ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
Richard Carver and Alexey Korotaev
October 2007
FOREWORD
This is the report of a study carried out by Richard Carver and Alexey Korotaev on behalf of
the UNDP Regional Centre in Bratislava. Entitled “Assessing the Effectiveness of National
Human Rights Institutions”, the project aimed to look at ways in which Ombudsman or
national human rights institutions in the former Soviet Union could develop methods to
evaluate their own effectiveness.
Much of the literature on national human rights institutions has focused on their legal
foundation, structure and powers. The question has been how to translate the legal
provisions of the Paris Principles into national legislation.
The Paris Principles – adopted by national human rights institution at an international
workshop in Paris in 1991 – have become the standard and benchmark for such institutions.
Later adopted by both the UN General Assembly and the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, they represent the minimum threshold for acceptability of a national human rights
institution. However, the Paris Principles are not merely legal benchmarks. They also set out
various characteristics and functions of national institutions that will enable them to perform
their duties more effectively. These include, for example:
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securing adequate funding;
working with non-governmental organizations;
consulting with other bodies responsible for promoting and protecting human rights;
addressing the public through the media;
establishing local or regional sections.
This is not an exhaustive list. The point is simply that the legal normative aspects of the Paris
Principles – functional independence, appointment of members, powers to compel the
production of evidence and so on – are only one aspect of what makes an effective national
human rights institution, albeit a very important one.
This study, taking the Paris Principles as its starting point, set out to look at how
Ombudsman institutions in the region might become more effective.
The method of the study was to visit three countries – Moldova, Georgia and Lithuania –
between April and August 2007. (A fourth visit was planned but had to be cancelled for
practical reasons.) The aim of the visits was both to make practical recommendations to the
institutions visited and to draw some more general observations that could be of use to
similar institutions throughout the region. What this report does, therefore, is both to draw
lessons from some of the shortcomings of the institutions visited but also – perhaps most
importantly – to use the many examples of good practice by these same institutions.
These examples, both positive and negative, are generally not identified by country or
institution in the course of this report. However, it is only proper to salute the many
achievements and praiseworthy examples offered by the three institutions visited: the
Parliamentary Advocates in Moldova, the Public Defender’s Office in Georgia, and the
Children’s Rights Ombudsman in Lithuania. These include: the innovative approaches to
consulting with NGOs in Georgia and Lithuania; the effective monitoring of prisons and
pre-trial detention centres in Moldova; the public impact of media work in Lithuania and
Georgia; and the admirable record of the Moldovan institution in constitutional litigation.
The list could be much longer.
It is also appropriate, of course, to register our appreciation of the hospitality, patience and
co-operation of the Ombudsmen and staff of these three institutions. The authors would
also like to register their thanks to the staff of UNDP, both in country offices and at the
regional centre in Bratislava, for their smooth and efficient organization of the missions and
their constant reliable support.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are nine national human rights institutions in the CIS region (in Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). There are also
Ombudsman institutions in the Baltic states. Hence all countries of the former Soviet Union,
except Belarus, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, have established such institutions. NHRIs
began to emerge almost immediately after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the
creation of the new independent states in 1991-92. They were all created between the mid1990s and 2003.
NHRIs (or ombudsman institutions) are a completely new kind of state institution
throughout the region, which has almost no historical, political or cultural roots. They were
modelled on existing institutions in Western Europe and elsewhere and, by and large,
formally correspond to the Paris Principles. Such institutions were created in a situation of a
rapid and turbulent transition from the totalitarian communist system to a more or less
democratic society with a free-market oriented economy. This explains many of the
difficulties that NHRIs in this region have faced. The main problems can be summarized as
follows:
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The status of the NHRI: NHRIs are a new and unusual kind of institution – they
belong neither to the executive nor to the judicial branch. Nor are they elected
legislative bodies either, although they are accountable to the parliament. In many
countries, the public and even the staff of the NHRIs are confused as to how to
define the status of the institution. NHRIs have to define and publicly promote their
status as a statutory but non-executive and non-judicial body with the sole task of
defending human rights;
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The role of the NHRI: These institutions emerged in countries where the established
and familiar system of authority (be they party or government structures) had almost
crumbled. Thus, the population often sees the NHRI as a substitute for old
complaints-taking bodies, such as the Communist Party committee complaints
department. As a result, NHRIs receive a huge volume of complaints not only about
violations of human rights, but also – and sometimes mainly – about violations of all
possible laws, rights and interests. Widespread corruption and a poorly functioning
judicial system only aggravate this situation. Only by educating the population about
what an Ombudsman can and cannot do, and by demonstrating the results of its
work can NHRIs win popular support and legitimacy in the eyes of society;
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The authority and place of the NHRI in the hierarchy of state bodies: As a new institution
without executive authorities or judicial powers, the NHRI is usually at the bottom
of the pecking order of state and government bodies. NHRIs by definition cannot
have executive or judicial powers, but by demonstrating the results of their work and
by winning wide public support they can improve their standing in the state
hierarchy;
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The resources available: As a rule, NHRIs in this region suffer from an acute shortage of
resources. There are clear objective reasons for this: almost all these countries are
still in a poor economic situation. But there is one more factor: governments usually
do not put needs of the NHRI at the top of their spending list. They have other
priorities: military, security and law enforcement bodies. Only wide popular support
for the NHRIs is likely to change this situation;
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“Institutional memory”: Experience in several countries of the region shows that
NHRIs face big problems related to staff turnover and, especially, regular change of
the head of the institution. As a new institution without developed tradition and
system of transferring knowledge and experience, the NHRI is in danger of
becoming dependent – perhaps fatally so – upon the drive and impact of the current
ombudsman and becomes unable to function effectively with a different leadership.
In order to avoid this problem, an institution needs to develop its own memory and
capacity.
In short, NHRIs in the CIS region are new institutions with insufficient resources working in
a very complex and often turbulent political, social and economic situation and burdened
with enormous, often quite unrealistic, expectations from society. NHRIs have to win public
support and legitimacy and to define and consolidate their status and place in the state
hierarchy. Only after achieving these goals will NHRIs be able successfully to perform their
main function: to defend and promote human rights in their countries. Improving the
effectiveness of the NHRI’s activities can significantly contribute to achieving these goals.
Of course, the efficiency of the NHRI’s activities depends significantly on the level of
development of democratic institutions and judicial system in the country. NHRI cannot
usually be much better than the general level of institutional development and effectiveness
in the country. They have to develop and improve together. But there is a complex two-way
relationship: active, consistent and efficient NHRIs can greatly contribute to the democratic
development of their country.
2. GENERAL ISSUES
Legal basis
The legal basis for the functioning of a NHRI can be provided by the Constitution of the
country and by a special (organic) law, which describes powers, functions, obligations and
procedure of appointment of the Ombudsman. It cannot be said that a NHRI definitely
must be rooted in the national Constitution. The Paris Principles state only that:
2. A national institution shall be given as broad a mandate as possible, which shall be clearly set
forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its composition and its sphere of competence.
There are diverse arrangements in various countries. For example, the functions of the
Public Defender of Georgia are briefly described in the Article 43 of the Constitution of
Georgia, while no kind of Ombudsman or national human rights institution is mentioned in
the Moldova Constitution. But current experience shows that a constitutional foundation is
very important for a newly established institution without strong historical and social-cultural
roots and especially in a country which is going through a transitional period in its
development. Such constitutional basis raises both the institution’s level of legitimacy and its
status and ensures its long-term existence. In the two biggest countries of the CIS region,
Russia and Ukraine, NHRIs are entrenched in the Constitution.
Laws governing the functioning of the NHRIs in the CIS region are quite similar and were
prepared on the basis of corresponding laws in Western Europe. They mainly use the format
of the Ombudsman office, chaired by one person. The only exception is Moldova, where the
Law on Parliamentary Advocates introduces the Centre for Human Rights (CHR) as the
NHRI and three Parliamentary Advocates who have “equal rights and responsibilities.” (Article
4). One of them serves as director of the CHR.
The structure of the Moldovan NHRI is rather unusual because the law does not say
anything about the interaction between the Parliamentary Advocates and essentially treats
them as three independent “ombudsmen”. Only the Charter of the CHR states that “On the
joint decision of the Parliamentary Advocates they can specialize in different areas of law while resolving
complaints” (Item 16). But there is no procedure for taking such decisions. In a sense, this
arrangement is a kind of intermediate form between two more strictly determined structures:
one ombudsman or a collective body, such as a commission, with a clearly defined hierarchy,
procedures and responsibilities.
There is also the issue of the title of Ombudsman. In all CIS countries except Moldova, the
title mentions human rights, or defence of rights: Human Rights Defender (Armenia), Public
Defender (Georgia), Human Rights Commissioner (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia),
Ombudsman (Kyrgyzstan), etc. Only in Moldova three “ombudspersons” have the
somewhat unclear title of the Parliamentary Advocate. Taking into account the novelty of
this institution and the necessity to educate the population about it and win public support,
the issue of the title can become quite serious.
CHR staff members and outsiders told us that the Parliamentary Advocates title is unclear
and confusing, even misleading. As a result, a significant part of the Moldovan population
thinks that Parliamentary Advocates are lawyers defending the parliament and its members.
And the Centre for Human Rights is often perceived as a non-government organization
because it is a typical NGO name.
Nomination and election
Usually, a new ombudsman is elected by a majority vote in the national parliament (a
majority of all elected members of parliament in Moldova and Georgia, or a constitutional
majority – two-thirds of elected members – in Russia and elsewhere). Candidates must be
citizen of the country with varying requirements relating to age, place of residence and
education. For example, there is a mandatory requirement for “higher legal education” in
Moldova but nothing about the educational level of the candidate in Georgia (or in Russia
and Ukraine).
Although the requirement for higher education of the candidate might be reasonable, it is
not clear why “higher legal education” should be obligatory. Good knowledge of human
rights and experience of work in the area of human rights protection can be at least as
important as legal education for an effective Ombudsman. And the requirement for higher
legal education can unduly restrict the pool of eligible candidates, which can be important
for the countries lacking experienced human rights activists.
Candidates can usually be nominated by the President of Republic or by a group of members
of parliament (or by the government in the case of Moldova). In Lithuania candidates are
nominated by the chairman of the Seimas (parliament). While this procedure is standard, its
openness and transparency depend on how vigorously the parliament exercises independent
oversight of the candidates. But we were told, for example, in Moldova, that in practice there
is almost no transparency in selection of the candidates and no competition during their
approval by the parliament. Usually there is only one set of candidates, which is more or less
automatically approved by the parliament.
Another issue is participation of civil society representatives in this process. While we were
told by Georgian and Lithuanian NGOs that they have no problems in accessing friendly
parliamentarians with their comments and proposals, in our opinion, this is again a case of
absence of clear rules of procedure. It would be advisable for each country to develop some
transparent and widely known procedure for:
1) primary nomination of candidates with mandatory participation of various groups
of civil society like trade unions and NGOs;
2) public scrutiny of candidates and
3) competitive selection and approval of candidates by the parliament.
Powers
The laws in Moldova, Georgia and Lithuania give Ombudsman institutions quite wide
powers, including the right to consider complaints about decisions, actions or omissions by
central and local public authorities, public or private organizations, institutions and
enterprises irrespective of their type of ownership, public associations and officials at all
levels. Ombudsmen can visit any administrative office, institution or organization, including
penitentiary and military institutions and police offices and request explanation and
information from officials at all levels.
Very important is a power to review national legislation and to refer cases to the
Constitutional Court, which are closely related. NHRIs regularly review new proposed
legislative bills related to human rights issues and send their comments to the parliament.
Unfortunately, they lack resources to undertake a systematic review of all existing national
legislation to determine its consistency with human rights standards. Such a review or audit
of existing legislation would be very useful and it could be planned to fit in with the overall
priorities of the institution.
There is also the important issue of legislative initiative. NHRIs in Georgia and Moldova do
not have the right of legislative initiative as such but can refer their legislative proposals and
comments to the parliamentary committees. But in practice, as we were told by the CHR
staff in Moldova, this provision does not work because there is no parliamentary procedure
for receiving proposals from the CHR. And while this informal mechanism seems to work in
Georgia, it is again a case of absence of formal rules of procedure. In our opinion, some
formal procedures should be developed by the national parliaments to provide the NHRIs
with the possibility of presenting their legislative proposals.
But the most serious complaint that we have heard in Moldova and Georgia refers to the
practical absence of effective legal mechanisms for ensuring a response to the Ombudsman’s
recommendations or requests for information. While in both countries the law on the NHRI
creates an offence of interfering with or impeding activities of the ombudsman, they do not
list any specific punishment and simply refers to “relevant legislation”. In practice, as we
were told in both countries, the institution has almost no means of compelling the
authorities to respond to its recommendations or to provide requested information. This
appears to be a problem for practically most NHRIs in the region. In order to solve this
problem it would be necessary to amend the law on NHRI and several other relevant laws
and, which is even harder, to change the established judicial practice.
3. ISSUES
3.1. Planning and a systemic approach to human rights
National human rights institutions of all descriptions face a common problem: there are
massive (and unrealistic) expectations facing them and limited resources, both human and
material, with which to meet these expectations. This – over and above many other good
reasons – is why planning is so vital for such institutions.
An additional problem for institutions that handle complaints is the danger that dealing with
the potentially overwhelming mass of public petitions will make it impossible for the
institution to set its own priorities.
However, it is precisely this constant pressure of responding to complaints from the public
that makes the setting of priorities such a vital aspect of the work of national human rights
institutions. The most effective institutions are almost invariably those that determine their
own priorities on the basis of an evaluation of the most important human rights issues to be
addressed in their own country. This general observation was strongly reinforced through
our study of the working of Ombudsman institutions in Eastern Europe.
Complaints handling is seen as a vital part of the work of Ombudsman institutions and for
the individual client this is, without question, extremely important. However, resolving an
individual complaint should be less of a priority than addressing the root causes of the most
important human rights issues.
Some institutions use the complaints that they receive as a way of determining what are the
most important human rights issues that need to be tackled in a systemic fashion. One
institution has a rule that if a matter is complained about three times, then it is regarded as a
“problem” – an issue where root causes have to be addressed in order that there is no
recurrence of complaints.
The complaints that an institution receives are, without doubt, an important indication of
what are the most important human rights issues. Sometimes these issues will be the same
ones that generate the most complaints, but this is not always so. Certain types of issue are
almost most likely to generate the most complaints and certain sectors of society are more
likely to complain than others. Residents of closed institutions, especially prisoners, always
tend to generate the most complaints – and not only because prisoners have the most to
complain about. Prisoners inevitably spend a large part of their time trying to better their
conditions, or even to get released. They tend to make use of any avenue of complaint.
In the ideal world where national human rights institutions had endless resources to address
all human rights issues, the question of prioritization of the most important issues might
perhaps be less important. But the reality is that such institutions always need to make hard
choices about where they will allocate their resources. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say
that the aim of an Ombudsman institution should be to reduce the number of complaints
that they receive – a reduction in complaints should be seen as a sign that human rights
problems are being tackled at their roots.
Two of the institutions that we studied had made strong choices of priority issues, in each
case coinciding with the appointment of a new Ombudsman. The aim was to tackle human
rights issues systemically – that is to say, to get to the roots of the problem. But it also entails
tackling them systematically – that is, through various different dimensions. The approach
works like this…
The institution identifies, say, the fight against torture as a priority issue. This may, perhaps,
be because there are many complaints relating to torture, but this need not be so – perhaps it
is just that torture is seen as the most important threat to human rights. This will then be
addressed across the whole range of activities of the institution. This might include:
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international relations – signature or ratification of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention Against Torture, for example.
legislative reform – strengthening the prohibition on torture in domestic law, for
example by advocating a provision excluding the admissibility of evidence gathered
through torture.
public campaigning – mobilizing popular sentiment against torture and in favour of
reforms.
monitoring – increasing visits to closed institutions in order to monitor (and thereby
prevent) incidences of torture.
training – ensuring that officials responsible for arrest, interrogation and custody of
prisoners understand the prohibition on torture and are equipped with alternative
means of treating prisoners without resorting to abusive methods.
Of course, the institution will continue at the same time to respond to individual complaints
of torture – which are likely to grow with increased publicity on the issue.
Identifying priority issues and working in this systemic fashion places demands upon the
planning process. The choice of certain issues implies a downgrading of others.
The planning process in the institutions that we visited was organized in different ways.
However, from the institutions’ practice – both good and bad – it was possible to draw up
several guidelines for how to conduct this process best:
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Planning should not be a purely internal matter – it will be done more effectively if
other stakeholders are involved.
Planning is not just a matter for senior management – planning will work most
effectively if all the staff are involved.
Planning will also be most effective if it builds in methods for assessing whether the
objectives of the plan have been achieved.
Involving others in the plan
We look later at the general importance of involving other stakeholders in the work of an
Ombudsman. National human rights institutions exist at a unique intersection between state
bodies and civil society. They have statutory functions and powers, yet largely exist outside
the conventional framework of governmental institutions. One of the reasons why they are
endowed with these unique characteristics – as explicitly mentioned in the Paris Principles –
is that they draw strength from their collaboration with both state and civil society.
It follows that this collaboration should be a continuing process. It is not simply a matter of
attending an NGO meeting or sitting on a committee with officials of a government
ministry. NHRIs work most effectively when they involve their partners in the planning
process. One of the institutions that we visited held annual consultations with government
and civil society stakeholders as part of its planning process. We felt that it was not
coincidental that this institution was highly effective.
Of course, ultimately all decisions to do with planning work must be taken independently by
the Ombudsman institution itself. The institution is not an adjunct of either government or
the NGO human rights movement. However, if these other bodies are involved in the
planning process, not only will the discussion be richer, but also they will be more inclined to
collaborate in the implementation of planned activities.
Involving the staff
Equally important is the full involvement of the staff in the planning process. There are two
particular reasons why this is so. First, the staff are those with the experience of the
institution’s work – dealing with complainants, monitoring respect for human rights,
working to promote rights and reform law and policy. This experience is essential to the
planning process. Second, it is the staff who will be required to carry out the planned
activities. They will be more motivated and do this more effectively if they are fully involved
in planning.
We observed varying experiences of Ombudsman institutions in this regard. Some involved
staff fully in the planning process, while others did not. Our observation was that where staff
were more thoroughly involved, they were more effectively motivated in carrying our
planned activities.
Building in indicators of effectiveness
It is a good practice to spend time during the planning process developing indicators that
will allow the institution to evaluate whether the elements of its plan have been effectively
implemented.
What are commonly referred to as “performance indicators” usually include three types of
indicators:
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Indicators of output.
Indicators of performance.
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Indicators of impact.1
The first of these are the easiest to develop, since they flow naturally out of the work of the
institution. Examples of output indicators would include the number of complaints handled,
the number of press releases published and so on. This information is useful, but its value is
limited. It should also be stressed that this sort of quantitative indicator needs to be
interpreted correctly in order to have any value.
Output indicators are limited in their use, however. Indeed, they can become dangerous. The
tendency is for such indicators to become targets, whether or not they are explicitly described
as such. This creates the danger that they become “perverse incentives” – that is, they
encourage staff to do things that are not in the interest of the institution.2
Indicators of performance are intended to tell the institution how well it is doing its job –
not simply how many complaints it handles, but how well it handles them, for example. Such
indicators are more likely to be qualitative than quantitative. For example, complainants may
be asked if they are satisfied with the way in which their complaint has been handled.
Although this is a qualitative judgment, it can nevertheless be aggregated (for example, x per
cent were satisfied with the handling of their complaint).3
Indicators of impact are much more difficult to collect and evaluate. First, it would be
necessary to collect data on the human rights situation (something that the Ombudsman
institutions generally do anyway in the course of their monitoring work). But then it would
be necessary to show a causal link between the work of the institution – campaigning against
torture, for example – and an improvement in the human rights situation in the world
outside. Usually it is impossible to make the connection with any certainty. However, a
qualitative evaluation that concentrated on the targets of the institution’s work – police
officers or prison officials, for example – might be able to gather further information that
would help to answer the question.
Best of all is if the process of devising indicators is a participatory one. That is to say that
those stakeholders in the institution who are involved in the planning process should also be
invited to give their suggestions on how to assess whether the planned programme of
activities has had the envisaged impact.
It is not recommended that the Ombudsman institutions, which are already busy and underresourced, should undertake lengthy and costly self-evaluation exercises. They should be a
1
For a full discussion see Carver, R. (2005). Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights
Institutions. Geneva, International Council on Human Rights Policy. See also Audit Commission. (2000).
Aiming to improve: the principles of performance measurement. London.
2
The classic example of the perverse incentive is the (possibly apocryphal) company that instructed its
telephonists that all incoming calls were to be transferred within five seconds. In meeting this target the
company experienced a sudden increase in calls put through to the wrong extension. In other words, the target
had been met, but in so doing a new problem had been created. In the context of a national human rights
institution, a comparable example might be the creation of tight time limits for complaints handling –
complaints would be addressed quickly, but perhaps not always satisfactorily.
3
Appendix 1 gives an example of how to evaluate data from complaints.
way of helping the institution be more effective, not an additional burden. However, we
recommend that if indicators of output, performance and, where possible, impact are built in
at the planning stage this may help the institution. In any event, it should be axiomatic that any
plan of activity should contain within it a means of determining whether its aims have been
achieved.
3.2. Finance
The shadow looming over all national human rights institutions is the shortage of funds.
Very often Ombudsmen responded to suggestions with remarks to the effect that they
would love to adopt new suggestions, but there was the problem of money…
In some instances the situation has actually got worse with the passage of time. National
institutions have been kick-started into existence with external donor funds, only for
budgetary responsibility to be handed over to the national authorities after a few years. This
point usually marks a slump in the institution’s fortunes and, in at least one instance, has
been followed by an exodus of experienced staff.
Ultimately this problem is out of the institution’s hands. NHRIs are funded out of the
national budget, approved by parliament. Given their status as statutory bodies this is right
and proper. It will be important for the Ombudsman, along with their allies in parliament
and civil society, to fight for the largest possible share. The budget allocation to human
rights should be a clear sign of a government’s commitment to rights protection.
It is particularly important, for example, that the level of staff salary should be kept
competitive. No one does human rights work in order to make their fortune – the private
sector will always be more attractive if that is the aim. But NHRIs should be able to pay at a
level that will encourage staff to stay rather than to drift into other public sector jobs or
NGOs.
However, while the core budget of the institution will be provided by the nation, this is no
reason not to supplement this by fundraising in order to cover operational costs. This is a
delicate issue. If external donors fund too large a portion of the operational budget, there
will be a tendency by government to trim their contribution. The leaders of national
institutions will have to use political judgment, as well as skilled financial management, to
navigate these problems.
We noted that there were varying levels of experience and skills in external fundraising.
Operational budgets are an integral part of the planning process and preparing project
proposals for donors is an essential skill for NHRI managers.
3.3. Staff development and training
The efficiency of any institution depends in large measure on the expertise, experience and
commitment of its staff. While we were greatly impressed by the commitment and quality of
the staff in the institutions we visited, in some instances we saw some problems related to
the training of the staff members and particularly the issue of how to retain their experience
in order to develop and maintain an “institutional memory”.
NHRIs are a new type of institution in all countries of the region. When they began their
activities there were no people educated and experienced in this type of work. Thus, all staff
members of the newly created NHRIs had to learn by doing, with little initial guidance from
superiors who were as inexperienced as they. As a rule, new NHRIs in the region were
created with help from UNDP, other UN agencies and international organizations, from
foreign donors and from ombudsman institutions in other countries. The first rounds of
training of the NHRI’s staff were carried out with support and experts from these
organisations. Then there emerged the problem of the “institutional memory”: how to
preserve and further develop staff skills and experience during the life of organization.
There are various reasons why this institutional memory can be threatened. In one case, as
noted, after an initial period external donors stopped their full support of the new NHRI
and it began to be funded from the national budget. Salaries went down sharply and many
trained and experienced staff members left. In another case, several changes of heads of the
NHRI resulted in almost complete renewal of the staff. And the relatively low level of
salaries in the NHRIs will usually contribute to a high turnover of staff.
Most NHRIs have programmes of staff training and induction for new staff. But these are
not always sufficient. We would make two observations in particular. First, there were often
no detailed manuals setting out procedures for basic functions of the institution, two of the
most obvious being handling of complaints and visiting prisons and other places of
detention. The forms in use for visiting various types of closed institutions appeared on
occasion to be well-designed. Use of these forms would undoubtedly assist new staff.
However, not all information required by an inexperienced or new staff member can be
gleaned from a form. We felt that the formulation of procedural manuals would be of use
both as a basis for induction of new staff and for reference by those who had already
completed training. Compilation of such manuals would not be an onerous task. The
process would allow a review (and therefore probably an improvement) of procedures.
Manuals could be in a loose-leaf format that would allow for constant updating.
Second, it seems inevitable that the problem of high staff turnover will continue, since it is
largely out of the hands of the NHRI itself. Also, we believe that it is necessary to place
greater emphasis on continuous training of staff. Given this, we would suggest that the
NHRIs have to try to increase their in-house training capacity. This could be achieved by
using external facilitators primarily in order to carry out training of trainers in order to
maintain expertise within the institution. We recognize that this is not foolproof – trainers
themselves will move on, of course – but with sufficient investment of time it will avoid
some of the worst effects of high staff turnover.
The development of personal training programmes for individual staff members could have
two positive effects. One would be to motivate staff, possibly encouraging them to stay with
the institution by underlining the progress they have made and setting targets for further
development. The other, assuming the individual training programmes are coordinated,
would be to ensure fairness in access to training, which again would be good for staff
morale, as well as effectiveness.
3.4. Complaints handling
Dealing with complaints from members of the public is an important part of the work of
any Ombudsman institution. Although it is true that the most effective institutions tackle
human rights issues in a systemic manner – thereby hoping to reduce the numbers of
complaints in particular areas – the reality tends to be that the greater the success of the
institution, the more rapidly the number of complaints increases.
All the institutions that we visited had seen an increase in complaints in recent years –
particularly marked in some instances when the present incumbent took office and raised the
public profile of the institution. All the institutions devoted a considerable amount of staff
time and effort to complaints handling and, without exception, we concluded that they did
an effective job. In particular we noted that all institutions had some system for following up
their recommendations, to ensure that the authority complained against was obliged to
respond to the decision of the Ombudsman. Although the Ombudsman has no direct power
of enforcement, it is vital that a case is kept open so that the final outcome can be
monitored. If necessary the Ombudsman will have to intervene further – often with legal
powers – to ensure that the relevant authority gives a response.
In practice, the institutions that we visited appeared to have few problems in investigating
complaints. Although all had legal powers to compel the appearance of witnesses and the
production of evidence, actually utilizing these powers was a rare occurrence.
However, an area of weakness shared by all the institutions that we visited – to a greater or
lesser extent – lay in the recording of information relating to complaints. Most institutions
tend to use data derived from the complaints process to help broader analysis of both the
general human rights situation and the impact of the institution itself. Yet we noted that the
process of gathering such information tended to be inconsistent and, even when carried out
correctly, often unnecessarily time-consuming.
In all instances the process of complaints-handling and subsequent data analysis could be
improved by more systematic record-keeping. Ideally an Ombudsman institution would
make use of specially designed complaints-handling software. But even in the absence of
this, existing procedures could usually be improved by two simple steps.
First, institutions could design a simple complaints form that would contain all the
information required at any stage of the process. This need not be a form that is completed
by the complainant – it could simply be the record completed by the official handling the
complaint. Too often we encountered institutions that kept several different records
containing information relating to the same case.
Typically a form would include all the obvious personal information about the complainant,
details of the complaint and, often, the means by which the complaint was lodged (in
writing, by telephone, in person etc). In addition the form may contain fields that would
allow the progress of the case to be recorded (setting necessary deadlines, recording official
responses etc). And, very importantly, the form should contain in consistent, coded format
all information that might be the basis of subsequent statistical analysis. This might include
the classification of the complaint by type, social or demographic information about the
complainant, classification of the body complained against, the geographical location of the
complaint or complainant, and so on.
Second, institutions are strongly advised to develop complaints handling databases. As noted,
it is clearly preferable if these consist of dedicated complaints-handling software. But if this
is not available, then a serviceable database can be made using readily available commercial
database software, such as Microsoft Access. The database should be networked, so access is
available from any computer, allowing the official responsible to update the record promptly.
Of vital importance is that the fields on the database correspond precisely to those on the
form. In other words, there should be one single record of each complaint.
This procedure means that information can be kept permanently up-to-date on a single
database with access available to all those responsible for case-handling. Generating
statistical information – as well as tracking complaints – will be an instant process,
eliminating much of the unnecessary transferring and reprocessing of data that takes place in
many institutions at present. Needless to add, systematic procedures should be employed for
the security of the database and for regular back-ups.
Two other suggestions may be added on complaints handling.
First, some institutions did not have procedural manuals for handling complaints. This is
part of a more general point – the existence of manuals helping staff to carry out the key
functions of the institution are a means of training news staff and ensuring a smooth
turnover. This is of particular importance in the area of complaints handling, where precise
observation of procedure – often paid down by law – is extremely important.
Second, no institution visited carried out any review of client satisfaction. Such a system
could be instituted with very little cost or effort. All that is required is an anonymous form
that could be completed by complainants once their complaint has been resolved.
3.5. Visiting closed institutions
Most Ombudsman institutions in Eastern Europe have a mandate to visit closed institutions,
often including prisons, pre-trial detention centres, closed mental hospitals and homes for
the elderly and children. In most instances this mandate is accompanied by powers that
allow the Ombudsman to carry out its mandate effectively.
The greatest problem faced by Ombudsmen in the region in carrying out this part of their
mandate is a simple one: there are simply too many institutions to be visited and not enough
staff (or hours in the day) to visit all regularly. This poses a genuine dilemma: should the aim
be to visit as many institutions as possible, or to focus on just a few – either a particular type
of institution or those where there appear to be particular problems. Each choice raises its
own problems. Any attempt to be comprehensive will mean that visits are infrequent and
may allow serious deterioration of standards between visits. Yet a focus on specific
institutions will mean that others escape scrutiny altogether. There is simply no easy answer
to this choice.
In practice most Ombudsmen in the region seem to choose an option that seems something
like a middle way. They focus their attention on those places that seem to have the greatest
problems, at the same time as conveying the impression that their coverage of closed
institutions is reasonably comprehensive. We did not actually visit closed institutions to
gather the views of the potential beneficiaries of Ombudsmen’s work. Yet we formed the
strong impression that the coverage and impact of the visiting programmes was positive.
We noted a number of distinct issues that arose in some or all of the institutions we visited.
First, in some countries several different agencies carry out visits of closed institutions (some
also, like the Ombudsman, receiving complaints from inmates). Our impression was that
there was considerable duplication of effort when this happened. Given the problem of
shortage of resources, it would be far preferable to draw up a memorandum of
understanding between the different visiting bodies in order to ensure the widest possible
coverage.
Another issue that arose was that often the legal power to visit closed institutions was vested
solely with the Ombudsman himself, not with the staff of the national human rights
institution. This had led in some instances to staff being refused access to prisons when the
Ombudsman was not present. Given the difficulty of coverage, we strongly recommend that
the power of Ombudsman to visit should be delegated to senior staff. In some instances this
may require a change in the law; otherwise, simply a memorandum of understanding
between the Ombudsman and the closed institutions that are subject to visits.
Thirdly, visiting closed institutions, more than any other aspect of the Ombudsman’s work,
demands a systematic approach. There needs to be consistency of approach in all institutions
visited and regular follow-up of issues that have been signalled on previous visits. In this
area, as with complaints-handling, it is essential to develop clear procedures that are
accessible to all relevant staff.
3.6. OPCAT
Currently, seven countries of the former Soviet Union - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine – have ratified or signed the Optional Protocol
to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT). It can be expected that some other
countries of this region will follow in the foreseeable future. All countries joining OPCAT
have to decide how they will form a National Preventive Mechanism (NPM). While there is
not yet any really working model of NPM in the region, some general observations and
recommendations can be made.
The guide to creating National Preventive Mechanisms produced by the Association for the
Prevention of Torture makes the following recommendations in this respect:



States can choose either to designate an existing mechanism or to create an entirely
new mechanism. Neither model is universally inherently better than the other.
Civil society must be included in the process of deciding whether to use an existing
or create a new mechanism.
Before designating an existing institution, the government and civil society must
carefully and exhaustive [sic] review its mandate, jurisdiction, independence, powers
and guarantees, to ensure that it fully complies with OPCAT requirements, make any
necessary legislative amendments and provide any increase in resources required.4
We believe that these recommendations are very relevant in the context of interaction
between the national human rights institutions and the National Preventive Mechanisms.
The field of activities and scope of responsibilities of the NHRI and NPM are inherently and
unavoidably overlapping. Most NHRIs are involved in monitoring places of detention,
torture prevention and investigation. For many of them it is a central area of their activity.
Thus, it would be perverse to establish a new, completely separate mechanism, especially
taking into account the shortage of material and human resources typical of this region.
It is understandable then that many governments are prompted simply to charge the existing
NHRI with the responsibilities of the NPM. Such a model is convenient, requires fewer
resources and avoids creating some new state body with a subsequent change of
responsibilities and authorities of existing bodies. It can be also favourable for the NHRI,
especially a new one, because it raises its status and profile and provides additional resources
for its work.
However, there are some arguments against this model. They can be summarized as follows:
-
the addition of such a large and specialized area of work can upset the balance of the
NHRI’s activities and can be detrimental to its other important functions (especially,
if government does not provide sufficient resources for additional work);
-
unfortunately there can be situations when the government, due to inevitable critical
comments and requests from the NHRI, views it suspiciously or even regards it as a
political enemy. Then government, of course, is reluctant to give the NHRI new
responsibilities and to boost its status.
In this case, another model can be practical and useful. This entails an umbrella body
(council, etc.), which would include representatives of all relevant government bodies as well
as NHRI and civil society. This body can be chaired by the head of the NHRI (ombudsman)
and it should use resources and experience of the NHRI as a base of its activity. It can also
have several subordinate thematic/local bodies (commissions) in charge of monitoring
prisons, police establishments, military detention units, children’s homes, psychiatric
institutions, and homes for the elderly.
4
Association for the Prevention of Torture, Establishment and Designation of National Preventive Mechanisms,
Geneva, 2006, p. 88. See Appendix 4.
We believe that this model, while not making the NPM an integral part of the NHRI, makes
full use of the existing resources, experience and strengths of the NHRI in the area of
monitoring of places of detention. It also allows the NPM to cover all existing places of
detention, which is not always possible for many NHRIs.
We would conclude that there is no doubt that the national human rights institution should
play a role in the National Preventive Mechanism. However, we believe that a decision to
adopt one or another model of interaction between the NHRI and the NPM should be
taken with two provisos:


Civil society organizations, including human rights NGOs, should be assigned a
formal role within the governance and work of the National Preventive Mechanism.
An adequate and sufficient resources should be provided either to NHRI or to any
new body to fulfill the functions of the NPM.
4. RELATIONS WITH OTHER ACTORS
4.1. Government and state bodies
National human rights institutions depend for their effectiveness on developing and
maintaining good working relations with governmental bodies. Although they should have
legal powers to compel the co-operation of the various authorities that they deal with, in
practice these powers may be difficult to use. In any case, it would be impossible to invoke
legal sanction repeatedly on a day-to-day basis and still function effectively.
The problem is that government bodies are, naturally, inherently defensive when they fear
that they are being criticized. At the same time, the role of the Ombudsman is often not
sufficiently well understood and there is the danger of an adversarial relationship developing.
We encountered a wide variety of attitudes in the countries we visited. Some officials had a
fruitful and positive relationship with the Ombudsman, even when there were differences of
opinion. Others appeared much less co-operative, or even obstructive.
One particularly noteworthy observation was that in all the countries we visited relations
between the NHRI and the police and prison authorities were friendly and constructive. This
is probably attributable to two factors. One is that on the side of the police and prison
authorities there had been education of senior personnel in the standards that are expected
of them in a new democratic dispensation. They generally seem prepared to regard the
Ombudsman as someone who could help them to meet these standards. Second, from the
NHRI side, there was a general willingness to be collaborative and constructive. The result
was that when criticisms were made – or when public complaints submitted – the authorities
were more inclined to respond in an equally constructive manner.
Relations with the military establishments are not so easy. The army traditionally is one of
the most closed institutions in all the post-Soviet countries. Improvement of the human
rights situation in the army will depend on the success of serious military reform and the
NHRIs can significantly contribute to it.
A more problematic institution generally appears to be the prosecutorial authorities. In
different countries we discerned tense relations with prosecutors. There are perhaps a couple
of reasons for this. One might be the historic role of the prosecutor and the slow
transformation that has taken place. Another, more structural reason is that the Ombudsman
usually has a dual relationship with the prosecutor: on the one hand the prosecutorial
authority will in some cases act as the implementing agency on the Ombudsman’s behalf,
taking cases to court. On the other, the prosecutor may also be the recipient of complaints in
its function as supervisor of the investigation of cases. This dual relationship sometimes
creates problems.
There is no easy answer to this situation. As with the police and prison authorities, the
Ombudsman would do well to develop a collaborative relationship. Also, the utmost
professionalism in the preparation of complaints submitted to the prosecutor will convince
the latter that the national human rights institution is a serious body that deserves respect.
In all the countries we visited, the Ombudsman institution appeared to enjoy friendly and
fruitful relations with the parliamentary committees responsible for rights, to whom they are
answerable. One problem, however, is that the process of reviewing the regular reports from
the Ombudsman – annually or six-monthly – is often a rather cursory one. The process of
reporting is an important part of the accountability of a national human rights institution. It
also creates a considerable burden of work – we heard several complaints from staff about
the time they had to devote to this function. Parliaments should be prepared to devote
greater time to discussing these reports, which relate not only to the work of the institution
but to the overall human rights situation in the country. There is also generally low media
interest in these reports; greater parliamentary interest might serve to convince journalists
that the process of human rights reporting is worthy of greater public attention.
4.2. Judiciary
Judicial institutions are one of the most important partners of the NHRIs. There appeared to
be good and fruitful relations between NHRIs and the Constitutional Courts. This was
particularly marked in Moldova. Between 1999 and 2006, the Parliamentary Advocates
submitted 51 letters to the Constitutional Court. To date, the court has ruled on 20 of these
cases, finding completely in favour of the Parliamentary Advocates on nine occasions and
partly in favour of the Parliamentary Advocates on three occasions.
More strained are sometimes relations with the other parts of the judicial system, though
both sides always stress the importance of their interaction. We heard many complaints from
the NHRIs that courts do not take seriously enough their requests and recommendations
and do not use fully and efficiently existing laws to punish those who impede activities of the
NHRI.
From the other side, judges often do not feel comfortable when the NHRI makes a public
statement against some court decision or sentence. As an extreme example, one senior judge
told us that he “does not approve excessive publicity of the NHRI work” and even thinks
that the “unsubstantial” criticisms of individual judges will “discredit all national judicial
system”. Partly it can be explained by the fact that the judicial system is inherently very
conservative and cannot easily accept a new institution that to some extent encroaches upon
its prerogatives.
It is a delicate issue because both actors – NHRI and judicial system – and their cooperation
are very important for the democratic development of any country in the region.
Shortcomings of the judicial system in all countries of the CIS region are well known but
improvement of this system and raising the level of public respect to it are the cornerstone
for any development. We would recommend NHRIs to take this into account and to be very
careful with any, especially public, accusations against judges and courts and to provide for
the highest level of their factual and legal validity.
4.3. NGOs
Permanent contact and interaction between the NHRI and civil society is a precondition for
the success of the NHRI’s activities. The activities of a statutory body and nongovernmental organizations can be complementary, given their different roles and functions.
In addition, they can pool their resources and collaborate.
There is usually a fair amount of collaboration and consultation between Ombudsman
institutions and NGOs in the region. There are regular exchanges of information, as well as
invitations to attend events, such as seminars, and sometimes collaboration in joint projects.
Usually, however, these relations are almost entirely informal. It would be helpful to create
some more formal procedure for regular consultation with a wide range of national NGOs
and other civil society actors (like trade unions and professional associations). This could
take the form of an advisory council to the NHRI. We believe that the ombudsman has a
unique potential in comparison with all other state bodies to attract civil society actors to
participate. Such a council would be a useful tool to help formulate common positions of
civil society on the human rights situation in the country and to help the NHRI to develop a
strategic programme of proactive measures.
In fact, a model of more formal structure for regular contacts and interactions with some
specific segments of the civil society already exists within the framework of the Georgian
Public Defender’s Office. Two such structures were established in 2005-2006 by the
Tolerance Centre: the National Council of Ethnic Minorities (comprised of some 80 NGOs
from all over Georgia) and the Council of Religions, which includes representatives of 23
religious denominations functioning in the territory of Georgia (except the Georgian
Orthodox church and the Jehovah’s Witnesses). They meet every two to three months with
various thematic working groups meeting weekly. There is also a Monitoring Council for
Psychiatric Hospitals under the Patients’ Right Centre, which, we were told, includes
representatives of most NGOs working in this area.
An example of the potential impact of such bodies was the work of the national council of
ethnic minorities in developing a set of recommendations for the Georgian government
bodies on implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, which entered into force in Georgia on 1 April 2006. These recommendations,
we were told, were met with interest by the representatives of the relevant state bodies and
are now under consideration by them.
In Lithuania, the Children’s Rights Ombudsman has a different model for collaborating with
NGOs, also regarded as highly effective from both the NGO side and from the national
institution itself, There, NGOs are involved directly in the planning process, attending
annual meetings with the Ombudsman – and with state and other bodies – to make
recommendations on the institution’s priorities and activities.
4.4. Treaty body reporting
One important area of interaction of the NHRI with many other governmental bodies and
with civil society is participation in the process of reporting to treaty bodies. General
responsibility for preparation of the national reports to the UN treaty bodies lies usually with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). There are usually several experienced and mature
NGOs in each country which are capable of preparing shadow (alternative) reports to
human rights treaty bodies.
For the most part, the institutions we visited were not actively involved in preparing either
the governmental or shadow reports. We were told that the MFA, while preparing the
national reports to some treaty bodies, sometimes sent requests for information to the
NHRI. But there is generally no established practice for the NHRI to have a say in
preparation of the government reports or presenting its comments on the final drafts of
such reports.
Generally, participation in a process of preparation and public discussion of the country’s
periodic reports to the UN treaty bodies is an important function of a national human rights
institution. Of course, there are some risks in too close involvement of the NHRI in
preparation of the reports to the treaty bodies. After all, these are government reports and
the NHRI is an independent human rights watchdog that should not be perceived as a part
of the government machinery. From the other side, its involvement in the preparation of the
critical shadow reports can alienate the NHRI from the government and give the governing
political elite some grounds to consider the NRHI as a part of the political opposition. This
is, unfortunately, always a danger for the active and independent NHRI in the CIS region
countries.
Nevertheless we believe that there are parts of the process of the treaty bodies reporting
where participation of the NHRI is not only advisable and helpful but critical for achieving
the real goals of this process. The Paris Principles envisage such an involvement as one of
the core functions of national institutions. NHRIs should “contribute to the reports which
States are required to submit… and, where necessary, to express an opinion on the subject,
with due respect for their independence.”
We would recommend that the NHRIs participate in the analysis of the final drafts of the
national reports to the treaty bodies and present their comments to the MFA. But their most
important role should be in initiating and facilitating a wide public discussion of these
reports and, especially, a consideration of the treaty bodies’ concluding observations and
recommendations and ways of implementing these in their countries.
5. PUBLIC PROFILE
Developing a strong public profile is a vital part of the process of making a national human
rights institution effective. Such institutions rest to a very large degree upon their public
legitimacy, which in turn is strongly influenced by the profile and reputation that they enjoy.
This derives largely, although not exclusively, from the picture presented of the institution in
the mass media.
We saw sharply contrasting experiences of work with the media. Some institutions have
clearly been far more effective than others in communicating their messages to the public
and this has usually been reflected in the level of public knowledge of and trust in the
institution. However, there were certain respects in which all the institutions visited could
improve their communications work.
Some institutions clearly suffer from a low public profile. This may flow from inexperience
on the part of the Ombudsman in dealing with the media; typically the heads of national
human rights institutions are lawyers without much practical experience of media work. We
observed situations where Ombudsmen were not readily available for media inquiries at
short notice; nor did they understand the sort of issue that interested the media. The heavy
workload that Ombudsmen face may be a factor, along with a shortage of available resources
to recruit media specialists.
On the other hand, there were other institutions that made extensive use of the media.
Ombudsmen were readily available for comment and there was a good understanding on
their part of media interests and requirements. These institutions tended to have a far higher
public profile and hence a much broader base of public support. It might be added that
these same institutions tend to be those with a strongly proactive, systemic approach to
human rights issues.
However, even those institutions that made greater use of the media tended towards an
unplanned and unsystematic approach to their communications work. In one instance an
institution operated a policy of being largely responsive, addressing whatever issues the
media wanted for information about. The advantage of this approach is that the institution
maximizes the quantity of coverage it receives by only providing material that is of interest to
the journalists – the coverage is largely driven by the media themselves. This has clearly
yielded enormous advantages in terms of the public profile of the institution and the
generally high regard in which it is held.
On the other hand, the disadvantage is that the institution itself is unable to shape the media
agenda. It does not have control over what issues are covered. Although in practice this may
not have led to many opportunities for coverage being missed, it is not hard to hypothesize
that there may be instances when the institution is unable to convey the message that it
chooses, on the issues of its choice.
Another institution – also with a very high media profile – has taken an opposite approach.
It issues a very large number of press releases – almost one for every day of the year. The
effect of this, paradoxically, is almost the same as the institution that adopts a responsive
approach. So many statements are issued that it again rests with the media to choose which
ones they report.
For all these institutions a more effective use of the media would be an approach that was
selective and pro-active. That is, the institution would choose the relatively small number
issues where it wanted to promote media coverage and would produce materials that would
encourage and assist journalists to do so.
In all instances, the best way of systematizing an approach to the public will be through a
communications plan. Communications planning will naturally be tied in to the overall
planning process, since the priorities in communications will largely correspond to the
strategic priorities of the institution and the most important human rights issues.
The process of communications planning starts from an identification of strengths and
weaknesses, as well as the principal messages that the institution seeks to convey to which
audiences. From these coordinates a communications strategy is developed. Within that,
various specific communications tactics can be identified. Appendix 2 contains a more
detailed outline of the process of communications planning.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are a list of select recommendations aimed only at national human rights
institutions themselves. Clearly there are many other suggestions that could be made to other
agencies that would enhance the effective functioning of NHRIs – increasing their funding,
or their legal powers, for example. However, our purpose was to concentrate on practical
steps that institutions could take on their own, without great cost or the need for external
support.
It is recommended that all institutions develop a strategic plan, as well as plans of
action for specific activities. This should aim to strengthen its focus on important
human rights issues in a systemic and systematic manner. It should incorporate selfevaluation mechanisms into its plans (namely indicators of output, performance and
impact).
It is recommended that the planning process involve the staff of the institution, as
well as key external stakeholders.
It is recommended that institutions also develop a communications plan. Among
other things this would allow the institution to use its already high profile in the
mass media in a more strategic manner.
It is recommended that institutions develop procedural manuals for all of their
activities, in particular complaints handling (including verification of complaints)
and monitoring (including visiting closed institutions). These manuals would
provide a basis for induction of new staff and continuous training of existing staff.
It is recommended that institutions explore how to increase their own in-house
training capacity through “training of trainer” programmes.
It is recommended that institutions consider introducing personal training plans for
staff, tailored to meeting their specific needs and encouraging career development
within the institution.
It is recommended that institutions develop a standard complaints form that would
include all essential information abut a complainant and the issue complained of.
This form should be combined with a new database for complaints handling –
preferably, but not necessarily, made with dedicated complaints-handling software.
It is recommended that an anonymous client satisfaction form be distributed to all
complainants to be completed voluntarily. The findings would be analysed with a
view to improving complaints handling procedures.
It is recommended that institutions establish a permanent body for regular
consultation with NGOs on pressing human rights issues and ways of addressing
them. This would allow joint planning of activities and an effective exchange of
information and division of labour within the human rights community.
It is recommended that institutions consider a joint model for an OPCAT National
Preventive Mechanism, involving the NHRI and non-governmental organizations
APPENDIX 1: ANALYSING STATISTICS OF COMPLAINTS
National human rights institutions commonly keep detailed records of complaints they
receive. Though it is often suspected that complaint handling is measured merely because it
is easily measurable, useful statistics can be gathered:





Total numbers of complaints: Compared year by year this may indicate the public profile
of the national institution or show deterioration or improvement in the human rights
situation.
Breakdown of complaints by type: This may reveal the more widespread human rights
violations – or just the issues which the public feels can be resolved through NHRIs.
Breakdown of complaints by body complained against: This may reveal which institutions
have the worst record – or merely where complainants were most hopeful of
achieving a result.
Breakdown of complaints by complainant: Complainants can be characterised by gender,
social or ethnic origin, language, place of residence and so on. Complaint patterns
can reveal who are most vulnerable to human rights abuses, or possibly those whom
the NHRI is reaching successfully.
Tracking of complaints by outcome: Many national institutions report resolution rates and
duration of cases. This information can help them to evaluate their performance.
Nevertheless, the figures should be handled with care: a speedy resolution is not
necessarily a satisfactory one. Compliance with the NHRI’s recommendations is a
more important measure, though less frequently gathered.
Raw statistics are only the starting point for evaluating impact. Institutions should
supplement them with qualitative analysis. Opinion surveys need to ascertain whether the
process for handling complaints was efficient, rigorous and sensitive to the complainant’s
needs.
(Adapted from Richard Carver, Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions,
International Council on Human Rights Policy, Geneva, 2005.)
APPENDIX 2: DEVELOPING A COMMUNICATIONS PLAN
The temptation in planning communications is always to do it in reverse order, starting with
the well-tested techniques – press releases, news conferences etc – rather than with the
overall objectives, messages and audience. This is tempting, but dangerous. Organisations
(not just national human rights institutions) stick with what is familiar and easy for them.
This may not necessarily be the most means to communicate their messages to the required
audience.
There are, of course, different approaches to communications planning. That developed by
the Institute for Media, Politics and Civil Society is a particularly good one.5 But all effective
approaches are likely to have the following steps in common (in more or less this order):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Analysing your own strengths and weaknesses.
Defining your message.
Defining your audience.
Developing a media strategy.
Developing techniques of media relations.
1. A credible and effective communications plan will be based upon a realistic assessment of
the strengths and weaknesses of the NHRI. These strengths and weaknesses will obviously
include the attributes and resources of the NHRI itself. Is it well funded? Does it have a
trained and experienced press office?
Just as important, however, is an evaluation of how the NHRI is perceived in the world
outside. Does it have a high public profile? Is it trusted by the public? By the media? Is it
perceived as professional and competent? Is it seen as being independent of the government
of the day? These are all important questions that should be answered honestly. If there are
negative perceptions of the NHRI these need to be addressed. Any communications plan
will need to include strategies for dispelling mistrust.
2. People planning a communications strategy are usually advised to define a clear and simple
message, reducible to a single slogan. This works for many organizations, from a company
selling a product to a group lobbying for policy change. A NHRI, by contrast, has a large
number of different messages that it needs to communicate to different audiences at
different times.
3. Defining the audience is an essential step in developing a communications plan. For a
NHRI, this might seem too obvious to need doing: the audience is the population, of course.
However, there are three reasons in particular why defining the audience is indispensable:

5
In practice many institutions do not follow the logic of tailoring their
communications strategy to their audience. Instead they take the easiest
http://www.impacs.org/files/CommCentre/communications_planning.pdf
opportunities to communicate their message through the media without considering
whether they are really reaching the people they want to speak to.

There are in fact a number of different audiences for a national human rights
institution. For example: government officials, members of parliament, police and
penitentiary officials, non-governmental organizations, as well as the general
population.

The general population is not a single undifferentiated mass. Breaking it down into
its component parts will help NHRIs to devise the different messages that are
required by these different sections and identify the different media that should be
used.
4. When a NHRI has identified its audiences, as well as the messages that it wishes to
communicate to each of these, it is then ready to devise a strategy for its media work.
A strategy is something concrete. It is determined by the particular strengths and weaknesses
of the NHRI, as well as by the particular characteristics of the media and the human rights
environment. A NHRI’s media strategy will vary enormously, for example, depending on the
degree of public confidence in the institution itself and whether its independence and
effectiveness is likely to be the subject of criticism.
For example, one particular institution evolved a strategy (based on a SWOT analysis) that
was, as far as possible, proactive. That is, the institution would strive to convey its messages
at the time and through the media of its choosing, rather than reacting to external events or
media inquiries. Not only was this seen as a better way of communicating its chosen
messages; it was also more cost-effective, because it allowed media materials to be prepared
in advance. This would allow the commission to use its small staff most effectively:
preparing proactive material during periods of low media interest and being available to react
to media inquiries during busy periods.
This strategy took advantage of the strengths and opportunities available to the institution.
However, it was not dictated by these. It was directed towards conveying its chosen
messages to a carefully identified audience. In this case, most people did not read
newspapers and could not afford television. Hence the offer of columns in newspapers was
less important to the strategy than the use of radio production facilities.
The strategy should not be confused with the various techniques or tactics that an institution
might use to get its message across. This is not the best point in the planning process for the
institution to decide how many news releases it is going to issue, or who is going to speak at
press conferences. These are questions that can be resolved when the strategy is decided
upon.
5. The techniques of media relations that a NHRI can use are mostly well known: media
briefings, press releases, briefing packs, websites and so on. It is important, however, to
emphasize three points about developing and using such techniques:

First, the techniques of media relations are subordinate to the communications
strategy than an institution has developed. This strategy is fashioned to the messages
that need to be communicated and the audiences that need to receive the messages.
The strategy can be seriously subverted if inappropriate techniques are chosen.

Second, while NHRIs need to have the capacity to react quickly to events, most
techniques of media relations can be prepared in advance and their use planned
carefully.

Third, wherever possible media relations should be handled by a specialist
department (or, failing that, by a specialist media officer, preferably with experience
of working as a journalist).
(Adapted from Richard Carver, “Developing a communications plan”, ACE Project, Media
and Elections. http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/me.)
APPENDIX 3: INTEGRATING INDICATORS INTO THE PLANNING
PROCESS
The planning process should include the identification of indicators that will allow the
institution to measure output, efficiency and impact.
The mechanism that some national institutions already use to do this is the logical
framework analysis, commonly known as “logframe” or LFA. This is widely used largely
because it is favoured by many funding agencies, which require grantees to apply this
methodology. Its advantage is that it integrates the definition and measurement of indicators
into the planning process. Its disadvantage, according to many users, is that it can be
mechanical and inflexible.
Typically a LFA is expressed in tabular form, like this6:
Intervention
logic
Goal or general
objective
Purpose
or
specific objective
Outputs
What will be
achieved by the
activities
(cell
below) that will
enable the purpose
(cell above) to be
achieved
Activities
The activities that
will produce the
outputs
(cell
above) provided
that you have the
inputs shown (cell
on the right)
6
Objective
verifiable
indicators
What
indicator
will show that
your project has
contributed to the
goal?
What
indicator
will show that you
have
achieved
your
specific
objective?
What
indicator
will show that the
outputs have been
produced?
Means
verification
of Assumptions
Inputs
List the resources
(and costs) that
you will need in
order to produce
the activities (cell
on the left)
Where will you find
the
information
showing that the
activities have been
carried out?
Where will you find
that information?
Where will you find What key factors
that information?
must hold true for
the purpose to
contribute to the
goal?
Where will you find What key factors
that information?
must hold true for
the outputs to
result
in
the
achievement
of
the purpose?
What key factors
must hold true to
enable
the
activities
and
inputs to produce
the outputs?
This example is adapted from Firoze Manji, Proposals that make a difference, Fahamu, Oxford, 1998.
Whatever the shortcomings of the logframe approach, its usefulness is immediately apparent
if the aim is to devise indicators of organisational impact or effectiveness. The table above
distinguishes between three different sets of indicators:
Indicators of organisational output.
Indicators that the purpose has been achieved.
Indicators that the overall goal has been achieved.
The value of looking at indicators in this manner is that it requires the institution to make a
series of logical steps that require it to determine that its planned activities are actually likely
to achieve its objectives and to develop indicators to determine both whether the activities
have taken place and whether they have had the impact that they were supposed to have.
The way that this works becomes clear if we look at the order in which the cells of the table
should be completed. The temptation is always to start at the activities and outputs (or, if it
is part of a funding proposal, at the inputs). Yet the most effective order is the following
one:
Intervention
logic
Goal
1
Purpose
2
Outputs
3
Activities
4
Objective
verifiable
indicators
Means
of Assumptions
verification
13
14
11
12
7
9
Inputs
15
10
6
8
5
The logic is to begin by defining the broadest goals and to work ‘backwards’ to define
specific purposes, or interim goals. Only then are the necessary activities and outputs
explored. The next step is to examine a series of assumptions on which the effectiveness of
the activities and outputs are premised. These assumptions are simple, practical
preconditions. For example, if the activity is a series of training workshops in provincial
capitals, one of the assumptions might be that trainees are able to travel from their homes to
the place where the workshop is being held. If such assumptions cannot be relied upon, it
might be necessary to devise additional activities (providing transport in this example).
The next step is to devise indicators that will measure whether the activities result in the
intended outputs, whether the outputs will achieve the purpose intended, and whether this
will contribute towards the overall goal.
The following is an example of how a LFA table might be completed for a programme to
train prison officers to respect human rights standards.
Intervention
logic
Goal
(1)
Prison
officers to treat
inmates
in
accordance with
international
human
rights
standards
Purpose
(2) Create a
nucleus
of
prison officers
trained
in
human
rights
standards
Objective
verifiable
indicators
(13) Decline in (14) Regular
cases of abuse prison
against prisoners
inspections,
interviewing
prisoners and
prison officers
(11)
Continued
familiarity
with
relevant
human
rights standards
Outputs
(3) 250 prison (9)
Completed
officers
who evaluation forms
have completed
training course
Activities
(4) 15 regional
training
workshops
Means
of Assumptions
verification
Inputs
(15)
Venues,
transport, trainers,
training material,
etc
(12) On-site
evaluation six
months after
completion of
training
(7)
Participants
are respected
officials who
can influence
broader
behaviour in
prison service
(10)
Forms
collected at the
end of the
workshops
(6) Attendance
of
openminded,
motivated
officials
(8) Attendance
of
national
institution
officials
at
workshops
(5)
Cooperation of
prison
authorities to
allow
attendance of
officers
This example illustrates the hierarchy of indicators. The lowest level of indicator is simply
the number of workshops organised or the number of officials who attended. This is a
measurement of output. Some additional qualitative character can be given to this indicator
by the use of evaluation forms (a practice already widely used by national institutions in their
training activities).
The next level of indicator is to demonstrate that the purpose of the training has been
achieved – creating a nucleus of prison officials trained in human rights standards. This is to
be achieved by an evaluation that revisits the trainees in their workplace six months after
they attended the training course.
The final level of indicator seeks to measure how this newly created nucleus of trained
prison officers contribute to (a better) respect for human rights in the prisons. The problem
of linking the organisational outputs – the trained officers – to the final goal still remains, of
course.
In practice, the national institution would use a variety of measures of its own impact. It
would use quantitative measures such as the number of reported instances of ill-treatment or
abuse. These could be derived from complaints received by the institution itself, reports by
the prison service and by other organizations monitoring prison conditions (such as human
rights NGOs) or cases before the courts. Of course, these indicators in themselves would
tell nothing about the impact of the institution’s own work on the general behaviour of
prison officers. Qualitative evaluation could potentially do this: interviews with prisoners and
prison officers, discussions with other organizations working on the same issue and so on.
They may show whether positive developments were linked to that training, as well as other
factors that might have led to improvements: training by other agencies, improved internal
monitoring by the prison service, an increase in the number of staff, etc. It would also seek
to determine whether abuse and ill-treatment were caused by ignorance and poor training of
prison officers or by some other factor (although one would hope that this issue might have
been addressed when the training programme was first under consideration). Perhaps, for
example, there was a deliberate policy of ill-treatment on the part of a section of the prison
management – something that training officers could address, albeit with difficulties.
This latter type of issue is an example of the most common evaluation problem that national
institutions are likely to face. After all, it is seldom that they will undertake activities that are
actively harmful. Training prison officers in human rights standards can hardly be a bad
thing – but is it actually relevant in addressing the most immediate problems faced by
prisoners?
APPENDIX 4: OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTIONS AS NATIONAL PREVENTIVE
MECHANISMS
As with national human rights commissions, Ombudsman and Public Defender’s Offices
often already enjoy good guarantees of independence, particularly when their mandate is
grounded in the country’s constitution or a long constitutional tradition.
The degree to which Ombudsman or Public Defender’s Offices may already have experience
with systematic preventive visits will vary. Such offices may be more accustomed to reacting
to and acting on individual complaints, or focussing on a particular countrywide issue in a
given year and then moving on to new issues in subsequent years. As with national human
rights com- missions, prior experience visiting complainants in prisons to document or
investigate individual complaints does not necessarily translate into adequate preparation to
undertake ongoing systematic preventive visits.
As with national human rights commissions, the likelihood that an Ombudsman or Public
Defender’s office designated as an NPM will be forced simultaneously to carry out
“constructive dialogue” preventive visits, and to advocate particular cases arising out of such
visits, can present problems. These may be less severe than in the case of a national human
rights commission that potentially has the authority to actually adjudicate such complaints,
but nevertheless may require internal restructuring of the office to ensure separation of
functions.
Like national human rights commissions, Ombudsman and Public Defender’s offices often
have an extremely broad mandate. They will rarely already have sufficient financial and
human resources to properly undertake an OPCAT-compliant system of preventive visits.
States designating such an office as the sole NPM will generally need to allocate additional
resources.
The nature of the office often means that there is ultimately a single official (often a lawyer)
who is the decision-maker; it is inherently difficult to achieve the full range of necessary
professional qualifications for members of an NPM if there is only one “member”. Of
course, the Ombudsman or Public Defender may be supported by a relatively large and
diverse staff, but again particular areas of necessary expertise are often missing (e.g. medical
expertise). In any event, it is always preferable that the members of the NPM themselves
have a range of relevant expertise, rather than relying on expert staff or periodically
hiring outside experts, as this tends to improve the quality and impact of recommendations.
The approach mandated to Ombudsman’s offices, and the scope of their power to make
recommendations, varies from country to country. As was noted earlier, the OPCAT
requires that the NPM approach its work with the aim of improving conditions of detention
and protecting persons in a practical or “policy” sense rather than an assessment of “legality”
or “fairness” per se. While some issues of a “legal” nature will arise, particularly in terms of
procedural and legal safeguards, these are only part of a much wider array of aspects to be
examined and objectives to be achieved. Many of the issues that will arise in the work of
most NPMs will instead be questions of “policy” or questions of a technical nature.
Institutions that traditionally have been charged with a “legalistic” mandate – i.e.
determining whether specific administrative action complied with proper administrative
procedure or standards of fairness – may thus find it difficult to take on the
“policy”/technical approach of OPCAT. This could include commenting on government or
parliamentary “policy” choices, and potentially proposing that the legislature pass, amend, or
repeal laws.
Detainees and staff in places of detention may also find it confusing to have an institution
that has an established approach or role of a more legalistic kind now taking different
approaches and assuming different roles under OPCAT. Again, as there is a great deal of
variation between States in terms of the history, legal context, and working approach of
Ombudsman’s offices, these concerns may or may not apply in a given country.
(Excerpted from: Association for the Prevention of Torture, Establishment and Designation of
National Preventive Mechanisms, Geneva, 2006, pp 83-4.)