, Fraser, 1997).
In addition, land conflicts are proving more difficult to solve because traditional instruments of
conciliation, such as compromise and consensus are failing. On the one hand, local institutions
have largely lost their authority, and on the other, few institutional innovations have been
developed (Hasseling and Ba 1994; Kirk and Adokp-Migan 1994 in Kirk 1999). Williams has
similarly observed that government interventions in natural resource management in semi-arid
1
A Visiting Scholar from Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension, Usman Danfodiyo University,
Sokoto, Nigeria.
1
West Africa have frequently resulted in unintended, but disastrous outcomes. This, in his words,
is because:
The interventions often arise from an insufficient understanding of the intricacies of
customary institutions with their emphasis on differentiated access rights and the often
subtle, but important, sanctions that are utilized to regulate resource use. Thus, as a result
of inappropriate interventions, resources that were under effective communal management
have been converted into de facto open access resources. This conversion, in the opinion of
Williams, is often accelerated due to inability of the responsible government agencies to
provide effective management programmes because of poor staffing and inadequate
technical and material provision by the government for the work of these agencies
(Williams, 1998:5).
Lawry (1990) also rightly notes that while states have usurped the last vestiges of local control
through legal reforms, they have been unable to put in place an effective alternative system for
managing collective resources, and for resolving user-conflicts. The result is what Lawry calls a
hiatus, in which economic and political changes have combined to forestall collective action, and
state regulation ineffectual. To end this hiatus, it may be necessary to think in terms of policies
for shoring up the respective weaknesses of states and communities in managing pastoral
resources and resolving conflicts among users of the resources. This has been part of the task of
this study.
The specific objectives of the study include: (i) to identify factors that augment conflicts between
pastoralists and farmers in the state; (ii) to examine existing centralised and informal channels
for managing key rural resources and resolution of conflicts in the state with a view to exposing
their strengths and weaknesses; and (iv) to draw policy implications from the findings.
Methodology
The study was conducted in Zamfara State, Nigeria. The choice of the state was informed by its
high population of farmers and pastoralists (who constitute over 80% of the people) and for its
relatively large number of grazing reserves (e.g Zamfara Grazing reserve). The state also serves
as a transit zone for pastoralists migrating from neighbouring states and the Niger Republic
towards central and southwestern Nigeria in search of greener pasture at the end of the wet
season. Zamfara State, like many other states in northern Nigeria, has a history of rampant
clashes between pastoralists and sedentary farmers. One of the recent clashes between the two
groups in the State has been reported by Anon. (2000).
Zamfara State stretches from latitudes 10° 211 N to 13° 151 N and longitude 6° 201 E, covering a
landmass of 38, 418 square kilometres. It shares boundaries with Niger, and Kebbi States in the
West, Katsina State in the east, Kaduna State in the south and Sokoto State and Niger Republic
in the north. The population of the state was estimated at 2, 231, 402 people in the 1991 National
Census (Dangusau, 1991).
Agriculture has a unique position in the economy of the state. It is estimated that agriculture, in
its various forms, provides the means of livelihood to over 80 per cent of the population of the
area. In addition to crop production, the inhabitants of Zamfara State engage in rearing of
livestock such as cattle, sheep, goats and poultry. It is estimated that the livestock population in
the area is well over 9 million heads (Dangusau, 1998).
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Sampling procedure and data collection
The respondents for this study included farmers, pastoralists, and officials of selected pastoral
and farmers associations, law enforcement agents, staff of organisations concerned with
management of common property resources and local leaders. Cluster sampling was used in the
selection of the farmers and pastoralists. The area was divided into four clusters on the basis of
some criteria. Birnin Magaji LGA was sampled in the first cluster because the popular Zamfara
Grazing Reserve stretches through the area. Zurmi LGA was sampled in the second cluster
because it shares a common boundary with the Niger Republic. In the third cluster, Talata
Mafara LGA was sampled due to the presence of the Bakolori Irrigation Project, which
facilitates year-round cropping in the area. Lastly, in the fourth cluster, Tsafe LGA was sampled
because a major cattle route leading to the south passes through the area. A total of 235 people
(160 farmers and 75 pastoralists) were interviewed. In addition, 21 leaders/staff of selected
CBOs/NGOs, law enforcement and common property resource management agencies, farmers’
and pastoralists’ association and local leaders were interviewed.
PRA and questionnaire administration were employed to generate data for the study. Three sets
of questionnaires were administered to farmers, pastoralists, and local leaders and officials of
sampled agencies and associations respectively. Frequency distribution and ranking were
employed in data analysis. For the PRA, which was conducted in the Zamfara Reserve
(Shamushalle village), transect walk, focus group discussions and ranking were conducted with
separate groups of herders and farmers.
Results and discussion
Majority of the farmers (90.0%) and herders (82.7%) has ever witnessed a dispute between
farmers and herders in their locality. This shows that occurrence of farmer-herder disputes is
high in the area. Crop damage by herders’ livestock, cattle corridors and grazing lands
encroachment, and blockage of water points by farmers are the predominant manifest causes of
the conflicts. Williams (1998:3-4) has similarly observed that farmland expansion involving
encroachment of large areas of CPRs such as forests, wetlands and rangelands, with farmers
overriding and ignoring the traditional use rights of other groups to these resources has
heightened conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in semi-arid West Africa. For example
findings from transect walk conducted to the west of Shamushalle with the aid of a key
informant who is a pastoralist revealed that politicians and traditional rulers, with the support of
the state government, have converted over 100 hectares of grazing land to farmland this growing
season (2002). A perennial water pond, an international stock route, and some Fulani rainy
season camps (mashekari) were all blocked/converted to farmland in the exercise.
Most of the farmers studied are both crop growers and animal keepers (84.4%). The keeping of
animals by farmers which, started in the recent past, heightens competition with Fulani herders
for pasture, crop residue, and water and related grazing facilities, which usually result into
conflicts between the two groups. The fact that the farmers who keep animals employ either a
combination of the intensive and extensive methods (54.4%) or only the extensive system of
herding (18.8%) which herders mainly employ further compounds the situation.
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Herders’ animals usually graze crop residue on farmers’ fields at the beginning of the dry season
when pasture available for animal grazing starts declining in the grazing reserve. During the
rainy season, the herders move their animals away from the cultivated zones to graze high
quality forage found in the rangelands and to avoid damage to farmers’ crops. Williams (1998:23) has also observed this sequential use of land by farmers and herders in semi-arid West Africa.
But a major problem, which has been causing conflicts between farmers and herders in the area,
is that farmers don’t want to release the croplands to herders in good time at the onset of the dry
season. This delay is caused in part by the planting of late crops of cotton, sorghum and potato
by farmers recently. The fact that many farmers leave the late crops unfenced makes them more
potential trouble spots for herders. The fact that herders now have to pay farmers for crop residue
has further sown the seed of discord between the two groups.
The nomadic Fulani herders, according to farmers and herders, are more frequently involved in
conflicts with farmers (64.4%) although the semi-settled (43.1%) and sedentary herders are also
involved (37.5%). Unfortunately, the conflicts involving nomads have usually been violent
involving the use of arms including guns, which result mostly in lost of human lives and
property. Farmers blame the semi settled and sedentary herders of inviting nomads to pool up
their herds to collectively damage farmers’ crops and harvests in the harvest season. Other
pastoral groups also blame nomads of damaging farmers’ crops overnight and fleeing only to
leave them to bear the brunt sometimes in the form of fatal clashes with farmers.
The way the Fulani perceive the Hausa and vice versa is believed to affect relationships between
the two ethnic groups. For example, the Fulani were known to see the Hausa as Kado (meaning
infidels or unbelievers) whose property they can use without offence to God. The Hausa, on the
other hand, perceive the Fulani as intruders, uncivilised and uninformed. Historically, the
feelings the Hausa and the Fulani have for one another since the jihad times of the Sokoto
Caliphate have been major reasons why they were at loggerheads. Though the feelings have
changed seriously, some herders (10.7%) admitted the existence of Fulani who still hold to the
above view.
Majority of the herders (78.7%) have, however, put the blame of the predicament of herders and
their profession (pastoralism) to biased Nigeria’s public policy that has been neglecting livestock
production in favour of crop farming, urbanisation and the like. This, together with the feelings
of ill-will described above may be viewed as the underlying causes of conflicts between herders
and farmers.
Conflict arbitration
Forty percent of the farmers and 30.7% of the herders have reported village heads as major
arbitrators of disputes involving farmers and herders in the study area. Farmers neighbouring
crop fields where farmer-herder disputes occur also play some role in arbitration. However,
involvement of dispute resolution institutions of police and courts of law was found to be very
low. This shows that informal traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution are still functional
in Zamfara and that both farmers and herders have preference for them over formal authorities
when it comes to the issue of conflict arbitration. The desire for sustaining relationships is the
major factor that informed farmers’ and herders’ preferences. Both have the view that taking
4
disputes to formal authorities like the police and courts of law worsens relationships between
disputants.
Pair-wise ranking of preference for institutions concerned with grazing reserve control and
conflict resolution was also done by separate groups of herders and farmers. In the herders’
ranking, traditional rulers and the Miyetti Allah cattle breeders association (MACBAN), a
herders’ union, were ranked first followed by the local government and court in that order (Table
1). The police and the traditional Fulani leader, Filani (the herders’ traditional leader) were
ranked last. Herders’ reasons for the ranking is that the police are corrupt, detain people and
delay cases unduly. In the case of the Filani, they did not choose him because, according to them,
he has no authority over farmers.
The ranking by farmers, however, involved up to nine institutions. Traditional rulers and courts
were ranked first and MACBAN last with a score of zero (Table 2). Peaceful conflict
reconciliation is the farmers’ criterion for selecting an institution. For example, the village head’s
intervention in a dispute, though considered as peaceful way of conflict resolution, is sometimes
less preferred than village elders’ mediation. This is because the accused person will always see
it that the offended is lenient to him for not taking him to higher authorities.
A major non-government organization concerned with prevention/resolution of farmer-herder
conflicts is MACBAN. More than half (58%) of the herders studied are members of the
association. This pastoral association, which has branches in all states of Nigeria having
considerable population of Fulani herders, aims at protecting the interests of herders and grazing
facilities in the country. Officials of the association are members of local governments
committees on farmer-Fulani disputes in Zamfara State. The association, though despised by
farmers for the challenge it poses, has been found to have influence on not only sedentary and
semi-sedentary herders but also on the nomadic herders.
Conclusions
This paper concludes that the causes of pastoral-agricultural conflicts in Zamfara State are twofold: underlying (covert) and manifest (overt). The underlying causes are related biased and
insensitive public policy and the ill feelings that herders and farmers hold for another and the
transfer of control of key resources from traditional to state authorities. All other causes can be
seen as the manifest causes. This study holds that the best way to resolve the pastoral-agricultural
crisis in state is to address both causes of conflict through devolution of control of natural
resources and conflict resolution by government to their users, the local communities. The main
role of government with respect to devolution is that of creating an enabling environment. This
may include the following: (1) creating a positive and supportive legislative environment, (2)
using bottom-up and participatory approach in order to avoid imposing any ideas or external
institutions on local communities. Building on existing local organizations like the Miyetti Allah
Fulani association, young farmers’ clubs, and vigilante groups may be a good idea in gaining
support of community members, (3) cooperating with NGOs and local community institutions
and providing financial backing for their effort in common resource management, (4) providing
training and sensitization for all stakeholders (farmers, Fulani herders, wood sellers, traditional
rulers, traditional healers, wood carvers, etc), (5) ensuring proper representativeness and
accountability of management organisations, and (6) government institutions will be important in
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resolving disputes and reconciling the different interests of various user groups that could not be
handled by local management structures, and in providing an appropriate legal framework to
support and enforce resource use agreements worked out by different local groups.
Acknowledgements
This study was conducted with support from the Usman Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Nigeria,
the EU-sponsored INCO-DC Project, Faculty of Agriculture, Usman Danfodiyo University,
Sokoto and the UNESCO MAB Young Scientists Awards programme.
REFERENCES
Anonymous (2000). New Nigerian, Monday, January 10, pp.2.
Cousins, B. (1996). Conflict Management for Multiple Resource Users in Pastoral and Agropastoral Contexts. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 3.
Dangusau, A.M. (1998). Who is Who in Zamfara State. Mega Press Limited, Kaduna, Nigeria,
pp. 8-39.
Fraser, S. (1997). Indigenous ‘Symbiotic’ Exchange Relations between Cattle Herders and
Farmers in the Savanna Region of Nigeria: A Neglected Natural Resource Management Strategy.
An Unpublished M.Sc. Anthropology and Ecology of Development Dissertation, Dept. of
Anthropology, University of London, 54p.
Gefu, J. O. and J. L. Gills (1990) Pastoralists, Ranchers and the state in Nigeria and North
America: A comparative Analysis. Nomadic Peoples, Nos. 25-27, pp.34-49.
Kirk, M. (1999). The Context for Livestock and Crop-Livestock Development in Africa: the
Evolving Role of the State in influencing Property Rights over Grazing Resources in SubSaharan Africa. In: McCarthy, N. : B. Swallow; M. Kirk and P. Hazell (eds.) Property Rights,
Risk, and Livestock Development in Africa. IFPRI and ILRI.
Lawry, S.W. (1990). Tenure Policy Toward Common Property Natural Resource Management in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Natural Resources Journal Vol. 30, No. 2.
Williams, T. O. (1998). Multiple Uses of Common Pool Resources in Semi-Arid West Africa: A
Survey of Existing Practices and Options for Sustainable Resource Management. ODI Natural
Resource Perspectives, No. 38.
Corresponding author
Umar, Bello Farouk, Iowa State University, North Central Regional Centre for Rural
Development, 107 Curtiss Hall, Ames, 50011 IA, USA, Phone: 515 294 2882, Fax: 515 294
3180, bfumar@yahoo.com, ORAL, Engaging diverse stakeholders in support of small farms
6
Table 1. Pair wise ranking of conflict management institutions by herders
XXX
Village head
Police
Filani
Village head
XXXX
Village head
Village head
XXXX
Police
Court
XXXX
Court
Police
Filani
Court
Court
Miyetti
Allah
Local
Government
Total score
Ranking
4
1
1
4
1
4
7
Miyetti
Allah
Local
Government
Miyetti
Allah
Miyetti
Allah
Filani
Village head
XXXX
Miyetti
Allah
XXXX
2
3
4
1
Local
Government
Local
Government
Local
Government
Miyetti
Allah
XXXX
3
2
Table 2. Pair wise ranking of conflict management institutions by farmers
XXXX
Police
Police
Court
Local Govt.
State Govt.
XXXX
Court
Police
XXXX
Court
Local
Govt.
State Govt.
Filani
Police
Vigilante
Groups
Police
Court
Court
XXXX
Local Govt.
XXXX
Vigilante
groups
Filani
Miyetti
Allah
Village
elders
Village
head
Total score
Ranking
Village elders
Police
Miyetti
Allah
Police
Court
Court
Court
Court
Vigilante
groups
Vigilante
groups
XXXX
Local Govt.
Local Govt.
Local Govt.
Filani
State Govt.
Village elders
Vigilante
groups
XXXX
Vigilante
groups
Filani
Vigilante groups
XXXX
Village elders
Police
Village elders
XXXX
6
2
7
1
4
4
1
6
5
3
8
2
5
0
7
4
4