1.
Discussion Questions: A Theory of Justice, sections 60-68
(1) what does Rawls mean by saying that “a more comprehensive view is required for the subsequent
argument”?
(2) what does Rawls man by saying that “justice and goodness are congruent”?
60. The Need for a Theory of the Good
(1) what does Rawls mean by saying that the right is prior to the good in justice as fairness?
(2) why does the priority of the right require a thin rather than a robust theory of the good? Why do we
need a theory of the good at all to arrive at principles of justice?
(3) explain Rawls’s remark: “we need what I have called the thin theory of the good to explain the rational
preference for the primary goods and to explicate the notion of rationality underlying the choice of
principles in the original position” (349).
(4) what is “the third main concept of ethics”? what are the other two? Why must we “find a place for it
within the contract view”?
(5) explain the distinction between the thin and the full theories of the good in light of the remarks made
on p. 349-50.
(6) why does Rawls think that “when we ask whether the sense of justice is a good, the important question
clearly is that defined by the thin theory”? why not the full theory?
61. The Definition of the Good for Simpler Cases
(1) give the three stages of the definition of goodness.
(2) under what circumstances is it proper to call something a “human good”?
(3) explain what Rawls means by saying “The essential point, however, is that these criteria depend upon
the nature of the objects in question and upon our experience with them; and therefore we say that certain
things are good without further elaboration only when a certain backgrounds is presupposed or some
particular context is taken for granted. The basic value judgements are those made from the standpoint of
persons, given their interests, abilities and circumstances.” (352)
(4) some philosophers (e.g. Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods) have thought that value judgements
should be made from God’s point of view. others have thought that goodness is, in the first instance, a
metaphysical category. can Rawls’s treatment of goodness be rendered consistent with these?
(5) why is Rawls at pains to explain that he is not giving a definition of ‘good’ in the usual sense of
‘definition’?
(6) why is a morally neutral definition of the good to be expected in contract theory? should we be
troubled by this implication of contract theory? why or why not?
(7) why does Rawls say that a theory of the virtues presupposes the principles of right (355)? is he correct
about this?
(8) explain the hint Rawls gives at the conclusion of this section about how goodness as rationality will be
used to construct a conception of the moral worth of persons. (recall that we were told in the last section
that this is “the third main concept of ethics”.)
2.
62. A Note on Meaning
(1) what does Rawls mean by saying that “goodness as rationality is a descriptive theory” (356)?
(2) what does Rawls mean by “illocutionary force”? what does the appeal to illocutionary force allow
Rawls to explain? how does his reliance on the invocation of illocutionary force enable him to avoid
postulating prescriptive or emotive meanings?
63. The Definition of the Good for Plans of Life
(1) what is the shortcoming of the definition of goodness as it has been expounded so far?
(2) why must the definition of goodness be extended to plans of life “if it is to serve the purposes of the
theory of justice”? (358)
(3) under what circumstances will Rawls say that a person’s conception of the good is rational?
(4) under what circumstances will Rawls say that a person’s plan of life is rational?
(5) note the movement of Rawls’s thought from sections 61-63:
1. something is good if it has the features which it would be rational to want in things of that
kind
2. therefore someone’s conception of the good is good if it has the features it would be rational
to want in a conception of the good
3. someone’s conception of the good is rational is if his plan of life is rational
4. therefore someone’s conception of the good is good if his plan of life is rational
5. his plan of life is rational if and only if it satisfies the two conditions given on p. 358-9
6. therefore someone’s conception of the good is good if and only if his plan of life satisfies the
two conditions given on p. 358-9
isn’t this a very weak, and highly subjectivist, account of what it is for someone’s conception of the good to
be good?
(6) what does Rawls mean by saying that “a rational plan of life establishes the basic point of view from
which all judgments of value relating to a particular person are to be made and finally rendered consistent?
(7) what are “the good things in life” (361) according to goodness as rationality?
(8) what are the principles of rational choice as applied to ends and plans of life?
(9) why does Rawls think the more inclusive plan of life to be preferred to the less inclusive one? explain
the objection to applying the principle of inclusion to long-term plans. how is the objection answered?
(10) the assumptions Rawls makes in laying out the principles are not always satisfied in actual lives.
what does Rawls think we must do to apply the principles? why is it therefore appropriate to call the
principles “counting principles” (364)?
(11) explain Rawls’s remark on p. 365: “These considerations appear evident enough, and simply parallel
in the case of the individual the deep effects that a choice of a conception of justice is bound to have upon
the kinds of aims and interests encouraged by the basic structure of society. Convictions about what sort of
person to be are similarly involved in the acceptance of principles of justice.”
3.
64. Deliberative Rationality
(1) explain the subjectivist elements of choice that are left open by the counting principles. does the
persistence of these elements imply that philosophy is not able to do all that we want it to? why does
Rawls talk about assessing the intensity of desires as if it is a last resort?
(2) explain deliberative rationality as Sidgwick seems to understand it.
(3) what is deliberative rationality as applied to plans of life?
(4) explain the distinction between one’s real and apparent good. under what circumstances is one NOT to
be blamed for a discrepancy between the two (366-7)?
(5) why is it reasonable to find a sub-optimal but satisfactory plan of life rather than an optimal one?
(6) explain the “time-related principles” (369) that are part of the notion of deliberative rationality.
(7) explain the distinction between regret and self-reproach (370).
(8) what is the principle of responsibility to self and how does it resemble a principle of right?
(9) why is the principle of responsibility to self relevant to choice in the original position?
65. The Aristotelian Principle
(1) why is it necessary to draw on “general facts” to draw conclusions about what sorts of ends rational
plans of life are likely to include or encourage? what are the general facts Rawls cites on p. 372?
(2) why is it important that the human goods can be pursued within the bounds allowed by principles of
justice?
(3) what does Rawls mean by calling the human goods “complementary goods”? is the fact that they are
complementary really why we praise them? don’t we prize the creation of beauty because we think
beautiful things are intrinsically valuable?
(4) state the Aristotelian principle. is it a psychological law or a norm? what is the difference?
(5) what explains why the Aristotelian principle is true of us?
(6) why are “the activities favored by the Aristotelian principle … good for other persons as well” (376)?
(7) why does Rawls say that “if [the Aristotelian principle] is a useful theoretical notion, the tendency
postulated should be relatively strong and not easily counterbalanced” (377)? what evidence does he offer
that this is so? do you find the evidence compelling? why or why not?
(8) why does Rawls offer an evolutionary argument for the Aristotelian principle?
(9) what is “[t]he role of the Aristotelian Principle in the theory of the good” (379)?
(10) what intuitions does the Principle allow Rawls to accommodate? does it allow Rawls, as it were, not
to have his perfectionist cake but to eat it too? (HINT: Rawls says “assuming the principle is true we seem
able to account for what things are recognized as good for human beings taking them as they are” (380).
why is this a better account than, say, one according to which some human lives are better than others
because they incorporate more or better intrinsic goods?)
4.
66. The Definition of the Good Applied to Persons
(1) how can the list of primary goods be explained within the thin theory of the good?
(2) what is the objection frequently made to the application of goodness as rationality to moral worth? how
exactly will the availability of principles of justice (hence of the full theory of the good) enable Rawls to
answer this objection?
(3) what does Rawls mean by saying “developing the thin into the full theory via the original position is the
essential step” (382)?
(4) what are the two ways we might extend goodness as rationality to the case of moral worth? why is the
second the more plausible of the two?
(5) what are “broad-based properties” (382)?
(6) how does Rawls understand the virtues (383)? is this a plausible way to understand them? is it the way
Aristotle understood them?
(7) on what grounds does Rawls argue that virtues are broad-based properties?
(8) how does Rawls describe the person of moral worth? why is this description part of the full, rather than
the thin, theory of the good?
(9) how does Rawls exploit his definition of moral worth to explain good actions? supererogatory actions?
evil persons? unjust persons? bad persons? why does he think it important that the definition of moral
worth can be exploited in these ways?
67. Self-Respect, Excellences and Shame
(1) why must goodness as rationality be able to explain why self-respect is the most important of the
primary goods?
(2) what are the two aspects of self-respect?
(3) what are the two circumstances that support the first aspect of self-esteem, as those circumstances are
characterized by goodness as rationality?
(4) what is the “companion affect” to the Aristotelian principle?
(5) why might one “suppose that only in a limited association of highly gifted individuals united in the
pursuit of common, artistic, scientific or social ends is” mutual respect possible (441)? why is this
supposition mistaken?
(6) Rawls says “this democracy in judging each other’s aims is the foundation of self-respect in a wellordered society” (388). what does Rawls mean by “democracy in judging each other’s aims”? does the
remark “in public life citizens respect one another’s ends and adjudicate their political claims in ways that
also support their self-esteem” (388) qualify this form of democracy in a significant way? is this form of
democracy reasonable for a liberal society? is it reasonable, or would we be better off with some principle
of perfectionism?
(7) why does Rawls discuss the connection between self-respect and shame? (HINT: see section 40)
(8) what is natural shame?
(9) what is moral shame? how is our liability to it connected to the Kantian interpretation and the
Aristotelian principle?
5.
(10) how does shame differ from guilt? explain Rawls’s remark “Moral shame and guilt, it is clear, both
involve our relations to others and each is an expression of our acceptance of first principles of right and
justice. Nevertheless, these emotions occur within different points of view, our circumstances being seen
in contrasting ways.” (391)
68. Contrasts Between the Right and the Good
(1) why does Rawls draw “several contrasts between the right and the good”?
(2) explain the three contrasts Rawls draws.